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ML19066A168    *via email            NRO-002 OFFICE          DLSE/LB1:PM        DLSE/LB1:LA      DLSE/LB1:PM NAME            CSantos            CSmith*          CSantos (signed)
ML19066A168    *via email            NRO-002 OFFICE          DLSE/LB1:PM        DLSE/LB1:LA      DLSE/LB1:PM NAME            CSantos            CSmith*          CSantos (signed)
DATE            03/14/2019          03/12/2019      03/14/2019
DATE            03/14/2019          03/12/2019      03/14/2019 PUBLIC TELECONFERENCE REGARDING REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NUMBER 9612 IN NUSCALE POWER LLCS DESIGN CERTIFICATION APPLICATION February 27, 2019 Meeting Summary On October 15, 2018, the staff issued request for additional information (RAI) 9612, Question 14.03.09-5 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18288A257). During the teleconference, NuScale described its approach for responding to this RAI.
 
PUBLIC TELECONFERENCE REGARDING REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NUMBER 9612 IN NUSCALE POWER LLCS DESIGN CERTIFICATION APPLICATION February 27, 2019 Meeting Summary On October 15, 2018, the staff issued request for additional information (RAI) 9612, Question 14.03.09-5 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18288A257). During the teleconference, NuScale described its approach for responding to this RAI.
The second part of this RAI requested an explanation of the redundant means of shutting down the plant in the event that the main control room becomes uninhabitable. NuScale stated that if the main control room is evacuated, the main objective of the operators would be to place the nuclear power modules in passive cooling. This could be done by operation of the appropriate switches in the various module protection system equipment rooms. NuScale commented that operators would first try to place the modules in passive cooling prior to evacuating the main control room, but if they are unable to do so, they could accomplish this objective from the module protection system equipment rooms. This is NuScales approach for compliance with General Design Criteria (GDC) 19.
The second part of this RAI requested an explanation of the redundant means of shutting down the plant in the event that the main control room becomes uninhabitable. NuScale stated that if the main control room is evacuated, the main objective of the operators would be to place the nuclear power modules in passive cooling. This could be done by operation of the appropriate switches in the various module protection system equipment rooms. NuScale commented that operators would first try to place the modules in passive cooling prior to evacuating the main control room, but if they are unable to do so, they could accomplish this objective from the module protection system equipment rooms. This is NuScales approach for compliance with General Design Criteria (GDC) 19.
The staff asked if written procedures for performing these tasks are available in the module protection system equipment room. NuScale responded that operators have tablets with operating procedures that they could take with them when they leave the main control room or a hardcopy of the procedure could be placed in the room. In response to a question from the staff, NuScale stated that there are no design changes to the remote shutdown station.
The staff asked if written procedures for performing these tasks are available in the module protection system equipment room. NuScale responded that operators have tablets with operating procedures that they could take with them when they leave the main control room or a hardcopy of the procedure could be placed in the room. In response to a question from the staff, NuScale stated that there are no design changes to the remote shutdown station.

Latest revision as of 11:59, 2 February 2020

Summary of Public Meeting with NuScale to Discuss RAI 9612
ML19066A168
Person / Time
Site: NuScale
Issue date: 03/14/2019
From: Cayetano Santos
NRC/NRO/DLSE/LB1
To: Samson Lee
NRC/NRO/DLSE/LB1
Santos C/nro/7270
References
Download: ML19066A168 (5)


Text

March 14, 2019 MEMORANDUM TO: Samuel S. Lee, Chief Licensing Branch 1 Division of Licensing, Siting, and Environmental Analysis Office of New Reactors FROM: Cayetano Santos Jr., Project Manager /RA/

Licensing Branch 1 Division of Licensing, Siting, and Environmental Analysis Office of New Reactors

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF FEBRUARY 27, 2019, PUBLIC TELECONFERENCE REGARDING REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NUMBER 9612 IN NUSCALE POWER LLCS DESIGN CERTIFICATION APPLICATION On February 27, 2019, a Category 1 public teleconference was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and NuScale Power, LLC (NuScale). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Request for Additional Information (RAI) 9612, Question 14.03.09-5.

