ML21168A261
| ML21168A261 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/2021 |
| From: | Mark D. Sartain Dominion Energy South Carolina |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 21-017, GL-2004-02 | |
| Download: ML21168A261 (25) | |
Text
Dominion EnergySouth
- Carolina, Inc.
5000 Dominion Boulevard, GlenAllen, VA23060 DominionEnergy.com
@Q June17,2021 ATTN:Document Control Desk Serial No.: 21-017 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRA/GDM:RO Washington, DC20555-0001 Docket No.:50-395 License No.:NPF-12 ONEMERGENCY RECIRCULATION DURING DESIGN BASISACCIDENTS AT PRESSURizED-WATER REACTORS" f
Thepurpose ofthis submittal istoprovide theDominion Energy SouthCarolina, Inc.
(DESC) final supplemental response forVCSNSUnit1to Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, "Potential Impact ofDebris Blockage onEmergency Recirculation duringDesign Basis Accidents atPressurized-Water Reactors,"
dated September13, 2004.
Byletter dated-May16,2013(ADAMS Accession No.ML13140A007),
DESC submitted aletter ofintent perSECY-12-0093, "Closure Options forGeneric Safety Issue (GSI) 191,Assessment ofDebrisAccumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance,"
indicating VCSNSUnit1wouldpursue Closure Option 2
Deterministic oftheSECYrecommendations (refinements toevaluation methods andacceptance criteria).
Thefinal outstanding issue identified inthat letter forVCSNSUnit 1with respect toGL2004-02 closure isthein-vessel downstream effects evaluation todemonstrate long-term corecooling (LTCC) canbeadequately maintained forpostulated accident scenarios requiring sumprecirculation.
iIf Thein-vessel downstream effects evaluation hasbeencompleted forVCSNSUnit 1with satisfactory results asdocumented intheenclosure tothis letter.
Thecompletion ofthis activity andtheupdate oftheFinal Safety Analysis Report following NRCacceptance of j
thefinal supplemental response satisfy thefinal GSl-191 commitments identified inthe l
VCSNSUnit 1May16,2013Closure Option letter.
r a
c I
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 Page2of3 If you have anyquestionsregarding this submittal, please contact Mr.GaryD.Miller at (804)273-2771.
Sincerely,
(
MarkD.Sartain VicePresident
- Nuclear Engineering andFleet Support Commitment contained inthis letter:
1, DESCwillupdate thecurrent licensing basis (Final Safety Analysis Reportin accordance with10 CFR 50.71(e)) following NRCacceptance ofthefinal supplemental response forVCSNSUnit 1
Enclosure:
Final Supplemental
Response
toGL2004-02 COMMONWEALTH OFVIRGINIA))
COUNTYOFHENRICO
)
Theforegoing document wasacknowledged before me,inandfortheCounty andCommonwealth aforesaid, todaybyMarkD.Sartain, whoisVicePresident
- Nuclear Engineeringand Fleet Support ofDominion Energy South
- Carolina, Inc.Hehasaffirmed before methat he is duly I
authorized toexecute andfile theforegoing document inbehalf ofthat
- Company, andthat the statements inthedocument aretruetothebest ofhisknowledge andbelief.
Acknowledged before methisF76
- dayofE, 2021.
MyCommission Expires:
CRAIGDSLY Notary Public Commonwealth ofVirginia otary P
.ic Reg.#7518653 y
MyCommission Expires December 31,2b
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 Page3of3 cc:
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Region II Marquis OneTower 245 Peachtree Center
- Avenue, NE Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 Mr.VaughnThomas NRCProject Manager
- VCSNS U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission OneWhiteFlint North Mail Stop04F12 11555Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 NRCSenior Resident Inspector V.C.SummerNuclear Station Mr.G.J.Lindamood Santee CooperNuclear Coordinator
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 Enclosure FINALSUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSE
TOGENERIC LETTER 2004-02 Dominion Energy SouthCarolina, inc.
(DESC)
V.C.SummerNuclear Station (VCSNS)
Unit 1
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure TableofContents 1 Overall Compliance..-.--....-....-.-....-...-...-...--..=-.-.........--.2 1.1 Overview ofV. C. Summer ResolutiontoGL200402--.................-...2 1.2 CorrespondenceBackground
--.........-.....-........-...-....3 1.3 General Plant SystemDescription....--......,..-.....-.......-.4 1.4 General Description ofContainment SumpStrainers.-......-...-.-5 2
General Description andSchedule for Corrective Actions
-.,.............7 3
Specific information forReview Areas.-.......--........-...-.-.10 3.n Downstream Effects
- FuelandVessel
...-......-..-...........-..11 3.o Chemical Effects.--.---...-...--.-.-.-.....-....-
--.-.-.19 3.p Licensing Basis
--.......-..-........-.19 4
References.-..-........-...--.-..........---......-.-.-.20 Page1of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure 1
Overall Compliance NRCissue:
Provide information requested inGL2004-02, "Requested Information,"
Item2(a) regarding compliance with regulations.
That is, provide confirmation that theEmergency CoreCooling System (ECCS) andthe[Containment SpraySystem(CSS))
CSS recirculation functions under debris loading conditions areorwill beincompliance with theregulatory requirements listed intheApplicableRegulatory Requirements section of this generic letter.
This submittal should address theconfiguration oftheplant that will exist onceall modifications required forregulatory compliance havebeenmadeandthis licensing basis hasbeenupdatedto reflect theresults oftheanalysis described above.
DE.SCRes.ponsel Inaccordance with SECY-12-0093, andasidentified intheMay16,2013DESCletter to theNRC(ADAMS Accession No.ML13140A007),V. C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS)
Unit 1elected topursue Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191 Closure Option 2
- Deterministic.
Topical Report (TR)
WCAP-17788-P, Rev.1,"Comprehensive Analysis andTestProgram forGSl-191 Closure (PA-SEE-1090),"
provides evaluation methods andresults to address in-vessel downstream effects.
Asdiscussed in NRC "Technical Evaluation Report ofIn-Vessel Debris Effects" (ADAMS Accession No.ML19178A252),
theNRC staff hasperformed adetailed review ofWCAP-17788-P.
Although the NRCstaff didnot issuea Safety Evaluation forWCAP-17788, asdiscussed further in"U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff ReviewGuidance forIn-Vessel Downstream Effects Supporting ReviewofGeneric Letter 2004-02Responses" (ADAMS Accession No.
thestaff expects manyofthemethods developed intheTR can beused bypressurized waterreactor (PWR) licensees todemonstrate adequate long term core cooling (LTCC).
Completion oftheanalyses demonstrates compliance with10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptance criteria foremergency corecooling systems forlight-water nuclear powerplants,"
(b)(5),
"Long-term cooling,"
asitrelates toin-vessel downstream debris effects forVCSNSUnit 1.
1.1Overview ofVCSNSUnit1Resolution toGL2004-02 OnFebruary 29,2008(ADAMS Accession No.ML080640545),
DESCsubmitted a
Supplemental
Response
toGL 2004-02 forVCSNSUnit1 thatprovided specific information regarding themethodology usedfordemonstrating compliance withthe applicable regulations, aswell asthecorrective actions that hadeither beenimplemented orplanned tosupport theresolution ofGSl-191Byletters dated November 29,2009 (ADAMS Accession No.ML093360336) andDecember 17,2010(ADAMS Accession No.
DESCsubmitted additional information forVCSNSUnit1regarding the analyses andcorrective actions thathadnotbeencompleted atthetimeofthe2008 response.
Thecontent andlevel ofdetail provided wereconsistent withtheNRC Page2of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure guidance dated November 21,2007,"Revised Content Guide forGeneric Letter 2004-02 Supplemental Responses,"
(ADAMS Accession No.ML073110389).
inthe November29, 2009 andtheDecember 17,2010letters, DESCcommitted toaddress the resolution ofdownstream in-vessel effects forVCSNSUnit1following theissuance of revised WCAP-16793, "Evaluation ofLong-Term Cooling Considering Particulate, Fibrous andChemical Debris intheRecirculating Fluid,"
andtheassociated NRCSafety Evaluation Report (SER).
- However, byletter dated May 16,2013(ADAMS Accession No.ML13140A007),
DESC provided itsplanforresolving in-vessel downstream effects pursuant tothePWROG comprehensive program underway todevelop newacceptance criteria forin-vessel debris (i.e.,
WCAP-17788) for VCSNS Unit 1.Thatletter alsoincluded asummary ofthe corrective actions andanalyses that had been implemented forVCSNSUnit 1toaddress GSl-191, aswell asinherent margins and conservatisms included intheanalyses.
The plant
- analyses, modifications,
- margins, and conservatisms summarized andupdated in theMay16,2013correspondence remain valid.
Theresolution ofin-vessel downstream effects forVCSNS Unit 1isprovided inSection 3.nbelow.DESCopted toapply theNElclean plant methodology, asdescribed in Reference 4.1andasapproved bytheNRCinReference 4.2, toconservatively determine theamountoffiber thatcanbypass theReactor Building (RB) recirculation sump strainers.
1.2Correspondence
Background
Table 1provides alist ofthepertinent GL2004-02 correspondence issued bytheNRC orsubmitted byDESCapplicable toVCSNSUnit 1
TABLE1-GENERICLETTER2004-02 CORRESPONDENCE ADAMS Document Date Accession Document Number September 13,2004 ML042360586NRCGL2004-02 March 7,2005 ML05069020790-day
Response
toGL2004-02 September 1,2005 ML052520333Follow-up response toGL2004-02 February 8,2006 ML060410214Supplemental
Response
toNRCGL2004-02 February 21,2006 ML060380003NRCRequest forAdditional Information March 28,2006 ML060870274NRCAlternative Approach forGL2004-02
Response
Page3of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure TABLE1
- GENERIC LETTER2004-02 CORRESPONDENCE ADAMS DocumentDate Accession Document Number November 21,2007 ML073110389 NRCRevised Content Guide December 21,2007 ML073601006 Preliminary Supplemental
Response
toNRCGL 2004-02 andExtension Request December 28,2007 ML073620338 NRCApproval ofExtension Request February 29,2008 ML080640545 Supplemental
Response
toGL2004-02 identification ofcommitment tosubmit Alternate March18,2008 ML080810190Source Term(AST) licensing submittal to facilitate resolution ofGL200402 December 10,2008 ML083510086 Newprojected dateforASTlicensing submittal February 3,2009 ML090270927 NRCRequestfor Additional Information License Amendment Request (LAR) to February 17,2009 ML090720887implement full scopeAlternative Source Term (AST) inaccordance with 10 CFR 50.67 May1,2009 ML091270196Request forExtension torespond toRAl November 29,2009 ML093360336 Response toNRCGL200402RAl January 14,2010 ML100210969Supplemental
Response
toASTLARRAl October 4,2010 ML102160020ASTLicense Amendment(LA)
No.183 December 17,2010 ML103610171Follow-up response toRAl May16,2013 ML13140A007 GSI-191 Closure Option 1.3General Plant SystemDescription VCSNSUnit1isa Westinghouse three-loop pressurized waterreactor (PWR).
The Nuclear SteamSupply System(NSSS) consists ofonereactor pressure vessel (RPV),
three steamgenerators (SGs),
three reactor coolant pumps(RCPs),
onepressurizer, and theReactor Coolant System(RCS) piping andinstrumentation.
TheVCSNSUnit1 containment iscompartmentalized, i.e.,
there aredistinct robust structures surrounding themajor components (steam generators, pressurizer, RCPs,etc.)
oftheRCS.The containment compartmentalization slows thetransport ofdebris tothesump.
Page4of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure TheEmergency CoreCooling System(ECCS) components aredesigned suchthat a
minimum of two accumulators, oneCharging pumpandoneResidual HeatRemoval (RHR)
- pump, together with their associated valves andpiping, will assure adequate core cooling inthe event ofaDesign Basis Accident (DBA).
TheCharging andRHRpumps serve astheSafety Injection (SI) pumps.
Theemergency corecooling injection modeis initiated byanSIsignal.
WhentheSIsystem isactuated inresponsetoaLOCA,twoCharging pumpsandtwo RHRpumpsarestarted and aligned toinject into theRCScoldlegs.
TheCharging pumps provide highhead,lowflow,and theRHRpumpsprovide
- highflow, lowheadinjection.
Thepumps' suction isalignedto the Refueling WaterStorage Tank(RWST) forthe injection phase.
AstheRCSpressure decreases, three accumulators will also discharge into theRCScoldlegs.
ThetwoRBSpraypumpsareactuatedby a High Containment Pressure signal.
The pumps' suction isalsoaligned totheRWST.
The SprayAdditive Tank(SAT) also provides flow tothepumpsuction forsodium hydroxide (NaOH) addition.
TheRBSpray pumpsdischarge tospray ring headers located inthe RB dome. AstheSIandRBSpray systems
- operate, theRWSTvolume isdepleted.
At the RWST Lo-LoLevel, theRHR pumpandRBSpray pumpsuctions areautomatically realigned fromtheRWSTtotheRB recirculation sumps.Eachpumphasaseparate suctionline and suctionbell inside the RBrecirculation sumps.
TherearetwoRBrecirculation sumps.Onesumpsupplies TrainA of theRHRandRB Spray
- pumps, andthesecondsumpsupplies Train B.After theRHR pumps' suctionis aligned totheRBrecirculation
- sumps, theCharging pumpsuction is manually aligned to theRHRpumpdischarge downstream oftheRHRheatexchanger.
Thealignment istrain specific with oneCharging pumptaking suction fromoneRHRpump.
Within 8hours following aLOCA,simultaneous hotlegandcoldlegrecirculationwill be initiated toavoid boronprecipitation inthecoreandtoterminate boiling.
1.4General Description ofContainment SumpStrainers Asstated intheVCSNSUnit1Supplemental
Response
dated February 29,2008,two separate strainer assemblies havebeendesigned andinstalled toaddress RBSpray and RHRsystemrequirements.
Thestrainers wereprovided byAtomic Energy
- Canada, Ltd.
(AECL).
TheRBhastworecirculation
- sumps, SumpA andSumpB,that areinternally separated into twosumppits, oneforRHRandoneforRBSpray, eachofwhichis protected bya commonstrainer assembly against theentryofpotential typesand quantities ofdebris generated astheresult ofhypothetical, postulated LOCApipe break events.
Eachsumpsupports oneredundant train ofRHRandRBSpray equipment.
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Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure TheRHR and RBSpraystrainer modules ineachsumpareinterconnected byacross-duct toallow water toflow fromonemodule totheother, conservatively assuming oneof thestrainer modules becomesblocked bypostulated debris.
Eachstrainer assembly is composed ofa single squaremodule, theheader box,equipped withforty-four hollow
- fins, eleven oneach ofthefoursides ofthestrainer header box.Thefins areconnected laterally tothe approximately 4.75-foothighsides oftheheader boxlocated directly over eachsumppit.
Thefins are ofvaried length andaredesigned tofit within theavailable spaceinthesump.Each vertically oriented strainer finconsists of18gaugestainless steel
- sheet, perforated with nominal 0.0625-inch diameter holes.
Theperformance ofthe strainer isenhanced bythe extremely lowapproach velocity totheperforated fins ofless than0.1inch/second.
Thearea ratio ofholes isabout 41percent, andthesurfaces of thefins arecorrugated toincrease their surface area.Asthewaterlevel rises inthe strainer during
- filling, air canescape through thefins andthrough theventholes provided atthetopofthestrainer header box.
This design precludes airingestion duetotrapped airpockets during filling.
Asnoted
- above, thedesign ofboththeSumpA and Sump Bstrainers includes aclosed cross ductconnecting theRHRandRBSpray header boxes within thesump.Thecross ductprovides aflow areaapproximately 5inches highby 30inches wideforflow between theinterior ofthetwoheader boxesandisconnected on the sideandnearthetopofthe header boxes.Thecrossductisdesigned andfabricated to thesamecriteria asthe strainers andserves toprovide additional redundancy tothe strainer design forboth SumpAandSumpB.Forapostulated eventwherethefin strainers oneither theRHR ortheRBSpray sides ofthesumpareassumed tobeblocked by debris generated by thepostulated LOCApipe break
- event, theflow into theunblockedstrainer headerbox provides sufficient recirculation flowthrough thecrossducttosatisfy the netpositive suction head(NPSH) requirements forthepumpsonboththeRHRandRB Spray sides ofthat sump.Theheader
- boxes, strainer
- fins, andcross ducts aredesigned, fabricated, andinstalled inaccordance with ASMECodeandSeismic Category 1requirements.
Thesurface areas forthecontainment sumpstrainers aresummarized inTable 2below.
TABLE2 - CONTAINMENT SUMPSTRAINERS SURFACE AREAS SumpA Strainer Surface Area(fta)
Total(ft2)
RHRStrainer
~1404
~2939 RBSpray Strainer
~1534 SumpBStrainer Surface Area(ft2)
Total(ft2)
RHRStrainer
~1251
~2380 RBSpray Strainer
~1129 Page6of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure 2
General Description andSchedule forCorrective Actions NRCIssue:
Provide ageneral description ofactions taken orplanned, anddates foreach.
Foractions planned beyond December 31,2007,reference approved extension requests orexplain howregulatory requirements willbemetasper"Requested Information" Item2(b).
That is,provide ageneral description ofandimplementation schedule forallcorrective
- actions, including anyplant modifications, thatyouidentified while responding tothis generic letter.
Efforts toimplement theidentified actionsshould beinitiated nolater thanthefirst refueling outagestarting after April 1,2006. Allactions should becompleted by December 31,2007.Provide justification fornotimplementingtheidentified actions during thefirst refueling outage startingafter April 1,2006.Ifall corrective actions will not be completed byDecember31,2007,describe how theregulatory requirements discussed intheApplicable Regulatory Requirements section will bemetuntil the corrective actions arecompleted.
D.ESC.Respo.nsel DESCperformed analyses todetermine thesusceptibility of the ECCSandRBSpray systemfunctions forVCSNSUnit1 totheadverse effects of post-accident debris blockage andoperation withdebris-laden fluids.
Theanalyses considered postulated DBAsforwhichtheRB sumprecirculation modeofthesesystems isrequired.
Mechanistic analyses supporting theevaluation satisfied thefollowing areas oftheNRC approved methodology intheNuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04-07, "Pressurized Water Reactor SumpPerformance Evaluation Methodology" Guidance Report (GR),
as submitted byNElonMay28,2004(Reference 4.3),
andasmodified bytheNRC Safety Evaluation (SE) dated December 6,2004(Reference 4.4):
BreakSelection Debris Generation andzone ofInfluence Debris Characteristics Latent Debris Debris Transport HeadLoss Vortexing NetPositive Suction HeadAvailable Debris Source Term Structural Analysis Upstream Effects Detailed analyses ofdebris generation andtransport wereperformed toensurea bounding quantity andalimiting mixofdebris areassumed attheRBrecirculation sumps' strainers following a DBA.Theresults oftheanalyses, conservative evaluations, and strainer testing wereusedtodetermine worst-case strainer headlossanddownstream effects.
Chemical effects bench-top tests conservatively assessed thesolubilities and behaviors ofprecipitates andtheapplicability ofindustry dataonthedissolution and precipitation tests ofstation-specific conditions andmaterials.
Reduced-scale testing was Page7of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure performed byAECLandestablished theinfluence ofchemical products onheadloss across the strainer surfaces bysimulating theplant-specific chemical environment present inthe water oftheRBrecirculation sumpsafter aLOCA.
Inaddition, several plant modifications werecompleted forVCSNSUnit1insupport of GSl-191 resolutionincluding thefollowing:
- ThetwoRBrecirculation sumps' original strainers hadasurface areaof23ft2 foreach oftheTrain A andB RHR andRBSpraypumps,withnominal 1/4-inch square openings.
Thestrainerswere replaced with AECLfin-type strainers having surface areasofapproximately 2939 ft2 and2380ft2, withnominal 0.0625-inch circular openings.
- TwelveHighHeadSafety injection (HHSI) throttlevalves werereplaced with Flowserve Pressure-Combo valves.
These valves feature anoutlet flownozzle that takes upmostoftherequired pressure drop for theflow
- balance, permitting thevalve tohaveadequate clearance forthe downstream effects ofdebris.
Theminimum valve opening basedontheECCSflow balancing criteria isapproximately 0.0938 inches compared tothe0.0625-inch screen openings.
- Twovertical trash rackgateswereinstalled intheRB annulus onthe412-foot elevation.
Thegates arelocated oneither sideofthe recirculation sumps tostoplarge debris fromentering thesumparea.
Thegates have8-inch openings toallow smaller material topassthrough.
Thegatesareanon-deterministic design feature added to enhance thesumpdesign basedontheguidance provided inSection 1.1.1.3of Regulatory Guide1.82, Revision 3(Reference 4.5).
Nocredit istaken for these gates intheGSl-191 analysis.
Inaddition tothemodifications listed
- above, thefollowing actions werecompleted in support ofGSl-191 resolution:
- AnASTLOCADoseAnalysis LARwassubmitted andapproved forVCSNSUnit 1to address adownstream effects analysis concern regarding pumpsealbackup bushing failures.
Incorporating theASTanalysis into thelicensing basis eliminated thepump sealbackup bushing failure fromthedoseanalysis
- basis, thereby addressing the concern.
- Latent debris sampling wascompleted andestablished a105-pound load that includes a 50percent margin.
Walkdowns forunqualified material werealsocompleted consistent withNEl02-01(Reference 4.6).
A design input of200ft2 sacrificial area wassetbasedonthewalkdowns.
- Debris generation anddebris transport analyses werecompleted andincluded theuse ofcomputer-aided design (CAD) modeling oftheRBandtarget insulation.
Thedebris Page8of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure transport analyses usedcomputational fluid dynamic (CFD) modeling anddebris transport trees toestablishdebris loading atthestrainers.
Ex-vesseldownstream effects analysis wascompleted perPWROGWCAP-16406-P, Revision 1(Reference 4.7),
withaugmented datafromWCAP-16571-P (Reference 4.8).
Application of WCAP-16571-P wasreviewed andapproved bytheNRC.
Chemical effects testing was performedanddatawas collected atvarious temperatures andflow rates.
Thestrainerheadloss supported NPSHcalculations.
TheRHRpumpandRBSpray pump NPSHvalues werecalculated at700Fconsistent with theoriginal design basis.
No credit wastaken forsubcooling.
Theupdated RHR andRBSpray PumpNPSHmargins are asfollows:
TABLE3 UPDATEDRHRANDRB SPRAY PUMPSNPSHMARGINS PumpFlow NPSHRequired NPSHAvailableNPSHMargin Rate[gpm)
[ft)
[ft)
[ft)
RHRPumpA 4300 17 20.2 3.2 RHRPumpB 4200 16 20.8 4.8 RBSpray PumpA 3300 17 22.1 5.1 RBSpray PumpB 3300 17 21.9 4.9 A cumulative effects program was established fortabulating, controlling, and evaluating changes toquantities ofinsulation inside theRB. This included the development ofacalculation listing
- thetype, location, andquantities ofinsulation.
- A cumulative effects program wasestablished fortabulating, controlling, and evaluating changes toquantities ofunqualified coatings inside theRB.This included thedevelopment ofacalculation listing
- thetype, location, andquantities ofunqualified coatings.
A Level 1coatings program wasestablished fortheRBthat includes thetracking of qualified coatings within a4Dzone ofInfluence (zOI).
To ensurethemodifications implemented andtheanalyses performed effectively addressed uncertainties withsufficient
- margin, thefollowing margins andconservatisms wereincorporated into theGSl-191 corrective actions asdetailed below:
TheTemp-Mat debris loading casehasthegreatest fiber loadatthestrainers.
The Page9of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure transport calculations conservatively assume10percent erosion.
- However, thetested erosion rates wereinthe1percent range.
Marinite XL insulation isinstalled around theRCSlooppiping inside theprimary shield wall.
With the pipe whipwithin theshield
- wall, theMarinite XLisassumed tobe100 percent particulate with allfiber
- released, andalltheMarinite XLisassumedto transport tothesump strainer.
- Thechemical debris load includes a100ft2 operating margin outofatotal of320ft2 ofaluminum inside theRB.
- Eachstrainer ineachRBrecirculation sumpprovides asuction source foranRHR pumpandanRBSpray pump.The flow andassociated fiber totheRBSpray nozzles will notenterthereactor vessel onthe first passthrough thestrainer.
Theflow rates with twotrains operating areasfollows:
TABLE4-FLOWSPLITWITHTWOOPERATING TRAINS RHRFlow[gpm)
Spray Flow [gpm)
Train A
3669 3300 Train B
3590 3300
- Flowinthebottom ofthereactor vessel isdirected upthrough thecoreand through holes inthebaffle former plates.
Eachformer plate isprovided with holes so that flow travels upthrough theformer plates.
Ifflow through thecorebecomes restricted, flow will continue through theformer plate holes thereby providing flow tothetopof the coreplate.
Thiscorebypass flow will provide somelevel ofcorecooling.
Resolution ofDownstream Effects-FuelandVessel:
This item isdispositioned inSection 3.nbelow.
Withthecompletion ofthedownstream effects analysis forthefuel andvessel detailed
- below, DESChasresolved theissues identified inGL2004-02 forVCSNSUnit 1andis incompliance with theapplicable regulations.
3 Specific Information forReviewAreas Asstated intheVCSNSUnit 1GL2004-02 Supplemental
Response
dated February 29, 2008(ADAMS Accession No.ML080640545),
asamended onNovember 29,2009 (ADAMS Accession No.ML093360336),
December 17,2010(ADAMS Accession No.
Page10of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure ML103610171),
andMay16,2013(ADAMS Accession No.ML13140A007),
review areas 3.athrough 3.m havebeenaddressed forVCSNSUnit 1;therefore, only theoutstanding review areas 3.n through 3.pareaddressed inthis submittal.
3.nDownstream Effects
- FuelandVessel NRCIssue:
Theobjective ofthe downstream
- effects, fuel andvessel section istoevaluate theeffects that debris carried downstream of the containment sumpscreen andinto thereactor vessel hasoncorecooling.
Showthattheinvessel effects evaluation isconsistent with, orboundedby,the industry generic guidance (WCAP-16793),
as modified byNRCstaff commentson that document.
Briefly summarize the application ofthemethods.Indicate wherethe WCAPmethods werenotusedorexceptions were takenandsummarize the evaluation ofthose areas.
DESCRes.ponse; TRWCAP-17788-P, Rev.1,(Reference 4.9) provides evaluation methods andresults to address in-vessel downstream effects.
Asdiscussed inNRC"Technical Evaluation Report ofIn-Vessel Debris Effects,"
(ADAMS Accession No.ML19178A252),
theNRC staff hasperformed adetailed review ofWCAP-17788.
Although theNRC staffdidnot issue a Safety Evaluation forWCAP-17788, asdiscussed further in"U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff ReviewGuidance forin-Vessel Downstream Effects Supporting ReviewofGeneric Letter 2004-02 Responses" (ADAMS Accession No.
(Reference 4.10),
thestaff expects manyofthemethods developed in theTRmaybeusedbyPWRlicensees todemonstrate adequate LTCC.DESCused methods andanalytical results developed inWCAP-17788-P, Rev.1,toaddress in-vessel downstream debris effects forVCSNSUnit 1andhasevaluated theapplicability ofthe methods andanalytical results fromWCAP-17788-P, Rev.1,forVCSNSUnit 1.
3.n.1W DESChasapplied theNEIclean plant criteria todetermine theamount offibrous debris penetrating thesumpstrainers foruseinthedownstream in-vessel debris effects analysis forVCSNSUnit1.Theclean plant
- criteria, asapplied toin-vessel
- effects, utilize afiber penetration (bypass) fraction of45%andadebris transport fraction of75%.
Todetermine theappropriate debris loading touseforthein-vessel debris effects
- analysis, themassoffiber that penetrates thestrainer andisfree totravel into theSIand RBSpray systems wasdetermined.
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Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure Sourcesof fiber intheVCSNSUnit 1RBareTemp-Mat exposed
- blankets, large
- pieces, fines, andlatent fiber.
Considering thequantities ofthese fiber
- sources, thefiber load thatcould bypass thestrainersandtransport tothecoreinlet wasdetermined by evaluating the latent debris sourcesandthelarge pieces andfines originating fromTemp-Matblankets (including erosion). Thefollowing stepswereperformed todetermine the total fiber load forusein the strainer bypass calculation:
- Determine the totalquantity offibrous insulation debris generated inthebounding
- break, fiber fines andlatent fiber.
- Determine thequantity oferosion products created during aLOCAat8hoursinto theeventfromexposed insulation blankets andsmall pieces ofTempMat.
- Addthebreak-generated fiber tothe amount offiber created byerosion to determine thetotal fiber load.
Analysis fiber fines andlatent fiber TheRCSA Loop31"crossover line double-ended guillotine break creates thelargest amountoffibrous
- debris, 15.49ft3.
Table5 breaks downtheamount ofTemp-Mat destroyed aseither large pieces orfines:
TABLE5 - TEMPMATFIBROUSINSULATION DEBRISSOURCETERM
- CASE1LBLOCA Large Pieces Fines Amount Destroyed Intact Exposed Small Amount Size BlanketsBlankets Pieces 15.49 ft3 5.27ft3 4,96ft3 4,j8ft3 1.08ft3 2.95E-05ft (34%)
(32%)
(27%)
NEl04-07(Reference 4.3) classifies thedestroyed insulation debris created into two categories:
fines andlarge pieces.
Fines include individual fibers andsmall pieces less than4inches
- x4inches, andlarge pieces include material 4inches andlarger.
Thissize distribution isusedformaterials forwhichdebris generation dataisprovided inNEl04-07,with theexception ofhigh-density fiberglass andreflective metal insulation materials.
Thetotal fiber loadforevaluation ofin-vessel effects consists oferoded large Temp-Mat pieces (4.96 ft3 fromexposed blankets and4.18ft3 fromsmall pieces) andfines (1.08 ft3),
Fines areconservatively considered tocompletely passthrough thesumpstrainers, so thefiber loadof1.08ft3 isaddedtothefiber created through erosion oflarge pieces of Page12of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure Temp-Mat toestablish thetotal fiber load tobeusedforin-vessel debris effects.
NEl04-07,Table Vl-1, notesthat intact blankets arenotsubject toerosion andcanbeexcluded fromthe fiber strainer bypass calculation.
Thiscalculation ofVCSNSUnit 1downstream in-vessel effects used theWCAP-17788-Pmethodology whichonlyrequires consideration offibrous andchemicalproduct debris.
Thismethod bounds allparticulate
- loads, soitwasnotnecessary toconsider particulate debris intheevaluation.
Converting thevolume of Temp-Mat fines fiber toIbm:1.08ft3
- j1,glbm/ft3
= 12,74lbm, TheRBlatent debris loadingused intheGSl-191 sumpevaluation wasconservatively determined tobe105Ibm(which includes significant margin).
PertheNRCSERforNEl 04-07(Reference 4.4),
thesize distribution oflatent debris isconsidered tobe15%fibrous and85%particulate.
Consequently,the latent fiber loadconsidered inthis calculation is 105Ibmx0.15
= 16lbm.
Therefore, thetotal fiber transported tothe strainers is12.74 Ibm+16Ibm= 28.74Ibm.
FromTable
- 5above, theamountoffiber available for erosion from exposed blankets and small pieces ofTemp-Mat isequal to:
Temp-Mat (exposed blankets)
+Temp-Mat (small pieces)
= 4.96 ft3 + 4,18 ft3
= g,14fj3 TheNRCSERforNEl04-07(Reference 4.4) includes thefollowingequation forthe calculation ofthepercentage oferoded fiber (feroaea) generated fromthe small pieces and exposed Temp-Mat blankets:
feroasa
= 1
- (1
- rate)number ofhours Using anerosion rateof0.3%fromNEl04-07 andtheVCSNSUnit 1HotLegSwitchover (HLSO) timeof8hours intheaboveequation, thepercentage oferoded fines generated atHLSOwould be:
ferodea
= 1-(1-0.003)8
= 0.02375
= 2.375%
Applying theerosion percentage totheamountofexposed blankets andsmall pieces of Temp-Mat insulation:
Erosion fines fromTemp-Mat exposed blankets
= 4.96ft3
- 2.375%
= 0.118 ft3 Erosion fines fromTemp-Mat small pieces
= 4.18ft3
- 2.375%
= 0.0993 ft3 Page13of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure Therefore, atotalof0.218ft3(
= 0.118ft3
+0.0993ft3)
Oferoded fines wasaddedtothe total fiber load thatreachesthesumpstrainers.
Converting 0.218ft3 10lbm 0.218ft3
- jj,glbm/ft3
= 2.57Ibm Total fiber transported tothe strainers
= Eroded Fines
+Temp-Mat Fines
+Latent Debris (fiber)
Total fiber transported tostrainers= 2.57 Ibm+ 12.74Ibm+16lbm= 31.31lbm Theamountoffibrous debris calculatedto arrive atthereactor vessel wasdetermined for VCSNSUnit1bycalculating thestrainer bypass usingtheNElclean plant 45%bypass factor.
g/FA=(M
- T*CF* P)/N where:g/FA
= gramsoffiber perfuel assembly M= massoftransported andlatent
- fiber, including erosion products T = transport fraction tostrainer CF= conversion fromIbmtograms P= strainer fiber bypass
- fraction, and N= numberoffuel assemblies Thegramsoffiber perfuel assembly (g/FA) forVCSNSUnit 1wascalculated using the equation above.
Thisequation accounts forthefiber debris source termsatthestrainer being fiber frominsulation, erosion
- fines, andlatent debris (Reference 4.1).
Theg/FAforVCSNSUnit 1wasdetermined using thefollowing values:
M= massoftransported andlatent
- fiber, including erosion products
= 31.31 Ibm T = transport fraction tostrainer
= 0.75(DESC didnotapply thetransport factor of0.75foraddedconservatism.)
CF= conversion fromlbmtograms
= 453.6 grams/lbm P = strainer fiber bypass fraction
= 0.45(Reference 4.2)
N= numberoffuel assemblies
= 157assemblies Page14of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure Using the clean plant 45%strainer bypass
- fraction, thecalculated gramsperfuel assembly is:
g/FA
= (31.31
- 453.6
- 0.45)
/157
= 40.71 or40.7g/FA ThisistheVCSNS Unit 1 specificin-vessel fiber loadthatwill becompared tothe applicable WCAP-17788-P, Rev.1,in-vessel debris acceptance criterion, which assumes all fibrous debris calculated topenetrate thestrainer will reach thereactor core.
Conservatisms intheabove calculation include thefollowing:
. Theentire 16Ibmoflatent fiberload was assumedtoreach thestrainer.
The75%transport factor wasnotapplied when calculatingthefiber loadforin-vessel debris
- effects, i.e.,
100%ofthefiber load was assumed totransport tothestrainer.
- Allfines, particulate, transportable miscellaneous debris(tags,
- labels, etc.),
eroded
- fines, andlatent debris wereassumed totransport inunity(100%)
totherecirculation sumpswith anequal fraction toeachrespective sump.
3.n.2 VCSNSUnit 1isaWestinghouse 3-loop upflow barrel/baffleconfiguration plant design.
PerSection 3.0oftheNRCStaff ReviewGuidance (Reference 4.10), itisnecessary to confirm VCSNSUnit1 iswithin thekeyparameters oftheWCAP-17788-P, Rev.1, methods andanalysis.
Eachofthekeyparameters isdiscussed below.
3.n.3F.uel Desjign TheVCSNSUnit 1coreconsists of157VANTAGE+17x17optimized fuel assemblies (OFAs)
Asdocumented inWCAP-17788-P, Volume 1,Table RAl-1.1-1, this fuel design wasincluded intheWCAPtesting program.
SincetheVCSfuelassembly typewas
- tested, thecoreinlet debris loaddoesnotrequire adjustment orscaling toaccount for differences between theastested andVCSNSUnit 1OFAs.
3.n.4WCAP-17788 Debris Limit TheProprietary total in-vessel (core inlet andheatedcore) fibrous debris limit contained inSection 6.5ofWCAP-17788-P, Volume1,Rev.1,applies toVCSNSUnit1 3.n.5 Asdescribed inSection 3.n.1 ofthis submittal, VCSNSUnit1assumesthatallfibrous debris calculated topenetrate thestrainer reaches thereactor vessel.
Page15of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure 3.n.6 Asshowninthesump strainer fiber penetration section (3.n.1),
themaximumamountof fiber forVCSNSUnit 1calculated topotentially reach thereactor vessel is40.7g/FA, which isless than the proprietary in-vesselfibrous debris limit provided inSection 6.5of WCAP-17788-P, Volume 1, Rev.
1, 3.n.7Confirmation that theCore InletFiber AmountisLessthantheWCAP-17788-P R.eL1 Thresho.Ld VCSNSUnit 1isa Westinghouse 3-loop upflow barrel/baffle configuration design with Westinghouse VANTAGE+17x17OFAs.
The applicable WCAP-17788-P,Rev.1,core inlet fiber threshold isprovided inTable 6-3 for Westinghouse fuel.
Thecoreinlet fiber amountforVCSNSUnit 1iscalculated tobe40.7 g/FA, which isless thantheapplicable WCAP-17788-P, Rev.1,coreinlet fiber threshold.
3.n.8 r
Greater TheSSOtimeformaximumECCSflow(using thedesign basis RB Spray pumpflow rate of3,000gpm/pump forLOCApressure andtemperature) is1460 sec, or24.4minutes.
TheSSOtimewith amaximum RBSpray pumpflow of3381gpmresulting fromanoverfill oftheRWSTwhenthecontainment backpressure
- is0psig, is1382 sec, or23.0minutes.
BothSSOtimes aregreater thanthe20minutes assumed inTable 6-1of WCAP-17788-P,Rev.1,Volume4.
3.n.9 Chemical precipitation timing isdependent ontheplant
- buffer, sumppool pH,volume and temperature, anddebris typesandquantities.
Table 4.4-1 ofPWROG-16073 (Reference 4.11) identifies TestGroup 11asrepresentative ofVCSNSUnit 1,therefore, thepredicted chemical precipitation timing (tchem) is24hours.
3.n.10 Confirmation thatChemical Effects will notOccurEarlier thanLatest Timeto M
PerSection 6.2.1.3 oftheVCSNSUnit 1Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR),
switchover tohotlegrecirculation occurs nolater than8hoursafter eventinitiation (post-LOCA) to mitigate thepotential forboric acidprecipitation, which isless than24hours.
Page16of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure 3.n.11 VCSNS Unit 1 isaWestinghouse 3-loop baffle/barrel upflow configuration design.
Based onWCAP-17788-P, Rev.1,Volume 1,Table 6-1,tblock forVCSNSUnit 1is143minutes.
3.n.12 Confirmation that Chemical Effects donotOccurPrior totblock PerTable4.4-1 ofPWROG-16073 (Reference4.11),
theearliest timeofchemical precipitation forVCSNS Unit 1was determined tobe24hours, which isgreater thanthe applicable tbiock value of143minutes.
3.n.13 DesigrLC.at.egoJy VCSNSUnit 1hasarated thermal power of2900 MWt.VCSNSUnit 1isaWestinghouse 3-loop design; therefore, theapplicable analyzed thermal poweris3658MWtasprovided inWCAP-17788-P, Rev.1,Volume 4,Table 6-1. The VCSNS Unit 1rated thermal power islessthantheanalyzed power; therefore, this parameter isbounded bytheWCAP-17788-P, Rev.1,alternate flow pathanalysis.
3.n.14 VCSNSUnit 1isa3-loop Westinghouse upflow barrel/baffle configuration design.The Proprietary analyzed AFPresistance isprovided inTable 6-1ofWCAP-17788-P, Volume 4,Rev.1.TheProprietary VCSNSUnit 1specific AFPresistance isprovided inTable RAl-4.2-24.
TheVCSNSUnit 1specific AFPresistance isless thanthe analyzed value; therefore, theVCSNSUnit 1AFPresistance isbounded bytheresistance applied tothe AFPanalysis.
3.n.15W VCSNSUnit 1isaWestinghouse upflow barret/baffle configuration design.
TheAFP analysis forWestinghouse upflow plants analyzed a range ofECCSrecirculation flow rates asshowninTable 6-1ofWCAP-17788-P, Volume 4,Rev.1,Theminimum VCSNS Unit1ECCSrecirculation flowrateanalyzed is21.9gpm/FA, andthemaximumECCS recirculation flowrateis37.7gpm/FA.
TheVCSNSUnit 1ECCSrecirculation flowrate corresponding tothemostlimiting fiber injection hotlegbreak scenario is22.7gpm/FA.
Therefore, allofthese flowrates arewithin therange ofECCSrecirculation flowrates considered intheAFPanalysis.
Page17of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure 3.n.16 Summ.ary Thecomparison ofkeyparameters usedintheWCAP-17788 AFPanalysis totheVCSNS Unit 1specific values issummarized inTable 6.Basedonthese comparisons, VCSNS Unit1 isbounded by thekeyparameters;therefore, theWCAP-17788 methods and results areapplicable.
TABLE6
- KEYPARAMETER VALUESFORIN-VESSEL DEBRISEFFECTS V.C.Summer WCAP-17788 Parameter Nuclear Station Evaluation Value Unit1Value MaximumTotal In-Volume1
< WCAP-17788 Maximumin-vessel fiber loadis V sselFiber Load Section 6.5 Value less thanWCAP-17788 limit.
MaximumCoreinletVolume 1
Maximum coreinlet fiber loadis 40.7 Fiber Load(g/FA)
Table 6-3 lessthan WCAP-17788 threshold.
Later switchover timeresults ina Minimum Sump lower decay heatatthetimeof Switchover Time 20 23 debris arrival, reducing the (min) potentialfor debris inducedcore uncovery and heatup.
Potential for complete coreinlet Minimum Chemical blockage duetochemical product 2.4(tblock) 24(tchem)
Precipitate Time(hr) generation would occur much later thanassumed.
MaximumHotLeg Latest hotlegswitchover occurs Switchover Time 24(tchem) 8 Well before theearliest potential (hr) chemical product generation.
Rated Thermal Lowerrated thermal powerresults 3658 2900 Power(MWr) inlower decayheat.
AFPresistance isless thanthe Maximum AFP Volume 4
Volume 4
Resistance, ft4 Table 6-1 Table RAl-4.2-24 analyzed
- value, whichincreases theeffectiveness oftheAFP.
ECCSrecirculation flow rate ECCSRecirculation Volume 4
corresponding tothemostlimiting M.7
@erinWonhotlegWeak Flow(gpm/FA)
Table 6-1 scenario iswithin theanalyzed flowrange.
Page18of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure 3.o Chemical Effects NRCIssue:
Theobjective ofthe chemical effects section istoevaluate theeffect thatchemical precipitates haveonhead lossandcorecooling.
1)Provide asummaryofevaluation resultsthat showthat chemical precipitates formed inthepost-LOCA containment environment, either bythemselves orcombined with
- debris, donotdeposit atthe sump screen totheextent that anunacceptable headloss
- results, ordeposit downstream of the sump screen totheextent that long-term core cooling isunacceptably impeded.
DESCResponse; TheVCSNSUnit1chemical effects analysis ofthe sump strainerswassubmitted inits Supplemental
Response
datedFebruary 29,2008 and further supplemented byletters datedNovember 29,2009andDecember 17,2010. The VCSNS Unit 1sumpstrainer chemical effects analysis isunchanged.
3.p Licensing Basis NRCIssue:
Theobjective ofthelicensing basis section istoprovide informationregarding any changes totheplant licensing basis duetothesumpevaluation orplant modifications.
1)Provide theinformation requested inGL04-02Requested Information Item 2(e) regarding changes totheplant licensing basis.
Theeffective dateforchanges tothe licensing basis should bespecified.
Thisdateshould correspond tothat specified inthe 10CFR50.59 evaluation forthechange tothelicensing basis.
DE CResp.onse; License Amendment DESC'sFebruary 29,2008Supplemental
Response
discussed thelicensing basis change forVCSNSUnit 1associated withtheresolution ofthesumpissues considered inGSl-191 andGL2004-02.
Specifically, aLARwassubmitted byletter dated February 17,2009Property "Letter" (as page type) with input value "RC-09-0004, License Amendment Request - LAR 04-02911 License Amendment and Related Technical Specification Changes to Implement Full-scope Alternative Source Term in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.67" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process.(ADAMS Accession No.ML090720887) forNRCreview andapproval insupport oftheresolution ofGSI-191 andNRCGL2004-02.
Asdetailed further
- below, theNRC approved theLAR,andDESCimplemented theapproved license amendment forVCSNS Page19of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure Unit1.
Specifically, theLARimplemented an alternative source termapplication methodology foranalyzing theradiological consequences forsixdesign-basis accidents.
TheASTamendment eliminatedtheneedtoassumeapassive failure ofapumpseal at 24hours afteran accident asrequired bytheprevious licensing basis doseanalysis.
This eliminated a concern regarding theuseofcarbon/graphite disaster bushings inpump seals.
Withnoprimary seal failureassumption intheASTlicensing basis doseanalysis, there wasnodesignrequirement tolimit thepumpsealleakage to50gpm,andthe carbon/graphite disasterbushings werenolonger required tobereplaced.
TheNRCapproved theLARfor VCSNS Unit 1inAmendment No.183dated October 4,
2010(ADAMS Accession No.ML102160020).
Final Safety Analysis Report TheVCSNSUnit 1FSARwaspreviouslyupdated todescribetheinstallation ofthenew strainers.
DESCwill update thecurrent licensing basis (Final Safety Analysis Report in accordance with10CFR50.71(e))
following NRC acceptance ofthefinal supplemental response forVCSNSUnit 1.
4 References 4.1 Letter fromJ.Butler (NEl) toS.Bailey (NRC) dated December 22,2011, Transmittal ofGSl-191 Resolution Criteria for"LowFiber" Plants (with enclosure)
(ADAMS Accession Numbers ML113570219 andML113570226).
4.2 Letter fromW.Ruland(NRC) toJ.Butler (NEl) datedMay2,2012,NRC Review ofNuclear Energy Institute CleanPlant Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ADAMS Accession NumberML120730181).
4.3 NEl04-07, Revision 0,"Pressurizer Water Reactor SumpPerformance Evaluation Methodology,"
May28,2004.
4.4 NRCSERforNEl04-07,"Safety Evaluation bytheOffice ofNuclear Reactor Regulation Related toNRCGeneric Letter 2004-02, Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance Report (Proposed Document NumberNEl04-07),
'Pressurized Water Reactor SumpPerformance Evaluation Methodology',"
dated December 6,2004.
4.5 NRCRegulatory Guide1.82, "Water Sources forLong-Term Recirculation Cooling Following aLoss-of-Coolant Accident,"
November 2003.
4.6 NEl02-01, Revision 1,"Condition Assessment Guidelines:
Debris Sources Inside PWRContainments."
Page20of21
Serial No.21-017 Docket No.50-395 GL2004-02 Final Supplemental
Response
Enclosure 4.7 PWROG WCAP-16406-P, Revision 1,"Evaluation ofDownstream SumpDebris Effects inSupport ofGSI-191."
4.8 WCAP-16571-P, "Test ofPumpandValve Surfaces toAssess theWear fromPaint Chip Debris Laden Water."
4.9 WCAP-17788-P, Rev. 1,"Comprehensive Analysis andTestProgram forGSl-191 Closure (PA-SEE-1090),"
December 2019.
4.10NRCStaff Review Guidance for In-Vessel Downstream Effects Supporting Review ofGeneric Letter 2004-02 Responses, ADAMSAccessions No.ML19228A011, September 2019.
4.11PWROG-16073-P, Rev.0,"TSTF-567 Implementation
- Guidance, Evaluation ofIn-Vessel Debris
- Effects, Submittal Template forFinal
Response
toGeneric Letter 2004-02 andFSARChanges,"
February 2020.
Page21of21