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| issue date = 02/01/2013
| issue date = 02/01/2013
| title = IR 05000424-12-005 & 05000425-12-005, 10/01/2012 - 12/31/2012, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Post-Maintenance Testing, Identification and Resolution of Problems
| title = IR 05000424-12-005 & 05000425-12-005, 10/01/2012 - 12/31/2012, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Post-Maintenance Testing, Identification and Resolution of Problems
| author name = Ehrhardt F J
| author name = Ehrhardt F
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
| addressee name = Tynan T E
| addressee name = Tynan T
| addressee affiliation = Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Inc
| addressee affiliation = Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Inc
| docket = 05000424, 05000425
| docket = 05000424, 05000425
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 51
| page count = 51
}}
}}
See also: [[followed by::IR 05000424/2012005]]
See also: [[see also::IR 05000424/2012005]]


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter: UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 February 1, 2013   Mr. Tom E. Tynan  
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
Vice President - Vogtle  
                                NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  
                                              REGION II
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant  
                            245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
7821 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830
                                    ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257
SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2012005 AND 05000425/2012005 Dear Mr. Tynan:
                                          February 1, 2013
On December 31, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an  
Mr. Tom E. Tynan
inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated  
Vice President - Vogtle
inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on January 11, 2013, with you and other members of your staff.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.  
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed  
7821 River Road
personnel. Three self-revealing findings of very low safety significance (Green) were identified during this inspection. These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. Two licensee-identified violations which were determined to be of very low safety significance are listed in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Waynesboro, GA 30830
If you contest these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this  
SUBJECT:         VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:  
                REPORT 05000424/2012005 AND 05000425/2012005
Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional  
Dear Mr. Tynan:
Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.  
On December 31, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated
If you disagree with the cross-cutting aspects assigned in this report, you should provide a  
inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on January 11,
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.
2013, with you and other members of your staff.
T. Tynan 2 
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
In accordance with the 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS).  ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
Sincerely,        /RA/  Frank Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
Division of Reactor Projects 
personnel.
Docket Nos.: 05000424, 05000425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81   
Three self-revealing findings of very low safety significance (Green) were identified during this
Enclosures:  Inspection Report 05000424/2012005 and 05000425/2012005 w/Attachment:  Supplemental Information
inspection. These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. Two
cc w/encl: (See page 3) 
licensee-identified violations which were determined to be of very low safety significance are
T. Tynan 2 
listed in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs)
In accordance with the 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS).  ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Sincerely,        /RA/  Frank Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2
If you contest these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this
Division of Reactor Projects 
inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Docket Nos.: 05000424, 05000425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81   
Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional
Enclosures:  Inspection Report 05000424/2012005 and 05000425/2012005 w/Attachment:  Supplemental Information
Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory
cc w/encl: (See page 3) 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Vogtle
Electric Generating Plant.
If you disagree with the cross-cutting aspects assigned in this report, you should provide a
  X PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G SENSITIVE X NON-SENSITIVE ADAMS: G Yes ACCESSION NUMBER:_________________________  X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE G FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS SIGNATURE Via email Via email Via email Via email Via email Via email Via email NAME MCain TChandler BCaballero ANielsen CDykes WPursley JLaughlin DATE 01/25/2013 02/31/2013 01/25/2013 01/28/2013 01/28/2013 01/29/2013 01/28/2013 E-MAIL COPY?    YES NO      YES NO      YES NO      YES NO      YES NO      YES NO      YES NO    OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP      SIGNATURE MOM /RA/ FJE /RA/      NAME MMiller FEhrhardt      DATE 01/20/2013 02/01/2013 2/      /2013 2/      /2013 2/      /2013 2/      /2013 2/      /2013 E-MAIL COPY?    YES NO      YES NO      YES NO      YES NO      YES NO      YES NO      YES NO    OFFICIAL RECORD COPY          DOCUMENT NAME:  G:\DRPII\RPB2\VOGTLE\REPORTS\2012\2012-005\VOGTLE 2012005.DOCX 
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your
T. Tynan 3 
disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the
cc w/encl: C. Russ Dedrickson Fleet Support Supervisor
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
S. Kuczynski Chairman, President and CEO Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
Todd L. Youngblood Vice President Fleet Oversight
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
W. L. Bargeron Plant Manager
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
D. G. Bost Chief Nuclear Officer
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
N. J. Stringfellow Licensing Manager
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
Paula Marino Vice President Engineering
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
T. A. Lynch Vice President
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
Arthur H. Domby, Esq. Troutman Sanders
Electronic Mail Distribution
Dennis R. Madison Vice President Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
Leigh Perry SVP & General Counsel-Ops & SNC Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
T. E. Tynan Site Vice President Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
M. J. Ajluni Nuclear Licensing Director
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
B. D. McKinney, Jr. Regulatory Response Manager Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
D. W. Daughhetee Licensing Engineer Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
Bradley J. Adams
Vice President Fleet Operations Support Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
T. D. Honeycutt Regulatory Response Supervisor Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
(cc/w enclosure continued next page)
   
T. Tynan 4 
(cc w/encl continued)  L. P. Hill
Licensing Supervisor
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
L. L. Crumpton Administrative Assistant, Sr.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
Hickox, T. Mark Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Mark Rauckhorst Site Vice President Vogtle Units 3 and 4
Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
S. C. Swanson Site Support Manager Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Jerry Ranalli Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Power
Electronic Mail Distribution
Sandra Threatt, Manager
Nuclear Response and Emergency Environmental Surveillance Bureau of Land and Waste Management
Department of Health and Environmental 
Control
Electronic Mail Distribution  Division of Radiological Health
TN Dept. of Environment & Conservation
401 Church Street
Nashville, TN  37243-1532
Office of the Attorney General 40 Capitol Square, SW
Atlanta, GA  30334
Richard Haynes Director, Division of Waste Management Bureau of Land and Waste Management
S.C. Department of Health and
Environmental Control
2600 Bull Street
Columbia, SC  29201  Lee Foley
Manager of Contracts Generation
Oglethorpe Power Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution  Mark Williams
Commissioner
Georgia Department of Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution  Chuck Mueller
Manager
Policy and Radiation Program
Georgia Department of Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution  Cynthia A. Sanders
Radioactive Materials Program Manager
Environmental Protection Division
Georgia Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution 
James C. Hardeman
Environmental Radiation Program Manager
Environmental Protection Division
Georgia Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution 
Mr. Steven M. Jackson
Senior Engineer - Power Supply
Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Electronic Mail Distribution 
Reece McAlister
Executive Secretary
Georgia Public Service Commission
Electronic Mail Distribution  (cc w/encl continued next page)
 
T. Tynan 5 
(cc w/encl continued)  Office of the County Commissioner
Burke County Commission
Electronic Mail Distribution
Director Consumers' Utility Counsel Division Governor's Office of Consumer Affairs
2 M. L. King, Jr. Drive
Plaza Level East; Suite 356
Atlanta, GA  30334-4600  Amy Whaley
Resident Manager
Electronic Mail Distribution
 
T. Tynan 6 
Letter to Tom E. Tynan from Frank Ehrhardt dated February 1, 2013  SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2012005 AND 05000425/2012005 
Distribution w/encl: C. Evans, RII  L. Douglas, RII  OE Mail 
RIDSNRRDIRS
PUBLIC
RidsNrrPMVogtle Resource 
Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  REGION II 
  Docket Nos.:  50-424, 50-425    License Nos.:    NPF-68, NPF-81 
  Report Nos.:  05000424/2012005 and 05000425/2012005 
  Licensee:  Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  (SNC) 
  Facility:  Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2    Location:  Waynesboro, GA 30830 
  Dates:  October 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012 
  Inspectors:  M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector  T. Chandler, Resident Inspector  B. Caballero, Senior Operations Engineer        A. Nielsen Senior Health Physicist C. Dykes Health Physicist  W. Pursley Health Physicist  J. Laughlin Emergency Preparedness Inspector    R. Williams Reactor Inspector
  A. Vargas-Mendez Reactor Inspector  Approved by:  Frank Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects 
  Enclosure SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  IR 05000424/2012-005, 05000425/2012-005; 10/01/2012 - 12/31/2012; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Post-Maintenance Testing, Identification and Resolution
of Problems  The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspectors.  Three
non-cited violations (NCVs) with very low safety significance (Green) were identified.  The significance of inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e., great than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC)
0609, "Significance Determination Process" dated June 19, 2012.  Cross-cutting aspects
are determined using IMC 0310, "Components Within The Cross-Cutting Areas" dated
October 28, 2011.  All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy dated June 7, 2012.  The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process" revision 3.
Cornerstone:  Mitigating Systems  Green:  A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) for failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" was
identified for failure to provide adequate work instructions in the maintenance procedure
used to modify 480V EMAX safety-related switchgear breakers.  Specifically, when modifying the breaker by adding a higher amperage closing coil, failure to verify the proper placement of the wire bundle on top of the closing coil following replacement resulted in the safety-related 2A NSW cooling tower fan #3 480V EMAX breaker failing
to close when demanded.  The licensee replaced the failed breaker and returned the fan
to operable status within 21.5 hours. 
The finding was more than minor because it impacted the reactor safety mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and affected the cornerstone attribute of equipment performance.  Since the inspectors
answered "No" to all of the IMC 0609.04 (dated June 19, 2012) Exhibit 2, section A,
questions 1-4, mitigating systems cornerstone screening questions, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).  The cause of this finding was related to the corrective action program component of the problem
identification and resolution cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate problem
evaluation. [P.1(c)]  Specifically, the licensees' extent of cause evaluations performed on previous 480V EMAX breaker failures (caused by restricted movement of the close lever) did not identify the potential of the closing coil wire bundle to interfere with the proper movement of the close lever.  The licensee's corrective action to the 480V EMAX breaker issue was to revise the maintenance procedure used to perform maintenance on
EMAX breakers (procedure 28480-C, 480V EMAX Breaker Maintenance), and then
inspect all 480V EMAX breakers on site that had been modified with the higher
amperage closing coil to verify that the wire bundles were not interfering with the operation of the close coil.  The licensee entered this into their corrective action program as CR 549999 and CR 550736. (Section 1R19)
3  Enclosure Cornerstone:  Initiating Events  Green:  A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) for failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" was
identified for failure to provide adequate work instructions in the operations and
maintenance procedures used to open main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) that were bound in their closed seat.  Specifically, the operations and maintenance procedures used to open the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard MSIVs did not provide instructions to limit the magnitude of the force applied to the valve stems while attempting to open the
valves, which ultimately resulted in the brittle failure of the valve stems.  The licensee conducted ultrasonic testing of the remaining six Unit 1 MSIVs to verify that the valve
stems were intact.  The two failed valve stems were replaced, and the reactor was restarted nine days later. 
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality
attribute of the reactor safety - initiating events cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.  Specifically, the failure to provide adequate work instructions to operations and
maintenance personnel resulted in the failure of both the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard
MSIVs and the subsequent manual reactor trip.  Since the inspectors answered "no" to
the Exhibit 1, section B, initiating events screening question, the inspectors concluded
that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).  The cause of the finding was related to the work control component of the human performance cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate work planning. [H.3(a)]  Specifically, the licensees'
procedures used to open the MSIVs that were stuck on their closed seat did not contain
instructions or precautions to limit the magnitude of the force applied to the valve stems while attempting to open the valves.  The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 530916. (Section 4OA2) 
Cornerstone:  Occupational Radiation Safety 
Green:  The inspectors identified a Green, self-revealing, Non-cited Violation of technical specification 5.7.1, "High Radiation Area", for an unauthorized entry into a High Radiation Area (HRA).  A maintenance worker entered a HRA in Unit 1 containment without being briefed on the radiological conditions.  The licensee entered this issue into
their corrective action program as CR 523976 and took immediate corrective actions including an outage work crew stand down.  This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the occupational radiation safety cornerstone attribute of human performance and adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from
exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor
operation.  The finding was evaluated using the occupational radiation safety
significance determination process.  The finding was not related to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) planning, nor did it involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not
compromised.  Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety 
4  Enclosure significance (Green).  This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance, work practices [H.4.b] because the HRA event was a direct result of poor communications during the pre-job briefing and a lack of procedure adherence on the
part of the maintenance worker.  The licensee entered this issue into the Corrective
Action Program (CAP) as CR 523976.  (Section 2RS1) 
Violations of very low safety significance that were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the inspectors.  Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program.  These violations and the corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.   
Enclosure REPORT DETAILS  Summary of Plant Status  Unit 1 started the report period shutdown for a planned refueling outage.  The licensee
conducted a reactor startup on October 8; however the licensee shutdown unit 1 later
that day due to issues with two main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).  The licensee restarted unit 1 on October 17 and attained full rated thermal power (RTP) power on
October 21.  Unit 1 operated at essentially full RTP for the remainder of the inspection period. 
Unit 2 operated at essentially full RTP for the entire inspection period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY  Cornerstones:  Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity 
1R01  Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)  .1 Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions 
  a.  Inspection Scope 
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the station's adverse weather procedures
written for extreme low temperatures.  The inspectors verified that weather related equipment deficiencies identified during the previous year had been corrected prior to the onset of seasonal extremes.  The inspectors evaluated the licensee's
implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures before the onset of seasonal extreme weather conditions.  Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.  The inspectors evaluated the following risk-significant systems:  * Unit 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) system (both trains) * Unit 2 nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) system (both trains)    b. Findings  No findings were identified.  .2 Impending Adverse Weather Conditions     
a.  Inspection Scope  The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparations to protect risk-significant systems from predicted severe weather conditions of sub-freezing temperatures expected on December 21, 2012.  The inspectors evaluated the licensee's implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures, including operator
staffing, before the onset of and during the adverse weather conditions.  The inspectors 
6  Enclosure reviewed the licensee's plans to address the ramifications of potentially lasting effects that may result from sub-freezing temperatures.  The inspectors verified that operator actions specified in the licensee's adverse weather procedure maintained readiness of
essential systems.  The inspectors verified that required surveillances were current, or
were scheduled and completed, if practical, before the onset of anticipated adverse
weather conditions.  The inspectors also verified the licensee implemented periodic
equipment walk-downs or other measures to ensure that the condition of plant equipment met operability requirements.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.   
  b. Findings  No findings were identified.  1R04  Equipment Alignment (71111.04) 
.1 Partial Walkdown  The inspectors verified that critical portions of selected risk-significant systems were
correctly aligned.  The inspectors selected systems for assessment because they were a redundant or backup system/train, were important for mitigating risk for the current plant
conditions, had been recently realigned, or were a single-train system.  The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures and drawings.  The inspectors verified that critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned by performing partial walkdowns.  Document reviewed are listed in the Attachment.  The
inspectors selected the following three systems/trains to inspect:  * Diesel-driven fire water pump #2, the motor-driven firewater pump, and the associated yard piping system while the diesel-driven firewater pump # 1 was out of service for a scheduled maintenance outage * Unit 1 train B containment spray (CS) system while the Unit 1 train A CS system was out of service due to a planned maintenance outage. * Unit 1 train B residual heat removal (RHR) system    b. Findings  No findings were identified.
.2 Complete Walkdown    a.  Inspection Scope 
The inspectors verified the alignment of the Unit 1 A train residual heat removal (RHR)
system.  The inspectors selected this system for assessment because it is a risk-
significant mitigating system.  The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures, drawings, the updated final safety analysis report, and other documents.  In order to identify any deficiencies that could affect the ability of the system to perform its function(s), the inspectors reviewed records related to outstanding design 
7  Enclosure issues and maintenance work requests.  The inspectors verified that the selected system was correctly aligned by performing a complete walk down of accessible components. 
To verify the licensee was identifying and resolving equipment alignment discrepancies, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents, including condition reports and
outstanding work orders, as well as periodic reports containing information on the status
of risk-significant systems, including maintenance rule reports and system health reports.  Document reviewed are listed in the Attachment.   
  b. Findings  No findings were identified.  1R05  Fire Protection (71111.05AQ) 
  a.  Inspection Scope      Quarterly Inspection  The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of selected fire plans by comparing the fire plans
to the defined hazards and defense-in-depth features specified in the fire protection
program.  In evaluating the fire plans, the inspectors assessed the following items:     
(1) control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, (2) fire detection systems, (3) water-based fire suppression systems, (4) gaseous fire suppression systems, (5) manual firefighting equipment and capability (6) passive fire protection features, (7)
compensatory measures and fire watches, and (8) issues related to fire protection
contained in the licensee's corrective action program.  The inspectors toured the
following five fire areas to assess material condition and operational status of fire protection equipment.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.  * Unit 1 north and south main steam valve room, fire zones 99, 104 and 45  * Unit 2 control building level B east penetration areas (zones 62, 63 and 82) and west penetration areas (zones 60, 61, and 64) * Unit 1A and 1B nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) pump rooms, fire zones 160A and 160B * Unit 1 A, B, C, and D class 1E 125 VDC station batteries and associated switchgear rooms, fire zones 71, 76, 77A, 77B, 78A, 78B, 79A, 79B, 56A, 56B, 83, and 152 * Unit 2 A, B, C, and D class 1E 125 VDC station batteries and associated switchgear rooms, fire zones 71, 76, 77A, 77B, 78A, 78B, 79A, 79B, 56A, 56B, 83, and 152     
  b. Findings  No findings were identified.     
8  Enclosure 1R06  Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)  .1 Internal Flooding  The inspectors reviewed related flood analysis documents and walked down the areas listed below that contain risk significant structures, systems, and components susceptible to flooding.  The inspectors verified plant design features and plant procedures for flood mitigation were consistent with design requirements and internal flooding analysis assumptions.  The inspectors also assessed the condition of flood
protection barriers and drain systems.  In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee
was identifying and properly addressing issues using their corrective action program.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.  * Unit 2 residual heat removal (RHR) and containment spray (CS) pump rooms    b. Findings  No findings were identified.  .2 Underground Cables   
  a.  Inspection Scope  The inspectors reviewed related flood analysis documents and inspected the areas listed below that contain cables whose failure could disable risk significant equipment.  The inspector directly observed the condition of cables and cable support structures and, as
applicable, verified that dewatering devices and drainage systems were functioning
properly.  In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee was identifying and properly
addressing issues using their corrective action program.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.  * Cable Pull Boxes:  1NE7ADKEM40, 1NE7ADKEM39, 1NE9GHKEPB01    b. Findings  No findings were identified. 
1R07  Heat Sink Performance (71111.07) 
.1 Annual Review    a.  Inspection Scope  The inspectors verified the readiness and availability of the Unit 1 emergency diesel
generator (EDG) jacket water (JW) heat exchanger to perform its design function by observing performance tests or reviewing reports of those tests, verifying the licensee uses the periodic maintenance method outlined in Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water 
9  Enclosure System Problems Affecting Safety Related Equipment," observing the licensee's heat exchanger inspections and verifying critical operating parameters through direct observation or by reviewing operating data.  Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee had entered any significant heat exchanger performance problems into their corrective action program and that the licensee's corrective actions were appropriate. 
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
    b. Findings  No findings were identified. 
1R11  Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)  .1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification 
  a.  Inspection Scope  The inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario administered to an operating crew conducted in accordance with the licensee's accredited requalification training
program.  The inspectors assessed licensed operator performance, the ability of the
licensee to administer the scenario and evaluate the operators, the quality of any post-
scenario critique, any follow-up actions taken by the facility licensee, and the
performance of the simulator.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.    b. Findings  No findings were identified.  .2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (Licensed Operator Performance):    The inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room on
October 8, during the reactor startup following the 1R17 refueling outage.  Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.  Inspectors observed licensed operator
performance to assess the following:  * Use of plant procedures * Control board manipulations  * Communications between crew members  * Use and interpretation of instruments, indications, and alarms * Use of human error prevention techniques  * Documentation of activities  * Management and supervision      b. Findings  No findings were identified. 
10  Enclosure .3 Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results (71111.11A)      a.  Inspection Scope 
On November 29, 2012, the licensee completed administering the annual requalification
operating test and biennial written examination, which is required to be administered to
all licensed operators in accordance with 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2).  The inspectors performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating tests and the crew simulator operating tests.  These results were compared to the thresholds
established in Manual Chapter 609, Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human
Performance Significance Determination Process.    b. Findings  No findings were identified. 
1R12  Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)    a.  Inspection Scope  The inspectors assessed the licensee's treatment of the issues listed below in order to
verify the licensee appropriately addressed equipment problems within the scope of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65).  The inspectors reviewed procedures and records in order to evaluate the licensee's identification, assessment, and characterization of the problems as well as their corrective actions for returning the equipment to a satisfactory
condition.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.  The inspectors also
interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule coordinator to assess the accuracy of performance deficiencies and extent of condition.  * Unit 2, 2PV3000 main steam atmospheric relief valve (ARV) exceeded MR performance criteria for maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs) * Unit 1, 1HV8702A B train RHR pump hot leg suction valve failed to open when demanded from the control room. 
  b. Findings No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)    a. Inspection Scope  The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify the licensee
assessed and managed plant risk as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee procedures.  The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensee's risk assessments and implementation of risk management actions.  The inspectors also verified that the
licensee was identifying and resolving problems with assessing and managing
maintenance-related risk using the corrective action program.  Additionally, for
maintenance resulting from unforeseen situations, the inspectors assessed the 
11  Enclosure effectiveness of the licensee's planning and control of emergent work activities.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.  * Week of 10/22:  Unit 1A EDG 18 month surveillance in conjunction with ongoing work in the high voltage switchyard * Week of 10/29:  maintenance outage on the 2A EDG concurrent with maintenance activities on various breakers in the high-voltage switchyard.  Week of 11/12:  performing testing on the 2B EDG concurrent with maintenance activities in the high-voltage switchyard.  Week of 12/3:  rendering the Unit 1 B train NSCW cooling tower fans inoperable to perform inspections of the 480V EMAX breakers.  Week of 12/17:  rendering the Unit 1 A train NSCW cooling tower fans inoperable to perform inspections of the 480V EMAX breakers.    b. Findings  No findings were identified. 
1R15 Operability Evaluations 
    a. Inspection Scope  The inspectors reviewed the following five evaluations to verify they met the
requirements of procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and NMP-GM-002-001, Corrective Action Program Instructions.  The scope of these inspections
included a review of the technical adequacy of the evaluations, the adequacy of
compensatory measures, and the impact on continued plant operation.  Inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and conducted walkdowns in accordance with OpESS FY 2012-02 "Technical Specification Interpretation and Operability Determination,"
inspection guidance to ensure that the licensee properly interprets Technical
Specification (TS) Bases, properly develops operability determinations, and adheres to
the NRC's guidance on the temporary use of manual actions to support operability determinations.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.  CR 501741, Unit 1A EDG unit available light is not working  CR 533822, Unit 1 and 2 main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)  CR 550736, Unit 2A NSCW fan #3 failed to close  CR 479829, Unit 2B RHR oil sample analysis  CR 562504, Gas void discovered at 1-1208-X4-05 
  b. Findings  No findings were identified.   
12  Enclosure 1R18 Plant Modifications    a. Inspection Scope  Temporary Modification:  The inspectors reviewed minor design change package SNC439341/1.0 which allowed the temporary installation of clamping device on valve 1-1208-U4-A11, auxiliary pressurizer spray valve, to address body-to-bonnet leakage of the non-isolable valve.  Inspectors also reviewed the associated 10 CFR Part 50.59 screening criteria against the system design bases documentation and procedure 00307-C, Temporary Modifications.  The inspectors reviewed implementation,
configuration control, post-installation test activities, drawing and procedure updates,
and operator awareness for this temporary modification.    b. Findings 
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing 
  a. Inspection Scope  The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for
the following six maintenance activities to verify that the testing met the requirements of procedure 29401-C, Work Order Functional Tests, for ensuring equipment operability and functional capability was restored.  The inspectors also reviewed the test
procedures to verify the acceptance criteria were sufficient to meet the Technical
Specification (TS) operability requirements.  MWO SNC410412, Unit 1 Train B Safety Injection Accumulator Vent Header Isolation  Valve 1HV-0943B  MWO SNC439646, 1HV-3016B Disassemble MSIV and MWO SNC439647, 1HV-3026B Disassemble MSIV  MWO SNC43990, 1HV-3006A Disconnect Actuator and Perform Ultra-Sonic Testing  MWO SNC424222- 2A EDG Replace O-Rings in 2R, 2L, 7R, and 7L Fuel Injectors  MWO SNC127251 - Clean, Inspect, and Lubricate Valve Stem  MWO SNC447741 - 2A NSCW Fan #3 Not Operating 
  b. Findings  Introduction:  A Green self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" was identified for failure to provide
adequate work instructions in the maintenance procedure used to modify 480V EMAX
safety-related switchgear breakers.  Specifically, when modifying the breaker by adding a higher amperage closing coil, failure to verify the proper placement of the wire bundle
on top of the closing coil following replacement resulted in the safety-related 480V EMAX breaker failing to close when demanded.  Investigation revealed that the wire bundle on top of the closing coil was positioned such that it prevented the close lever
from fully seating, thus preventing the breaker from closing.     
13  Enclosure Description:  At 0700 on November 19, 2012, the control room operators noted that the 2A NSCW cooling tower fan #3 did not start when the associated tower return valve opened.  On Unit 2, NSCW cooling tower fan #3 is interlocked to automatically start
when the associated tower return valve opens and initiates flow to the tower spray lines.
At the direction of the shift supervisor, the operators attempted to start fan #3 manually
from the main control room, but the fan did not start.  The green light for the hand switch
indicated that control power was available.  The licensee declared the fan inoperable and an incident response team (IRT) was assembled.  The 480V EMAX breaker was replaced and the monthly surveillance test was successfully completed.  The fan was declared operable at 4:30 a.m. on November 20, 2012.  The investigation of the failed
breaker revealed that the wire bundle on top of the closing coil was in physical contact
with the side of the close lever, preventing the close lever from fully seating, thus preventing the breaker from closing.  When the wire bundle was properly anchored away from the close lever, the breaker operated normally.  The IRT determined that the wire bundle on this breaker had been improperly repositioned following modification of the
breaker.  The 480V EMAX breakers that supply specific safety-related loads at Vogtle
must be modified by installing a higher amperage closing coil because with the current plant design, the closing coils are continuously energized.  Maintenance procedure 28480-C Rev.26, "480V EMAX Breaker Maintenance," did not provide any guidance on how to anchor the wire bundle following closing coil replacement so that the wire bundle
did not interfere with the operation of the close lever.  The licensee entered this issue
into their corrective action program as condition reports (CR) 549999 and CR 550736.
Analysis:  The failure of the breaker to close when demanded and start the safety-related NSCW cooling tower fan was a performance deficiency.  The inspectors
concluded that the finding was more than minor because it impacted the reactor safety
mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and affected the cornerstone attribute of equipment performance.  Specifically, failure of the 480V EMAX breaker to close when demanded resulted in the
2A NSCW cooling tower fan #3 being inoperable for approximately 21.5 hours. 
Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings" dated 
June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone.  The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated June 19, 2012. 
The inspectors used the Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings (IMC 0609.04
Exhibit 2, dated June 19, 2012) to characterize the finding. Since the inspectors
answered "No" to all of the Exhibit 2, section A, questions 1-4, mitigating systems cornerstone screening questions, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). 
The inspectors determined the primary cause of the performance deficiency was that the maintenance technicians who were modifying the 480V EMAX breakers were unaware that the improper placement of the closing coil wire bundle could interfere with the operation of the close lever.  The inspectors determined that the cause of this finding was related to the corrective action program component of the problem identification and
resolution cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate problem evaluation [P.1(c).] 
14  Enclosure Specifically, the licensees' extent of cause evaluations performed on previous 480V EMAX breaker failures (caused by restricted movement of the close lever) did not identify the potential of the closing coil wire bundle to interfere with the proper movement
of the close lever.
Enforcement:  The inspectors determined that the finding represents a violation of regulatory requirements because it involved inadequate maintenance procedures used to modify safety-related plant equipment.  10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires, in part, that procedures shall include
appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.  Contrary to the above, maintenance procedure 28480-C Rev.26, "480V EMAX Breaker Maintenance," did not provide guidance on how to anchor the wire bundle following closing coil replacement so that the wire bundle did not interfere with the operation of the close lever.  As a result of the
violation, the 2A NSCW cooling tower fan #3 was rendered inoperable for a period of
approximately 21.5 hours on November 19 and 20.  Because this violation was of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 549999 and CR 550736, this violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.  (NCV 05000425/2012005-01, Inadequate
Maintenance Procedure Results in Inoperability of NSCW Cooling Tower Fan.)
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities    a. Inspection Scope 
The inspectors performed the activities described below for the 1R17 refueling outage
that ended on October 18, 2012.  The inspectors confirmed that, when the licensee
removed equipment from service, the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk control plan for key safety functions and applicable TS and that configuration changes due to emergent work and unexpected conditions
were controlled in accordance with the outage risk control plan.  Inspection activities
included:
Observed refueling activities for compliance with TS, to verify proper tracking of fuel assemblies from the spent fuel pool to the core, and to verify foreign material exclusion was maintained  Performed containment closure activities, including a detailed containment walkdown prior to startup, to verify no evidence of leakage and that debris had not been left
which could affect the performance of the containment sump  Observed heat up and startup activities to verify that TS, license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites for mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant conditions. Reactor
coolant system (RCS) integrity was verified by reviewing RCS leakage calculations and containment integrity was verified by reviewing the status of containment
penetrations and containment isolation valves 
 
15  Enclosure    b. Findings  No findings were identified.
  1R22 Surveillance Testing 
  a. Inspection Scope  The inspectors reviewed the following eight surveillance test procedures and either
observed the testing or reviewed test results to verify that testing was conducted in
accordance with the procedures and that the acceptance criteria adequately
demonstrated that the equipment was operable.  Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the CR database to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions for surveillance test problems.  Surveillance Tests  14666-1 Rev. 34.1, Train A Diesel Generator and ESFAS Test  14670A-1 Rev. 1.2, Diesel Generator 1A Hot Restart Test  14802A-1 Rev. 4.1, Train A NSCW Pump/Check Valve IST and Response Time Test  14804A-1 Rev. 4, Safety Injection Pump A Inservice and Response Time Test 
Containment Isolation Valve  14372B-1 Rev. 9, Containment Penetration No. 72B RCS loop 3 Accumulator Sample Line Local Leak Rate Test 
In-Service Tests (IST)  14808A-2 Rev. 2.2, Train A Centrifugal Charging Pump and Check Valve IST and Response Time Test  RCS Leak Detection  14905-1 Rev. 67.2, RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)  14905-2 Rev. 50.1, RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance) 
  b. Findings  No findings were identified. 
Cornerstone:  Emergency Preparedness
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes 
  a. Inspection Scope  The NSIR headquarters staff performed an in-office review of the latest revisions of various Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) and the Emergency Plan located under ADAMS accession numbers ML12188A352, ML122430598, ML12081A211, ML12093A204, and ML12115A174.
 
16  Enclosure The licensee determined that in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), the changes made in the revisions resulted in no reduction in the effectiveness of the Plan, and that the revised Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to
10 CFR Part 50.  The NRC review was not documented in a safety evaluation report and
did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, these revisions are
subject to future inspection.  This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for
the emergency action level and emergency plan changes on an annual basis.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. 
  b. Findings  No findings were identified.  2. RADIATION SAFETY [RS]
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls        a. Inspection Scope 
Hazard Assessment and Instructions to Workers:  During facility tours, the inspectors directly observed labeling of radioactive material and postings for radiation areas, high
radiation areas (HRA)s, Very High Radiation Areas (VHRA)s and airborne radioactivity
areas established within the radiologically controlled area (RCA) of the auxiliary building, Unit 1 (U1) reactor containment building, and radioactive waste (radwaste) processing and storage locations.  The inspectors independently measured radiation dose rates or
directly observed conduct of licensee radiation surveys for selected RCA areas.  The
inspectors reviewed survey records for several plant areas including surveys for alpha emitters, discrete radioactive particles, airborne radioactivity, gamma surveys with a range of dose rate gradients, and pre-job surveys for upcoming tasks.  The inspectors also discussed changes to plant operations that could contribute to changing radiological
conditions since the last inspection.  For selected outage jobs, the inspectors attended
pre-job briefings and reviewed radiation work permit (RWP) details to assess
communication of radiological control requirements and current radiological conditions to
workers.    Hazard Control and Work Practices:  The inspectors evaluated access barrier effectiveness for selected Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA) locations and discussed
changes to procedural guidance for LHRA and VHRA controls with health physics (HP)
supervisors.  The inspectors reviewed implementation of controls for the storage of irradiated material within the spent fuel pool (SFP).  Established radiological controls (including airborne controls) were evaluated for selected Unit 1 Refueling Outage 17
(1R-17) tasks including maintenance activities in the transfer canal, removal of
pressurizer code safety valves, and steam generator (S/G) eddy current testing.  In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee controls for areas where dose rates could
change significantly as a result of plant shutdown and refueling operations.     
17  Enclosure Through direct observations and interviews with licensee staff, inspectors evaluated occupational workers' adherence to selected RWPs and HP technician (HPT) proficiency in providing job coverage.  Electronic dosimeter (ED) alarm set points and worker stay
times were evaluated against area radiation survey results for selected 1R17 job tasks. 
As part of Inspection Procedure (IP) 71124.04, inspectors reviewed the use of personnel
dosimetry (ED alarms, extremity dosimetry, multibadging in high dose rate gradients, etc.).  The inspectors also evaluated worker responses to dose and dose rate alarms during selected work activities.   
Control of Radioactive Material:  The inspectors observed surveys of material and personnel being released from the RCA using small article monitor (SAM), personnel contamination monitor (PCM), and portal monitor (PM) instruments.  The inspectors reviewed the last two calibration records for selected release point survey instruments and discussed equipment sensitivity, alarm setpoints, and release program guidance
with licensee staff.  The inspectors compared recent 10 Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) Part 61 results for the Dry Active Waste (DAW) radioactive waste stream with
radio nuclides used in calibration sources to evaluate the appropriateness and accuracy of release survey instrumentation.  The inspectors also reviewed records of leak tests on selected sealed sources and discussed nationally tracked source transactions with
licensee staff.
Problem Identification and Resolution:  The inspectors reviewed and assessed Condition Reports (CR)s associated with radiological hazard assessment and control.  The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with procedure NMP-GM-002, "Corrective Action Program", Ver. 12.1.  The inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment results. 
Radiation protection activities were evaluated against the requirements of Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 12; Technical Specifications (TS) Sections 5.4 and 5.7; 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; and approved licensee procedures.  Licensee programs for
monitoring materials and personnel released from the RCA were evaluated against 10
CFR Part 20 and IE Circular 81-07, "Control of Radioactively Contaminated Material". 
Documents reviewed are listed in Sections 2RS1, 2RS2, 2RS3, and 2RS5 of the
Attachment.    b.  Findings  Introduction:  The inspectors identified a Green, self-revealing, Non-cited Violation (NCV) of TS 5.7.1, "High Radiation Area", for an unauthorized entry into a HRA.    Description:  On September 26, 2012, a maintenance worker entered U1 containment to locate and walk down two Nuclear Service Cooling Water check valves in preparation for inspection.  Prior to the entry, the worker received a pre-job briefing from HP to allow
access into containment.  Neither the worker nor the HPT performing the briefing were
confident of the valve locations, however they determined that Quadrant 1 of the 184' elevation was the most likely area to find the valves.  Since the assigned RWP (as well as TS 5.7.1) did not allow entry into any HRAs without first obtaining a briefing on the
radiological conditions, the worker was briefed on conditions in HRAs on the 184' 
18  Enclosure elevation.  The worker was not briefed on conditions in HRAs in other parts of containment.  During the entry, the worker was unable to locate one of the check valves on the 184' elevation and proceeded to exit out a stairwell to the 197' elevation.  On the
197' elevation, the worker observed the other check valve inside a posted HRA.  Without knowledge of dose rates in the area, the worker proceeded past the HRA swing gate to
verify the valve tag number and subsequently received an ED dose rate alarm of 173
mrem/hr.  The worker acknowledged the ED alarm and backed out of the HRA.  In addition, HP central control noted the ED alarm via telemetry and sent an HPT to intercept the worker.  The worker's ED alarm setpoint was 150 mrem/hr and dose rates
in the area were as high as 445 mrem/hr on contact and 117 mrem/hr at 30 cm.  The
licensee entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as CR 523976 and
took immediate corrective actions including an outage work crew stand down.  Analysis:  The inspectors determined that the unauthorized entry into a HRA was a performance deficiency.  This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with
the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance and adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation.  Workers who enter HRAs without prior knowledge of current radiological conditions could receive unintended occupational exposures.  The finding was evaluated using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance
Determination Process (SDP).  The finding was not related to As Low As Reasonably
Achievable (ALARA) planning, nor did it involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.  Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green).  The
inspectors noted that the maintenance worker responded properly to the ED dose rate
alarm and was monitored by HP central control via telemetry, thereby limiting his potential for unintended exposure.  This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Work Practices [H.4.b] because the HRA event was a direct result of poor communications during the pre-job briefing and a lack of procedure (RWP)
adherence on the part of the maintenance worker.  Enforcement:  TS 5.7.1, "High Radiation Area", requires individuals entering HRAs to meet one or more of the following criteria:  1) be provided with a survey meter; 2) wear an ED and be made aware of radiological conditions in the area; or 3) be escorted by a HPT.  Contrary to the above, on September 26, 2012, a worker entered a HRA without a
survey meter, without being made aware of radiological conditions in the area, and
without HPT escort.  Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it
was entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CR 523976), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with the Enforcement Policy:  NCV 05000424/425, 2012005-02, Unauthorized Entry into a High Radiation Area. 
 
19  Enclosure 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls    a. Inspection Scope  Work Planning and Exposure Tracking:  The inspectors reviewed planned work activities and their collective exposure estimates for the current 1R17 outage.  The inspectors reviewed ALARA planning packages for the following high collective exposure tasks:
S/G 1-4 job evolutions (nozzle dam removal and installation, eddy current testing, and
sludge lance) and repair of unit 1 transfer canal transfer tube isolation valve work.  For
the selected tasks, the inspectors reviewed established dose goals and discussed assumptions regarding the bases for the current estimates with responsible ALARA planners.  The inspectors evaluated the incorporation of exposure reduction initiatives and operating experience, including historical post-job reviews, into RWP requirements. 
Day-to-day collective dose data for the selected tasks were compared with established
dose estimates and evaluated against procedural criteria (work-in-progress review limits) for additional ALARA review.  Where applicable, the inspectors discussed changes to established estimates with ALARA planners and evaluated them against work scope
changes or unanticipated elevated dose rates. 
Source Term Reduction and Control:  The inspectors reviewed the collective exposure three-year rolling average from 2009 - 2011 and reviewed historical collective exposure trends from 1988 - 2012.  The inspectors evaluated historical dose rate trends for reactor coolant system piping and compared them to current 1R17 data.  Crud burst
evolution during the first week of the 1R17 outage and source term reduction initiatives
were reviewed and discussed with Chemistry and HP staff. 
Radiation Worker Performance:  The inspectors observed radiation worker performance for S/G job evolutions such as the diaphragm and manway removal and nozzle dam
removal and installation. The inspectors observed ALARA briefings for multiple steam
generator jobs and emerging jobs such as U1 transfer canal valve work.  Radiation
worker performance was also evaluated as part of IP 71124.01.  While observing job
tasks, the inspectors evaluated the use of remote technologies to reduce dose including teledosimetry and remote visual monitoring. 
Problem Identification and Resolution:  The inspectors reviewed and discussed selected CAP documents associated with ALARA program implementation.  The inspectors
evaluated the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, "Corrective Action Program", Ver. 12.1.  The inspectors also evaluated the scope and frequency of the licensee's self-assessment
program and reviewed recent assessment results.
ALARA program activities were evaluated against the requirements of FSAR Section 12,
TS Section 5.4, 10 CFR Part 20, and approved licensee procedures.  Records reviewed are listed in the Attachment. 
 
20  Enclosure    b. Findings  No findings were identified. 
2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation    a. Inspection Scope  Engineering Controls:  The inspectors reviewed the use of temporary and permanent engineering controls to mitigate airborne radioactivity during the 1R17 refueling outage.  The inspectors observed the use of portable air filtration units for work in contaminated areas of the containment building and reviewed filtration unit testing certificates.  The
inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of continuous air monitors and air samplers placed in work area "breathing zones" to provide indication of increasing airborne levels.  Respiratory Protection Equipment:  The inspectors reviewed the use of respiratory protection devices to limit the intake of radioactive material.  This included review of
devices used for routine tasks and devices stored for use in emergency situations.  As part
of IP 71124.02, the inspectors reviewed ALARA evaluations for the use of respiratory protection devices during work in the lower cavity near the transfer canal.  Selected Self-
Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) units and negative pressure respirators (NPR)s staged for routine and emergency use in the Main Control Room and other locations were inspected for material condition, SCBA bottle air pressure, number of units, and number of
spare masks and air bottles available.  The inspectors reviewed maintenance records for
selected SCBA units for the past two years and evaluated SCBA and NPR compliance with
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certification requirements.  The inspectors also reviewed records of air quality testing for supplied-air devices and SCBA bottles. 
The inspectors observed the use of air-supplied suits during S/G maintenance work.  The
inspectors discussed training for various types of respiratory protection devices with HP
staff and interviewed radworkers and control room operators on use of the devices including SCBA bottle change-out and use of corrective lens inserts.  The inspectors reviewed respirator qualification records (including medical qualifications) for several Main
Control Room operators and emergency responder personnel in the Maintenance and HP
departments.  In addition, inspectors evaluated qualifications for individuals responsible for
testing and repairing SCBA vital components.  Problem Identification and Resolution:  The inspectors reviewed and assessed CRs associated with airborne radioactivity mitigation and respiratory protection.  The
inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the issues in
accordance with procedure NMP-GM-002, "Corrective Action Program", Ver. 12.1.  The inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment results.  Licensee activities associated with the use of engineering controls and respiratory
protection equipment were reviewed against TS Section 5.4; 10 CFR Part 20; Regulatory
Guide 8.15, "Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection"; and applicable licensee
procedures.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. 
21  Enclosure    b. Findings  No findings were identified. 
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment 
  a. Inspection Scope  External Dosimetry:  The inspectors reviewed the licensee's National Voluntary Accreditation Program (NVLAP) certification data for accreditation for the current year for
Ionizing Radiation Dosimetry.  The inspectors reviewed program procedures for
processing active personnel dosimeters (ED)s and onsite storage of Optically Stimulated Luminescent Dosimeters (OSLD)s.  Comparisons between ED and OSLD results, including correction factors, were discussed in detail.  The inspectors also reviewed
dosimetry occurrence reports regarding alarming dosimeters. 
Internal Dosimetry:  Inspectors reviewed and discussed the in vivo bioassay program with the licensee.  Inspectors reviewed procedures that addressed methods for determining internal or external contamination, releasing contaminated individuals, the
assignment of dose, and the frequency of measurements depending on the nuclides. Inspectors reviewed and evaluated Whole Body Counter (WBC) records selected from March 2010 to September 2012.  The inspectors evaluated the licensee's program for in
vitro monitoring, however there were no dose assessments using this method to review.  There were no internal dose assessments for internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent to review. 
Special Dosimetric Situations:  The inspectors reviewed records for declared pregnant workers (DPW)s from March 2010 through September 2012 and discussed guidance for monitoring and instructing DPWs.  Inspectors reviewed and witnessed the licensee's practices for monitoring external dose in areas of expected dose rate gradients,
including the use of multi-badging and extremity dosimetry.  The inspectors evaluated the licensee's neutron dosimetry program including instrumentation which was evaluated
under procedure 71124.05.  In addition, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of
shallow dose assessments for selected Personnel Contamination Events occurring between September 2011 and September 2012.   
Problem Identification and Resolution:  The inspectors reviewed and discussed licensee CAP documents associated with occupational dose assessment.  Inspectors evaluated
the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the identified issues in accordance with procedure NPM-GM-002, "Corrective Action Program", Version 12.1.  The inspectors also discussed the scope of the licensee's internal audit program and reviewed recent
assessment results. 
HP program occupational dose assessment activities were evaluated against the
requirements of FSAR Section 12; TS Section 5.4; 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; and approved licensee procedures.  Records reviewed are listed in the Attachment. 
 
22  Enclosure    b. Findings  No findings were identified. 
2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation 
  a. Inspection Scope  Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation:  During walk-downs of the auxiliary building and the RCA exit point, the inspectors observed installed and portable radiation detection
equipment.  These included area radiation monitors (ARM)s, continuous air samplers, liquid and gaseous effluent monitors, PCMs, SAMs, PMs, a WBC, count room equipment, and portable survey instruments.  The inspectors observed the physical location of the components, noted their material condition, observed the currency of
calibration and source check stickers, and discussed performance of equipment with RP
personnel.    In addition to equipment walk-downs, the inspectors observed source functional checks of portable detection instruments, including ion chambers and telepoles.  For the portable instruments, the inspectors observed the use of a high-range calibrator and
discussed periodic output value testing, calibration, and source check processes with
health physics technicians.  The inspectors reviewed calibration records and discussed
with chemistry personnel alarm setpoint values for PCMs, PMs, effluent monitors, WBCs, and an ARM.  This included a sampling of instruments used for post-accident monitoring such as a containment high-range radiation monitor and effluent monitors for noble gas and iodine.  The inspectors reviewed the most recent 10 CFR Part 61 analysis
for DAW to determine if calibration and check sources are representative of the plant
source term.  The inspectors observed computerized performance check calibration efficiency information for count room gamma detectors and a liquid scintillation detector.  The inspectors also observed the currency of calibration for selected EDs at the RCA
entry point.      Problem Identification and Resolution:  The inspectors reviewed selected CAP reports in the area of radiological instrumentation.  The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with procedure NMP-GM-002-001, "Corrective Action Program Instructions", Ver. 29.0.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Effectiveness and reliability of selected radiation detection instruments were reviewed against details documented in the following:  10 CFR Part 20; NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements; FSAR Chapters 11 and 12; and
applicable licensee procedures.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. 
  b. Findings  No findings were identified. 
 
23  Enclosure 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES  4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification 
  a. Inspection Scope  The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the listed mitigating systems cornerstone PIs during the period from October 1, 2011, through September 30, 2012, for Unit 1 and Unit 2.  The inspectors verified the licensee's basis in reporting each data element using
the PI definitions and guidance contained in procedures 00163-C, NRC Performance Indicator and Monthly Operating Report Preparation and Submittal, and Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline.  Mitigating Systems Cornerstone  Emergency AC Power Systems  Cooling Water Systems  Safety System Functional Failures  The inspectors reviewed Unit 1 and Unit 2 operator log entries, the CR data base, the
Vogtle mitigating system performance indicator basis document, the monthly operating reports and monthly PI summary reports to verify that the licensee had accurately submitted the PI data.      Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone:  The inspectors reviewed the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness PI results for the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone from June 2011 through September 2012.  For the assessment period, the
inspectors reviewed electronic dosimeter alarm logs and CRs related to controls for
exposure significant areas.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.  Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone:  The inspectors reviewed the Radiological Control Effluent Release Occurrences PI results for the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone
from June 2011 through September 2012.  For the assessment period, the inspectors
reviewed cumulative and projected doses to the public contained in liquid and gaseous
release permits and CRs related to Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual issues.  The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedural guidance for collecting and documenting PI data.  Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment.
The inspectors completed five of the required samples specified in IP 71151.      b. Findings  No findings were identified.
   
24  Enclosure 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems  .1 Daily Condition Report Review.  As required by inspection procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive
equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors
performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program.  This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensee's computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated. 
.2 Focused Review    a. Inspection Scope  The inspectors performed a detailed review of the following CR which addressed the
failure of the Unit 1 Loop 2 & 3 outboard MSIVs in the closed position during startup. 
The goal of the review was to verify that the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the CR against the licensees corrective action
program as delineated in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.  Documents reviewed are
listed in the Attachment.
*  530916 - Unit 1 steam generators 2&3 do not indicate steam flow    b. Findings and Observations  Introduction:  A Green self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" was identified for failure to provide
adequate work instructions in the operations and maintenance procedures used to open main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) that were bound in their closed seat.  Specifically, the operations and maintenance procedures used to open the loop 2 and loop 3
outboard MSIVs did not provide instructions to limit the magnitude of the force applied to
the valve stems while attempting to open the valves.  Investigation revealed that the cause of the stem failures was excessive force applied to the thermally embrittled stems.      Description:  On October 8, with Unit 1 in Mode 2, the operators had begun preparations for power ascension. At 1616, as the main feed pump was being placed on line, the
control room operators noted a divergence in RCS loop differential temperatures (Ts), steam pressures, and steam flows between loops 1 & 4 and loops 2 & 3.  Loops 1 & 4
showed increasing loop Ts, lowering steam pressure, and some minimal steam flow, while loops 2 & 3 showed no loop T, increasing steam pressures (to the point of lifting the loop 2 & 3 atmospheric relief valves), and no steam flow.  The Main Control Board hand switches indicated that all MSIVs and associated bypass valves were open. The
operators identified the potential impact to the core neutron flux and stopped power
ascension.  Following discussions with plant management and engineering, the operators placed the plant in a safe condition by inserting a manual trip of the reactor at   
25  Enclosure 2155.  The licensee subsequently assembled an Issue Response Team (IRT) and a root cause team to investigate the cause of the diverging indications and to determine the required corrective actions.
The investigations revealed that the outboard MSIVs on both loops 2 & 3 were failed in
the closed position. Upon disassembly, it was discovered the stems of both the failed
MSIVs had undergone brittle fracture just above the T-head, where the valve stem is connected to the valve disk.  Westinghouse representatives were consulted on the MSIV issue.  They conveyed to the licensee that the material used for the MSIV stems, ASME SA564 Gr. 630PH T 17-4 PH heat treated to 1100oF, is susceptible to embrittlement when exposed to temperatures above 500oF for a sustained period (after about 10 years).  Metallurgical analysis performed on the sheared stems validated that thermal embrittlement was the failure mechanism.  The failure analysis concluded that both stem fractures were the result of sudden brittle failures from single tensile stress events.
Further investigation by the IRT revealed that the loop 2 outboard MSIV stem failed
during main steam line warming evolutions conducted on October 6 by operations personnel.  The IRT also determined that that the loop 3 outboard MSIV stem failed on the night of October 7 following activities performed by maintenance personnel to lift the valve disk off its closed seat.
The root cause team determined that the root cause of the MSIV stem failures was temperature aging embrittlement of the stem material.  The team also determined that the major contributing causes of the event were thermal binding of the valve disks in the closed seat and inadequate procedural guidance, i.e. procedures used to open the MSIVs did not provide instructions or guidance to limit the magnitude of the force applied
to the valve stems while attempting to open the valves, which ultimately resulted in the brittle failure of the valve stems.  The inadequate procedures specified by the root cause team were operating procedures 12001-C, "Unit Heat Up to Hot Shutdown (Mode 5 to Mode 4)", and 14850-1/2, "Cold Shutdown Valve In-Service Test", and maintenance procedure 26854-C, "MSIV Actuator Maintenance".  The licensee conducted ultrasonic
testing on the remaining six Unit 1 MSIVs to verify that the valve stems were intact.  The
two failed valve stems were replaced, and the reactor was restarted on October 17.  The
licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 530916.
Analysis:  The failure to provide adequate work instructions in the operations and maintenance procedures used to open main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) that were stuck on their closed seat was a performance deficiency.  The inspectors concluded that
the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality
attribute of the reactor safety - initiating events cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. 
Specifically, the failure to provide adequate work instructions to operations and
maintenance personnel resulted in the failure of both the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard
MSIVs and the subsequent manual reactor trip. 
Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings" dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that finding affected the Initiating Events cornerstone. 
The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance 
26  Enclosure Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated 06/19/12.  The inspectors used the Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings (IMC 0609.04 Exhibit 1, dated June 19, 2012) to characterize the finding. Since the inspectors answered "No" to
the Exhibit 1, section B, Initiating Events screening question, the inspectors concluded
that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). 
The primary cause of the performance deficiency, as determined by the inspectors, was less than adequate work planning and coordination.  The inspectors determined that the cause of this finding was related to the work control component of the human
performance cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate work planning [H.3 (a)].   
Specifically, the licensees' procedures used to open the MSIVs that were stuck on their
closed seat did not contain instructions or precautions to limit the magnitude of the force applied to the valve stems while attempting to open the valves.  Enforcement:  The inspectors determined that the finding represents a violation of regulatory requirements because it involved inadequate operations and maintenance procedures used to operate safety-related plant equipment.  10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V requires, in part, that procedures shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been
satisfactorily accomplished.  Contrary to the above, the licensees' procedures used to open the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard MSIVs did not provide instructions to limit the
magnitude of the force applied to the valve stems while attempting to open the valves.  As a result of the violation, the loop 2 and loop 3 MSIVs failed in the closed position, and the reactor was manually tripped on October 8, extending the 1R17 refueling outage for an additional nine days.  The licensee conducted ultrasonic testing on the remaining six
Unit 1 MSIVs to verify that the valve stems were intact.  The stems of the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard MSIVs were replaced, and the Unit 1 reactor was restarted on October
17.  Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 530916, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.  (NCV
05000424/2012005-03, Inadequate Operations and Maintenance Procedures Results in
Brittle Failure of the Loop 2 and Loop 3 Outboard MSIV Stems.) 
.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review      a. Inspection Scope  The inspectors performed a review of the licensee's Corrective Action Program and associated documents to identify trends which could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue.  The review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of inspector daily CR screening and the licensee's trending
efforts.  The review nominally considered the six month period of April 2012 through
September 2012 although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted.  The inspectors also reviewed several CRs associated
with operability determinations which occurred during the period.  Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensee's trend reports were reviewed for adequacy.  The inspectors also evaluated the trend reports against the 
27  Enclosure requirements of the licensee's corrective action program as specified in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. 
  b. Findings and Observations  No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153) 
.1 (Closed) LER 05000424/2012-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification LCOs 3.7.14 and 3.0.3    a. Inspection Scope 
On August 17, 2012, 1A ESF Chiller condenser vacuum was noted to be 12 inches of
mercury, with a vacuum of 15 inches of mercury specified as the low limit on operating
logs.  The shift supervisor mistakenly believed condenser pressure was one of the parameters which engineering had evaluated and was continuing to monitor with a recorder.  Condenser pressure was not one of the parameters being monitored and
recorded on a recorder.  When the condenser pressure was recorded as out of
specification on the operator rounds log sheet, the shift supervisor failed to initiate
operability and reportability determination processes.  This misinformation was carried
forward through subsequent shifts via logs. During the next five days, 1A ESF Chiller condenser vacuum decreased to 4 inches of mercury and stabilized for an additional four days prior to initiation of a CR on August 26, 2012. Subsequent investigation and
consultation with the vendor determined the 1A ESF Chiller was inoperable and the TS
LCO was entered at 1437 on August 26, 2012. As a result of the delay in recognition of
the status of the subject chiller, appropriate actions of LCOs 3.7.14 and 3.0.3 were not taken.  The inspectors reviewed the LER, the associated CR and enhanced apparent cause determination, and subsequent action items. 
    b. Findings  One licensee-identified violation was identified, and is documented in section 4OA7 of this report.  This LER is closed.  4OA5 Other Activities 
.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities    a. Inspection Scope  During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force
personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee
security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.  These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours. 
 
28  Enclosure These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples.  Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors' normal plant status review and inspection activities. 
  b. Findings and Observations  No findings were identified.  .2 (Discussed) Temporary Instruction 2515/187 - Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns 
  a. Inspection Scope  Inspectors conducted independent walkdowns to verify that the licensee completed the
actions associated with the flood protection feature specified in paragraph 03.02.a.2 of
this TI.  Inspectors are performing walkdowns at all sites in response to a letter from the
NRC to licensees, entitled "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," dated
March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340). 
Enclosure 4 of the letter requested licensees to perform external flooding walkdowns
using an NRC-endorsed walkdown methodology (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A050).  Nuclear Energy Industry (NEI) document 12-07 titled, "Guidelines for Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Protection Features," (ADAMS Accession
No. ML12173A215) provided the NRC-endorsed methodology for assessing external flood protection and mitigation capabilities to verify that plant features, credited in the
CLB for protection and mitigation from external flood events, and are available, functional, and properly maintained.    b. Findings and Observations  Findings or violations associated with the flooding, if any, will be documented in the 1st quarter integrated inspection report of 2013.  .3 Temporary Instruction 2515/188 - Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns 
  a. Inspection Scope  The inspectors accompanied the licensee on their seismic walkdowns of the following
SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 components:
* Unit 1 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump A, SWEL 1 item #60, on August 15 in the Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Building * Unit 1B Diesel Generator Control Panel, SWEL 1 item #61, on August 15 in the Diesel Generator Building 
29  Enclosure * Unit 1 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump and Turbine Driver, SWEL 1 item #13, on August 16 in the AFW Pump House * Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger B, SWEL 2 item #1, on August 21 in the Auxiliary Building  The inspectors verified that the licensee confirmed that the following seismic features associated with the above listed components were free of potential adverse seismic
conditions:
* Anchorage was free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware * Anchorage was free of corrosion that is more than mild surface corrosion * Anchorage is free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors * Anchorage configuration was consistent with plant documentation * SSCs will not be damaged from impact by nearby equipment or structures * Overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls are secure and not likely to collapse onto the equipment * Attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage * The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area * The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area * The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)  The inspectors independently performed their walkdowns and verified that the following
components were free of the potential adverse seismic conditions listed above:
* Unit 2A Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver #1, SWEL 1 item #55, on December 17 in the Diesel Generator Building * Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Pump B, SWEL item #2, on December 17 in the Auxiliary Building  Observations made during the walkdowns that could not be determined to be acceptable were entered into the licensee's corrective action program for evaluation.
Additionally, inspectors verified that items that could allow the spent fuel pool to drain
down rapidly were added to the SWEL and these items were walked down by the
licensee.    b. Findings and Observations  No findings were identified.
   
30  Enclosure 4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit  .1 Exit Meeting  On January 11, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Tom
Tynan and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings.  The inspectors
confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.  4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations  The following violations of very low significance (Green) or Severity Level IV were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as Non-cited Violations.  .1 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification LCOs 3.7.14 and 3.0.3  TS 3.0.3 requires, in part, that when a limiting condition of operation (LCO) is not met and the associated actions are not met, an associated action is not provided, or if
directed by the associated actions, the unit shall be placed in a mode or other specified
condition in which the LCO is not applicable.  TS 3.7.14 require that two engineered
safety feature (ESF) room cooler and safety-related chiller trains shall be operable. 
Contrary to the above, on August 17, 2012, at approximately midnight, the unit 1 shift supervisor failed to enter the required action statement for TS LCO 3.7.14, Condition 'A' when the unit 1A ESF chiller condenser purge pressure was noted to be out of
specification high.  Inoperability of the chiller was not recognized until August 26, 2012,
and the LCO entered at 1437.  Further, during the extended period during which the 1A
ESF chiller was inoperable (albeit unrecognized as inoperable), opposite train supported components as well as redundant room coolers on the train B ESF Chiller and room cooler train were removed from service for unrelated activities which resulted in two
occasions during which TS 3.0.3 should have been applied.  The licensee documented
this event in their corrective action program as CR 507143. Using IMC 0609, dated 
June 19, 2012, Attachment 4, Table 2, the inspectors verified that the finding affected
the mitigation systems cornerstone.  IMC 0609 Attachment 4 Table 3 directed the inspectors to use IMC 0609 Appendix A to characterize the finding.  Because the finding represented an actual loss of function of one train of ECCS for greater than its TS
Allowed Outage Time, a detailed risk evaluation was required.  A detailed risk evaluation
was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst in accordance with IMC 0609
Appendix A guidance using the NRC Vogtle SPAR model and the Saphire 8 risk analysis code.  An Event/Condition Analysis module in Saphire was run with the unit 1A train ESF chiller failed with no recovery allowed for a 9 day exposure period.  The dominant
sequence was a loss of offsite power with success of reactor trip and emergency power
with late failure of feedwater and failure to implement feed and bleed cooling due to
failure of the Unit 1B train chiller and loss of the safety related switchgear.  The detailed
risk evaluation determined that the risk due to the performance deficiency was an increase in core damage frequency of <1E-6/year, a GREEN finding of very low safety significance.  The risk was mitigated by the availability of alternate train components and
the short exposure period. 
31  Enclosure .2 Failure to Conduct Required ASME Code Section XI Inspections  On April 12, 2012, Vogtle staff identified that in-service inspections for the second 10-
year ISI period were missed for eight ASME Code Class 1 valves. Valves 1/2 1208U6035, 1/2 1208U6036, 1/2 1208U6037 and 1/2 1208U6038 are chemical and
volume control system normal and alternate charging check valves to the reactor coolant system.  Leakage control devices (seal encapsulation devices) were installed on the Unit 1 valves in 1987 to address recurring body-to-bonnet leakage per an industry approved Westinghouse design change.  The seal caps were subsequently installed on the unit 2
valves in 1989.  Title 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) requires, in part, that licensees follow the
pressure test requirements of ASME Code Section XI.  ASME Code, Section XI, IWA-
5240, requires visual examinations as part of system pressure tests.  ASME Code Section XI, IWA-5242, 1998 Edition through 2000 addenda, requires VT-2 visual examinations for pressure retaining bolted connections in borated water systems.
Contrary to the above, from October, 1987, to the present, Vogtle did not perform a visual inspection of the valve body-to-bonnet studs.  This finding was more than minor because it impacted the initiating events cornerstone and its attribute of equipment performance.  Specifically, it affected the objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well
as power operations.  Using Inspection manual chapter 0609, dated June 19, 2012,
Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," this
finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the licensee's
evaluation was able to demonstrate structural integrity.  Specifically, stud stress was not sufficiently close to the yield stress to cause a loss of integrity.  Therefore, the finding does not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that
mitigation equipment will not be available.  The licensee has entered this issue into their
corrective action program as CRs 438268, 458567, 505111 and 547078.  To address
the issue for the short term, the licensee plans to follow the 'needed' and 'good practice' recommendations detailed by the PWROG in letter OG-12-330 which was issued on August 16, 2012.  The long term corrective actions will be to remove all of the existing
seal caps and install a bonnet with a canopy seal weld to remove the need for a seal cap
as a way to mitigate the effects of leakage and to allow visual examination of the bolted
connections.  .3 Failure to Post High Radiation Area  10 CFR 20.1902(b) requires licensees to post each HRA with a conspicuous sign or
signs bearing the radiation symbol and the words "CAUTION, HIGH RADIATION AREA" or "DANGER, HIGH RADIATION AREA".  Contrary to this, on September 18, 2012, the entryway into the Unit 1 spent fuel pool cooling system demineralizer valve gallery was discovered to be missing a conspicuous sign bearing the radiation symbol and the words
"CAUTION, HIGH RADIATION AREA" or "DANGER, HIGH RADIATION AREA." 
Accessible areas inside the Valve Gallery room contained dose rates up to 327 mrem/hr
at 30 cm.  A HP foreman discovered this violation while performing a walkdown of HRA
postings in the auxiliary building.  The licensee took immediate corrective actions upon discovery including restoration of the HRA posting (CR 519818).  There was no evidence of unauthorized worker entry into the affected area.  Although this event
involved the failure to maintain proper control for a HRA, this finding is of very low safety 
32  Enclosure significance because it was not related to ALARA planning, nor did it involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. 
ATTACHMENT:  SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Attachment SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION  KEY POINTS OF CONTACT  Licensee personnel: S. Bargeron, Plant Manager
B. Brown, Training Manager
R. Collins, Chemistry Manager
K. Dyar, Security Manager G. Gunn, Licensing I. Kochery, Health Physics Manager
D. McCary, Maintenance Manager
K. Molina, Heat Exchanger Engineer 
D. Puckett, Performance Analysis Supervisor J. Robinson, Engineering Programs Manager S. Swanson, Site Support Manager
T. Tynan, Site Vice-President
 
NRC personnel: M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector T. Chandler, Resident Inspector
F. Ehrhardt, Chief, Region II Reactor Projects Branch 2
T. Lighty, Project Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED  Opened and Closed 
050000425/2012005-01 NCV Inadequate Maintenance Procedure Results in Inoperability of NSCW Cooling Tower Fan (Section 1R19)    05000424, 425/2012005-02    NCV Unauthorized Entry into a High Radiation Area. (Section 2RS1)    05000424/2012005-03 NCV Inadequate Operations and Maintenance Procedures Results in Brittle Failure of the Loop
2 and Loop 3 Outboard MSIV Stems (Section 4OA2)  Closed 
05000424/2012-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification LCOs 3.7.14 and 3.0.3  05000424/425/2515/188 TI Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns
(Section 4OA5.3) 
2  Attachment Discussed    LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 
Section 1R01:  Adverse Weather Protection Procedures 11877-1 Rev. 23, Cold Weather Checklist 11877-2 Rev. 21, Cold Weather Checklist 11901-1 Rev. 17.2, Heat Tracing System Alignment
11901-2 Rev. 12.3, Heat Tracing System Alignment
Section 1R04:  Equipment Alignment Procedures 11903-C Rev. 30.4, Fire Protection System Alignment, Section A
11011-1 Rev. 14.2, Residual Heat Removal System Alignment
13011-1 Rev. 70.3, Residual Heat Removal System
11115-1 Rev. 10.2, Containment Spray System Alignment
Drawings CX4DB173-1 Rev. 41.0, P&I Diagram Fire Protection - Pump House No. 1 & 2, System 2301 CX4DB173-2 Rev. 29.0, P&I Diagram Fire Protection - Yard Piping System, System 2301 1X4DB122 Rev. 51.0, P&I Diagram Residual Heat Removal System 1205
1X4DB131 Rev. 35.0, P&I Diagram Containment Spray System - System No. 1206  Section 1R05:  Fire Protection Procedures 92799-1 Rev. 3.2, Zone 99 - Control Building Level A Fire Fighting Preplan
92804-1 Rev. 4.2, Zone 104 - MSIV Room Level 1 Fire Fighting Preplan
92745-1 Rev. 2.2, Zone 45 - Auxiliary Building Level 1 Fire Fighting Preplan 92760-2 Rev. 1.0, Zone 60 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan 92761-2 Rev. 1.1, Zone 61 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92764-2 Rev. 1.1, Zone 64 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92762-2 Rev. 2.0, Zone 62 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92763-2 Rev. 0.2, Zone 63 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan 92782-2 Rev. 1.2, Zone 82 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan 92860A-1 Rev. .2, Zone 160A - NSCW Pumphouse - Train A Fire Fighting Preplan
92860B-1 Rev. .2, Zone 160B - NSCW Pumphouse - Train B Fire Fighting Preplan
92771-1, Rev. 4.1, Zone 71 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92776-1, Rev. 2.1, Zone 76 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92777A-1, Rev. 1.1, Zone 77A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan 92777B-1, Rev. 1.2, Zone 77B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan 92778A-1, Rev. 2.1, Zone 78A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92778B-1, Rev. 1.2, Zone 78B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan 05000424/425/2515/187 TI Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns
(Section 4OA5.2) 
3  Attachment 92779A-1, Rev. 0.2, Zone 79A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan 92779B-1, Rev. 1.2, Zone 79B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan 92756A-1, Rev. 0.2, Zone 56A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92756B-1, Rev. 1.2, Zone 56B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92783-1, Rev. 2.2, Zone 83 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92852-1, Rev. 2.2, Zone 152 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92771-2, Rev. 1.1, Zone 71 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan 92776-2, Rev. 1.1, Zone 76 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan 92777A-2, Rev. 1.1, Zone 77A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92777B-2, Rev. 1.2, Zone 77B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92778A-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 78A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92778B-2, Rev. 1.2, Zone 78B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan 92779A-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 79A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan 92779B-2, Rev. 1.2, Zone 79B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92756A-2, Rev. 1.1, Zone 56A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92756B-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 56B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92783-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 83 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan 92852-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 152 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan  Section 1R06:  Flood Protection Measures Work Orders SNC 395851
Calculations X6CXC-27 Rev.8, Flooding Analysis Auxiliary Building Level D
Procedures 25512-C Rev.1.0, General Inspection Outdoor Electrical Duct Run Pull Boxes/Manholes  Drawings 2X4DB147-1 Rev. 18.0, P&I Diagram Aux BLDG. Flood Retaining Rooms Alarms & Drains
System No. 1218
Section 1R07:  Heat Sink Performance Work Orders: SNC 121039
Procedures 83309-C Rev. 6.4, Safety-Related Heat Exchanger Inspection 83305-C Rev. 7.6, Heat Exchanger Test/Maintenance Program 
Condition Reports: CR 523190
Other Heat Exchanger 'as-found' and 'as-left' photos taken 09/24/2012   
4  Attachment Section 1R11:  Licensed Operator Requalification Program Other V-RQ-SE-12705, Simulator Exercise Guide: Steam Generator Tube Leak 
Procedures 18009-C Rev. 29.2, Steam Generator Tube Leak
18007-C Rev. 23, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction
Section 1R12:  Maintenance Effectiveness Engineering Documents System 1301-2, Main Steam System 2012 health reports System 1205 RHR System, 4th quarter 2012 system health report Condition Reports: 348759, 2PV3000 has exceeded its MR OOS time
343991, 2PV3000 SG-1 ARV Failure
518228, 1HV8702A will not open
534190, MR evaluation identified FF  Procedures 50028-C Rev. 18.1, Engineering Maintenance Rule Implementation
Section 1R15:  Operability Evaluations Condition Reports: 501741, U-1 D/G "A" unit available light is not working 533822, Unit 1 and 2 main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) 530916, Unit 1 steam generator loops 2 & 3 do not indicate steam flow
Engineering Documents RER SNC440108, MSIV stem failure evaluation DOEJ-VRSNC440108-M001, Unit 1 MSIVs ((1HV3016B & 1HV3026B) disk separation
Other VNP-12-008 REV. 1.0, ODMI worksheet for degraded MSIV stems
Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) 2012/02, Revision 1, Technical Specification Interpretation and Operability Determination  Section 1R18:  Plant Modifications Other MDC SNC439341/1.0, 1-1208-U4-A11, Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray Valve Seal Leak  Section 1R19:  Post Maintenance Testing Procedures 25022-C Rev. 7, General Small Bore Piping Installation
14240-1 Rev. 5.2, Manual SLI TADOT
14850-1 Rev. 52, Cold Shutdown Valve Inservice Test 14980A-2 Rev. 23, Diesel Generator Operability Test 14825-1 Rev. 97, Quarterly Inservice Valve Test
14430-2 Rev. 9.0, NSCW Cooling Tower Fans Monthly Test 
5  Attachment Condition Reports 523221 530916
550378
Work Orders SNC410412 SNC439646 SNC439647
SNC439900
SNC424222
SNC387201 SNC127251 SNC447741
Section 1R22:  Surveillance Testing Procedures 14666-1 Rev. 34.1, Train A Diesel Generator and ESFAS Test 14372B-1 Rev. 9, Containment Penetration No. 72B RCS Loop #3 Accumulator Sample Line Local Leak Rate Test 14670A-1 Rev. 1.2, Diesel Generator 1A Hot Restart Test
14808A-2 Rev. 2.2, Train A Centrifugal Charging Pump and Check Valve IST and Response Time Test 14804A-1 Rev. 4, Safety Injection Pump A Inservice and Response Time Test 14905-1 Rev. 67.2, RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)
14905-2 Rev. 50.1, RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)
14802A-1 Rev. 4.1, Train A NSCW Pump/Check Valve IST and Response Time Test
Work Orders SNC356759
SNC335801
SNC371576
SNC385697
SNC380426 SNC392870  Section 1EP4:  Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Change Packages Emergency Plan, Revision 57 NMP-EP-110, "Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action," Version 3.0 NMP-EP-110, "Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action," Version 4.0
NMP-EP-111, "Emergency Notifications," Version 7.0
NMP-EP-112, "Protective Action Recommendations," Version 2.0
91201-C, "Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center," Revision 17
91202-C, "Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center," Revision 22 
 
6  Attachment Section 2RS1:  Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals 43014-C, "Special Radiological Controls", Ver. 46
46024-C, "Release of Materials from the RCA", Ver. 9.3
93240A-C, "Reactor Vessel Disassembly Instructions", Ver. 33
NMP-HP-300, "Radiation and Contamination Surveys", Ver. 2.0
NMP-HP-302, "Restricted Area Classification, Postings, and Access Control", Ver. 2.1 NMP-HP-303, "Personnel Decontamination", Ver. 1.4 NMP-HP-305, "Alpha Radiation Monitoring", Ver. 4.0
NMP-CH-013-001, "Vogtle RCS Chemistry During Scheduled Plant Shutdowns with Fuel Defects Suspected", Ver. 1.0 NMP-GM-002, "Corrective Action Program", Ver. 12.1  Records and Data NMP-HP-109, "Investigation, Evaluation and Management of Damaged, Lost, Malfunctioning or Alarming Dosimetry", Ver. 1.1, Data Sheet 2, Worker's Statement for Dose/Rate Alarm or
Malfunctioning Electronic Dosimeter, 9/26/12 Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Inventory Log Non Fuel Radioactive Material Stored in Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Contingency Plan for:  Health Physics Controls for High Noble Gas Activity During Code Safety Valve Removal During 1R17 ALARA Briefing Notes: Rx Head/ Upper Internals Lift and Set
Alpha Levels, Comparing 100 cm2 Samples RWP 12-1618, Repair of Unit 1 Transfer Canal Transfer Tube ISO Valve 1-1213-U6-086, Rev. 0 RWP 12-1505, Under Rx Vessel Work, Rev. 0
RWP 12-1608, Remove/Install Pzr Code Safety Valves, Rev. 0
RWP 12-1600, CM/PM, VLVS, Motors, Misc Activities in U1 CTMT, Rev. 0
Radiological Survey 124805, U1 SFP Transfer Canal Radiological Survey 124876, U1 SFP Transfer Canal Radiological Survey 152222, Unit 1 Transfer Canal - Top View (1FHBC1)
Radiological Survey 151559, Valve Gallery SFP Cooling Demin (1AXA46)
Radiological Survey 153033, Inside Bioshield Area (1RXC)
Radiological Survey 152915, Inside Bioshield Area (1RXC)
Radiological Survey 152836, Inside Bioshield Area (1RXC) Radiological Survey 152699, Seal Table Rack Pulled Back (1RXA3) Radiological Survey 152711, Seal Table (1RXA3)
Radiological Survey 151834, Auxiliary Building Level D (CAXD)
Radiological Survey 9/18/2012 15:38, Under Vessel
Radiological Survey 152143, Top of PZR - 252' el. (1RX32) Radiological Survey 152054, Top of PZR - 252' el. (1RX32) Radiological Survey 135176, Top of PZR - 252' el. (1RX32)
Radiological Survey 152283, S/G 4 Channel Head Cold Leg (1RXB27)
Radiological Survey 152282, S/G 4 Channel Head Hot Leg (1RXB26)
Radiological Survey 152281, S/G 1 Channel Head Cold Leg (1RXB19)
Radiological Survey 152281, S/G 1 Channel Head Cold Leg (1RXB19) Radiological Survey 151964, U1 Containment Building Level 1 (1RX1) Radiological Survey 152549, U1 Containment Level A Lower Overview (1RXA) Radiological Survey 151986, U1 Containment 184' El. Quadrant 1 (1RXB) 
7  Attachment Radiological Survey 152662, U1 Containment 197' El. Quadrant 1 (1RXA) Radiological Survey 151910, U1 Containment 197' El. Quadrant 1 (1RXA) Radioactive Sealed Source Leak Test Certification, Source ID 0413-00-00, 6/22/12, 12/5/11, 6/28/11, 1/19/10  Air Sample Log, 9/18/12 - 9/20/12
CAP Documents V-HP-2011, Fleet Oversight Audit of Health Physics, 8/15/11 CR 382120
CR 335736
CR 519818
CR 527832 CR 523976 CR 434496
CR 434498
CR 481012
Section 2RS2:  Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals 16035-1, "Chemistry Operations Interface for RCS Chemistry Control During Scheduled Plant Shutdowns", Ver. 13 43031-C, "Steam Generator Job Coverage", Rev. 5.3
00910-C, "VEGP ALARA Program", Rev. 15.3 41001-C, "ALARA Job Review", Rev. 33.1 NMP-AD-035, "ALARA Program", Ver. 1.0
NMP-HP-204, "ALARA Planning and Job Review", Ver. 2.0
43014-C, "Special Radiological Controls", Ver. 46
Records and Data Audit No. V-HP-2011, Fleet Oversight Audit of Health Physics, 8/15/2011
NMP-GM-003-F04 Self-Assessment Final Report; ALARA Outage Planning, CR#2011100194,
12/17/10
Shutdown Chemistry Review: Vogtle Unit 2 Fuel Cycle 15, Final report October 24, 2011 ALARA Committee Meeting Minutes First Quarter 2012 2011 Annual ALARA Report, March 30, 2012 Pre-1R17 ALARA Sub-Committee Meeting Minutes, August 10, 2012
Vogtle 1R17 EPRI Standard Radiation Monitoring Points
Chemistry Crud Burst chart 9/16/12 22:00-9/20/12 22:00
ALARA Steam Generator Work Package: ALARA Briefing Records  RWP 12-1300, R/I Primary Manway Covers & Diaphragms on S/G 1-4; ALARA Briefing
Record RWP 12-1301, Install and Remove Nozzle Dams for SGs 1-4; ALARA Briefing
Record RWP 12-1302, EDDY Current Testing on SG 1-4 & All Associated Work; ALARA
Briefing Record RWP 12-1303, Sludge Lance on S/G 1-4 & all Associated Work; ALARA
Briefing Record RWP 12-1305,  Radiological Surveys #152638, 9/25/12 20:58, S/G Manway Platt #1; #152279, 9/20/12 14:59, S/G Channel Head
Hot leg; #152281 9/20/12 15:30, S/G Channel Head Cold Leg; #152688 9/26/12 11:15, S/G 
8  Attachment Manway Platt 2; #152244 9/20/12 6:25 S/G Channel Head Hot Leg; #152245 9/20/12 6:35 S/G Channel Head Cold Leg; #152690 9/26/12 11:26 S/G Manyway Platt 3; #152246 9/20/12 6:43 S/G 3 Channel Head Hot Leg; #152282 9/20/12 15:57 S/G 4 Channel Head
Hot Leg; #152639 9/25/12 21:05 S/G Manway Platt 4; #152653 9/26/12 1:29 S/G #3 Hand-
Hole Plat
Work-In-Progress Reviews NMP-HP-104 (or equivalent) RWP 12-1303, 9/27/12 80% Review; RWP 12-1302, 9/23/12 50% Review; RWP 12-1300 9/24/12 50% Review; RWP 12-1301 9/24/12 50% Review; RWP !2-1303 9/25/12 50% Review; RWP 12-1304 9/25/12 50% Review
NMP-HP-204 Form 8 Respirator Use Evaluation Worksheets for RWP 12-1301 Radiological Surveys: #38622, 1/22/02, Plant Vogtle U1 Transfer Canal- top view #117917, 7/14/09, U1 Transfer Canal- topview #152208, 9/19/12, U1 Transfer Canal- Side view ALARA Briefing Record RWP 12-1004, Install/Remove Scaffold in U1 CTMT
ALARA Briefing Record RWP 12-1104, Waste and Decon Routines in U1 CTMT
ALARA Briefing Record RWP 12-1618, Repair of U1 Transfer Canal  ALARA Post-Job Report 11-2509, RPV Cold Leg Nozzle Inspection in U2 Annulus ALARA Post-Job Report 11-2302, Eddy Current Testing on S/G 1&4  CAP Documents CR 167416, The accumulated dose for the U-1 Aux Bldg ECCS Flowpath Verification that was performed CR 339453, HP Self Assessment on High Rad Area Controls CR 346242, Dose goal exceeded for placing old UFC skid into shipping container  Section 2RS3:  In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals 43635-C, "Operation and Calibration of the AMS-4 Continuous Air Monitor", Rev. 18.1 47013-C, "Inspection, Repair, and Storage of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus", Ver. 37
NMP-HP-301, "Airborne Radioactivity Sampling and Evaluation", Ver. 1.2
00970-C, "Respiratory Protection Program", Rev. 11.4
NMP-GM-002, "Corrective Action Program", Ver. 12.1  Records and Data Compressed Air/Gas Quality Testing, SCBA Compressor (Demin Plant), 2/5/10, 5/10/10, 8/11/10, 11/9/10, 2/14/11, 5/11/11, 8/25/11, 11/7/11, 2/9/12, 5/7/12, 8/14/12 00012-C, "Shift Manning Requirements", Rev. 17.1, Data Sheet 1, Minimum Shift Manning (Either Unit in Mode 1-4), Day Shift, 9/21/12 Qualification List, ID V-GE-099H, MSA High Pressure Firehawk MMR SCBA, Maintenance, Health Physics, and Operations Qualification List, ID V-HP-999 MSA C.A.R.E. Tech
Control Room Monthly Emergency SCBA Inspection, 8/7/12
TSC Monthly Emergency SCBA Inspection, 8/10/12
SCBA PosiChek3 Test Results, SCBA Unit HP-82, 11/26/10, 12/30/10, 11/23/11 SCBA Posichek3 Test Results, SCBA Unit HP-61, 12/29/10, 12/28/11 SCBA Posichek3 Test Results, SCBA Unit HP-58, 8/24/10, 8/25/11, 8/27/12
Maintenance Record Report, SCBA Units HP-58, HP-61, HP-82, 8/1/10 - 9/16/12 
9  Attachment CAP Documents V-HP-2011, Fleet Oversight Audit of Health Physics, 8/15/11 CR 167804
Section 2RS4:  Occupational Dose Assessment Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals NMP-HP-107-001, "Instructions for Retrieving, Printing and Updating Individual Radiation Exposure Records", Version 1.0 NMP-HP-105, "Comparisons of OSLD and ED Dosimetry Results", Ver. 1.0
NMP-HP-106, "Investigating of Exposures Exceeding Fleet Administrative Limits", Ver. 1.0 NMP-HP-103, "Skin Dose Assessment", Ver. 1.1
NMP-HP-100, "Bioassay Program", Ver. 1.0 NMP-HP-101, "In-Vivo Bioassay and Internal Dose Assessment", Ver. 1.0 45013-C, "Issuance, Use and Collection of Personnel Dosimetry", Ver. 26.3
Records and Data Canberra Report of Performance Testing Results for Nuclear Enterprises (NE) Model SPM 904B/906 Personnel Portal Monitor, May 18, 2012 Personnel Contamination Events/Personnel Contamination Reports (PCE/PCR) Logs, 9/2011-9/2012 EDE & NRC Form 5 Calculations for Steam Generator Multibadging Jobs entry made on 9/20/12; Multibadge RCA Authorization/Worksheets NMP-HP-109 Data Sheets, Investigation of Lost, Damaged or Malfunctioning Personnel Dosimetry, for occurrence on 9/26/12 NMP-HP-109 Data Sheet 2, Investigation of Lost, Damaged or Malfunctioning Personnel Dosimetry, for occurrence on 9/28/12 Varskin 3 Calculations 10/5/2011
CAP Documents CR 149580, On 4-16-10 there were (62) EPD's and (1) EPD "Vibe Mesh Transmitter" found at the RPF control room CR 152467, A vendor arrived on site on June 22 at 08:45 am. and asked for a source that was shipped to Plant Vogtle. CR 466572, HP Tier 1 outage readiness Health Physics Tier 1 outage review was performed with the HP Manager.  Section 2RS5:  Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals 17005-1, "Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB 05 on Panel 1A2 on MCB", Ver. 33 17100-2, "Annunciator Response Procedure for the Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring System (RMS)", Rev. 20.1 24625-1, "Containment High Range (2RE-0005) Area Monitor 2RX-0005 Channel Calibration", Rev. 29.1 24652-1, "Plant Vent Wide Range Radiogas Monitor 1RX-12444 Channel Operational Test and
Channel Calibration", Rev. 19 34313-C, "Operation of the DRMS Plant Vent Effluent Wide Range Monitor 1(2) RE-12444," Rev 17 43802-C, "Calibration of Gamma Standards", Rev. 12.1 
10  Attachment 43500-C, "Health Physics Instrument Calibration and Control Program," Rev. 53.10 43685-C, "Calibration and Operation of the Asp-1", Rev 20.3 43693-C, "Operation and Use of the Jl Shepherd Model 89-400 Shielded Calibrator, Rev. 2.1
NMP-HP-703, "RO-2, RO-2A and RO-20 Operation and Calibration, Ver.1.0
NMP-HP-703, "Daily Instrumentation Source Checks," Ver 1.1
NMP-EP-110-GL03, "VEGP EALs - ICs, Threshold Values and Basis", Ver. 3.0
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), ODCM, Ver. 28  Records and Data 10 CFR Part 61 Analysis, DAW, Dated 12/21/2011
10 CFR Part 61 Analysis, DAW, Dated 12/28/2010
Chemistry Issues Turnover Log, Dated 09/17/2012 In Situ Calibration of High Range Monitors, VEGP Units 1&2, Dated 02/18/1997 LS 6500 SN 7069842 Source Check Response Charts, Dated 02/11/2011 - 03/28/2012
HPGE Detector #1 Control Charts, Dated 12/25/2011 - 04/03/2012
Radiation Monitor RE-005 Monthly Tech Spec Response Surveillance, Dated May 2010 - September 2012 Radiation Monitor System Health Reports for 1st and 2nd Quarters 2012 LCO/TR Status Sheet, 1RE006 Failure, initiated 08/14/2010
Special Report 2011-001-00, Inoperable Radiation Monitor 1RE-006, Dated 03/29/2011 
RadCal Electrometer Model 2025, SN4676 Calibration Record, Dated 10/31/2011
RadCal Probe Model 20X5-3, SN14166 Calibration Record, Dated 10/31/2011
RadCal Probe Model 20X5-180, SN16121 Calibration Record, Dated 10/31/2011 RadCal Probe Model 20X5-1800, SN21721 Calibration Record, Dated 10/31/2011 Instruments Missing Operation Checks Report, Dated 09/19/2012
Online Instruments Issued Report, Dated 09/19/2012
IPM-7A/8/9, VEGP-HP 0637, Calibration Records, Dated 06/14/2011 and 06/12/2012
Model 28-5 Calibrator, Source VEGP 0292, Calibration Record, Dated 05/18/12 Model 89-400 Calibrator, Source VEGP 0413, Calibration Record, Dated 08/12/2012 Model 878-10 Calibrator, Source VEGP 1049, Calibration Record, Dated 08/12/2012
SAM-11, VEGP-HP 1151, Calibration Records, Dated 05/26/2011 and 05/23/2012
SPM-904B, VEGP-HP 0754, Calibration Records, Dated 02/8/2011 and 02/10/2012
WO 1090817001, Plant Vent Wide Range Radiogas Flow 1F-12444 Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, Dated 03/03/11 WO SNC332418, Plant Vent Wide Range Radiogas Flow 1F-12444 Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, Dated 03/28/2012 WO 1090816001, Plant Vent Wide Range Radiogas Radiation Monitor 1RX12444 Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, Dated 10/15/10 WO 1100068601, 2RE0005 Containment High Range Monitor Channel Calibration, Dated 08/09/2010 WO 11000408201, 2RE0005 Containment High Range Monitor Channel Calibration,
Dated 03/29/2011
WO 1080853101, 1RE0011 In-Core Instrumentation Room Area Monitor Calibration, Dated 09/26/2009 WO 1100216601, 1RE0011 In-Core Instrumentation Room Area Monitor Calibration, Dated 03/14/2011 WO SNC328096, 1RE0018 Waste Liquid Effluent Channel Operational Test and Calibration, Dated 03/09/2012 
11  Attachment WO 1090816201, 1RE0018 Waste Liquid Effluent Channel Operational Test and Calibration, Dated 01/28/2011 WO 1090816201, 1RE0018 Waste Liquid Effluent Isotopic Channel Calibration, Dated 02/23/2012 WBC Calibration Report, "Calibration of the Canberra Fastscan-1 WBC System at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant", Dated 06/08/2011 and 06/13/2012 WBC Calibration Report, "Calibration of the Canberra Fastscan-2 WBC System at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant", Dated 06/09/2011 and 06/15/2012 
CAP Documents Fleet Oversight Audit of Health Physics, V-HP-2011, Dated 08/15/2011
CR 285751 CR 302822 CR 410359
CR 321427
CR 472385
CR 483434 CR 481949 CR 490231
CR 521213
Section 4OA1:  Performance Indicator Verification Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals 00163-C, "NRC Performance Indicator and Monthly Operating Report Preparation and Submittal", Ver. 14.3 
Records and Data Liquid Permit Post-Release Data Permit # L-20120725-087-B Gas Permit Post-Release Data Permit # G-20120813-171-C Gas Permit Post-Release Data Permit # G-20120808-165-C
Liquid Permit Post-Release Data Permit # G-20120803-091-B
ED Alarm Log Sept 2011-Sept 2012
CAP Documents CR 349797, Trouble shoot plan for U2 CVCS Demin Results in Resin in Drain Line CR 474221, Dose equivalent Iodine definition in Tech Specs and ODCM does not match
CR 480703, U-1 RMWST degassifier dissolved oxygen anomaly
CR 354479, Increased dose rates in 2AB-A-72
Section 4OA2:  Identification and Resolution of Problems Procedures/Calculations/Engineering Documents CAR 196113 - Root Cause and Corrective Actions Evaluation for the Unit 1 Steam Generator Loop T Mismatch 12001-C, Unit Heat Up to Hot Shutdown (Mode 5 to Mode 4)
14850-1/2, Cold Shutdown Valve In-Service Test 26854-C, MSIV Actuator Maintenance 
 
12  Attachment Condition Reports 530916 - Unit 1 steam generators 2&3 do not indicate steam flow  Section 4OA7:  Licensee Identified Violations Radiological Survey 151559, Valve Gallery SFP Cooling Demin (1AXA46) CR 519818
LIST OF ACRONYMS  1R17  Unit 1 Refueling Outage 17 ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ARM  Area Radiation Monitor CAP Corrective Action Program CFR  Code of Federal Regulations
CR  Condition Report
DAW  Dry Active Waste
DPW  Declared Pregnant Worker ED  Electronic Dosimeter FSAR  Final Safety Analysis Report
HP  Health Physics
HPT  HP Technician
HRA  High Radiation Area
IP  Inspection Procedure LHRA  Locked High Radiation Area NCV  Non-cited Violation
NPR  Negative Pressure Respirator
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
OA  Other Activities OSLD  Optically Stimulated Luminescent Dosimeter PCM Personnel Contamination Monitor
PI  Performance Indicator
PM  Portal Monitor
Radwaste Radioactive Waste
RCA  Radiologically Controlled Area RS Radiation Safety RWP Radiation Work Permit
S/G  Steam Generator
SAM  Small Article Monitor
SCBA  Self-contained Breathing Apparatus SDP  Significance Determination Process SFP  Spent Fuel Pool
TS Technical Specification
U1  Unit 1
VHRA  Very High Radiation Area
WBC  Whole Body Counter 


T. Tynan                                    2
In accordance with the 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its
enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the
NRCs Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public
Electronic Reading Room).
                                            Sincerely,
                                            /RA/
                                            Frank Ehrhardt, Chief
                                            Reactor Projects Branch 2
                                            Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 05000424, 05000425
License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81
Enclosures: Inspection Report 05000424/2012005 and 05000425/2012005
              w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: (See page 3)
        T. Tynan                                        2
        In accordance with the 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its
        enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
        NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the
        NRCs Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is
        accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public
        Electronic Reading Room).
                                                        Sincerely,
                                                        /RA/
                                                        Frank Ehrhardt, Chief
                                                        Reactor Projects Branch 2
                                                        Division of Reactor Projects
        Docket Nos.: 05000424, 05000425
        License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81
        Enclosures: Inspection Report 05000424/2012005 and 05000425/2012005
                        w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
        cc w/encl: (See page 3)
X PUBLICLY AVAILABLE            G NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE                  G SENSITIVE      X NON-SENSITIVE
ADAMS: G Yes    ACCESSION NUMBER:_________________________                X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE G FORM 665 ATTACHED
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SIGNATURE        Via email      Via email    Via email      Via email      Via email        Via email    Via email
NAME              MCain          TChandler    BCaballero      ANielsen        CDykes          WPursley      JLaughlin
DATE                01/25/2013    02/31/2013    01/25/2013      01/28/2013      01/28/2013      01/29/2013    01/28/2013
E-MAIL COPY?        YES    NO    YES    NO  YES      NO    YES      NO    YES      NO      YES      NO  YES      NO
OFFICE            RII:DRP        RII:DRP
SIGNATURE        MOM /RA/      FJE /RA/
NAME              MMiller        FEhrhardt
DATE                01/20/2013    02/01/2013    2/  /2013      2/  /2013      2/  /2013      2/  /2013    2/  /2013
E-MAIL COPY?        YES    NO    YES    NO  YES      NO    YES      NO    YES      NO      YES      NO  YES      NO
        OFFICIAL RECORD      COPY      DOCUMENT    NAME:      G:\DRPII\RPB2\VOGTLE\REPORTS\2012\2012-005\VOGTLE
        2012005.DOCX
T. Tynan                                3
cc w/encl:                                Dennis R. Madison
C. Russ Dedrickson                        Vice President
Fleet Support Supervisor                  Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution              Electronic Mail Distribution
S. Kuczynski                              Leigh Perry
Chairman, President and CEO                SVP & General Counsel-Ops & SNC
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution              Electronic Mail Distribution
Todd L. Youngblood                        T. E. Tynan
Vice President                            Site Vice President
Fleet Oversight                            Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution              Electronic Mail Distribution
W. L. Bargeron                            M. J. Ajluni
Plant Manager                              Nuclear Licensing Director
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant          Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  Electronic Mail Distribution
Electronic Mail Distribution
                                          B. D. McKinney, Jr.
D. G. Bost                                Regulatory Response Manager
Chief Nuclear Officer                      Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  Electronic Mail Distribution
Electronic Mail Distribution
                                          D. W. Daughhetee
N. J. Stringfellow                        Licensing Engineer
Licensing Manager                          Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  Electronic Mail Distribution
Electronic Mail Distribution
                                          Bradley J. Adams
Paula Marino                              Vice President
Vice President                            Fleet Operations Support
Engineering                                Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  Electronic Mail Distribution
Electronic Mail Distribution
                                          T. D. Honeycutt
T. A. Lynch                                Regulatory Response Supervisor
Vice President                            Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant            Electronic Mail Distribution
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution              (cc/w enclosure continued next page)
Arthur H. Domby, Esq.
Troutman Sanders
Electronic Mail Distribution
T. Tynan                                4
(cc w/encl continued)                      Richard Haynes
                                          Director, Division of Waste Management
L. P. Hill                                Bureau of Land and Waste Management
Licensing Supervisor                      S.C. Department of Health and
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  Environmental Control
Electronic Mail Distribution              2600 Bull Street
                                          Columbia, SC 29201
L. L. Crumpton
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Letter to Tom E. Tynan from Frank Ehrhardt dated February 1, 2013
SUBJECT:      VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
              REPORT 05000424/2012005 AND 05000425/2012005
Distribution w/encl:
C. Evans, RII
L. Douglas, RII
OE Mail
RIDSNRRDIRS
PUBLIC
RidsNrrPMVogtle Resource
          U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                          REGION II
Docket Nos.:        50-424, 50-425
License Nos.:        NPF-68, NPF-81
Report Nos.:        05000424/2012005 and 05000425/2012005
Licensee:            Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)
Facility:            Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:            Waynesboro, GA 30830
Dates:              October 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012
Inspectors:          M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector
                    T. Chandler, Resident Inspector
                    B. Caballero, Senior Operations Engineer
                    A. Nielsen Senior Health Physicist
                    C. Dykes Health Physicist
                    W. Pursley Health Physicist
                    J. Laughlin Emergency Preparedness Inspector
                    R. Williams Reactor Inspector
                    A. Vargas-Mendez Reactor Inspector
Approved by:        Frank Ehrhardt, Chief
                    Reactor Projects Branch 2
                    Division of Reactor Projects
                                                                    Enclosure
                              SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000424/2012-005, 05000425/2012-005; 10/01/2012 - 12/31/2012; Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Post-Maintenance Testing, Identification and Resolution
of Problems
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspectors. Three
non-cited violations (NCVs) with very low safety significance (Green) were identified.
The significance of inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e., great than Green,
or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC)
0609, Significance Determination Process dated June 19, 2012. Cross-cutting aspects
are determined using IMC 0310, Components Within The Cross-Cutting Areas dated
October 28, 2011. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance
with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated June 7, 2012. The NRCs program for
overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process revision 3.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) for failure to meet the requirements of
10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was
identified for failure to provide adequate work instructions in the maintenance procedure
used to modify 480V EMAX safety-related switchgear breakers. Specifically, when
modifying the breaker by adding a higher amperage closing coil, failure to verify the
proper placement of the wire bundle on top of the closing coil following replacement
resulted in the safety-related 2A NSW cooling tower fan #3 480V EMAX breaker failing
to close when demanded. The licensee replaced the failed breaker and returned the fan
to operable status within 21.5 hours.
The finding was more than minor because it impacted the reactor safety mitigating
systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of
systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and
affected the cornerstone attribute of equipment performance. Since the inspectors
answered No to all of the IMC 0609.04 (dated June 19, 2012) Exhibit 2, section A,
questions 1-4, mitigating systems cornerstone screening questions, the inspectors
concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of this
finding was related to the corrective action program component of the problem
identification and resolution cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate problem
evaluation. [P.1(c)] Specifically, the licensees extent of cause evaluations performed on
previous 480V EMAX breaker failures (caused by restricted movement of the close
lever) did not identify the potential of the closing coil wire bundle to interfere with the
proper movement of the close lever. The licensees corrective action to the 480V EMAX
breaker issue was to revise the maintenance procedure used to perform maintenance on
EMAX breakers (procedure 28480-C, 480V EMAX Breaker Maintenance), and then
inspect all 480V EMAX breakers on site that had been modified with the higher
amperage closing coil to verify that the wire bundles were not interfering with the
operation of the close coil. The licensee entered this into their corrective action program
as CR 549999 and CR 550736. (Section 1R19)
                                                                                      Enclosure
                                          3
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) for failure to meet the requirements of
10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was
identified for failure to provide adequate work instructions in the operations and
maintenance procedures used to open main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) that were
bound in their closed seat. Specifically, the operations and maintenance procedures
used to open the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard MSIVs did not provide instructions to limit
the magnitude of the force applied to the valve stems while attempting to open the
valves, which ultimately resulted in the brittle failure of the valve stems. The licensee
conducted ultrasonic testing of the remaining six Unit 1 MSIVs to verify that the valve
stems were intact. The two failed valve stems were replaced, and the reactor was
restarted nine days later.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality
attribute of the reactor safety - initiating events cornerstone and it adversely affected the
cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and
challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
Specifically, the failure to provide adequate work instructions to operations and
maintenance personnel resulted in the failure of both the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard
MSIVs and the subsequent manual reactor trip. Since the inspectors answered no to
the Exhibit 1, section B, initiating events screening question, the inspectors concluded
that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding
was related to the work control component of the human performance cross-cutting area
due to less-than-adequate work planning. [H.3(a)] Specifically, the licensees
procedures used to open the MSIVs that were stuck on their closed seat did not contain
instructions or precautions to limit the magnitude of the force applied to the valve stems
while attempting to open the valves. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective
action program as CR 530916. (Section 4OA2)
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
Green: The inspectors identified a Green, self-revealing, Non-cited Violation of technical
specification 5.7.1, High Radiation Area, for an unauthorized entry into a High
Radiation Area (HRA). A maintenance worker entered a HRA in Unit 1 containment
without being briefed on the radiological conditions. The licensee entered this issue into
their corrective action program as CR 523976 and took immediate corrective actions
including an outage work crew stand down.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the occupational
radiation safety cornerstone attribute of human performance and adversely affects the
cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from
exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor
operation. The finding was evaluated using the occupational radiation safety
significance determination process. The finding was not related to As Low As
Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) planning, nor did it involve an overexposure or
substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not
compromised. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety
                                                                                    Enclosure
                                              4
        significance (Green). This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human
        performance, work practices [H.4.b] because the HRA event was a direct result of poor
        communications during the pre-job briefing and a lack of procedure adherence on the
        part of the maintenance worker. The licensee entered this issue into the Corrective
        Action Program (CAP) as CR 523976. (Section 2RS1)
Violations of very low safety significance that were identified by the licensee have been
reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been
entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and the corrective action
tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
                                                                                        Enclosure
                                      REPORT DETAILS
      Summary of Plant Status
      Unit 1 started the report period shutdown for a planned refueling outage. The licensee
      conducted a reactor startup on October 8; however the licensee shutdown unit 1 later
      that day due to issues with two main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). The licensee
      restarted unit 1 on October 17 and attained full rated thermal power (RTP) power on
      October 21. Unit 1 operated at essentially full RTP for the remainder of the inspection
      period.
      Unit 2 operated at essentially full RTP for the entire inspection period.
1.    REACTOR SAFETY
      Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
.1    Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the stations adverse weather procedures
      written for extreme low temperatures. The inspectors verified that weather related
      equipment deficiencies identified during the previous year had been corrected prior to
      the onset of seasonal extremes. The inspectors evaluated the licensees
      implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory
      measures before the onset of seasonal extreme weather conditions. Documents
      reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors evaluated the following risk-
      significant systems:
      *  Unit 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) system (both trains)
      *  Unit 2 nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) system (both trains)
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2    Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
a.    Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparations to protect risk-significant systems
      from predicted severe weather conditions of sub-freezing temperatures expected on
      December 21, 2012. The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of adverse
      weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures, including operator
      staffing, before the onset of and during the adverse weather conditions. The inspectors
                                                                                      Enclosure
                                              6
      reviewed the licensees plans to address the ramifications of potentially lasting effects
      that may result from sub-freezing temperatures. The inspectors verified that operator
      actions specified in the licensees adverse weather procedure maintained readiness of
      essential systems. The inspectors verified that required surveillances were current, or
      were scheduled and completed, if practical, before the onset of anticipated adverse
      weather conditions. The inspectors also verified the licensee implemented periodic
      equipment walk-downs or other measures to ensure that the condition of plant
      equipment met operability requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the
      Attachment.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1    Partial Walkdown
      The inspectors verified that critical portions of selected risk-significant systems were
      correctly aligned. The inspectors selected systems for assessment because they were a
      redundant or backup system/train, were important for mitigating risk for the current plant
      conditions, had been recently realigned, or were a single-train system. The inspectors
      determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures and drawings. The
      inspectors verified that critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned by
      performing partial walkdowns. Document reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The
      inspectors selected the following three systems/trains to inspect:
      *  Diesel-driven fire water pump #2, the motor-driven firewater pump, and the
          associated yard piping system while the diesel-driven firewater pump # 1 was out of
          service for a scheduled maintenance outage
      *  Unit 1 train B containment spray (CS) system while the Unit 1 train A CS system was
          out of service due to a planned maintenance outage.
      *  Unit 1 train B residual heat removal (RHR) system
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2    Complete Walkdown
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors verified the alignment of the Unit 1 A train residual heat removal (RHR)
      system. The inspectors selected this system for assessment because it is a risk-
      significant mitigating system. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by
      reviewing plant procedures, drawings, the updated final safety analysis report, and other
      documents. In order to identify any deficiencies that could affect the ability of the system
      to perform its function(s), the inspectors reviewed records related to outstanding design
                                                                                          Enclosure
                                            7
    issues and maintenance work requests. The inspectors verified that the selected system
    was correctly aligned by performing a complete walk down of accessible components.
    To verify the licensee was identifying and resolving equipment alignment discrepancies,
    the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents, including condition reports and
    outstanding work orders, as well as periodic reports containing information on the status
    of risk-significant systems, including maintenance rule reports and system health
    reports. Document reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b.  Findings
    No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05AQ)
a.  Inspection Scope
    Quarterly Inspection
    The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of selected fire plans by comparing the fire plans
    to the defined hazards and defense-in-depth features specified in the fire protection
    program. In evaluating the fire plans, the inspectors assessed the following items:
    (1) control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, (2) fire detection systems, (3)
    water-based fire suppression systems, (4) gaseous fire suppression systems, (5) manual
    firefighting equipment and capability (6) passive fire protection features, (7)
    compensatory measures and fire watches, and (8) issues related to fire protection
    contained in the licensees corrective action program. The inspectors toured the
    following five fire areas to assess material condition and operational status of fire
    protection equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
    *    Unit 1 north and south main steam valve room, fire zones 99, 104 and 45
    *    Unit 2 control building level B east penetration areas (zones 62, 63 and 82) and west
          penetration areas (zones 60, 61, and 64)
    *    Unit 1A and 1B nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) pump rooms, fire zones 160A
          and 160B
    *    Unit 1 A, B, C, and D class 1E 125 VDC station batteries and associated switchgear
          rooms, fire zones 71, 76, 77A, 77B, 78A, 78B, 79A, 79B, 56A, 56B, 83, and 152
    *    Unit 2 A, B, C, and D class 1E 125 VDC station batteries and associated switchgear
          rooms, fire zones 71, 76, 77A, 77B, 78A, 78B, 79A, 79B, 56A, 56B, 83, and 152
b.  Findings
    No findings were identified.
                                                                                        Enclosure
                                            8
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
.1    Internal Flooding
      The inspectors reviewed related flood analysis documents and walked down the areas
      listed below that contain risk significant structures, systems, and components
      susceptible to flooding. The inspectors verified plant design features and plant
      procedures for flood mitigation were consistent with design requirements and internal
      flooding analysis assumptions. The inspectors also assessed the condition of flood
      protection barriers and drain systems. In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee
      was identifying and properly addressing issues using their corrective action program.
      Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
      *    Unit 2 residual heat removal (RHR) and containment spray (CS) pump rooms
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2    Underground Cables
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed related flood analysis documents and inspected the areas listed
      below that contain cables whose failure could disable risk significant equipment. The
      inspector directly observed the condition of cables and cable support structures and, as
      applicable, verified that dewatering devices and drainage systems were functioning
      properly. In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee was identifying and properly
      addressing issues using their corrective action program. Documents reviewed are listed
      in the Attachment.
      *    Cable Pull Boxes: 1NE7ADKEM40, 1NE7ADKEM39, 1NE9GHKEPB01
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)
.1    Annual Review
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors verified the readiness and availability of the Unit 1 emergency diesel
      generator (EDG) jacket water (JW) heat exchanger to perform its design function by
      observing performance tests or reviewing reports of those tests, verifying the licensee
      uses the periodic maintenance method outlined in Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water
                                                                                        Enclosure
                                            9
      System Problems Affecting Safety Related Equipment, observing the licensees heat
      exchanger inspections and verifying critical operating parameters through direct
      observation or by reviewing operating data. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the
      licensee had entered any significant heat exchanger performance problems into their
      corrective action program and that the licensees corrective actions were appropriate.
      Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)
.1    Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario administered to an operating
      crew conducted in accordance with the licensees accredited requalification training
      program. The inspectors assessed licensed operator performance, the ability of the
      licensee to administer the scenario and evaluate the operators, the quality of any post-
      scenario critique, any follow-up actions taken by the facility licensee, and the
      performance of the simulator. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2    Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (Licensed Operator Performance):
      The inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room on
      October 8, during the reactor startup following the 1R17 refueling outage. Documents
      reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Inspectors observed licensed operator
      performance to assess the following:
      *  Use of plant procedures
      *  Control board manipulations
      *  Communications between crew members
      *  Use and interpretation of instruments, indications, and alarms
      *  Use of human error prevention techniques
      *  Documentation of activities
      *  Management and supervision
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
                                                                                      Enclosure
                                            10
.3    Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results (71111.11A)
  a. Inspection Scope
      On November 29, 2012, the licensee completed administering the annual requalification
      operating test and biennial written examination, which is required to be administered to
      all licensed operators in accordance with 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2). The inspectors performed
      an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating tests and the
      crew simulator operating tests. These results were compared to the thresholds
      established in Manual Chapter 609, Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human
      Performance Significance Determination Process.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors assessed the licensees treatment of the issues listed below in order to
      verify the licensee appropriately addressed equipment problems within the scope of the
      Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65). The inspectors reviewed procedures and records in
      order to evaluate the licensees identification, assessment, and characterization of the
      problems as well as their corrective actions for returning the equipment to a satisfactory
      condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors also
      interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule coordinator to assess the
      accuracy of performance deficiencies and extent of condition.
      *    Unit 2, 2PV3000 main steam atmospheric relief valve (ARV) exceeded MR
            performance criteria for maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs)
      *    Unit 1, 1HV8702A B train RHR pump hot leg suction valve failed to open when
            demanded from the control room.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify the licensee
      assessed and managed plant risk as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee
      procedures. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees risk assessments
      and implementation of risk management actions. The inspectors also verified that the
      licensee was identifying and resolving problems with assessing and managing
      maintenance-related risk using the corrective action program. Additionally, for
      maintenance resulting from unforeseen situations, the inspectors assessed the
                                                                                          Enclosure
                                            11
    effectiveness of the licensees planning and control of emergent work activities.
    Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
    *  Week of 10/22: Unit 1A EDG 18 month surveillance in conjunction with ongoing
        work in the high voltage switchyard
    *  Week of 10/29: maintenance outage on the 2A EDG concurrent with maintenance
        activities on various breakers in the high-voltage switchyard.
    C  Week of 11/12: performing testing on the 2B EDG concurrent with maintenance
        activities in the high-voltage switchyard.
    C  Week of 12/3: rendering the Unit 1 B train NSCW cooling tower fans inoperable to
        perform inspections of the 480V EMAX breakers.
    C  Week of 12/17: rendering the Unit 1 A train NSCW cooling tower fans inoperable to
        perform inspections of the 480V EMAX breakers.
b.  Findings
    No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors reviewed the following five evaluations to verify they met the
    requirements of procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and NMP-GM-
    002-001, Corrective Action Program Instructions. The scope of these inspections
    included a review of the technical adequacy of the evaluations, the adequacy of
    compensatory measures, and the impact on continued plant operation. Inspectors
    reviewed licensee procedures and conducted walkdowns in accordance with OpESS FY
    2012-02 Technical Specification Interpretation and Operability Determination,
    inspection guidance to ensure that the licensee properly interprets Technical
    Specification (TS) Bases, properly develops operability determinations, and adheres to
    the NRCs guidance on the temporary use of manual actions to support operability
    determinations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
    C  CR 501741, Unit 1A EDG unit available light is not working
    C  CR 533822, Unit 1 and 2 main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)
    C  CR 550736, Unit 2A NSCW fan #3 failed to close
    C  CR 479829, Unit 2B RHR oil sample analysis
    C  CR 562504, Gas void discovered at 1-1208-X4-05
b.  Findings
    No findings were identified.
                                                                                      Enclosure
                                            12
1R18 Plant Modifications
a.  Inspection Scope
    Temporary Modification: The inspectors reviewed minor design change package
    SNC439341/1.0 which allowed the temporary installation of clamping device on valve 1-
    1208-U4-A11, auxiliary pressurizer spray valve, to address body-to-bonnet leakage of
    the non-isolable valve. Inspectors also reviewed the associated 10 CFR Part 50.59
    screening criteria against the system design bases documentation and procedure
    00307-C, Temporary Modifications. The inspectors reviewed implementation,
    configuration control, post-installation test activities, drawing and procedure updates,
    and operator awareness for this temporary modification.
b.  Findings
    No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a.  Inspection Scope
    The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for
    the following six maintenance activities to verify that the testing met the requirements of
    procedure 29401-C, Work Order Functional Tests, for ensuring equipment operability
    and functional capability was restored. The inspectors also reviewed the test
    procedures to verify the acceptance criteria were sufficient to meet the Technical
    Specification (TS) operability requirements.
    C  MWO SNC410412, Unit 1 Train B Safety Injection Accumulator Vent Header
        Isolation Valve 1HV-0943B
    C  MWO SNC439646, 1HV-3016B Disassemble MSIV and MWO SNC439647, 1HV-
        3026B Disassemble MSIV
    C  MWO SNC43990, 1HV-3006A Disconnect Actuator and Perform Ultra-Sonic Testing
    C  MWO SNC424222- 2A EDG Replace O-Rings in 2R, 2L, 7R, and 7L Fuel Injectors
    C  MWO SNC127251 - Clean, Inspect, and Lubricate Valve Stem
    C  MWO SNC447741 - 2A NSCW Fan #3 Not Operating
b.  Findings
    Introduction: A Green self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B
    Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was identified for failure to provide
    adequate work instructions in the maintenance procedure used to modify 480V EMAX
    safety-related switchgear breakers. Specifically, when modifying the breaker by adding
    a higher amperage closing coil, failure to verify the proper placement of the wire bundle
    on top of the closing coil following replacement resulted in the safety-related 480V
    EMAX breaker failing to close when demanded. Investigation revealed that the wire
    bundle on top of the closing coil was positioned such that it prevented the close lever
    from fully seating, thus preventing the breaker from closing.
                                                                                        Enclosure
                                      13
Description: At 0700 on November 19, 2012, the control room operators noted that the
2A NSCW cooling tower fan #3 did not start when the associated tower return valve
opened. On Unit 2, NSCW cooling tower fan #3 is interlocked to automatically start
when the associated tower return valve opens and initiates flow to the tower spray lines.
At the direction of the shift supervisor, the operators attempted to start fan #3 manually
from the main control room, but the fan did not start. The green light for the hand switch
indicated that control power was available. The licensee declared the fan inoperable
and an incident response team (IRT) was assembled. The 480V EMAX breaker was
replaced and the monthly surveillance test was successfully completed. The fan was
declared operable at 4:30 a.m. on November 20, 2012. The investigation of the failed
breaker revealed that the wire bundle on top of the closing coil was in physical contact
with the side of the close lever, preventing the close lever from fully seating, thus
preventing the breaker from closing. When the wire bundle was properly anchored away
from the close lever, the breaker operated normally. The IRT determined that the wire
bundle on this breaker had been improperly repositioned following modification of the
breaker. The 480V EMAX breakers that supply specific safety-related loads at Vogtle
must be modified by installing a higher amperage closing coil because with the current
plant design, the closing coils are continuously energized. Maintenance procedure
28480-C Rev.26, 480V EMAX Breaker Maintenance, did not provide any guidance on
how to anchor the wire bundle following closing coil replacement so that the wire bundle
did not interfere with the operation of the close lever. The licensee entered this issue
into their corrective action program as condition reports (CR) 549999 and CR 550736.
Analysis: The failure of the breaker to close when demanded and start the safety-
related NSCW cooling tower fan was a performance deficiency. The inspectors
concluded that the finding was more than minor because it impacted the reactor safety
mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and
capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable
consequences and affected the cornerstone attribute of equipment performance.
Specifically, failure of the 480V EMAX breaker to close when demanded resulted in the
2A NSCW cooling tower fan #3 being inoperable for approximately 21.5 hours.
Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings dated
June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that finding affected the mitigating systems
cornerstone. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The
Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012.
The inspectors used the Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings (IMC 0609.04
Exhibit 2, dated June 19, 2012) to characterize the finding. Since the inspectors
answered No to all of the Exhibit 2, section A, questions 1-4, mitigating systems
cornerstone screening questions, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very
low safety significance (Green).
The inspectors determined the primary cause of the performance deficiency was that the
maintenance technicians who were modifying the 480V EMAX breakers were unaware
that the improper placement of the closing coil wire bundle could interfere with the
operation of the close lever. The inspectors determined that the cause of this finding
was related to the corrective action program component of the problem identification and
resolution cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate problem evaluation [P.1(c).]
                                                                                  Enclosure
                                            14
    Specifically, the licensees extent of cause evaluations performed on previous 480V
    EMAX breaker failures (caused by restricted movement of the close lever) did not
    identify the potential of the closing coil wire bundle to interfere with the proper movement
    of the close lever.
    Enforcement: The inspectors determined that the finding represents a violation of
    regulatory requirements because it involved inadequate maintenance procedures used
    to modify safety-related plant equipment. 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B Criterion V,
    Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that procedures shall include
    appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important
    activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Contrary to the above, maintenance
    procedure 28480-C Rev.26, 480V EMAX Breaker Maintenance, did not provide
    guidance on how to anchor the wire bundle following closing coil replacement so that the
    wire bundle did not interfere with the operation of the close lever. As a result of the
    violation, the 2A NSCW cooling tower fan #3 was rendered inoperable for a period of
    approximately 21.5 hours on November 19 and 20. Because this violation was of very
    low safety significance and was entered into the licensees corrective action program as
    CR 549999 and CR 550736, this violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with
    Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000425/2012005-01, Inadequate
    Maintenance Procedure Results in Inoperability of NSCW Cooling Tower Fan.)
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a.  Inspection Scope
    The inspectors performed the activities described below for the 1R17 refueling outage
    that ended on October 18, 2012. The inspectors confirmed that, when the licensee
    removed equipment from service, the licensee maintained defense-in-depth
    commensurate with the outage risk control plan for key safety functions and applicable
    TS and that configuration changes due to emergent work and unexpected conditions
    were controlled in accordance with the outage risk control plan. Inspection activities
    included:
    C  Observed refueling activities for compliance with TS, to verify proper tracking of fuel
        assemblies from the spent fuel pool to the core, and to verify foreign material
        exclusion was maintained
    C  Performed containment closure activities, including a detailed containment walkdown
        prior to startup, to verify no evidence of leakage and that debris had not been left
        which could affect the performance of the containment sump
    C  Observed heat up and startup activities to verify that TS, license conditions, and
        other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites for
        mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant conditions. Reactor
        coolant system (RCS) integrity was verified by reviewing RCS leakage calculations
        and containment integrity was verified by reviewing the status of containment
        penetrations and containment isolation valves
                                                                                        Enclosure
                                          15
b.  Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a.  Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the following eight surveillance test procedures and either
      observed the testing or reviewed test results to verify that testing was conducted in
      accordance with the procedures and that the acceptance criteria adequately
      demonstrated that the equipment was operable. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed
      the CR database to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and implemented
      appropriate corrective actions for surveillance test problems.
      Surveillance Tests
      C 14666-1 Rev. 34.1, Train A Diesel Generator and ESFAS Test
      C 14670A-1 Rev. 1.2, Diesel Generator 1A Hot Restart Test
      C 14802A-1 Rev. 4.1, Train A NSCW Pump/Check Valve IST and Response Time Test
      C 14804A-1 Rev. 4, Safety Injection Pump A Inservice and Response Time Test
      Containment Isolation Valve
      C 14372B-1 Rev. 9, Containment Penetration No. 72B RCS loop 3 Accumulator
          Sample Line Local Leak Rate Test
      In-Service Tests (IST)
      C 14808A-2 Rev. 2.2, Train A Centrifugal Charging Pump and Check Valve IST and
          Response Time Test
      RCS Leak Detection
      C 14905-1 Rev. 67.2, RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)
      C 14905-2 Rev. 50.1, RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)
b.  Findings
      No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a.  Inspection Scope
      The NSIR headquarters staff performed an in-office review of the latest revisions of
      various Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) and the Emergency Plan
      located under ADAMS accession numbers ML12188A352, ML122430598,
      ML12081A211, ML12093A204, and ML12115A174.
                                                                                      Enclosure
                                            16
      The licensee determined that in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), the changes made in
      the revisions resulted in no reduction in the effectiveness of the Plan, and that the
      revised Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to
      10 CFR Part 50. The NRC review was not documented in a safety evaluation report and
      did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, these revisions are
      subject to future inspection. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for
      the emergency action level and emergency plan changes on an annual basis.
      Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
2.    RADIATION SAFETY [RS]
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
  a. Inspection Scope
      Hazard Assessment and Instructions to Workers: During facility tours, the inspectors
      directly observed labeling of radioactive material and postings for radiation areas, high
      radiation areas (HRA)s, Very High Radiation Areas (VHRA)s and airborne radioactivity
      areas established within the radiologically controlled area (RCA) of the auxiliary building,
      Unit 1 (U1) reactor containment building, and radioactive waste (radwaste) processing
      and storage locations. The inspectors independently measured radiation dose rates or
      directly observed conduct of licensee radiation surveys for selected RCA areas. The
      inspectors reviewed survey records for several plant areas including surveys for alpha
      emitters, discrete radioactive particles, airborne radioactivity, gamma surveys with a
      range of dose rate gradients, and pre-job surveys for upcoming tasks. The inspectors
      also discussed changes to plant operations that could contribute to changing radiological
      conditions since the last inspection. For selected outage jobs, the inspectors attended
      pre-job briefings and reviewed radiation work permit (RWP) details to assess
      communication of radiological control requirements and current radiological conditions to
      workers.
      Hazard Control and Work Practices: The inspectors evaluated access barrier
      effectiveness for selected Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA) locations and discussed
      changes to procedural guidance for LHRA and VHRA controls with health physics (HP)
      supervisors. The inspectors reviewed implementation of controls for the storage of
      irradiated material within the spent fuel pool (SFP). Established radiological controls
      (including airborne controls) were evaluated for selected Unit 1 Refueling Outage 17
      (1R-17) tasks including maintenance activities in the transfer canal, removal of
      pressurizer code safety valves, and steam generator (S/G) eddy current testing. In
      addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee controls for areas where dose rates could
      change significantly as a result of plant shutdown and refueling operations.
                                                                                        Enclosure
                                        17
  Through direct observations and interviews with licensee staff, inspectors evaluated
  occupational workers adherence to selected RWPs and HP technician (HPT) proficiency
  in providing job coverage. Electronic dosimeter (ED) alarm set points and worker stay
  times were evaluated against area radiation survey results for selected 1R17 job tasks.
  As part of Inspection Procedure (IP) 71124.04, inspectors reviewed the use of personnel
  dosimetry (ED alarms, extremity dosimetry, multibadging in high dose rate gradients,
  etc.). The inspectors also evaluated worker responses to dose and dose rate alarms
  during selected work activities.
  Control of Radioactive Material: The inspectors observed surveys of material and
  personnel being released from the RCA using small article monitor (SAM), personnel
  contamination monitor (PCM), and portal monitor (PM) instruments. The inspectors
  reviewed the last two calibration records for selected release point survey instruments
  and discussed equipment sensitivity, alarm setpoints, and release program guidance
  with licensee staff. The inspectors compared recent 10 Code of Federal Regulations
  (CFR) Part 61 results for the Dry Active Waste (DAW) radioactive waste stream with
  radio nuclides used in calibration sources to evaluate the appropriateness and accuracy
  of release survey instrumentation. The inspectors also reviewed records of leak tests on
  selected sealed sources and discussed nationally tracked source transactions with
  licensee staff.
  Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and assessed Condition
  Reports (CR)s associated with radiological hazard assessment and control. The
  inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve the issues in
  accordance with procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Ver. 12.1. The
  inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment results.
  Radiation protection activities were evaluated against the requirements of Final Safety
  Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 12; Technical Specifications (TS) Sections 5.4 and 5.7;
  10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; and approved licensee procedures. Licensee programs for
  monitoring materials and personnel released from the RCA were evaluated against 10
  CFR Part 20 and IE Circular 81-07, Control of Radioactively Contaminated Material.
  Documents reviewed are listed in Sections 2RS1, 2RS2, 2RS3, and 2RS5 of the
  Attachment.
b. Findings
  Introduction: The inspectors identified a Green, self-revealing, Non-cited Violation
  (NCV) of TS 5.7.1, High Radiation Area, for an unauthorized entry into a HRA.
  Description: On September 26, 2012, a maintenance worker entered U1 containment to
  locate and walk down two Nuclear Service Cooling Water check valves in preparation for
  inspection. Prior to the entry, the worker received a pre-job briefing from HP to allow
  access into containment. Neither the worker nor the HPT performing the briefing were
  confident of the valve locations, however they determined that Quadrant 1 of the 184
  elevation was the most likely area to find the valves. Since the assigned RWP (as well
  as TS 5.7.1) did not allow entry into any HRAs without first obtaining a briefing on the
  radiological conditions, the worker was briefed on conditions in HRAs on the 184
                                                                                    Enclosure
                                    18
elevation. The worker was not briefed on conditions in HRAs in other parts of
containment. During the entry, the worker was unable to locate one of the check valves
on the 184 elevation and proceeded to exit out a stairwell to the 197 elevation. On the
197 elevation, the worker observed the other check valve inside a posted HRA. Without
knowledge of dose rates in the area, the worker proceeded past the HRA swing gate to
verify the valve tag number and subsequently received an ED dose rate alarm of 173
mrem/hr. The worker acknowledged the ED alarm and backed out of the HRA. In
addition, HP central control noted the ED alarm via telemetry and sent an HPT to
intercept the worker. The workers ED alarm setpoint was 150 mrem/hr and dose rates
in the area were as high as 445 mrem/hr on contact and 117 mrem/hr at 30 cm. The
licensee entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as CR 523976 and
took immediate corrective actions including an outage work crew stand down.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the unauthorized entry into a HRA was a
performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with
the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance and
adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker
health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine
civilian nuclear reactor operation. Workers who enter HRAs without prior knowledge of
current radiological conditions could receive unintended occupational exposures. The
finding was evaluated using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance
Determination Process (SDP). The finding was not related to As Low As Reasonably
Achievable (ALARA) planning, nor did it involve an overexposure or substantial potential
for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Therefore, the
inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The
inspectors noted that the maintenance worker responded properly to the ED dose rate
alarm and was monitored by HP central control via telemetry, thereby limiting his
potential for unintended exposure. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of
Human Performance, Work Practices [H.4.b] because the HRA event was a direct result
of poor communications during the pre-job briefing and a lack of procedure (RWP)
adherence on the part of the maintenance worker.
Enforcement: TS 5.7.1, High Radiation Area, requires individuals entering HRAs to
meet one or more of the following criteria: 1) be provided with a survey meter; 2) wear
an ED and be made aware of radiological conditions in the area; or 3) be escorted by a
HPT. Contrary to the above, on September 26, 2012, a worker entered a HRA without a
survey meter, without being made aware of radiological conditions in the area, and
without HPT escort. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it
was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CR 523976), this violation is
being treated as an NCV, consistent with the Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000424/425,
2012005-02, Unauthorized Entry into a High Radiation Area.
                                                                                Enclosure
                                          19
2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
a.  Inspection Scope
    Work Planning and Exposure Tracking: The inspectors reviewed planned work activities
    and their collective exposure estimates for the current 1R17 outage. The inspectors
    reviewed ALARA planning packages for the following high collective exposure tasks:
    S/G 1-4 job evolutions (nozzle dam removal and installation, eddy current testing, and
    sludge lance) and repair of unit 1 transfer canal transfer tube isolation valve work. For
    the selected tasks, the inspectors reviewed established dose goals and discussed
    assumptions regarding the bases for the current estimates with responsible ALARA
    planners. The inspectors evaluated the incorporation of exposure reduction initiatives
    and operating experience, including historical post-job reviews, into RWP requirements.
    Day-to-day collective dose data for the selected tasks were compared with established
    dose estimates and evaluated against procedural criteria (work-in-progress review limits)
    for additional ALARA review. Where applicable, the inspectors discussed changes to
    established estimates with ALARA planners and evaluated them against work scope
    changes or unanticipated elevated dose rates.
    Source Term Reduction and Control: The inspectors reviewed the collective exposure
    three-year rolling average from 2009 - 2011 and reviewed historical collective exposure
    trends from 1988 - 2012. The inspectors evaluated historical dose rate trends for
    reactor coolant system piping and compared them to current 1R17 data. Crud burst
    evolution during the first week of the 1R17 outage and source term reduction initiatives
    were reviewed and discussed with Chemistry and HP staff.
    Radiation Worker Performance: The inspectors observed radiation worker performance
    for S/G job evolutions such as the diaphragm and manway removal and nozzle dam
    removal and installation. The inspectors observed ALARA briefings for multiple steam
    generator jobs and emerging jobs such as U1 transfer canal valve work. Radiation
    worker performance was also evaluated as part of IP 71124.01. While observing job
    tasks, the inspectors evaluated the use of remote technologies to reduce dose including
    teledosimetry and remote visual monitoring.
    Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and discussed selected
    CAP documents associated with ALARA program implementation. The inspectors
    evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with
    licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Ver. 12.1. The
    inspectors also evaluated the scope and frequency of the licensees self-assessment
    program and reviewed recent assessment results.
    ALARA program activities were evaluated against the requirements of FSAR Section 12,
    TS Section 5.4, 10 CFR Part 20, and approved licensee procedures. Records reviewed
    are listed in the Attachment.
                                                                                      Enclosure
                                          20
b.  Findings
    No findings were identified.
2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
a.  Inspection Scope
    Engineering Controls: The inspectors reviewed the use of temporary and permanent
    engineering controls to mitigate airborne radioactivity during the 1R17 refueling outage.
    The inspectors observed the use of portable air filtration units for work in contaminated
    areas of the containment building and reviewed filtration unit testing certificates. The
    inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of continuous air monitors and air samplers placed
    in work area breathing zones to provide indication of increasing airborne levels.
    Respiratory Protection Equipment: The inspectors reviewed the use of respiratory
    protection devices to limit the intake of radioactive material. This included review of
    devices used for routine tasks and devices stored for use in emergency situations. As part
    of IP 71124.02, the inspectors reviewed ALARA evaluations for the use of respiratory
    protection devices during work in the lower cavity near the transfer canal. Selected Self-
    Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) units and negative pressure respirators (NPR)s
    staged for routine and emergency use in the Main Control Room and other locations were
    inspected for material condition, SCBA bottle air pressure, number of units, and number of
    spare masks and air bottles available. The inspectors reviewed maintenance records for
    selected SCBA units for the past two years and evaluated SCBA and NPR compliance with
    National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certification requirements. The
    inspectors also reviewed records of air quality testing for supplied-air devices and SCBA
    bottles.
    The inspectors observed the use of air-supplied suits during S/G maintenance work. The
    inspectors discussed training for various types of respiratory protection devices with HP
    staff and interviewed radworkers and control room operators on use of the devices
    including SCBA bottle change-out and use of corrective lens inserts. The inspectors
    reviewed respirator qualification records (including medical qualifications) for several Main
    Control Room operators and emergency responder personnel in the Maintenance and HP
    departments. In addition, inspectors evaluated qualifications for individuals responsible for
    testing and repairing SCBA vital components.
    Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and assessed CRs
    associated with airborne radioactivity mitigation and respiratory protection. The
    inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve the issues in
    accordance with procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Ver. 12.1. The
    inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment results.
    Licensee activities associated with the use of engineering controls and respiratory
    protection equipment were reviewed against TS Section 5.4; 10 CFR Part 20; Regulatory
    Guide 8.15, Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection; and applicable licensee
    procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
                                                                                        Enclosure
                                            21
b.  Findings
    No findings were identified.
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment
a.  Inspection Scope
    External Dosimetry: The inspectors reviewed the licensees National Voluntary
    Accreditation Program (NVLAP) certification data for accreditation for the current year for
    Ionizing Radiation Dosimetry. The inspectors reviewed program procedures for
    processing active personnel dosimeters (ED)s and onsite storage of Optically Stimulated
    Luminescent Dosimeters (OSLD)s. Comparisons between ED and OSLD results,
    including correction factors, were discussed in detail. The inspectors also reviewed
    dosimetry occurrence reports regarding alarming dosimeters.
    Internal Dosimetry: Inspectors reviewed and discussed the in vivo bioassay program
    with the licensee. Inspectors reviewed procedures that addressed methods for
    determining internal or external contamination, releasing contaminated individuals, the
    assignment of dose, and the frequency of measurements depending on the nuclides.
    Inspectors reviewed and evaluated Whole Body Counter (WBC) records selected from
    March 2010 to September 2012. The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for in
    vitro monitoring, however there were no dose assessments using this method to review.
    There were no internal dose assessments for internal exposure greater than 10 millirem
    committed effective dose equivalent to review.
    Special Dosimetric Situations: The inspectors reviewed records for declared pregnant
    workers (DPW)s from March 2010 through September 2012 and discussed guidance for
    monitoring and instructing DPWs. Inspectors reviewed and witnessed the licensees
    practices for monitoring external dose in areas of expected dose rate gradients,
    including the use of multi-badging and extremity dosimetry. The inspectors evaluated
    the licensees neutron dosimetry program including instrumentation which was evaluated
    under procedure 71124.05. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of
    shallow dose assessments for selected Personnel Contamination Events occurring
    between September 2011 and September 2012.
    Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and discussed licensee
    CAP documents associated with occupational dose assessment. Inspectors evaluated
    the licensees ability to identify and resolve the identified issues in accordance with
    procedure NPM-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Version 12.1. The inspectors
    also discussed the scope of the licensees internal audit program and reviewed recent
    assessment results.
    HP program occupational dose assessment activities were evaluated against the
    requirements of FSAR Section 12; TS Section 5.4; 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; and
    approved licensee procedures. Records reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
                                                                                        Enclosure
                                          22
b.  Findings
    No findings were identified.
2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
a.  Inspection Scope
    Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation: During walk-downs of the auxiliary building and
    the RCA exit point, the inspectors observed installed and portable radiation detection
    equipment. These included area radiation monitors (ARM)s, continuous air samplers,
    liquid and gaseous effluent monitors, PCMs, SAMs, PMs, a WBC, count room
    equipment, and portable survey instruments. The inspectors observed the physical
    location of the components, noted their material condition, observed the currency of
    calibration and source check stickers, and discussed performance of equipment with RP
    personnel.
    In addition to equipment walk-downs, the inspectors observed source functional checks
    of portable detection instruments, including ion chambers and telepoles. For the
    portable instruments, the inspectors observed the use of a high-range calibrator and
    discussed periodic output value testing, calibration, and source check processes with
    health physics technicians. The inspectors reviewed calibration records and discussed
    with chemistry personnel alarm setpoint values for PCMs, PMs, effluent monitors,
    WBCs, and an ARM. This included a sampling of instruments used for post-accident
    monitoring such as a containment high-range radiation monitor and effluent monitors for
    noble gas and iodine. The inspectors reviewed the most recent 10 CFR Part 61 analysis
    for DAW to determine if calibration and check sources are representative of the plant
    source term. The inspectors observed computerized performance check calibration
    efficiency information for count room gamma detectors and a liquid scintillation detector.
    The inspectors also observed the currency of calibration for selected EDs at the RCA
    entry point.
    Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed selected CAP reports in
    the area of radiological instrumentation. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability
    to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with procedure NMP-GM-002-001,
    Corrective Action Program Instructions, Ver. 29.0. Documents reviewed are listed in
    the Attachment.
    Effectiveness and reliability of selected radiation detection instruments were reviewed
    against details documented in the following: 10 CFR Part 20; NUREG-0737,
    Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements; FSAR Chapters 11 and 12; and
    applicable licensee procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b.  Findings
    No findings were identified.
                                                                                      Enclosure
                                            23
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
  a.  Inspection Scope
      The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the listed mitigating systems cornerstone
      PIs during the period from October 1, 2011, through September 30, 2012, for Unit 1 and
      Unit 2. The inspectors verified the licensees basis in reporting each data element using
      the PI definitions and guidance contained in procedures 00163-C, NRC Performance
      Indicator and Monthly Operating Report Preparation and Submittal, and Nuclear Energy
      Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline.
      Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
      C Emergency AC Power Systems
      C Cooling Water Systems
      C Safety System Functional Failures
      The inspectors reviewed Unit 1 and Unit 2 operator log entries, the CR data base, the
      Vogtle mitigating system performance indicator basis document, the monthly operating
      reports and monthly PI summary reports to verify that the licensee had accurately
      submitted the PI data.
      Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone: The inspectors reviewed the Occupational
      Exposure Control Effectiveness PI results for the Occupational Radiation Safety
      Cornerstone from June 2011 through September 2012. For the assessment period, the
      inspectors reviewed electronic dosimeter alarm logs and CRs related to controls for
      exposure significant areas. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
      Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone: The inspectors reviewed the Radiological Control
      Effluent Release Occurrences PI results for the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone
      from June 2011 through September 2012. For the assessment period, the inspectors
      reviewed cumulative and projected doses to the public contained in liquid and gaseous
      release permits and CRs related to Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite
      Dose Calculation Manual issues. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedural
      guidance for collecting and documenting PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the
      Attachment.
      The inspectors completed five of the required samples specified in IP 71151.
  b.  Findings
      No findings were identified.
                                                                                      Enclosure
                                            24
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1    Daily Condition Report Review. As required by inspection procedure 71152,
      Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive
      equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors
      performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action
      program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings
      that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensees computerized corrective
      action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.
.2    Focused Review
  a.  Inspection Scope
      The inspectors performed a detailed review of the following CR which addressed the
      failure of the Unit 1 Loop 2 & 3 outboard MSIVs in the closed position during startup.
      The goal of the review was to verify that the full extent of the issue was identified, an
      appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified
      and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the CR against the licensees corrective action
      program as delineated in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program,
      and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action. Documents reviewed are
      listed in the Attachment.
      *    530916 - Unit 1 steam generators 2&3 do not indicate steam flow
    b. Findings and Observations
      Introduction: A Green self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B
      Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was identified for failure to provide
      adequate work instructions in the operations and maintenance procedures used to open
      main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) that were bound in their closed seat. Specifically,
      the operations and maintenance procedures used to open the loop 2 and loop 3
      outboard MSIVs did not provide instructions to limit the magnitude of the force applied to
      the valve stems while attempting to open the valves. Investigation revealed that the
      cause of the stem failures was excessive force applied to the thermally embrittled stems.
      Description: On October 8, with Unit 1 in Mode 2, the operators had begun preparations
      for power ascension. At 1616, as the main feed pump was being placed on line, the
      control room operators noted a divergence in RCS loop differential temperatures (Ts),
      steam pressures, and steam flows between loops 1 & 4 and loops 2 & 3. Loops 1 & 4
      showed increasing loop Ts, lowering steam pressure, and some minimal steam flow,
      while loops 2 & 3 showed no loop T, increasing steam pressures (to the point of lifting
      the loop 2 & 3 atmospheric relief valves), and no steam flow. The Main Control Board
      hand switches indicated that all MSIVs and associated bypass valves were open. The
      operators identified the potential impact to the core neutron flux and stopped power
      ascension. Following discussions with plant management and engineering, the
      operators placed the plant in a safe condition by inserting a manual trip of the reactor at
                                                                                          Enclosure
                                        25
2155. The licensee subsequently assembled an Issue Response Team (IRT) and a root
cause team to investigate the cause of the diverging indications and to determine the
required corrective actions.
The investigations revealed that the outboard MSIVs on both loops 2 & 3 were failed in
the closed position. Upon disassembly, it was discovered the stems of both the failed
MSIVs had undergone brittle fracture just above the T-head, where the valve stem is
connected to the valve disk. Westinghouse representatives were consulted on the MSIV
issue. They conveyed to the licensee that the material used for the MSIV stems, ASME
SA564 Gr. 630PH T 17-4 PH heat treated to 1100oF, is susceptible to embrittlement
when exposed to temperatures above 500oF for a sustained period (after about 10
years). Metallurgical analysis performed on the sheared stems validated that thermal
embrittlement was the failure mechanism. The failure analysis concluded that both stem
fractures were the result of sudden brittle failures from single tensile stress events.
Further investigation by the IRT revealed that the loop 2 outboard MSIV stem failed
during main steam line warming evolutions conducted on October 6 by operations
personnel. The IRT also determined that that the loop 3 outboard MSIV stem failed on
the night of October 7 following activities performed by maintenance personnel to lift the
valve disk off its closed seat.
The root cause team determined that the root cause of the MSIV stem failures was
temperature aging embrittlement of the stem material. The team also determined that
the major contributing causes of the event were thermal binding of the valve disks in the
closed seat and inadequate procedural guidance, i.e. procedures used to open the
MSIVs did not provide instructions or guidance to limit the magnitude of the force applied
to the valve stems while attempting to open the valves, which ultimately resulted in the
brittle failure of the valve stems. The inadequate procedures specified by the root cause
team were operating procedures 12001-C, Unit Heat Up to Hot Shutdown (Mode 5 to
Mode 4), and 14850-1/2, Cold Shutdown Valve In-Service Test, and maintenance
procedure 26854-C, MSIV Actuator Maintenance. The licensee conducted ultrasonic
testing on the remaining six Unit 1 MSIVs to verify that the valve stems were intact. The
two failed valve stems were replaced, and the reactor was restarted on October 17. The
licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 530916.
Analysis: The failure to provide adequate work instructions in the operations and
maintenance procedures used to open main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) that were
stuck on their closed seat was a performance deficiency. The inspectors concluded that
the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality
attribute of the reactor safety - initiating events cornerstone and it adversely affected the
cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and
challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
Specifically, the failure to provide adequate work instructions to operations and
maintenance personnel resulted in the failure of both the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard
MSIVs and the subsequent manual reactor trip.
Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings dated June 19,
2012, the inspectors determined that finding affected the Initiating Events cornerstone.
The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance
                                                                                    Enclosure
                                            26
      Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated 06/19/12. The inspectors
      used the Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings (IMC 0609.04 Exhibit 1,
      dated June 19, 2012) to characterize the finding. Since the inspectors answered No to
      the Exhibit 1, section B, Initiating Events screening question, the inspectors concluded
      that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).
      The primary cause of the performance deficiency, as determined by the inspectors, was
      less than adequate work planning and coordination. The inspectors determined that the
      cause of this finding was related to the work control component of the human
      performance cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate work planning [H.3 (a)].
      Specifically, the licensees procedures used to open the MSIVs that were stuck on their
      closed seat did not contain instructions or precautions to limit the magnitude of the force
      applied to the valve stems while attempting to open the valves.
      Enforcement: The inspectors determined that the finding represents a violation of
      regulatory requirements because it involved inadequate operations and maintenance
      procedures used to operate safety-related plant equipment. 10 CFR 50 Appendix B
      Criterion V requires, in part, that procedures shall include appropriate quantitative or
      qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been
      satisfactorily accomplished. Contrary to the above, the licensees procedures used to
      open the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard MSIVs did not provide instructions to limit the
      magnitude of the force applied to the valve stems while attempting to open the valves.
      As a result of the violation, the loop 2 and loop 3 MSIVs failed in the closed position, and
      the reactor was manually tripped on October 8, extending the 1R17 refueling outage for
      an additional nine days. The licensee conducted ultrasonic testing on the remaining six
      Unit 1 MSIVs to verify that the valve stems were intact. The stems of the loop 2 and
      loop 3 outboard MSIVs were replaced, and the Unit 1 reactor was restarted on October
      17. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered into the
      licensees corrective action program as CR 530916, this violation is being treated as an
      NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV
      05000424/2012005-03, Inadequate Operations and Maintenance Procedures Results in
      Brittle Failure of the Loop 2 and Loop 3 Outboard MSIV Stems.)
.3    Semi-Annual Trend Review
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors performed a review of the licensees Corrective Action Program and
      associated documents to identify trends which could indicate the existence of a more
      significant safety issue. The review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but
      also considered the results of inspector daily CR screening and the licensees trending
      efforts. The review nominally considered the six month period of April 2012 through
      September 2012 although some examples extended beyond those dates when the
      scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors also reviewed several CRs associated
      with operability determinations which occurred during the period. Corrective actions
      associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports were
      reviewed for adequacy. The inspectors also evaluated the trend reports against the
                                                                                        Enclosure
                                            27
      requirements of the licensees corrective action program as specified in licensee
      procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
  b. Findings and Observations
      No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)
.1    (Closed) LER 05000424/2012-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification
      LCOs 3.7.14 and 3.0.3
  a. Inspection Scope
      On August 17, 2012, 1A ESF Chiller condenser vacuum was noted to be 12 inches of
      mercury, with a vacuum of 15 inches of mercury specified as the low limit on operating
      logs. The shift supervisor mistakenly believed condenser pressure was one of the
      parameters which engineering had evaluated and was continuing to monitor with a
      recorder. Condenser pressure was not one of the parameters being monitored and
      recorded on a recorder. When the condenser pressure was recorded as out of
      specification on the operator rounds log sheet, the shift supervisor failed to initiate
      operability and reportability determination processes. This misinformation was carried
      forward through subsequent shifts via logs. During the next five days, 1A ESF Chiller
      condenser vacuum decreased to 4 inches of mercury and stabilized for an additional
      four days prior to initiation of a CR on August 26, 2012. Subsequent investigation and
      consultation with the vendor determined the 1A ESF Chiller was inoperable and the TS
      LCO was entered at 1437 on August 26, 2012. As a result of the delay in recognition of
      the status of the subject chiller, appropriate actions of LCOs 3.7.14 and 3.0.3 were not
      taken. The inspectors reviewed the LER, the associated CR and enhanced apparent
      cause determination, and subsequent action items.
  b. Findings
      One licensee-identified violation was identified, and is documented in section 4OA7 of
      this report. This LER is closed.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1    Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
  a. Inspection Scope
      During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force
      personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee
      security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.
      These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.
                                                                                          Enclosure
                                          28
      These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities
      did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an
      integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.
  b. Findings and Observations
      No findings were identified.
.2    (Discussed) Temporary Instruction 2515/187 - Inspection of Near-Term Task Force
      Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns
  a. Inspection Scope
      Inspectors conducted independent walkdowns to verify that the licensee completed the
      actions associated with the flood protection feature specified in paragraph 03.02.a.2 of
      this TI. Inspectors are performing walkdowns at all sites in response to a letter from the
      NRC to licensees, entitled Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of
      Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the
      Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, dated
      March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340).
      Enclosure 4 of the letter requested licensees to perform external flooding walkdowns
      using an NRC-endorsed walkdown methodology (ADAMS Accession No.
      ML12056A050). Nuclear Energy Industry (NEI) document 12-07 titled, Guidelines for
      Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Protection Features, (ADAMS Accession
      No. ML12173A215) provided the NRC-endorsed methodology for assessing external
      flood protection and mitigation capabilities to verify that plant features, credited in the
      CLB for protection and mitigation from external flood events, and are available,
      functional, and properly maintained.
  b. Findings and Observations
      Findings or violations associated with the flooding, if any, will be documented in the 1st
      quarter integrated inspection report of 2013.
.3    Temporary Instruction 2515/188 - Inspection of Near-Term Task Force
      Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors accompanied the licensee on their seismic walkdowns of the following
      SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 components:
      *  Unit 1 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump A, SWEL 1 item #60, on August 15 in the
          Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Building
      *  Unit 1B Diesel Generator Control Panel, SWEL 1 item #61, on August 15 in the
          Diesel Generator Building
                                                                                          Enclosure
                                          29
  *  Unit 1 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump and Turbine Driver, SWEL 1 item #13, on August
      16 in the AFW Pump House
  *  Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger B, SWEL 2 item #1, on August 21 in the
      Auxiliary Building
  The inspectors verified that the licensee confirmed that the following seismic features
  associated with the above listed components were free of potential adverse seismic
  conditions:
  *  Anchorage was free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware
  *  Anchorage was free of corrosion that is more than mild surface corrosion
  *  Anchorage is free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors
  *  Anchorage configuration was consistent with plant documentation
  *  SSCs will not be damaged from impact by nearby equipment or structures
  *  Overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry
      block walls are secure and not likely to collapse onto the equipment
  *  Attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage
  *  The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could
      cause flooding or spray in the area
  *  The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could
      cause a fire in the area
  *  The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated
      with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary
      installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)
  The inspectors independently performed their walkdowns and verified that the following
  components were free of the potential adverse seismic conditions listed above:
  *  Unit 2A Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver #1, SWEL 1 item #55, on December 17
      in the Diesel Generator Building
  *  Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Pump B, SWEL item #2, on December 17 in the Auxiliary
      Building
  Observations made during the walkdowns that could not be determined to be acceptable
  were entered into the licensees corrective action program for evaluation.
  Additionally, inspectors verified that items that could allow the spent fuel pool to drain
  down rapidly were added to the SWEL and these items were walked down by the
  licensee.
b. Findings and Observations
  No findings were identified.
                                                                                      Enclosure
                                            30
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
.1  Exit Meeting
    On January 11, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Tom
    Tynan and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors
    confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the
    inspection.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
    The following violations of very low significance (Green) or Severity Level IV were
    identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria
    of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as Non-cited Violations.
.1  Failure to Comply with Technical Specification LCOs 3.7.14 and 3.0.3
    TS 3.0.3 requires, in part, that when a limiting condition of operation (LCO) is not met
    and the associated actions are not met, an associated action is not provided, or if
    directed by the associated actions, the unit shall be placed in a mode or other specified
    condition in which the LCO is not applicable. TS 3.7.14 require that two engineered
    safety feature (ESF) room cooler and safety-related chiller trains shall be operable.
    Contrary to the above, on August 17, 2012, at approximately midnight, the unit 1 shift
    supervisor failed to enter the required action statement for TS LCO 3.7.14, Condition A
    when the unit 1A ESF chiller condenser purge pressure was noted to be out of
    specification high. Inoperability of the chiller was not recognized until August 26, 2012,
    and the LCO entered at 1437. Further, during the extended period during which the 1A
    ESF chiller was inoperable (albeit unrecognized as inoperable), opposite train supported
    components as well as redundant room coolers on the train B ESF Chiller and room
    cooler train were removed from service for unrelated activities which resulted in two
    occasions during which TS 3.0.3 should have been applied. The licensee documented
    this event in their corrective action program as CR 507143. Using IMC 0609, dated
    June 19, 2012, Attachment 4, Table 2, the inspectors verified that the finding affected
    the mitigation systems cornerstone. IMC 0609 Attachment 4 Table 3 directed the
    inspectors to use IMC 0609 Appendix A to characterize the finding. Because the finding
    represented an actual loss of function of one train of ECCS for greater than its TS
    Allowed Outage Time, a detailed risk evaluation was required. A detailed risk evaluation
    was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst in accordance with IMC 0609
    Appendix A guidance using the NRC Vogtle SPAR model and the Saphire 8 risk analysis
    code. An Event/Condition Analysis module in Saphire was run with the unit 1A train ESF
    chiller failed with no recovery allowed for a 9 day exposure period. The dominant
    sequence was a loss of offsite power with success of reactor trip and emergency power
    with late failure of feedwater and failure to implement feed and bleed cooling due to
    failure of the Unit 1B train chiller and loss of the safety related switchgear. The detailed
    risk evaluation determined that the risk due to the performance deficiency was an
    increase in core damage frequency of <1E-6/year, a GREEN finding of very low safety
    significance. The risk was mitigated by the availability of alternate train components and
    the short exposure period.
                                                                                        Enclosure
                                          31
.2 Failure to Conduct Required ASME Code Section XI Inspections
  On April 12, 2012, Vogtle staff identified that in-service inspections for the second 10-
  year ISI period were missed for eight ASME Code Class 1 valves. Valves 1/2
  1208U6035, 1/2 1208U6036, 1/2 1208U6037 and 1/2 1208U6038 are chemical and
  volume control system normal and alternate charging check valves to the reactor coolant
  system. Leakage control devices (seal encapsulation devices) were installed on the Unit
  1 valves in 1987 to address recurring body-to-bonnet leakage per an industry approved
  Westinghouse design change. The seal caps were subsequently installed on the unit 2
  valves in 1989. Title 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) requires, in part, that licensees follow the
  pressure test requirements of ASME Code Section XI. ASME Code, Section XI, IWA-
  5240, requires visual examinations as part of system pressure tests. ASME Code
  Section XI, IWA-5242, 1998 Edition through 2000 addenda, requires VT-2 visual
  examinations for pressure retaining bolted connections in borated water systems.
  Contrary to the above, from October, 1987, to the present, Vogtle did not perform a
  visual inspection of the valve body-to-bonnet studs. This finding was more than minor
  because it impacted the initiating events cornerstone and its attribute of equipment
  performance. Specifically, it affected the objective to limit the likelihood of those events
  that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well
  as power operations. Using Inspection manual chapter 0609, dated June 19, 2012,
  Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, this
  finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the licensees
  evaluation was able to demonstrate structural integrity. Specifically, stud stress was not
  sufficiently close to the yield stress to cause a loss of integrity. Therefore, the finding
  does not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that
  mitigation equipment will not be available. The licensee has entered this issue into their
  corrective action program as CRs 438268, 458567, 505111 and 547078. To address
  the issue for the short term, the licensee plans to follow the needed and good practice
  recommendations detailed by the PWROG in letter OG-12-330 which was issued on
  August 16, 2012. The long term corrective actions will be to remove all of the existing
  seal caps and install a bonnet with a canopy seal weld to remove the need for a seal cap
  as a way to mitigate the effects of leakage and to allow visual examination of the bolted
  connections.
.3 Failure to Post High Radiation Area
  10 CFR 20.1902(b) requires licensees to post each HRA with a conspicuous sign or
  signs bearing the radiation symbol and the words CAUTION, HIGH RADIATION AREA
  or DANGER, HIGH RADIATION AREA. Contrary to this, on September 18, 2012, the
  entryway into the Unit 1 spent fuel pool cooling system demineralizer valve gallery was
  discovered to be missing a conspicuous sign bearing the radiation symbol and the words
  CAUTION, HIGH RADIATION AREA or DANGER, HIGH RADIATION AREA.
  Accessible areas inside the Valve Gallery room contained dose rates up to 327 mrem/hr
  at 30 cm. A HP foreman discovered this violation while performing a walkdown of HRA
  postings in the auxiliary building. The licensee took immediate corrective actions upon
  discovery including restoration of the HRA posting (CR 519818). There was no
  evidence of unauthorized worker entry into the affected area. Although this event
  involved the failure to maintain proper control for a HRA, this finding is of very low safety
                                                                                        Enclosure
                                        32
    significance because it was not related to ALARA planning, nor did it involve an
    overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose
    was not compromised.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
                                                                                    Enclosure
                              SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
                                  KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel:
S. Bargeron, Plant Manager
B. Brown, Training Manager
R. Collins, Chemistry Manager
K. Dyar, Security Manager
G. Gunn, Licensing
I. Kochery, Health Physics Manager
D. McCary, Maintenance Manager
K. Molina, Heat Exchanger Engineer
D. Puckett, Performance Analysis Supervisor
J. Robinson, Engineering Programs Manager
S. Swanson, Site Support Manager
T. Tynan, Site Vice-President
NRC personnel:
M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector
T. Chandler, Resident Inspector
F. Ehrhardt, Chief, Region II Reactor Projects Branch 2
T. Lighty, Project Engineer
                          LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
Opened and Closed
050000425/2012005-01            NCV          Inadequate Maintenance Procedure Results in
                                            Inoperability of NSCW Cooling Tower Fan
                                            (Section 1R19)
05000424, 425/2012005-02        NCV          Unauthorized Entry into a High Radiation Area.
                                            (Section 2RS1)
05000424/2012005-03            NCV          Inadequate Operations and Maintenance
                                            Procedures Results in Brittle Failure of the Loop
                                            2 and Loop 3 Outboard MSIV Stems (Section
                                            4OA2)
Closed
05000424/2012-003-00            LER          Failure to Comply with Technical Specification
                                            LCOs 3.7.14 and 3.0.3
05000424/425/2515/188          TI          Inspection of Near-Term Task Force
                                            Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns
                                            (Section 4OA5.3)
                                                                                      Attachment
                                          2
Discussed
05000424/425/2515/187          TI            Inspection of Near-Term Task Force
                                            Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns
                                            (Section 4OA5.2)
                            LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures
11877-1 Rev. 23, Cold Weather Checklist
11877-2 Rev. 21, Cold Weather Checklist
11901-1 Rev. 17.2, Heat Tracing System Alignment
11901-2 Rev. 12.3, Heat Tracing System Alignment
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
11903-C Rev. 30.4, Fire Protection System Alignment, Section A
11011-1 Rev. 14.2, Residual Heat Removal System Alignment
13011-1 Rev. 70.3, Residual Heat Removal System
11115-1 Rev. 10.2, Containment Spray System Alignment
Drawings
CX4DB173-1 Rev. 41.0, P&I Diagram Fire Protection - Pump House No. 1 & 2, System 2301
CX4DB173-2 Rev. 29.0, P&I Diagram Fire Protection - Yard Piping System, System 2301
1X4DB122 Rev. 51.0, P&I Diagram Residual Heat Removal System 1205
1X4DB131 Rev. 35.0, P&I Diagram Containment Spray System - System No. 1206
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
Procedures
92799-1 Rev. 3.2, Zone 99 - Control Building Level A Fire Fighting Preplan
92804-1 Rev. 4.2, Zone 104 - MSIV Room Level 1 Fire Fighting Preplan
92745-1 Rev. 2.2, Zone 45 - Auxiliary Building Level 1 Fire Fighting Preplan
92760-2 Rev. 1.0, Zone 60 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92761-2 Rev. 1.1, Zone 61 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92764-2 Rev. 1.1, Zone 64 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92762-2 Rev. 2.0, Zone 62 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92763-2 Rev. 0.2, Zone 63 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92782-2 Rev. 1.2, Zone 82 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92860A-1 Rev. .2, Zone 160A - NSCW Pumphouse - Train A Fire Fighting Preplan
92860B-1 Rev. .2, Zone 160B - NSCW Pumphouse - Train B Fire Fighting Preplan
92771-1, Rev. 4.1, Zone 71 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92776-1, Rev. 2.1, Zone 76 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92777A-1, Rev. 1.1, Zone 77A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92777B-1, Rev. 1.2, Zone 77B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92778A-1, Rev. 2.1, Zone 78A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92778B-1, Rev. 1.2, Zone 78B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
                                                                                Attachment
                                            3
92779A-1, Rev. 0.2, Zone 79A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92779B-1, Rev. 1.2, Zone 79B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92756A-1, Rev. 0.2, Zone 56A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92756B-1, Rev. 1.2, Zone 56B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92783-1, Rev. 2.2, Zone 83 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92852-1, Rev. 2.2, Zone 152 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92771-2, Rev. 1.1, Zone 71 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92776-2, Rev. 1.1, Zone 76 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92777A-2, Rev. 1.1, Zone 77A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92777B-2, Rev. 1.2, Zone 77B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92778A-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 78A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92778B-2, Rev. 1.2, Zone 78B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92779A-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 79A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92779B-2, Rev. 1.2, Zone 79B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92756A-2, Rev. 1.1, Zone 56A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92756B-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 56B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92783-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 83 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
92852-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 152 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures
Work Orders
SNC 395851
Calculations
X6CXC-27 Rev.8, Flooding Analysis Auxiliary Building Level D
Procedures
25512-C Rev.1.0, General Inspection Outdoor Electrical Duct Run Pull Boxes/Manholes
Drawings
2X4DB147-1 Rev. 18.0, P&I Diagram Aux BLDG. Flood Retaining Rooms Alarms & Drains
System No. 1218
Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance
Work Orders:
SNC 121039
Procedures
83309-C Rev. 6.4, Safety-Related Heat Exchanger Inspection
83305-C Rev. 7.6, Heat Exchanger Test/Maintenance Program
Condition Reports:
CR 523190
Other
Heat Exchanger as-found and as-left photos taken 09/24/2012
                                                                                Attachment
                                            4
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Other
V-RQ-SE-12705, Simulator Exercise Guide: Steam Generator Tube Leak
Procedures
18009-C Rev. 29.2, Steam Generator Tube Leak
18007-C Rev. 23, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
Engineering Documents
System 1301-2, Main Steam System 2012 health reports
System 1205 RHR System, 4th quarter 2012 system health report
Condition Reports:
348759, 2PV3000 has exceeded its MR OOS time
343991, 2PV3000 SG-1 ARV Failure
518228, 1HV8702A will not open
534190, MR evaluation identified FF
Procedures
50028-C Rev. 18.1, Engineering Maintenance Rule Implementation
Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations
Condition Reports:
501741, U-1 D/G A unit available light is not working
533822, Unit 1 and 2 main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)
530916, Unit 1 steam generator loops 2 & 3 do not indicate steam flow
Engineering Documents
RER SNC440108, MSIV stem failure evaluation
DOEJ-VRSNC440108-M001, Unit 1 MSIVs ((1HV3016B & 1HV3026B) disk separation
Other
VNP-12-008 REV. 1.0, ODMI worksheet for degraded MSIV stems
Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) 2012/02, Revision 1, Technical Specification
Interpretation and Operability Determination
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications
Other
MDC SNC439341/1.0, 1-1208-U4-A11, Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray Valve Seal Leak
Section 1R19: Post Maintenance Testing
Procedures
25022-C Rev. 7, General Small Bore Piping Installation
14240-1 Rev. 5.2, Manual SLI TADOT
14850-1 Rev. 52, Cold Shutdown Valve Inservice Test
14980A-2 Rev. 23, Diesel Generator Operability Test
14825-1 Rev. 97, Quarterly Inservice Valve Test
14430-2 Rev. 9.0, NSCW Cooling Tower Fans Monthly Test
                                                                              Attachment
                                          5
Condition Reports
523221
530916
550378
Work Orders
SNC410412
SNC439646
SNC439647
SNC439900
SNC424222
SNC387201
SNC127251
SNC447741
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
Procedures
14666-1 Rev. 34.1, Train A Diesel Generator and ESFAS Test
14372B-1 Rev. 9, Containment Penetration No. 72B RCS Loop #3 Accumulator Sample Line
Local Leak Rate Test
14670A-1 Rev. 1.2, Diesel Generator 1A Hot Restart Test
14808A-2 Rev. 2.2, Train A Centrifugal Charging Pump and Check Valve IST and Response
Time Test
14804A-1 Rev. 4, Safety Injection Pump A Inservice and Response Time Test
14905-1 Rev. 67.2, RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)
14905-2 Rev. 50.1, RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)
14802A-1 Rev. 4.1, Train A NSCW Pump/Check Valve IST and Response Time Test
Work Orders
SNC356759
SNC335801
SNC371576
SNC385697
SNC380426
SNC392870
Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Change Packages
Emergency Plan, Revision 57
NMP-EP-110, Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action, Version 3.0
NMP-EP-110, Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action, Version 4.0
NMP-EP-111, Emergency Notifications, Version 7.0
NMP-EP-112, Protective Action Recommendations, Version 2.0
91201-C, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center, Revision 17
91202-C, Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center, Revision 22
                                                                                  Attachment
                                          6
Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals
43014-C, Special Radiological Controls, Ver. 46
46024-C, Release of Materials from the RCA, Ver. 9.3
93240A-C, Reactor Vessel Disassembly Instructions, Ver. 33
NMP-HP-300, Radiation and Contamination Surveys, Ver. 2.0
NMP-HP-302, Restricted Area Classification, Postings, and Access Control, Ver. 2.1
NMP-HP-303, Personnel Decontamination, Ver. 1.4
NMP-HP-305, Alpha Radiation Monitoring, Ver. 4.0
NMP-CH-013-001, Vogtle RCS Chemistry During Scheduled Plant Shutdowns with Fuel
  Defects Suspected, Ver. 1.0
NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Ver. 12.1
Records and Data
NMP-HP-109, Investigation, Evaluation and Management of Damaged, Lost, Malfunctioning or
  Alarming Dosimetry, Ver. 1.1, Data Sheet 2, Workers Statement for Dose/Rate Alarm or
  Malfunctioning Electronic Dosimeter, 9/26/12
Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Inventory Log Non Fuel Radioactive Material Stored in Unit 1 Spent Fuel
  Pool
Contingency Plan for: Health Physics Controls for High Noble Gas Activity During Code Safety
  Valve Removal During 1R17
ALARA Briefing Notes: Rx Head/ Upper Internals Lift and Set
Alpha Levels, Comparing 100 cm2 Samples
RWP 12-1618, Repair of Unit 1 Transfer Canal Transfer Tube ISO Valve 1-1213-U6-086, Rev. 0
RWP 12-1505, Under Rx Vessel Work, Rev. 0
RWP 12-1608, Remove/Install Pzr Code Safety Valves, Rev. 0
RWP 12-1600, CM/PM, VLVS, Motors, Misc Activities in U1 CTMT, Rev. 0
Radiological Survey 124805, U1 SFP Transfer Canal
Radiological Survey 124876, U1 SFP Transfer Canal
Radiological Survey 152222, Unit 1 Transfer Canal - Top View (1FHBC1)
Radiological Survey 151559, Valve Gallery SFP Cooling Demin (1AXA46)
Radiological Survey 153033, Inside Bioshield Area (1RXC)
Radiological Survey 152915, Inside Bioshield Area (1RXC)
Radiological Survey 152836, Inside Bioshield Area (1RXC)
Radiological Survey 152699, Seal Table Rack Pulled Back (1RXA3)
Radiological Survey 152711, Seal Table (1RXA3)
Radiological Survey 151834, Auxiliary Building Level D (CAXD)
Radiological Survey 9/18/2012 15:38, Under Vessel
Radiological Survey 152143, Top of PZR - 252 el. (1RX32)
Radiological Survey 152054, Top of PZR - 252 el. (1RX32)
Radiological Survey 135176, Top of PZR - 252 el. (1RX32)
Radiological Survey 152283, S/G 4 Channel Head Cold Leg (1RXB27)
Radiological Survey 152282, S/G 4 Channel Head Hot Leg (1RXB26)
Radiological Survey 152281, S/G 1 Channel Head Cold Leg (1RXB19)
Radiological Survey 152281, S/G 1 Channel Head Cold Leg (1RXB19)
Radiological Survey 151964, U1 Containment Building Level 1 (1RX1)
Radiological Survey 152549, U1 Containment Level A Lower Overview (1RXA)
Radiological Survey 151986, U1 Containment 184 El. Quadrant 1 (1RXB)
                                                                                    Attachment
                                          7
Radiological Survey 152662, U1 Containment 197 El. Quadrant 1 (1RXA)
Radiological Survey 151910, U1 Containment 197 El. Quadrant 1 (1RXA)
Radioactive Sealed Source Leak Test Certification, Source ID 0413-00-00, 6/22/12, 12/5/11,
  6/28/11, 1/19/10
Air Sample Log, 9/18/12 - 9/20/12
CAP Documents
V-HP-2011, Fleet Oversight Audit of Health Physics, 8/15/11
CR 382120
CR 335736
CR 519818
CR 527832
CR 523976
CR 434496
CR 434498
CR 481012
Section 2RS2: Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals
16035-1, Chemistry Operations Interface for RCS Chemistry Control During Scheduled Plant
  Shutdowns, Ver. 13
43031-C, Steam Generator Job Coverage, Rev. 5.3
00910-C, VEGP ALARA Program, Rev. 15.3
41001-C, ALARA Job Review, Rev. 33.1
NMP-AD-035, ALARA Program, Ver. 1.0
NMP-HP-204, ALARA Planning and Job Review, Ver. 2.0
43014-C, Special Radiological Controls, Ver. 46
Records and Data
Audit No. V-HP-2011, Fleet Oversight Audit of Health Physics, 8/15/2011
NMP-GM-003-F04 Self-Assessment Final Report; ALARA Outage Planning, CR#2011100194,
12/17/10
Shutdown Chemistry Review: Vogtle Unit 2 Fuel Cycle 15, Final report October 24, 2011
ALARA Committee Meeting Minutes First Quarter 2012
2011 Annual ALARA Report, March 30, 2012
Pre-1R17 ALARA Sub-Committee Meeting Minutes, August 10, 2012
Vogtle 1R17 EPRI Standard Radiation Monitoring Points
Chemistry Crud Burst chart 9/16/12 22:00-9/20/12 22:00
ALARA Steam Generator Work Package:
  ALARA Briefing Records
    RWP 12-1300, R/I Primary Manway Covers & Diaphragms on S/G 1-4; ALARA Briefing
    Record RWP 12-1301, Install and Remove Nozzle Dams for SGs 1-4; ALARA Briefing
    Record RWP 12-1302, EDDY Current Testing on SG 1-4 & All Associated Work; ALARA
    Briefing Record RWP 12-1303, Sludge Lance on S/G 1-4 & all Associated Work; ALARA
    Briefing Record RWP 12-1305,
  Radiological Surveys
    #152638, 9/25/12 20:58, S/G Manway Platt #1; #152279, 9/20/12 14:59, S/G Channel Head
    Hot leg; #152281 9/20/12 15:30, S/G Channel Head Cold Leg; #152688 9/26/12 11:15, S/G
                                                                                  Attachment
                                            8
  Manway Platt 2; #152244 9/20/12 6:25 S/G Channel Head Hot Leg; #152245 9/20/12 6:35
  S/G Channel Head Cold Leg; #152690 9/26/12 11:26 S/G Manyway Platt 3; #152246
  9/20/12 6:43 S/G 3 Channel Head Hot Leg; #152282 9/20/12 15:57 S/G 4 Channel Head
  Hot Leg; #152639 9/25/12 21:05 S/G Manway Platt 4; #152653 9/26/12 1:29 S/G #3 Hand-
  Hole Plat
  Work-In-Progress Reviews NMP-HP-104 (or equivalent)
    RWP 12-1303, 9/27/12 80% Review; RWP 12-1302, 9/23/12 50% Review; RWP 12-1300
    9/24/12 50% Review; RWP 12-1301 9/24/12 50% Review; RWP !2-1303 9/25/12 50%
    Review; RWP 12-1304 9/25/12 50% Review
    NMP-HP-204 Form 8 Respirator Use Evaluation Worksheets for RWP 12-1301
Radiological Surveys:
#38622, 1/22/02, Plant Vogtle U1 Transfer Canal- top view
#117917, 7/14/09, U1 Transfer Canal- topview
#152208, 9/19/12, U1 Transfer Canal- Side view
ALARA Briefing Record RWP 12-1004, Install/Remove Scaffold in U1 CTMT
ALARA Briefing Record RWP 12-1104, Waste and Decon Routines in U1 CTMT
ALARA Briefing Record RWP 12-1618, Repair of U1 Transfer Canal
ALARA Post-Job Report 11-2509, RPV Cold Leg Nozzle Inspection in U2 Annulus
ALARA Post-Job Report 11-2302, Eddy Current Testing on S/G 1&4
CAP Documents
CR 167416, The accumulated dose for the U-1 Aux Bldg ECCS Flowpath Verification that was
performed
CR 339453, HP Self Assessment on High Rad Area Controls
CR 346242, Dose goal exceeded for placing old UFC skid into shipping container
Section 2RS3: In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals
43635-C, Operation and Calibration of the AMS-4 Continuous Air Monitor, Rev. 18.1
47013-C, Inspection, Repair, and Storage of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus, Ver. 37
NMP-HP-301, Airborne Radioactivity Sampling and Evaluation, Ver. 1.2
00970-C, Respiratory Protection Program, Rev. 11.4
NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Ver. 12.1
Records and Data
Compressed Air/Gas Quality Testing, SCBA Compressor (Demin Plant), 2/5/10, 5/10/10,
8/11/10, 11/9/10, 2/14/11, 5/11/11, 8/25/11, 11/7/11, 2/9/12, 5/7/12, 8/14/12
00012-C, Shift Manning Requirements, Rev. 17.1, Data Sheet 1, Minimum Shift Manning
(Either Unit in Mode 1-4), Day Shift, 9/21/12
Qualification List, ID V-GE-099H, MSA High Pressure Firehawk MMR SCBA, Maintenance,
Health Physics, and Operations
Qualification List, ID V-HP-999 MSA C.A.R.E. Tech
Control Room Monthly Emergency SCBA Inspection, 8/7/12
TSC Monthly Emergency SCBA Inspection, 8/10/12
SCBA PosiChek3 Test Results, SCBA Unit HP-82, 11/26/10, 12/30/10, 11/23/11
SCBA Posichek3 Test Results, SCBA Unit HP-61, 12/29/10, 12/28/11
SCBA Posichek3 Test Results, SCBA Unit HP-58, 8/24/10, 8/25/11, 8/27/12
Maintenance Record Report, SCBA Units HP-58, HP-61, HP-82, 8/1/10 - 9/16/12
                                                                                  Attachment
                                          9
CAP Documents
V-HP-2011, Fleet Oversight Audit of Health Physics, 8/15/11
CR 167804
Section 2RS4: Occupational Dose Assessment
Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals
NMP-HP-107-001, Instructions for Retrieving, Printing and Updating Individual Radiation
Exposure Records, Version 1.0
NMP-HP-105, Comparisons of OSLD and ED Dosimetry Results, Ver. 1.0
NMP-HP-106, Investigating of Exposures Exceeding Fleet Administrative Limits, Ver. 1.0
NMP-HP-103, Skin Dose Assessment, Ver. 1.1
NMP-HP-100, Bioassay Program, Ver. 1.0
NMP-HP-101, In-Vivo Bioassay and Internal Dose Assessment, Ver. 1.0
45013-C, Issuance, Use and Collection of Personnel Dosimetry, Ver. 26.3
Records and Data
Canberra Report of Performance Testing Results for Nuclear Enterprises (NE) Model SPM
904B/906 Personnel Portal Monitor, May 18, 2012
Personnel Contamination Events/Personnel Contamination Reports (PCE/PCR) Logs, 9/2011-
9/2012
EDE & NRC Form 5 Calculations for Steam Generator Multibadging Jobs entry made on
9/20/12; Multibadge RCA Authorization/Worksheets
NMP-HP-109 Data Sheets, Investigation of Lost, Damaged or Malfunctioning Personnel
Dosimetry, for occurrence on 9/26/12
NMP-HP-109 Data Sheet 2, Investigation of Lost, Damaged or Malfunctioning Personnel
Dosimetry, for occurrence on 9/28/12
Varskin 3 Calculations 10/5/2011
CAP Documents
CR 149580, On 4-16-10 there were (62) EPD's and (1) EPD "Vibe Mesh Transmitter" found at
the RPF control room
CR 152467, A vendor arrived on site on June 22 at 08:45 am. and asked for a source that was
shipped to Plant Vogtle.
CR 466572, HP Tier 1 outage readiness Health Physics Tier 1 outage review was performed
with the HP Manager.
Section 2RS5: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals
17005-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB 05 on Panel 1A2 on MCB, Ver. 33
17100-2, Annunciator Response Procedure for the Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring
System (RMS), Rev. 20.1
24625-1, Containment High Range (2RE-0005) Area Monitor 2RX-0005 Channel Calibration,
Rev. 29.1
24652-1, Plant Vent Wide Range Radiogas Monitor 1RX-12444 Channel Operational Test and
Channel Calibration, Rev. 19
34313-C, Operation of the DRMS Plant Vent Effluent Wide Range Monitor 1(2) RE-12444,
Rev 17
43802-C, Calibration of Gamma Standards, Rev. 12.1
                                                                                    Attachment
                                          10
43500-C, Health Physics Instrument Calibration and Control Program, Rev. 53.10
43685-C, Calibration and Operation of the Asp-1, Rev 20.3
43693-C, Operation and Use of the Jl Shepherd Model 89-400 Shielded Calibrator, Rev. 2.1
NMP-HP-703, RO-2, RO-2A and RO-20 Operation and Calibration, Ver.1.0
NMP-HP-703, Daily Instrumentation Source Checks, Ver 1.1
NMP-EP-110-GL03, VEGP EALs - ICs, Threshold Values and Basis, Ver. 3.0
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), ODCM, Ver. 28
Records and Data
10 CFR Part 61 Analysis, DAW, Dated 12/21/2011
10 CFR Part 61 Analysis, DAW, Dated 12/28/2010
Chemistry Issues Turnover Log, Dated 09/17/2012
In Situ Calibration of High Range Monitors, VEGP Units 1&2, Dated 02/18/1997
LS 6500 SN 7069842 Source Check Response Charts, Dated 02/11/2011 - 03/28/2012
HPGE Detector #1 Control Charts, Dated 12/25/2011 - 04/03/2012
Radiation Monitor RE-005 Monthly Tech Spec Response Surveillance, Dated May 2010 -
  September 2012
Radiation Monitor System Health Reports for 1st and 2nd Quarters 2012
LCO/TR Status Sheet, 1RE006 Failure, initiated 08/14/2010
Special Report 2011-001-00, Inoperable Radiation Monitor 1RE-006, Dated 03/29/2011
RadCal Electrometer Model 2025, SN4676 Calibration Record, Dated 10/31/2011
RadCal Probe Model 20X5-3, SN14166 Calibration Record, Dated 10/31/2011
RadCal Probe Model 20X5-180, SN16121 Calibration Record, Dated 10/31/2011
RadCal Probe Model 20X5-1800, SN21721 Calibration Record, Dated 10/31/2011
Instruments Missing Operation Checks Report, Dated 09/19/2012
Online Instruments Issued Report, Dated 09/19/2012
IPM-7A/8/9, VEGP-HP 0637, Calibration Records, Dated 06/14/2011 and 06/12/2012
Model 28-5 Calibrator, Source VEGP 0292, Calibration Record, Dated 05/18/12
Model 89-400 Calibrator, Source VEGP 0413, Calibration Record, Dated 08/12/2012
Model 878-10 Calibrator, Source VEGP 1049, Calibration Record, Dated 08/12/2012
SAM-11, VEGP-HP 1151, Calibration Records, Dated 05/26/2011 and 05/23/2012
SPM-904B, VEGP-HP 0754, Calibration Records, Dated 02/8/2011 and 02/10/2012
WO 1090817001, Plant Vent Wide Range Radiogas Flow 1F-12444 Channel Operational Test
  and Channel Calibration, Dated 03/03/11
WO SNC332418, Plant Vent Wide Range Radiogas Flow 1F-12444 Channel Operational Test
  and Channel Calibration, Dated 03/28/2012
WO 1090816001, Plant Vent Wide Range Radiogas Radiation Monitor 1RX12444 Channel
  Operational Test and Channel Calibration, Dated 10/15/10
WO 1100068601, 2RE0005 Containment High Range Monitor Channel Calibration,
Dated 08/09/2010
WO 11000408201, 2RE0005 Containment High Range Monitor Channel Calibration,
Dated 03/29/2011
WO 1080853101, 1RE0011 In-Core Instrumentation Room Area Monitor Calibration, Dated
  09/26/2009
WO 1100216601, 1RE0011 In-Core Instrumentation Room Area Monitor Calibration, Dated
  03/14/2011
WO SNC328096, 1RE0018 Waste Liquid Effluent Channel Operational Test and Calibration,
  Dated 03/09/2012
                                                                                Attachment
                                          11
WO 1090816201, 1RE0018 Waste Liquid Effluent Channel Operational Test and Calibration,
  Dated 01/28/2011
WO 1090816201, 1RE0018 Waste Liquid Effluent Isotopic Channel Calibration, Dated
  02/23/2012
WBC Calibration Report, Calibration of the Canberra Fastscan-1 WBC System at the Vogtle
  Electric Generating Plant, Dated 06/08/2011 and 06/13/2012
WBC Calibration Report, Calibration of the Canberra Fastscan-2 WBC System at the Vogtle
  Electric Generating Plant, Dated 06/09/2011 and 06/15/2012
CAP Documents
Fleet Oversight Audit of Health Physics, V-HP-2011, Dated 08/15/2011
CR 285751
CR 302822
CR 410359
CR 321427
CR 472385
CR 483434
CR 481949
CR 490231
CR 521213
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals
00163-C, NRC Performance Indicator and Monthly Operating Report Preparation and
  Submittal, Ver. 14.3
Records and Data
Liquid Permit Post-Release Data Permit # L-20120725-087-B
Gas Permit Post-Release Data Permit # G-20120813-171-C
Gas Permit Post-Release Data Permit # G-20120808-165-C
Liquid Permit Post-Release Data Permit # G-20120803-091-B
ED Alarm Log Sept 2011-Sept 2012
CAP Documents
CR 349797, Trouble shoot plan for U2 CVCS Demin Results in Resin in Drain Line
CR 474221, Dose equivalent Iodine definition in Tech Specs and ODCM does not match
CR 480703, U-1 RMWST degassifier dissolved oxygen anomaly
CR 354479, Increased dose rates in 2AB-A-72
Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems
Procedures/Calculations/Engineering Documents
CAR 196113 - Root Cause and Corrective Actions Evaluation for the Unit 1 Steam Generator
Loop T Mismatch
12001-C, Unit Heat Up to Hot Shutdown (Mode 5 to Mode 4)
14850-1/2, Cold Shutdown Valve In-Service Test
26854-C, MSIV Actuator Maintenance
                                                                                Attachment
                                          12
Condition Reports
530916 - Unit 1 steam generators 2&3 do not indicate steam flow
Section 4OA7: Licensee Identified Violations
Radiological Survey 151559, Valve Gallery SFP Cooling Demin (1AXA46)
CR 519818
                                    LIST OF ACRONYMS
1R17          Unit 1 Refueling Outage 17
ALARA        As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ARM          Area Radiation Monitor
CAP          Corrective Action Program
CFR          Code of Federal Regulations
CR            Condition Report
DAW          Dry Active Waste
DPW          Declared Pregnant Worker
ED            Electronic Dosimeter
FSAR          Final Safety Analysis Report
HP            Health Physics
HPT          HP Technician
HRA          High Radiation Area
IP            Inspection Procedure
LHRA          Locked High Radiation Area
NCV          Non-cited Violation
NPR          Negative Pressure Respirator
NVLAP        National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
OA            Other Activities
OSLD          Optically Stimulated Luminescent Dosimeter
PCM          Personnel Contamination Monitor
PI            Performance Indicator
PM            Portal Monitor
Radwaste      Radioactive Waste
RCA          Radiologically Controlled Area
RS            Radiation Safety
RWP          Radiation Work Permit
S/G          Steam Generator
SAM          Small Article Monitor
SCBA          Self-contained Breathing Apparatus
SDP          Significance Determination Process
SFP          Spent Fuel Pool
TS            Technical Specification
U1            Unit 1
VHRA          Very High Radiation Area
WBC          Whole Body Counter
                                                                    Attachment
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 09:23, 20 March 2020

IR 05000424-12-005 & 05000425-12-005, 10/01/2012 - 12/31/2012, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Post-Maintenance Testing, Identification and Resolution of Problems
ML13032A277
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 02/01/2013
From: Frank Ehrhardt
NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
To: Tynan T
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-12-005
Download: ML13032A277 (51)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000424/2012005

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

February 1, 2013

Mr. Tom E. Tynan

Vice President - Vogtle

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

7821 River Road

Waynesboro, GA 30830

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000424/2012005 AND 05000425/2012005

Dear Mr. Tynan:

On December 31, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an

inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated

inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on January 11,

2013, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

Three self-revealing findings of very low safety significance (Green) were identified during this

inspection. These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. Two

licensee-identified violations which were determined to be of very low safety significance are

listed in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs)

consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this

inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional

Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Vogtle

Electric Generating Plant.

If you disagree with the cross-cutting aspects assigned in this report, you should provide a

response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your

disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

T. Tynan 2

In accordance with the 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its

enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the

NRCs Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is

accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public

Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Frank Ehrhardt, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 05000424, 05000425

License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81

Enclosures: Inspection Report 05000424/2012005 and 05000425/2012005

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: (See page 3)

T. Tynan 2

In accordance with the 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its

enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the

NRCs Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is

accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public

Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Frank Ehrhardt, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 05000424, 05000425

License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81

Enclosures: Inspection Report 05000424/2012005 and 05000425/2012005

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: (See page 3)

X PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G SENSITIVE X NON-SENSITIVE

ADAMS: G Yes ACCESSION NUMBER:_________________________ X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE G FORM 665 ATTACHED

OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS

SIGNATURE Via email Via email Via email Via email Via email Via email Via email

NAME MCain TChandler BCaballero ANielsen CDykes WPursley JLaughlin

DATE 01/25/2013 02/31/2013 01/25/2013 01/28/2013 01/28/2013 01/29/2013 01/28/2013

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP

SIGNATURE MOM /RA/ FJE /RA/

NAME MMiller FEhrhardt

DATE 01/20/2013 02/01/2013 2/ /2013 2/ /2013 2/ /2013 2/ /2013 2/ /2013

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRPII\RPB2\VOGTLE\REPORTS\2012\2012-005\VOGTLE

2012005.DOCX

T. Tynan 3

cc w/encl: Dennis R. Madison

C. Russ Dedrickson Vice President

Fleet Support Supervisor Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution

S. Kuczynski Leigh Perry

Chairman, President and CEO SVP & General Counsel-Ops & SNC

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution

Todd L. Youngblood T. E. Tynan

Vice President Site Vice President

Fleet Oversight Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution

W. L. Bargeron M. J. Ajluni

Plant Manager Nuclear Licensing Director

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution

Electronic Mail Distribution

B. D. McKinney, Jr.

D. G. Bost Regulatory Response Manager

Chief Nuclear Officer Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution

Electronic Mail Distribution

D. W. Daughhetee

N. J. Stringfellow Licensing Engineer

Licensing Manager Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution

Electronic Mail Distribution

Bradley J. Adams

Paula Marino Vice President

Vice President Fleet Operations Support

Engineering Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution

Electronic Mail Distribution

T. D. Honeycutt

T. A. Lynch Regulatory Response Supervisor

Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Electronic Mail Distribution

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution (cc/w enclosure continued next page)

Arthur H. Domby, Esq.

Troutman Sanders

Electronic Mail Distribution

T. Tynan 4

(cc w/encl continued) Richard Haynes

Director, Division of Waste Management

L. P. Hill Bureau of Land and Waste Management

Licensing Supervisor S.C. Department of Health and

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Environmental Control

Electronic Mail Distribution 2600 Bull Street

Columbia, SC 29201

L. L. Crumpton

Administrative Assistant, Sr. Lee Foley

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Manager of Contracts Generation

Electronic Mail Distribution Oglethorpe Power Corporation

Electronic Mail Distribution

Hickox, T. Mark

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Mark Williams

Electronic Mail Distribution Commissioner

Georgia Department of Natural Resources

Mark Rauckhorst Electronic Mail Distribution

Site Vice President

Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Chuck Mueller

Southern Nuclear Operating Company Manager

Electronic Mail Distribution Policy and Radiation Program

Georgia Department of Natural Resources

S. C. Swanson Electronic Mail Distribution

Site Support Manager

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Cynthia A. Sanders

Electronic Mail Distribution Radioactive Materials Program Manager

Environmental Protection Division

Jerry Ranalli Georgia Department of Natural Resources

Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Electronic Mail Distribution

Power

Electronic Mail Distribution James C. Hardeman

Environmental Radiation Program Manager

Sandra Threatt, Manager Environmental Protection Division

Nuclear Response and Emergency Georgia Department of Natural Resources

Environmental Surveillance Electronic Mail Distribution

Bureau of Land and Waste Management

Department of Health and Environmental Mr. Steven M. Jackson

Control Senior Engineer - Power Supply

Electronic Mail Distribution Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia

Electronic Mail Distribution

Division of Radiological Health

TN Dept. of Environment & Conservation Reece McAlister

401 Church Street Executive Secretary

Nashville, TN 37243-1532 Georgia Public Service Commission

Electronic Mail Distribution

Office of the Attorney General

40 Capitol Square, SW (cc w/encl continued next page)

Atlanta, GA 30334

T. Tynan 5

(cc w/encl continued)

Office of the County Commissioner

Burke County Commission

Electronic Mail Distribution

Director

Consumers' Utility Counsel Division

Governor's Office of Consumer Affairs

2 M. L. King, Jr. Drive

Plaza Level East; Suite 356

Atlanta, GA 30334-4600

Amy Whaley

Resident Manager

Electronic Mail Distribution

T. Tynan 6

Letter to Tom E. Tynan from Frank Ehrhardt dated February 1, 2013

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000424/2012005 AND 05000425/2012005

Distribution w/encl:

C. Evans, RII

L. Douglas, RII

OE Mail

RIDSNRRDIRS

PUBLIC

RidsNrrPMVogtle Resource

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425

License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81

Report Nos.: 05000424/2012005 and 05000425/2012005

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: Waynesboro, GA 30830

Dates: October 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012

Inspectors: M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector

T. Chandler, Resident Inspector

B. Caballero, Senior Operations Engineer

A. Nielsen Senior Health Physicist

C. Dykes Health Physicist

W. Pursley Health Physicist

J. Laughlin Emergency Preparedness Inspector

R. Williams Reactor Inspector

A. Vargas-Mendez Reactor Inspector

Approved by: Frank Ehrhardt, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000424/2012-005, 05000425/2012-005; 10/01/2012 - 12/31/2012; Vogtle Electric

Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Post-Maintenance Testing, Identification and Resolution

of Problems

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspectors. Three

non-cited violations (NCVs) with very low safety significance (Green) were identified.

The significance of inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e., great than Green,

or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process dated June 19, 2012. Cross-cutting aspects

are determined using IMC 0310, Components Within The Cross-Cutting Areas dated

October 28, 2011. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance

with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated June 7, 2012. The NRCs program for

overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in

NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process revision 3.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) for failure to meet the requirements of

10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was

identified for failure to provide adequate work instructions in the maintenance procedure

used to modify 480V EMAX safety-related switchgear breakers. Specifically, when

modifying the breaker by adding a higher amperage closing coil, failure to verify the

proper placement of the wire bundle on top of the closing coil following replacement

resulted in the safety-related 2A NSW cooling tower fan #3 480V EMAX breaker failing

to close when demanded. The licensee replaced the failed breaker and returned the fan

to operable status within 21.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

The finding was more than minor because it impacted the reactor safety mitigating

systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of

systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and

affected the cornerstone attribute of equipment performance. Since the inspectors

answered No to all of the IMC 0609.04 (dated June 19, 2012) Exhibit 2, section A,

questions 1-4, mitigating systems cornerstone screening questions, the inspectors

concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of this

finding was related to the corrective action program component of the problem

identification and resolution cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate problem

evaluation. P.1(c) Specifically, the licensees extent of cause evaluations performed on

previous 480V EMAX breaker failures (caused by restricted movement of the close

lever) did not identify the potential of the closing coil wire bundle to interfere with the

proper movement of the close lever. The licensees corrective action to the 480V EMAX

breaker issue was to revise the maintenance procedure used to perform maintenance on

EMAX breakers (procedure 28480-C, 480V EMAX Breaker Maintenance), and then

inspect all 480V EMAX breakers on site that had been modified with the higher

amperage closing coil to verify that the wire bundles were not interfering with the

operation of the close coil. The licensee entered this into their corrective action program

as CR 549999 and CR 550736. (Section 1R19)

Enclosure

3

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) for failure to meet the requirements of

10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was

identified for failure to provide adequate work instructions in the operations and

maintenance procedures used to open main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) that were

bound in their closed seat. Specifically, the operations and maintenance procedures

used to open the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard MSIVs did not provide instructions to limit

the magnitude of the force applied to the valve stems while attempting to open the

valves, which ultimately resulted in the brittle failure of the valve stems. The licensee

conducted ultrasonic testing of the remaining six Unit 1 MSIVs to verify that the valve

stems were intact. The two failed valve stems were replaced, and the reactor was

restarted nine days later.

The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality

attribute of the reactor safety - initiating events cornerstone and it adversely affected the

cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and

challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.

Specifically, the failure to provide adequate work instructions to operations and

maintenance personnel resulted in the failure of both the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard

MSIVs and the subsequent manual reactor trip. Since the inspectors answered no to

the Exhibit 1, section B, initiating events screening question, the inspectors concluded

that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding

was related to the work control component of the human performance cross-cutting area

due to less-than-adequate work planning. H.3(a) Specifically, the licensees

procedures used to open the MSIVs that were stuck on their closed seat did not contain

instructions or precautions to limit the magnitude of the force applied to the valve stems

while attempting to open the valves. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective

action program as CR 530916. (Section 4OA2)

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

Green: The inspectors identified a Green, self-revealing, Non-cited Violation of technical specification 5.7.1, High Radiation Area, for an unauthorized entry into a High

Radiation Area (HRA). A maintenance worker entered a HRA in Unit 1 containment

without being briefed on the radiological conditions. The licensee entered this issue into

their corrective action program as CR 523976 and took immediate corrective actions

including an outage work crew stand down.

This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the occupational

radiation safety cornerstone attribute of human performance and adversely affects the

cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from

exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor

operation. The finding was evaluated using the occupational radiation safety

significance determination process. The finding was not related to As Low As

Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) planning, nor did it involve an overexposure or

substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not

compromised. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety

Enclosure

4

significance (Green). This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human

performance, work practices H.4.b] because the HRA event was a direct result of poor

communications during the pre-job briefing and a lack of procedure adherence on the

part of the maintenance worker. The licensee entered this issue into the Corrective

Action Program (CAP) as CR 523976. (Section 2RS1)

Violations of very low safety significance that were identified by the licensee have been

reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been

entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and the corrective action

tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 started the report period shutdown for a planned refueling outage. The licensee

conducted a reactor startup on October 8; however the licensee shutdown unit 1 later

that day due to issues with two main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). The licensee

restarted unit 1 on October 17 and attained full rated thermal power (RTP) power on

October 21. Unit 1 operated at essentially full RTP for the remainder of the inspection

period.

Unit 2 operated at essentially full RTP for the entire inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

.1 Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the stations adverse weather procedures

written for extreme low temperatures. The inspectors verified that weather related

equipment deficiencies identified during the previous year had been corrected prior to

the onset of seasonal extremes. The inspectors evaluated the licensees

implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory

measures before the onset of seasonal extreme weather conditions. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors evaluated the following risk-

significant systems:

  • Unit 2 nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) system (both trains)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparations to protect risk-significant systems

from predicted severe weather conditions of sub-freezing temperatures expected on

December 21, 2012. The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of adverse

weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures, including operator

staffing, before the onset of and during the adverse weather conditions. The inspectors

Enclosure

6

reviewed the licensees plans to address the ramifications of potentially lasting effects

that may result from sub-freezing temperatures. The inspectors verified that operator

actions specified in the licensees adverse weather procedure maintained readiness of

essential systems. The inspectors verified that required surveillances were current, or

were scheduled and completed, if practical, before the onset of anticipated adverse

weather conditions. The inspectors also verified the licensee implemented periodic

equipment walk-downs or other measures to ensure that the condition of plant

equipment met operability requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

.1 Partial Walkdown

The inspectors verified that critical portions of selected risk-significant systems were

correctly aligned. The inspectors selected systems for assessment because they were a

redundant or backup system/train, were important for mitigating risk for the current plant

conditions, had been recently realigned, or were a single-train system. The inspectors

determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures and drawings. The

inspectors verified that critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned by

performing partial walkdowns. Document reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The

inspectors selected the following three systems/trains to inspect:

  • Diesel-driven fire water pump #2, the motor-driven firewater pump, and the

associated yard piping system while the diesel-driven firewater pump # 1 was out of

service for a scheduled maintenance outage

out of service due to a planned maintenance outage.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Complete Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the alignment of the Unit 1 A train residual heat removal (RHR)

system. The inspectors selected this system for assessment because it is a risk-

significant mitigating system. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by

reviewing plant procedures, drawings, the updated final safety analysis report, and other

documents. In order to identify any deficiencies that could affect the ability of the system

to perform its function(s), the inspectors reviewed records related to outstanding design

Enclosure

7

issues and maintenance work requests. The inspectors verified that the selected system

was correctly aligned by performing a complete walk down of accessible components.

To verify the licensee was identifying and resolving equipment alignment discrepancies,

the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents, including condition reports and

outstanding work orders, as well as periodic reports containing information on the status

of risk-significant systems, including maintenance rule reports and system health

reports. Document reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05AQ)

a. Inspection Scope

Quarterly Inspection

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of selected fire plans by comparing the fire plans

to the defined hazards and defense-in-depth features specified in the fire protection

program. In evaluating the fire plans, the inspectors assessed the following items:

(1) control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, (2) fire detection systems, (3)

water-based fire suppression systems, (4) gaseous fire suppression systems, (5) manual

firefighting equipment and capability (6) passive fire protection features, (7)

compensatory measures and fire watches, and (8) issues related to fire protection

contained in the licensees corrective action program. The inspectors toured the

following five fire areas to assess material condition and operational status of fire

protection equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • Unit 1 north and south main steam valve room, fire zones 99, 104 and 45
  • Unit 2 control building level B east penetration areas (zones 62, 63 and 82) and west

penetration areas (zones 60, 61, and 64)

  • Unit 1A and 1B nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) pump rooms, fire zones 160A

and 160B

  • Unit 1 A, B, C, and D class 1E 125 VDC station batteries and associated switchgear

rooms, fire zones 71, 76, 77A, 77B, 78A, 78B, 79A, 79B, 56A, 56B, 83, and 152

  • Unit 2 A, B, C, and D class 1E 125 VDC station batteries and associated switchgear

rooms, fire zones 71, 76, 77A, 77B, 78A, 78B, 79A, 79B, 56A, 56B, 83, and 152

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Enclosure

8

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

.1 Internal Flooding

The inspectors reviewed related flood analysis documents and walked down the areas

listed below that contain risk significant structures, systems, and components

susceptible to flooding. The inspectors verified plant design features and plant

procedures for flood mitigation were consistent with design requirements and internal

flooding analysis assumptions. The inspectors also assessed the condition of flood

protection barriers and drain systems. In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee

was identifying and properly addressing issues using their corrective action program.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Underground Cables

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed related flood analysis documents and inspected the areas listed

below that contain cables whose failure could disable risk significant equipment. The

inspector directly observed the condition of cables and cable support structures and, as

applicable, verified that dewatering devices and drainage systems were functioning

properly. In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee was identifying and properly

addressing issues using their corrective action program. Documents reviewed are listed

in the Attachment.

  • Cable Pull Boxes: 1NE7ADKEM40, 1NE7ADKEM39, 1NE9GHKEPB01

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

.1 Annual Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the readiness and availability of the Unit 1 emergency diesel

generator (EDG) jacket water (JW) heat exchanger to perform its design function by

observing performance tests or reviewing reports of those tests, verifying the licensee

uses the periodic maintenance method outlined in Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water

Enclosure

9

System Problems Affecting Safety Related Equipment, observing the licensees heat

exchanger inspections and verifying critical operating parameters through direct

observation or by reviewing operating data. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the

licensee had entered any significant heat exchanger performance problems into their

corrective action program and that the licensees corrective actions were appropriate.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario administered to an operating

crew conducted in accordance with the licensees accredited requalification training

program. The inspectors assessed licensed operator performance, the ability of the

licensee to administer the scenario and evaluate the operators, the quality of any post-

scenario critique, any follow-up actions taken by the facility licensee, and the

performance of the simulator. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (Licensed Operator Performance):

The inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room on

October 8, during the reactor startup following the 1R17 refueling outage. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Inspectors observed licensed operator

performance to assess the following:

  • Use of plant procedures
  • Control board manipulations
  • Communications between crew members
  • Use and interpretation of instruments, indications, and alarms
  • Use of human error prevention techniques
  • Documentation of activities
  • Management and supervision

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Enclosure

10

.3 Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results (71111.11A)

a. Inspection Scope

On November 29, 2012, the licensee completed administering the annual requalification

operating test and biennial written examination, which is required to be administered to

all licensed operators in accordance with 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2). The inspectors performed

an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating tests and the

crew simulator operating tests. These results were compared to the thresholds

established in Manual Chapter 609, Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human

Performance Significance Determination Process.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensees treatment of the issues listed below in order to

verify the licensee appropriately addressed equipment problems within the scope of the

Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65). The inspectors reviewed procedures and records in

order to evaluate the licensees identification, assessment, and characterization of the

problems as well as their corrective actions for returning the equipment to a satisfactory

condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors also

interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule coordinator to assess the

accuracy of performance deficiencies and extent of condition.

performance criteria for maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs)

  • Unit 1, 1HV8702A B train RHR pump hot leg suction valve failed to open when

demanded from the control room.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify the licensee

assessed and managed plant risk as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee

procedures. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees risk assessments

and implementation of risk management actions. The inspectors also verified that the

licensee was identifying and resolving problems with assessing and managing

maintenance-related risk using the corrective action program. Additionally, for

maintenance resulting from unforeseen situations, the inspectors assessed the

Enclosure

11

effectiveness of the licensees planning and control of emergent work activities.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • Week of 10/22: Unit 1A EDG 18 month surveillance in conjunction with ongoing

work in the high voltage switchyard

  • Week of 10/29: maintenance outage on the 2A EDG concurrent with maintenance

activities on various breakers in the high-voltage switchyard.

C Week of 11/12: performing testing on the 2B EDG concurrent with maintenance

activities in the high-voltage switchyard.

C Week of 12/3: rendering the Unit 1 B train NSCW cooling tower fans inoperable to

perform inspections of the 480V EMAX breakers.

C Week of 12/17: rendering the Unit 1 A train NSCW cooling tower fans inoperable to

perform inspections of the 480V EMAX breakers.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five evaluations to verify they met the

requirements of procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and NMP-GM-

002-001, Corrective Action Program Instructions. The scope of these inspections

included a review of the technical adequacy of the evaluations, the adequacy of

compensatory measures, and the impact on continued plant operation. Inspectors

reviewed licensee procedures and conducted walkdowns in accordance with OpESS FY

2012-02 Technical Specification Interpretation and Operability Determination,

inspection guidance to ensure that the licensee properly interprets Technical

Specification (TS) Bases, properly develops operability determinations, and adheres to

the NRCs guidance on the temporary use of manual actions to support operability

determinations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

C CR 501741, Unit 1A EDG unit available light is not working

C CR 533822, Unit 1 and 2 main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)

C CR 550736, Unit 2A NSCW fan #3 failed to close

C CR 479829, Unit 2B RHR oil sample analysis

C CR 562504, Gas void discovered at 1-1208-X4-05

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Enclosure

12

1R18 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

Temporary Modification: The inspectors reviewed minor design change package

SNC439341/1.0 which allowed the temporary installation of clamping device on valve 1-

1208-U4-A11, auxiliary pressurizer spray valve, to address body-to-bonnet leakage of

the non-isolable valve. Inspectors also reviewed the associated 10 CFR Part 50.59

screening criteria against the system design bases documentation and procedure

00307-C, Temporary Modifications. The inspectors reviewed implementation,

configuration control, post-installation test activities, drawing and procedure updates,

and operator awareness for this temporary modification.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for

the following six maintenance activities to verify that the testing met the requirements of

procedure 29401-C, Work Order Functional Tests, for ensuring equipment operability

and functional capability was restored. The inspectors also reviewed the test

procedures to verify the acceptance criteria were sufficient to meet the Technical

Specification (TS) operability requirements.

