IR 05000333/2015004

Integrated Inspection Report 05000333/2015004 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Report 07200012/2015001

ML16042A066
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	02/10/2016
From:	Arthur Burritt NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5
To:	Brian Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Northeast
Burritt A
References
IR 2015004, ISFSI 2015001
Download: ML16042A066 (40)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:ary 10, 2016

SUBJECT:

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2015004 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION REPORT 07200012/2015001

Dear Mr. Sullivan:

On December 31, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick). The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on January 26, 2016, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents two violations of NRC requirements, both of which were of very low safety significance (Green or Severity Level IV). Additionally, a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the non-cited violations in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at FitzPatrick. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at FitzPatrick. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/ Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000333/2015004 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I== Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59 Report No. 05000333/2015004 Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy) Facility: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Location: Scriba, NY Dates: October 1, 2015, through December 31, 2015 Inspectors: E. Knutson, Senior Resident Inspector B. Sienel, Resident Inspector B. Bollinger, Health Physicist O. Masnyk Bailey, Health Physicist R. Rolph, Health Physicist J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved by: Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

Inspection Report 05000333/2015004; 10/01/2015 - 12/31/2015; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear

Power Plant (FitzPatrick); Maintenance Risk Assessments and Operability Determinations.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. The inspectors identified two findings of very low safety significance (Green or Severity Level IV), both of which were non-cited violations (NCVs).

The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated February 4, 2015. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Title10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.65, Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants, for failure to adequately manage the increase in risk during planned maintenance on the A emergency diesel generator (EDG). Specifically, Entergy staff action to make the C EDG unavailable while the A EDG was already unavailable resulted in an unplanned increase in overall plant risk and deviation from the approved EDG outage risk management plan from a risk category of Green to the next higher risk category of

Yellow.

As immediate corrective action, the issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2015-05242.

The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the C EDG was not available when it should have been, in accordance with the approved risk management plan, which resulted in an unplanned escalation of risk from Green to

Yellow.

Additionally, this finding was similar to example 7.e in IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety function, did not represent actual loss of a safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Management, because FitzPatrick did not execute the A EDG maintenance outage work activities as planned, and after deviating from that plan, did not identify and manage the risk of barring the C EDG while the A EDG was unavailable [H.5].

   (Section 1R13)

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, because inoperability of the secondary containment system was not reported to the NRC within eight hours of when the need to do so should reasonably have been recognized, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. Specifically, positive pressure in the secondary containment due to a previously unidentified equipment malfunction that occurred during transition between the reactor building being isolated and normal reactor building ventilation being in service was not promptly recognized as a condition that caused the single train secondary containment system to be inoperable and therefore to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72. This issue was entered into the CAP as CR-JAF-2015-05244 and CR-JAF-2015-05265.

The inspectors determined that the failure to inform the NRC of the secondary containment system inoperability within eight hours in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct.

The inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process because the issue impacted the regulatory process, in that a safety system functional failure was not reported to the NRC within the required timeframe, thereby delaying the NRCs opportunity to review the matter. Using Example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was an SL IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation, because Entergy personnel failed to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 when information that the report was required had been reasonably within their ability to have identified. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects.

   (Section 1R15)

Other Findings

A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by FitzPatrick was reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by FitzPatrick have been entered into FitzPatricks CAP. This violation and corrective action tracking number are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

FitzPatrick began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On October 14, 2015, operators reduced power to 67 percent to perform a control rod sequence exchange, single control rod scram time testing, main turbine valve testing, and control rod hydraulic control unit maintenance. Operators restored power to 100 percent later that day, and the plant continued to operate at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of FitzPatricks readiness for the onset of seasonal low temperatures. The review focused on the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)and EDG room ventilation systems. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), TSs, control room logs, and the CAP to determine what temperatures or other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, and to ensure FitzPatrick personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including FitzPatricks seasonal weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during cold weather conditions. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

On November 6, 2015, the inspectors reviewed FitzPatricks preparations for high winds due to an arriving weather front. The inspectors walked down exterior portions of the plant to identify loose or inadequately protected equipment and materials. The inspectors verified that the circulating water and service water systems were operated in accordance with procedural requirements for high wind conditions. The plant did not experience any significant operational issues as a result of the high wind conditions.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment Partial System Walkdown (71111.04 - 3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

== The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: B and D EDG systems while reserve station service transformer 71T-2 and 115 kilovolt (kV) offsite line 4 were inoperable for planned maintenance on October 1, 2015 A core spray system while A low pressure coolant injection inverter was inoperable due to an emergent equipment problem on October 13, 2015 Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system due to it being a high risk significant single train system on November 4, 2015 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, TSs, CRs, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies.

The inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection