ML20237E234

Insp Repts 50-498/87-71 & 50-499/87-71 on 871101-30. Violation & Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ie Info Notices,Misalignment Between Flanges on Safety Injection Sys & Fire Control Isolation Dampers

ML20237E234
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	12/16/1987
From:	Bess J, Carpenter D, Constable G, Hildebrand E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237E218	List: ML20237E214 ML20237E234
References
50-498-87-71, 50-499-87-71, IEIN-87-006, IEIN-87-009, IEIN-87-6, IEIN-87-9, NUDOCS 8712280225
Download: ML20237E234 (10)

See also: IR 05000498/1987071

Text

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APPENDIX

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/87-71 Operating License: NPF-71

50-499/87-71 Construction Permit: CPPR-128

Dockets: 50-498

50-499 CP Expiration Date: December 1989

Licensee: Houston .ighting & Power Company (HL&P)

P.O. Box 1700

Houston, Texas 77001

Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP)

Inspectior, At: STP, Matagorda County, Texas

Inspection Conducted: November 1-30, 1987

Inspectors: /. nn, n <

/J 'J' f 7

D. R. Ca,rpenter, Sdnior Resident Inspector Date

Project /Section D, Division of Reactor Projects

d.

VP/ Hildebrarid, Resident Inspector, Project

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Section D, Division of Reactor Projects

$0S Ukt/87

ff. E.' Bess, Resident Inspector, Project Date '

v Section D, Division of Reactor Projects

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Approved: ., c /2[j[p

M t~ Con' stable, Chief, Project Section D Date

Division of Reactor Projects 1

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8712280225 871210

PDR ADOCK 05000498

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted November 1-30, 1987 (Report 50-498/87-71; 50-499/87-71)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including IE Information

Notices (IEN), misalignment between flanges on safety injection system, fire

control isolation dampers, pressurizer pressure-lew trip setpoint Unit 1,

status of incomplete preoperational tests (Unit 1), auxiliary feedwater system s

failure in Unit 1, Unit 2 preoperational test program, and site tours.  ;

Results: Within the areas inspected, one apparent violation (Paragraph 5) and f

one apparent deviation from your commitments to the NRC (Paragraph 7) were j

identified.  !

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l DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

• W. P. Evans, Licensing Engineer

l *J. J. Drymiller, Nuclear Security Lead Coordinator

• C. L. Kern, Nuclear Security Manager (Acting)

• G. L. Jarvela, Health Physics Manager

• S. M. Head, Supervisor, Licensing Engineer

• J. W. Loesch, Plant Operations Manager

• T. E. Underwood, Chemical Operations and Analysis Manager

• M. A. McBurnett, Manager, Support Licensing

• W. H. Kinsey, Plant Manager

• J. H. Goldberg, Group Vice President, Nuclear

• J. T. Westermeier, Project Manager

• J. E. Geiger, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance

• N. S. Tasker, Security Consultant

• S. L. Rosen, General Manager, NSRB

• R. W. Chewning, Special Assist Group Vice President

In addition to the above, the NRC inspectors also held discussions with

various licensee, architect engineer, constructor, and other contractor

personnel during this inspection.

• Denotes those individuals attending an exit interview conducted on

December 1, 1987.

2. IE Information Notices (IEN)

(Closed) IEN 87-06, Loss of Suction to Low-Pressure Service Water

System Pumps Resulting From Loss of Siphon

The licensee has stated that the STP design differs ~from the design as

i described in the reference IEN. Therefore, this IEN is not applicable to

l the STP project. The NRC inspector has reviewed this IEN and the

licensee's evaluation and concurs with this conclusion. This IEN is

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considered closed.

(Closed) IEN 87-09, Emergency Diesel Generator Room Cooling Design

Deficiency

The licensee stated that the concerns of this IEN are not applicable to

STP. The NRC inspector has reviewed the IEN and the licensee's evaluation

and concurs with this conclusion. This item is considered closed.

3. Misalignment Between Flanges on Safety Injection Systems

During operation of the safety injection (SI) system, the licensee

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discovered that the flange upstream of a Flow Element FE927 in an 8-inch

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line was n'isaligned. The misalignment between flanges is approximately

1/4-inch, which exceeds the 3/64-inch per foot of flange diameter allowed.

Nonconformance Report (NCR) 87-0292 has been written to correct this

problem. The root cause of this problem is under investigation. Pending

completion of the above NCR and review of all documentation by the NRC,

this i: an open item (498/8771-01).

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No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Fire Control Isolation _D_ampers

During this inspection period, the licensee conducted an 18-month ,

surveillance of fire control dampers. Out of 27 dampers inspected, 2 were  !

found to be inoperable due to having a plastic tie wrap installed instead

of the required fusible links. This condition would nave prevented damper

closure in an emergency.

The licensee commenced hourly fire patrols of the affected areas and

commenced an inspection of all fire control dampers for this condition.

There are approximately 260 fire dampers. At the end of this inspection

period, over 200 have been inspected. No additional inoperable fire

dampers have been found. The resident inspectors are monitoring the

licensee's actions.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Pressurizer Pressure-Low Trip Setpoint (Unit 1)

_

During this inspection period, it was identified by the licensee that the

pressurizer pressure-low trip setpoint for Unit I was not set at the

correct trip point as required by Table 3.3-4 of the STP Technical

Specifications (TS).

The TS require the pressurizer pressure-low trip to be set at equal to or

greater than 1869 psig with the allowable value at equal to or greater

than 1861 psig for Modes 1, 2, and 3. The actual setpoint was 1850 psig

which is nonconservative.

This was discovered by HL&P during the development of Unit 2 instrument

calibration procedures. The licensee was checking Unit 1 setpoints for a

cross check verification.

The plant was in Mode 4 at the time of the discovery of the error, but had

been in Mode 3 with a temperature of approximately 440 F at 900 psig

pressurizer pressure for a period of time that was terminated on

November 22, 1987, for the reasons described in paragraph 7 below. During

the operation in Mode 3, the pressurizer pressure-low reactor trip was not

actuated since it is locked out of service by an allowed interlock

(identified as the P11 interlock). It had been the licensee's plan,

however, to continue the temperature-pressure ascension until operating

conditions were reached, which would have released the interlock.

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The NRC resident inspector met with licensee management on several

occasions to determine the root cause for the incorrect setting. Some of

the factors presented by the licensee were:

. The pressurizer pressure-low trip setpoint was one of the last things

to be agreed upon during the TS review and approval process.

. The setpoint was missed during previous verification programs due to

the above and the fact that the plant operations management personnel

believed that the quality assurance department had completed a

detailed audit of the TS trip setpoints.

The licensee has initiated corrective action which consists of a

100 percent review of instrumentation TS setpoints. Elements of this

review include the following:

. A review of all surveillance to verify the correct setpoint. This

review will be completed prior to reentering Mode 3.

. A review of all preoperational test procedures which were used to

take credit for a surveillance TS requirement (mainly preoperational

tests which were used for response time testing).

The pressurizer pressure-low trip setpoint-error was discovered after

previous TS reviews had been conducted by the licensee. These reviews and

verifications basically ~ consisted of the following:

. In June 1987 the HL&P instrumentation and control department ensured

the TS Proof and Review Specifications were entered into the plant

instrument setpoints.

. The HL&P operations department performed a 100 percent review of

operations procedures to ensure that all procedures conformed with

the TS. This was done as a result of open item 8739-10 which

addressed several annunciator setpoints which'did not conform with

the TS setpoints.

.

A 100 percent surveillance procedure review was performed to ensure

that all setpoints in these procedures conformed to the TS. Then a

100-item reverification sample was performed. The surveillance

l- procedure review was performed due to an iodine monitor having an

incorrect setpoint. This review also consisted of verification that

TS Table 4.3-2, Surveillance Requirements Table, was correct in the

requirements for frequency, plant mode, and type of test. The

Table 3.3-4 trip setpoints were not verified at this time.

As a result of the improper setpoint for pressurizer pressure-low trip,

the licensee apparently violated the OPERABILITY requirements of TS

Table 3.3-3 Item 1.e, for the number of required Safety Injection (SI)

trip channels when the plant was placed in Mode 3 on November 22, 1987.

Specifically, the minimum number of OPERABLE channels required was three,

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but in actuality all four SI trip channels were inoperable because of the'

incorrect pressurizer pressure-low trip setpoints. This occurred

notwithstanding the . previous NRC concerns related to assuring that all

instrumentation setpoints conform to TS (tracked as open item 498/8739-10)

and the discussion by the NRC of changing this specific setpoint in

closing out Incident Review Committee Item Noi 333 (Inspection

Report 50-498;499/87-27). No deviations were identified.

6. Status of Incomplete Preoperational Tests (Unit 1)

The following is an update of Unit 1 preoperational test completion status

during this inspection period. These test procedures were identified as

being incomplete in NRC Inspection Report 50-498/87-47, paragraph 3 imV

updated in subsequent NRC Operations Resident Inupection Reports.

Test IR 50-498/87-64 Current (November 30, 1987)

1-BR-P-01 99% field complete 100%

1-CN-P-01 100% 100%

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1-EW-P-05 100% 100%

1-FW-P-01 100% 100%

1-HB-P-01 99% 99%*

1-NK-P-01 99% field complete 100%

1-PS-P-01 99% 99%*

1-RA-P-04 100% 100%

! 1-RA-P-18 100% 100%

1-HC-A-02- 100% 100%

1-RC-P-06 99% 99%*

1-RC-P-07 99% 99%*

1-RC-P-08 99% 99%*

1-RC-P-11 98% 98%*

1-SP-P-03 95% 95%*

1-WL-P-02 50% 100%

1-WL-P-03 99% field complete 100%

1-WS-P-01 50% 100%

1-WS-P-02 99% field complete 100%

1-CU-A-01 100% 100%

1-CV-A-01 100% 100%

1-FW-A-01 100% 100%

1-LA-A-02 99% field complete 100%

1-LA-A-04 100% 100%

1-LA-A-05 100% 100%

l 1-LA-A-06 100% 100%

1-LA-A-08 100%. 100%

• These tests are restrained by plant mode conditions. The required plant

operating mode must be established before testing and data

collection / reduction can be completed.

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The NRC inspectors are monitoring the licensee's specific activities on

selected tests only.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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7. Auxiliary Feedwater System Failures - Unit 1 I

During this inspection period, there have been several failures in the

auxiliary feedwater (AF) system resulting in the licensee declaring the

system inoperable.

The failures have been attributed to water hammer events which resulted in

significant vibration of AF piping and pipe supports. The following is a

description of the failures and the resulting actions taken by the l

licensee:

a. On November 5, 1987, a one-inch vent valve (AF0188) line failed in i

Train "A" of the AF system. The line served'as a pump discharge vent

connection. The failure occurred at the socket weld toe in the heat

affected zone where the vent connection meets the main line boss.

Repairs were conducted and the AF system was restored to operation.

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b. On November 8, 1987, leakage was noted and a crack discovered by the

licensee at the one-inch flow element root valve (AF0018) connection

l in Train "D" of the AF system. The crack was about one-inch long and

was in the same general location as the previous failure, i.e.,'where

the one-inch line meets the header boss. The plant was in Mode 4

during both failures. The AF system was declared inoperable by the

licensee. Repairs were commenced and development of a test program

to determine the root cause of the failures was initiated by the

licensee.

c. On November 14, 1987, the licensee commenced vibration testing of the

AF system. A cracked pipe anchor (AF-1013-HL5002) was found

downstream of the Train "A" cross-connect isolation valve. Testing

was stopped and a temporary support was installed while repairs were

conducted. The AF system was inspected for additional damage.

d. On November 15, 1987, during vibration testing, water hammer occurred

when opening cross connect valves from Train "A" to Train "D" under

no flow conditions. Vibration testing was completed on November 16,

1987.

e. The November 15, 1987, water hammer event appeared to be due to air

trapped in the system cross-connect header. The licensee changed the

system fill and vent procedure and installed additional high point

vents in the system,

f. On November 19, 1987, the system had been drained, refilled, and

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vented using the new fill and vent procedure and the additional vent

valves. A significant amount of additional air was obtained from the

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system using the new high point vents. Another-water hammer event

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was observed while running the Train "A" pump and opening the Train

"A" and Train "D" cross-connect header isolation valves. This event

was witnessed by the resident inspector. .The water hammer was

believed to be due to air in the cross-connect header.

g. The system fill and vent procedure was then changed to sweep the

cross-connect header of air using various pump combinations and high

fluid flow. The licensee then successfully demonstrated that the

system fill and vent procedure did provide a water solid system and

that no water hammer occurred when operating system cross-connect

header isolation valves under no flow conditions,

h. In a meeting onsite on November 20, 1987, between the licensee and

the NRC (Region IV and NRR representatives) the test and analytical

data was reviewed and an agreement was reached allowing the licensee

to proceed to Mode 3 provided the licensee completed system

restoration and documentation, and that they shut and tag. shut AFW

"A" train cross-connect valve FV-7517. This was required due to the

fact that this air operated valve had a diaphragm air leak and repair

could not be accomplished for several days. The system was

operational but it was agreed that the valve should be closed (its

failed position) so as not to affect the system in any way if the

valve became inoperable. The licensee made a verbal commitment to

the NRC to close and tag this valve prior to proceeding to Mode 3.

This commitment was transmitted to the shift operations personnel

from the Plant Operations Manager via written directions in the

operations Night Order Log. However, the licensee failed to shut and

tag the "A" train cross-connect valve prior to going into Mode 3.

When the NRC inspector returned to the site, he noted the plant was

in Mode 3 with all AF system cross-connect valves open. When the'NRC

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inspector informed plant management of this condition, they took

l prompt action to shut and tag the cross connect valve. This is

l considered an apparent deviation of a commitment made to the NRC.

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i i. On November 22, 1987, while in Mode 3 (primary system at 440 F and

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1100 psi), a sustained (continous low frequency vibration) water

hammer event occurred while feeding steam generators at low flow

rates. This event caused AF system damage as follows:

Cracked 1-inch drain conne'ction at cross connect header drain

valve AF028.

. Cracked 1-inch vent line at Train "A" pump suction vent

valve AF0328.

. Crack in Train "A" cross-connect pipe anchor (AF-1013-HL5002)

embedment plate.

. Broken pin on strut for Train "C" cross-connect header

(AF-1047-HL5002). l

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j. The licensee declared the AF system inoperable and placed the plant

in Mode 4.

k. The licensee then commenced development of a test program to' identify

the root cause of water hammer which occurred during multi-feeding of

steam generators at low flow rates.

1. Repairs were performed, complete AF system walkdowns were conducted

and nondestructive examinations (NDE) were performed in selected

areas of the system.

m. The licensee conducted testing which basically consisted of the-

following:

. AF system Trains A, B, and C pump suction piping was verified to

be properly vented and water solid.

. Train "B" pump head curve was established and interactions

between the pump, the auto-recirculation control valve, and the

cross-connect header isolation valve were tested.

. During testing a short duration water hammer was obtained by

closing the Train "C" cross-connect header isolation valve

against a high flow of 650 GPM. This resulted in the air

open/ spring close cross-connect valve popping open to the

40 percent open position and remaining open.

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On November 27, 1987, testing was performed, while in Mode 4, in

an attempt to duplicate the sustained water hammer which

occurred on November 22, 1987.- Train "B" pump was aligned to

feed various combinations of steam generators at various flow

rates. The test was unsuccessful in duplicating the previous

event.

The resident inspectors closely observed the licensee's actions related to

the AF system failures and noted that subsequent trouble shooting and

testing was well controlled and conducted in a formal manner, preshift

briefings were conducted and communications between various organizations

were good.

At one time, it was noted by the NRC inspector that there was a lack of

communications between the test engineer and the data collection

personnel. This was reported to the shift supervisor and the situation

was immediately corrected.

No violations were identified; however, one deviation was identified in

that the licensee did not satisfy a commitment to the NRC (senior resident

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inspector and NRR representatives) as noted above.

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8. Unit 2 Preoperational Test Program

The Unit 2 preoperational test program is in progress. Testing is

primarily on support systems and have not been specifically monitored by

the resident inspectors. Some prerequisite testing and system flushing

was observed during this report period. Conduct of these evolutions was

satisfactory. Preoperational test procedures are being received by the

NRC resident inspector and the review process has commenced.

Meetings with startup personnel were conducted to discuss the

preoperational test program.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Site Tours

During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors conducted site tours of

all plant areas of both units. Observations have been discussed with

licensee management. Those observations requiring licensee attention were

resolved in a responsive and timely manner.

The NRC inspector witnessed the conduct of security department operations

during this inspection period. Activities observed were conduct of

operations in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm

Station (SAS), CAS and SAS log keeping, security response to alarms, badge

issue area operation, physical search practices of individuals and

vehicles, and compensatory posting of security offices. The above

activities witnessed by the NRC inspectors were in compliance with

licensee procedures and were performed in a professional manner.

The NRC inspector witnessed the conduct of the Health Physics (HP)

department activities during the inspection period. The NRC inspectors

witnessed the use of HP equipment by HP technicians as well as plant

workers, use of radiation work permits (RWPs), and general conduct of

shift HP activities. The HP activities appear to be acceptable and in

compliance with licensee procedures.

Plant maintenance activities were witnessed by the NRC inspectors during

the repair process of the various plant system failures during the

inspection period.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Exit Interview

The NRC inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in

paragraph 1) on December 1, 1987, and summarized the scope and findings of

the inspection period. Other meetings between NRC inspectors and licensee

management were held periodically during the inspection to discuss

identified concerns.

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