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| | number = ML14148A374 | | | number = ML14148A374 |
| | issue date = 06/02/2014 | | | issue date = 06/02/2014 |
| | title = Palo Verde, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Request for Additional Information, Review of Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 16 (TAC No. D91660) | | | title = Request for Additional Information, Review of Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 16 (TAC No. D91660) |
| | author name = Rankin J K | | | author name = Rankin J |
| | author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DORL/LPLIV-1 | | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DORL/LPLIV-1 |
| | addressee name = Edington R K | | | addressee name = Edington R |
| | addressee affiliation = Arizona Public Service Co | | | addressee affiliation = Arizona Public Service Co |
| | docket = 05000528, 05000529, 05000530 | | | docket = 05000528, 05000529, 05000530 |
| | license number = NPF-041, NPF-051, NPF-074 | | | license number = NPF-041, NPF-051, NPF-074 |
| | contact person = Rankin J K | | | contact person = Rankin J |
| | case reference number = TAC D91660 | | | case reference number = TAC D91660 |
| | document type = Letter, Request for Additional Information (RAI) | | | document type = Letter, Request for Additional Information (RAI) |
| | page count = 12 | | | page count = 12 |
| | | project = TAC:D91660 |
| | | stage = RAI |
| }} | | }} |
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| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 Mr. Randall K. Edington Executive Vice President Nuclear/ Chief Nuclear Officer Mail Station 7602 Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034 June 2, 2014 | | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 June 2, 2014 Mr. Randall K. Edington Executive Vice President Nuclear/ |
| | Chief Nuclear Officer Mail Station 7602 Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034 |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3-REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RE: PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN, TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION PLAN, AND SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLAN (TAC NO. D91660) | | PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3-REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RE: PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN, TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION PLAN, AND SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLAN (TAC NO. D91660) |
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| ==Dear Mr. Edington:== | | ==Dear Mr. Edington:== |
| By letter dated June 12, 2013 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 13168A417), Arizona Public Service Company (APS, the licensee) submitted the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 16. The enclosure to the letter contained Safeguards Information and has been withheld from public disclosure. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is currently reviewing the submittal to ensure compliance with paragraph 50.54(p)(2) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR). The NRC staff has determined that the information identified in the enclosed request for additional information (RAI) is needed in order for the NRC staff to complete its review. The draft copy of this request for additional information (RAI) was transmitted on May 2, 2014, and a clarification call was held on May 22, 2014. Mr. Daniel Hautala of APS agreed to provide the response within 60 days from the date of this letter. | | |
| R. Edington If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-1530 or via e-mail at jennivine.rankin@nrc.gov. Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 50-529, and STN 50-530 | | By letter dated June 12, 2013 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13168A417), Arizona Public Service Company (APS, the licensee) submitted the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 16. The enclosure to the letter contained Safeguards Information and has been withheld from public disclosure. |
| | The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is currently reviewing the submittal to ensure compliance with paragraph 50.54(p)(2) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR). The NRC staff has determined that the information identified in the enclosed request for additional information (RAI) is needed in order for the NRC staff to complete its review. The draft copy of this request for additional information (RAI) was transmitted on May 2, 2014, and a clarification call was held on May 22, 2014. Mr. Daniel Hautala of APS agreed to provide the response within 60 days from the date of this letter. |
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| | R. Edington If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-1530 or via e-mail at jennivine.rankin@nrc.gov. |
| | Sincerely, J~~er Plant Licensing Branch IV-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 50-529, and STN 50-530 |
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| ==Enclosure:== | | ==Enclosure:== |
| As stated cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv Sincerely, Plant Licensing Branch IV-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 10 CFR 50.54(P)(2) CHANGES TO SECURITY PLAN ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. UNITS 1. 2. AND 3 DOCKET NOS. STN 50-538. STN 50-529. AND STN 50-530 By letter dated June 12, 2013 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 13168A417), Arizona Public Service Company (APS, the licensee) submitted the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station's Physical Security Plan (PSP), Training and Qualification Plan (T&QP), and Safeguards Contingency Plan (SCP), Revision 16. The enclosure to the letter contained Safeguards Information and has been withheld from public disclosure. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is currently reviewing the submittal to ensure compliance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR), Section 50.54(p)(2). The NRC staff has determined that the additional information requested below is needed to complete its review. 1. Sections 11.1, 14.6, and 15.3 of the PSP, as well as Section 7 of the SCP include descriptions of a Security Owner Controlled Area (SOCA) (e.g., physical barrier, access controls and intrusion detection system, and as described support the site's protective strategy as a component of the physical protection program). Each function of the SOCA as implemented must meet specific regulatory requirements consistent with 10 CFR Section 73.55, "Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage." How these requirements are implemented must be described in the PSP. The following additional information is requested regarding implementation of the SOCA: Regulatory Basis As stated in 73.55(c)(3), Physical Security Plan: The licensee shall establish, maintain, and implement a Physical Security Plan which describes how the performance objective and requirements set forth in this section will be implemented. a. In Section 11.1 of the PSP, please describe how openings in the barrier in this section are secured and monitored to prevent exploitation (e.g., personnel gates, etc.). Enclosure Regulatory Basis: As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(e)(4): Consistent with the stated function to be performed, openings in any barrier or barrier system established to meet the requirements of this section must be secured and monitored to prevent exploitation of the opening. b. Section 14.6 of the PSP describes the method and location "primarily" used to control personnel access into this area (as well as in Section 7 of the SCP, which in part states, "the majority of individuals seeking access"). Please indicate and describe any other methods or locations where personnel and material access into this area are controlled, as well as the locking devices, intrusion detection equipment, surveillance equipment and search procedures associated with these other locations (i.e., not "primarily" used). Regulatory Basis: As stated, in part, in 10 CFR 73.55(g)(1 ): Consistent with the function of each barrier or barrier system, the licensee shall control personnel, vehicle, and material access, as applicable, at each access control point in accordance with the physical protection program design requirements of§ 73.55(b). (i) To accomplish this, the licensee shall: (A) Locate access control portals outside of, or concurrent with, the physical barrier system through which it controls access. (B) Equip access control portals with locking devices, intrusion detection equipment, and surveillance equipment consistent with the intended function. As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(h)(2), Owner controlled area searches: (i) Where the licensee has established physical barriers in the owner controlled area, the licensee shall implement search procedures for access control points in the barrier. c. Section 15.3 of the PSP describes intrusion detection system technologies utilized at the SOCA perimeter. Section 15.5.1 of the PSP describes an intrusion detection system and closed circuit television system utilized in the OCA. Please describe how the intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the OCA (i.e., SOCA perimeter) provides, at all times, the capability to detect and assess unauthorized persons and facilitate the effective implementation of the protective strategy. Regulatory Basis As stated in the 10 CFR 73.55(i)(1 ): The licensee shall establish and maintain intrusion detection and assessment systems that satisfy the design requirements of§ 73.55(b) and provide, at all times, the capability to detect and assess unauthorized persons and facilitate the effective implementation of the licensee's protective strategy. d. Please describe how the intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the SOCA perimeter is designed to annunciate and display concurrently in two continuously staffed onsite alarm stations. Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(i)(2): Intrusion detection equipment must annunciate and video assessment equipment shall display concurrently, in at least two continuously staffed onsite alarm stations, at least one of which must be protected in accordance with the requirements of the central alarm station within this section. e. Please describe how the intrusion detection and assessment system at the SOCA perimeter is designed to: (1) Provide visual and audible annunciation of the alarm. (2) Provide a visual display from which assessment of the detected activity can be made. (3) Ensure that annunciation of an alarm indicates the type and location of the alarm. (4) Ensure that alarm devices to include transmission lines to annunciators are tamper indicating and self-checking. (5) Provide an automatic indication when the alarm system or a component of the alarm system fails, or when the system is operating on the backup power supply. (6) Support the initiation of a timely response in accordance with the security plans, licensee protective strategy, and associated implementing procedures. Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(i)(3)(i) through (i)(3)(vi): The licensee's intrusion detection and assessment systems must be designed to: (i) Provide visual and audible annunciation of the alarm. (ii) Provide a visual display from which assessment of the detected activity can be made. (iii) Ensure that annunciation of an alarm indicates the type and location of the alarm. (iv) Ensure that alarm devices to include transmission lines to annunciators are tamper indicating and self-checking. (v) Provide an automatic indication when the alarm system or a component of the alarm system fails, or when the system is operating on the backup power supply. (vi) Support the initiation of a timely response in accordance with the security plans, licensee protective strategy, and associated implementing procedures. f. Please describe the illumination methods and technologies utilized at the SOCA perimeter that provides the illumination necessary to satisfy the design requirements of Section 73.55(b) and implement the protective strategy. Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(i)(6)(i): The licensee shall ensure that all areas of the facility are provided with illumination necessary to satisfy the design requirements of§ 73.55(b) and implement the protective strategy. g. Please describe how the implementation of the SOCA barrier and associated equipment and systems (e.g., intrusion detection and assessment, access controls, etc.) are included in security program reviews. Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(m)(1 ): As a minimum the licensee shall review each element of the physical protection program at least every 24 months. h. Please describe how the SOCA barrier and associated equipment and systems (e.g., intrusion detection and assessment, access controls, etc.) are included in the site maintenance, testing and calibration program as well as the intervals that the systems and equipment are tested for operability and performance. Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(n)(1): The licensee shall: (i) Establish, maintain and implement a maintenance, testing and calibration program to ensure that security systems and equipment, including secondary power supplies, are tested for operability and performance at predetermined intervals, maintained in operable condition, and are capable of performing their intended functions. i. Please describe the compensatory measures that are implemented when the SOCA barrier and associated equipment and systems (e.g., intrusion detection and assessment, access controls, etc.) fails or becomes degraded. Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(o)(1): The licensee shall identify criteria and measures to compensate for degraded or inoperable equipment, systems, and components to meet the requirements of this section. 2. Please describe the delegation of duties that occurs before the Security Operations Section Leader (SOSL) assumes the duties as indicated in Section 4.1.2 of the SCP. In addition, based on the assumption of duties in Section 4.1.2 of the SCP, the SOSL is not identified in Section 3.3 and Table 1: Critical Task Matrix (CTM) of the T&QP as being trained, qualified, and equipped to perform these duties (e.g., Task 21). Please indicate the training, qualifications, and equipment consistent with the duties and responsibilities of the SOSL position and any other security-related delegated duties (i.e., Section 4.1.2 of the SCP). Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(d)(2)(ii), the security organization must include: At least one member, onsite and available at all times, who has the authority to direct the activities of the security organization and who is assigned no other duties that would interfere with this individual's ability to perform these duties in accordance with the security plans and the licensee protective strategy. As stated, in part, in 10 CFR 73.55(d)(3): The licensee may not permit any individual to implement any part of the physical protection program unless the individual has been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with appendix B, section VI to this part and the Training and Qualification Plan. Consistent with 10 CFR 73 Appendix B VI.C, Duty Training: 1. Duty Training and qualifications requirements. All personnel who are assigned to perform any security-related duty or responsibility shall be trained and qualified to perform assigned duties and responsibilities to ensure that each individual possesses the minimum knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively carry out those assigned duties and responsibilities. (a) The areas of knowledge, skills and abilities that are required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities must be identified in the licensee's Commission-approved training and qualification plan. (b) Each individual who is assigned duties and responsibilities identified in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures shall, before assignment: (1) Be trained to perform assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of this appendix and the approved training and qualification plan. (2) Meet the minimum qualification requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan. (3) Be trained and qualified in the use of all equipment or devices required to effectively perform all assigned duties and responsibilities. 3. The position of Armed Security Officer (ASO) is not identified as being trained and qualified on Task 20 in Table 1: CTM of the T&QP. However, the position of ASO is described in Section 18 of the PSP and Sections 4.1.1 and 5.2 of the SCP, as performing duties and responsibilities consistent with duties and responsibilities associated with Task 20. Please indicate whether the position of ASO is trained and qualified on duties and responsibilities consistent with Task 20 or that the position of ASO is not required to perform the duties described in Section 18 of the T&QP and Sections 4.1.1 and 5.2 of the SCP. Regulatory Basis Consistent with 10 CFR 73 Appendix B VI.C, Duty Training: 1. Duty Training and qualifications requirements. All personnel who are assigned to perform any security-related duty or responsibility shall be trained and qualified to perform assigned duties and responsibilities to ensure that each individual possesses the minimum knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively carry out those assigned duties and responsibilities. (a) The areas of knowledge, skills and abilities that are required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities must be identified in the licensee's Commission-approved training and qualification plan. (b) Each individual who is assigned duties and responsibilities identified in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures shall, before assignment: (1) Be trained to perform assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of this appendix and the approved training and qualification plan. (2) Meet the minimum qualification requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan. (3) Be trained and qualified in the use of all equipment or devices required to effectively perform all assigned duties and responsibilities. 4. In Section 11.2.1 of the PSP, please describe how the active barriers in this section are placed in the denial position to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance in the event of a power failure. Regulatory Basis: As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1 O)(i)(B), licensees shall perform the following: Periodically check the operation of active vehicle barriers and provide a secondary power source, or a means of mechanical or manual operation in the event of a power failure, to ensure that the active barrier can be placed in the denial position to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance. 5. In Section 11.2.2 of the PSP, please describe how the active barriers in this section are placed in the denial position to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance in the event of a power failure. Regulatory Basis: As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1 O)(i)(B), licensees shall perform the following: Periodically check the operation of active vehicle barriers and provide a secondary power source, or a means of mechanical or manual operation in the event of a power failure, to ensure that the active barrier can be placed in the denial position to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance. 6. Figure 2 of the PSP (page 43) identifies two separate areas with isolation zones. Please explain whether both of these areas are intended to meet the definition of an isolation zone in accordance with 10 CFR 73.2 and the requirements of an isolation zone in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(e)(7). 7. In Appendix A (page A-8), the definition of Response Team Leader is missing. This is not consistent with NEI 03-12 template. 8. In Section 2.4 of the T&QP, please indicate whether a simulated contingency weapon is carried or slung for the physical fitness test by armed members of the security organization responsible for implementing the licensee's protective strategy. Regulatory Basis: As stated, in part, in 10 CFR 73 Appendix B VI.B.4, Medical examinations and physical fitness qualifications: (b) Before assignment, armed members of the security organization shall demonstrate physical fitness for assigned duties and responsibilities by performing a practical physical fitness test. (1) The physical fitness test must consider physical conditions such as strenuous activity, physical exertion, levels of stress, and exposure to elements as they pertain to each individual's assigned security duties for both normal and emergency operations and must simulate site specific conditions under which the individual will be required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities. (3) The physical fitness test must include physical attributes and performance objectives which demonstrate the strength, endurance, and agility, consistent with assigned duties in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures during normal and emergency conditions. 9. Section 18 of the PSP describes the minimum number of armed security officers designated to strengthen on site response capabilities. Section 7 of the SCP provides additional information regarding security shift staffing. Please indicate which armed security officers listed in Section 7 of the SCP are the armed security officers designated to strengthen the onsite response consistent with the description provided in Section 18 of the PSP. Regulatory Basis: As stated, in part, in 10 CFR 73.55(c), Security plans: (1) Licensee security plans must describe: (i) How the licensee will implement requirements of this section through the establishment and maintenance of a security organization, the use of security equipment and technology, the training and qualification of security personnel, the implementation of predetermined response plans and strategies, and the protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks. As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(k)(4): The licensee shall provide armed response personnel consisting of armed responders which may be augmented with armed security officers to carry out armed response duties within predetermined timelines specified by the site protective strategy.
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| ML 14148A374 *Memo dated 4/22/14 **via email OFFICE NRRIDORLILPL4-1 /PM NRRIDORL/LPL4-1 /LA** NSIR/DSP/RSLB/BC* NRRIDORLILPL4-1/BC NRR/DORLILPL4-1 /PM NAME JRankin JBurkhardt PLee MMarkley JRankin DATE 5/29/14 5/29/14 4/22/14 5/30/14 6/2/14}}
| | As stated cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv |
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| | REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 10 CFR 50.54(P)(2) CHANGES TO SECURITY PLAN ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. UNITS 1. 2. AND 3 DOCKET NOS. STN 50-538. STN 50-529. AND STN 50-530 By letter dated June 12, 2013 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13168A417), Arizona Public Service Company (APS, the licensee) submitted the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station's Physical Security Plan (PSP), Training and Qualification Plan (T&QP), and Safeguards Contingency Plan (SCP), Revision 16. The enclosure to the letter contained Safeguards Information and has been withheld from public disclosure. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is currently reviewing the submittal to ensure compliance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR), |
| | Section 50.54(p)(2). The NRC staff has determined that the additional information requested below is needed to complete its review. |
| | : 1. Sections 11.1, 14.6, and 15.3 of the PSP, as well as Section 7 of the SCP include descriptions of a Security Owner Controlled Area (SOCA) (e.g., physical barrier, access controls and intrusion detection system, and as described support the site's protective strategy as a component of the physical protection program). Each function of the SOCA as implemented must meet specific regulatory requirements consistent with 10 CFR Section 73.55, "Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage." How these requirements are implemented must be described in the PSP. The following additional information is requested regarding implementation of the SOCA: |
| | Regulatory Basis As stated in 73.55(c)(3), Physical Security Plan: |
| | The licensee shall establish, maintain, and implement a Physical Security Plan which describes how the performance objective and requirements set forth in this section will be implemented. |
| | : a. In Section 11.1 of the PSP, please describe how openings in the barrier in this section are secured and monitored to prevent exploitation (e.g., personnel gates, etc.). |
| | Enclosure |
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| | Regulatory Basis: |
| | As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(e)(4): |
| | Consistent with the stated function to be performed, openings in any barrier or barrier system established to meet the requirements of this section must be secured and monitored to prevent exploitation of the opening. |
| | : b. Section 14.6 of the PSP describes the method and location "primarily" used to control personnel access into this area (as well as in Section 7 of the SCP, which in part states, "the majority of individuals seeking access"). Please indicate and describe any other methods or locations where personnel and material access into this area are controlled, as well as the locking devices, intrusion detection equipment, surveillance equipment and search procedures associated with these other locations (i.e., not "primarily" used). |
| | Regulatory Basis: |
| | As stated, in part, in 10 CFR 73.55(g)(1 ): |
| | Consistent with the function of each barrier or barrier system, the licensee shall control personnel, vehicle, and material access, as applicable, at each access control point in accordance with the physical protection program design requirements of§ 73.55(b). |
| | (i) To accomplish this, the licensee shall: |
| | (A) Locate access control portals outside of, or concurrent with, the physical barrier system through which it controls access. |
| | (B) Equip access control portals with locking devices, intrusion detection equipment, and surveillance equipment consistent with the intended function. |
| | As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(h)(2), Owner controlled area searches: |
| | (i) Where the licensee has established physical barriers in the owner controlled area, the licensee shall implement search procedures for access control points in the barrier. |
| | : c. Section 15.3 of the PSP describes intrusion detection system technologies utilized at the SOCA perimeter. Section 15.5.1 of the PSP describes an intrusion detection system and closed circuit television system utilized in the OCA. Please describe how the intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the OCA (i.e., |
| | SOCA perimeter) provides, at all times, the capability to detect and assess unauthorized persons and facilitate the effective implementation of the protective strategy. |
| | |
| | Regulatory Basis As stated in the 10 CFR 73.55(i)(1 ): |
| | The licensee shall establish and maintain intrusion detection and assessment systems that satisfy the design requirements of§ 73.55(b) and provide, at all times, the capability to detect and assess unauthorized persons and facilitate the effective implementation of the licensee's protective strategy. |
| | : d. Please describe how the intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the SOCA perimeter is designed to annunciate and display concurrently in two continuously staffed onsite alarm stations. |
| | Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(i)(2): |
| | Intrusion detection equipment must annunciate and video assessment equipment shall display concurrently, in at least two continuously staffed onsite alarm stations, at least one of which must be protected in accordance with the requirements of the central alarm station within this section. |
| | : e. Please describe how the intrusion detection and assessment system at the SOCA perimeter is designed to: |
| | (1) Provide visual and audible annunciation of the alarm. |
| | (2) Provide a visual display from which assessment of the detected activity can be made. |
| | (3) Ensure that annunciation of an alarm indicates the type and location of the alarm. |
| | (4) Ensure that alarm devices to include transmission lines to annunciators are tamper indicating and self-checking. |
| | (5) Provide an automatic indication when the alarm system or a component of the alarm system fails, or when the system is operating on the backup power supply. |
| | (6) Support the initiation of a timely response in accordance with the security plans, licensee protective strategy, and associated implementing procedures. |
| | |
| | Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(i)(3)(i) through (i)(3)(vi): |
| | The licensee's intrusion detection and assessment systems must be designed to: |
| | (i) Provide visual and audible annunciation of the alarm. |
| | (ii) Provide a visual display from which assessment of the detected activity can be made. |
| | (iii) Ensure that annunciation of an alarm indicates the type and location of the alarm. |
| | (iv) Ensure that alarm devices to include transmission lines to annunciators are tamper indicating and self-checking. |
| | (v) Provide an automatic indication when the alarm system or a component of the alarm system fails, or when the system is operating on the backup power supply. |
| | (vi) Support the initiation of a timely response in accordance with the security plans, licensee protective strategy, and associated implementing procedures. |
| | : f. Please describe the illumination methods and technologies utilized at the SOCA perimeter that provides the illumination necessary to satisfy the design requirements of Section 73.55(b) and implement the protective strategy. |
| | Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(i)(6)(i): |
| | The licensee shall ensure that all areas of the facility are provided with illumination necessary to satisfy the design requirements of§ 73.55(b) and implement the protective strategy. |
| | : g. Please describe how the implementation of the SOCA barrier and associated equipment and systems (e.g., intrusion detection and assessment, access controls, etc.) are included in security program reviews. |
| | Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(m)(1 ): |
| | As a minimum the licensee shall review each element of the physical protection program at least every 24 months. |
| | : h. Please describe how the SOCA barrier and associated equipment and systems (e.g., intrusion detection and assessment, access controls, etc.) are included in the site maintenance, testing and calibration program as well as the intervals that the systems and equipment are tested for operability and performance. |
| | Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(n)(1): |
| | The licensee shall: |
| | (i) Establish, maintain and implement a maintenance, testing and calibration program to ensure that security systems and equipment, including secondary power supplies, are tested for operability and performance at predetermined intervals, maintained in operable condition, and are capable of performing their intended functions. |
| | : i. Please describe the compensatory measures that are implemented when the SOCA barrier and associated equipment and systems (e.g., intrusion detection and assessment, access controls, etc.) fails or becomes degraded. |
| | Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(o)(1): |
| | The licensee shall identify criteria and measures to compensate for degraded or inoperable equipment, systems, and components to meet the requirements of this section. |
| | : 2. Please describe the delegation of duties that occurs before the Security Operations Section Leader (SOSL) assumes the duties as indicated in Section 4.1.2 of the SCP. In addition, based on the assumption of duties in Section 4.1.2 of the SCP, the SOSL is not identified in Section 3.3 and Table 1: Critical Task Matrix (CTM) of the T&QP as being trained, qualified, and equipped to perform these duties (e.g., Task 21). Please indicate the training, qualifications, and equipment consistent with the duties and responsibilities of the SOSL position and any other security-related delegated duties (i.e., Section 4.1.2 of the SCP). |
| | Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(d)(2)(ii), the security organization must include: |
| | At least one member, onsite and available at all times, who has the authority to direct the activities of the security organization and who is assigned no other duties that would interfere with this individual's ability to perform these duties in accordance with the security plans and the licensee protective strategy. |
| | |
| | As stated, in part, in 10 CFR 73.55(d)(3): |
| | The licensee may not permit any individual to implement any part of the physical protection program unless the individual has been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with appendix B, section VI to this part and the Training and Qualification Plan. |
| | Consistent with 10 CFR 73 Appendix B VI.C, Duty Training: |
| | : 1. Duty Training and qualifications requirements. All personnel who are assigned to perform any security-related duty or responsibility shall be trained and qualified to perform assigned duties and responsibilities to ensure that each individual possesses the minimum knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively carry out those assigned duties and responsibilities. |
| | (a) The areas of knowledge, skills and abilities that are required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities must be identified in the licensee's Commission-approved training and qualification plan. |
| | (b) Each individual who is assigned duties and responsibilities identified in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures shall, before assignment: |
| | (1) Be trained to perform assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan. |
| | (2) Meet the minimum qualification requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan. |
| | (3) Be trained and qualified in the use of all equipment or devices required to effectively perform all assigned duties and responsibilities. |
| | : 3. The position of Armed Security Officer (ASO) is not identified as being trained and qualified on Task 20 in Table 1: CTM of the T&QP. However, the position of ASO is described in Section 18 of the PSP and Sections 4.1.1 and 5.2 of the SCP, as performing duties and responsibilities consistent with duties and responsibilities associated with Task 20. Please indicate whether the position of ASO is trained and qualified on duties and responsibilities consistent with Task 20 or that the position of ASO is not required to perform the duties described in Section 18 of the T&QP and Sections 4.1.1 and 5.2 of the SCP. |
| | |
| | Regulatory Basis Consistent with 10 CFR 73 Appendix B VI.C, Duty Training: |
| | : 1. Duty Training and qualifications requirements. All personnel who are assigned to perform any security-related duty or responsibility shall be trained and qualified to perform assigned duties and responsibilities to ensure that each individual possesses the minimum knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively carry out those assigned duties and responsibilities. |
| | (a) The areas of knowledge, skills and abilities that are required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities must be identified in the licensee's Commission-approved training and qualification plan. |
| | (b) Each individual who is assigned duties and responsibilities identified in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures shall, before assignment: |
| | (1) Be trained to perform assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan. |
| | (2) Meet the minimum qualification requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan. |
| | (3) Be trained and qualified in the use of all equipment or devices required to effectively perform all assigned duties and responsibilities. |
| | : 4. In Section 11.2.1 of the PSP, please describe how the active barriers in this section are placed in the denial position to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance in the event of a power failure. |
| | Regulatory Basis: |
| | As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1 O)(i)(B), licensees shall perform the following: |
| | Periodically check the operation of active vehicle barriers and provide a secondary power source, or a means of mechanical or manual operation in the event of a power failure, to ensure that the active barrier can be placed in the denial position to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance. |
| | : 5. In Section 11.2.2 of the PSP, please describe how the active barriers in this section are placed in the denial position to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance in the event of a power failure. |
| | |
| | Regulatory Basis: |
| | As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1 O)(i)(B), licensees shall perform the following: |
| | Periodically check the operation of active vehicle barriers and provide a secondary power source, or a means of mechanical or manual operation in the event of a power failure, to ensure that the active barrier can be placed in the denial position to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance. |
| | : 6. Figure 2 of the PSP (page 43) identifies two separate areas with isolation zones. Please explain whether both of these areas are intended to meet the definition of an isolation zone in accordance with 10 CFR 73.2 and the requirements of an isolation zone in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(e)(7). |
| | : 7. In Appendix A (page A-8), the definition of Response Team Leader is missing. This is not consistent with NEI 03-12 template. |
| | : 8. In Section 2.4 of the T&QP, please indicate whether a simulated contingency weapon is carried or slung for the physical fitness test by armed members of the security organization responsible for implementing the licensee's protective strategy. |
| | Regulatory Basis: |
| | As stated, in part, in 10 CFR 73 Appendix B VI.B.4, Medical examinations and physical fitness qualifications: |
| | (b) Before assignment, armed members of the security organization shall demonstrate physical fitness for assigned duties and responsibilities by performing a practical physical fitness test. |
| | (1) The physical fitness test must consider physical conditions such as strenuous activity, physical exertion, levels of stress, and exposure to elements as they pertain to each individual's assigned security duties for both normal and emergency operations and must simulate site specific conditions under which the individual will be required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities. |
| | (3) The physical fitness test must include physical attributes and performance objectives which demonstrate the strength, endurance, and agility, consistent with assigned duties in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures during normal and emergency conditions. |
| | : 9. Section 18 of the PSP describes the minimum number of armed security officers designated to strengthen on site response capabilities. Section 7 of the SCP provides additional information regarding security shift staffing. Please indicate which armed security officers listed in Section 7 of the SCP are the armed security officers designated |
| | |
| | to strengthen the onsite response consistent with the description provided in Section 18 of the PSP. |
| | Regulatory Basis: |
| | As stated, in part, in 10 CFR 73.55(c), Security plans: |
| | (1) Licensee security plans must describe: |
| | (i) How the licensee will implement requirements of this section through the establishment and maintenance of a security organization, the use of security equipment and technology, the training and qualification of security personnel, the implementation of predetermined response plans and strategies, and the protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks. |
| | As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(k)(4): |
| | The licensee shall provide armed response personnel consisting of armed responders which may be augmented with armed security officers to carry out armed response duties within predetermined timelines specified by the site protective strategy. |
| | |
| | ML14148A374 *Memo dated 4/22/14 **via email OFFICE NRRIDORLILPL4-1 /PM NRRIDORL/LPL4-1 /LA** NSIR/DSP/RSLB/BC* NRRIDORLILPL4-1/BC NRR/DORLILPL4-1 /PM NAME JRankin JBurkhardt PLee MMarkley JRankin DATE 5/29/14 5/29/14 4/22/14 5/30/14 6/2/14}} |
Letter Sequence RAI |
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Initiation
- Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request
- Acceptance...
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MONTHYEARRA-12-082, Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, (Revision 12)2012-07-13013 July 2012 Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, (Revision 12) Project stage: Request NOC-AE-12002878, Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan Revision 142012-07-17017 July 2012 Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan Revision 14 Project stage: Request ML12214A2642012-07-25025 July 2012 PVNGS Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program, Revision 14 Project stage: Request CP-201200875, Report of Changes to the Physical Security Plan (Revision 7)2012-07-26026 July 2012 Report of Changes to the Physical Security Plan (Revision 7) Project stage: Request ML12214A5812012-07-30030 July 2012 Associated ISFSIs - Submittal of Security Plan, Training & Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan & ISFSI Security Program Project stage: Request RBG-47269, Submittal of Revision 10 to the Security Plan, T&Q Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan2012-08-0202 August 2012 Submittal of Revision 10 to the Security Plan, T&Q Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan Project stage: Request L-2012-305, Revision 15 to the Physical Security Plan, Cover Letter2012-08-0303 August 2012 Revision 15 to the Physical Security Plan, Cover Letter Project stage: Request ULNRC-05889, Union Electric Co. Facility Operating License NPF-030 Physical Security Plan, Revision 102012-08-0303 August 2012 Union Electric Co. Facility Operating License NPF-030 Physical Security Plan, Revision 10 Project stage: Request ML12219A2282012-08-0303 August 2012 Revision to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program, Revision 9 Project stage: Request ML12221A3362012-08-0808 August 2012 Draft RAI on Revision to Security Plan Project stage: Draft RAI ML12229A2872012-08-13013 August 2012 Security Plan, Revision 9 to the Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan Project stage: Request ML12237A0772012-08-23023 August 2012 Draft Request for Information Email - Related to Physical Security Plant (Psp), Training and Qualification Plan (T&Qp), and Safeguards Contingency Plan (Scp), Revision 14 (TAC D91660) Project stage: Draft RAI ML12229A4332012-09-0606 September 2012 Request for Additional Information Regarding Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 12 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12251A0472012-09-11011 September 2012 Request for Additional Information, Review of Physical Security Plan (Psp), Training and Qualification Plan (T&Qp), and Safeguards Contingency Plan (Scp), Revision 14 (TAC D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12255A0742012-09-18018 September 2012 Request for Additional Information, Changes to Callaway Physical Security Plan (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12286A3362012-10-0404 October 2012 (ANO) Units 1 and 2, Revision 14 of the ANO Security Plan Project stage: Request ML12284A0182012-10-0505 October 2012 NRR E-mail Capture - (D91660) Request for Additional Information (RAI) Draft Questions Corporate Security Plans Submitted 7/30/2012 Project stage: Draft RAI ULNRC-05921, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Changes to Security Plan (TAC No. D91660)2012-10-18018 October 2012 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Changes to Security Plan (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: Response to RAI ML12296A0102012-10-19019 October 2012 NRR E-mail Capture - D91660 - Dominion Physical Security Plan - Request for Additional Information - This Message Is Publically Available and non-sensitive Project stage: RAI ML12296A9302012-10-23023 October 2012 Enclosudraft Request for Additional Information Project stage: RAI ML12305A0432012-10-29029 October 2012 Email Security-Related Request for Additional Information, Review of Revision 10 of the Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan (TAC D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12305A0192012-10-30030 October 2012 NRR E-mail Capture - FW: D91660 - NextEra Energy Duane Arnold Physical Security Plan - RAI - This Message Is Publically Available and non-sensitive Project stage: RAI ML12306A5462012-11-0101 November 2012 E-mail, Request for Additional Information - Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 7 for the CPNPP (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12292A3222012-11-0101 November 2012 Request for Additional Information Regarding Revision 9 to Security Plant, Training & Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installa Project stage: RAI ML12297A3602012-11-0101 November 2012 Request for Additional Information, Review of Revision 14 of the Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan Project stage: RAI ML12300A0372012-11-0505 November 2012 Request for Additional Information Regarding Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualifications Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program Project stage: RAI ML12300A3222012-11-0505 November 2012 Redacted Letter Only, Request for Additional Information Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan (TAC D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12307A3692012-11-0707 November 2012 Request for Additional Information Regarding Revision 18 to the Physical Security Plan (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12310A0292012-11-16016 November 2012 Request for Additional Information Related to Physical Security Plan, Revision 16 Project stage: RAI ML12314A3562012-11-20020 November 2012 Request for Additional Information, Round 2, Changes to Callaway Physical Security Plan (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12335A0112012-11-28028 November 2012 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Review of Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 14 Project stage: Response to RAI ML12347A3022012-12-12012 December 2012 Email, Request for Additional Information on Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 15, (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML12341A1592012-12-18018 December 2012 Request for Additional Information Regarding Physical Security Plan, Training Qualifications Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Security Program Revision 15 Project stage: RAI ML13002A0352012-12-19019 December 2012 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Revision 9 to the Wolf Creek Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan Project stage: Response to RAI ML12356A2182012-12-21021 December 2012 Email, Request for Additional Information Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 14 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML13010A5522013-01-16016 January 2013 Request for Additional Information Regarding Revision 18 to the Physical Security Plan Project stage: RAI ML13010A5512013-01-16016 January 2013 Request for Additional Information Regarding Revision 18 to the Physical Security Plan (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML13023A4072013-01-23023 January 2013 Request for Additional Information Email, Review of Physical Security Plan (Psp), Training and Qualification Plan (T&Qp), and Safeguards Contingency Plan (Scp), Revision 7 Project stage: RAI ULNRC-05954, Response to Request for Additional Information Changes to Physical Security Plan (TAC No. D91660)2013-01-28028 January 2013 Response to Request for Additional Information Changes to Physical Security Plan (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: Response to RAI ML13029A7132013-01-29029 January 2013 Email, Request for Additional Information, Revision 13 to Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency, and Training and Qualification Plan (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML13077A3372013-03-18018 March 2013 Email, Request for Additional Information, Physical Security Plan (Psp), Training and Qualification Plan (T&Qp), and Safeguards Contingency Plan (Scp), Revision 14 (TAC D91660) Project stage: RAI ML13120A0832013-03-22022 March 2013 Request for Additional Information Email Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 20 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML13120A0842013-03-22022 March 2013 Request for Additional Information Email Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 20 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML13165A3442013-06-12012 June 2013 Revision 15 of the ANO Security Plan Project stage: Request ML13165A0842013-06-13013 June 2013 Request for Additional Information Email Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 21 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: RAI ML13116A3702013-07-12012 July 2013 (Redacted) Review of Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 10 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: Approval ML13116A0942013-07-12012 July 2013 (Redacted) Review of Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 9 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: Approval ML13116A3912013-07-12012 July 2013 (Redacted) Review of Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 17 (TAC No. D91660) Project stage: Approval ML13120A2322013-07-18018 July 2013 (Redacted) Review of Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revisions 14 and 15 (TAC D91660) Project stage: Approval ML13275A3102013-11-25025 November 2013 Cover Memo from Robert Caldwell to Robert Pascarelli, RAI for V C Summer Revision 10 Security Plan Review Project stage: RAI 2012-07-26
[Table View] |
