|
---|
Category:Letter type:RC
MONTHYEARRC-22-0004, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - 2021 Annual Letter of Certification and Testing Results of the Public Alerting System2022-01-14014 January 2022 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - 2021 Annual Letter of Certification and Testing Results of the Public Alerting System RC-18-0157, (Vcsns), Units 1, 2 and 3 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Order Approving Indirect Transfer of Control of Operating License and Combined Licenses2018-12-28028 December 2018 (Vcsns), Units 1, 2 and 3 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Order Approving Indirect Transfer of Control of Operating License and Combined Licenses RC-18-0149, ISFSI - Order Approving Indirect Transfer of Control of Operating License and Combined Licenses2018-12-21021 December 2018 ISFSI - Order Approving Indirect Transfer of Control of Operating License and Combined Licenses RC-18-0136, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request to Remove the Expired One-Time Extension to Surveillance Frequency 4.3.3.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation and to Remove the Index from Technical Specifications (LAR-18-04683)2018-12-12012 December 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request to Remove the Expired One-Time Extension to Surveillance Frequency 4.3.3.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation and to Remove the Index from Technical Specifications (LAR-18-04683) RC-18-0144, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) for Cycle 252018-11-20020 November 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) for Cycle 25 RC-18-0126, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Notification of an Intended Change a Commitment Date for Open Phase Condition (OPC) Made in RC-17-01692018-11-0909 November 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Notification of an Intended Change a Commitment Date for Open Phase Condition (OPC) Made in RC-17-0169 RC-18-0070, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-14, Use of a Performance Based Testing Frequency for Pressure Isolation Valves as an Alternative to the Requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code for ...2018-10-0808 October 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-14, Use of a Performance Based Testing Frequency for Pressure Isolation Valves as an Alternative to the Requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code for ... RC-18-0067, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - License Amendment Request - LAR-16-00644 - Revise Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.2.22018-10-0808 October 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - License Amendment Request - LAR-16-00644 - Revise Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.2.2 RC-18-0123, NRC Request for Information Baseline Radiation Safety Inspection2018-10-0404 October 2018 NRC Request for Information Baseline Radiation Safety Inspection RC-18-0117, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 3.1: Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment2018-09-28028 September 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 3.1: Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment RC-18-0112, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request for License Amendment to Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.8.2, D.C. Sources - Operating, Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.B.2 and 4.8.2.1.C.32018-09-27027 September 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request for License Amendment to Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.8.2, D.C. Sources - Operating, Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.B.2 and 4.8.2.1.C.3 RC-18-0119, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Supplement to License Amendment Request LAR-18-03422, Request for a One-Time Extension to the Surveillance Frequency 4.3.3.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation2018-09-19019 September 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Supplement to License Amendment Request LAR-18-03422, Request for a One-Time Extension to the Surveillance Frequency 4.3.3.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation RC-18-0118, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-18, Request for a Temporary Non-Code Repair of a Service Water System Flange2018-09-14014 September 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-18, Request for a Temporary Non-Code Repair of a Service Water System Flange RC-18-0116, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request for a One-Time Extension to the Surveillance Frequency 4.4.4.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation - Response to Request for Additional Information2018-09-11011 September 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request for a One-Time Extension to the Surveillance Frequency 4.4.4.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation - Response to Request for Additional Information RC-18-0113, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Supplement to License Amendment Request LAR-18-03422 Request for a One-Time Extension to the Surveillance Frequency 4.3.3.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation2018-08-31031 August 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Supplement to License Amendment Request LAR-18-03422 Request for a One-Time Extension to the Surveillance Frequency 4.3.3.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation RC-18-0091, License Amendment Request - LAR-16-01490 National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 Program Revisions2018-08-29029 August 2018 License Amendment Request - LAR-16-01490 National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 Program Revisions RC-18-0111, License Amendment Request LAR-18-03422 Request for a One-Time Extension to the Surveillance Frequency 4.3.3.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation2018-08-24024 August 2018 License Amendment Request LAR-18-03422 Request for a One-Time Extension to the Surveillance Frequency 4.3.3.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation RC-18-0100, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Technical Specification Change Request for the Revision of the Surveillance Frequency of the Turbine Trip Functional Unit: Response to Request for Additional Information2018-08-22022 August 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Technical Specification Change Request for the Revision of the Surveillance Frequency of the Turbine Trip Functional Unit: Response to Request for Additional Information RC-18-0105, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-17, Request to Utilize Code Case N-513-3 'Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Division 1' for a Service Water ..2018-08-14014 August 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-17, Request to Utilize Code Case N-513-3 'Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Division 1' for a Service Water .. RC-18-0102, Withdrawal of Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Correct an Administrative Error2018-08-10010 August 2018 Withdrawal of Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Correct an Administrative Error RC-18-0098, (Vcsns), Units 1, 2 and 3 - Modification of Requested Latest Completion Date in Application for Order Approving Indirect Transfer of Control of Operating License and Combined Licenses2018-07-30030 July 2018 (Vcsns), Units 1, 2 and 3 - Modification of Requested Latest Completion Date in Application for Order Approving Indirect Transfer of Control of Operating License and Combined Licenses RC-18-0085, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Notification of an Intended Change to a Commitment Made in RC-17-01262018-07-23023 July 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Notification of an Intended Change to a Commitment Made in RC-17-0126 RC-18-0090, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-16, Request for Alternative to Implement Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Response to Request...2018-07-12012 July 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-16, Request for Alternative to Implement Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Response to Request... RC-18-0089, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-16, Request for Alternative to Implement Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping2018-07-11011 July 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-16, Request for Alternative to Implement Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping RC-18-0084, Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-15, Request for Alternative to Implement Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Laws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Response to Requ2018-07-0303 July 2018 Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-15, Request for Alternative to Implement Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Laws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Response to Reques RC-18-0082, Relief Request RR-4-15, Request for Alternative to Implement Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping2018-07-0303 July 2018 Relief Request RR-4-15, Request for Alternative to Implement Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping RC-18-0079, Vigil C. Summer Nuclear Station (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Correct an Administrative Error2018-06-29029 June 2018 Vigil C. Summer Nuclear Station (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Correct an Administrative Error RC-18-0074, Change of the Commitment Date of DRIB/105A&B Door Submittal2018-06-18018 June 2018 Change of the Commitment Date of DRIB/105A&B Door Submittal RC-18-0060, (VCSNS) - Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Correct Administrative Error2018-05-30030 May 2018 (VCSNS) - Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Correct Administrative Error RC-18-0064, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Annual Commitment Change Summary Report2018-05-18018 May 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Annual Commitment Change Summary Report RC-18-0063, Submittal of 10 CFR 72.48 Biennial Report for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation2018-05-0202 May 2018 Submittal of 10 CFR 72.48 Biennial Report for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation RC-18-0056, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Licensee Event Reports (2016-001-02, 2016-002-01, 2016-003-02) - Revision to Correct Typographical Errors2018-04-25025 April 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Licensee Event Reports (2016-001-02, 2016-002-01, 2016-003-02) - Revision to Correct Typographical Errors RC-18-0059, Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2018-04-25025 April 2018 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report RC-18-0046, License Amendment Request LAR-14-01541 Integrated Leak Rate Test Peak Calculated Containment Internal Pressure Change Request for Additional Information2018-04-19019 April 2018 License Amendment Request LAR-14-01541 Integrated Leak Rate Test Peak Calculated Containment Internal Pressure Change Request for Additional Information RC-18-0036, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-13, Use of a Risk-Informed Process as an Alternative for the Selection of Class 1 and Class 2 Piping Welds - Response to Request for Additional Information2018-04-0202 April 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-13, Use of a Risk-Informed Process as an Alternative for the Selection of Class 1 and Class 2 Piping Welds - Response to Request for Additional Information RC-18-0041, Report of Status of Decommissioning Funding2018-03-28028 March 2018 Report of Status of Decommissioning Funding RC-17-0175, Correction to Amendment No. 170 Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Correct Administrative Error2018-01-31031 January 2018 Correction to Amendment No. 170 Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Correct Administrative Error RC-18-0006, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Re Application for Order Approving Indirect Transfer of Control of Operating License and Combined Licenses2018-01-25025 January 2018 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Re Application for Order Approving Indirect Transfer of Control of Operating License and Combined Licenses RC-17-0169, Notification of an Intended Change of a Commitment Date for Open Phase Condition Made in RC-14-00192017-12-11011 December 2017 Notification of an Intended Change of a Commitment Date for Open Phase Condition Made in RC-14-0019 RC-17-0182, (VCSNS) - Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Information and Status2017-12-11011 December 2017 (VCSNS) - Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Information and Status RC-17-0172, Notification of Personnel Changes2017-11-30030 November 2017 Notification of Personnel Changes RC-17-0161, Submittal of Change of the Commitment Date of DRIB/105A&B Door2017-11-28028 November 2017 Submittal of Change of the Commitment Date of DRIB/105A&B Door RC-17-0135, Annual Commitment Change Summary Report2017-11-0303 November 2017 Annual Commitment Change Summary Report RC-17-0123, Relief Request RR-4-13, Use of a Risk-Informed Process as an Alternative for the Selection of Class 1 and Class 2 Piping Welds2017-10-30030 October 2017 Relief Request RR-4-13, Use of a Risk-Informed Process as an Alternative for the Selection of Class 1 and Class 2 Piping Welds RC-17-0140, Transmittal of 10 CFR 50.59 Biennial Report2017-10-23023 October 2017 Transmittal of 10 CFR 50.59 Biennial Report RC-17-0107, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Integrated Leak Rate Test Peak Calculated Containment Internal Pressure Change2017-10-0606 October 2017 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Integrated Leak Rate Test Peak Calculated Containment Internal Pressure Change RC-17-0134, Response to Request for Supplemental Information, License Amendment Request - LAR-15-01424; Implementation of WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 12017-09-27027 September 2017 Response to Request for Supplemental Information, License Amendment Request - LAR-15-01424; Implementation of WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1 RC-17-0126, Reply to a Notice of Violation, Per Inspection Report 05000395/20170022017-09-0606 September 2017 Reply to a Notice of Violation, Per Inspection Report 05000395/2017002 RC-17-0112, Special Report (Spr) 2017-007 Regarding Waste Gas Holdup System Explosive Gas Monitoring System Being Inoperable for Greater than Thirty Days2017-09-0101 September 2017 Special Report (Spr) 2017-007 Regarding Waste Gas Holdup System Explosive Gas Monitoring System Being Inoperable for Greater than Thirty Days RC-17-0069, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Quality Assurance Approval Certificate No. 0479, Transmittal of the Quality Assurance Program Description2017-08-30030 August 2017 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Quality Assurance Approval Certificate No. 0479, Transmittal of the Quality Assurance Program Description 2022-01-14
[Table view] Category:License-Application for Facility Operating License (Amend/Renewal) DKT 50
MONTHYEARML23233A1762023-08-17017 August 2023 Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390 ML23233A1742023-08-17017 August 2023 Appendix E, Applicants Environmental Report Subsequent Operating License Renewal License Stage ML23233A1752023-08-17017 August 2023 Application for Subsequent Renewed Operating License ML23233A1722023-08-17017 August 2023 Application for Subsequent License Renewal August 2023 ML23159A2332023-06-0808 June 2023 License Amendment Request - Emergency Response Organization Augmentation Time Change, Emergency Operations Facility Relocation and Other Emergency Plan Changes ML22242A1642022-08-31031 August 2022 Vcsummer, Unit 1 FOL - Amd 222 Corrected Pages ML22146A0272022-05-25025 May 2022 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-554, Revise Reactor Coolant. ML22115A1042022-04-22022 April 2022 License Amendment Request- Technical Specifications Nozzle Blockage Testing Requirement Change for Reactors Building Spray System ML22115A0602022-04-22022 April 2022 Application for Technical Specification Change TSTF-491, Removal of Main Steam and Main Feedwater Valve Isolation Times from Technical Specifications Using Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process ML21147A3772021-05-27027 May 2021 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Proposed Amendment to Relocate Unit Staff Qualification from Technical Specifications to Quality Assurance Program Description (QAPD) ML21102A1272021-04-0909 April 2021 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frquency Requirements to Licensee-Controlled Program ML21063A0012021-04-0909 April 2021 Issuance of Amendment No. 218 to Modify Techncial Specifcation 3.6.4, Contaiment Isolation Valves ML20121A1852020-04-30030 April 2020 License Amendment Request LAR-20-142 - Request for Technical Specification Change Technical Specification 3.6.4, Containment Isolation Valves ML19323E9522019-11-19019 November 2019 (Vcsns), Unit 1 License Amendment Request to Revise the Company Name - Supplement ML19053A5442019-02-22022 February 2019 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Supplemental Letter to License Amendment Request - LAR-16-00644 License Amendment Request - Revise Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.2.2 RC-18-0136, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request to Remove the Expired One-Time Extension to Surveillance Frequency 4.3.3.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation and to Remove the Index from Technical Specifications (LAR-18-04683)2018-12-12012 December 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request to Remove the Expired One-Time Extension to Surveillance Frequency 4.3.3.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation and to Remove the Index from Technical Specifications (LAR-18-04683) RC-18-0067, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - License Amendment Request - LAR-16-00644 - Revise Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.2.22018-10-0808 October 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - License Amendment Request - LAR-16-00644 - Revise Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.2.2 RC-18-0112, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request for License Amendment to Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.8.2, D.C. Sources - Operating, Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.B.2 and 4.8.2.1.C.32018-09-27027 September 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request for License Amendment to Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.8.2, D.C. Sources - Operating, Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.B.2 and 4.8.2.1.C.3 RC-18-0113, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Supplement to License Amendment Request LAR-18-03422 Request for a One-Time Extension to the Surveillance Frequency 4.3.3.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation2018-08-31031 August 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Supplement to License Amendment Request LAR-18-03422 Request for a One-Time Extension to the Surveillance Frequency 4.3.3.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation RC-18-0091, License Amendment Request - LAR-16-01490 National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 Program Revisions2018-08-29029 August 2018 License Amendment Request - LAR-16-01490 National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 Program Revisions RC-18-0111, License Amendment Request LAR-18-03422 Request for a One-Time Extension to the Surveillance Frequency 4.3.3.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation2018-08-24024 August 2018 License Amendment Request LAR-18-03422 Request for a One-Time Extension to the Surveillance Frequency 4.3.3.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation RC-18-0079, Vigil C. Summer Nuclear Station (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Correct an Administrative Error2018-06-29029 June 2018 Vigil C. Summer Nuclear Station (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Correct an Administrative Error RC-18-0060, (VCSNS) - Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Correct Administrative Error2018-05-30030 May 2018 (VCSNS) - Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Correct Administrative Error ML18092B5102018-03-29029 March 2018 (VCSNS) - Administrative License Amendment Request to Correct the Typographical Error in TS Table 6.2-1 Minimum Shift Crew RC-17-0107, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Integrated Leak Rate Test Peak Calculated Containment Internal Pressure Change2017-10-0606 October 2017 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Integrated Leak Rate Test Peak Calculated Containment Internal Pressure Change RC-16-0092, License Amendment Request LAR-12-02439, Technical Specification 3.5.4, Limiting Condition for Operation Refueling Water Storage Tank2016-08-29029 August 2016 License Amendment Request LAR-12-02439, Technical Specification 3.5.4, Limiting Condition for Operation Refueling Water Storage Tank RC-16-0059, License Amendment Request LAR 12-02439, Technical Specification Change Request for TS 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)2016-04-28028 April 2016 License Amendment Request LAR 12-02439, Technical Specification Change Request for TS 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) RC-16-0039, Exigent License Amendment Request - LAR (16-00848), Technical Specification Change Request for Emergency Feedwater System Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.1.2 Action B - Response to Request for Additional..2016-03-0303 March 2016 Exigent License Amendment Request - LAR (16-00848), Technical Specification Change Request for Emergency Feedwater System Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.1.2 Action B - Response to Request for Additional.. RC-15-0171, License Amendment Request - LAR-15-01424, Implementation of WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1 - Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times.2015-12-16016 December 2015 License Amendment Request - LAR-15-01424, Implementation of WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1 - Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times. RC-15-0113, License Amendment Request LAR-08-001, 62Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF)-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation2015-09-29029 September 2015 License Amendment Request LAR-08-001, 62Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF)-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation RC-15-0109, License Amendment Request - LAR 14-02981, Proposed Revision to Technical Specification 6.0, Administrative Controls.2015-07-22022 July 2015 License Amendment Request - LAR 14-02981, Proposed Revision to Technical Specification 6.0, Administrative Controls. ML14261A2762014-09-18018 September 2014 Draft September 23, 2014, Category 1 Public Meeting with V. C. Summer - Draft License Amendment Related to Approval of the Technical Support Center RC-14-0112, License Amendment Request - LAR-12-04269 License Basis Changes in Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis2014-08-27027 August 2014 License Amendment Request - LAR-12-04269 License Basis Changes in Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis RC-14-0032, Virgil C. Summer Unit 1, License Amendment Request LAR-14-02392, Request for NRC Approval of Proposed Changes to Emergency Action Levels. Attachment I: Analysis of Proposed Emergency Action Levels Enclosed2014-04-0707 April 2014 Virgil C. Summer Unit 1, License Amendment Request LAR-14-02392, Request for NRC Approval of Proposed Changes to Emergency Action Levels. Attachment I: Analysis of Proposed Emergency Action Levels Enclosed ML14122A1562014-04-0707 April 2014 License Amendment Request LAR-14-02392, Request for NRC Approval of Proposed Changes to Emergency Action Levels. Attachment I: Analysis of Proposed Emergency Action Levels Enclosed RC-13-0188, License Amendment Request - LAR-13-01414, License Amendment Request to Change the Completion Date of Implementation Milestone 8 Response to Request for Additional Information2013-12-20020 December 2013 License Amendment Request - LAR-13-01414, License Amendment Request to Change the Completion Date of Implementation Milestone 8 Response to Request for Additional Information RC-13-0037, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1, License Amendment Request - LAR (13-00705) Technical Specification Change to Extend Integrated Leak Rate Test Frequency to 15 Years2013-04-0303 April 2013 Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1, License Amendment Request - LAR (13-00705) Technical Specification Change to Extend Integrated Leak Rate Test Frequency to 15 Years ML13095A1092013-04-0303 April 2013 License Amendment Request - LAR (13-00705) Technical Specification Change to Extend Integrated Leak Rate Test Frequency to 15 Years RC-13-0034, License Amendment Request - LAR (11-02281) Technical Specification Change to Add an Exception to Specification 3.0.4 in Technical Specification 3/4.7.6 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS)2013-04-0303 April 2013 License Amendment Request - LAR (11-02281) Technical Specification Change to Add an Exception to Specification 3.0.4 in Technical Specification 3/4.7.6 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) RC-13-0047, License Amendment Request - LAR 12-03567, Application to Revise Tech Specs to Adopt TSTF-510, Revision to Steam Generator Program Inspection Frequencies and Tube Sample Selection, Using Consolidated Line Item Improvement..2013-04-0202 April 2013 License Amendment Request - LAR 12-03567, Application to Revise Tech Specs to Adopt TSTF-510, Revision to Steam Generator Program Inspection Frequencies and Tube Sample Selection, Using Consolidated Line Item Improvement.. RC-13-0048, License Amendment Request - LAR 12-06014 Changes to Snubber Surveillance Requirements2013-04-0202 April 2013 License Amendment Request - LAR 12-06014 Changes to Snubber Surveillance Requirements RC-13-0037, Permanent ILRT Interval Extension Risk Impact Assessment2013-03-0101 March 2013 Permanent ILRT Interval Extension Risk Impact Assessment ML12030A0352012-02-22022 February 2012 Issuance of Amendment Regarding Reporting Requirements ML12047A1462012-02-0101 February 2012 NPDES Permits No. SC0030856 Renewal Application RC-11-0157, License Amendment Request LAR 11-04821, Request for Prior NRC Approval to Exempt Five-High-Head Safety Injection Containment Isolation Valves from Local Leak Rate Testing Requirements2011-10-12012 October 2011 License Amendment Request LAR 11-04821, Request for Prior NRC Approval to Exempt Five-High-Head Safety Injection Containment Isolation Valves from Local Leak Rate Testing Requirements RC-11-0063, License Amendment Request - LAR 11-01774, Application to Eliminate License Condition 2.G.1 Requiring Reporting of Violations of Section 2.C of the Operating License Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP)2011-08-23023 August 2011 License Amendment Request - LAR 11-01774, Application to Eliminate License Condition 2.G.1 Requiring Reporting of Violations of Section 2.C of the Operating License Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP) RC-11-0104, License Amendment Request - LAR (10-03107) Proposed Change in Administrative Controls Section to Allow the Use of Westinghouse WCAP-12472-P-A, Addendum 1-A2011-08-11011 August 2011 License Amendment Request - LAR (10-03107) Proposed Change in Administrative Controls Section to Allow the Use of Westinghouse WCAP-12472-P-A, Addendum 1-A RC-11-0052, License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-513, Revision 3, Revise PWR Operability Requirements and Actions for RCS Leakage Instrumentation.2011-05-0202 May 2011 License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-513, Revision 3, Revise PWR Operability Requirements and Actions for RCS Leakage Instrumentation. RC-11-0062, V. C. Summer, License Amendment Request - LAR 04-02961, License Amendment Request for Slave Relay Surveillance Testing2011-04-18018 April 2011 V. C. Summer, License Amendment Request - LAR 04-02961, License Amendment Request for Slave Relay Surveillance Testing RC-11-0006, License Amendment Request - LAR-10-03108, Proposed Change to Relocate Administrative Control Requirements Related to Quality Assurance and Submittal of Quality Assurance Program Description (QAPD)2011-03-18018 March 2011 License Amendment Request - LAR-10-03108, Proposed Change to Relocate Administrative Control Requirements Related to Quality Assurance and Submittal of Quality Assurance Program Description (QAPD) 2023-08-17
[Table view] Category:Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARML22353A5462022-12-19019 December 2022 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Alternative Request to Defer ASME Code Section XI Inservice Inspection Examinations for Pressurizer and Steam Generator Pressure-Retaining Welds and Full Penetration Welded Nozzles Response to Request ML22300A2202022-10-27027 October 2022 (VCSNS) Unit 1, Alternative Request Rr-4-26 Application for Alternative Request - Extension of Steam Generator Primary Inlet Nozzle Dissimilar Metal Weld Inspection Interval (Volumetric Examination) RAI ML22020A2262022-01-20020 January 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information to License Amendment Request LAR-20-203 Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency ML21180A4052021-06-29029 June 2021 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Supplement to Request for Additional Information Regarding RF-25 Stem Generator Tube Inspection Report ML21168A2612021-06-17017 June 2021 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-water Reactors - Final Supplemental Response ML21154A1802021-06-0303 June 2021 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding RGF-25 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML21007A3232021-01-0707 January 2021 License Amendment Request LAR-20-142 Request for Technical Specification Change Technical Specification 3.6.4, Containment Isolation Valves Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) ML21007A3402021-01-0707 January 2021 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - License Amendment Request LAR-20-176 Update of Analytical Method to the Core Operating Limits Report with the Full Spectrum Loss of Coolant Accident Approach - Response to Request for Additional Info ML20349A3262020-12-14014 December 2020 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding RF-24 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML19282E2612019-10-0909 October 2019 Response to Follow-Up Question to PRA RAI 03, License Amendment Request - LAR-16-01490 NFPA 805 Program Revisions ML19224B1152019-08-12012 August 2019 Response to NRC Follow-Up Question PRA RAI 03, License Amendment Request - LAR-16-01490 NFPA 805 Program Revisions ML19119A3652019-04-29029 April 2019 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - License Amendment Request - LAR-16-01490, NFPA 805 Program Revisions: Response to Request for Additional Information ML19071A3572019-03-11011 March 2019 Request for License Amendment to Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.8.2., D.C. Sources - Operating, Surveillance Requirements 4.8.2.1.b.2 and 4.8.2.1.c.3 - Request for Additional Information RC-18-0116, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request for a One-Time Extension to the Surveillance Frequency 4.4.4.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation - Response to Request for Additional Information2018-09-11011 September 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Request for a One-Time Extension to the Surveillance Frequency 4.4.4.6 of the Core Exit Temperature Instrumentation - Response to Request for Additional Information RC-18-0100, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Technical Specification Change Request for the Revision of the Surveillance Frequency of the Turbine Trip Functional Unit: Response to Request for Additional Information2018-08-22022 August 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Technical Specification Change Request for the Revision of the Surveillance Frequency of the Turbine Trip Functional Unit: Response to Request for Additional Information RC-18-0090, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-16, Request for Alternative to Implement Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Response to Request...2018-07-12012 July 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-16, Request for Alternative to Implement Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Response to Request... RC-18-0084, Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-15, Request for Alternative to Implement Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Laws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Response to Requ2018-07-0303 July 2018 Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-15, Request for Alternative to Implement Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Laws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Response to Reques RC-18-0046, License Amendment Request LAR-14-01541 Integrated Leak Rate Test Peak Calculated Containment Internal Pressure Change Request for Additional Information2018-04-19019 April 2018 License Amendment Request LAR-14-01541 Integrated Leak Rate Test Peak Calculated Containment Internal Pressure Change Request for Additional Information RC-18-0036, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-13, Use of a Risk-Informed Process as an Alternative for the Selection of Class 1 and Class 2 Piping Welds - Response to Request for Additional Information2018-04-0202 April 2018 (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-13, Use of a Risk-Informed Process as an Alternative for the Selection of Class 1 and Class 2 Piping Welds - Response to Request for Additional Information RC-17-0134, Response to Request for Supplemental Information, License Amendment Request - LAR-15-01424; Implementation of WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 12017-09-27027 September 2017 Response to Request for Supplemental Information, License Amendment Request - LAR-15-01424; Implementation of WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1 RC-17-0093, License Amendment Request - LAR-15-01424 Implementation of WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1 - Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times, Response To.2017-07-0606 July 2017 License Amendment Request - LAR-15-01424 Implementation of WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1 - Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times, Response To. RC-17-0088, Implementation of WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1 - Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times - Response to Request for Additional Information2017-06-22022 June 2017 Implementation of WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1 - Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times - Response to Request for Additional Information RC-17-0032, Spent Fuel Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident2017-03-30030 March 2017 Spent Fuel Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident ML17087A1512017-03-28028 March 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information on VC Summer Sfpli RC-17-0019, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request LAR-15-01424, Implementation of WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 12017-02-0606 February 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request LAR-15-01424, Implementation of WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1 RC-16-0147, VC Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Response to Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools Pursuant to Title 10 9f the Code of Federal Regulations 05.54(f)2016-11-0303 November 2016 VC Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Response to Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools Pursuant to Title 10 9f the Code of Federal Regulations 05.54(f) ML16235A2422016-08-18018 August 2016 Response to Request for Information for Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection RC-16-0091, Response to Request for Additional Information on Relief Request RR-III-12 Proposed Alternative Inspection Requirements for Piping Welds2016-06-0202 June 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information on Relief Request RR-III-12 Proposed Alternative Inspection Requirements for Piping Welds RC-16-0077, Relief Request RR-III-12, Proposed Alternative Inspection Requirements for Piping Welds - Response to Request for Additional Information2016-05-0606 May 2016 Relief Request RR-III-12, Proposed Alternative Inspection Requirements for Piping Welds - Response to Request for Additional Information RC-16-0046, Response to Request for Additional Information on Relief Request RR-III-2, Proposed Alternative Inspection Requirements for Piping Welds2016-03-18018 March 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information on Relief Request RR-III-2, Proposed Alternative Inspection Requirements for Piping Welds RC-16-0036, License Amendment Request - LAR-15-01424 - Implementation of WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1, Response to Request for Supplemental Information2016-03-0707 March 2016 License Amendment Request - LAR-15-01424 - Implementation of WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1, Response to Request for Supplemental Information RC-16-0031, License Amendment Request - LAR-12-04269, License Basis Changes in Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis Supplement Response2016-03-0404 March 2016 License Amendment Request - LAR-12-04269, License Basis Changes in Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis Supplement Response RC-16-0039, Exigent License Amendment Request - LAR (16-00848), Technical Specification Change Request for Emergency Feedwater System Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.1.2 Action B - Response to Request for Additional..2016-03-0303 March 2016 Exigent License Amendment Request - LAR (16-00848), Technical Specification Change Request for Emergency Feedwater System Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.1.2 Action B - Response to Request for Additional.. RC-16-0001, V.C. Summer, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012, Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order EA-12-051) and Responses to Requests for Additional Information2016-01-22022 January 2016 V.C. Summer, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012, Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order EA-12-051) and Responses to Requests for Additional Information RC-16-0006, Response to Request for Additional Information to License Amendment Request - LAR-12-04269, License Basis Changes in Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis2016-01-14014 January 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information to License Amendment Request - LAR-12-04269, License Basis Changes in Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis RC-15-0186, Response to Request for Information (NRC Inspection Report No. 05000395/2015404)2015-11-11011 November 2015 Response to Request for Information (NRC Inspection Report No. 05000395/2015404) IR 05000395/20154042015-11-11011 November 2015 V.C. Summer, Unit 1 - Response to Request for Information (NRC Inspection Report No. 05000395/2015404) RC-15-0160, Response to Request for Information (NRC Inspection Report No. 05000395/2015404)2015-09-25025 September 2015 Response to Request for Information (NRC Inspection Report No. 05000395/2015404) ML15310A0762015-09-21021 September 2015 Response to Request for Information to Support the Cyber Security Inspection RC-15-0142, License Amendment Request, LAR 12-04269, License Basis Changes in Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis, Response to Request for Additional Information2015-09-10010 September 2015 License Amendment Request, LAR 12-04269, License Basis Changes in Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis, Response to Request for Additional Information RC-15-0116, Response to NRC Request for Information Baseline Radiation Safety Inspection2015-07-13013 July 2015 Response to NRC Request for Information Baseline Radiation Safety Inspection 2022-12-19
[Table view] |
Text
George A. Lippard Vice President, Nuclear Operations 803.345.4810 March 3, 2016 A SCANA COMPANY RC-1 6-0039 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir!/Madam:
Subject:
VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS) UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 EXIGENT LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST - LAR (16-00848)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST FOR THE EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 ACTION b - RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Reference:
SCE&G Letter from George A. Lippard to NRC Document Control Desk, "Technical Specification Change Request for the Emergency Feedwater System Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.1.2 Action b," dated March 1, 2016 (ML16062A368)
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G), acting for itself and as an agent for South Carolina Public Service Authority pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.91, submitted a request for an exigent amendment to Technical Specifications (TS) per the referenced letter.
NRC review of this License Amendment Request determined that additional information was required. A request for additional information (RAI) was issued by email and discussed per teleconference on March 3, 2016.
The Attachment provides the VCSNS response to the RAIs.
This letter contains no new commitments. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Bruce Thompson at (803) 931-5042.
V.C.Summer N~uclear Station.* P.O0.
Box 88.* en kinsville, SC. 29065.* F(803) 941-9776 / -oo I
Document Control Desk RC-I16-0039 CR-I16-00848 Page 2 of 2 I certify under penalty of perjury that the information contained herein is true and correct.
E:xecuted on Geor* .Lpar WLT/GAL/ts Attachment c: K. B. Marsh S. A. Williams S. A. Byrne NRC Resident inspector J. B. Archie K. M. Sutton N. S. Carns P. Ledbetter J. H. Hamilton S. E. Jenkins J. W. Williams NSRC W. M. Cherry RTS (CR-I16-00848)
C. Haney File (813.20)
PRSF (RC-16-0039)
Document Control Desk Attachment RC-I16-0039 CR-I16-00848 Page 1 of 7 VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS)
DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 Attachment VCSNS Response to Request for Additional Information RAI-SBPB-01:
- a. Describe ifthe IPTE is still be considered for the performance of STP-120.006 and describe the nuclear safety benefit for this activity.
- b. Based on the response to item a, describe the "other controls in place' that benefit nuclear plant safety if an IPTE is not considered.
VCSNS Response to RAI-SBPB-01:
- a. This evolution will be designated as an Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution (IPTE).
An IPTE requires a member of Station Management to conduct a pre-job briefing emphasizing key aspects of the evolution. For this evolution, the additional requirements for Critical Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions (CIPTE) will be implemented. The Management Duty Supervisor (MDS) will be designated to provide additional management oversight assistance during the evolution.
Below is an excerpt from SAP-123, "Procedure Use and Adherence," describing the content of the brief.
INFREQUENTLY PERFORMED TESTS OR EVOLUTIONS (IPTE)
A. The Shift Manager or discipline supervisor (or designee), as appropriate, shall conduct a pre-job brief with personnel prior to the performance of an Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution. The following areas should be discussed:
- 1. Scope of the activity and the flowpath.
- 2. Cautions and limitations.
Document Control Desk Attachment RC-I16-0039 CR-I16-00848 Page 2 of 7
- 3. Expected plant response.
- 4. Termination criteria.
- 5. Restoration steps.
CRITICAL INFREQUENTLY PERFORMED TESTS OR EVOLUTIONS (CIPTE)
A. The General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations (GMNPO), or his designee, shall brief operating and testing personnel on management expectations prior to the performance of Critical Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions.
B. In addition to steps above, the following areas should be discussed:
- 1. The need for exercising caution and conservatism during the test
... or evolution, particularly when uncertainties are encountered.
- 2. Emphasis on maintaining the highest margins of safety, to place proper perspective on any sense of urgency that may otherwise prevail.
- 3. Assigned responsibilities for the activity and any deviation from the normal shift duties and accountabilities.
- 4. The need for open communications.
- 5. Application of lessons learned from pertinent in-house and industry operating experience to assist personnel involved with the test or evolution in internalizing these lessons.
- 6. The need to stop the test (or stop power ascension, decrease power, trip the reactor, etc.) when unexpected conditions arise or unexplained plant behavior is experienced.
C. The GMNPO, or his designee, will determine whether it is appropriate to designate a manager, senior to the Shift Manager, for oversight of a particular test or evolution:
- 1. If such a manager is deemed appropriate, this manager shall have the authority and experience to exercise continuous responsibility.
- 2. This authority should include control of the pace of the test or evolution and the resolution (or escalation) of problems encountered.
Document Control Desk Attachment RC-1 6-0039 CR-I16-00848 Page 3 of 7
- b. Since this test will be considered an IPTE with the additional requirements of a CIPTE applied, a response is not required.
RAI-SBPB-02:
- a. Describe if the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time allowance to placing the plant into hot standby has adequate margin to allow a controlled reactor shutdown without initialing a reactor trip.
Include the amount of time acceptable to perform a controlled shutdown.
- b. Describe the time line that supports the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time allowance, given worst case components noted above (18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> for the accumulator check valve).
VCSNS Response to RAI-SBPB-02:
- a. Conservatism is built into this timeline and there is adequate margin to conduct a controlled reactor shutdown without initiating a reactor trip. The worst case timeline results from failing the initial test, replacing an air accumulator check valve, subsequently failing the post-repair test, and then initiating shutdown. The ACTION statement will be entered when the test is initiated, with the pressure drop test interval for the flow control valve commencing within 15 minutes. Station In-Service Testing (IST) Engineering has provided guidance and psi/mai pressure drop criteria for test personnel to determine if the leakrate will exceed acceptance criteria after the first 15 minutes. The test setup opens the air vent valve just upstream of the check valve; therefore, excessive check valve leakage will be detectable at that vent. Based on these times, it is reasonable to assume that a test failure and check valve leakage would be detected within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of entering the ACTION statement.
The worst case repair time, based on check valve replacement, is 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> (see item b.
below). This time, however, assumes the post-maintenance check valve leakrate is acceptable and the re-test takes 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This scenario postulates unacceptable post-maintenance check valve leakage, which would be detected within the first hour of the re-test. Therefore, this time is conservative by 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> in addition to the 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> of conservatism inherent in the repair time. The response to question (b.) below describes this repair timeline.
The amount of time typically allotted at the station for a controlled shutdown to Hot Standby is 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The most limiting timeline for compliance with the proposed ACTION, based on the worst-case repair activity is shown in Table 1.
Document Control Desk Attachment RC-1 6-0039 CR-i16-00848 Page 4 of 7 Table 1 Time to perform the initial, unsatisfactory, air drop test 1 hr Time to complete worst-case repair (includes 4 hr re-test) 18 hr Time to shutdown to Mode 3, assuming repair is unsuccessful 3 hr Total time for ACTION compliance (1 hr + 18 hr + 3 hr) 22 hr
- b. The accumulator check valves are installed in 1/2 inch schedule 40, carbon steel piping by threaded connections at either end of the check valve body. On one of the three flow control valves, a union connection is in-line with the check valve allowing replacement without cutting or welding. On the other two flow control valves, replacement of their respective check valves requires cutting and re-welding a 90 degree socket-weld elbow connection adjacent to the check valve. The repair time estimate provided by Maintenance Planning is 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for the check valve replacement and associated welding. In developing the LAR, this time was conservatively increased, to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Before the check valve can be replaced, a lock-out/tag-out (LOTO) on the flow control valve supply air must be hung by Operations to isolate the piping from the air supply and provide a vent path. The required LOTO boundary consists of the two instrument air supply isolation valves and the air accumulator vent valve, all located at the flow control valve. The time required for Operations to hang this LOTO and authorize the replacement work is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. After the repair is complete, Operations will then need to clear the LOTO, which also requires less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to complete. For the timeline submitted in this LAR, it was conservatively assumed that 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> would be incurred both before the repair and after repair to bound the LOTO times and account for any other coordination issues that might occur.
The post-maintenance testing required for replacement of the check valve consists of visual examination (VT), non-ASME Section Xl external leakage test at normal pressure, and re-performance of the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> pressure test STP-1 20.006. STP-1 20.006 is estimated to require 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to perform, allowing 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in addition to the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> test interval for test setup and restoration. Station In-Service Testing (1ST) Engineering has provided guidance and psi/mmn pressure drop criteria for test personnel to determine ifthe leakrate will exceed acceptance criteria after the first 15 minutes of testing.
Given these estimates, the total time expected for a wor'st case repair is 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> (3hr+
8hr + 3hr +4hr). Based on the conservatisms in the LOTO and repair times, there is 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> (2hr + 2hr + 3hr) of margin in this timeline.
Document Control Desk Attachment RC-I16-0039 CR-I16-00848 Page 5 of 7 RAI-SBPB-O3:
- a. Provide specific details of how the flow control valves are tested.
- b. Describe if each of the three flow controls valves share any air accumulators.
- c. Describe the risk and or benefit for testing all three flow control valves (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> hold time) at power verses testing each of the three flow control valves individually.
VCSNS Response to RAI-SBPB-03:
- a. STP-120.006 Revision 7F currently allows testing the valves simultaneously or one at a time (Precaution 2.2). Motor driven flow control valve closure in Modes 1-3 requires entry into LCO Action Statement 3.7.I.2.b (Precaution 2.1). Performance in Modes 1, 2, or 3 also requires both Diesel Generators be operable with no maintenance or testing in progress on either diesel generator. A Pre-Job brief is conducted to stress Human Performance Tool use. Following the brief, an AS FOUND equipment lineup is performed and test instrumentation is installed. If a flow control valve is closed (Normally open at power, refer to TS SR 4.7.1 .2.a.4), it is opened. With the flow control valve open, the non-safety related air supply to the accumulator is isolated. Air is slowly bled-off upstream of the safety-related check valve constituting the boundary between the safety related (accumulator) and non-safety air systems. The flow control valve is then closed using air from the safety-related air accumulator, and once closed, the drop test is conducted for a period of three hours. Test acceptance is based on meeting established pressure drop (PSI/HR) criterion and the valve being held in the closed position for the three hour test duration. Subsequent to test completion, manipulated valves are restored'to their pre-test positions, the flow control valve is re-opened, and field standards are removed.
- b. The flow control valves do not share an accumulator. The emergency feedwater system Design Basis Document (Section 2.4.2.2) notes that a safety class control air accumulator (XTK-3531, 3541, 3551-EF) is provided for each Motor-Driven Pump Flow Control Valve. Station Drawings B-817-056, Sheets 1 and 2, detail the tubing and subcomponents associated with each motor driven and turbine driven emergency feedwater pump flow control valve.
- c. The risk of testing all three control valves simultaneously has two elements. The first element is the increased risk in core damage associated with maintaining all three flow control valves closed with control air removed. In the plant risk model (EQOS), this configuration is functionally equivalent to removing both motor driven emergency feedwater pumps from service, leaving the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump as the only safety related source of shutdown feedwater. The difference in risk from testing 3 valves at once compared to testing 1 valve at a time (in series) is tied to the heat sink function of the valves. The comparison is shown in Table 2. This is due to the availability of the remaining two steam generator flowpaths from the motor driven pumps, providing additional defense in depth for the heat sink function when only one valve is undergoing test or maintenance.
Document Control Desk Attachment RC-1 6-0039 CR-1 6-00848 Page 6 of 7 Table 2 Risk Comparison of Testing Valves in Parallel or in Series Number of valves EOOS 1 .0E-06 Time to complete Cumulative CDF tested CDF Time, hours testing, hours Change to complete concurrently Factor ________________testing 1 1.62 4562.6 72 (three 24 hr 1 .58E-08
____________ tests)___ __________
367.2 42.7 24 5.62E-07 The second risk element is due to the potential for having multiple valve failures and repairs to manage simultaneously. With approval of this LAR, the station will avoid this risk and increased CDF exposure by performing the test on only one valve at a time, entering and exiting the ACTION statement for each valve test.
RAI-SBPB-04:
Describe the defense-in-depth and protection for other safety trains and supporting structures, systems, and components (SSCs) appropriate to maintain the safety function of EFW during testing. Include discussion for your consideration of the following:
- a. Describe if during the performance of the three flow control valve test (all at the same time) if one dedicated operator is required or three dedicated operators are required.
- b. Describe the actions for 'a' above and if these actions will be added to the surveillance test.
- c. Describe if any electrical buses will be operable (verses available) and protected in support of this test including the turbine driven EFW pump such as direct current buses for valves and governor controls.
- d. Describe all other defense-in-depth, special operator training, and protected equipment strategies that are necessary for the performance of Surveillance Test Procedure (STP)-
120.006, such as feed and bleed SSCs and just-in time operator training.
- VCSNS Response to RAI-SBPB-04:
- a. Only one valve will be tested at a time, therefore one dedicated operator stationed at the flow control valves will be sufficient to perform local manual valve operation, if required.
- b. The actions required to restore functionality to a flow control valve during this test are to close the two air vent valves previously opened, and open the air isolation valve previously closed. These actions are described in STP-120.006, Enclosure A, "Tech Spec/EOOS/Functionality Review." There will be a dedicated local operator stationed at
Document Control Desk Attachment RC-I16-0039 CR-I16-00848 Page 7 of 7 the flow control valves. The dedicated operator is required to be briefed on these actions prior to the test.
- c. The station will protect the following equipment per OAP-1 14.1: the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and both emergency diesel generators. Switchyard work that places the plant in a grid risk condition will be restricted. As stated within the referenced letter, the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump room is normally locked closed. All engineered safety features busses will be operable during the performance, up to and including instrument busses for valve control.
- d. Operators are trained on local manual operation of these valves. Operators are trained on initiation of bleed and feed during a loss of Heat Sink, within the requalification training matrix of every two years. All required operator actions credited in PRA insights are within the scope of continuous operator training, at regular intervals, therefore no specialized training is required.
George A. Lippard Vice President, Nuclear Operations 803.345.4810 March 3, 2016 A SCANA COMPANY RC-1 6-0039 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir!/Madam:
Subject:
VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS) UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 EXIGENT LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST - LAR (16-00848)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST FOR THE EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 ACTION b - RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Reference:
SCE&G Letter from George A. Lippard to NRC Document Control Desk, "Technical Specification Change Request for the Emergency Feedwater System Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.1.2 Action b," dated March 1, 2016 (ML16062A368)
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G), acting for itself and as an agent for South Carolina Public Service Authority pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.91, submitted a request for an exigent amendment to Technical Specifications (TS) per the referenced letter.
NRC review of this License Amendment Request determined that additional information was required. A request for additional information (RAI) was issued by email and discussed per teleconference on March 3, 2016.
The Attachment provides the VCSNS response to the RAIs.
This letter contains no new commitments. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Bruce Thompson at (803) 931-5042.
V.C.Summer N~uclear Station.* P.O0.
Box 88.* en kinsville, SC. 29065.* F(803) 941-9776 / -oo I
Document Control Desk RC-I16-0039 CR-I16-00848 Page 2 of 2 I certify under penalty of perjury that the information contained herein is true and correct.
E:xecuted on Geor* .Lpar WLT/GAL/ts Attachment c: K. B. Marsh S. A. Williams S. A. Byrne NRC Resident inspector J. B. Archie K. M. Sutton N. S. Carns P. Ledbetter J. H. Hamilton S. E. Jenkins J. W. Williams NSRC W. M. Cherry RTS (CR-I16-00848)
C. Haney File (813.20)
PRSF (RC-16-0039)
Document Control Desk Attachment RC-I16-0039 CR-I16-00848 Page 1 of 7 VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS)
DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 Attachment VCSNS Response to Request for Additional Information RAI-SBPB-01:
- a. Describe ifthe IPTE is still be considered for the performance of STP-120.006 and describe the nuclear safety benefit for this activity.
- b. Based on the response to item a, describe the "other controls in place' that benefit nuclear plant safety if an IPTE is not considered.
VCSNS Response to RAI-SBPB-01:
- a. This evolution will be designated as an Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution (IPTE).
An IPTE requires a member of Station Management to conduct a pre-job briefing emphasizing key aspects of the evolution. For this evolution, the additional requirements for Critical Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions (CIPTE) will be implemented. The Management Duty Supervisor (MDS) will be designated to provide additional management oversight assistance during the evolution.
Below is an excerpt from SAP-123, "Procedure Use and Adherence," describing the content of the brief.
INFREQUENTLY PERFORMED TESTS OR EVOLUTIONS (IPTE)
A. The Shift Manager or discipline supervisor (or designee), as appropriate, shall conduct a pre-job brief with personnel prior to the performance of an Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution. The following areas should be discussed:
- 1. Scope of the activity and the flowpath.
- 2. Cautions and limitations.
Document Control Desk Attachment RC-I16-0039 CR-I16-00848 Page 2 of 7
- 3. Expected plant response.
- 4. Termination criteria.
- 5. Restoration steps.
CRITICAL INFREQUENTLY PERFORMED TESTS OR EVOLUTIONS (CIPTE)
A. The General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations (GMNPO), or his designee, shall brief operating and testing personnel on management expectations prior to the performance of Critical Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions.
B. In addition to steps above, the following areas should be discussed:
- 1. The need for exercising caution and conservatism during the test
... or evolution, particularly when uncertainties are encountered.
- 2. Emphasis on maintaining the highest margins of safety, to place proper perspective on any sense of urgency that may otherwise prevail.
- 3. Assigned responsibilities for the activity and any deviation from the normal shift duties and accountabilities.
- 4. The need for open communications.
- 5. Application of lessons learned from pertinent in-house and industry operating experience to assist personnel involved with the test or evolution in internalizing these lessons.
- 6. The need to stop the test (or stop power ascension, decrease power, trip the reactor, etc.) when unexpected conditions arise or unexplained plant behavior is experienced.
C. The GMNPO, or his designee, will determine whether it is appropriate to designate a manager, senior to the Shift Manager, for oversight of a particular test or evolution:
- 1. If such a manager is deemed appropriate, this manager shall have the authority and experience to exercise continuous responsibility.
- 2. This authority should include control of the pace of the test or evolution and the resolution (or escalation) of problems encountered.
Document Control Desk Attachment RC-1 6-0039 CR-I16-00848 Page 3 of 7
- b. Since this test will be considered an IPTE with the additional requirements of a CIPTE applied, a response is not required.
RAI-SBPB-02:
- a. Describe if the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time allowance to placing the plant into hot standby has adequate margin to allow a controlled reactor shutdown without initialing a reactor trip.
Include the amount of time acceptable to perform a controlled shutdown.
- b. Describe the time line that supports the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time allowance, given worst case components noted above (18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> for the accumulator check valve).
VCSNS Response to RAI-SBPB-02:
- a. Conservatism is built into this timeline and there is adequate margin to conduct a controlled reactor shutdown without initiating a reactor trip. The worst case timeline results from failing the initial test, replacing an air accumulator check valve, subsequently failing the post-repair test, and then initiating shutdown. The ACTION statement will be entered when the test is initiated, with the pressure drop test interval for the flow control valve commencing within 15 minutes. Station In-Service Testing (IST) Engineering has provided guidance and psi/mai pressure drop criteria for test personnel to determine if the leakrate will exceed acceptance criteria after the first 15 minutes. The test setup opens the air vent valve just upstream of the check valve; therefore, excessive check valve leakage will be detectable at that vent. Based on these times, it is reasonable to assume that a test failure and check valve leakage would be detected within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of entering the ACTION statement.
The worst case repair time, based on check valve replacement, is 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> (see item b.
below). This time, however, assumes the post-maintenance check valve leakrate is acceptable and the re-test takes 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This scenario postulates unacceptable post-maintenance check valve leakage, which would be detected within the first hour of the re-test. Therefore, this time is conservative by 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> in addition to the 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> of conservatism inherent in the repair time. The response to question (b.) below describes this repair timeline.
The amount of time typically allotted at the station for a controlled shutdown to Hot Standby is 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The most limiting timeline for compliance with the proposed ACTION, based on the worst-case repair activity is shown in Table 1.
