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Initiation
- Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request
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MONTHYEARRA-12-082, Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, (Revision 12)2012-07-13013 July 2012 Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, (Revision 12) Project stage: Request NOC-AE-12002878, Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan Revision 142012-07-17017 July 2012 Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan Revision 14 Project stage: Request ML12214A2642012-07-25025 July 2012 PVNGS Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program, Revision 14 Project stage: Request CP-201200875, Report of Changes to the Physical Security Plan (Revision 7)2012-07-26026 July 2012 Report of Changes to the Physical Security Plan (Revision 7) Project stage: Request ML12214A5812012-07-30030 July 2012 Associated ISFSIs - Submittal of Security Plan, Training & Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan & ISFSI Security Program Project stage: Request RBG-47269, Submittal of Revision 10 to the Security Plan, T&Q Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan2012-08-0202 August 2012 Submittal of Revision 10 to the Security Plan, T&Q Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan Project stage: Request L-2012-305, Revision 15 to the Physical Security Plan, Cover Letter2012-08-0303 August 2012 Revision 15 to the Physical Security Plan, Cover Letter Project stage: Request ULNRC-05889, Union Electric Co. Facility Operating License NPF-030 Physical Security Plan, Revision 102012-08-0303 August 2012 Union Electric Co. Facility Operating License NPF-030 Physical Security Plan, Revision 10 Project stage: Request ML12219A2282012-08-0303 August 2012 Revision to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program, Revision 9 Project stage: Request ML12221A3362012-08-0808 August 2012 Draft RAI on Revision to Security Plan Project stage: Draft RAI ML12229A2872012-08-13013 August 2012 Security Plan, Revision 9 to the Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan Project stage: Request ML12237A0772012-08-23023 August 2012 Draft Request for Information Email - Related to Physical Security Plant (Psp), Training and Qualification Plan (T&Qp), and Safeguards Contingency Plan (Scp), Revision 14 (TAC D91660) Project stage: Draft RAI ML12229A4332012-09-0606 September 2012 Request for Additional Information Regarding Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 12 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12251A0472012-09-11011 September 2012 Request for Additional Information, Review of Physical Security Plan (Psp), Training and Qualification Plan (T&Qp), and Safeguards Contingency Plan (Scp), Revision 14 (TAC D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12255A0742012-09-18018 September 2012 Request for Additional Information, Changes to Callaway Physical Security Plan (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12286A3362012-10-0404 October 2012 (ANO) Units 1 and 2, Revision 14 of the ANO Security Plan Project stage: Request ML12284A0182012-10-0505 October 2012 NRR E-mail Capture - (D91660) Request for Additional Information (RAI) Draft Questions Corporate Security Plans Submitted 7/30/2012 Project stage: Draft RAI ULNRC-05921, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Changes to Security Plan (TAC No. D91660)2012-10-18018 October 2012 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Changes to Security Plan (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: Response to RAI ML12296A0102012-10-19019 October 2012 NRR E-mail Capture - D91660 - Dominion Physical Security Plan - Request for Additional Information - This Message Is Publically Available and non-sensitive Project stage: RAI ML12296A9302012-10-23023 October 2012 Enclosudraft Request for Additional Information Project stage: RAI ML12305A0432012-10-29029 October 2012 Email Security-Related Request for Additional Information, Review of Revision 10 of the Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan (TAC D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12305A0192012-10-30030 October 2012 NRR E-mail Capture - FW: D91660 - NextEra Energy Duane Arnold Physical Security Plan - RAI - This Message Is Publically Available and non-sensitive Project stage: RAI ML12306A5462012-11-0101 November 2012 E-mail, Request for Additional Information - Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 7 for the CPNPP (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12292A3222012-11-0101 November 2012 Request for Additional Information Regarding Revision 9 to Security Plant, Training & Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installa Project stage: RAI ML12297A3602012-11-0101 November 2012 Request for Additional Information, Review of Revision 14 of the Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan Project stage: RAI ML12300A0372012-11-0505 November 2012 Request for Additional Information Regarding Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualifications Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program Project stage: RAI ML12300A3222012-11-0505 November 2012 Redacted Letter Only, Request for Additional Information Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan (TAC D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12307A3692012-11-0707 November 2012 Request for Additional Information Regarding Revision 18 to the Physical Security Plan (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12310A0292012-11-16016 November 2012 Request for Additional Information Related to Physical Security Plan, Revision 16 Project stage: RAI ML12314A3562012-11-20020 November 2012 Request for Additional Information, Round 2, Changes to Callaway Physical Security Plan (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12335A0112012-11-28028 November 2012 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Review of Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 14 Project stage: Response to RAI ML12347A3022012-12-12012 December 2012 Email, Request for Additional Information on Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 15, (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12341A1592012-12-18018 December 2012 Request for Additional Information Regarding Physical Security Plan, Training Qualifications Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Security Program Revision 15 Project stage: RAI ML13002A0352012-12-19019 December 2012 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Revision 9 to the Wolf Creek Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan Project stage: Response to RAI ML12356A2182012-12-21021 December 2012 Email, Request for Additional Information Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 14 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML13010A5522013-01-16016 January 2013 Request for Additional Information Regarding Revision 18 to the Physical Security Plan Project stage: RAI ML13010A5512013-01-16016 January 2013 Request for Additional Information Regarding Revision 18 to the Physical Security Plan (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML13023A4072013-01-23023 January 2013 Request for Additional Information Email, Review of Physical Security Plan (Psp), Training and Qualification Plan (T&Qp), and Safeguards Contingency Plan (Scp), Revision 7 Project stage: RAI ULNRC-05954, Response to Request for Additional Information Changes to Physical Security Plan (TAC No. D91660)2013-01-28028 January 2013 Response to Request for Additional Information Changes to Physical Security Plan (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: Response to RAI ML13029A7132013-01-29029 January 2013 Email, Request for Additional Information, Revision 13 to Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency, and Training and Qualification Plan (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML13077A3372013-03-18018 March 2013 Email, Request for Additional Information, Physical Security Plan (Psp), Training and Qualification Plan (T&Qp), and Safeguards Contingency Plan (Scp), Revision 14 (TAC D91660) Project stage: RAI ML13120A0832013-03-22022 March 2013 Request for Additional Information Email Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 20 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML13120A0842013-03-22022 March 2013 Request for Additional Information Email Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 20 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML13165A3442013-06-12012 June 2013 Revision 15 of the ANO Security Plan Project stage: Request ML13165A0842013-06-13013 June 2013 Request for Additional Information Email Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 21 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML13116A3702013-07-12012 July 2013 (Redacted) Review of Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 10 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: Approval ML13116A0942013-07-12012 July 2013 (Redacted) Review of Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 9 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: Approval ML13116A3912013-07-12012 July 2013 (Redacted) Review of Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 17 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: Approval ML13120A2322013-07-18018 July 2013 (Redacted) Review of Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revisions 14 and 15 (TAC D91660) Project stage: Approval ML13275A3102013-11-25025 November 2013 Cover Memo from Robert Caldwell to Robert Pascarelli, RAI for V C Summer Revision 10 Security Plan Review Project stage: RAI 2012-07-26
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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML24025A1792024-01-23023 January 2024 State Consultation Response e-mail on Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 License Termination Plan License Amendment (License No. DPR-40, Docket No. 50-285) ML24024A2242024-01-22022 January 2024 State Consultation e-mail on Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 License Termination Plan License Amendment- (License No. DPR-40, Docket No. 50-285) ML23311A0862023-11-0505 November 2023 Letter to M Morales Re Ft Calhoun License Termination Section 7 Determination for Ipac 2022-0029456 ML23038A1882023-01-31031 January 2023 Request for Additional Time to Respond to Request for Additional Information on License Amendment Request for Approval of License Termination Plan (License No. DPR-40, Docket No. 50-285) ML22222A1192022-08-0808 August 2022 Email Section 106 NHPA- Ft Calhoun Station License Termination Plan ML21069A2482021-03-10010 March 2021 Umax, 07200054, 05000361, 05000362, FSAR Revision 4 for San Onofre ISFSI ML21335A3352021-01-25025 January 2021 January 25, 2021 e-mail from J. Parrott, NRC to C. Cameron, OPPD Use of Resrad Model to Represent Well Water Concentrations in a Basement Substructure (License No. DPR-40, Docket No. 50-285) ML20204B0782020-07-22022 July 2020 Donna Gilmore Email Holtec Umax Materials (07200054, 05000361, 05000362) ML20113F0622020-04-22022 April 2020 E-mail Results of Acceptance Review of OPPD Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 20, App G, Section Iii.E (License No. DPR-40, Docket No. 50-285) ML20100J2272020-03-26026 March 2020 E-mail Notification to the State of Nebraska on the Issuance of the License Amendment for Revised Security Plans to Reflect an ISFSI-only Configuration (License No. DPR-40, Docket Nos. 50-285 and 72-54) ML20100L7232020-03-15015 March 2020 Email: Town of Desoto National Register of Historic Places Eligibility ML19353C3612019-12-11011 December 2019 E-mail to State of Nebraska Informing of the Pending Revision to the Emergency Plan to Reflect Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Only Status (License DPR-40, Docket Nos. 50-285 and 72-054) ML19309F1112019-10-11011 October 2019 ISFSI-Only Tech Specs ML19241A1812019-08-21021 August 2019 Request for Additional Information on Proposed Changes to the FCS Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme to Reflect an ISFSI-only Status ML19175A0212019-06-19019 June 2019 Acceptance Review - License Amendment Request to Revise Security and Safeguards Requirements to Reflect ISFSI-Only Configuration ML19130A2082019-05-0808 May 2019 Email - NRC Email to FEMA Dated May 8, 2019: NRC Response to Comment on FEMA Review of Proposed Changes to DBNPS Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Condition ML19126A2802019-05-0101 May 2019 Acceptance Review - License Amendment Request for ISFSI-Only EP and EAL Scheme ML18100A2712018-04-0909 April 2018 04-09-18 OPPD E-Mail (FCS Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan Implementation) ML17236A3462017-08-24024 August 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Final RAI for Fort Calhoun LAR Regarding Permanently Defueled TS (MF9567) ML17236A3442017-08-24024 August 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Final RAI for Fort Calhoun Exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), Off-site Primary and Secondary Liability Insurance (MF9664) ML17234A4692017-08-22022 August 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Final RAI for Fort Calhoun LAR Regarding Removal of Dry Cask Loading Limits (MF9831) ML17194A9732017-07-13013 July 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Final RAI for Fort Calhoun Ultimate Strength Design for Aux. Bldg LAR (MF8525) ML17191B0212017-07-10010 July 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Fort Calhoun - Acceptance Review of Modification of LC 3.C to Delete Commission-approved CSP ML17184A0042017-06-30030 June 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Fort Calhoun - Acceptance Review of Removal of Dry Cask Loading Limits ML17142A0202017-05-19019 May 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Need Corrected Page 6 to TQ-DC-FC-101 ML17144A0132017-05-19019 May 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Fort Calhoun PSDAR - Findings and Concerns ML17139C5082017-05-19019 May 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Need Corrected Page 6 for LIC-17-0043 ML17139C8342017-05-19019 May 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Fort Calhoun - Acceptance Review Partial Exemption from Record Retention Requirements ML17139B6782017-05-18018 May 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Fort Calhoun - Acceptance Review Exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1), On-Site Property Damage Insurance ML17139B6762017-05-18018 May 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Fort Calhoun - Acceptance Review Exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), Off-Site Liability Insurance ML17136A1692017-05-16016 May 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) OPPD FCS Decommissioning Financial Reports ML17115A4722017-04-25025 April 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Corrected Page 18 to TQ-DC-FC-201 ML17114A3112017-04-24024 April 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Fort Calhoun - Acceptance Review TS Changes to Align for Decommissioning ML17112A0362017-04-20020 April 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Fort Calhoun Station - Final RAI Regarding Permanently Defueled EP and EAL Scheme Change LAR ML17090A3942017-03-31031 March 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Fort Calhoun - Final RAI Regarding Administrative Control TS Change LAR (MF8437) ML17082A0022017-03-22022 March 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Fort Calhoun Station - Final Nsir/Dpr RAI Regarding Proposed Emergency Planning Exemption ML17081A0192017-03-21021 March 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Fort Calhoun Station - Final RAI Regarding Proposed Emergency Planning Exemption ML17052A0272017-02-15015 February 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance of Requested Amendment Revise Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and EAL Scheme ML17033A9692017-02-0202 February 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Fort Calhoun Station - Final Request for Additional Information Concerning Post-Shutdown Eplan Amendment ML16350A0392016-12-15015 December 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review (CAC No. MF8858) Fort Calhoun, Unit 1 - License Amendment Request (LAR) 16-06; Removal of License Condition 3.D., Fire Protection Program ML16351A0432016-12-15015 December 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Fort Calhoun Station Offsite Response Organizations ML16334A3002016-11-29029 November 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review (CAC No. MF8525) Fort Calhoun, Unit 1 - License Amendment Request LAR-16-04 to Revise Current Licensing Basis to Use Aci Ultimate Strength Requirements ML16333A0992016-11-28028 November 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review (CAC No. MF8452), Fort Calhoun, Unit 1 - Request for Exemption from Specific Provisions in 10 CFR 73.55 ML16333A2312016-11-28028 November 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review (CAC No. MF8843)Fort Calhoun, Unit 1, Request for Rescission of Interim Compensatory Measure B.1.a from EA-02-026, Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures. ML16286A0812016-10-12012 October 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1, License Amendment Request 16-03, Technical Specifications to Align Staffing Requirements to Those Required for Decommissioning ML16278A0292016-10-0303 October 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review Fort Calhoun Station Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) for Decommissioning ML16257A0262016-09-12012 September 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) OPPD Slides for 9/13/16 Pre-Application Meeting on Class 1 Structures ML16207A0182016-07-22022 July 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review ML16137A0092016-05-16016 May 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review CAC No. MF7574 ML16131A7312016-05-10010 May 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Question Rvi Inspection Results 2024-01-23
[Table view] Category:Security Plan
MONTHYEARLIC-20-0002, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Submittal of Revision 7 to Physical Security Plan2020-02-27027 February 2020 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Submittal of Revision 7 to Physical Security Plan LIC-19-0004, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Submittal of Revision 4 to Physical Security Plan (PSP)2019-03-28028 March 2019 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Submittal of Revision 4 to Physical Security Plan (PSP) LIC-15-0058, ISFSI - Provides Redacted Version of License Amendment Request 14-08; Request Extension for Milestone 8 of Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule2015-04-20020 April 2015 ISFSI - Provides Redacted Version of License Amendment Request 14-08; Request Extension for Milestone 8 of Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule ML13165A0842013-06-13013 June 2013 Request for Additional Information Email Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 21 (TAC No. D91660) LIC-11-0036, (Fcs), Unit No.1, FCS / OPPD Cyber Security Plan, License Amendment Request (Revised)2011-04-0808 April 2011 (Fcs), Unit No.1, FCS / OPPD Cyber Security Plan, License Amendment Request (Revised) LIC-10-0055, License Amendment Request, Request for Approval of the Fcs/Oppd Cyber Security Plan2010-07-26026 July 2010 License Amendment Request, Request for Approval of the Fcs/Oppd Cyber Security Plan ML0432100682004-11-0404 November 2004 Deletion of Listed Safeguards Contingency Plans & Site Security Plans ML0309800052003-04-0202 April 2003 Site Security Plan, Rev. 19 2020-02-27
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Burkhardt, Janet From: Wilkins, Lynnea Sent: Thursday, June 13, 2013 5:29 PM To: 'EDWARDS, MICHAEL L' Cc: 'LIPPY, DONNA L'; 'HANSHER, BILL R'; Burkhardt, Janet
Subject:
DRAFT: RAI for Fort Calhoun Station Re: 50.54 Changes, Rev 21 (D91660)
Attachments: 50 54 Changes Rev 21 RAIs Email.docx
- Mike, By letter dated May 14, 2013 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13137A059), Omaha Public Power District submitted the Fort Calhoun Stations Physical Security Plan (PSP), Training and Qualification Plan (T&QP), and Safeguards Contingency Plan (SCP), Revision 21. The enclosure to the letter contained Safeguards Information and has been withheld from public disclosure. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is currently reviewing the submittal to ensure compliance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.54(p)(2).
The NRC staff has reviewed your submittal and has determined that the information specified in the attached Request for Additional Information (RAI) is needed for the staff to complete its evaluation.
Please contact me if a clarifying teleconference is needed for the attached RAIs.
Thanks Lynnea Lynnea Wilkins, Project Manager Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 Cooper Nuclear Station Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Phone: 301-415-1377 1
10 CFR 50.54(p)(2) CHANGES TO SECURITY PLAN OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT FORT CALHOUN STATION DOCKET NO. 50-285 By letter dated May 14, 2013 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13137A059), Omaha Public Power District submitted the Fort Calhoun Stations Physical Security Plan (PSP), Training and Qualification Plan (T&QP), and Safeguards Contingency Plan (SCP), Revision 21. The enclosure to the letter contained Safeguards Information and has been withheld from public disclosure. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is currently reviewing the submittal to ensure compliance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.54(p)(2). The NRC staff has determined that the additional information requested below is needed to complete its review.
- 1. Consistent with 10 CFR 73.55(c)(1)(i), licensee security plans must describe how the licensee will implement requirements of this section through the establishment and maintenance of a security organization, the use of security equipment and technology, the training and qualification of security personnel, the implementation of predetermined response plans and strategies, and the protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks.
Consistent with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(2)(ii), the security organization must include at least one member, onsite and available at all times, who has the authority to direct the activities of the security organization and who is assigned no other duties that would interfere with this individuals ability to perform these duties in accordance with the security plans and the licensee protective strategy.
Consistent with 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix C II, B.3.a., the safeguards contingency plan must describe the organizations chain of command and delegation of authority during safeguards contingency events, to include a general description of how command and control functions will be coordinated and maintained.
In Section 4.1 of the PSP, the description of the duties of the Security Shift Supervisor (SSS) and Response Team Leader (RTL) has changed. Though the purpose of this change was identified within the summary of changes, to be consistent with the NEI 03-12, Rev. 7 format, no information was submitted to demonstrate that this change has no impact on the site-specific implementation of the protective strategy and does not decrease the effectiveness of the security plans. The second to the last paragraph within Section 4.1 of the PSP identifies the SSS or Lieutenant as being responsible for directing the security forces which seems to conflict with the changed duty descriptions of the SSS and RTL provided within Section 4.1 of the PSP. In addition, changes were made to Section 4.1.2 Security Chain of Command/Delegation of Authority, that were identified within the summary of changes as removing redundant information. It is
unclear from these descriptions and changes whether the SSS would have any responsibility for directing security force actions during a safeguards contingency event.
- a. Please describe how the changes to the duties of the SSS and RTL as identified in Section 4.1 of the PSP do not decrease the effectiveness of the site security plans.
- b. Please describe whether the SSS would be responsible for directing the response actions of the security organization at any time during a contingency event.
- c. Please describe the rationale for the duty position of the SSS not being included within Section 4.1.2, Chain of Command/Delegation of Authority.
Additionally, please confirm that appropriate changes will be made during the next revision of the security plans to clearly describe the duties and responsibilities of the SSS during a safeguards contingency event and (as applicable) to identify the SSS within the security organizations Chain of Command/Delegation of Authority, listing.
- 2. Consistent with 10 CFR 73.55(c) (1) (I), licensee security plans must describe how the licensee will implement requirements of this section through the establishment and maintenance of a security organization, the use of security equipment and technology, the training and qualification of security personnel, the implementation of predetermined response plans and strategies, and the protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks.
Consistent with 10 CFR 73.55(d) (2) (ii), the security organization must include at least one member, onsite and available at all times, who has the authority to direct the activities of the security organization and who is assigned no other duties that would interfere with this individuals ability to perform these duties in accordance with the security plans and the licensee protective strategy.
Consistent with 10 CFR 73.55(k)(5)(iii), armed responders shall be available at all times inside the protected area and may not be assigned other duties or responsibilities that could interfere with their assigned response duties.
Consistent with 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix C II, B.3.a., the safeguards contingency plan must describe the organizations chain of command and delegation of authority during safeguards contingency events, to include a general description of how command and control functions will be coordinated and maintained.
Section 4.1 of the PSP provides descriptions of the duty positions within the security organization. Section 4.1.1 of the SCP also provides duty descriptions for members of the security response organization. The second to the last paragraph within Section 4.1 of the PSP identifies the SSS or Lieutenant as the one full time member of the security force that has the authority to direct security forces and is on site at all times consistent with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(2)(ii). Section 4.1.2 of the SCP identifies the duty position of Lieutenant within the Chain of Command/Delegation of Authority table as being RTL qualified. Neither Section 4.1 of the PSP or Section 4.1.1 of the SCP provide a description of the duty position and duties of the Lieutenant or directly correlate this duty position to the duty positions and duty descriptions of SSS or RTL. Within the critical 2
task matrix (CTM) of the T&QP, the training and qualification criteria for the duty position of Lieutenant is not identified or directly correlated to the duty position of SSS or RTL.
- a. Please describe the duty position and duties of the Lieutenant within the security organization to include any interrelation to the duties and responsibilities of the SSS and RTL during normal operations and safeguards contingency events.
- b. Please describe the training and qualification criteria for the duty position of Lieutenant and how this criterion enables an individual performing within this duty position to fulfill all assigned duties and responsibilities.
- c. If this duty position is responsible to perform the duties of the SSS and RTL, please describe how an individual within this duty position discharges those duties without conflict consistent with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(2)(ii), 10 CFR 73.55(k)(5)(iii), and the regulatory position demonstrated in Security Frequently Asked Question (SFAQ) 10-13.
Additionally, please confirm that appropriate changes will be made during the next revision of the security plans to clearly describe the duty position, duties, and training and qualification criteria for the duty position of Lieutenant within the sites security organization.
- 3. Consistent with 10 CFR 73.55(c)(3), the licensee shall establish, maintain, and implement a PSP which describes how the performance objective and requirements set forth in this section will be implemented.
Consistent with 10 CFR 73.55(h)(3)(i), the search for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or other items which could be used to commit radiological sabotage shall be accomplished through the use of equipment capable of detecting these items, or through visual and physical searches, or both, to ensure that all items are clearly identified before granting access to PAs. The licensee shall subject all persons except official Federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel on official duty to these searches upon entry to the PA. Armed security officers who are on duty and have exited the PA may re-enter the PA without being searched for firearms.
Section 14.4.4 of the PSP describes protected area (PA) vehicle search and the process for armed security officers to re-enter the PA. In Revision 19, Section 14.4.4 of the PSP, the language used to describe this process was consistent with the suggested language within the resolution of Security Frequently Asked Question (SFAQ) 12-06; however, in Section 14.4.4 of the PSP, Revisions 20 and 21, the suggested language within the resolution of SFAQ 12-06 has been removed and replaced with a reference to specific security measures that are documented in site procedures. Please describe the specific security measures implemented for armed security officer re-entry into the PA that are documented in site procedures as referenced in Section 14.4.4 of the PSP and how these measures meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(h)(3)(i). See SFAQ 12-06.
Additionally, please confirm that appropriate changes will be made during the next revision of the security plans to clearly describe the security measures for maintaining the search integrity of armed security officers re-entering the PA.
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- 4. Consistent with 10 CFR 73.2, Definitions, vital equipment means any equipment, system, device, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. Equipment or systems which would be required to function to protect public health and safety following such failure, destruction, or release are also considered to be vital.
Consistent with 10 CFR 73.55(e)(9)(i) through (e)(9)(vi)(B), (i) vital equipment must be located only within vital areas, which must be located within a protected area so that access to vital equipment requires passage through at least two physical barriers, except as otherwise approved by the Commission and identified in the security plans; (ii) the licensee shall protect all vital area access portals and VA emergency exits with intrusion detection equipment and locking devices that allow rapid egress during an emergency and satisfy the vital area entry control requirements of this section; (iii) unoccupied VA must be locked and alarmed; (iv) more than one VA may be located within a single protected area; (v) at a minimum, the following shall be considered vital areas: (A) the reactor control room; (B) the spent fuel pool; (C) the central alarm station; and (D) the secondary alarm station in accordance with Section 73.55(i)(4)(iii); (vi) at a minimum, the following shall be located within a vital area: (A) the secondary power supply systems for alarm annunciation equipment; and (B) the secondary power supply systems for non-portable communications equipment.
Section 14.5 of the PSP includes a vital area (VA) listing that identifies the VAs at the site. The list of VAs in the current revision of the PSP has changed from the list that was contained in the previous revision of the PSP. A specific location was removed from the VA listing along with the list of front line vital systems and support systems which includes a component/area (Item 7 of the front line vital systems list) that is required to be considered a VA consistent with 10 CFR 73.55(e)(9)(v). Though the changes to remove the specific location and the front line and support systems list was identified in the summary of changes, the rationale for these changes, and how these changes were evaluated to ensure they did not decrease the effectiveness of the security plans was not provided. Please provide an explanation of the rationale for these changes which demonstrates that these changes do not constitute a decrease in the effectiveness of the security plans, specifically:
- a. Please describe the rationale for previously designating and protecting the area that was removed from the VA listing, as a VA.
- b. Please describe the rationale for removing the site specific information (front line vital systems and support systems lists) that included the identification of a component/area (Item 7 of the front line vital systems list) that is required by 10 CFR 73.55(e)(9)(v) to be considered a VA. This description should include identifying the location of Item 7 of the front line vital systems list within the PA (e.g.
located within Item b of the VA listing), and confirming that it is provided the protection of a vital area consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(e)(9).
Confirm that the areas containing the vital equipment identified on the front line vital systems and support systems lists are still designated and protected as VA consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(e)(9).
- c. Please confirm that an evaluation of the equipment within the area that was removed from the VA listing was conducted and that consistent with the definition of vital 4
equipment in 10 CFR 73.2, Definitions, there is no vital equipment (to include the secondary power supplies for alarm annunciation equipment and non-portable communications equipment) within the area.
- d. Please describe whether the area that was removed from the VA listing is still designated as a controlled area (i.e. access restricted to certain plant personnel) or has been designated as an uncontrolled area (i.e. allowing unrestricted access). If this area is still designated as a controlled area, please describe how access to this area is controlled (e.g. card reader, locking mechanism, intrusion detection equipment, surveillance equipment, etc.).
- 5. Consistent with 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B VI, A.3., the licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow a Commission-approved training and qualification plan, describing how the minimum training and qualification requirements set forth in this appendix will be met, to include the processes by which all individuals, will be selected, trained, equipped, tested, and qualified.
The CTM within the T&QP does not identify whether any duty position within the sites security organization is trained and qualified to perform Critical Tasks 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 14. Though the summary of changes identifies that the sites CTM was changed to be consistent with the security plans of the rest of the Entergy Fleet, and the NEI 03-12, Revision 7, template for security plans, the sites implementation of the minimum training and qualifications for the duty positions within the security organization are not demonstrated within the CTM of the T&QP..
Please describe the duty positions within the security organization that at a minimum are trained and qualified to perform Critical Tasks 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. 11, 12, and 14.
Additionally, please confirm that appropriate changes will be made during the next revision of the security plans to identify the minimum training and qualifications of each duty position within the sites security organization.
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