ML20237E234
| ML20237E234 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 12/16/1987 |
| From: | Bess J, Carpenter D, Constable G, Hildebrand E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237E218 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-87-71, 50-499-87-71, IEIN-87-006, IEIN-87-009, IEIN-87-6, IEIN-87-9, NUDOCS 8712280225 | |
| Download: ML20237E234 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1987071
Text
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APPENDIX
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-498/87-71
Operating License:
50-499/87-71
Construction Permit:
CPPR-128
Dockets:
50-498
50-499
CP Expiration Date:
December 1989
Licensee:
Houston .ighting & Power Company (HL&P)
P.O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas 77001
Facility Name:
South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP)
Inspectior, At:
Inspection Conducted:
November 1-30, 1987
Inspectors:
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D. R. Ca,rpenter, Sdnior Resident Inspector
Date
Project /Section D, Division of Reactor Projects
d.
Sbbh2
VP/ Hildebrarid, Resident Inspector, Project
Oa'te '
Section D, Division of Reactor Projects
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Ukt/87
ff. E.' Bess, Resident Inspector, Project
Date '
v Section D, Division of Reactor Projects
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Approved:
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M t~ Con' stable, Chief, Project Section D
Date
Division of Reactor Projects
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8712280225 871210
ADOCK 05000498
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Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted November 1-30, 1987 (Report 50-498/87-71; 50-499/87-71)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection including IE Information
Notices (IEN), misalignment between flanges on safety injection system, fire
control isolation dampers, pressurizer pressure-lew trip setpoint Unit 1,
status of incomplete preoperational tests (Unit 1), auxiliary feedwater system
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failure in Unit 1, Unit 2 preoperational test program, and site tours.
Results: Within the areas inspected, one apparent violation (Paragraph 5) and
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one apparent deviation from your commitments to the NRC (Paragraph 7) were
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identified.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- W. P. Evans, Licensing Engineer
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- J. J. Drymiller, Nuclear Security Lead Coordinator
- C. L. Kern, Nuclear Security Manager (Acting)
- G. L. Jarvela, Health Physics Manager
- S. M. Head, Supervisor, Licensing Engineer
- J. W. Loesch, Plant Operations Manager
- T. E. Underwood, Chemical Operations and Analysis Manager
- M. A. McBurnett, Manager, Support Licensing
- W. H. Kinsey, Plant Manager
- J. H. Goldberg, Group Vice President, Nuclear
- J. T. Westermeier, Project Manager
- J. E. Geiger, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance
- N. S. Tasker, Security Consultant
- S.
L. Rosen, General Manager, NSRB
- R. W. Chewning, Special Assist Group Vice President
In addition to the above, the NRC inspectors also held discussions with
various licensee, architect engineer, constructor, and other contractor
personnel during this inspection.
- Denotes those individuals attending an exit interview conducted on
December 1, 1987.
2.
IE Information Notices (IEN)
(Closed) IEN 87-06, Loss of Suction to Low-Pressure Service Water
System Pumps Resulting From Loss of Siphon
The licensee has stated that the STP design differs ~from the design as
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described in the reference IEN.
Therefore, this IEN is not applicable to
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the STP project.
The NRC inspector has reviewed this IEN and the
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licensee's evaluation and concurs with this conclusion.
This IEN is
considered closed.
(Closed) IEN 87-09, Emergency Diesel Generator Room Cooling Design
Deficiency
The licensee stated that the concerns of this IEN are not applicable to
STP. The NRC inspector has reviewed the IEN and the licensee's evaluation
and concurs with this conclusion.
This item is considered closed.
3.
Misalignment Between Flanges on Safety Injection Systems
During operation of the safety injection (SI) system, the licensee
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discovered that the flange upstream of a Flow Element FE927 in an 8-inch
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line was n'isaligned.
The misalignment between flanges is approximately
1/4-inch, which exceeds the 3/64-inch per foot of flange diameter allowed.
Nonconformance Report (NCR) 87-0292 has been written to correct this
problem. The root cause of this problem is under investigation.
Pending
completion of the above NCR and review of all documentation by the NRC,
this i: an open item (498/8771-01).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Fire Control Isolation _D_ampers
During this inspection period, the licensee conducted an 18-month
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surveillance of fire control dampers.
Out of 27 dampers inspected, 2 were
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found to be inoperable due to having a plastic tie wrap installed instead
of the required fusible links. This condition would nave prevented damper
closure in an emergency.