Document Control Desk Attachment RC-1 6-0039 CR-i16-00848 Page 4 of 7 Table 1 Time to perform the initial, unsatisfactory, air drop test 1 hr Time to complete worst-case repair (includes 4 hr re-test) 18 hr Time to shutdown to Mode 3, assuming repair is unsuccessful 3 hr Total time for ACTION compliance (1 hr + 18 hr + 3 hr) 22 hr
- b. The accumulator check valves are installed in 1/2 inch schedule 40, carbon steel piping by threaded connections at either end of the check valve body. On one of the three flow control valves, a union connection is in-line with the check valve allowing replacement without cutting or welding. On the other two flow control valves, replacement of their respective check valves requires cutting and re-welding a 90 degree socket-weld elbow connection adjacent to the check valve. The repair time estimate provided by Maintenance Planning is 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for the check valve replacement and associated welding. In developing the LAR, this time was conservatively increased, to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Before the check valve can be replaced, a lock-out/tag-out (LOTO) on the flow control valve supply air must be hung by Operations to isolate the piping from the air supply and provide a vent path. The required LOTO boundary consists of the two instrument air supply isolation valves and the air accumulator vent valve, all located at the flow control valve. The time required for Operations to hang this LOTO and authorize the replacement work is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. After the repair is complete, Operations will then need to clear the LOTO, which also requires less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to complete. For the timeline submitted in this LAR, it was conservatively assumed that 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> would be incurred both before the repair and after repair to bound the LOTO times and account for any other coordination issues that might occur.
The post-maintenance testing required for replacement of the check valve consists of visual examination (VT), non-ASME Section Xl external leakage test at normal pressure, and re-performance of the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> pressure test STP-1 20.006. STP-1 20.006 is estimated to require 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to perform, allowing 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in addition to the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> test interval for test setup and restoration. Station In-Service Testing (1ST) Engineering has provided guidance and psi/mmn pressure drop criteria for test personnel to determine ifthe leakrate will exceed acceptance criteria after the first 15 minutes of testing.
Given these estimates, the total time expected for a wor'st case repair is 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> (3hr+
8hr + 3hr +4hr). Based on the conservatisms in the LOTO and repair times, there is 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> (2hr + 2hr + 3hr) of margin in this timeline.
Document Control Desk Attachment RC-I16-0039 CR-I16-00848 Page 5 of 7 RAI-SBPB-O3:
- a. Provide specific details of how the flow control valves are tested.
- b. Describe if each of the three flow controls valves share any air accumulators.
- c. Describe the risk and or benefit for testing all three flow control valves (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> hold time) at power verses testing each of the three flow control valves individually.
VCSNS Response to RAI-SBPB-03:
- a. STP-120.006 Revision 7F currently allows testing the valves simultaneously or one at a time (Precaution 2.2). Motor driven flow control valve closure in Modes 1-3 requires entry into LCO Action Statement 3.7.I.2.b (Precaution 2.1). Performance in Modes 1, 2, or 3 also requires both Diesel Generators be operable with no maintenance or testing in progress on either diesel generator. A Pre-Job brief is conducted to stress Human Performance Tool use. Following the brief, an AS FOUND equipment lineup is performed and test instrumentation is installed. If a flow control valve is closed (Normally open at power, refer to TS SR 4.7.1 .2.a.4), it is opened. With the flow control valve open, the non-safety related air supply to the accumulator is isolated. Air is slowly bled-off upstream of the safety-related check valve constituting the boundary between the safety related (accumulator) and non-safety air systems. The flow control valve is then closed using air from the safety-related air accumulator, and once closed, the drop test is conducted for a period of three hours. Test acceptance is based on meeting established pressure drop (PSI/HR) criterion and the valve being held in the closed position for the three hour test duration. Subsequent to test completion, manipulated valves are restored'to their pre-test positions, the flow control valve is re-opened, and field standards are removed.
- b. The flow control valves do not share an accumulator. The emergency feedwater system Design Basis Document (Section 2.4.2.2) notes that a safety class control air accumulator (XTK-3531, 3541, 3551-EF) is provided for each Motor-Driven Pump Flow Control Valve. Station Drawings B-817-056, Sheets 1 and 2, detail the tubing and subcomponents associated with each motor driven and turbine driven emergency feedwater pump flow control valve.
- c. The risk of testing all three control valves simultaneously has two elements. The first element is the increased risk in core damage associated with maintaining all three flow control valves closed with control air removed. In the plant risk model (EQOS), this configuration is functionally equivalent to removing both motor driven emergency feedwater pumps from service, leaving the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump as the only safety related source of shutdown feedwater. The difference in risk from testing 3 valves at once compared to testing 1 valve at a time (in series) is tied to the heat sink function of the valves. The comparison is shown in Table 2. This is due to the availability of the remaining two steam generator flowpaths from the motor driven pumps, providing additional defense in depth for the heat sink function when only one valve is undergoing test or maintenance.
Document Control Desk Attachment RC-1 6-0039 CR-1 6-00848 Page 6 of 7 Table 2 Risk Comparison of Testing Valves in Parallel or in Series Number of valves EOOS 1 .0E-06 Time to complete Cumulative CDF tested CDF Time, hours testing, hours Change to complete concurrently Factor ________________testing 1 1.62 4562.6 72 (three 24 hr 1 .58E-08
____________ tests)___ __________
367.2 42.7 24 5.62E-07 The second risk element is due to the potential for having multiple valve failures and repairs to manage simultaneously. With approval of this LAR, the station will avoid this risk and increased CDF exposure by performing the test on only one valve at a time, entering and exiting the ACTION statement for each valve test.
RAI-SBPB-04:
Describe the defense-in-depth and protection for other safety trains and supporting structures, systems, and components (SSCs) appropriate to maintain the safety function of EFW during testing. Include discussion for your consideration of the following:
- a. Describe if during the performance of the three flow control valve test (all at the same time) if one dedicated operator is required or three dedicated operators are required.
- b. Describe the actions for 'a' above and if these actions will be added to the surveillance test.
- c. Describe if any electrical buses will be operable (verses available) and protected in support of this test including the turbine driven EFW pump such as direct current buses for valves and governor controls.
- d. Describe all other defense-in-depth, special operator training, and protected equipment strategies that are necessary for the performance of Surveillance Test Procedure (STP)-
120.006, such as feed and bleed SSCs and just-in time operator training.
- VCSNS Response to RAI-SBPB-04:
- a. Only one valve will be tested at a time, therefore one dedicated operator stationed at the flow control valves will be sufficient to perform local manual valve operation, if required.
- b. The actions required to restore functionality to a flow control valve during this test are to close the two air vent valves previously opened, and open the air isolation valve previously closed. These actions are described in STP-120.006, Enclosure A, "Tech Spec/EOOS/Functionality Review." There will be a dedicated local operator stationed at
Document Control Desk Attachment RC-I16-0039 CR-I16-00848 Page 7 of 7 the flow control valves. The dedicated operator is required to be briefed on these actions prior to the test.
- c. The station will protect the following equipment per OAP-1 14.1: the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and both emergency diesel generators. Switchyard work that places the plant in a grid risk condition will be restricted. As stated within the referenced letter, the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump room is normally locked closed. All engineered safety features busses will be operable during the performance, up to and including instrument busses for valve control.
- d. Operators are trained on local manual operation of these valves. Operators are trained on initiation of bleed and feed during a loss of Heat Sink, within the requalification training matrix of every two years. All required operator actions credited in PRA insights are within the scope of continuous operator training, at regular intervals, therefore no specialized training is required.