|
|
Line 18: |
Line 18: |
|
| |
|
| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:January 12, 2006Rick A. Muench, President and Chief Executive Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation | | {{#Wiki_filter:ary 12, 2006 |
|
| |
|
| P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating CorporationSUBJECT:NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2005004
| | ==SUBJECT:== |
| | NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2005004 |
|
| |
|
| ==Dear Mr. Muench:== | | ==Dear Mr. Muench:== |
| Because of an error in documenting the completed inspection scope for the ALARAinspection conducted June 27 - July 1, 2005, insert the enclosure to this letter as replacements for pages 13 - 15 of NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2005004.Please accept my apology for any inconvenience these actions may have caused. | | Because of an error in documenting the completed inspection scope for the ALARA inspection conducted June 27 - July 1, 2005, insert the enclosure to this letter as replacements for pages 13 - 15 of NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2005004. |
| | |
| | Please accept my apology for any inconvenience these actions may have caused. |
|
| |
|
| Sincerely, | | Sincerely, |
| //RA// | | //RA// |
| Michael P. Shannon, ChiefPlant Support Branch Division of Reactor SafetyDocket: 50-482License: NPF-42Enclosure:Pages 13 - 15 of NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2005004cc w/enclosure: | | Michael P. Shannon, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket: 50-482 License: NPF-42 Enclosure: |
| Vice President Operations/Plant ManagerWolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. | | Pages 13 - 15 of NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2005004 cc w/enclosure: |
| | Vice President Operations/Plant Manager Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. |
| | |
| | P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839 |
| | |
| | Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. -2-Jay Silberg, Esq. |
| | |
| | Shaw Pittman, LLP 2300 N Street, NW Washington, DC 20037 Supervisor Licensing Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. |
| | |
| | P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839 Chief Engineer Utilities Division Kansas Corporation Commission 1500 SW Arrowhead Road Topeka, KS 66604-4027 Office of the Governor State of Kansas Topeka, KS 66612 Attorney General 120 S.W. 10th Avenue, 2nd Floor Topeka, KS 66612-1597 County Clerk Coffey County Courthouse 110 South 6th Street Burlington, KS 66839-1798 Chief, Radiation and Asbestos Control Section Kansas Department of Health and Environment Bureau of Air and Radiation 1000 SW Jackson, Suite 310 Topeka, KS 66612-1366 |
| | |
| | Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. -3-Electronic distribution by RIV: |
| | Regional Administrator (BSM1) |
| | DRP Director (ATH) |
| | DRS Director (DDC) |
| | DRS Deputy Director (RJC1) |
| | Senior Resident Inspector (SDC) |
| | Resident Inspector (TBR2) |
| | SRI, Callaway (MSP) |
| | Branch Chief, DRP/B (WBJ) |
| | Senior Project Engineer, DRP/B (RAK1) |
| | Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1) |
| | RITS Coordinator (KEG) |
| | Only inspection reports to the following: |
| | DRS STA (DAP) |
| | J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD) |
| | ROPreports WC Site Secretary (SLA2) |
| | SUNSI Review Completed: __Yes____ ADAMS: / Yes G No Initials: GLG____ |
| | / Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive / Non-Sensitive S\DRS\DRSLTRS\WC2005004errata.wpd RIV: DRS/PSB/HPI C:PSB GLGuerra MPShannon |
| | /RA/ /RA/ |
| | 1/ 12 /06 1/ 12 /06 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax |
| | |
| | -13- |
| | * Self-assessments, audits, and special reports related to the ALARA program since the last inspection |
| | * Effectiveness of self-assessment activities with respect to identifying and addressing repetitive deficiencies or significant individual deficiencies |
| | * Radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during work l activities in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas l The inspector completed 7 of the required 15 samples and 7 of the optional samples. l b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. |
| | |
| | 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems Resident Inspector Annual Sample Review a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of WCNOCs corrective action program as applied to corrective action document PIR 2005-2142. This document was initiated to address the conditions and events that led to the inoperability of both site fire protection pumps. Attributes considered during this review included the following: |
| | * Completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of problem identification |
| | * Operability and reportability evaluation |
| | * Extent of condition evaluation |
| | * Apparent cause evaluation |
| | * Prioritization |
| | * Corrective action effectiveness The inspectors completed one sample. |
| | |
| | b. Findings Failure to Follow the Clearance Order Procedure Introduction: An apparent violation (AV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1a occurred when station personnel failed to follow Procedure AP 21E-001, Clearance Orders, and manipulated a component inside a fire protection piping clearance boundary without instructions and authorization. The starting of a temporary fire pump resulted in water Enclosure |
| | |
| | -14-spraying on the controller of the operable diesel-driven fire pump through an open vent valve, which rendered the pump inoperable. |
| | |
| | Description: On June 30, 2005, the motor of the electric fire pump experienced a short in its winding which led to a fire at the motor. The plant took the appropriate compensatory measures and started parallel paths to restore the fire suppression water system within the allotted 14 days. One path involved a temporary modification to the fire protection system that installed a temporary motor-driven fire pump, which was accomplished on July 11, 2005. The temporary fire pump was tested on July 12, 2005, to verify it would provide the required flow of water suppression; however, the pump failed this test. |
| | |
| | Station fire protection personnel requested a clearance order to isolate the temporary fire pump from the fire protection piping but failed to make station operations personnel aware of the desire to run the temporary fire pump following repairs. Once repairs to the pump were completed, the vendor under the direction of station fire protection personnel started the pump believing they had authorization to operate the temporary fire pump. This resulted in water issuing from an open vent valve which sprayed the controller of the diesel-driven fire pump. Station fire protection personnel discovered the wet controller and notified the control room. Control room personnel declared the diesel-driven fire pump inoperable. The diesel-driven fire pump was returned to service in approximately 4 hours. |
| | |
| | The inspectors reviewed Procedure AP-10-103, Fire Protection Impairment Control, Revision 19, which identified the compensatory measures for the loss of fire suppression water systems. With the motor driven and the diesel driven fire pump inoperable (approximately 4 hours) the impairment control procedure required that a backup fire pump be provided within 24 hours. In this case, both the motor driven and the diesel driven fire pumps were restored within approximately 18 hours. This issue involved human performance crosscutting aspects associated with station personnel not following a station procedure. |
| | |
| | Analysis: The failure to follow station procedures is a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to degrade the fire protection system suppression and was evaluated using Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. This finding requires a Phase 3 analysis and is currently under evaluation. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation entered this finding into their corrective action program as PIR 2005-2142 Enforcement: Technical Specification 5.4.1a requires procedures be implemented in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, requires procedures for the performance of station maintenance. Contrary to the above, on July 13, 2005, station personnel operated Enclosure |
|
| |
|
| P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.-2-Jay Silberg, Esq.Shaw Pittman, LLP 2300 N Street, NW Washington, DC 20037Supervisor LicensingWolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
| | -15-components inside an established fire protection piping clearance boundary without work instructions or control room authorization as required by Station Procedure AP 21E-001, Clearance Orders, Section 6.6.8. This resulted in an adjacent diesel-driven fire pump becoming inoperable. Pending determination of the final safety significance of this issue, this violation is being treated as an AV consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: AV 05000482/0500404, manipulation of plant component without proper authorization results in inoperable fire protection pumps. |
|
| |
|
| P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839Chief EngineerUtilities Division Kansas Corporation Commission 1500 SW Arrowhead Road Topeka, KS 66604-4027Office of the GovernorState of Kansas Topeka, KS 66612Attorney General120 S.W. 10th Avenue, 2nd Floor Topeka, KS 66612-1597County ClerkCoffey County Courthouse 110 South 6th Street Burlington, KS 66839-1798Chief, Radiation and Asbestos Control Section Kansas Department of Health and Environment Bureau of Air and Radiation 1000 SW Jackson, Suite 310Topeka, KS 66612-1366 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.-3-Electronic distribution by RIV:Regional Administrator (BSM1)DRP Director (ATH)DRS Director (DDC)DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)Senior Resident Inspector (SDC)Resident Inspector (TBR2)SRI, Callaway (MSP)Branch Chief, DRP/B (WBJ)Senior Project Engineer, DRP/B (RAK1)Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)RITS Coordinator (KEG)Only inspection reports to the following:DRS STA (DAP)J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)ROPreports WC Site Secretary (SLA2)SUNSI Review Completed: __Yes____ADAMS: Yes G No Initials: GLG____ Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive Non-SensitiveS\DRS\DRSLTRS\WC2005004errata.wpdRIV: DRS/PSB/HPIC:PSBGLGuerraMPShannon
| | Corrective Action Effectiveness There were no findings identified that were associated with the corrective actions for this event. However, the inspectors made the following observations from their review of the apparent cause evaluation and the associated corrective actions: The apparent cause evaluation states that some fire protection personnel are unfamiliar with the clearance order program because, for them, clearance orders are infrequently performed evolutions. Additionally, the evaluation states that some groups mistakenly believed it was acceptable to work on vendor equipment inside clearance order boundaries without proper authorization or an approved procedure. These evaluation results suggest a clearance order program knowledge deficiency within the fire protection group. Yet, the corrective action for these contributing causes was counseling only the one individual involved with this event. |
| /RA//RA/
| |
| 1/ 12 /061/ 12 /06OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax-13-Enclosure*Self-assessments, audits, and special reports related to the ALARA programsince the last inspection*Effectiveness of self-assessment activities with respect to identifying andaddressing repetitive deficiencies or significant individual deficiencies *Radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during work lactivities in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas lThe inspector completed 7 of the required 15 samples and 7 of the optional samples.
| |
|
| |
|
| l b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
| | .2 Cross-References to Problem Identification & Resolution Findings Documented Elsewhere Section 1R15 documents a condition where station personnel did not properly evaluate a condition adverse to quality regarding debris in the auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters. |
|
| |
|
| 4.OTHER ACTIVITIES4OA2Identification and Resolution of ProblemsResident Inspector Annual Sample Review a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of WCNOC's corrective action program asapplied to corrective action document PIR 2005-2142. This document was initiated to address the conditions and events that led to the inoperability of both site fire protectionpumps. Attributes considered during this review included the following: *Completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of problem identification *Operability and reportability evaluation *Extent of condition evaluation
| | .3 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas and ALARA Inspections Section 2OS1 evaluated the effectiveness of WCNOC's problem identification and resolution processes regarding access controls to radiologically significant areas and radiation worker practices. The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents for root cause/apparent cause analysis against WCNOCs PI&R process. No findings of significance were identified. |
| *Apparent cause evaluation
| |
| *Prioritization
| |
| *Corrective action effectiveness
| |
|
| |
|
| The inspectors completed one sample.
| | Section 2OS2 evaluated the effectiveness of WCNOC's PI&R processes regarding exposure tracking, higher than planned exposure levels, and radiation worker practices. |
|
| |
|
| b.FindingsFailure to Follow the Clearance Order ProcedureIntroduction: An apparent violation (AV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1a occurredwhen station personnel failed to follow Procedure AP 21E-001, "Clearance Orders," and manipulated a component inside a fire protection piping clearance boundary without instructions and authorization. The starting of a temporary fire pump resulted in water-14-Enclosurespraying on the controller of the operable diesel-driven fire pump through an open ventvalve, which rendered the pump inoperable.Description: On June 30, 2005, the motor of the electric fire pump experienced a shortin its winding which led to a fire at the motor. The plant took the appropriate compensatory measures and started parallel paths to restore the fire suppression water system within the allotted 14 days. One path involved a temporary modification to thefire protection system that installed a temporary motor-driven fire pump, which was accomplished on July 11, 2005. The temporary fire pump was tested on July 12, 2005, to verify it would provide the required flow of water suppression; however, the pump failed this test. Station fire protection personnel requested a clearance order to isolate the temporaryfire pump from the fire protection piping but failed to make station operations personnel aware of the desire to run the temporary fire pump following repairs. Once repairs to the pump were completed, the vendor under the direction of station fire protectionpersonnel started the pump believing they had authorization to operate the temporaryfire pump. This resulted in water issuing from an open vent valve which sprayed the controller of the diesel-driven fire pump. Station fire protection personnel discovered the wet controller and notified the control room. Control room personnel declared the diesel-driven fire pump inoperable. The diesel-driven fire pump was returned to service in approximately 4 hours. The inspectors reviewed Procedure AP-10-103, Fire Protection Impairment Control, Revision 19, which identified the compensatory measures for the loss of fire suppression water systems. With the motor driven and the diesel driven fire pumpinoperable (approximately 4 hours) the impairment control procedure required that abackup fire pump be provided within 24 hours. In this case, both the motor driven and the diesel driven fire pumps were restored within approximately 18 hours. This issue involved human performance crosscutting aspects associated with station personnel notfollowing a station procedure.Analysis: The failure to follow station procedures is a performance deficiency. Thefinding was determined to be more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability ofsystems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Usingthe Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process,"
| | The inspector reviewed the corrective action documents listed in the attachment against WCNOCs PI&R program requirements. No findings of significance were identified. |
| the finding was determined to degrade the fire protecti on system suppression and wasevaluated using Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. This finding requires a Phase 3 analysis and is currently under evaluation. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation entered this finding into their corrective action program as PIR 2005-2142 Enforcement: Technical Specification 5.4.1a requires procedures be implemented inaccordance with Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. RegulatoryGuide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, requires procedures for the performance of stationmaintenance. Contrary to the above, on July 13, 2005, station personnel operated-15-Enclosurecomponents inside an established fire protection piping clearance boundary withoutwork instructions or control room authorization as required by Station Procedure AP 21E-001, "Clearance Orders," Section 6.6.8. This resulted in an adjacent diesel-driven fire pump becoming inoperable. Pending determination of the final safety significance of this issue, this violation is being treated as an AV consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: AV 05000482/0500404, manipulation ofplant component without proper authorization results in inoperable fire protection pumps.Corrective Action EffectivenessThere were no findings identified that were associated with the corrective actions for thisevent. However, the inspectors made the following observations from their review of the apparent cause evaluation and the associated corrective actions: The apparent cause evaluation states that some fire protection personnel are unfamiliar with the clearanceorder program because, for them, clearance orders are infrequently performed evolutions. Additionally, the evaluation states that some "groups" mistakenly believed itwas acceptable to work on vendor equipment inside clearance order boundaries without proper authorization or an approved procedure. These evaluation results suggest a clearance order program knowledge deficiency within the fire protection group. Yet, the corrective action for these contributing causes was counseling only the one individual involved with this event. .2Cross-References to Problem Identification & Resolution Findings DocumentedElsewhereSection 1R15 documents a condition where station personnel did not properly evaluatea condition adverse to quality regarding debris in the auxiliary feedwater flowtransmitters..3Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas and ALARA InspectionsSection 2OS1 evaluated the effectiveness of WCNOC's problem identification andresolution processes regarding access controls to radiologically significant areas and radiation worker practices. The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents for root cause/apparent cause analysis against WCNOC's PI&R process. No findings of significance were identified.Section 2OS2 evaluated the effectiveness of WCNOC's PI&R processes regardingexposure tracking, higher than planned exposure levels, and radiation worker practices.
| |
|
| |
|
| The inspector reviewed the corrective action documents listed in the attachment against WCNOC's PI&R program requirements. No findings of significance were identified.
