IR 05000277/2016003

Integrated Inspection Report 05000277/2016003 and 05000278/2016003

ML16309A002
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	11/03/2016
From:	Daniel Schroeder Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4
To:	Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
Schroeder D
References
IR 2016003
Download: ML16309A002 (28)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:[Type here] UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD.

KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 November 3, 2016 Mr. Bryan Hanson Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Rd.

Warrenville, IL 60555 SUBJECT: PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000277/2016003 AND 05000278/2016003

Dear Mr. Hanson:

On September 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PB), Units 2 and 3. On October 14, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Michael Massaro, Peach Bottom Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements. If you disagree with the finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U. S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC, 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Peach Bottom.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, /RA/ Daniel L. Schroeder, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278 License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000277/2016003 and 05000278/2016003 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I== Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278 License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 Report No. 05000277/2016003 and 05000278/2016003 Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Location: Delta, Pennsylvania Dates: July 1, 2016 through September 30, 2016 Inspectors: J. Heinly, Senior Resident Inspector B. Smith, Resident Inspector Approved By: Daniel L. Schroeder, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

Inspection Report 05000277/2016003, 05000278/2016003; 07/01/2016 - 09/30/2016;

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PB), Units 2 and 3; Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors. The inspectors identified one finding, which was of very low safety significance (Green). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red)and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects Within Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. All violations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated August 1, 2016. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified for Exelons failure to maintain the Unit 2 C reactor feed pump (RFP) Woodward controller secondary power supply in accordance with PES-S-002, Exelon Shelf Life Program. Specifically, on May 27, 2016, the Unit 2 C RFP experienced speed oscillations due to an age-related failure of the Woodward controller secondary power supply, which resulted in an automatic recirculation runback to 53 percent rated thermal power (RTP). The power supply contained an electrolytic capacitor that had exceeded its shelf life per PES-S-002. This issue was entered into Exelons corrective action program (CAP) under issue report (IR) 02691322.

Exelons corrective actions included replacement of the faulted power supply and an extent of condition (EOC) review of proper expiration date entry for shelf life program components.

The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstones objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability during power operations. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with Exhibit 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, SDP for Findings At-Power, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. The inspectors determined that no cross-cutting aspect was applicable to this finding because the performance deficiency (PD) was not indicative of current performance. The PD occurred between 1997 and 1999 when the power supply expiration date was incorrectly coded in Exelons work management process in accordance with PES-S-002. (Section 4OA3)

Other Findings

None.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent RTP. On September 2, 2016, operators reduced power to 59 percent RTP to support waterbox cleaning in order to improve degraded vacuum in the main condenser. The unit was returned to full power on September 3, 2016. The unit remained at 100 percent RTP except for brief periods to support planned testing and control rod pattern adjustments. The unit then began end-of-cycle coastdown for refueling outage (RFO) 2R21 on September 28, 2016, and ended the inspection period at 98 percent RTP.

Unit 3 began the inspection period at 100 percent RTP. On July 29, 2016, operators responded to a high differential alarm on the 3C intake structure traveling screen by reducing power to 84 percent RTP and removing the 3C circulating water pump from service. The unit was returned to full power that same day following the repairs. Unit 3 remained at 100 percent RTP until the end of the inspection period, except for brief periods to support planned testing and control rod pattern adjustments.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

External Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

On August 29, 2016, the inspectors performed an inspection of the external flood protection measures for PB. The inspectors reviewed technical specification (TS),procedures, design documents, and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 2.3.4.5 and Appendix C.2.5.4, which depict the design flood levels and protection areas containing safety-related equipment. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the internal and external features of the safety-related pump structure for Units 2 and 3 to ensure the stations flood protection measures were controlled in accordance with the design specifications. The inspectors also reviewed operating procedures for mitigating external flooding during severe weather to determine if Exelon planned or established adequate measures to protect against external flooding events.

Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the .

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 5 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

== The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:

• Unit 2 and Unit 3 A standby gas treatment (SBGT) train with the B SBGT train out of service (OOS) on July 7, 2016
• Unit 2 and Unit 3 A and B emergency cooling tower cells with the C cell OOS on July 25, 2016
• Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system during high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system testing on August 25, 2016
• Offsite power source alignment with the Unit 3 start-up source removed from service on September 13, 2016
• Unit 2 and Unit 3 A main control room emergency ventilation system during a planned E-4 emergency diesel generator (EDG) overhaul on September 22, 2016 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the Reactor Safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, TSs, work orders (WOs), IRs, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted the systems performance of its intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Exelon staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection