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{{#Wiki_filter: | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES ber 30, 2015 | ||
==SUBJECT:== | ==SUBJECT:== | ||
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2015007 AND | JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2015007 AND 05000364/2015007 | ||
05000364/2015007 | |||
==Dear Ms. Gayheart:== | ==Dear Ms. Gayheart:== | ||
On November 19, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution biennial inspection at your Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The NRC inspection team discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The inspection team documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. | On November 19, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution biennial inspection at your Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The NRC inspection team discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The inspection team documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. | ||
Based on the inspection sample, the inspection team determined that your | Based on the inspection sample, the inspection team determined that your staffs implementation of the corrective action program supported nuclear safety. In reviewing your corrective action program, the team assessed how well your staff identified problems at a low threshold, your staffs implementation of the stations process for prioritizing and evaluating these problems, and the effectiveness of corrective actions taken by the station to resolve these problems. In each of these areas, the team determined that your staffs performance was adequate to support nuclear safety. | ||
The team also evaluated other processes your staff used to identify issues for resolution. These included your use of audits and self-assessments to identify latent problems and your incorporation of lessons learned from industry operating experience into station programs, processes, and procedures. The team determined that your | The team also evaluated other processes your staff used to identify issues for resolution. These included your use of audits and self-assessments to identify latent problems and your incorporation of lessons learned from industry operating experience into station programs, processes, and procedures. The team determined that your stations performance in each of these areas supported nuclear safety. | ||
Finally, the team determined that your | Finally, the team determined that your stations management maintains a safety-conscious work environment adequate to support nuclear safety. Based on the teams observations, your employees are willing to raise concerns related to nuclear safety through at least one of the several means available. | ||
The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance. | The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance. | ||
C. Gayheart. 2 | C. Gayheart. 2 In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). | ||
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, | |||
Sincerely, | Sincerely, | ||
/RA/ | /RA/ | ||
Kevin M. Ellis, Branch Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 | Kevin M. Ellis, Branch Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-348, 50-364 License No. NPF-2 and NPF-8 | ||
Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-348, 50-364 License No. NPF-2 and NPF-8 | |||
===Enclosure:=== | ===Enclosure:=== | ||
IR 05000348/2015007, 05000364/2015007 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information | IR 05000348/2015007, 05000364/2015007 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information | ||
REGION II== | REGION II== | ||
Docket No.: 50-348, 50-364 | Docket No.: 50-348, 50-364 License No.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Report No.: 05000348/2015007 and 05000364/2015007 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc Facility: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Location: Columbia, AL Dates: November 2 - 6, 2015 November 16 - 19, 2015 Inspectors: R. Taylor, Senior Projects Inspector, Team Leader D. Mas, Project Engineer D. Merzke, Senior Reactor Operations Engineer A. Ruh, Resident Inspector, Browns Ferry Approved by: Kevin Ellis, Branch Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure | ||
License No.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 | |||
Report No.: 05000348/2015007 and 05000364/2015007 | |||
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc | |||
Facility: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Location: Columbia, AL | |||
Dates: November 2 - 6, 2015 November 16 - 19, 2015 | |||
Inspectors: R. Taylor, Senior Projects Inspector, Team Leader D. Mas, Project Engineer D. Merzke, Senior Reactor Operations Engineer A. Ruh, Resident Inspector, Browns Ferry | |||
Approved by: Kevin Ellis, Branch Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects | |||
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS= | =SUMMARY OF FINDINGS= | ||
IR 05000348/2015007, 05000364/2015007; November 2 - 19, 2015; Joseph M. Farley Nuclear | IR 05000348/2015007, 05000364/2015007; November 2 - 19, 2015; Joseph M. Farley Nuclear | ||
Plant, Units 1 and 2; Biennial Inspection of the Problem Identification and Resolution Program. | |||
The inspection was conducted by a senior project inspector, a senior reactor operations engineer, a project engineer, and a resident inspector. No findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process. | |||
The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution, as evidenced by the relatively few number of deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee, during the review period. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for | Identification and Resolution of Problems The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution, as evidenced by the relatively few number of deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee, during the review period. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner. | ||