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24019A2012024-01-19019 January 2024 Fourth 10-Year Interval, Second Period Owners Activity Report Number 1R24 ML24019A1362024-01-18018 January 2024 Inservice Inspection Request for Information ML24012A2452024-01-12012 January 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information to Proposed Method to Manage Environmentally Assisted Fatigue for the Pressurizer Surge Line ML24010A1532024-01-10010 January 2024 Information Request for the Cybersecurity Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection ML23341A0062023-12-21021 December 2023 Project Manager Assignment IR 05000528/20230112023-12-18018 December 2023 License Renewal Inspection Report 05000528/2023011 ML23335A0782023-11-30030 November 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation ML23325A1602023-11-17017 November 2023 Supplemental Submittal - Relief Request 70 Proposed Alternatives for Pressurizer Lower Shell Temperature Nozzle IR 05000528/20234032023-11-13013 November 2023 NRC Security Inspection Report 05000528 2023403, 05000529 2023403, 05000530 2023403 (Full Report) ML23311A2082023-11-0909 November 2023 Reassignment of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch IV ML23299A3052023-10-26026 October 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Relief Request 70 Proposed Alternatives for Pressurizer Lower Shell Temperature Nozzle IR 05000528/20230032023-10-17017 October 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000528 2023003 and 05000529 2023003 and 05000530 2023003 ML23270B9232023-09-28028 September 2023 Notification of Age-Related Degradation Inspection (05000528/2024012, 05000529/2024012, and 05000530/2024012) and Request for Information ML23251A2332023-09-13013 September 2023 Notification of Post Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal and Request for Information Inspection (05000528/2023011) ML23241B0182023-09-13013 September 2023 Use of Honeywell Mururoa V4F1 and MTH2 Supplied Air Suits within Respiratory Protection Program IR 05000528/20243012023-09-0606 September 2023 Notification of NRC Initial Operator Licensing Examination 05000528/2024301; 05000529/2024301; 05000530/2024301 IR 05000528/20230102023-08-22022 August 2023 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000528/2023010, 05000529/2023010 and 05000530/2023010 IR 05000528/20230052023-08-21021 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (Report 05000528/2023005 and 05000529/2023005 and 05000530/2023005) ML23222A2762023-08-10010 August 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Registration of Dry Spent Fuel Transportable Storage Canister Identification Numbers AMZDFX175 and AMZDFX176 and Vertical Concrete Cask Identification Numbers AMZDNE175, and AMZDNE176 ML23199A2942023-08-0909 August 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 221, 221, and 221, to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-107, Separate Control Rods That Are Untrippable Versus Inoperable IR 05000528/20230022023-08-0808 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000528/2023002 and 05000529/2023002 and 05000530/2023002 ML23207A2482023-07-26026 July 2023 License Renewal Pressurizer Surge Line Inspection ML23188A1872023-07-0707 July 2023 Fourth 10-Year Interval, Second Period Owners Activity Report Number 2R24 ML23166B0832023-07-0505 July 2023 Independence Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Issuance of Exemption ML23181A1602023-06-30030 June 2023 2 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and Revision 3 to Operations Quality Assurance Program Description ML23180A2222023-06-29029 June 2023 Application to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) 3.5.1, Safety Injection Tanks (Sits) - Operating, TS 3.5.2, Safety Injection Tanks (Sits) - Shutdown, and TS 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature ML23181A0772023-06-29029 June 2023 Program Review - Simulator Testing Methodology ML23157A1292023-06-0101 June 2023 Annual Report of Guarantee of Payment of Deferred Premium ML23144A3722023-05-24024 May 2023 Response to Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML23143A3912023-05-23023 May 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Request for Exemption from NAC-MAGNASTOR Certificate of Compliance 72-1031 - Cask Lid Batch 3 Design Requirements ML23145A2772023-05-17017 May 2023 10-PV-2023-05 Post-Exam Comments ML23132A3392023-05-12012 May 2023 Application to Revise Technical Specifications 3.3.11 to Adopt TSTF-266-A, Revision 3, Eliminate the Remote Shutdown System Table of Instrumentation and Controls IR 05000528/20230012023-05-0808 May 2023 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Integrated Inspection Report 05000528/2023001 and 05000529/2023001 and 05000530/2023001 and 07200044/2023001 ML23128A0692023-05-0808 May 2023 Notification of Biennial Problem Dentification and Resolution Inspection and Request for Information ML23122A1822023-04-29029 April 2023 Transmittal of Technical Specification Bases Revision 76 ML23122A1912023-04-29029 April 2023 Unit 1 Core Operating Limits Report Revision 32, Unit 2 Core Operating Limits Report Revision 25, Unit 3 Core Operating Limits Report Revision 31 ML23116A2772023-04-26026 April 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report 2022 ML23115A4012023-04-26026 April 2023 Review of the 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspections During Refueling Outage 23 ML23115A4982023-04-25025 April 2023 2022 Annual Environmental Operating Report IR 05000528/20230122023-04-19019 April 2023 Notification of Commercial Grade Dedication Inspection (05000528/2023012, 05000529/2023012, and 05000530/2023012) and RFI ML23108A0342023-04-18018 April 2023 NRC Initial Operator Licensing Examination Approval 05000528/2023301; 05000529/2023301; 05000530/2023301 ML23103A4642023-04-13013 April 2023 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report 2022 ML23103A4312023-04-13013 April 2023 Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Evaluation Models, 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii) Annual Report for 2022 IR 05000528/20224012023-04-13013 April 2023 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000528/2022401 and 05000529/2022401 and 05000530/2022401 ML23102A3292023-04-12012 April 2023 Application for Authorized Use of Mururoa Single-Use, Supplied Air Suits, Models V4F1 and MTH2 ML23102A3242023-04-12012 April 2023 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-107-A, Separate Control Rods That Are Untrippable Versus Inoperable ML23089A4002023-03-30030 March 2023 Consolidated Decommissioning Funding Status Report - 2022 ML23088A4012023-03-30030 March 2023 Project Manager Assignment IR 05000528/20234022023-03-29029 March 2023 and 3 - NRC Security Inspection Report 05000528-2023402, 05000529-2023402, and 05000530-2023402, (Cover Letter Only) ML23080A3002023-03-21021 March 2023 Present Levels of Financial Protection 2024-01-19
[Table view] Category:Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARML24011A1002024-01-10010 January 2024 March 2024 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection - Request for Information ML23334A1612023-11-30030 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - RAIs Associated with License Renewal Commitment for Pressurizer Surge Line Welds Inspection Program to Manage Environmentally Assisted Fatigue ML23334A0072023-11-29029 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR That Revises TSs 3.5.1, SITs - Operating; 3.5.2, SIT Shutdown; 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature; and SRs for TS 3.5.1, SITs Operating ML23298A1232023-10-25025 October 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 1 - RAIs for Relief Request 70, Proposed Alternatives for Pressurizer Lower Shell Temperature Nozzle ML23031A3392023-01-31031 January 2023 In-service Inspection Request for Information ML23013A0632023-01-13013 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Unit 1 -Request for Additional Information - U1R23 Inspection Summary Report for Steam Generator Tubing ML22348A1672022-12-14014 December 2022 March 2023 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Inspection - Request for Information ML22339A2372022-12-0505 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Unit 1 Request for Additional Information - U1R23 Inspection Summary Report for Steam Generator Tubing ML22272A3252022-09-29029 September 2022 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test Request for Additional Information ML22209A1752022-07-28028 July 2022 Inservice Inspection Request for Information ML22187A2632022-07-0606 July 2022 Notification of Inspection (NRC IR 05000528/2022004, 05000529/2022004 and 05000530/2022004) and Request for Information ML22067A2292022-03-0202 March 2022 Inservice Inspection Inspection PWR Request for Information ML22055A5842022-02-24024 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 3 - Final RAIs for 22nd Refueling Outage (Spring 2021) Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Report ML22035A3302022-02-10010 February 2022 Requests for Confirmation of Information for Exemption to Delete Diverse Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System Based on Risk-Informed Process for Evaluations ML22025A4012022-01-0303 January 2022 March 2022 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection - Request for Information ML21245A2222021-09-0101 September 2021 Request for Information ML21200A2392021-07-20020 July 2021 Docs Request AC - AA August 2021 ML21154A0082021-05-26026 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2 and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR Associated with Permanent Extension of Containment ILRT Frequency to 15 Years (Type a) and CIV Leak Rate Test Frequency to 75 Months (Type C) ML21064A2372021-03-0303 March 2021 ISI Request for Information Rls ML21042B9692021-02-18018 February 2021 Notification of NRC Design Bases Assurance Inspection and Initial Request for Information ML21043A1462021-02-11011 February 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAI for an Order Associated with Indirect License Transfer from Public Service Company of New Mexico to Avangrid, Inc ML21023A0212021-01-13013 January 2021 PVNGS PI&R Request for Information RA ML21011A1972021-01-12012 January 2021 Unit 2, and Unit 3 - Notification of an NRC Fire Protection Baseline Inspection (NRC Inspection Report 05000528/2021012, 05000529/2021012 and 05000530/2021012) and Request for Information ML20227A0992020-08-14014 August 2020 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test Request for Additional Information ML20118D1362020-04-28028 April 2020 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test Request for Additional Information ML20049A0992020-02-14014 February 2020 Notification of Cyber Security Inspection (NRC Inspection Report 05000528/2020401; 05000529/2020401; and 05000530/2020401) and Request for Information ML20049A0252020-02-12012 February 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 - Official RAIs for License Amendment Request Associated with Changes to Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements ML20021A3172020-01-21021 January 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 - Official RAIs for Relief Request 64, Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year ISI Interval ML19317D0782019-11-13013 November 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1 - Requests for Additional Information on Unit 1 21st Refueling Outage Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML19234A3202019-08-29029 August 2019 Redacted - Request for Additional Information for Amendment and Exemption Request to Support the Implementation of Framatome High Thermal Performance Fuel (EPID L-2018-LLA-0194; EPID L-2018-LLE-0010) ML19155A1842019-05-30030 May 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 - Mvib Official RAIs for RR-63, Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year ISI Interval ML19095A6552019-04-0404 April 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 - Mphb Official RAIs for RR-63, Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year ISI Interval ML19044A7342019-02-13013 February 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde1, 2, and 3 - Official Requests for Additional Information for RR 62, Third and Fourth 10-Year ISI Intervals, Proposed Alternative - Pressurizer Heat Sleeve Repairs ML19008A3612019-01-0808 January 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR Associated with Response Time Testing of Pressure Transmitters ML18341A0252018-12-0303 December 2018 Notification of NRC Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)(05000528/2019011, 05000529/2019011, and 05000530/2019011) and Initial Request for Information ML18271A0392018-10-0202 October 2018 Non Proprietary - Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested License Amendments and Exemptions Implementation of Framatome High Thermal Performance Fuel (Epids L-2018-LLA-0194 and L-2018-LLE-0010) ML18221A5102018-08-23023 August 2018 Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times (CAC Nos. MF6576, MF6577, and MF6578; EPID: L-2015-LLA-0001) ML18229A3132018-08-17017 August 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information Relief Request 58: Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, Unit 2 - Second Se ML18227A8672018-08-15015 August 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information Relief Request 58: Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, Unit 2 ML18124A0112018-05-0303 May 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official Eeob RAIs for TSTF-505 (4b) LAR (CAC Nos. MF6576, MF6577, and MF6578; EPID L-2015-LLA-0001) ML18099A0072018-04-0606 April 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for 10 CFR 50.69 LAR (CAC Nos. MF9971, MF9972, and MF9973; EPID L-2017-LLA-0276) ML18094B1122018-04-0404 April 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Final RAIs for TSTF-505 (Initiative 4b) LAR (CAC Nos. MF6576, MF6577, and MF6578: EPID L-2015-LLA-0001) ML18066A7032018-03-0707 March 2018 Notification of Nrc Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) 05000528/2018011, 05000529/2018011, and 05000530/2018011 Initial Request for Information ML17248A0162017-08-31031 August 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Final RAI for RRs PRR-03, PRR-04 and PRR-05, Pump Testing ML17107A0052017-04-14014 April 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Ngf LAR and Exemption RAIs (CAC Nos. MF8076 to MF8081) ML17082A4462017-03-28028 March 2017 PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 Transition to CE 16x16 Ngf - Draft RAIs Rev 3 ML17003A0182017-01-0202 January 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 3 - Draft RAIs for the Second Emergency LAR Associated with EDG 3B Failure ML16258A0312016-09-14014 September 2016 PVNGS Units 1-3 - Notif of NRC Insp of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instr. Orders and Emer. Prep. Comm./Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plns(05000528/ 2016009;05000529/2016009;and 05000530/2016009) and ML16111B3312016-04-20020 April 2016 Notification of NRC Component Design Bases Inspection (05000528/2016007; 05000529/2016007; 05000530/2016007) and Initial Request for Information ML16083A2502016-03-23023 March 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for EAL LAR 2024-01-10
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 June 2, 2014 Mr. Randall K. Edington Executive Vice President Nuclear/
Chief Nuclear Officer Mail Station 7602 Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034
SUBJECT:
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3-REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RE: PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN, TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION PLAN, AND SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLAN (TAC NO. D91660)
Dear Mr. Edington:
By letter dated June 12, 2013 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13168A417), Arizona Public Service Company (APS, the licensee) submitted the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 16. The enclosure to the letter contained Safeguards Information and has been withheld from public disclosure.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is currently reviewing the submittal to ensure compliance with paragraph 50.54(p)(2) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR). The NRC staff has determined that the information identified in the enclosed request for additional information (RAI) is needed in order for the NRC staff to complete its review. The draft copy of this request for additional information (RAI) was transmitted on May 2, 2014, and a clarification call was held on May 22, 2014. Mr. Daniel Hautala of APS agreed to provide the response within 60 days from the date of this letter.
R. Edington If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-1530 or via e-mail at jennivine.rankin@nrc.gov.
Sincerely, J~~er Plant Licensing Branch IV-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 50-529, and STN 50-530
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 10 CFR 50.54(P)(2) CHANGES TO SECURITY PLAN ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. UNITS 1. 2. AND 3 DOCKET NOS. STN 50-538. STN 50-529. AND STN 50-530 By letter dated June 12, 2013 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13168A417), Arizona Public Service Company (APS, the licensee) submitted the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station's Physical Security Plan (PSP), Training and Qualification Plan (T&QP), and Safeguards Contingency Plan (SCP), Revision 16. The enclosure to the letter contained Safeguards Information and has been withheld from public disclosure. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is currently reviewing the submittal to ensure compliance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR),
Section 50.54(p)(2). The NRC staff has determined that the additional information requested below is needed to complete its review.
- 1. Sections 11.1, 14.6, and 15.3 of the PSP, as well as Section 7 of the SCP include descriptions of a Security Owner Controlled Area (SOCA) (e.g., physical barrier, access controls and intrusion detection system, and as described support the site's protective strategy as a component of the physical protection program). Each function of the SOCA as implemented must meet specific regulatory requirements consistent with 10 CFR Section 73.55, "Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage." How these requirements are implemented must be described in the PSP. The following additional information is requested regarding implementation of the SOCA:
Regulatory Basis As stated in 73.55(c)(3), Physical Security Plan:
The licensee shall establish, maintain, and implement a Physical Security Plan which describes how the performance objective and requirements set forth in this section will be implemented.
- a. In Section 11.1 of the PSP, please describe how openings in the barrier in this section are secured and monitored to prevent exploitation (e.g., personnel gates, etc.).
Enclosure
Regulatory Basis:
As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(e)(4):
Consistent with the stated function to be performed, openings in any barrier or barrier system established to meet the requirements of this section must be secured and monitored to prevent exploitation of the opening.
- b. Section 14.6 of the PSP describes the method and location "primarily" used to control personnel access into this area (as well as in Section 7 of the SCP, which in part states, "the majority of individuals seeking access"). Please indicate and describe any other methods or locations where personnel and material access into this area are controlled, as well as the locking devices, intrusion detection equipment, surveillance equipment and search procedures associated with these other locations (i.e., not "primarily" used).
Regulatory Basis:
As stated, in part, in 10 CFR 73.55(g)(1 ):
Consistent with the function of each barrier or barrier system, the licensee shall control personnel, vehicle, and material access, as applicable, at each access control point in accordance with the physical protection program design requirements of§ 73.55(b).
(i) To accomplish this, the licensee shall:
(A) Locate access control portals outside of, or concurrent with, the physical barrier system through which it controls access.
(B) Equip access control portals with locking devices, intrusion detection equipment, and surveillance equipment consistent with the intended function.
As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(h)(2), Owner controlled area searches:
(i) Where the licensee has established physical barriers in the owner controlled area, the licensee shall implement search procedures for access control points in the barrier.
- c. Section 15.3 of the PSP describes intrusion detection system technologies utilized at the SOCA perimeter. Section 15.5.1 of the PSP describes an intrusion detection system and closed circuit television system utilized in the OCA. Please describe how the intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the OCA (i.e.,
SOCA perimeter) provides, at all times, the capability to detect and assess unauthorized persons and facilitate the effective implementation of the protective strategy.
Regulatory Basis As stated in the 10 CFR 73.55(i)(1 ):
The licensee shall establish and maintain intrusion detection and assessment systems that satisfy the design requirements of§ 73.55(b) and provide, at all times, the capability to detect and assess unauthorized persons and facilitate the effective implementation of the licensee's protective strategy.
- d. Please describe how the intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the SOCA perimeter is designed to annunciate and display concurrently in two continuously staffed onsite alarm stations.
Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(i)(2):
Intrusion detection equipment must annunciate and video assessment equipment shall display concurrently, in at least two continuously staffed onsite alarm stations, at least one of which must be protected in accordance with the requirements of the central alarm station within this section.
- e. Please describe how the intrusion detection and assessment system at the SOCA perimeter is designed to:
(1) Provide visual and audible annunciation of the alarm.
(2) Provide a visual display from which assessment of the detected activity can be made.
(3) Ensure that annunciation of an alarm indicates the type and location of the alarm.
(4) Ensure that alarm devices to include transmission lines to annunciators are tamper indicating and self-checking.
(5) Provide an automatic indication when the alarm system or a component of the alarm system fails, or when the system is operating on the backup power supply.
(6) Support the initiation of a timely response in accordance with the security plans, licensee protective strategy, and associated implementing procedures.
Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(i)(3)(i) through (i)(3)(vi):
The licensee's intrusion detection and assessment systems must be designed to:
(i) Provide visual and audible annunciation of the alarm.
(ii) Provide a visual display from which assessment of the detected activity can be made.
(iii) Ensure that annunciation of an alarm indicates the type and location of the alarm.
(iv) Ensure that alarm devices to include transmission lines to annunciators are tamper indicating and self-checking.
(v) Provide an automatic indication when the alarm system or a component of the alarm system fails, or when the system is operating on the backup power supply.
(vi) Support the initiation of a timely response in accordance with the security plans, licensee protective strategy, and associated implementing procedures.
- f. Please describe the illumination methods and technologies utilized at the SOCA perimeter that provides the illumination necessary to satisfy the design requirements of Section 73.55(b) and implement the protective strategy.
Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(i)(6)(i):
The licensee shall ensure that all areas of the facility are provided with illumination necessary to satisfy the design requirements of§ 73.55(b) and implement the protective strategy.
- g. Please describe how the implementation of the SOCA barrier and associated equipment and systems (e.g., intrusion detection and assessment, access controls, etc.) are included in security program reviews.
Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(m)(1 ):
As a minimum the licensee shall review each element of the physical protection program at least every 24 months.
- h. Please describe how the SOCA barrier and associated equipment and systems (e.g., intrusion detection and assessment, access controls, etc.) are included in the site maintenance, testing and calibration program as well as the intervals that the systems and equipment are tested for operability and performance.
Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(n)(1):
The licensee shall:
(i) Establish, maintain and implement a maintenance, testing and calibration program to ensure that security systems and equipment, including secondary power supplies, are tested for operability and performance at predetermined intervals, maintained in operable condition, and are capable of performing their intended functions.
- i. Please describe the compensatory measures that are implemented when the SOCA barrier and associated equipment and systems (e.g., intrusion detection and assessment, access controls, etc.) fails or becomes degraded.
Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(o)(1):
The licensee shall identify criteria and measures to compensate for degraded or inoperable equipment, systems, and components to meet the requirements of this section.
- 2. Please describe the delegation of duties that occurs before the Security Operations Section Leader (SOSL) assumes the duties as indicated in Section 4.1.2 of the SCP. In addition, based on the assumption of duties in Section 4.1.2 of the SCP, the SOSL is not identified in Section 3.3 and Table 1: Critical Task Matrix (CTM) of the T&QP as being trained, qualified, and equipped to perform these duties (e.g., Task 21). Please indicate the training, qualifications, and equipment consistent with the duties and responsibilities of the SOSL position and any other security-related delegated duties (i.e., Section 4.1.2 of the SCP).
Regulatory Basis As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(d)(2)(ii), the security organization must include:
At least one member, onsite and available at all times, who has the authority to direct the activities of the security organization and who is assigned no other duties that would interfere with this individual's ability to perform these duties in accordance with the security plans and the licensee protective strategy.
As stated, in part, in 10 CFR 73.55(d)(3):
The licensee may not permit any individual to implement any part of the physical protection program unless the individual has been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with appendix B, section VI to this part and the Training and Qualification Plan.
Consistent with 10 CFR 73 Appendix B VI.C, Duty Training:
- 1. Duty Training and qualifications requirements. All personnel who are assigned to perform any security-related duty or responsibility shall be trained and qualified to perform assigned duties and responsibilities to ensure that each individual possesses the minimum knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively carry out those assigned duties and responsibilities.
(a) The areas of knowledge, skills and abilities that are required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities must be identified in the licensee's Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(b) Each individual who is assigned duties and responsibilities identified in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures shall, before assignment:
(1) Be trained to perform assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(2) Meet the minimum qualification requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(3) Be trained and qualified in the use of all equipment or devices required to effectively perform all assigned duties and responsibilities.
- 3. The position of Armed Security Officer (ASO) is not identified as being trained and qualified on Task 20 in Table 1: CTM of the T&QP. However, the position of ASO is described in Section 18 of the PSP and Sections 4.1.1 and 5.2 of the SCP, as performing duties and responsibilities consistent with duties and responsibilities associated with Task 20. Please indicate whether the position of ASO is trained and qualified on duties and responsibilities consistent with Task 20 or that the position of ASO is not required to perform the duties described in Section 18 of the T&QP and Sections 4.1.1 and 5.2 of the SCP.
Regulatory Basis Consistent with 10 CFR 73 Appendix B VI.C, Duty Training:
- 1. Duty Training and qualifications requirements. All personnel who are assigned to perform any security-related duty or responsibility shall be trained and qualified to perform assigned duties and responsibilities to ensure that each individual possesses the minimum knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively carry out those assigned duties and responsibilities.
(a) The areas of knowledge, skills and abilities that are required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities must be identified in the licensee's Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(b) Each individual who is assigned duties and responsibilities identified in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures shall, before assignment:
(1) Be trained to perform assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(2) Meet the minimum qualification requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(3) Be trained and qualified in the use of all equipment or devices required to effectively perform all assigned duties and responsibilities.
- 4. In Section 11.2.1 of the PSP, please describe how the active barriers in this section are placed in the denial position to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance in the event of a power failure.
Regulatory Basis:
As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1 O)(i)(B), licensees shall perform the following:
Periodically check the operation of active vehicle barriers and provide a secondary power source, or a means of mechanical or manual operation in the event of a power failure, to ensure that the active barrier can be placed in the denial position to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance.
- 5. In Section 11.2.2 of the PSP, please describe how the active barriers in this section are placed in the denial position to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance in the event of a power failure.
Regulatory Basis:
As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1 O)(i)(B), licensees shall perform the following:
Periodically check the operation of active vehicle barriers and provide a secondary power source, or a means of mechanical or manual operation in the event of a power failure, to ensure that the active barrier can be placed in the denial position to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance.
- 6. Figure 2 of the PSP (page 43) identifies two separate areas with isolation zones. Please explain whether both of these areas are intended to meet the definition of an isolation zone in accordance with 10 CFR 73.2 and the requirements of an isolation zone in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(e)(7).
- 7. In Appendix A (page A-8), the definition of Response Team Leader is missing. This is not consistent with NEI 03-12 template.
- 8. In Section 2.4 of the T&QP, please indicate whether a simulated contingency weapon is carried or slung for the physical fitness test by armed members of the security organization responsible for implementing the licensee's protective strategy.
Regulatory Basis:
As stated, in part, in 10 CFR 73 Appendix B VI.B.4, Medical examinations and physical fitness qualifications:
(b) Before assignment, armed members of the security organization shall demonstrate physical fitness for assigned duties and responsibilities by performing a practical physical fitness test.
(1) The physical fitness test must consider physical conditions such as strenuous activity, physical exertion, levels of stress, and exposure to elements as they pertain to each individual's assigned security duties for both normal and emergency operations and must simulate site specific conditions under which the individual will be required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.
(3) The physical fitness test must include physical attributes and performance objectives which demonstrate the strength, endurance, and agility, consistent with assigned duties in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures during normal and emergency conditions.
- 9. Section 18 of the PSP describes the minimum number of armed security officers designated to strengthen on site response capabilities. Section 7 of the SCP provides additional information regarding security shift staffing. Please indicate which armed security officers listed in Section 7 of the SCP are the armed security officers designated
to strengthen the onsite response consistent with the description provided in Section 18 of the PSP.
Regulatory Basis:
As stated, in part, in 10 CFR 73.55(c), Security plans:
(1) Licensee security plans must describe:
(i) How the licensee will implement requirements of this section through the establishment and maintenance of a security organization, the use of security equipment and technology, the training and qualification of security personnel, the implementation of predetermined response plans and strategies, and the protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks.
As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(k)(4):
The licensee shall provide armed response personnel consisting of armed responders which may be augmented with armed security officers to carry out armed response duties within predetermined timelines specified by the site protective strategy.
ML14148A374 *Memo dated 4/22/14 **via email OFFICE NRRIDORLILPL4-1 /PM NRRIDORL/LPL4-1 /LA** NSIR/DSP/RSLB/BC* NRRIDORLILPL4-1/BC NRR/DORLILPL4-1 /PM NAME JRankin JBurkhardt PLee MMarkley JRankin DATE 5/29/14 5/29/14 4/22/14 5/30/14 6/2/14