| | Enclosure |
| }} | | }} |
|
---|
Category:Inspection Report
MONTHYEARIR 05000482/20230042024-01-11011 January 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2023004 IR 05000482/20233012023-12-19019 December 2023 NRC Examination Report 05000482/2023301 IR 05000482/20230052023-08-23023 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Unit 1 (Report 05000482/2023005) - Mid-Cycle Letter 2023 IR 05000482/20234202023-07-12012 July 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000482/2023420 - Cover Letter IR 05000482/20230022023-07-11011 July 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2023002 IR 05000482/20234012023-06-21021 June 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000482/2023401 ML23111A0662023-04-20020 April 2023 (Cover Letter Only) Wolf Creek Generating Station Special Inspection Reactive Report 05000482-20220502 IR 05000482/20230012023-04-19019 April 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2023001 IR 05000482/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Report 05000482/2022006) IR 05000482/20234022023-02-0606 February 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 050004822023402 ML23017A2092023-01-18018 January 2023 Emergency Preparedness Biennial Exercise Inspection URI Closure Report IR 05000482/20220042023-01-17017 January 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2022004 ML22333A7132022-12-0202 December 2022 License Renewal Phase 1 Report IR 05000482/20220032022-10-25025 October 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2022003 IR 05000482/20224032022-08-31031 August 2022 NRC Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000482/2022403 IR 05000482/20220052022-08-23023 August 2022 Updated Inspection Plan for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Report 05000482/2022005) IR 07200079/20224042022-08-0404 August 2022 NRC Security Inspection Report 07200079/2022404 (Cover Letter) IR 05000482/20220022022-07-25025 July 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2022002 IR 05000482/20224022022-06-29029 June 2022 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000482/2022402 - Public IR 05000482/20220102022-05-0505 May 2022 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000482/2022010 IR 05000482/20224012022-05-0303 May 2022 Information Request for the Cyber-Security Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000482/2022401 IR 05000482/20220012022-04-25025 April 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2022001 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200079/2022001 IR 05000482/20210062022-03-0202 March 2022 Annual Assessment Letter (Report 05000482/2021006) IR 05000482/20213012022-01-19019 January 2022 NRC Examination Report 05000482/2021301 IR 05000482/20210042022-01-19019 January 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2021004 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200079/2021002 IR 05000482/20210112021-12-0101 December 2021 Temporary Instruction 2515/194 Report 05000482/2021011 IR 05000482/20214202021-11-15015 November 2021 Inspection Report Cover Letter FOF 05000482/2021420 IR 05000482/20210032021-11-0505 November 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2021003 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200079/2021001, WC2021003 IR Ch IR 05000482/20210102021-09-0909 September 2021 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Teams) Inspection Report 05000482/2021010 IR 05000482/20210022021-08-0909 August 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2021002 IR 05000482/20214022021-07-27027 July 2021 NRC Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000482/2021402 (Cover Letter Without Enclosure) IR 05000482/20210012021-05-0505 May 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2021001 IR 05000482/20190062021-03-0303 March 2021 Annual Assessment Letter (Report 05000482/2019006) IR 05000482/20214012021-02-26026 February 2021 NRC Security Inspection Report 05000482/2021401 IR 05000482/20200042021-02-0909 February 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2020004 IR 05000482/20200132020-12-0303 December 2020 Traditional Enforcement Follow-Up Inspection Report 05000482/2020013 IR 05000482/20200122020-11-19019 November 2020 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000482/2020012 IR 05000482/20200032020-11-12012 November 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2020003 IR 05000482/20204102020-09-29029 September 2020 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000482/2020410 IR 05000482/20200022020-08-12012 August 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2020002 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200079/2020001 IR 05000482/20200102020-08-0303 August 2020 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000482/2020010 IR 05000482/20200112020-05-21021 May 2020 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Inspection Report 05000482/2020011 IR 05000482/20200012020-05-0404 May 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2020001 IR 05000482/20194132020-02-11011 February 2020 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000482/2019413 IR 05000482/20190042020-02-0303 February 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2019004 IR 05000482/20193012020-01-15015 January 2020 NRC Examination Report 05000482/2019301 IR 05000482/20190032019-10-25025 October 2019 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2019003 IR 05000482/20194102019-09-24024 September 2019 NRC Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000482/2019410 IR 05000482/20194122019-09-11011 September 2019 NRC Security Inspection Report 05000482/2019412 IR 05000482/20190052019-08-30030 August 2019 Updated Inspection Plan for Wolf Creek Generating Station, Report 05000482/2019005 2024-01-11
[Table view] Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24025A0992024-01-25025 January 2024 Withdrawal of Request for Exemption from Specific 10 CFR Part 73 Requirements ML24018A0792024-01-22022 January 2024 Individual Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License, Proposed Nshcd and Opportunity for a Hearing (EPID L-2024-LLA-0007) (Letter) ML24018A1382024-01-18018 January 2024 Inservice Inspection Request for Information ML24018A2482024-01-18018 January 2024 License Amendment Request to Modify the Implementation Date of License Amendment No. 238 IR 05000482/20230042024-01-11011 January 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2023004 ML23356A0722024-01-0404 January 2024 Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Actions Exemption from Specific 10 CFR Part 73N Requirements (EPID L-2023-LLE-0048) (Redacted Version) WO 23-0002, Operating Corp., Summary of Actions Implemented for EA-18-165, Confirmatory Order, NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2019010 and NRC Investigation Report 4-2018-0082023-12-26026 December 2023 Operating Corp., Summary of Actions Implemented for EA-18-165, Confirmatory Order, NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2019010 and NRC Investigation Report 4-2018-008 ML23348A3662023-12-18018 December 2023 Notification of an NRC Fire Protection Baseline Inspection (NRC Inspection Report 05000482 2024012) and Request for Information ML23334A2502023-11-30030 November 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation ML23299A2662023-11-29029 November 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 238 Modified Implementation Date of License Amendment No. 237 ML23331A4972023-11-27027 November 2023 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Modify the 90-Day Implementation of License Amendment No. 237 ML23325A2112023-11-20020 November 2023 Submittal of Request for Exemption from Specific Provisions in 10 CFR 73.55 ML23320A2772023-11-16016 November 2023 License Amendment Request to Revise Ventilation Filter Testing Program Criteria in Technical Specification 5.5.11.b and Administrative Correction of Absorber in Technical Specification 5.5.11 ML23311A2082023-11-0909 November 2023 Reassignment of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch IV ML23305A3472023-11-0101 November 2023 Revision of One Form That Implements the Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) ML23292A3592023-10-19019 October 2023 License Amendment Request to Modify the 90-Day Implementation of License Amendment No. 237 ML23292A3572023-10-19019 October 2023 Operating Corporation, Request for Correction in Response to Issuance of Amendment No. 237 and Corresponding Safety Evaluation ML23277A2772023-10-11011 October 2023 Regulatory Audit Summary Concerning Review of Request Number CI3R-01 for Proposed Alternative Inspection Frequency for Containment Unbonded Post Tensioning System Components ML23284A2392023-10-11011 October 2023 NRC Initial Operator Licensing Examination Approval 05000482/2023301 ML23276B4552023-10-0303 October 2023 Technical Specification 5.6.8 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Report ML23264A8682023-09-21021 September 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Registration of Dry Storage Canister WC-EOS-37PTH-008-B4L, WC-EOS-37PTH-007-B4L, and WC-EOS-37PTH-002-B4L ML23256A2062023-09-14014 September 2023 Withdrawal of Requested Licensing Action Exemption from Specific 10 CFR Part 73 Requirements ML23165A2502023-08-31031 August 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 237 Request for Deviation from Fire Protection Requirements ML23243A0002023-08-31031 August 2023 Wolf Generating Station - Withdrawal of Request for Exemption from Specific 10 CFR Part 73 Requirements IR 05000482/20230052023-08-23023 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Unit 1 (Report 05000482/2023005) - Mid-Cycle Letter 2023 ML23232A0012023-08-19019 August 2023 Revision of One Procedure That Implements the Radiological Emergency Response Plan (Rerp). Includes EPP 06-009, Rev. 13 ML23221A3932023-08-0909 August 2023 Submittal of Request for Exemption from Specific 10 CFR Part 73 Requirements ML23220A4222023-08-0808 August 2023 Supplement to License Amendment Request (LAR) for Deviation from Fire Protection Program Requirements ML23201A1212023-08-0707 August 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 236 Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-554, Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements ML23130A2902023-07-26026 July 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 235 Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections IR 05000482/20230022023-07-11011 July 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2023002 ML23167A0042023-06-26026 June 2023 Audit Plan to Support Review of Request for Alternative Containment Inservice Inspection Frequency IR 05000482/20234012023-06-21021 June 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000482/2023401 ML23171B1312023-06-20020 June 2023 Additional Supplement to License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-577-A, Revision 1, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections ML23151A4162023-05-31031 May 2023 Revision of One Form That Implements the Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) for Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) ET 23-0006, CFR 50.55a Request Number CI3R-01 for the Third Containment Inservice Inspection Program Interval for Proposed Alternative Frequency to Containment Unbonded Post-Tensioning System Components2023-05-17017 May 2023 CFR 50.55a Request Number CI3R-01 for the Third Containment Inservice Inspection Program Interval for Proposed Alternative Frequency to Containment Unbonded Post-Tensioning System Components WO 23-0014, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-05-17017 May 2023 Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML23132A1532023-05-12012 May 2023 Transmittal of 2022 Annual Financial Reports WM 23-0009, Financial Assurance Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Reactors 10 CFR 50.75(f)(1)2023-05-10010 May 2023 Financial Assurance Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Reactors 10 CFR 50.75(f)(1) ML23135A1172023-05-0808 May 2023 Redacted Version of Revision 36 to Updated Safety Analysis Report ML23117A2112023-04-27027 April 2023 Annual Exposure Report (2022) ML23117A1342023-04-27027 April 2023 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report Report 46 2024-01-04
[Table view] |
Text
ary 12, 2006
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2005004
Dear Mr. Muench:
Because of an error in documenting the completed inspection scope for the ALARA inspection conducted June 27 - July 1, 2005, insert the enclosure to this letter as replacements for pages 13 - 15 of NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2005004.
Please accept my apology for any inconvenience these actions may have caused.
Sincerely,
//RA//
Michael P. Shannon, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket: 50-482 License: NPF-42 Enclosure:
Pages 13 - 15 of NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2005004 cc w/enclosure:
Vice President Operations/Plant Manager Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. -2-Jay Silberg, Esq.
Shaw Pittman, LLP 2300 N Street, NW Washington, DC 20037 Supervisor Licensing Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839 Chief Engineer Utilities Division Kansas Corporation Commission 1500 SW Arrowhead Road Topeka, KS 66604-4027 Office of the Governor State of Kansas Topeka, KS 66612 Attorney General 120 S.W. 10th Avenue, 2nd Floor Topeka, KS 66612-1597 County Clerk Coffey County Courthouse 110 South 6th Street Burlington, KS 66839-1798 Chief, Radiation and Asbestos Control Section Kansas Department of Health and Environment Bureau of Air and Radiation 1000 SW Jackson, Suite 310 Topeka, KS 66612-1366
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. -3-Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)
Senior Resident Inspector (SDC)
Resident Inspector (TBR2)
SRI, Callaway (MSP)
Branch Chief, DRP/B (WBJ)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/B (RAK1)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)
RITS Coordinator (KEG)
Only inspection reports to the following:
DRS STA (DAP)
J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)
ROPreports WC Site Secretary (SLA2)
SUNSI Review Completed: __Yes____ ADAMS: / Yes G No Initials: GLG____
/ Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive / Non-Sensitive S\DRS\DRSLTRS\WC2005004errata.wpd RIV: DRS/PSB/HPI C:PSB GLGuerra MPShannon
/RA/ /RA/
1/ 12 /06 1/ 12 /06 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
-13-
- Self-assessments, audits, and special reports related to the ALARA program since the last inspection
- Effectiveness of self-assessment activities with respect to identifying and addressing repetitive deficiencies or significant individual deficiencies
- Radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during work l activities in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas l The inspector completed 7 of the required 15 samples and 7 of the optional samples. l b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems Resident Inspector Annual Sample Review a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of WCNOCs corrective action program as applied to corrective action document PIR 2005-2142. This document was initiated to address the conditions and events that led to the inoperability of both site fire protection pumps. Attributes considered during this review included the following:
- Completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of problem identification
- Operability and reportability evaluation
- Extent of condition evaluation
- Apparent cause evaluation
- Corrective action effectiveness The inspectors completed one sample.
b. Findings Failure to Follow the Clearance Order Procedure Introduction: An apparent violation (AV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1a occurred when station personnel failed to follow Procedure AP 21E-001, Clearance Orders, and manipulated a component inside a fire protection piping clearance boundary without instructions and authorization. The starting of a temporary fire pump resulted in water Enclosure
-14-spraying on the controller of the operable diesel-driven fire pump through an open vent valve, which rendered the pump inoperable.