The inspectors determined that overall audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the | The inspectors determined that overall audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. | ||
Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns. | Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns. | ||
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====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors reviewed the | The inspectors reviewed the licensees CAP procedures which described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems primarily through the use of condition reports (CRs). To verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP, the inspectors reviewed CRs that had been issued between November 2013 and November 2015, including a detailed review of selected CRs associated with the following risk-significant systems: Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Containment Coolers, Fire Protection, and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG). Where possible, the inspectors independently verified that the corrective actions were implemented as intended. The inspectors also reviewed selected common causes and generic concerns associated with root cause evaluations to determine if they had been appropriately addressed. To help ensure that samples were reviewed across all cornerstones of safety identified in the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process, the inspectors selected a representative number of CRs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including operations, maintenance, engineering, health physics, chemistry, emergency preparedness, and security. These CRs were reviewed to assess each departments threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems, thoroughness of evaluations, and adequacy of corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed selected CRs, verified corrective actions were implemented, and attended meetings where CRs were screened for significance to determine whether the licensee was identifying, accurately characterizing, and entering problems into the CAP at an appropriate threshold. | ||
were reviewed across all cornerstones of safety identified in the | |||
The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns of equipment associated with the selected systems and other plant areas to assess the material condition and to look for any deficiencies that had not been previously entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed CRs, maintenance history, completed work orders for the systems, and reviewed associated system health reports. These reviews were performed to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP. Items reviewed generally covered a two-year period of time; however, in accordance with the inspection procedure, a five-year review was performed for selected systems for age-dependent issues. | The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns of equipment associated with the selected systems and other plant areas to assess the material condition and to look for any deficiencies that had not been previously entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed CRs, maintenance history, completed work orders for the systems, and reviewed associated system health reports. These reviews were performed to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP. Items reviewed generally covered a two-year period of time; however, in accordance with the inspection procedure, a five-year review was performed for selected systems for age-dependent issues. | ||
Control Room walkdowns were also performed to assess the main control room deficiency list and to ascertain if deficiencies were entered into the CAP. Operator workarounds and operator burden screenings were reviewed, and the inspectors verified compensatory measures for deficient equipment which were being implemented in the | Control Room walkdowns were also performed to assess the main control room deficiency list and to ascertain if deficiencies were entered into the CAP. Operator workarounds and operator burden screenings were reviewed, and the inspectors verified compensatory measures for deficient equipment which were being implemented in the field. | ||
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of selected CRs to assess the adequacy of the root-cause and apparent-cause evaluations of the problems identified. The inspectors reviewed these evaluations against the descriptions of the problem described in the CRs and the guidance in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002-006, Root Cause Analysis Instruction, and NMP-GM-002-007, Apparent Cause Determination Instruction. The inspectors assessed if the licensee had adequately determined the cause(s) of identified problems, and had adequately addressed operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent-of-condition, and extent-of-cause. The review also assessed if the licensee had appropriately identified and prioritized corrective actions to prevent recurrence. | |||
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of selected CRs to assess the adequacy of the root-cause and apparent-cause evaluations of the problems identified. The inspectors reviewed these evaluations against the descriptions of the problem described in the CRs and the guidance in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002-006, | |||
The inspectors reviewed selected industry operating experience items, including NRC generic communications to verify that they had been appropriately evaluated for applicability and that issues identified through these reviews had been entered into the CAP. | The inspectors reviewed selected industry operating experience items, including NRC generic communications to verify that they had been appropriately evaluated for applicability and that issues identified through these reviews had been entered into the CAP. | ||
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Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | ||
b. Assessment Problem Identification | b. Assessment Problem Identification The inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifying problems and entering them into the CAP and there was a low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating CRs as described in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, managements expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate CRs for any reason, and the relatively few number of deficiencies identified by inspectors during plant walkdowns not already entered into the CAP. Trending was generally effective in monitoring equipment performance. Site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues. | ||
The inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifying problems and entering them into the CAP and there was a low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating CRs as described in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, | |||
Based on reviews and walkdowns of accessible portions of the selected systems, the inspectors determined that system deficiencies were being identified and placed in the CAP. | Based on reviews and walkdowns of accessible portions of the selected systems, the inspectors determined that system deficiencies were being identified and placed in the CAP. | ||
Problem Prioritization and Evaluation Based on the review of CRs sampled by the inspection team during the onsite period, the inspectors concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the | Problem Prioritization and Evaluation Based on the review of CRs sampled by the inspection team during the onsite period, the inspectors concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensees CAP procedures as described in the CR severity level determination guidance in NMP-GM-002-001, Corrective Action Program Instructions. | ||
Each CR was assigned a severity level at the CAP coordinator (CAPCO) meeting, and adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk. | Each CR was assigned a severity level at the CAP coordinator (CAPCO) meeting, and adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk. | ||
The inspectors determined that station personnel had conducted root cause and apparent cause analyses in compliance with the | The inspectors determined that station personnel had conducted root cause and apparent cause analyses in compliance with the licensees CAP procedures and assigned cause determinations were appropriate, considering the significance of the issues being evaluated. A variety of formal causal-analysis techniques were used depending on the type and complexity of the issue consistent with NMP-GM-002-006 and NMP-GM-002-007. | ||
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions Based on a review of corrective action documents, interviews with licensee staff, and verification of completed corrective actions, the inspectors determined that overall, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality were corrected and non-recurring. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the corrective actions directly addressed the cause and effectively prevented recurrence in that a review of performance indicators, CRs, and effectiveness reviews demonstrated that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPRs) were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and were effective. | |||
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions | |||
Based on a review of corrective action documents, interviews with licensee staff, and verification of completed corrective actions, the inspectors determined that overall, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality were corrected and non-recurring. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the corrective actions directly addressed the cause and effectively prevented recurrence in that a review of performance indicators, CRs, and effectiveness reviews demonstrated that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPRs) were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and were effective. | |||
====c. Findings==== | ====c. Findings==== | ||
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====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors examined licensee programs for reviewing industry operating experience, reviewed licensee procedure NMP-GM-008, | The inspectors examined licensee programs for reviewing industry operating experience, reviewed licensee procedure NMP-GM-008, Operating Experience Program, and reviewed the licensees operating experience database to assess the effectiveness of how external and internal operating experience data was handled at the plant. In addition, the inspectors selected operating experience documents (e.g., NRC generic communications, 10 CFR Part 21 reports, licensee event reports, vendor notifications, and plant internal operating experience items, etc.), which had been issued since September 2011 to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for applicability to Joseph M. Farley Nuclear plant, and whether issues identified through these reviews were entered into the CAP. Procedure NMP-GM-008, Operating Experience Program, was reviewed to verify that the requirements delineated in the program were implemented at the station. | ||
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | ||
