ML20247G850

Petition Demanding That Commission Issue Order Stating That Administrative Limits of TS 88 Re Torus Water Temp Shall Remain in Force Until Listed Conditions Met

ML20247G850
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	04/09/1998
From:	Daley M NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION
To:	Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20247G764	List: ML20247G760 ML20247G794 ML20247G850
References
2.206, DD-99-04, DD-99-4, NUDOCS 9805200359
Download: ML20247G850 (8)

Text

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J New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, Inc.

PO Box 545, Brattleboro, Vermont 05302 (802)257-0336 necnp@necnp.org i

April 9, 1998 l

Dr. Shirley Jackson, Chair l Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D.C.

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Dear Dr. Jackson:

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l We are writing to you to demand that the Commission take immediate action to protect the public health and safety at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station The required action is for the Commission to issue an order stating that:

The administrative limits to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification #88, imposed by the licensee on January 6, 1998 and precluding opera-tion of the reactor with a maximum torus temperature greater than 80 degrees F or with a service water in-jection temperature greater than 50 degrees F, shall remain in force until,

1. Vermont Yankee has completely reconstituted the licensing basis for maximum torus temperature limit;

2. Vermont Yankee has prepared and submitted to NRC for review a technical specifications amendment intended to establish the correct maximum torus temperature limit;

3. NRC completes an independent review of such amendment request by experts certifiably qualified to comprehensively evaluate systems issues relating to the Mark I containment.

This action'is necessary because the record to date in-dicates that Vermont Yankee, over a period of 16 years, has been unable to demonstrate an ability to either justify the operational limits for the maximum torus temperature limit, nor maintain operations within existing administrative limitations.

IMPORTANCE TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY The importance of establishing the correct maximum torus temperature limit to assuring the protection of public health and safety cannot be stressed enough:

9905200359 990513 PDR ADOCK 05000271 Q PDR Educating the Public in Clean Alternatives to Nuclear Forcer

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NECNP, TORUS ISSUE, page 2 The torus is a water-filled, doughnut-shaped steel con-tainer located below the reactor. It holds the emergency cooling water and is an essential part of the containment system. The torus water temperature is critical to the proper functioning of the containment. The containment must work properly under all accident situations in order to pro-tect the public from lethal doses of radiation.

If torus temperature goes too high, any of the follow-ing might occur 1.' The increased temperature intensifies mechanical stresses that could rupture the torus, resulting in loss of ECCS cooling, leading to fuel melting.

2. The increased temperature results in the ECCS pumps being unable to suction the cooling water, leading to fuel melting.

3. The increased temperature degrades the ECCS cooling ability so severely that the fuel melts.

A RECORD OF INCOMPETENCE TO DATE The record we find so alarming is established in LER 97-20,Rev.2 "An Inadequate Technical Justification for a Proposed Change to Plant Technical Specification Results in Operation Outside of the Bounds of Current Analyses Relative to Suppression Pool Temperature During LOCA".

A simplified chronology is attached.

The technical justification in question was prepared by the Yankee Atomic Electric Company and submitted to NRC in 1982. It was approved in 1985 and allowed the plant to in-crease maximum torus temperature limit from 90 degrees F to 100 degrees F.

Since 1994, events have caused Vermont Yankee to ques-tion the adequacy of YAEC's 1982 justification four times in the last four years. Each time, the justification has been declared adequate, only to be followed by further re-emergence, often with the same issues in question, or with new issues identified.

On January 6, 1998, the burden of compounding errors {

finally resulted in Vermont Yankee no longer being certain i that even the original FSAR limits to maximum torus tempera- 1 ture were adequate to provide the required containment in-  !

tegrity in accident conditions. j This uncertainty led to the self-imposed administrative limits to TS #88 noted above.

WHY WE ARE DEMANDING THE COMMISSION INTERVENE ,

The record shows a series of errors in judgment, errors in fact, assignment of inadequately qualified personnel to the problem, errors in scope, failures to report reportable

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NECNP, TORUS ISSUE, page 3 occurrences to NRC, failures to update related-safety analyses discoveries of non-conservatism and~other1 flawed assumptions in critical ~ analyses,.and' failures to maintain plant operations ~within administrative limits imposed on TS

1. 88 in 1995.

If Vermont Yankee were. running a circus, we would be-laughing. As it is, we are demanding that the Commission

, take charge of Vermont Yankee's current attempts to."get it right".

.. . Vermont.. Yankee is struggling _at this . time, not .to. j us-tify.TS #88, but to re-establish the original 1971 FSAR-l limits for maximum torus temperature. This raises serious

-issues of whether the public was ever adequately protected by the. Mark I containment from lethal doses of radiation in the event of an accident.

