ML20246H478
| ML20246H478 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/10/1989 |
| From: | Spielberg A HARMON, CURRAN, SPIELBERG & EISENBERG, LLP., NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246H431 | List: |
| References | |
| OLA, NUDOCS 8905160111 | |
| Download: ML20246H478 (7) | |
Text
I l
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Pcwer Corporation
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA
)
(Spent Fuel Pool (Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Amendment)
Power Station)
)
)
NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION'S MEMORANDUM ON NUREG-1353 Both the applicant, Vermont Yankee, and the NRC Staff referred to and relied on NUREG-1353, " Regulatory Analysis For The Resolution of Generic Issue 82 'Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools'" (May 1989) in their May 3, 1989, oral argu-ment to this Board on the admission of Joint Environmental Con-tention 1.
The New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution
("NECNP") first received a copy of this newly issued document on May 5, 1989, and, therefore, had no opportunity to address the issues raised therein.
Consequently, NECNP now submits this memorandum on NUREG-1353's applicability to this case and in response to the applicant's and staff's arguments.
NUREG-1353 in no way undermines the findings in the Brook-1 haven National Laboratory Report and the Livermore Laboratory NUREG/CR-4982, " Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in Sup-1 port of Generic Safety Issue 82," Brookhavan National Laboratory (July 1987).
This report concludes that there is a significantly increased risk of a self-sustaining zircaloy cladding fire in the spent fuel pool as a result of high density storage of spent fuel and recommends against such storage.
Id. at 54, 57, 63, 107.
8905160111 890510 PDR ADOCK 05000271 G
L Report,2 discussed in NECNP's Brief, that there is a sig-1
.nificantly increased risk of a severe accident as a result of the proposed spent fuel densification and expansion.3 To the con-trary, the report suggests that the consequences of such an acci-l.-
L dent are even larger than previously thought.4 NUREG-1353 con-tains the staff's judgment that there should be no changes in the NRC's safety regulations to deal with the increased risks of a self-sustaining zircaloy cladding fire identified in the reports referenced by NECNP.
However, NUREG-1353.makes no. binding fac-tual findings, succorted with evidence which has been subiected to the oublic carticioation mandated by law, that the risks of an accident are remote and speculative.
Thus, there is nothing in NUREG-1353 which changes the fact that Joint Environmental Con-tention 1 meets the requirements for admission of a NEPA conten-tion under 10 C.F.R.
S 2.714, as was expressly found in the Sierra Club v. NRC5 and Limerick 6 decisions.
These court decisions make clear that the sole relevant inquiry, in judging the admissibility of a National Environmental l
2 NUREG/CR-5176, " Seismic Failure and Cask Drop Analyses of the Spent Fuel Pools at Two Representative Nuclear Power Plants,"
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (January 1989) (avail-able in the NRC Public Document Room as of March 3, 1989);
gee NECNP Brief at n.12 and 30.
3 NECNP Brief at 9 and n.
12, 28-30.
4 NUREG-1353 at Tables 4.8.2 and 4.8.3.
5 862 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1988).
6 No. 85-3431 (3d Cir. February 28, 1989).
J l
)
. Policy Act ("NEPA") contention, is whether the cont'ention postu-lates an accident whose risk is significantly increased by the proposed action so as to require the~ preparation of an Environ-i mental Impact Statement ("EIS").
A determination that there is no violation of the NRC's safety standards does not satisfy NEPA requirements that an EIS be prepared for any significant impact affecting the human environment.
Compliance with the Commis-sion's safety standards provides no basis for a categorical, threshold determination that the postulated accident scenario is by definition remote and speculative and thus immune to NEPA con-sideration.
Such a determination may only be made upon facts presented at a hearing or sworn to upon motion for summary judg-ment.7 Accordingly, NUREG-1353's judgment that no change in safety requirements is warranted is irrelevant to satisfaction of NEPA obligations.
Nor does NUREG-1353 have any impact on the fact that Joint Environmental Contention 1 is stated with adequate specificity.
Sierra Club v. NRC establishes beyond question that a contention is sufficiently specific if adequate notice has been provided to the parties of the issues to be litigated.
Like the contention found admissible in Eierra Club v. NRC, Joint Environmental Con-tention 1 informs the parties that an EIS is required because there is a significantly increased risk of a self-sustaining zir-l 1
caloy cladding fire as a result of the requested license amend-l l
7 See Limerick, slip op. at 23-24; NECNP Brief at 26-27.
lL_______________________________
ment.
It cites the same Brookhaven Report, describes a causal accident scenario, and identifies those factors that make this j
scenario likely to occur at Vermont Yankee (i.e., the p' articular vulnerability of the GE Mark I reactor design).
I The appropriate specificity inquiry is not whether there is a basis for a finding that there is an increased risk of any par-ticular initiating event (in this case hydrogen detonation in the reactor building), but rather whether there is a basis for a finding that there is an increased risk associated with a self-sustaining zircaloy cladding fire itself as a result of the spent fuel pool densification and expansion.
The Brookhaven and Livermore reports establish that there is an increased probabil-ity of a self-sustaining zircaloy cladding fire regardless of the initiating event, due solely to the increased density of the fuel rods.
However, the consequences of such a fire are also increased by virtue of the presence of a larger inventory of radioactive material in the pool.
Risk is a combination of prob-ability and consequences.
So long as this risk of a zircaloy cladding fire is increased by the spent fuel densification and expansion, the risk of any postulated accident scenario is likewise increased.8 Thus, since NECNP has postulated one 8
An example illustrates this key difference.
Assume that the riak of the initiating event is 1, or any number greater than O.
That figure will remain a constant regardless of whether or not a spent fuel pool expansion is allowed.
The Brook-haven Report finds that the risk of a self-sustaining zir-caloy cladding fire increases if the spent fuel pool is expanded.
Assume that the risk of a zircaloy fire increases from 2 to 3 if the spent fuel pool is expanded.
Even though the risk of the initiating event does not change, the risk of a zircaloy cladding fire in the spent fuel pool will increase directly because of the spent fuel pool amendment.
There-fore, the overall risk of a severe accident, resulting from i
plausible' initiating event, involving hydrogen deto'ation in the n
reactor building, it has satisfied the Sierra Club standards of
{
~
admissibi1ity.9 Any further inquiry by the Appeal Board would constitute an impermissible merits determination.
Egg Sierra Club v. NRC, 862 F.2d at 228.
Indeed, NECNP has provided even more specificity than was provided in the contention found admissible in Sierra Club v.
HEC.
The Diablo Canyon Appeal Board specifically recognized that NECNP's contention was more specific than that of the Sierra Club because it postulated increased risks as a result of the particu-lar infirmities of the Vermont Yankee containment.
NECNP cannot be penalized with nonadmission because it das Ovne beyond the Sierra Club case and provided increased specificity for its con-tention.
Thus, NUREG-1353 in no way changes the fact that under the Sierra Club and Limerick decisions, NECNP has the right to a fac-tual hearing on the increased risks associated with the proposed amendment.
NECNP has met all legal requirements for the admis-sion of a NEPA contention.
The law is clear that NRC may not 1
(continued) any initiating event and the zircaloy fire is increased because of the spent fuel expansion.
i 9
No party has challenged that hydrogen detonation is a plausible initiating event for a zircaloy cladding fire.
Indeed, a seismic event, whose increased probability is dis-cussed in both the Brookhaven Report at 4 and the Livermore Report at xiii and 6-6, could result in the hydrogen detona-tion NECNP has proposed as one plausible initiating event resulting in a zirceloy cladding fire.
I L simply declare a self-sustaining zircaloy cladding ' fire to be a j
remote.~and speculative event beyond the purview of NEPA.
Under
.i the Commission's rules and prevailing law, that'is a' factual' l:
determination ~that can be reached only upon a record and opportunity for public participation, not by fiat.
Minnesota-V.
HEC, 602 F.2d 412,.417-18 (D.C..Cir. 1979)
Respectfully submitted, dt'
/
Anne Spielberg i
Andrea Ferster HARMON, CURRAN & TOUSLEY 2001 "S" Street N.W.
Suite 430 Washington, D.C.
20009 (202) 328-3500 May 10, 1989
s.
I CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
,3!,
Um I certify that I caused copies of the foregoin'g pleading to
{
be served on May 10, 1989, by first class mail og s pth rwise I
indicated on all parties listed below:
8 MM 1 P3 :06 ODr. W. Reed Johnson
- Howar'd A. WiAber Administrative Judge AdministratividJudgei99.$,g 115 Falcon Drive Atomic Safety andbRAhlH Colthurst Licensing Appeal Board
' Charlottesville, VA 22901 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
'Gnorge Dana'Bisbee, Esq.
Senior Assistant Attorney General Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman Environmental Protection Bureau Atomic Safety and
-25' Capitol Street Licensing Board Panel Concord, NH 03301-6397 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Jay'Gutierrez, Esq.
R:gional Counsel Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
USNRC, Region I
' Atomic Safety and 475 Allendale Road Licensing Board Panel King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
- R.
K. Gad. III Esq.
Thomas G.
Dignan, Jr., Esq.
Dr. James H. Carpenter Ropes & Gray Atomic Safety and' One International Place Licensing Board Panel l
Boston, MA 02110 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Richard J. Goddard, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Secretary of the Commission Region II Attn:
Docketing and Service Section 101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta, GA 30323 Washington, D.C.
20555 George Dean, Esq.
- Atomic Safety-and Licensing Commonwealth of Massachusetts Appeal Board Panel D3partment of the Attorney General U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission One Ashburton Place Washington, D.C. 20555 1
Boston, MA 02108
- Ann Hodgdon, Esq.
George Young, Esq.
Office of the General Vormont Department of Public Service Counsel, Bethesda 120 State Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Montpelier, VT 05602 Washington, D.C.
20555
- Christine N. Kohl, Chairman overnight mail Administrative Judge
- hand delivery i
l Atomic Safety'and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wcshington, D.C.
20555 s'e e m
Anne Spielberg /
L
--- -