b. Assessment Based on a review of documentation related to the review of operating experience issues, the inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in screening operating experience for applicability to the plant. Industry operating experience (OE)was evaluated by plant OE Coordinators and relevant information was then forwarded to the applicable department for further action or informational purposes. OE issues requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure. In addition, operating experience was included in root cause evaluations in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM-002-006, | b. Assessment Based on a review of documentation related to the review of operating experience issues, the inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in screening operating experience for applicability to the plant. Industry operating experience (OE)was evaluated by plant OE Coordinators and relevant information was then forwarded to the applicable department for further action or informational purposes. OE issues requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure. In addition, operating experience was included in root cause evaluations in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM-002-006, Root Cause Analysis Instruction. | ||
====c. Findings==== | ====c. Findings==== | ||
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====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors reviewed audit reports and self-assessment reports, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to assess the thoroughness and self-criticism of the licensee's audits and self-assessments, and to verify that problems identified through those activities were appropriately prioritized and entered into the CAP for resolution in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM-003, | The inspectors reviewed audit reports and self-assessment reports, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to assess the thoroughness and self-criticism of the licensee's audits and self-assessments, and to verify that problems identified through those activities were appropriately prioritized and entered into the CAP for resolution in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM-003, Self-Assessment Procedure. | ||
Procedure. | |||
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | ||
b. Assessment | b. Assessment The inspectors determined that the scopes of assessments and audits were adequate. | ||
The inspectors determined that the scopes of assessments and audits were adequate. | |||
Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical, as evidenced by findings consistent with the | Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical, as evidenced by findings consistent with the inspectors independent review. The inspectors verified that CRs were created to document all areas for improvement and findings resulting from the self-assessments and verified that actions were completed consistently with those recommendations. Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate. Site trend reports were thorough and a low threshold was established for evaluation of potential trends, as evidenced by the CRs reviewed that were initiated as a result of adverse trends. | ||
====c. Findings==== | ====c. Findings==== | ||
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====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors randomly interviewed 21 on-site workers regarding their knowledge of the corrective action program at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant and their willingness to write CRs or raise safety concerns. During technical discussions with members of the plant staff, the inspectors conducted interviews to develop a general perspective of the safety-conscious work environment at the site. The interviews were also conducted to determine if any conditions existed that would cause employees to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. The inspectors | The inspectors randomly interviewed 21 on-site workers regarding their knowledge of the corrective action program at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant and their willingness to write CRs or raise safety concerns. During technical discussions with members of the plant staff, the inspectors conducted interviews to develop a general perspective of the safety-conscious work environment at the site. The interviews were also conducted to determine if any conditions existed that would cause employees to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. The inspectors reviewed the licensees Employee Concerns Program (ECP) and interviewed the ECP manager. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of ECP issues to verify that concerns were properly reviewed and that identified deficiencies were resolved and entered into the CAP when appropriate. | ||
b. Assessment The inspectors determined that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs, including the CAP and ECP. These methods were readily accessible to all employees. The inspectors determined that employees felt free to raise issues, and that management encouraged employees to place issues into the CAP for resolution. | b. Assessment The inspectors determined that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs, including the CAP and ECP. These methods were readily accessible to all employees. The inspectors determined that employees felt free to raise issues, and that management encouraged employees to place issues into the CAP for resolution. | ||
The inspectors did not identify any reluctance on the part of the licensee staff to report | The inspectors did not identify any reluctance on the part of the licensee staff to report safety concerns. | ||
safety concerns. | |||
====c. Findings==== | ====c. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
{{a|4OA6}} | |||
{{a|4OA6}} | |||
==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit== | ==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit== | ||
On November 19, 2015, the inspectors presented the inspection results to you and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that all proprietary information examined during the inspection had been returned to the licensee. | On November 19, 2015, the inspectors presented the inspection results to you and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that all proprietary information examined during the inspection had been returned to the licensee. | ||
ATTACHMENT: | ATTACHMENT: | ||
=SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION= | =SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION= | ||
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===Licensee personnel=== | ===Licensee personnel=== | ||
: B. Reed Training Manager | : | ||
: [[contact::D. Lawton]], Security Engineer | B. Reed Training Manager | ||
: [[contact::C. Gayheart]], Site Vice President | : [[contact::D. Lawton]], Security Engineer | ||
: [[contact::G. Bell]], Licensing Supervisor | : [[contact::C. Gayheart]], Site Vice President | ||
: [[contact::J. Hershman - System Engineer]], RHR | : [[contact::G. Bell]], Licensing Supervisor | ||
: [[contact::J. McLean]], Licensing Engineer | : [[contact::J. Hershman - System Engineer]], RHR | ||
: [[contact::J. McLean]], Licensing Engineer | |||
: [[contact::L. McKay]], Engineer | : [[contact::L. McKay]], Engineer | ||
J. Purcell - OpE Coordinator | J. Purcell - OpE Coordinator | ||
: [[contact::M. Ludlam]], Performance Improvement Engineer | : [[contact::M. Ludlam]], Performance Improvement Engineer | ||
: [[contact::B. Taylor]], Regulatory Affairs Manager | : [[contact::B. Taylor]], Regulatory Affairs Manager | ||
: [[contact::R. Fletcher]], | : [[contact::R. Fletcher]], FIN Manager | ||
: [[contact::R. Wells]], NOS Manager | : [[contact::R. Wells]], NOS Manager | ||
: [[contact::S. | : [[contact::S. DSouza - System Engineer]], Containment Coolers | ||
: [[contact::S. Gard]], Operations Manager | : [[contact::S. Gard]], Operations Manager | ||
: [[contact::S. Wilson]], Maintenance CAPCO | : [[contact::S. Wilson]], Maintenance CAPCO | ||
W.Simmons, Site Projects Supervisor | W.Simmons, Site Projects Supervisor | ||
: [[contact::V. Locke]], Performance Improvement Manager | : [[contact::V. Locke]], Performance Improvement Manager | ||
===NRC personnel=== | ===NRC personnel=== | ||
: | : | ||
: [[contact::A. Thomas]], Resident Inspector Trainee | : [[contact::A. Thomas]], Resident Inspector Trainee | ||
: [[contact::K. Ellis]], Chief, Branch 7, Division of Reactor Projects | : [[contact::K. Ellis]], Chief, Branch 7, Division of Reactor Projects | ||
: [[contact::K. Miller]], Resident Inspector | : [[contact::K. Miller]], Resident Inspector | ||
: [[contact::P. Niebaum]], Senior Resident Inspector | : [[contact::P. Niebaum]], Senior Resident Inspector | ||
==LIST OF REPORT ITEMS== | ==LIST OF REPORT ITEMS== | ||
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===Opened and Closed=== | ===Opened and Closed=== | ||
None | None | ||
===Closed=== | ===Closed=== | ||
None | None | ||
===Discussed=== | ===Discussed=== | ||
None | |||
None | |||
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED== | ==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED== | ||
}} | }} |
Latest revision as of 01:27, 20 December 2019
ML15364A523 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Farley ![]() |
Issue date: | 12/30/2015 |
From: | Ellis K Reactor Projects Branch 7 |
To: | Gayheart C Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
References | |
IR 2015007 | |
Download: ML15364A523 (14) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ber 30, 2015
SUBJECT:
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2015007 AND 05000364/2015007
Dear Ms. Gayheart:
On November 19, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution biennial inspection at your Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The NRC inspection team discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The inspection team documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
Based on the inspection sample, the inspection team determined that your staffs implementation of the corrective action program supported nuclear safety. In reviewing your corrective action program, the team assessed how well your staff identified problems at a low threshold, your staffs implementation of the stations process for prioritizing and evaluating these problems, and the effectiveness of corrective actions taken by the station to resolve these problems. In each of these areas, the team determined that your staffs performance was adequate to support nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated other processes your staff used to identify issues for resolution. These included your use of audits and self-assessments to identify latent problems and your incorporation of lessons learned from industry operating experience into station programs, processes, and procedures. The team determined that your stations performance in each of these areas supported nuclear safety.
Finally, the team determined that your stations management maintains a safety-conscious work environment adequate to support nuclear safety. Based on the teams observations, your employees are willing to raise concerns related to nuclear safety through at least one of the several means available.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
C. Gayheart. 2 In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kevin M. Ellis, Branch Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-348, 50-364 License No. NPF-2 and NPF-8
Enclosure:
IR 05000348/2015007, 05000364/2015007 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
REGION II==
Docket No.: 50-348, 50-364 License No.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Report No.: 05000348/2015007 and 05000364/2015007 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc Facility: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Location: Columbia, AL Dates: November 2 - 6, 2015 November 16 - 19, 2015 Inspectors: R. Taylor, Senior Projects Inspector, Team Leader D. Mas, Project Engineer D. Merzke, Senior Reactor Operations Engineer A. Ruh, Resident Inspector, Browns Ferry Approved by: Kevin Ellis, Branch Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000348/2015007, 05000364/2015007; November 2 - 19, 2015; Joseph M. Farley Nuclear
Plant, Units 1 and 2; Biennial Inspection of the Problem Identification and Resolution Program.
The inspection was conducted by a senior project inspector, a senior reactor operations engineer, a project engineer, and a resident inspector. No findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.
Identification and Resolution of Problems The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution, as evidenced by the relatively few number of deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee, during the review period. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.
The inspectors determined that overall audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations.
Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings.
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Corrective Action Program Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees CAP procedures which described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems primarily through the use of condition reports (CRs). To verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP, the inspectors reviewed CRs that had been issued between November 2013 and November 2015, including a detailed review of selected CRs associated with the following risk-significant systems: Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Containment Coolers, Fire Protection, and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG). Where possible, the inspectors independently verified that the corrective actions were implemented as intended. The inspectors also reviewed selected common causes and generic concerns associated with root cause evaluations to determine if they had been appropriately addressed. To help ensure that samples were reviewed across all cornerstones of safety identified in the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process, the inspectors selected a representative number of CRs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including operations, maintenance, engineering, health physics, chemistry, emergency preparedness, and security. These CRs were reviewed to assess each departments threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems, thoroughness of evaluations, and adequacy of corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed selected CRs, verified corrective actions were implemented, and attended meetings where CRs were screened for significance to determine whether the licensee was identifying, accurately characterizing, and entering problems into the CAP at an appropriate threshold.
The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns of equipment associated with the selected systems and other plant areas to assess the material condition and to look for any deficiencies that had not been previously entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed CRs, maintenance history, completed work orders for the systems, and reviewed associated system health reports. These reviews were performed to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP. Items reviewed generally covered a two-year period of time; however, in accordance with the inspection procedure, a five-year review was performed for selected systems for age-dependent issues.
Control Room walkdowns were also performed to assess the main control room deficiency list and to ascertain if deficiencies were entered into the CAP. Operator workarounds and operator burden screenings were reviewed, and the inspectors verified compensatory measures for deficient equipment which were being implemented in the field.
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of selected CRs to assess the adequacy of the root-cause and apparent-cause evaluations of the problems identified. The inspectors reviewed these evaluations against the descriptions of the problem described in the CRs and the guidance in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002-006, Root Cause Analysis Instruction, and NMP-GM-002-007, Apparent Cause Determination Instruction. The inspectors assessed if the licensee had adequately determined the cause(s) of identified problems, and had adequately addressed operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent-of-condition, and extent-of-cause. The review also assessed if the licensee had appropriately identified and prioritized corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
The inspectors reviewed selected industry operating experience items, including NRC generic communications to verify that they had been appropriately evaluated for applicability and that issues identified through these reviews had been entered into the CAP.
The inspectors reviewed site trend reports to determine if the licensee effectively trended identified issues and initiated appropriate corrective actions when adverse trends were identified.
The inspectors attended various plant meetings to observe management oversight functions of the corrective action process. These included CR screening meetings and Management Review Committee meetings.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Assessment Problem Identification The inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifying problems and entering them into the CAP and there was a low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating CRs as described in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, managements expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate CRs for any reason, and the relatively few number of deficiencies identified by inspectors during plant walkdowns not already entered into the CAP. Trending was generally effective in monitoring equipment performance. Site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues.
Based on reviews and walkdowns of accessible portions of the selected systems, the inspectors determined that system deficiencies were being identified and placed in the CAP.
Problem Prioritization and Evaluation Based on the review of CRs sampled by the inspection team during the onsite period, the inspectors concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensees CAP procedures as described in the CR severity level determination guidance in NMP-GM-002-001, Corrective Action Program Instructions.
Each CR was assigned a severity level at the CAP coordinator (CAPCO) meeting, and adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk.
The inspectors determined that station personnel had conducted root cause and apparent cause analyses in compliance with the licensees CAP procedures and assigned cause determinations were appropriate, considering the significance of the issues being evaluated. A variety of formal causal-analysis techniques were used depending on the type and complexity of the issue consistent with NMP-GM-002-006 and NMP-GM-002-007.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions Based on a review of corrective action documents, interviews with licensee staff, and verification of completed corrective actions, the inspectors determined that overall, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality were corrected and non-recurring. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the corrective actions directly addressed the cause and effectively prevented recurrence in that a review of performance indicators, CRs, and effectiveness reviews demonstrated that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPRs) were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and were effective.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Use of Operating Experience
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors examined licensee programs for reviewing industry operating experience, reviewed licensee procedure NMP-GM-008, Operating Experience Program, and reviewed the licensees operating experience database to assess the effectiveness of how external and internal operating experience data was handled at the plant. In addition, the inspectors selected operating experience documents (e.g., NRC generic communications, 10 CFR Part 21 reports, licensee event reports, vendor notifications, and plant internal operating experience items, etc.), which had been issued since September 2011 to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for applicability to Joseph M. Farley Nuclear plant, and whether issues identified through these reviews were entered into the CAP. Procedure NMP-GM-008, Operating Experience Program, was reviewed to verify that the requirements delineated in the program were implemented at the station.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Assessment Based on a review of documentation related to the review of operating experience issues, the inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in screening operating experience for applicability to the plant. Industry operating experience (OE)was evaluated by plant OE Coordinators and relevant information was then forwarded to the applicable department for further action or informational purposes. OE issues requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure. In addition, operating experience was included in root cause evaluations in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM-002-006, Root Cause Analysis Instruction.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Self-Assessments and Audits
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed audit reports and self-assessment reports, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to assess the thoroughness and self-criticism of the licensee's audits and self-assessments, and to verify that problems identified through those activities were appropriately prioritized and entered into the CAP for resolution in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM-003, Self-Assessment Procedure.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Assessment The inspectors determined that the scopes of assessments and audits were adequate.
Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical, as evidenced by findings consistent with the inspectors independent review. The inspectors verified that CRs were created to document all areas for improvement and findings resulting from the self-assessments and verified that actions were completed consistently with those recommendations. Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate. Site trend reports were thorough and a low threshold was established for evaluation of potential trends, as evidenced by the CRs reviewed that were initiated as a result of adverse trends.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Safety-Conscious Work Environment
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors randomly interviewed 21 on-site workers regarding their knowledge of the corrective action program at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant and their willingness to write CRs or raise safety concerns. During technical discussions with members of the plant staff, the inspectors conducted interviews to develop a general perspective of the safety-conscious work environment at the site. The interviews were also conducted to determine if any conditions existed that would cause employees to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. The inspectors reviewed the licensees Employee Concerns Program (ECP) and interviewed the ECP manager. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of ECP issues to verify that concerns were properly reviewed and that identified deficiencies were resolved and entered into the CAP when appropriate.
b. Assessment The inspectors determined that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs, including the CAP and ECP. These methods were readily accessible to all employees. The inspectors determined that employees felt free to raise issues, and that management encouraged employees to place issues into the CAP for resolution.
The inspectors did not identify any reluctance on the part of the licensee staff to report safety concerns.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On November 19, 2015, the inspectors presented the inspection results to you and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that all proprietary information examined during the inspection had been returned to the licensee.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
B. Reed Training Manager
- D. Lawton, Security Engineer
- C. Gayheart, Site Vice President
- G. Bell, Licensing Supervisor
- J. McLean, Licensing Engineer
- L. McKay, Engineer
J. Purcell - OpE Coordinator
- M. Ludlam, Performance Improvement Engineer
- B. Taylor, Regulatory Affairs Manager
- R. Fletcher, FIN Manager
- R. Wells, NOS Manager
- S. DSouza - System Engineer, Containment Coolers
- S. Gard, Operations Manager
- S. Wilson, Maintenance CAPCO
W.Simmons, Site Projects Supervisor
- V. Locke, Performance Improvement Manager
NRC personnel
- A. Thomas, Resident Inspector Trainee
- K. Ellis, Chief, Branch 7, Division of Reactor Projects
- K. Miller, Resident Inspector
- P. Niebaum, Senior Resident Inspector
LIST OF REPORT ITEMS
Opened and Closed
None
Closed
None
Discussed
None