ML20199A312

Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR70.24 Re Criticality Monitors to Ensure That Personnel Would Be Alerted If Criticality Were to Occur During Handling of Snm.Exemption Granted

ML20199A312
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	01/20/1998
From:	Collins S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP.
Shared Package
ML20199A265	List: ML20199A261 ML20199A312
References
NUDOCS 9801270179
Download: ML20199A312 (6)

Text

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7590-01 P UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 11UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of )

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VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR ) Docket No. 50-271 POWER CORPORATION )

. )

Vermont Yankee Nuclear )

Power Station )

EXEMPTION l.

The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (tne licensee) is the holder of Facility Operatl. g License No. DPR 28, which authorizes operation of the Vermont Yr.nkee Nuclear Power Station. The license provides, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Nudear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) now or hereafter in effect. The facility consists of a single-unit boiling-water reactor located at the licensee's site in Windham County, Vermont.

II.

Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (1G CFR 70.24),

" Criticality Accident Requirements," requires that each licensee authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain a criticality accident monitoring system in each area where such material is handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas subject to criticality accident monitoring must be covered by 9001270179 900120 PDR ADOCK 05000271 P PDR

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2 two detectors. Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored and also requires that (1) the procedures e,1sure that all personne! withdraw to an area of safety upon the sc=: ding of a criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the procedures must include drills to familiarize personnol with the evacuation plan, and (3) the procedures designate responsible individuals for determining the cause of the alarm and placement of radiation survey instruments in accessible locations for use in such an emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have a means for identifying quickly personnel who nave received a dose of 10 rads or more. Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain personnel decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for the services of a physician and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies, and to maintain arrangemente for the transportation of contaminated individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary. Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for SNM used or to be used in the reactor, Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any licensee who believes that there is good cause why he or she should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 rFR 70.24 may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the retaons for the relief requested.

Ill.

The SNM that could be assembled into a critical mass at Vermont Yankee is in the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of SNM other than fuel that is stored on site in any given location is small enough to precicde achieving a critical mass. The Commission's technical staff has evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent criticality of the nuclear fuel at Vermont Yankee and has determined that it is extremely unlikely for such an accident to occur if the licensee meets

. the following seven crite.ia:

1. Only three new fuel assemblies are allowed out of a shipping cask or storage rack at one time.

2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability,95% confidence level, in tho event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water.

3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator der.sity, then the k-effective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probahility,95% confidence level, in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with a moderator at the density corresponding to optimum moderation.

4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability,95% confidence level, in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water.

5. The quantity of forms of SNM other than nuclear fuel, that is stored on site in any given area % less than the quantity necessary for a critical mass.

6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion (GDC) 63. are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.

7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight percent.

By letter dated December 16,1997, the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. The licensee's letter dated January 13,1998, provided additionalinformation supporting the exemption. In the submittals, the licensee addressed criteria 1,2,4,5,6, and 7. Criterion 3 is satisfied because the licensee's submittal dated January 13,1998, states that the cycle 20 fuel will be channeled and stored in the spent fuel storage pool until it is loaded in the core and

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4 that the licensee has no plans to store new fuel in the new fuel storage vault. The Commission's technical staff has reviewed the licensee's submittals and has determined that Vermont Yankee meets the criteria for prevention of inadvertent criticaiity; therefore, the staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely for an inadvertent criticality to occur in SNM handling or storage arcas at Vermont Yankee.

The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is to ensme that if a criticality were to occur during the handiing of SNM, personnel would be alerted to that fact and would take appropriate action. The staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely that such an accident could occur; furthermore, the licensee has radiation monitors that meet GDC 63 in fuel storage and handling areas. These monitors will alert personnel to excessive radiation levels and allow them to initiate appropriate safety actions. The low probability of an inadvertent criticality, together with the licensee's adherence to GDC 63, constitutes good cause for granting an exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.

IV.

The Commission has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is othenAlse in the public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.

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c 5-Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the granting of this exemption will have no significant, impact on the human environment (63 FR 2425).

This exemption is effective upon issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Onghalcignedby Cam'JolJ.Comns Samuel J. Collins, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20tiday of 4an.1998 DOCUMENT NAME: G:UABBOUR\KNJex.109

• PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box. "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" =

Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy 0FFICE PDI 3/PM f 16 PDI-3/LA 0 D A l 8; l PDI 3/PD(A),cy 8 l TECH ED.* BC/SRX8' [_

NAME KJabbour iftJA TClarku '}'hC / REston l# dVF BCalure TCottins NAME ANogdon BBoger P RZ f nperman _ h {b I) Coll'fis l m/

DATE 1/12/98 1/ /6 /98 1/// /98 (d"T. h F/2D/98 LAW OFFICIAL afCORD COPY

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6-DISTRIBUTION:

_ Docket File

_ PUBLIC PD l-3 Rdg.

B. Boger R. Eaton -

M. Boyle T. Clark K. Jabbour OGC G. Hill (2 cys.)

ACRS B. McCabe '

C. Hehl, RI 1

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