We have spoken with.NRC' staff at Vermont Yankee and at Headquarters. They have been very helpful in assisting us to develop an understanding of the situation'and its '

fregulatory status.

We were told that this issue wa's significant to safety and that the agency would like to see it resolved before restart of the unit [ currently down for refueling]'. In 1 fact, Mr. Croteau, indicated that Vermont Yankee originally 1 intended-to resolve the issue before restart, but has recently notified'him that they will now resolve it post-restart. This will not allow an NRC review of the change to l

be. complete before-Vermont Yankee restarts.

On April 6, in response to my inquiries, Mr. Croteau also informed me that Vermont Yankee could unilaterally  ;

change the administrative limits presently in effect. l THIS IS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE.  ;

Vermont Yankee, and it's consultant YAEC [now Duke l Engineering .& Services], have' demonstrated that their judg-  !

ment is completely unreliable in this matter.

E Public1 safety cannot be left in their hands. YAEC has-L falsified containment analyses at Maine Yankee, and Vermont ,

Yankee's own staff has screwed-up on four other occasions.  !

-This'is not a' formula to inspire confidence  !

Your agency must move from a " wait and see" posture to  !

activeLintervention. The immediate' imposition-of the order j iwe recommend is a necessary first step in'that direction.  !

l t

Sincer .?/

1 ( "((~'  ;

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/ l$!// ) '

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l 5f//W'M chael J. aley, NECNP Trustee j i

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J New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, Inc. i PO llox 545, lirattleboro, Vermont 05302 (802)257-0336 neenp@ncenp.org ,

l Chronology of Errors '

l sources: Vermont Yankee LER 97-20,Rev.2; conversations with NRC Staff Sept. 21,1981: Vermont Yankee asks Yankee Atomic Electric Co. to work up a  ;

technical justification for raising the originally licensed FSAR torus I operating temperature limit from 90 degrees F to 100 degrees F. l REASON: The plant is too often approaching the 90 degree limit in the warm months.

July 22,1982: Vermont Yankee submits a request to the NRC for a Technical Specifications amendment using the technical justification developed by YAEC.

Meanwhile: While awaiting approval, two accident analyses are updated at the plant in which the maximum torus temperature is critical.

Engineers use the FSAR value of 90 degrees, not the anticipated -

amended value of 100 degrees. ,

Meanwhile: The " Plant Unique Analysis Report for Torus Suppression Chamber for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station"is updated as required by the NRC.

It uses the 100 degree value for some calculations, and the 90 degree value for others.

June 13,1985: NRC approves the Tech Spec change to 100 degrees, siting the

" Plant Unique Analysis Report" above as justification for the change.

9 years pass...

May 27,1994: YAEC discovers discrepancies between the 100 degree Tech Spec and the assumptions used in the FSAR to demonstrate that the containment will work during accidents.

YAEC tells VY about the confusion but nobody enters the problem into the problem reporting system at VY.

Nobody tells the NRC anything, either.

YAEC identifies several safety analysis that need to be updated to demonstrate the containment sytem will work with the higher Educating the Public in Clean Alternatives to Nuclear Power

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temperature. chrono 2

" Confidence"is expressed by those working on the problem that updating these analysis will justify the supposedly already justified and approved Tech Spec change to the 100 degree limit.

Aug.1,1994: An issue related to the operation of the Emergency Core Cooling System at the higher temperature is raised and declared irrelevant.

Formal calculation are completed and the issue is declared resolved.

Just over one yearlater...

Nov. 2,1995: Not quite. VY " discovers" the same problem YAEC reported to them in 1994.

VY concludes [again) that more calculations and analyses are needed to justify operations at 100 degrees.

The outstanding issues are so extensive, VY limits operations to 90 .'

degrees maximum.

The " confidence" of August 1994 has evaporated and another effort is launched to justify operations at 100 degrees.

VY begins investigation into why this keeps coming up.

Nov. 8,1995: VY decides it doesn't have to tell the NRC about what's going on.

Jan.12,1996: Investigation completed-VY determines that improvements in its review processes will prevent them from having to ask this question again.

But 2 months later...

Mar 26,1996: It's back. VY asks again, "Can we really justify operations at 100 degrees?"

It is now 14 years since the technical justification and 11 years since approval.

VY discovers flawed assumptions in both the original and follow-up analyses of critical accident scenarios.

chrono 3 This time, VY notifies the NRC 11 may have operated outside of the design basis by allowing torus temperatures over 90 degrees.

Even though the TS permitting operation up to 100 has been in effect l for 11 years, VY limits its search for such occurrences to the past 2 i years.

t .

They find no instances of violating the 90 degree limit.

VY decides to un-notify the NRC.

Nobody does so.

l VY begins another effort [the 3rd one since 1982] to justify operations

' above 90 degrees.

Nov 27,1996: A comprehensive licensing basis review is done and concludes that the Tech Spec for 100 degrees is justified and consistent with VY's licensing basis. /

l I Review team decides YAEC didn't have to look at thermal impacts in 1982 and we don't have to look at them this time either.

They also conclude that YAEC's original justification in 1982 was a bit of a sloppy job, as these things go.

The issue is declared resolved [for the 3rd time since 1982).

Six months later...

May 29,1997: Not quite. NRC asks VY to look for any times since 1985 when torus temperatures might have exceeded 90 degrees.

VY discovers several, one in August 1993 lasting eight days.

VY reviews if this has to be reported to the NRC as operation outside of design basis, but since they remember resolving this issue once and for all in November 1996, they conclude that it doesn't.

VY makes no report to NRC.

Meanwhile, a concern is raised that the Emergency Core Cooling Pumps might not work at the higher temperature of the torus water.

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chrono 4 VY consults with Mark I containment designer General Electric, and with YAEC's Accident Analysis and Fluid Systems group, and decides that everything is OKAY with regard to ECCS operation. j i

Five months later...

Oct. 30,1997: While reviewing torus temperature issues (for the 4th time since approval in 1985), VY concludes that they should have reported the {

higher temperatures discovered in the May,1997 search as  ;

operations outside of the design basis

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l REASON: Plant operation above 100 degrees isn't technically justified.

And they're off again...

Nov. 9,1997: Still working on the lack of technical justification (now 15 years after original application and 12 years after approval], VY discovers another error in a critical accident analysis.

Jan 6,1998: Still plugging away, VY discovers another error, this time in a computer model. 4 l

l Also, VY determines that they've tightened up so many sloppy  !

calculations and uncovered so many flawed assumptions that they )

must drastically restrict operation of the torus temperature.

VY imposes " administrative" limits of 80 degrees F for torus water and 50 degrees F for incoming river water.

Mar 5 & 24,1998: VY meets with NRC so that the agency can " gain some assurance that VY is doing the right thing" .

VY indicates its intention to complete an effort to reconstituted the licensing basis in an attempt to restore the original 1971 FSAR limits of 90 degrees before restart.

April 6,1998: NRC tells NECNP that VY now plans to resolve the issue after restart.

April 9,1998: NECNP steps in to alert public to this tale of engineering incompetence.

NECNP demands a higher level of NRC action in the interests of protecting the public from future repetitions of this comedy of errors.

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wn May 13p 1998 MEMORANDUM TO: Rules and Directives Branch Division of Administrative Services Office of Administration

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FROM: Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

RECEIPT OF' PETITION FOR DIRECTOR'S DECISION .

'UNDER'10 CFR 2.2061- VERMONI.. YANKEE NUCLEAR One signed ' original of the F a it Ntice identified below is' attached for your transmittal

to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. Additional conformed copies ( g ) of the Notice are enclosed for your use.

% No't ice of Receipt of Application for Construction Permit (s) and Operating License (s).

Notice of Receipt of Pa'rtial Application for Construction Permit (s) and Facility License (s):

Time for submission of Views on Antitrust matters.

Notice of Consideration of issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License. (Call with .

30-day insert date).'

' Notice of Receipt of Application for Facility License (s); Notice of Availability of Applicant's 1 Environmental Report; and Notice of Consideration of lasuance of Facility License (s) and Notice:

of Opportunity for Hearing.

, Notice of Availability'of NRC Draft / Final Environmental Statement.

Notice of Limited Work Authorization.

Notice of Availability of Safety Evaluation Report.

Notice of Issuance of Construction Permit (s). > '

-] Notice of lasuance of Facility Operating License (s) or Amendment (s).

Order.

Exemption.

Notice of Granting Exemption.

' Environmental Assessment.

- Notice of Preparation of Environmental Assessment.

Receipt of Petition for Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206.

' Issuance of Final Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206.

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Other:

[ DOCKET NO. 50-271 Attachment (s): As stated

Contact:

T. CLARK. NRR /.

Telephone:415-1474

' DOCUMENT NAME:

74 feceive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box: 'C' = Copy without attachment / enclosure 'E' = Copy with attachment / enclosure *N' = No copy ,

~ OFFICE -l Of(3L ale l l l l l l NAME- lLh4 DATE- ~05h4 / 98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

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