The meeting notice was posted on the NRC website and is also in the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) under Accession Number ML19056A434. Enclosure 1 captures the summary of topics discussed during this meeting.

The Meeting Agenda and List of Attendees are included in Enclosures 2 and 3, respectively.

Docket No.52-048

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/encl.: DC NuScale Power, LLC Listserv CONTACT: Cayetano Santos Jr., NRO/DLSE 301-415-7270

ML19066A168 *via email NRO-002 OFFICE DLSE/LB1:PM DLSE/LB1:LA DLSE/LB1:PM NAME CSantos CSmith* CSantos (signed)

DATE 03/14/2019 03/12/2019 03/14/2019 PUBLIC TELECONFERENCE REGARDING REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NUMBER 9612 IN NUSCALE POWER LLCS DESIGN CERTIFICATION APPLICATION February 27, 2019 Meeting Summary On October 15, 2018, the staff issued request for additional information (RAI) 9612, Question 14.03.09-5 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18288A257). During the teleconference, NuScale described its approach for responding to this RAI.

The second part of this RAI requested an explanation of the redundant means of shutting down the plant in the event that the main control room becomes uninhabitable. NuScale stated that if the main control room is evacuated, the main objective of the operators would be to place the nuclear power modules in passive cooling. This could be done by operation of the appropriate switches in the various module protection system equipment rooms. NuScale commented that operators would first try to place the modules in passive cooling prior to evacuating the main control room, but if they are unable to do so, they could accomplish this objective from the module protection system equipment rooms. This is NuScales approach for compliance with General Design Criteria (GDC) 19.

The staff asked if written procedures for performing these tasks are available in the module protection system equipment room. NuScale responded that operators have tablets with operating procedures that they could take with them when they leave the main control room or a hardcopy of the procedure could be placed in the room. In response to a question from the staff, NuScale stated that there are no design changes to the remote shutdown station.

The staff asked if there are any inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) to verify the function of the reactor trip breakers. NuScale responded that ITAAC Number 1 in Table 2.5-7, for the module protection system software lifecycle, verifies this function.

The staff asked, what is the purpose of the remote shutdown station interface. NuScale responded that the remote shutdown station capabilities are for asset protection.

The staff commented that the objective and purpose of the remote shutdown station should be incorporated into FSAR Chapter 7.

The first part of this RAI requested that an ITAAC be provided to verify the displays, alarms, and controls in the remote shutdown station that are used to meet the requirements of GDC 19.

NuScale stated that the requested ITAAC is not needed because: (1) no controls, alarms, and displays are credited for meeting GDC 19; (2) this capability is not a top-level design feature; and (3) existing ITAAC already verify safe shutdown capabilities remote from the main control room.

The staff asked if the disconnect switches used to prevent spurious actuations is a GDC 19 function. NuScale responded that these switches are not a GDC 19 function.

There was an opportunity for members of the public to provide comments and ask questions.

No comments or questions were received.

Enclosure 1

Meeting Agenda February 27, 2019 12:00 p.m. - 1:00 p.m.

The purpose of this teleconference was for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to discuss NuScales response to RAI 9612.

Time Topic Speaker 12:00 p.m. - 12:05 p.m. Introductions All 12:05 p.m. - 12:45 p.m. Discussion of RAI 9612 NRC/NuScale 12:45 p.m. - 1:00 p.m. Public Comments Public 1:00 p.m. Adjourn All Enclosure 2

List of Attendees FEBRUARY 27, 2019 12:00 p.m. - 1:00 p.m.

Name Organization Gregory Bowman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Brian Green NRC Cayetano Santos NRC Maurin Scheetz NRC Dinesh Taneja NRC Carrie Fosaaen NuScale Power, LLC. (NuScale)

Lee Dougherty NuScale Ryan Flamand NuScale Brian Gardes NuScale Rufino Ayala NuScale Spain Abney NuScale Chris Maxwell NuScale Edan Engstrom NuScale Gary Becker NuScale Brian Arnholt NuScale Nadja Joergensen NuScale Enclosure 3