The licensee commenced hourly fire patrols of the affected areas and
commenced an inspection of all fire control dampers for this condition.
There are approximately 260 fire dampers. At the end of this inspection
period, over 200 have been inspected.
No additional inoperable fire
dampers have been found. The resident inspectors are monitoring the
licensee's actions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Pressurizer Pressure-Low Trip Setpoint (Unit 1)
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During this inspection period, it was identified by the licensee that the
pressurizer pressure-low trip setpoint for Unit I was not set at the
correct trip point as required by Table 3.3-4 of the STP Technical
Specifications (TS).
The TS require the pressurizer pressure-low trip to be set at equal to or
greater than 1869 psig with the allowable value at equal to or greater
than 1861 psig for Modes 1, 2, and 3.
The actual setpoint was 1850 psig
which is nonconservative.
This was discovered by HL&P during the development of Unit 2 instrument
calibration procedures. The licensee was checking Unit 1 setpoints for a
cross check verification.
The plant was in Mode 4 at the time of the discovery of the error, but had
been in Mode 3 with a temperature of approximately 440 F at 900 psig
pressurizer pressure for a period of time that was terminated on
November 22, 1987, for the reasons described in paragraph 7 below.
During
the operation in Mode 3, the pressurizer pressure-low reactor trip was not
actuated since it is locked out of service by an allowed interlock
(identified as the P11 interlock).
It had been the licensee's plan,
however, to continue the temperature-pressure ascension until operating
conditions were reached, which would have released the interlock.
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The NRC resident inspector met with licensee management on several
occasions to determine the root cause for the incorrect setting.
Some of
the factors presented by the licensee were:
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The pressurizer pressure-low trip setpoint was one of the last things
to be agreed upon during the TS review and approval process.
The setpoint was missed during previous verification programs due to
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the above and the fact that the plant operations management personnel
believed that the quality assurance department had completed a
detailed audit of the TS trip setpoints.
The licensee has initiated corrective action which consists of a
100 percent review of instrumentation TS setpoints.
Elements of this
review include the following:
A review of all surveillance to verify the correct setpoint.
This
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review will be completed prior to reentering Mode 3.
A review of all preoperational test procedures which were used to
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take credit for a surveillance TS requirement (mainly preoperational
tests which were used for response time testing).
The pressurizer pressure-low trip setpoint-error was discovered after
previous TS reviews had been conducted by the licensee.
These reviews and
verifications basically ~ consisted of the following:
In June 1987 the HL&P instrumentation and control department ensured
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the TS Proof and Review Specifications were entered into the plant
instrument setpoints.
The HL&P operations department performed a 100 percent review of
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operations procedures to ensure that all procedures conformed with
the TS. This was done as a result of open item 8739-10 which
addressed several annunciator setpoints which'did not conform with
the TS setpoints.
A 100 percent surveillance procedure review was performed to ensure
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that all setpoints in these procedures conformed to the TS.
Then a
100-item reverification sample was performed.
The surveillance
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procedure review was performed due to an iodine monitor having an
incorrect setpoint.
This review also consisted of verification that
TS Table 4.3-2, Surveillance Requirements Table, was correct in the
requirements for frequency, plant mode, and type of test.
The
Table 3.3-4 trip setpoints were not verified at this time.
As a result of the improper setpoint for pressurizer pressure-low trip,
the licensee apparently violated the OPERABILITY requirements of TS
Table 3.3-3 Item 1.e, for the number of required Safety Injection (SI)
trip channels when the plant was placed in Mode 3 on November 22, 1987.
Specifically, the minimum number of OPERABLE channels required was three,
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but in actuality all four SI trip channels were inoperable because of the'
incorrect pressurizer pressure-low trip setpoints.
This occurred
notwithstanding the . previous NRC concerns related to assuring that all
instrumentation setpoints conform to TS (tracked as open item 498/8739-10)
and the discussion by the NRC of changing this specific setpoint in
closing out Incident Review Committee Item Noi 333 (Inspection
Report 50-498;499/87-27).
No deviations were identified.
6.
Status of Incomplete Preoperational Tests (Unit 1)
The following is an update of Unit 1 preoperational test completion status
during this inspection period.
These test procedures were identified as
being incomplete in NRC Inspection Report 50-498/87-47, paragraph 3 imV
updated in subsequent NRC Operations Resident Inupection Reports.
Test
IR 50-498/87-64
Current (November 30, 1987)
1-BR-P-01
99% field complete
100%
1-CN-P-01
100%
100%
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1-EW-P-05
100%
100%
1-FW-P-01
100%
100%
1-HB-P-01
99%
99%*
1-NK-P-01
99% field complete
100%
1-PS-P-01
99%
99%*
1-RA-P-04
100%
100%
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1-RA-P-18
100%
100%
1-HC-A-02-
100%
100%
1-RC-P-06
99%
99%*
1-RC-P-07
99%
99%*
1-RC-P-08
99%
99%*
1-RC-P-11
98%
98%*
1-SP-P-03
95%
95%*
1-WL-P-02
50%
100%
1-WL-P-03
99% field complete
100%
1-WS-P-01
50%
100%
1-WS-P-02
99% field complete
100%
1-CU-A-01
100%
100%
1-CV-A-01
100%
100%
1-FW-A-01
100%
100%
1-LA-A-02
99% field complete
100%
1-LA-A-04
100%
100%
1-LA-A-05
100%
100%
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1-LA-A-06
100%
100%
1-LA-A-08
100%.
100%
- These tests are restrained by plant mode conditions.
The required plant
operating mode must be established before testing and data
collection / reduction can be completed.
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The NRC inspectors are monitoring the licensee's specific activities on
selected tests only.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Auxiliary Feedwater System Failures - Unit 1
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During this inspection period, there have been several failures in the
auxiliary feedwater (AF) system resulting in the licensee declaring the
system inoperable.
The failures have been attributed to water hammer events which resulted in
significant vibration of AF piping and pipe supports.
The following is a
description of the failures and the resulting actions taken by the
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licensee:
a.
On November 5, 1987, a one-inch vent valve (AF0188) line failed in
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Train "A" of the AF system.
The line served'as a pump discharge vent
connection.
The failure occurred at the socket weld toe in the heat
affected zone where the vent connection meets the main line boss.
Repairs were conducted and the AF system was restored to operation.
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b.
On November 8, 1987, leakage was noted and a crack discovered by the
licensee at the one-inch flow element root valve (AF0018) connection
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in Train "D" of the AF system.
The crack was about one-inch long and
was in the same general location as the previous failure, i.e.,'where
the one-inch line meets the header boss.
The plant was in Mode 4
during both failures.
The AF system was declared inoperable by the
licensee.
Repairs were commenced and development of a test program
to determine the root cause of the failures was initiated by the
licensee.
c.
On November 14, 1987, the licensee commenced vibration testing of the
AF system.
A cracked pipe anchor (AF-1013-HL5002) was found
downstream of the Train "A" cross-connect isolation valve.
Testing
was stopped and a temporary support was installed while repairs were
conducted. The AF system was inspected for additional damage.
d.
On November 15, 1987, during vibration testing, water hammer occurred
when opening cross connect valves from Train "A" to Train "D" under
no flow conditions.
Vibration testing was completed on November 16,
1987.
e.
The November 15, 1987, water hammer event appeared to be due to air
trapped in the system cross-connect header.
The licensee changed the
system fill and vent procedure and installed additional high point
vents in the system,
f.
On November 19, 1987, the system had been drained, refilled, and
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vented using the new fill and vent procedure and the additional vent
valves.
A significant amount of additional air was obtained from the
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system using the new high point vents.
Another-water hammer event
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was observed while running the Train "A" pump and opening the Train
"A" and Train "D" cross-connect header isolation valves.
This event
was witnessed by the resident inspector. .The water hammer was
believed to be due to air in the cross-connect header.
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The system fill and vent procedure was then changed to sweep the
cross-connect header of air using various pump combinations and high
fluid flow.
The licensee then successfully demonstrated that the
system fill and vent procedure did provide a water solid system and
that no water hammer occurred when operating system cross-connect
header isolation valves under no flow conditions,
h.
In a meeting onsite on November 20, 1987, between the licensee and
the NRC (Region IV and NRR representatives) the test and analytical
data was reviewed and an agreement was reached allowing the licensee
to proceed to Mode 3 provided the licensee completed system
restoration and documentation, and that they shut and tag. shut AFW
"A" train cross-connect valve FV-7517.
This was required due to the
fact that this air operated valve had a diaphragm air leak and repair
could not be accomplished for several days.
The system was
operational but it was agreed that the valve should be closed (its
failed position) so as not to affect the system in any way if the
valve became inoperable.
The licensee made a verbal commitment to
the NRC to close and tag this valve prior to proceeding to Mode 3.
This commitment was transmitted to the shift operations personnel
from the Plant Operations Manager via written directions in the
operations Night Order Log.
However, the licensee failed to shut and
tag the "A" train cross-connect valve prior to going into Mode 3.
When the NRC inspector returned to the site, he noted the plant was
in Mode 3 with all AF system cross-connect valves open.
When the'NRC
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inspector informed plant management of this condition, they took
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prompt action to shut and tag the cross connect valve.
This is
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considered an apparent deviation of a commitment made to the NRC.
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On November 22, 1987, while in Mode 3 (primary system at 440 F and
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1100 psi), a sustained (continous low frequency vibration) water
hammer event occurred while feeding steam generators at low flow
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rates.
This event caused AF system damage as follows:
Cracked 1-inch drain conne'ction at cross connect header drain
valve AF028.
Cracked 1-inch vent line at Train "A" pump suction vent
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valve AF0328.
Crack in Train "A" cross-connect pipe anchor (AF-1013-HL5002)
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embedment plate.
Broken pin on strut for Train
"C" cross-connect header
(AF-1047-HL5002).
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The licensee declared the AF system inoperable and placed the plant
in Mode 4.
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The licensee then commenced development of a test program to' identify
the root cause of water hammer which occurred during multi-feeding of
steam generators at low flow rates.
1.
Repairs were performed, complete AF system walkdowns were conducted
and nondestructive examinations (NDE) were performed in selected
areas of the system.
m.
The licensee conducted testing which basically consisted of the-
following:
AF system Trains A, B, and C pump suction piping was verified to
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be properly vented and water solid.
Train "B" pump head curve was established and interactions
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between the pump, the auto-recirculation control valve, and the
cross-connect header isolation valve were tested.
During testing a short duration water hammer was obtained by
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closing the Train "C" cross-connect header isolation valve
against a high flow of 650 GPM.
This resulted in the air
open/ spring close cross-connect valve popping open to the
40 percent open position and remaining open.
On November 27, 1987, testing was performed, while in Mode 4, in
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an attempt to duplicate the sustained water hammer which
occurred on November 22, 1987.-
Train "B" pump was aligned to
feed various combinations of steam generators at various flow
rates.
The test was unsuccessful in duplicating the previous
event.
The resident inspectors closely observed the licensee's actions related to
the AF system failures and noted that subsequent trouble shooting and
testing was well controlled and conducted in a formal manner, preshift
briefings were conducted and communications between various organizations
were good.
At one time, it was noted by the NRC inspector that there was a lack of
communications between the test engineer and the data collection
personnel.
This was reported to the shift supervisor and the situation
was immediately corrected.
No violations were identified; however, one deviation was identified in
that the licensee did not satisfy a commitment to the NRC (senior resident
inspector and NRR representatives) as noted above.
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8.
Unit 2 Preoperational Test Program
The Unit 2 preoperational test program is in progress.
Testing is
primarily on support systems and have not been specifically monitored by
the resident inspectors.
Some prerequisite testing and system flushing
was observed during this report period.
Conduct of these evolutions was
satisfactory.
Preoperational test procedures are being received by the
NRC resident inspector and the review process has commenced.
Meetings with startup personnel were conducted to discuss the
preoperational test program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Site Tours
During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors conducted site tours of
all plant areas of both units.
Observations have been discussed with
licensee management.
Those observations requiring licensee attention were
resolved in a responsive and timely manner.
The NRC inspector witnessed the conduct of security department operations
during this inspection period.
Activities observed were conduct of
operations in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm
Station (SAS), CAS and SAS log keeping, security response to alarms, badge
issue area operation, physical search practices of individuals and
vehicles, and compensatory posting of security offices.
The above
activities witnessed by the NRC inspectors were in compliance with
licensee procedures and were performed in a professional manner.
The NRC inspector witnessed the conduct of the Health Physics (HP)
department activities during the inspection period.
The NRC inspectors
witnessed the use of HP equipment by HP technicians as well as plant
workers, use of radiation work permits (RWPs), and general conduct of
shift HP activities.
The HP activities appear to be acceptable and in
compliance with licensee procedures.
Plant maintenance activities were witnessed by the NRC inspectors during
the repair process of the various plant system failures during the
inspection period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Exit Interview
The NRC inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in
paragraph 1) on December 1, 1987, and summarized the scope and findings of
the inspection period.
Other meetings between NRC inspectors and licensee
management were held periodically during the inspection to discuss
identified concerns.
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