C MWO SNC410412, Unit 1 Train B Safety Injection Accumulator Vent Header

Isolation Valve 1HV-0943B

C MWO SNC439646, 1HV-3016B Disassemble MSIV and MWO SNC439647, 1HV-

3026B Disassemble MSIV

C MWO SNC43990, 1HV-3006A Disconnect Actuator and Perform Ultra-Sonic Testing

C MWO SNC424222- 2A EDG Replace O-Rings in 2R, 2L, 7R, and 7L Fuel Injectors

C MWO SNC127251 - Clean, Inspect, and Lubricate Valve Stem

C MWO SNC447741 - 2A NSCW Fan #3 Not Operating

b. Findings

Introduction: A Green self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B

Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was identified for failure to provide

adequate work instructions in the maintenance procedure used to modify 480V EMAX

safety-related switchgear breakers. Specifically, when modifying the breaker by adding

a higher amperage closing coil, failure to verify the proper placement of the wire bundle

on top of the closing coil following replacement resulted in the safety-related 480V

EMAX breaker failing to close when demanded. Investigation revealed that the wire

bundle on top of the closing coil was positioned such that it prevented the close lever

from fully seating, thus preventing the breaker from closing.

Enclosure

13

Description: At 0700 on November 19, 2012, the control room operators noted that the

2A NSCW cooling tower fan #3 did not start when the associated tower return valve

opened. On Unit 2, NSCW cooling tower fan #3 is interlocked to automatically start

when the associated tower return valve opens and initiates flow to the tower spray lines.

At the direction of the shift supervisor, the operators attempted to start fan #3 manually

from the main control room, but the fan did not start. The green light for the hand switch

indicated that control power was available. The licensee declared the fan inoperable

and an incident response team (IRT) was assembled. The 480V EMAX breaker was

replaced and the monthly surveillance test was successfully completed. The fan was

declared operable at 4:30 a.m. on November 20, 2012. The investigation of the failed

breaker revealed that the wire bundle on top of the closing coil was in physical contact

with the side of the close lever, preventing the close lever from fully seating, thus

preventing the breaker from closing. When the wire bundle was properly anchored away

from the close lever, the breaker operated normally. The IRT determined that the wire

bundle on this breaker had been improperly repositioned following modification of the

breaker. The 480V EMAX breakers that supply specific safety-related loads at Vogtle

must be modified by installing a higher amperage closing coil because with the current

plant design, the closing coils are continuously energized. Maintenance procedure

28480-C Rev.26, 480V EMAX Breaker Maintenance, did not provide any guidance on

how to anchor the wire bundle following closing coil replacement so that the wire bundle

did not interfere with the operation of the close lever. The licensee entered this issue

into their corrective action program as condition reports (CR) 549999 and CR 550736.

Analysis: The failure of the breaker to close when demanded and start the safety-

related NSCW cooling tower fan was a performance deficiency. The inspectors

concluded that the finding was more than minor because it impacted the reactor safety

mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and

capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable

consequences and affected the cornerstone attribute of equipment performance.

Specifically, failure of the 480V EMAX breaker to close when demanded resulted in the

2A NSCW cooling tower fan #3 being inoperable for approximately 21.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings dated

June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that finding affected the mitigating systems

cornerstone. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The

Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012.

The inspectors used the Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings (IMC 0609.04

Exhibit 2, dated June 19, 2012) to characterize the finding. Since the inspectors

answered No to all of the Exhibit 2, section A, questions 1-4, mitigating systems

cornerstone screening questions, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very

low safety significance (Green).

The inspectors determined the primary cause of the performance deficiency was that the

maintenance technicians who were modifying the 480V EMAX breakers were unaware

that the improper placement of the closing coil wire bundle could interfere with the

operation of the close lever. The inspectors determined that the cause of this finding

was related to the corrective action program component of the problem identification and

resolution cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate problem evaluation P.1(c).]

Enclosure

14

Specifically, the licensees extent of cause evaluations performed on previous 480V

EMAX breaker failures (caused by restricted movement of the close lever) did not

identify the potential of the closing coil wire bundle to interfere with the proper movement

of the close lever.

Enforcement: The inspectors determined that the finding represents a violation of

regulatory requirements because it involved inadequate maintenance procedures used

to modify safety-related plant equipment. 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B Criterion V,

Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that procedures shall include

appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important

activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Contrary to the above, maintenance

procedure 28480-C Rev.26, 480V EMAX Breaker Maintenance, did not provide

guidance on how to anchor the wire bundle following closing coil replacement so that the

wire bundle did not interfere with the operation of the close lever. As a result of the

violation, the 2A NSCW cooling tower fan #3 was rendered inoperable for a period of

approximately 21.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> on November 19 and 20. Because this violation was of very

low safety significance and was entered into the licensees corrective action program as

CR 549999 and CR 550736, this violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with

Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000425/2012005-01, Inadequate

Maintenance Procedure Results in Inoperability of NSCW Cooling Tower Fan.)

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed the activities described below for the 1R17 refueling outage

that ended on October 18, 2012. The inspectors confirmed that, when the licensee

removed equipment from service, the licensee maintained defense-in-depth

commensurate with the outage risk control plan for key safety functions and applicable

TS and that configuration changes due to emergent work and unexpected conditions

were controlled in accordance with the outage risk control plan. Inspection activities

included:

C Observed refueling activities for compliance with TS, to verify proper tracking of fuel

assemblies from the spent fuel pool to the core, and to verify foreign material

exclusion was maintained

C Performed containment closure activities, including a detailed containment walkdown

prior to startup, to verify no evidence of leakage and that debris had not been left

which could affect the performance of the containment sump

C Observed heat up and startup activities to verify that TS, license conditions, and

other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites for

mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant conditions. Reactor

coolant system (RCS) integrity was verified by reviewing RCS leakage calculations

and containment integrity was verified by reviewing the status of containment

penetrations and containment isolation valves

Enclosure

15

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following eight surveillance test procedures and either

observed the testing or reviewed test results to verify that testing was conducted in

accordance with the procedures and that the acceptance criteria adequately

demonstrated that the equipment was operable. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed

the CR database to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and implemented

appropriate corrective actions for surveillance test problems.

Surveillance Tests

C 14666-1 Rev. 34.1, Train A Diesel Generator and ESFAS Test

C 14670A-1 Rev. 1.2, Diesel Generator 1A Hot Restart Test

C 14802A-1 Rev. 4.1, Train A NSCW Pump/Check Valve IST and Response Time Test

C 14804A-1 Rev. 4, Safety Injection Pump A Inservice and Response Time Test

Containment Isolation Valve

C 14372B-1 Rev. 9, Containment Penetration No. 72B RCS loop 3 Accumulator

Sample Line Local Leak Rate Test

In-Service Tests (IST)

C 14808A-2 Rev. 2.2, Train A Centrifugal Charging Pump and Check Valve IST and

Response Time Test

RCS Leak Detection

C 14905-1 Rev. 67.2, RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)

C 14905-2 Rev. 50.1, RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The NSIR headquarters staff performed an in-office review of the latest revisions of

various Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) and the Emergency Plan

located under ADAMS accession numbers ML12188A352, ML122430598,

ML12081A211, ML12093A204, and ML12115A174.

Enclosure

16

The licensee determined that in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), the changes made in

the revisions resulted in no reduction in the effectiveness of the Plan, and that the

revised Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to

10 CFR Part 50. The NRC review was not documented in a safety evaluation report and

did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, these revisions are

subject to future inspection. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for

the emergency action level and emergency plan changes on an annual basis.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY [RS]

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

a. Inspection Scope

Hazard Assessment and Instructions to Workers: During facility tours, the inspectors

directly observed labeling of radioactive material and postings for radiation areas, high

radiation areas (HRA)s, Very High Radiation Areas (VHRA)s and airborne radioactivity

areas established within the radiologically controlled area (RCA) of the auxiliary building,

Unit 1 (U1) reactor containment building, and radioactive waste (radwaste) processing

and storage locations. The inspectors independently measured radiation dose rates or

directly observed conduct of licensee radiation surveys for selected RCA areas. The

inspectors reviewed survey records for several plant areas including surveys for alpha

emitters, discrete radioactive particles, airborne radioactivity, gamma surveys with a

range of dose rate gradients, and pre-job surveys for upcoming tasks. The inspectors

also discussed changes to plant operations that could contribute to changing radiological

conditions since the last inspection. For selected outage jobs, the inspectors attended

pre-job briefings and reviewed radiation work permit (RWP) details to assess

communication of radiological control requirements and current radiological conditions to

workers.

Hazard Control and Work Practices: The inspectors evaluated access barrier

effectiveness for selected Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA) locations and discussed

changes to procedural guidance for LHRA and VHRA controls with health physics (HP)

supervisors. The inspectors reviewed implementation of controls for the storage of

irradiated material within the spent fuel pool (SFP). Established radiological controls

(including airborne controls) were evaluated for selected Unit 1 Refueling Outage 17

(1R-17) tasks including maintenance activities in the transfer canal, removal of

pressurizer code safety valves, and steam generator (S/G) eddy current testing. In

addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee controls for areas where dose rates could

change significantly as a result of plant shutdown and refueling operations.

Enclosure

17

Through direct observations and interviews with licensee staff, inspectors evaluated

occupational workers adherence to selected RWPs and HP technician (HPT) proficiency

in providing job coverage. Electronic dosimeter (ED) alarm set points and worker stay

times were evaluated against area radiation survey results for selected 1R17 job tasks.

As part of Inspection Procedure (IP) 71124.04, inspectors reviewed the use of personnel

dosimetry (ED alarms, extremity dosimetry, multibadging in high dose rate gradients,

etc.). The inspectors also evaluated worker responses to dose and dose rate alarms

during selected work activities.

Control of Radioactive Material: The inspectors observed surveys of material and

personnel being released from the RCA using small article monitor (SAM), personnel

contamination monitor (PCM), and portal monitor (PM) instruments. The inspectors

reviewed the last two calibration records for selected release point survey instruments

and discussed equipment sensitivity, alarm setpoints, and release program guidance

with licensee staff. The inspectors compared recent 10 Code of Federal Regulations

(CFR) Part 61 results for the Dry Active Waste (DAW) radioactive waste stream with

radio nuclides used in calibration sources to evaluate the appropriateness and accuracy

of release survey instrumentation. The inspectors also reviewed records of leak tests on

selected sealed sources and discussed nationally tracked source transactions with

licensee staff.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and assessed Condition

Reports (CR)s associated with radiological hazard assessment and control. The

inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve the issues in

accordance with procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Ver. 12.1. The

inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment results.

Radiation protection activities were evaluated against the requirements of Final Safety

Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 12; Technical Specifications (TS) Sections 5.4 and 5.7;

10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; and approved licensee procedures. Licensee programs for

monitoring materials and personnel released from the RCA were evaluated against 10

CFR Part 20 and IE Circular 81-07, Control of Radioactively Contaminated Material.

Documents reviewed are listed in Sections 2RS1, 2RS2, 2RS3, and 2RS5 of the

Attachment.

b. Findings

Introduction: The inspectors identified a Green, self-revealing, Non-cited Violation

(NCV) of TS 5.7.1, High Radiation Area, for an unauthorized entry into a HRA.

Description: On September 26, 2012, a maintenance worker entered U1 containment to

locate and walk down two Nuclear Service Cooling Water check valves in preparation for

inspection. Prior to the entry, the worker received a pre-job briefing from HP to allow

access into containment. Neither the worker nor the HPT performing the briefing were

confident of the valve locations, however they determined that Quadrant 1 of the 184

elevation was the most likely area to find the valves. Since the assigned RWP (as well

as TS 5.7.1) did not allow entry into any HRAs without first obtaining a briefing on the

radiological conditions, the worker was briefed on conditions in HRAs on the 184

Enclosure

18

elevation. The worker was not briefed on conditions in HRAs in other parts of

containment. During the entry, the worker was unable to locate one of the check valves

on the 184 elevation and proceeded to exit out a stairwell to the 197 elevation. On the

197 elevation, the worker observed the other check valve inside a posted HRA. Without

knowledge of dose rates in the area, the worker proceeded past the HRA swing gate to

verify the valve tag number and subsequently received an ED dose rate alarm of 173

mrem/hr. The worker acknowledged the ED alarm and backed out of the HRA. In

addition, HP central control noted the ED alarm via telemetry and sent an HPT to

intercept the worker. The workers ED alarm setpoint was 150 mrem/hr and dose rates

in the area were as high as 445 mrem/hr on contact and 117 mrem/hr at 30 cm. The

licensee entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as CR 523976 and

took immediate corrective actions including an outage work crew stand down.

Analysis: The inspectors determined that the unauthorized entry into a HRA was a

performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with

the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance and

adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker

health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine

civilian nuclear reactor operation. Workers who enter HRAs without prior knowledge of

current radiological conditions could receive unintended occupational exposures. The

finding was evaluated using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance

Determination Process (SDP). The finding was not related to As Low As Reasonably

Achievable (ALARA) planning, nor did it involve an overexposure or substantial potential

for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Therefore, the

inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The

inspectors noted that the maintenance worker responded properly to the ED dose rate

alarm and was monitored by HP central control via telemetry, thereby limiting his

potential for unintended exposure. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of

Human Performance, Work Practices H.4.b] because the HRA event was a direct result

of poor communications during the pre-job briefing and a lack of procedure (RWP)

adherence on the part of the maintenance worker.

Enforcement: TS 5.7.1, High Radiation Area, requires individuals entering HRAs to

meet one or more of the following criteria: 1) be provided with a survey meter; 2) wear

an ED and be made aware of radiological conditions in the area; or 3) be escorted by a

HPT. Contrary to the above, on September 26, 2012, a worker entered a HRA without a

survey meter, without being made aware of radiological conditions in the area, and

without HPT escort. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it

was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CR 523976), this violation is

being treated as an NCV, consistent with the Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000424/425,

2012005-02, Unauthorized Entry into a High Radiation Area.

Enclosure

19

2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

Work Planning and Exposure Tracking: The inspectors reviewed planned work activities

and their collective exposure estimates for the current 1R17 outage. The inspectors

reviewed ALARA planning packages for the following high collective exposure tasks:

S/G 1-4 job evolutions (nozzle dam removal and installation, eddy current testing, and

sludge lance) and repair of unit 1 transfer canal transfer tube isolation valve work. For

the selected tasks, the inspectors reviewed established dose goals and discussed

assumptions regarding the bases for the current estimates with responsible ALARA

planners. The inspectors evaluated the incorporation of exposure reduction initiatives

and operating experience, including historical post-job reviews, into RWP requirements.

Day-to-day collective dose data for the selected tasks were compared with established

dose estimates and evaluated against procedural criteria (work-in-progress review limits)

for additional ALARA review. Where applicable, the inspectors discussed changes to

established estimates with ALARA planners and evaluated them against work scope

changes or unanticipated elevated dose rates.

Source Term Reduction and Control: The inspectors reviewed the collective exposure

three-year rolling average from 2009 - 2011 and reviewed historical collective exposure

trends from 1988 - 2012. The inspectors evaluated historical dose rate trends for

reactor coolant system piping and compared them to current 1R17 data. Crud burst

evolution during the first week of the 1R17 outage and source term reduction initiatives

were reviewed and discussed with Chemistry and HP staff.

Radiation Worker Performance: The inspectors observed radiation worker performance

for S/G job evolutions such as the diaphragm and manway removal and nozzle dam

removal and installation. The inspectors observed ALARA briefings for multiple steam

generator jobs and emerging jobs such as U1 transfer canal valve work. Radiation

worker performance was also evaluated as part of IP 71124.01. While observing job

tasks, the inspectors evaluated the use of remote technologies to reduce dose including

teledosimetry and remote visual monitoring.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and discussed selected

CAP documents associated with ALARA program implementation. The inspectors

evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with

licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Ver. 12.1. The

inspectors also evaluated the scope and frequency of the licensees self-assessment

program and reviewed recent assessment results.

ALARA program activities were evaluated against the requirements of FSAR Section 12,

TS Section 5.4, 10 CFR Part 20, and approved licensee procedures. Records reviewed

are listed in the Attachment.

Enclosure

20

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

a. Inspection Scope

Engineering Controls: The inspectors reviewed the use of temporary and permanent

engineering controls to mitigate airborne radioactivity during the 1R17 refueling outage.

The inspectors observed the use of portable air filtration units for work in contaminated

areas of the containment building and reviewed filtration unit testing certificates. The

inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of continuous air monitors and air samplers placed

in work area breathing zones to provide indication of increasing airborne levels.

Respiratory Protection Equipment: The inspectors reviewed the use of respiratory

protection devices to limit the intake of radioactive material. This included review of

devices used for routine tasks and devices stored for use in emergency situations. As part

of IP 71124.02, the inspectors reviewed ALARA evaluations for the use of respiratory

protection devices during work in the lower cavity near the transfer canal. Selected Self-

Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) units and negative pressure respirators (NPR)s

staged for routine and emergency use in the Main Control Room and other locations were

inspected for material condition, SCBA bottle air pressure, number of units, and number of

spare masks and air bottles available. The inspectors reviewed maintenance records for

selected SCBA units for the past two years and evaluated SCBA and NPR compliance with

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certification requirements. The

inspectors also reviewed records of air quality testing for supplied-air devices and SCBA

bottles.

The inspectors observed the use of air-supplied suits during S/G maintenance work. The

inspectors discussed training for various types of respiratory protection devices with HP

staff and interviewed radworkers and control room operators on use of the devices

including SCBA bottle change-out and use of corrective lens inserts. The inspectors

reviewed respirator qualification records (including medical qualifications) for several Main

Control Room operators and emergency responder personnel in the Maintenance and HP

departments. In addition, inspectors evaluated qualifications for individuals responsible for

testing and repairing SCBA vital components.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and assessed CRs

associated with airborne radioactivity mitigation and respiratory protection. The

inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve the issues in

accordance with procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Ver. 12.1. The

inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment results.

Licensee activities associated with the use of engineering controls and respiratory

protection equipment were reviewed against TS Section 5.4; 10 CFR Part 20; Regulatory

Guide 8.15, Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection; and applicable licensee

procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Enclosure

21

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

a. Inspection Scope

External Dosimetry: The inspectors reviewed the licensees National Voluntary

Accreditation Program (NVLAP) certification data for accreditation for the current year for

Ionizing Radiation Dosimetry. The inspectors reviewed program procedures for

processing active personnel dosimeters (ED)s and onsite storage of Optically Stimulated

Luminescent Dosimeters (OSLD)s. Comparisons between ED and OSLD results,

including correction factors, were discussed in detail. The inspectors also reviewed

dosimetry occurrence reports regarding alarming dosimeters.

Internal Dosimetry: Inspectors reviewed and discussed the in vivo bioassay program

with the licensee. Inspectors reviewed procedures that addressed methods for

determining internal or external contamination, releasing contaminated individuals, the

assignment of dose, and the frequency of measurements depending on the nuclides.

Inspectors reviewed and evaluated Whole Body Counter (WBC) records selected from

March 2010 to September 2012. The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for in

vitro monitoring, however there were no dose assessments using this method to review.

There were no internal dose assessments for internal exposure greater than 10 millirem

committed effective dose equivalent to review.

Special Dosimetric Situations: The inspectors reviewed records for declared pregnant

workers (DPW)s from March 2010 through September 2012 and discussed guidance for

monitoring and instructing DPWs. Inspectors reviewed and witnessed the licensees

practices for monitoring external dose in areas of expected dose rate gradients,

including the use of multi-badging and extremity dosimetry. The inspectors evaluated

the licensees neutron dosimetry program including instrumentation which was evaluated

under procedure 71124.05. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of

shallow dose assessments for selected Personnel Contamination Events occurring

between September 2011 and September 2012.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and discussed licensee

CAP documents associated with occupational dose assessment. Inspectors evaluated

the licensees ability to identify and resolve the identified issues in accordance with

procedure NPM-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Version 12.1. The inspectors

also discussed the scope of the licensees internal audit program and reviewed recent

assessment results.

HP program occupational dose assessment activities were evaluated against the

requirements of FSAR Section 12; TS Section 5.4; 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; and

approved licensee procedures. Records reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Enclosure

22

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation: During walk-downs of the auxiliary building and

the RCA exit point, the inspectors observed installed and portable radiation detection

equipment. These included area radiation monitors (ARM)s, continuous air samplers,

liquid and gaseous effluent monitors, PCMs, SAMs, PMs, a WBC, count room

equipment, and portable survey instruments. The inspectors observed the physical

location of the components, noted their material condition, observed the currency of

calibration and source check stickers, and discussed performance of equipment with RP

personnel.

In addition to equipment walk-downs, the inspectors observed source functional checks

of portable detection instruments, including ion chambers and telepoles. For the

portable instruments, the inspectors observed the use of a high-range calibrator and

discussed periodic output value testing, calibration, and source check processes with

health physics technicians. The inspectors reviewed calibration records and discussed

with chemistry personnel alarm setpoint values for PCMs, PMs, effluent monitors,

WBCs, and an ARM. This included a sampling of instruments used for post-accident

monitoring such as a containment high-range radiation monitor and effluent monitors for

noble gas and iodine. The inspectors reviewed the most recent 10 CFR Part 61 analysis

for DAW to determine if calibration and check sources are representative of the plant

source term. The inspectors observed computerized performance check calibration

efficiency information for count room gamma detectors and a liquid scintillation detector.

The inspectors also observed the currency of calibration for selected EDs at the RCA

entry point.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed selected CAP reports in

the area of radiological instrumentation. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability

to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with procedure NMP-GM-002-001,

Corrective Action Program Instructions, Ver. 29.0. Documents reviewed are listed in

the Attachment.

Effectiveness and reliability of selected radiation detection instruments were reviewed

against details documented in the following: 10 CFR Part 20; NUREG-0737,

Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements; FSAR Chapters 11 and 12; and

applicable licensee procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Enclosure

23

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the listed mitigating systems cornerstone

PIs during the period from October 1, 2011, through September 30, 2012, for Unit 1 and

Unit 2. The inspectors verified the licensees basis in reporting each data element using

the PI definitions and guidance contained in procedures 00163-C, NRC Performance

Indicator and Monthly Operating Report Preparation and Submittal, and Nuclear Energy

Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline.

Mitigating Systems Cornerstone

C Emergency AC Power Systems

C Cooling Water Systems

C Safety System Functional Failures

The inspectors reviewed Unit 1 and Unit 2 operator log entries, the CR data base, the

Vogtle mitigating system performance indicator basis document, the monthly operating

reports and monthly PI summary reports to verify that the licensee had accurately

submitted the PI data.

Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone: The inspectors reviewed the Occupational

Exposure Control Effectiveness PI results for the Occupational Radiation Safety

Cornerstone from June 2011 through September 2012. For the assessment period, the

inspectors reviewed electronic dosimeter alarm logs and CRs related to controls for

exposure significant areas. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone: The inspectors reviewed the Radiological Control

Effluent Release Occurrences PI results for the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone

from June 2011 through September 2012. For the assessment period, the inspectors

reviewed cumulative and projected doses to the public contained in liquid and gaseous

release permits and CRs related to Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite

Dose Calculation Manual issues. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedural

guidance for collecting and documenting PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment.

The inspectors completed five of the required samples specified in IP 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Enclosure

24

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Daily Condition Report Review. As required by inspection procedure 71152,

Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive

equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors

performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action

program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings

that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensees computerized corrective

action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.

.2 Focused Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed review of the following CR which addressed the

failure of the Unit 1 Loop 2 & 3 outboard MSIVs in the closed position during startup.

The goal of the review was to verify that the full extent of the issue was identified, an

appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified

and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the CR against the licensees corrective action

program as delineated in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program,

and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action. Documents reviewed are

listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings and Observations

Introduction: A Green self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B

Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was identified for failure to provide

adequate work instructions in the operations and maintenance procedures used to open

main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) that were bound in their closed seat. Specifically,

the operations and maintenance procedures used to open the loop 2 and loop 3

outboard MSIVs did not provide instructions to limit the magnitude of the force applied to

the valve stems while attempting to open the valves. Investigation revealed that the

cause of the stem failures was excessive force applied to the thermally embrittled stems.

Description: On October 8, with Unit 1 in Mode 2, the operators had begun preparations

for power ascension. At 1616, as the main feed pump was being placed on line, the

control room operators noted a divergence in RCS loop differential temperatures (Ts),

steam pressures, and steam flows between loops 1 & 4 and loops 2 & 3. Loops 1 & 4

showed increasing loop Ts, lowering steam pressure, and some minimal steam flow,

while loops 2 & 3 showed no loop T, increasing steam pressures (to the point of lifting

the loop 2 & 3 atmospheric relief valves), and no steam flow. The Main Control Board

hand switches indicated that all MSIVs and associated bypass valves were open. The

operators identified the potential impact to the core neutron flux and stopped power

ascension. Following discussions with plant management and engineering, the

operators placed the plant in a safe condition by inserting a manual trip of the reactor at

Enclosure

25

2155. The licensee subsequently assembled an Issue Response Team (IRT) and a root

cause team to investigate the cause of the diverging indications and to determine the

required corrective actions.

The investigations revealed that the outboard MSIVs on both loops 2 & 3 were failed in

the closed position. Upon disassembly, it was discovered the stems of both the failed

MSIVs had undergone brittle fracture just above the T-head, where the valve stem is

connected to the valve disk. Westinghouse representatives were consulted on the MSIV

issue. They conveyed to the licensee that the material used for the MSIV stems, ASME

SA564 Gr. 630PH T 17-4 PH heat treated to 1100oF, is susceptible to embrittlement

when exposed to temperatures above 500oF for a sustained period (after about 10

years). Metallurgical analysis performed on the sheared stems validated that thermal

embrittlement was the failure mechanism. The failure analysis concluded that both stem

fractures were the result of sudden brittle failures from single tensile stress events.

Further investigation by the IRT revealed that the loop 2 outboard MSIV stem failed

during main steam line warming evolutions conducted on October 6 by operations

personnel. The IRT also determined that that the loop 3 outboard MSIV stem failed on

the night of October 7 following activities performed by maintenance personnel to lift the

valve disk off its closed seat.

The root cause team determined that the root cause of the MSIV stem failures was

temperature aging embrittlement of the stem material. The team also determined that

the major contributing causes of the event were thermal binding of the valve disks in the

closed seat and inadequate procedural guidance, i.e. procedures used to open the

MSIVs did not provide instructions or guidance to limit the magnitude of the force applied

to the valve stems while attempting to open the valves, which ultimately resulted in the

brittle failure of the valve stems. The inadequate procedures specified by the root cause

team were operating procedures 12001-C, Unit Heat Up to Hot Shutdown (Mode 5 to

Mode 4), and 14850-1/2, Cold Shutdown Valve In-Service Test, and maintenance

procedure 26854-C, MSIV Actuator Maintenance. The licensee conducted ultrasonic

testing on the remaining six Unit 1 MSIVs to verify that the valve stems were intact. The

two failed valve stems were replaced, and the reactor was restarted on October 17. The

licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 530916.

Analysis: The failure to provide adequate work instructions in the operations and

maintenance procedures used to open main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) that were

stuck on their closed seat was a performance deficiency. The inspectors concluded that

the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality

attribute of the reactor safety - initiating events cornerstone and it adversely affected the

cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and

challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.

Specifically, the failure to provide adequate work instructions to operations and

maintenance personnel resulted in the failure of both the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard

MSIVs and the subsequent manual reactor trip.

Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings dated June 19,

2012, the inspectors determined that finding affected the Initiating Events cornerstone.

The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance

Enclosure

26

Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated 06/19/12. The inspectors

used the Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings (IMC 0609.04 Exhibit 1,

dated June 19, 2012) to characterize the finding. Since the inspectors answered No to

the Exhibit 1, section B, Initiating Events screening question, the inspectors concluded

that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

The primary cause of the performance deficiency, as determined by the inspectors, was

less than adequate work planning and coordination. The inspectors determined that the

cause of this finding was related to the work control component of the human

performance cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate work planning [H.3 (a)].

Specifically, the licensees procedures used to open the MSIVs that were stuck on their

closed seat did not contain instructions or precautions to limit the magnitude of the force

applied to the valve stems while attempting to open the valves.

Enforcement: The inspectors determined that the finding represents a violation of

regulatory requirements because it involved inadequate operations and maintenance

procedures used to operate safety-related plant equipment. 10 CFR 50 Appendix B

Criterion V requires, in part, that procedures shall include appropriate quantitative or

qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been

satisfactorily accomplished. Contrary to the above, the licensees procedures used to

open the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard MSIVs did not provide instructions to limit the

magnitude of the force applied to the valve stems while attempting to open the valves.

As a result of the violation, the loop 2 and loop 3 MSIVs failed in the closed position, and

the reactor was manually tripped on October 8, extending the 1R17 refueling outage for

an additional nine days. The licensee conducted ultrasonic testing on the remaining six

Unit 1 MSIVs to verify that the valve stems were intact. The stems of the loop 2 and

loop 3 outboard MSIVs were replaced, and the Unit 1 reactor was restarted on October

17. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered into the

licensees corrective action program as CR 530916, this violation is being treated as an

NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000424/2012005-03, Inadequate Operations and Maintenance Procedures Results in

Brittle Failure of the Loop 2 and Loop 3 Outboard MSIV Stems.)

.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the licensees Corrective Action Program and

associated documents to identify trends which could indicate the existence of a more

significant safety issue. The review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but

also considered the results of inspector daily CR screening and the licensees trending

efforts. The review nominally considered the six month period of April 2012 through

September 2012 although some examples extended beyond those dates when the

scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors also reviewed several CRs associated

with operability determinations which occurred during the period. Corrective actions

associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports were

reviewed for adequacy. The inspectors also evaluated the trend reports against the

Enclosure

27

requirements of the licensees corrective action program as specified in licensee

procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)

.1 (Closed) LER 05000424/2012-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification

LCOs 3.7.14 and 3.0.3

a. Inspection Scope

On August 17, 2012, 1A ESF Chiller condenser vacuum was noted to be 12 inches of

mercury, with a vacuum of 15 inches of mercury specified as the low limit on operating

logs. The shift supervisor mistakenly believed condenser pressure was one of the

parameters which engineering had evaluated and was continuing to monitor with a

recorder. Condenser pressure was not one of the parameters being monitored and

recorded on a recorder. When the condenser pressure was recorded as out of

specification on the operator rounds log sheet, the shift supervisor failed to initiate

operability and reportability determination processes. This misinformation was carried

forward through subsequent shifts via logs. During the next five days, 1A ESF Chiller

condenser vacuum decreased to 4 inches of mercury and stabilized for an additional

four days prior to initiation of a CR on August 26, 2012. Subsequent investigation and

consultation with the vendor determined the 1A ESF Chiller was inoperable and the TS

LCO was entered at 1437 on August 26, 2012. As a result of the delay in recognition of

the status of the subject chiller, appropriate actions of LCOs 3.7.14 and 3.0.3 were not

taken. The inspectors reviewed the LER, the associated CR and enhanced apparent

cause determination, and subsequent action items.

b. Findings

One licensee-identified violation was identified, and is documented in section 4OA7 of

this report. This LER is closed.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force

personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee

security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.

These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

Enclosure

28

These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities

did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an

integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

.2 (Discussed) Temporary Instruction 2515/187 - Inspection of Near-Term Task Force

Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

Inspectors conducted independent walkdowns to verify that the licensee completed the

actions associated with the flood protection feature specified in paragraph 03.02.a.2 of

this TI. Inspectors are performing walkdowns at all sites in response to a letter from the

NRC to licensees, entitled Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of

Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the

Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, dated

March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340).

Enclosure 4 of the letter requested licensees to perform external flooding walkdowns

using an NRC-endorsed walkdown methodology (ADAMS Accession No.

ML12056A050). Nuclear Energy Industry (NEI) document 12-07 titled, Guidelines for

Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Protection Features, (ADAMS Accession

No. ML12173A215) provided the NRC-endorsed methodology for assessing external

flood protection and mitigation capabilities to verify that plant features, credited in the

CLB for protection and mitigation from external flood events, and are available,

functional, and properly maintained.

b. Findings and Observations

Findings or violations associated with the flooding, if any, will be documented in the 1st

quarter integrated inspection report of 2013.

.3 Temporary Instruction 2515/188 - Inspection of Near-Term Task Force

Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors accompanied the licensee on their seismic walkdowns of the following

SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 components:

  • Unit 1 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump A, SWEL 1 item #60, on August 15 in the

Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Building

  • Unit 1B Diesel Generator Control Panel, SWEL 1 item #61, on August 15 in the

Diesel Generator Building

Enclosure

29

  • Unit 1 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump and Turbine Driver, SWEL 1 item #13, on August

16 in the AFW Pump House

  • Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger B, SWEL 2 item #1, on August 21 in the

Auxiliary Building

The inspectors verified that the licensee confirmed that the following seismic features

associated with the above listed components were free of potential adverse seismic

conditions:

  • Anchorage was free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware
  • Anchorage was free of corrosion that is more than mild surface corrosion
  • Anchorage is free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors
  • Anchorage configuration was consistent with plant documentation
  • SSCs will not be damaged from impact by nearby equipment or structures
  • Overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry

block walls are secure and not likely to collapse onto the equipment

  • Attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage
  • The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could

cause flooding or spray in the area

  • The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could

cause a fire in the area

  • The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated

with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary

installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)

The inspectors independently performed their walkdowns and verified that the following

components were free of the potential adverse seismic conditions listed above:

  • Unit 2A Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver #1, SWEL 1 item #55, on December 17

in the Diesel Generator Building

  • Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Pump B, SWEL item #2, on December 17 in the Auxiliary

Building

Observations made during the walkdowns that could not be determined to be acceptable

were entered into the licensees corrective action program for evaluation.

Additionally, inspectors verified that items that could allow the spent fuel pool to drain

down rapidly were added to the SWEL and these items were walked down by the

licensee.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

Enclosure

30

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting

On January 11, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Tom

Tynan and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors

confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the

inspection.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violations of very low significance (Green) or Severity Level IV were

identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria

of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as Non-cited Violations.

.1 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification LCOs 3.7.14 and 3.0.3

TS 3.0.3 requires, in part, that when a limiting condition of operation (LCO) is not met

and the associated actions are not met, an associated action is not provided, or if

directed by the associated actions, the unit shall be placed in a mode or other specified

condition in which the LCO is not applicable. TS 3.7.14 require that two engineered

safety feature (ESF) room cooler and safety-related chiller trains shall be operable.

Contrary to the above, on August 17, 2012, at approximately midnight, the unit 1 shift

supervisor failed to enter the required action statement for TS LCO 3.7.14, Condition A

when the unit 1A ESF chiller condenser purge pressure was noted to be out of

specification high. Inoperability of the chiller was not recognized until August 26, 2012,

and the LCO entered at 1437. Further, during the extended period during which the 1A

ESF chiller was inoperable (albeit unrecognized as inoperable), opposite train supported

components as well as redundant room coolers on the train B ESF Chiller and room

cooler train were removed from service for unrelated activities which resulted in two

occasions during which TS 3.0.3 should have been applied. The licensee documented

this event in their corrective action program as CR 507143. Using IMC 0609, dated

June 19, 2012, Attachment 4, Table 2, the inspectors verified that the finding affected

the mitigation systems cornerstone. IMC 0609 Attachment 4 Table 3 directed the

inspectors to use IMC 0609 Appendix A to characterize the finding. Because the finding

represented an actual loss of function of one train of ECCS for greater than its TS

Allowed Outage Time, a detailed risk evaluation was required. A detailed risk evaluation

was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst in accordance with IMC 0609

Appendix A guidance using the NRC Vogtle SPAR model and the Saphire 8 risk analysis

code. An Event/Condition Analysis module in Saphire was run with the unit 1A train ESF

chiller failed with no recovery allowed for a 9 day exposure period. The dominant

sequence was a loss of offsite power with success of reactor trip and emergency power

with late failure of feedwater and failure to implement feed and bleed cooling due to

failure of the Unit 1B train chiller and loss of the safety related switchgear. The detailed

risk evaluation determined that the risk due to the performance deficiency was an

increase in core damage frequency of <1E-6/year, a GREEN finding of very low safety

significance. The risk was mitigated by the availability of alternate train components and

the short exposure period.

Enclosure

31

.2 Failure to Conduct Required ASME Code Section XI Inspections

On April 12, 2012, Vogtle staff identified that in-service inspections for the second 10-

year ISI period were missed for eight ASME Code Class 1 valves. Valves 1/2

1208U6035, 1/2 1208U6036, 1/2 1208U6037 and 1/2 1208U6038 are chemical and

volume control system normal and alternate charging check valves to the reactor coolant

system. Leakage control devices (seal encapsulation devices) were installed on the Unit

1 valves in 1987 to address recurring body-to-bonnet leakage per an industry approved

Westinghouse design change. The seal caps were subsequently installed on the unit 2

valves in 1989. Title 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) requires, in part, that licensees follow the

pressure test requirements of ASME Code Section XI. ASME Code,Section XI, IWA-

5240, requires visual examinations as part of system pressure tests. ASME Code

Section XI, IWA-5242, 1998 Edition through 2000 addenda, requires VT-2 visual

examinations for pressure retaining bolted connections in borated water systems.

Contrary to the above, from October, 1987, to the present, Vogtle did not perform a

visual inspection of the valve body-to-bonnet studs. This finding was more than minor

because it impacted the initiating events cornerstone and its attribute of equipment

performance. Specifically, it affected the objective to limit the likelihood of those events

that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well

as power operations. Using Inspection manual chapter 0609, dated June 19, 2012,

Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, this

finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the licensees

evaluation was able to demonstrate structural integrity. Specifically, stud stress was not

sufficiently close to the yield stress to cause a loss of integrity. Therefore, the finding

does not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that

mitigation equipment will not be available. The licensee has entered this issue into their

corrective action program as CRs 438268, 458567, 505111 and 547078. To address

the issue for the short term, the licensee plans to follow the needed and good practice

recommendations detailed by the PWROG in letter OG-12-330 which was issued on

August 16, 2012. The long term corrective actions will be to remove all of the existing

seal caps and install a bonnet with a canopy seal weld to remove the need for a seal cap

as a way to mitigate the effects of leakage and to allow visual examination of the bolted

connections.

.3 Failure to Post High Radiation Area

10 CFR 20.1902(b) requires licensees to post each HRA with a conspicuous sign or

signs bearing the radiation symbol and the words CAUTION, HIGH RADIATION AREA

or DANGER, HIGH RADIATION AREA. Contrary to this, on September 18, 2012, the

entryway into the Unit 1 spent fuel pool cooling system demineralizer valve gallery was

discovered to be missing a conspicuous sign bearing the radiation symbol and the words

CAUTION, HIGH RADIATION AREA or DANGER, HIGH RADIATION AREA.

Accessible areas inside the Valve Gallery room contained dose rates up to 327 mrem/hr

at 30 cm. A HP foreman discovered this violation while performing a walkdown of HRA

postings in the auxiliary building. The licensee took immediate corrective actions upon

discovery including restoration of the HRA posting (CR 519818). There was no

evidence of unauthorized worker entry into the affected area. Although this event

involved the failure to maintain proper control for a HRA, this finding is of very low safety

Enclosure

32

significance because it was not related to ALARA planning, nor did it involve an

overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose

was not compromised.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel:

S. Bargeron, Plant Manager

B. Brown, Training Manager

R. Collins, Chemistry Manager

K. Dyar, Security Manager

G. Gunn, Licensing

I. Kochery, Health Physics Manager

D. McCary, Maintenance Manager

K. Molina, Heat Exchanger Engineer

D. Puckett, Performance Analysis Supervisor

J. Robinson, Engineering Programs Manager

S. Swanson, Site Support Manager

T. Tynan, Site Vice-President

NRC personnel:

M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector

T. Chandler, Resident Inspector

F. Ehrhardt, Chief, Region II Reactor Projects Branch 2

T. Lighty, Project Engineer

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened and Closed

050000425/2012005-01 NCV Inadequate Maintenance Procedure Results in

Inoperability of NSCW Cooling Tower Fan

(Section 1R19)

05000424, 425/2012005-02 NCV Unauthorized Entry into a High Radiation Area.

(Section 2RS1)05000424/2012005-03 NCV Inadequate Operations and Maintenance

Procedures Results in Brittle Failure of the Loop

2 and Loop 3 Outboard MSIV Stems (Section

4OA2)

Closed

05000424/2012-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification

LCOs 3.7.14 and 3.0.3

05000424/425/2515/188 TI Inspection of Near-Term Task Force

Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns

(Section 4OA5.3)

Attachment

2

Discussed

05000424/425/2515/187 TI Inspection of Near-Term Task Force

Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns

(Section 4OA5.2)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

11877-1 Rev. 23, Cold Weather Checklist

11877-2 Rev. 21, Cold Weather Checklist

11901-1 Rev. 17.2, Heat Tracing System Alignment

11901-2 Rev. 12.3, Heat Tracing System Alignment

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

Procedures

11903-C Rev. 30.4, Fire Protection System Alignment, Section A

11011-1 Rev. 14.2, Residual Heat Removal System Alignment

13011-1 Rev. 70.3, Residual Heat Removal System

11115-1 Rev. 10.2, Containment Spray System Alignment

Drawings

CX4DB173-1 Rev. 41.0, P&I Diagram Fire Protection - Pump House No. 1 & 2, System 2301

CX4DB173-2 Rev. 29.0, P&I Diagram Fire Protection - Yard Piping System, System 2301

1X4DB122 Rev. 51.0, P&I Diagram Residual Heat Removal System 1205

1X4DB131 Rev. 35.0, P&I Diagram Containment Spray System - System No. 1206

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Procedures

92799-1 Rev. 3.2, Zone 99 - Control Building Level A Fire Fighting Preplan

92804-1 Rev. 4.2, Zone 104 - MSIV Room Level 1 Fire Fighting Preplan

92745-1 Rev. 2.2, Zone 45 - Auxiliary Building Level 1 Fire Fighting Preplan

92760-2 Rev. 1.0, Zone 60 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92761-2 Rev. 1.1, Zone 61 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92764-2 Rev. 1.1, Zone 64 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92762-2 Rev. 2.0, Zone 62 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92763-2 Rev. 0.2, Zone 63 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92782-2 Rev. 1.2, Zone 82 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92860A-1 Rev. .2, Zone 160A - NSCW Pumphouse - Train A Fire Fighting Preplan

92860B-1 Rev. .2, Zone 160B - NSCW Pumphouse - Train B Fire Fighting Preplan

92771-1, Rev. 4.1, Zone 71 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92776-1, Rev. 2.1, Zone 76 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92777A-1, Rev. 1.1, Zone 77A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92777B-1, Rev. 1.2, Zone 77B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92778A-1, Rev. 2.1, Zone 78A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92778B-1, Rev. 1.2, Zone 78B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

Attachment

3

92779A-1, Rev. 0.2, Zone 79A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92779B-1, Rev. 1.2, Zone 79B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92756A-1, Rev. 0.2, Zone 56A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92756B-1, Rev. 1.2, Zone 56B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92783-1, Rev. 2.2, Zone 83 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92852-1, Rev. 2.2, Zone 152 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92771-2, Rev. 1.1, Zone 71 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92776-2, Rev. 1.1, Zone 76 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92777A-2, Rev. 1.1, Zone 77A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92777B-2, Rev. 1.2, Zone 77B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92778A-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 78A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92778B-2, Rev. 1.2, Zone 78B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92779A-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 79A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92779B-2, Rev. 1.2, Zone 79B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92756A-2, Rev. 1.1, Zone 56A - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92756B-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 56B - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92783-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 83 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

92852-2, Rev. 0.2, Zone 152 - Control Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures

Work Orders

SNC 395851

Calculations

X6CXC-27 Rev.8, Flooding Analysis Auxiliary Building Level D

Procedures

25512-C Rev.1.0, General Inspection Outdoor Electrical Duct Run Pull Boxes/Manholes

Drawings

2X4DB147-1 Rev. 18.0, P&I Diagram Aux BLDG. Flood Retaining Rooms Alarms & Drains

System No. 1218

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

Work Orders:

SNC 121039

Procedures

83309-C Rev. 6.4, Safety-Related Heat Exchanger Inspection

83305-C Rev. 7.6, Heat Exchanger Test/Maintenance Program

Condition Reports:

CR 523190

Other

Heat Exchanger as-found and as-left photos taken 09/24/2012

Attachment

4

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Other

V-RQ-SE-12705, Simulator Exercise Guide: Steam Generator Tube Leak

Procedures

18009-C Rev. 29.2, Steam Generator Tube Leak

18007-C Rev. 23, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

Engineering Documents

System 1301-2, Main Steam System 2012 health reports

System 1205 RHR System, 4th quarter 2012 system health report

Condition Reports:

348759, 2PV3000 has exceeded its MR OOS time

343991, 2PV3000 SG-1 ARV Failure

518228, 1HV8702A will not open

534190, MR evaluation identified FF

Procedures

50028-C Rev. 18.1, Engineering Maintenance Rule Implementation

Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations

Condition Reports:

501741, U-1 D/G A unit available light is not working

533822, Unit 1 and 2 main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)

530916, Unit 1 steam generator loops 2 & 3 do not indicate steam flow

Engineering Documents

RER SNC440108, MSIV stem failure evaluation

DOEJ-VRSNC440108-M001, Unit 1 MSIVs ((1HV3016B & 1HV3026B) disk separation

Other

VNP-12-008 REV. 1.0, ODMI worksheet for degraded MSIV stems

Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) 2012/02, Revision 1, Technical Specification

Interpretation and Operability Determination

Section 1R18: Plant Modifications

Other

MDC SNC439341/1.0, 1-1208-U4-A11, Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray Valve Seal Leak

Section 1R19: Post Maintenance Testing

Procedures

25022-C Rev. 7, General Small Bore Piping Installation

14240-1 Rev. 5.2, Manual SLI TADOT

14850-1 Rev. 52, Cold Shutdown Valve Inservice Test

14980A-2 Rev. 23, Diesel Generator Operability Test

14825-1 Rev. 97, Quarterly Inservice Valve Test

14430-2 Rev. 9.0, NSCW Cooling Tower Fans Monthly Test

Attachment

5

Condition Reports

523221

530916

550378

Work Orders

SNC410412

SNC439646

SNC439647

SNC439900

SNC424222

SNC387201

SNC127251

SNC447741

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

Procedures

14666-1 Rev. 34.1, Train A Diesel Generator and ESFAS Test

14372B-1 Rev. 9, Containment Penetration No. 72B RCS Loop #3 Accumulator Sample Line

Local Leak Rate Test

14670A-1 Rev. 1.2, Diesel Generator 1A Hot Restart Test

14808A-2 Rev. 2.2, Train A Centrifugal Charging Pump and Check Valve IST and Response

Time Test

14804A-1 Rev. 4, Safety Injection Pump A Inservice and Response Time Test

14905-1 Rev. 67.2, RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)

14905-2 Rev. 50.1, RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)

14802A-1 Rev. 4.1, Train A NSCW Pump/Check Valve IST and Response Time Test

Work Orders

SNC356759

SNC335801

SNC371576

SNC385697

SNC380426

SNC392870

Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

Change Packages

Emergency Plan, Revision 57

NMP-EP-110, Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action, Version 3.0

NMP-EP-110, Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action, Version 4.0

NMP-EP-111, Emergency Notifications, Version 7.0

NMP-EP-112, Protective Action Recommendations, Version 2.0

91201-C, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center, Revision 17

91202-C, Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center, Revision 22

Attachment

6

Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

43014-C, Special Radiological Controls, Ver. 46

46024-C, Release of Materials from the RCA, Ver. 9.3

93240A-C, Reactor Vessel Disassembly Instructions, Ver. 33

NMP-HP-300, Radiation and Contamination Surveys, Ver. 2.0

NMP-HP-302, Restricted Area Classification, Postings, and Access Control, Ver. 2.1

NMP-HP-303, Personnel Decontamination, Ver. 1.4

NMP-HP-305, Alpha Radiation Monitoring, Ver. 4.0

NMP-CH-013-001, Vogtle RCS Chemistry During Scheduled Plant Shutdowns with Fuel

Defects Suspected, Ver. 1.0

NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Ver. 12.1

Records and Data

NMP-HP-109, Investigation, Evaluation and Management of Damaged, Lost, Malfunctioning or

Alarming Dosimetry, Ver. 1.1, Data Sheet 2, Workers Statement for Dose/Rate Alarm or

Malfunctioning Electronic Dosimeter, 9/26/12

Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Inventory Log Non Fuel Radioactive Material Stored in Unit 1 Spent Fuel

Pool

Contingency Plan for: Health Physics Controls for High Noble Gas Activity During Code Safety

Valve Removal During 1R17

ALARA Briefing Notes: Rx Head/ Upper Internals Lift and Set

Alpha Levels, Comparing 100 cm2 Samples

RWP 12-1618, Repair of Unit 1 Transfer Canal Transfer Tube ISO Valve 1-1213-U6-086, Rev. 0

RWP 12-1505, Under Rx Vessel Work, Rev. 0

RWP 12-1608, Remove/Install Pzr Code Safety Valves, Rev. 0

RWP 12-1600, CM/PM, VLVS, Motors, Misc Activities in U1 CTMT, Rev. 0

Radiological Survey 124805, U1 SFP Transfer Canal

Radiological Survey 124876, U1 SFP Transfer Canal

Radiological Survey 152222, Unit 1 Transfer Canal - Top View (1FHBC1)

Radiological Survey 151559, Valve Gallery SFP Cooling Demin (1AXA46)

Radiological Survey 153033, Inside Bioshield Area (1RXC)

Radiological Survey 152915, Inside Bioshield Area (1RXC)

Radiological Survey 152836, Inside Bioshield Area (1RXC)

Radiological Survey 152699, Seal Table Rack Pulled Back (1RXA3)

Radiological Survey 152711, Seal Table (1RXA3)

Radiological Survey 151834, Auxiliary Building Level D (CAXD)

Radiological Survey 9/18/2012 15:38, Under Vessel

Radiological Survey 152143, Top of PZR - 252 el. (1RX32)

Radiological Survey 152054, Top of PZR - 252 el. (1RX32)

Radiological Survey 135176, Top of PZR - 252 el. (1RX32)

Radiological Survey 152283, S/G 4 Channel Head Cold Leg (1RXB27)

Radiological Survey 152282, S/G 4 Channel Head Hot Leg (1RXB26)

Radiological Survey 152281, S/G 1 Channel Head Cold Leg (1RXB19)

Radiological Survey 152281, S/G 1 Channel Head Cold Leg (1RXB19)

Radiological Survey 151964, U1 Containment Building Level 1 (1RX1)

Radiological Survey 152549, U1 Containment Level A Lower Overview (1RXA)

Radiological Survey 151986, U1 Containment 184 El. Quadrant 1 (1RXB)

Attachment

7

Radiological Survey 152662, U1 Containment 197 El. Quadrant 1 (1RXA)

Radiological Survey 151910, U1 Containment 197 El. Quadrant 1 (1RXA)

Radioactive Sealed Source Leak Test Certification, Source ID 0413-00-00, 6/22/12, 12/5/11,

6/28/11, 1/19/10

Air Sample Log, 9/18/12 - 9/20/12

CAP Documents

V-HP-2011, Fleet Oversight Audit of Health Physics, 8/15/11

CR 382120

CR 335736

CR 519818

CR 527832

CR 523976

CR 434496

CR 434498

CR 481012

Section 2RS2: Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

16035-1, Chemistry Operations Interface for RCS Chemistry Control During Scheduled Plant

Shutdowns, Ver. 13

43031-C, Steam Generator Job Coverage, Rev. 5.3

00910-C, VEGP ALARA Program, Rev. 15.3

41001-C, ALARA Job Review, Rev. 33.1

NMP-AD-035, ALARA Program, Ver. 1.0

NMP-HP-204, ALARA Planning and Job Review, Ver. 2.0

43014-C, Special Radiological Controls, Ver. 46

Records and Data

Audit No. V-HP-2011, Fleet Oversight Audit of Health Physics, 8/15/2011

NMP-GM-003-F04 Self-Assessment Final Report; ALARA Outage Planning, CR#2011100194,

12/17/10

Shutdown Chemistry Review: Vogtle Unit 2 Fuel Cycle 15, Final report October 24, 2011

ALARA Committee Meeting Minutes First Quarter 2012

2011 Annual ALARA Report, March 30, 2012

Pre-1R17 ALARA Sub-Committee Meeting Minutes, August 10, 2012

Vogtle 1R17 EPRI Standard Radiation Monitoring Points

Chemistry Crud Burst chart 9/16/12 22:00-9/20/12 22:00

ALARA Steam Generator Work Package:

ALARA Briefing Records

RWP 12-1300, R/I Primary Manway Covers & Diaphragms on S/G 1-4; ALARA Briefing

Record RWP 12-1301, Install and Remove Nozzle Dams for SGs 1-4; ALARA Briefing

Record RWP 12-1302, EDDY Current Testing on SG 1-4 & All Associated Work; ALARA

Briefing Record RWP 12-1303, Sludge Lance on S/G 1-4 & all Associated Work; ALARA

Briefing Record RWP 12-1305,

Radiological Surveys

  1. 152638, 9/25/12 20:58, S/G Manway Platt #1; #152279, 9/20/12 14:59, S/G Channel Head

Hot leg; #152281 9/20/12 15:30, S/G Channel Head Cold Leg; #152688 9/26/12 11:15, S/G

Attachment

8

Manway Platt 2; #152244 9/20/12 6:25 S/G Channel Head Hot Leg; #152245 9/20/12 6:35

S/G Channel Head Cold Leg; #152690 9/26/12 11:26 S/G Manyway Platt 3; #152246

9/20/12 6:43 S/G 3 Channel Head Hot Leg; #152282 9/20/12 15:57 S/G 4 Channel Head

Hot Leg; #152639 9/25/12 21:05 S/G Manway Platt 4; #152653 9/26/12 1:29 S/G #3 Hand-

Hole Plat

Work-In-Progress Reviews NMP-HP-104 (or equivalent)

RWP 12-1303, 9/27/12 80% Review; RWP 12-1302, 9/23/12 50% Review; RWP 12-1300

9/24/12 50% Review; RWP 12-1301 9/24/12 50% Review; RWP !2-1303 9/25/12 50%

Review; RWP 12-1304 9/25/12 50% Review

NMP-HP-204 Form 8 Respirator Use Evaluation Worksheets for RWP 12-1301

Radiological Surveys:

  1. 38622, 1/22/02, Plant Vogtle U1 Transfer Canal- top view
  1. 117917, 7/14/09, U1 Transfer Canal- topview
  1. 152208, 9/19/12, U1 Transfer Canal- Side view

ALARA Briefing Record RWP 12-1004, Install/Remove Scaffold in U1 CTMT

ALARA Briefing Record RWP 12-1104, Waste and Decon Routines in U1 CTMT

ALARA Briefing Record RWP 12-1618, Repair of U1 Transfer Canal

ALARA Post-Job Report 11-2509, RPV Cold Leg Nozzle Inspection in U2 Annulus

ALARA Post-Job Report 11-2302, Eddy Current Testing on S/G 1&4

CAP Documents

CR 167416, The accumulated dose for the U-1 Aux Bldg ECCS Flowpath Verification that was

performed

CR 339453, HP Self Assessment on High Rad Area Controls

CR 346242, Dose goal exceeded for placing old UFC skid into shipping container

Section 2RS3: In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

43635-C, Operation and Calibration of the AMS-4 Continuous Air Monitor, Rev. 18.1

47013-C, Inspection, Repair, and Storage of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus, Ver. 37

NMP-HP-301, Airborne Radioactivity Sampling and Evaluation, Ver. 1.2

00970-C, Respiratory Protection Program, Rev. 11.4

NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Ver. 12.1

Records and Data

Compressed Air/Gas Quality Testing, SCBA Compressor (Demin Plant), 2/5/10, 5/10/10,

8/11/10, 11/9/10, 2/14/11, 5/11/11, 8/25/11, 11/7/11, 2/9/12, 5/7/12, 8/14/12

00012-C, Shift Manning Requirements, Rev. 17.1, Data Sheet 1, Minimum Shift Manning

(Either Unit in Mode 1-4), Day Shift, 9/21/12

Qualification List, ID V-GE-099H, MSA High Pressure Firehawk MMR SCBA, Maintenance,

Health Physics, and Operations

Qualification List, ID V-HP-999 MSA C.A.R.E. Tech

Control Room Monthly Emergency SCBA Inspection, 8/7/12

TSC Monthly Emergency SCBA Inspection, 8/10/12

SCBA PosiChek3 Test Results, SCBA Unit HP-82, 11/26/10, 12/30/10, 11/23/11

SCBA Posichek3 Test Results, SCBA Unit HP-61, 12/29/10, 12/28/11

SCBA Posichek3 Test Results, SCBA Unit HP-58, 8/24/10, 8/25/11, 8/27/12

Maintenance Record Report, SCBA Units HP-58, HP-61, HP-82, 8/1/10 - 9/16/12

Attachment

9

CAP Documents

V-HP-2011, Fleet Oversight Audit of Health Physics, 8/15/11

CR 167804

Section 2RS4: Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

NMP-HP-107-001, Instructions for Retrieving, Printing and Updating Individual Radiation

Exposure Records, Version 1.0

NMP-HP-105, Comparisons of OSLD and ED Dosimetry Results, Ver. 1.0

NMP-HP-106, Investigating of Exposures Exceeding Fleet Administrative Limits, Ver. 1.0

NMP-HP-103, Skin Dose Assessment, Ver. 1.1

NMP-HP-100, Bioassay Program, Ver. 1.0

NMP-HP-101, In-Vivo Bioassay and Internal Dose Assessment, Ver. 1.0

45013-C, Issuance, Use and Collection of Personnel Dosimetry, Ver. 26.3

Records and Data

Canberra Report of Performance Testing Results for Nuclear Enterprises (NE) Model SPM

904B/906 Personnel Portal Monitor, May 18, 2012

Personnel Contamination Events/Personnel Contamination Reports (PCE/PCR) Logs, 9/2011-

9/2012

EDE & NRC Form 5 Calculations for Steam Generator Multibadging Jobs entry made on

9/20/12; Multibadge RCA Authorization/Worksheets

NMP-HP-109 Data Sheets, Investigation of Lost, Damaged or Malfunctioning Personnel

Dosimetry, for occurrence on 9/26/12

NMP-HP-109 Data Sheet 2, Investigation of Lost, Damaged or Malfunctioning Personnel

Dosimetry, for occurrence on 9/28/12

Varskin 3 Calculations 10/5/2011

CAP Documents

CR 149580, On 4-16-10 there were (62) EPD's and (1) EPD "Vibe Mesh Transmitter" found at

the RPF control room

CR 152467, A vendor arrived on site on June 22 at 08:45 am. and asked for a source that was

shipped to Plant Vogtle.

CR 466572, HP Tier 1 outage readiness Health Physics Tier 1 outage review was performed

with the HP Manager.

Section 2RS5: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

17005-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB 05 on Panel 1A2 on MCB, Ver. 33

17100-2, Annunciator Response Procedure for the Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring

System (RMS), Rev. 20.1

24625-1, Containment High Range (2RE-0005) Area Monitor 2RX-0005 Channel Calibration,

Rev. 29.1

24652-1, Plant Vent Wide Range Radiogas Monitor 1RX-12444 Channel Operational Test and

Channel Calibration, Rev. 19

34313-C, Operation of the DRMS Plant Vent Effluent Wide Range Monitor 1(2) RE-12444,

Rev 17

43802-C, Calibration of Gamma Standards, Rev. 12.1

Attachment

10

43500-C, Health Physics Instrument Calibration and Control Program, Rev. 53.10

43685-C, Calibration and Operation of the Asp-1, Rev 20.3

43693-C, Operation and Use of the Jl Shepherd Model 89-400 Shielded Calibrator, Rev. 2.1

NMP-HP-703, RO-2, RO-2A and RO-20 Operation and Calibration, Ver.1.0

NMP-HP-703, Daily Instrumentation Source Checks, Ver 1.1

NMP-EP-110-GL03, VEGP EALs - ICs, Threshold Values and Basis, Ver. 3.0

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), ODCM, Ver. 28

Records and Data

10 CFR Part 61 Analysis, DAW, Dated 12/21/2011

10 CFR Part 61 Analysis, DAW, Dated 12/28/2010

Chemistry Issues Turnover Log, Dated 09/17/2012

In Situ Calibration of High Range Monitors, VEGP Units 1&2, Dated 02/18/1997

LS 6500 SN 7069842 Source Check Response Charts, Dated 02/11/2011 - 03/28/2012

HPGE Detector #1 Control Charts, Dated 12/25/2011 - 04/03/2012

Radiation Monitor RE-005 Monthly Tech Spec Response Surveillance, Dated May 2010 -

September 2012

Radiation Monitor System Health Reports for 1st and 2nd Quarters 2012

LCO/TR Status Sheet, 1RE006 Failure, initiated 08/14/2010

Special Report 2011-001-00, Inoperable Radiation Monitor 1RE-006, Dated 03/29/2011

RadCal Electrometer Model 2025, SN4676 Calibration Record, Dated 10/31/2011

RadCal Probe Model 20X5-3, SN14166 Calibration Record, Dated 10/31/2011

RadCal Probe Model 20X5-180, SN16121 Calibration Record, Dated 10/31/2011

RadCal Probe Model 20X5-1800, SN21721 Calibration Record, Dated 10/31/2011

Instruments Missing Operation Checks Report, Dated 09/19/2012

Online Instruments Issued Report, Dated 09/19/2012

IPM-7A/8/9, VEGP-HP 0637, Calibration Records, Dated 06/14/2011 and 06/12/2012

Model 28-5 Calibrator, Source VEGP 0292, Calibration Record, Dated 05/18/12

Model 89-400 Calibrator, Source VEGP 0413, Calibration Record, Dated 08/12/2012

Model 878-10 Calibrator, Source VEGP 1049, Calibration Record, Dated 08/12/2012

SAM-11, VEGP-HP 1151, Calibration Records, Dated 05/26/2011 and 05/23/2012

SPM-904B, VEGP-HP 0754, Calibration Records, Dated 02/8/2011 and 02/10/2012

WO 1090817001, Plant Vent Wide Range Radiogas Flow 1F-12444 Channel Operational Test

and Channel Calibration, Dated 03/03/11

WO SNC332418, Plant Vent Wide Range Radiogas Flow 1F-12444 Channel Operational Test

and Channel Calibration, Dated 03/28/2012

WO 1090816001, Plant Vent Wide Range Radiogas Radiation Monitor 1RX12444 Channel

Operational Test and Channel Calibration, Dated 10/15/10

WO 1100068601, 2RE0005 Containment High Range Monitor Channel Calibration,

Dated 08/09/2010

WO 11000408201, 2RE0005 Containment High Range Monitor Channel Calibration,

Dated 03/29/2011

WO 1080853101, 1RE0011 In-Core Instrumentation Room Area Monitor Calibration, Dated

09/26/2009

WO 1100216601, 1RE0011 In-Core Instrumentation Room Area Monitor Calibration, Dated

03/14/2011

WO SNC328096, 1RE0018 Waste Liquid Effluent Channel Operational Test and Calibration,

Dated 03/09/2012

Attachment

11

WO 1090816201, 1RE0018 Waste Liquid Effluent Channel Operational Test and Calibration,

Dated 01/28/2011

WO 1090816201, 1RE0018 Waste Liquid Effluent Isotopic Channel Calibration, Dated

02/23/2012

WBC Calibration Report, Calibration of the Canberra Fastscan-1 WBC System at the Vogtle

Electric Generating Plant, Dated 06/08/2011 and 06/13/2012

WBC Calibration Report, Calibration of the Canberra Fastscan-2 WBC System at the Vogtle

Electric Generating Plant, Dated 06/09/2011 and 06/15/2012

CAP Documents

Fleet Oversight Audit of Health Physics, V-HP-2011, Dated 08/15/2011

CR 285751

CR 302822

CR 410359

CR 321427

CR 472385

CR 483434

CR 481949

CR 490231

CR 521213

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

00163-C, NRC Performance Indicator and Monthly Operating Report Preparation and

Submittal, Ver. 14.3

Records and Data

Liquid Permit Post-Release Data Permit # L-20120725-087-B

Gas Permit Post-Release Data Permit # G-20120813-171-C

Gas Permit Post-Release Data Permit # G-20120808-165-C

Liquid Permit Post-Release Data Permit # G-20120803-091-B

ED Alarm Log Sept 2011-Sept 2012

CAP Documents

CR 349797, Trouble shoot plan for U2 CVCS Demin Results in Resin in Drain Line

CR 474221, Dose equivalent Iodine definition in Tech Specs and ODCM does not match

CR 480703, U-1 RMWST degassifier dissolved oxygen anomaly

CR 354479, Increased dose rates in 2AB-A-72

Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems

Procedures/Calculations/Engineering Documents

CAR 196113 - Root Cause and Corrective Actions Evaluation for the Unit 1 Steam Generator

Loop T Mismatch

12001-C, Unit Heat Up to Hot Shutdown (Mode 5 to Mode 4)

14850-1/2, Cold Shutdown Valve In-Service Test

26854-C, MSIV Actuator Maintenance

Attachment

12

Condition Reports

530916 - Unit 1 steam generators 2&3 do not indicate steam flow

Section 4OA7: Licensee Identified Violations

Radiological Survey 151559, Valve Gallery SFP Cooling Demin (1AXA46)

CR 519818

LIST OF ACRONYMS

1R17 Unit 1 Refueling Outage 17

ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable

ARM Area Radiation Monitor

CAP Corrective Action Program

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CR Condition Report

DAW Dry Active Waste

DPW Declared Pregnant Worker

ED Electronic Dosimeter

FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report

HP Health Physics

HPT HP Technician

HRA High Radiation Area

IP Inspection Procedure

LHRA Locked High Radiation Area

NCV Non-cited Violation

NPR Negative Pressure Respirator

NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program

OA Other Activities

OSLD Optically Stimulated Luminescent Dosimeter

PCM Personnel Contamination Monitor

PI Performance Indicator

PM Portal Monitor

Radwaste Radioactive Waste

RCA Radiologically Controlled Area

RS Radiation Safety

RWP Radiation Work Permit

S/G Steam Generator

SAM Small Article Monitor

SCBA Self-contained Breathing Apparatus

SDP Significance Determination Process

SFP Spent Fuel Pool

TS Technical Specification

U1 Unit 1

VHRA Very High Radiation Area

WBC Whole Body Counter

Attachment

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