Description: On June 30, 2005, the motor of the electric fire pump experienced a short in its winding which led to a fire at the motor. The plant took the appropriate compensatory measures and started parallel paths to restore the fire suppression water system within the allotted 14 days. One path involved a temporary modification to the fire protection system that installed a temporary motor-driven fire pump, which was accomplished on July 11, 2005. The temporary fire pump was tested on July 12, 2005, to verify it would provide the required flow of water suppression; however, the pump failed this test.
Station fire protection personnel requested a clearance order to isolate the temporary fire pump from the fire protection piping but failed to make station operations personnel aware of the desire to run the temporary fire pump following repairs. Once repairs to the pump were completed, the vendor under the direction of station fire protection personnel started the pump believing they had authorization to operate the temporary fire pump. This resulted in water issuing from an open vent valve which sprayed the controller of the diesel-driven fire pump. Station fire protection personnel discovered the wet controller and notified the control room. Control room personnel declared the diesel-driven fire pump inoperable. The diesel-driven fire pump was returned to service in approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
The inspectors reviewed Procedure AP-10-103, Fire Protection Impairment Control, Revision 19, which identified the compensatory measures for the loss of fire suppression water systems. With the motor driven and the diesel driven fire pump inoperable (approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) the impairment control procedure required that a backup fire pump be provided within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. In this case, both the motor driven and the diesel driven fire pumps were restored within approximately 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />. This issue involved human performance crosscutting aspects associated with station personnel not following a station procedure.
Analysis: The failure to follow station procedures is a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to degrade the fire protection system suppression and was evaluated using Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. This finding requires a Phase 3 analysis and is currently under evaluation. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation entered this finding into their corrective action program as PIR 2005-2142 Enforcement: Technical Specification 5.4.1a requires procedures be implemented in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, requires procedures for the performance of station maintenance. Contrary to the above, on July 13, 2005, station personnel operated Enclosure
-15-components inside an established fire protection piping clearance boundary without work instructions or control room authorization as required by Station Procedure AP 21E-001, Clearance Orders, Section 6.6.8. This resulted in an adjacent diesel-driven fire pump becoming inoperable. Pending determination of the final safety significance of this issue, this violation is being treated as an AV consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: AV 05000482/0500404, manipulation of plant component without proper authorization results in inoperable fire protection pumps.
Corrective Action Effectiveness There were no findings identified that were associated with the corrective actions for this event. However, the inspectors made the following observations from their review of the apparent cause evaluation and the associated corrective actions: The apparent cause evaluation states that some fire protection personnel are unfamiliar with the clearance order program because, for them, clearance orders are infrequently performed evolutions. Additionally, the evaluation states that some groups mistakenly believed it was acceptable to work on vendor equipment inside clearance order boundaries without proper authorization or an approved procedure. These evaluation results suggest a clearance order program knowledge deficiency within the fire protection group. Yet, the corrective action for these contributing causes was counseling only the one individual involved with this event.
.2 Cross-References to Problem Identification & Resolution Findings Documented Elsewhere Section 1R15 documents a condition where station personnel did not properly evaluate a condition adverse to quality regarding debris in the auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters.
.3 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas and ALARA Inspections Section 2OS1 evaluated the effectiveness of WCNOC's problem identification and resolution processes regarding access controls to radiologically significant areas and radiation worker practices. The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents for root cause/apparent cause analysis against WCNOCs PI&R process. No findings of significance were identified.
Section 2OS2 evaluated the effectiveness of WCNOC's PI&R processes regarding exposure tracking, higher than planned exposure levels, and radiation worker practices.
The inspector reviewed the corrective action documents listed in the attachment against WCNOCs PI&R program requirements. No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure