ML20236D073
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Janu:ry 31, 1975 i
SUPPLDIENT NO. I j
TM[F.
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT '
'BY THE !
DIVISION OF REACTOR-LICENSING i
i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN,THE MATTER OF I
PACIFIC CAS AND ELECTRIC COMPM_lY DJAJLO CANYON NUCt. EAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND'2 SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY. CALIFORNIA
-o DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323 k I.
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TABL,E OF CONTENTS PAGE 1.0 INTRODUCT10N...... ...................................... 1-1 2.0 SITE CHARACTERISTICS..................................... 2-1 2.4 Hydrology.......................................... 2-1.
2.4.1 Hydrologic Description..................... 2-1 2.4.2 Flood Design Consider ations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 2.4.3 Saf ety Ralat ed Wat er Supply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5 2.4.4 . Gr o u nd Wa t e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6 2.4.5 Conclusions................................ 2-7 2.5 Geology, Seismology, and Foundation Engineering. .. . 2-8 2.5.1 Geology.................................... 2-9 2.5.2 Vibratory Ground hbt1on.................... 2-13 2.5.3 Slope Stability............................ 2-14 7.0 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTR0LS............................. 7-1 7.5 Saf ety Relat ed Display Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1 8.0 ELECTRIC P0WER........................................... 8-1 S.4 Physical Independence of Electrical Equipment aad Circuits..................................... 8-1 10.0 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTDI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1 10.3 Main Steam Supply System........................... 10-1 10.4 Other Features..................................... 10-1 13.01 CONDUCT OF 0FERATIONS.................................... 13-1 13.2 Training Program................................... 13-1
22.0 CONCLUSION
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11 APPENDICES W
APPENDIY A - CONTINUATION OF THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE RADIOLOGICAL REVIEb'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 B-1 APPENDIX B - BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................
APPENDIX C - REPORT OF THE U.S. ARMY' CORPS OF ENGINEERS. Dated May 31, 1974 ............. c-1 APPENDIX D - REPORT OF THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, Dated January 28, 1975................ D-1 E-1 1 APPENDIX E - ERRATA TO THE SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT........ 1 1
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Atomic Energy Commission's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) in the matter of the application by the Pacific Gas and Electric ;
Company 'to operate Units 1 med 2 of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear 1 l
Power Station was issued on October 16, 1974. 'In this SER, the ,
Regulatory staf f indicated (1) areas where the applicant had .
not submitted suf ficient information for the staff to complete 1 I
its review and (2) items where the staff.had only recently received j
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information from the applicant and had not. completed its review.
1 The purpose of this supplement is to update the SER by l
i providing_the staff's evaluation of certain matters which were not resolved when the SER was issued. In addition, this report .
provides corrections and explanations applicable to information provided in the SER. Each of the following sections of this
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supplement is numbered the same as the section of the SER that is l
being updated.
Appendix A of this supplement is a continuation of the chronology of the Regulatory staff's principal actions with respect to radiological matters related to the processing of the application.. Appendix 5 is a bibliography. Appendix C La the report of our soils consultant, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Appendix D. is the report of our geologic and seismic consultant, the U. S. Geological Survey.
Appendix E is a listing of errata to the SER.
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1 2-1 2.0 SITE CHARACTERISTICS _
2.4 Hydrology 1 j
2.4.1 Hydrologic Description _ !
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The plant site is on the California coast in San Luis Obispo I County, near the mouth'of Diable Canyon Creek. Plant grade f or all s,afety related structures except the intake structure is 85 feet mean j
sea level datum (f t MSL). Potential sources of flooding considered in the design of the plant were flooding from Diablo Canyon Creek, j
wind-induced and seismic-induced surges in the Pacific Ocean, and site flooding due to severe local precipitation. The Pacific Ocean is the source of cooling water for the f acility under all conditions.
I Ground water to the site area is quite limited, and there is no l k
use of ground water on-site. {
l Flood Design Considerations l 2.4.2 Due to the location, topography, and plant si e arrangement, flood design considerations for the site are limited to possible floodinF from Diablo Canyon Creek, site flooding due to storns j
as severe as one producing the local probable maximum precipitation (PMP), and ces wave action from the Pacific Ocean.
Diablo Canyon Creek runs in a general east-wegt direction, emptying directly into the Pacific Ocean near the plant site. The total drainage area is 5.19 square miles, and the maximum elevation of the rugged terrain in the watershed is about 1819 ft MSL. Snowmelt was r.ot considered in this study in view of the relatively low .
elevations of the basin, the watershed exposure to the Pacific e
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Ocean and the latitude. The PHP estimate for the basin was based on the U.S. Weather Bureau Hydrometeorological Report (HMR) No. 36, "Interia Report, Probable kximum Precipitation 'in California",
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including revisions made in October 1969. 'Precipita ion losses were estimated by reconstituting historical floods: for = a nearby, l I
hydrologically similar basin for which records exist,'and then j i
l transferring the information on possible minimum expected losses to Diablo Canyon Creek (there are no flood flow records for Diablo Canyon Creek). To assure that loss rates were consistent with PMP conditions, the applicant further reduced the loss rate parameters by 50%. Unit hydrograph parameters were estimated by methods presented in the report, " Design of Small Dams", by the U.S. Bureau of ,
Reclamation, and from the reconstitution studies mentioned above.
I The resultant estimated peak discharge of the resulting probable maximum flood (PMF) is approximately 6900 cubic feet per second .(cfs).
Since the switchyard fill is constructed over the strear channel with a large culvert underneath, the applicant evaluated the effect of - s 1
this fill on the PMF. It was assumed that the culvert could be '
blocked and that water could be impounded to the crest of the lowest point of the switchyard fill prior to a PMF. With this assumption, the PNF would not be attenuated by the storage upstream of the fill.
Since the available storage is small, a maximum of about 1100 acre-feet,
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f ailure of the fill during a PMF would not significantly contribute to j
, c flood flows. Estimated maximum water surface elevation dpring a PMF at a point nearest the plant was approxit ately 6 fcet below plant grade for the worst case. Due to the towography of the canyon in'the vicinity of the plant, any coincident wind waves would be neglible. We have reviewed the flood potential at the site due to a pMF on Diablo Canyon Creek, and have concluded that the applicant's estimates of discharge and water surface elevation at l conservative.
The drainage system f or the roof s of safety related buildings l
was designed for a maximam preci;itation rate of 4 inches per ;
i hour. In addition, overflow scuppers are provided in parapet walls at roof level to prevent ponding of accumulated rainwater in excess !
l of drain capacity. Yard areas around safety related buildings are i
graded to provide for drainage away from buildings. Storm runoff is overland and unobstructed. We have evaluated the effects of a local FMP event on site drainage, including the roofs of safety related buildings, and have concluded that safety related structuras, systems and components would not be adversely affected. !
The only safety related system that has compon ncs within the projected sea wave zone is the auxiliary salteder system (see Section 9.3.1 of the SER). The pumps foc this system are housed in l
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1 separate compartments at the intake structure, with a separate bay and intake bay gate for each pump. The compartments are made water- I tight by means of submarine type doors which are tc, be kept in a closed position, except for inspection and maintenance purpoces.
The opening of theme doors is annunciated in the control room.
The pumps are designed to operate during high levels to elevation 27.4 ft MSL. This is equivalent to 30.0 f t mean lower low water (MLLW).
i Normal floor elevation for the pumps is -2.1 ft MSL. The water-l I
I tight compartments are ventilated by forced air through a roof j i
ventilation shaft with a low point of 31.0 ft MSL. i l
Design basis high water levels for the auxiliary saltwater system are the result of postulated wave runup caused by a tsunami coincident with a high ambient tide and short period storm waves.
For distant generators (subterranean earthquakes, submarine land slides, etc.), the applicant estimated maximum tsunami wave runup i of sbrut 16 feet. Distant sources relative to the site are probably l
l found in the Aleutian area, the Kuril-Kanichatka region and along the South American coast. A design water level of 25.4 ft MSL was adopted during the CP review. We have reviewed the estimate of tsunami runup due to a f ar-field generator, and have concluded that the design vatar level is conservative and acceptable.
For local tsunami generators, the applicant originally estimated raximum tsunami vave heights of about 18 feet. However, the original analyses had not considered possible tsunami runup caused by two l
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nearby off shore faults, i.e. , 'the Santa Lucia Bank Fault, located i
approximately 2S miles offshore of the site, and the Santa Maria ]
i Basin Fault (also called the East Beundary Fault or ilosgri Tault) j 1
which passes within about 3.5 miles offshore of the site. Following discussions with the staff, the applicant provided analyses estimating i
maximum tsunami runup and drawdown for. these near-shore generatorc, j based upon the assumption that these. faults could be active (see Amendment 18 to the FSAR). We have concb'ded' that these local tsunami analyses do.not provide adequate bases for demonstrating )
the conservatism of the runup estiratee. We have requested the' 1
' applicant to provide' additional' information to verify the conservatism
'i of his estimates. Our final evalua: ion of the desidn bnis water <
1evel will be presented in a subsegrent supplement to the SER.
2.4.3 Safety Related Water Supply The Pacific Decan serves as the source of water to safely achieve and maintain shutdown under all conditions. The auxiliary saltwater system provides seawater to the component cooling t ater system, which in turn removes heat from the nuclear plant equipment and components. As menti:ned in Section 2.4.2 of this report,.
the auxiliary saltwater pump motors are hcused in the intake structure in separate watertight compartments. Design basis low water levels for the auxiliary saltwater pumps are the result of drawdown caused
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by a tsunami coincident with Jow tide and short period storm waves. For f ar-field generated tsunamis, the applicant has estimated the maximum drawdown under these conditions to be -11.6 f t MSL.
The bottom of the intake structure is at elevacion -31.5 ft MSL, and the auxiliary saltwater pumps are designed to operate with 1
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water levels down to -20.0 ft MSL. We have reviewed the estimate of l tsuna:ri drawdown due to a far-field generator, and have concluded i
that the design water level is conservative and acceptable. However, i
estimates of maximum tsunami drawdown due to near shore generation have not been completed, as discussed in Section 2.4.2 of this report.
Our final evaluation of the applicant.'s low water design basis water 1cvels will be presented in a subsequent supplement to the SEA.
2.4.4 Ground Water G.ound water at the site is generally limited to the stream bed I
of Diablo Canyon Creek, and no significant ground water has been encountered outside tSe stream-bed gravels. During excavation for the l Unit 1 containment structure, some seepage of t/ound water was encountered. Although the finv of water into the excavstion was slight, the applicant installed two collector loops under each containment structure to detect the presence of water. These loops are connected to observation wells which will be monitored and pumpe d if water should accuculate. There is no en-site use of ground water.
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8-7 2,.4.5 Conclusions With regard to plant design, we have analyzed the flood potential, safety related water supply and ground water. We have concluded that the plant is protected f rom conservatively postulated precipitation-induced floods from Diablo Canyon Creek, site drainage and distantly-generated tsunamis. We base further concluded that the ,11 ant will have an adequate water supply for shutdown and cooldown in the event of drawdown caused by. distantly-generated tsunamis, and that ground water in the vicinity will not adversely affect, or be affected by, operation of the plant. However, for near-shore generated tsunamir, auditional information is required from the applicant before we can cruplete our evaluation of design besis. flood and low water levelv Our conclusions as to the adequacy of the ap'plicant's design relative to near-shore tsunami potential will be presented in a
- at supplement to the SER.
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2.5 Geology, Seismology, and Foundat.on Engineering ]
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this geology and seismology evaluation reflects our review of investigations conducted since 1969. These investigations are der- J cribed in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant site and in a report by Wagner (1974). The geology and seismology of the Diablo Canyes site wera reviewed by the AEC staff and its geological and seismological advisors, cne U. S.
Geological Survey (USGS) and the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, during the construction permit review.
The findings of that review were published on November 18, 1969, j as part of the SER for Unit 2. With respect to seismic design input, i the SER concluded:
(1) "There are no identifiable major faults or other geologic structures in the area that could be expected to localize i i
seismicity in the immediate vicinity of the site. The nearest seismically. active major f ault is the Nacimiento f ault, a northwest-trending f ault zone that approaches to within about 18-20 miles of the site to the northeaet." and l
(2) " ... the Coast and Geodetic Survey agrees with the applicant's l
statement of 0.20g at the site and on rock for t.he predicted maximum ground accelerations of the design earthquake and twice that value, 0.40g on the rock for the ~ safe shut-down conditions."
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2-9 2.5.1 Geology Since publication of the 1969 SER, studies of the geologic l
structure offshore of the site heve been reported (Hoskins and Griffiths, 1971; Wagner, 1974). These studies revealed significant- I geologic structure offshore of the Diablo Canyon site. To determine the detailed structural relationships in the immediate offshore i
region, the applicant conducted extensive high resolution geophysical I investigations along that reach of the structure. Pro ties obtained by the applicant were made available to the USGS and those obtainod early in the investigation were included in the i independent interpretation of the offshore structure by Wagner (1974).
The applicant's interpretation, together with a susmaary of the results presented by Hoskins and Griffiths (1971) and Wagner (1974), are included in the FSAR for the Diablo Canyon site.
The Hoskins and Criffiths (1971) paper gives the results of an interpretation of extensive deep penetration seismic reflection surveys along the California Coast. The surveys revealed a structural basin of fshore of the r authern Coast Ranges which they called the Santa l
Maria basin. It is described as being a shallow, synclinorium about 140 miles long and 25 to 30 miles wide. Structural grain within the basin trends northwest parallel to the trend of the basin. Major fanits bound the basin on both the east and west. The eastern border
- i. fault as identified by Hoskins and Griffiths passes within about 5 l miles of the Diablo Canyon cite.
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2-10 Wagner (1974) utilized deep penetration seisaic reflection methods and high resolution seismic acoustic surveys. The configuration of the sea floor was obtained using precision bathymetic data and, locally, by side-scan sonar. These provided a considerable refine-ment of the structure along the eastern boundary of the Santa Maria basin in the region between Cape San Martin and Point Sal. The basin is indicated to have formed in Middle to Post-Hiocenc '(26 m.y.) time.
It contains from 2000 to 5000 f t of Miocene sediments unconformable overlain by up to 3500 f t of Pliocene (7 m.y.) section. An erosion surface is indicated to have formed on these Tertiary beds during Pleistocene time. Post-Wisconsinan sediments, deposited during the past 20,000 years, overlie much of the Tertiary erosion surface.
Wagner (1974) concurs with the interpretation of Hoskins and Grif fiths (1971) that a major f ault zone forms the eastern boundary of the offshore Santa Maria basin. He calls it the Hoagri fault.
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' In structural detail the Hosgri fault is a zone containing trom 2 j to 5 subparallel splays. These f aults locally of fset Tertiary and j Pre-Tertiary rocks with apparent vertical offsets ranging between 1500 and 6000 f t. The f ault is discontinuous and segmented in the late Tertiary and Quaternary section. The applicant interprets the East Boundary Zone (the Hosgri fault zone of Wagner,1974) as being the boundary between synclinal downwarping of the offshore Santa Maria basin and regional uplif t of the southern Coast Ranges. The style of f aulting in the zone is extensional as shown by its locali-zation along the flank of a regional upwarp and by its pattern of ,
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basin down-normal fcults ed crested faults clong th 12cnk of loce.1-l structural highs at Point San Imis and Point Piedras Blancas. Reverse }
1 drag downfolding is also shown in the strata adjacent' to the normal faults, and is likewise characteristic of extensional deformation.
Normal f aults with east-facing scarps have also been identified ad i 1
are interpreted as being antithetic faults of the overall extensic. cal i l
system. The applicant states that due to the lack of evidence for
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compressional deformation in the Pliocene and Pleistocene and the presence of the positive evidence for extensional deformation, the Santa Marf a basin is in a region that has probably been characterized by extensional strain during much of the time since initial deposition in the basin during the Miocene. I While the movement on the fault none was predominantly vertica.1 during Tertiary, Wagner (1974) cites evidence of lateral (strike-slip) l movenant in the upper section. Earthquake focal mechanisms for this zone determined by the applicant support a strike-slip component of movement.
Thus vertical movement on the fault may currently be sub-ordieste to strike-slip.
Evidence of recency of movement on the Hosgri fault zone is found 1 in soffsets of the sea ficor together with offsets of the Post-Wisconsinan sedtments.
Wagner (1974) found these offsets on three of his profile crossings of the zone. On other high resolution seismic profiles, offeets of the base of the Post-Wisconsinan sediments are observed but with no offset of the sea floog. Still other profiles show no offant of the Post-Wisconsinan sediments. This pattern of offset is 1
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largely supported by the applicant's investigations. We. snerefore, conclude that the Hongri fault zone must be considered capable within the meaning of 10 CFR Part 100 Appendix A, Section III (1).
The applicant places the east boundary of the Santa Maria basin in his seismic potential category of Level III which is defined as
" Potential for earthquakes resulting chiefly f rom movement at depth with no surface faulting, but at least wit'h some possibility of sur-face faulting of as much as a few miles strike length and a few feet uf slip."
l In its geological input to the Safety Evaluation Report, dated 28 January,1975 (Opendix D to this report), the USGS concluded that the East Boundary (EBZ) zone and the Santa Lucia Bank zone "should be considered inextricably involved with the strike-slip fault mechanics of plate boundary motions that are currently concentrated along the San Andreas fault." The USGS further concluded that earthquakes along the EBZ should not be expected to be as large as those expected along the San Andreas, but that based on the limited information on the Santa Lucia Bank fault, "the occurrence of an earthquake as large l l
as events characteristic of subpsrallel strike slip faults, which l bound basins, such as the Santa Maria .. . ." could not be precluded.
In the Seismology section of that report the USGS concluded that i t
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2 "with the limit of the present information'as to the interpretation -
of the relationship of the East Boundary f ault to the, Sants Lucia Bank f ault, an earthquake similar to the November 4,1927, event but.
occurring along the East Boundary Zone o. the Santa Lucia Bank fault zone represents the maximum. earthquake that is likely to ' occur near
.to'the site."' These conclusions consider the structural properties and' extent of the Santa Lucia Bank lault to be the came as those of' the Hosgri fault zone and..further..that-the Santa Lucia Bant fault was the source of the November ~ 4,1927, earthquake. We are pursuing a comparative evaluation of these two tectonic cones and will report the results in a future supplement to'the SER.
2.5.2 Vibratory Ground Motion Our SER (1969) for the Diablo Canyon Unit 2 concluded that one -
of the fo11owing four possible earthquakes would result in maxfzum accelerations at the site:
Earthquake A: Magnitude 8-1/2 along the San Andreas fault 48 miles from the site, resulting in a ground acceleration of 0.10s at the site.
Earthquake B: Magnitude 7-1/4 along the Nacimiento fault 20 miles from the ite, resulting in a ground acceleration of 0.12g at the sit,e.
Earthquake C: Magnitude 7-1/2 along the off-shore extension of the Santa Ynez fault 50 miles from the site, resulting in a ground acceleration of 0.05g at the site.
Earthquake D: Magnitude 6-3/4 af tershock near the site associated with Earthquake A which results in a ground acceleration of 0.20s-at the site.
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2-14 For doign purposes, an envelope of the B ad D response spectra l
was used. The operating basis earthquake (OBE) encompassed Earthquake I
-l B with a horizontal acceleration of 0.1$g and Earthquake is with a horizontal acceleration of 0;2g. The use of two earthquake response spectra for the OBE was selected because the frequencies of ground motion for the two earthquakes would ,be dif ferent in consequence of-unequal attenuation due to earthquske location, i.e. earthquake D i would have relatively higher accelerations in the high frequency part of its spectrum. The same spectra end 0.4g were used for the SSE.
The earlier conclusions regarding the geologic structure of the region and its relationship to earthquake occurrence have been altered by the subsequent detailed offshore investigations discussed previously.
Our evaluation of the earthquake potential of the Iloegri frolt sono is continuing; we will provide our conclusions on this matter in a l
future supplement to the SER.
2.5.3 _S_ lope Stability The stability of the cut slopes adjacent to the plant won evaluated by the staff and its advisor, the Corps of Engineers. The report of the Corps of Engineers, which is enclosed as Appendix C to this report, states that the exploration, sampling, and testing was sufficient to define soil properties, the methodology used in the dynamic analysio is consistent with the latest state-of-the-art 1
techniques, and the results are conservative. They concluded that s
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3-15 4 1
f 10 inches, resulting from "the calculated maximum displacement o f
the selected double design earthquake should not cause damage to l However, provisions should j structures located near the toe of the cut. (
be made to insure that thc condition of the material on the slope is
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not altered, particularly by saturation due to poor surface drainage." i The applicant has stated in Appendix 2.5C of the FSAR that I the soils on these slopes have exhibited very low permeability, e.g., 10~0 cm/sec. Because of this low permeability and the con- l figuration of the slope, an alteration of mater!al conditions that l would allow impoundment of water suf ficient to cause saturation of the soil is extremely unlikely.
1 We have reviewed the stability of the cut ulopes and the provisions for drainage to preclude saturation by groundwater, and have concluded that the slopes will remain stable during the occurrence of the SSE, and that Category I structures will not be damaged.
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.7.0 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS 7.5 Safety Related Display Information With regard to the safety related display informatica, we stated in the SER that the applicant had not provided a descrip-tion of the bypass and inoperable status indication.
In Amendment 22 to the FSAR, the applicant provided a f l
description of the safety systes status display which includes the I
inoperable, bypass, system alignment and annunciator displays. k The ser ety related dispisy provides data to enable the operator to f perfora the required maaual saft.ty functione, and also provides information for' post-accident surveillance. The instrumentation
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provided is similar to that for the Zion Nuclear Flant, except for the physical configuration. As mentioned in the SER, we have reviewed the drawings for this instrumentation and verified the implementa-tion during a site visit. ,
.1 We have concluded that the safety related display will provide We the required information to the operators, and is acceptable.
consider this matter to be resolved.
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b.0 ELECTRIC POWER 8.4 Physical Independence of Electrical Equipment and Circuits In the SER, we stated that the applicant had not providei a l
description and analysis of the criteria for protection of Class IE cabling and equipment in hazardous areas, e.g., missile prone areas.
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In Amendment 24 to the FSAR, the applicant provided a descrip-tion and analysis of tha criteria and procedures for (1) providing physical independence of safety related circuits and equipment and (2) providing protection of Class IE cabling and equipment in 1 We have reviewed the criteria and procedures and hazardous areso.
l verified that they have been prc>erly Laplemented during our initial site visit. Subject to f avorable resolution of our additional concern regarding physical separation in the process analog system (SER Section 7.2.3) we have concluded that the separation criteria meet the roma'ssion's requirements and are, i
therefore, acceptatie. I 1
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10-1 10.0 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM l
10.3 Main Steam Supply System We stated in the SER that we woul report in a supplement our evaluation of an analysis concerning the ability of the main steam line check valves to remain functional following a steam line break I
upstream of the valves.
In Amendment 21 to the FSAR the applicant subeitted an analysis of the capability of the main otsam isolation and check valves to i
withstand closure loads follovica a postulated main steam line break.
We have evaluated this knalysie and find the analytical methods and procedures used to calculate energy impact levels and stresses in the valve disco tail link assembly, valve sest, and those portions of ths valve body subjr.t to closure impact to be acceptable. We have concluded that the s,nalytical and design procedures used in the analysis give reasonable assurance that the main sesam check valves will perform their function and maintain their integrity under closure impact in the event of a rupture of a main steam line.
We consider this matter to be resolved.
10.4 Other Features We stated in the SER that we had requested the applicant to provide design modifications to the turbine building to ensure that flooding resulting from a rupture of remaining exposed portions of the circulating water pipe, i.e., f ailure of a condenser waterbox
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I 10-2 l manhole cover, would not icpair the safe operation of the emergency diesel generators which are located in separate compartments on the ground floor of the turbine building. We further stated that the applicant had proposed a two foot high door separating the entrance to the diesel geserator hallway from the main turbine building floor.
In Amendment 21 to the FSAR, the applicant stated that in the event of failure of a waterbox manhole cover to seal the manhole, either from materisi failure or from operating error, the flow would fill the sump and equipment pit storage areas below floor level in l 15 minutes if the building drains are assumed to be fut.ctioning, and in 10 minutes if the drains are not functioning. During this time, alarms would be given for turbine building sump high level and for water in the condenser pit. The addition of the door separating the emergency generator hallway from the main turbine building floor will !
allow at least 12 additional minutes (assuming no flow of water from the b'diding) during which corrective action may be taken to avoid flooding of the diesels. The door will be locked closed and under administrative control during plant operation. An alarm will sound in the control room when the door is opened for maintenance or other purposes.
We have reviewed the proposed design modifications to.the turbine.
building and have concluded that the minimum time interval of 22 -
minutes (assuming that the. building drains are clogged) available for corrective action is acceptable. We consider this matter to be resolved.
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13 4 F
13.0 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS _
13.2 Training Program We stated in the Safety Evaluation Report that certain revisions.
1 in the applicant's operator requalification program would be needed in order to meet the requirements _of Section' 50.54 (1-1) of 10 CFR I l
Part 50 and Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 55. These revisions involved the proposed lectare series, on-the-job training, and evaluaticen
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and records.
.In Amendtent 21 to the FSAR, the applicant submitted appropriate' 1 El d
revisions to the operator requalification i ogram. The program now t
adequately describes the^following items:
l (1)
The lecture series to be administered, including subjects and l duration; (2) The specific manipulations of controls; (3) The methods to be employed to assure individual review of design, procedure, and license changest.
(4) The, methods to be employed to assure individual review of abnormal and emergency procedures; H j
(5) The specific evaluation criteria for determining attendance at a specific lecture, required participation in an accelerated requalification program, and other additional training, as applicable; 1 (6) The records to be maintained to document each individual's participatic in the program.
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13-2 Based on the revisions to the operator requalification' program sub-mitted by the applicant, we have concluded that the program is acceptable. We consider this matter to be resolved.
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22.0 CONCLUSION
S In Section 22 of the SER we stated that 'several items were still outstanding, and that favorable resolution of thne items i
would be required before operating licenses for Diablo Canyon Un ts A number of these have been resolved in 1 and 2 could be issued.-
this supplement. . The remaining items which must be' resolved (and their present status) are summarised below
'(1) The applicant has ptovided additional information on the
-l program for control room monitoring of meteorological parcseters.
Our evaluation of 'this information has not .been completed.
(SER Sections 2.3.3'and 2.3.6) >
(2)
The applicant must provide additional information on the af f ecto of tsunami waves ' caused by near-shore generators.
2.4.2, 2.4.3 and 2.4.5 of this report) i (Sections I (3)
Our comparative evaluation of the Bosgri and Santa Lucia Bank faults, and our evaluation of the aarthquake' potential of .
the Hosgri fault have not been completed. (Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 of t'his report).
(4)
The applicant has agreed to provide additional information on. the potential consequences of pipe break outside con-Our evaluation of. this item will be completed when-tainment.
this additional information has been received. . (SER Section 3.6) f I
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(5) The applicant has not yet submitted required information-coniirming the seismic qualification of Category 1 instrumentation and electrical equipment. (SER Sections 3.10 and'7.8)
(6) Documentation has been provided in a WCAP report justifying ,
the use of the results of tests of 7-grid assemblies to prove f the acceptability of the 8-grid design. Our evaluation of this report has not been completed. (SER Section 4.2.1) _;
(7) The results of the single rod burst tests have been documented in a WCAP report. Our evaluation of this report has not been completed. (SER Section 4.2.1) 1 (8) Our evaluation of the 17 x 17 fuel rod surveillance program han not been completed. (SER Section 4.2.1)
(9) The applicant has not yet documented evidence codirming resolution of the uncertainties in the thermal and hydraulic design. (SER Section 4.4)
(10) The applicant has not yet submitted the results of certain i subcompartment. pressure calculations using the Transient l Mass Distribution (TMD) Program. (SER Section 6.2.1)
I (11) The applicant has not yet documented his commitment to remove power from the electrical system to lock certain motor-operated ECCS valves in their pref erred saf ety positions. (SER Sections 6.3.1 and 7.3.4)
22-3 (12) Our evaluation of the plants' compliance with the ECCS Final Acceptance Criteria has not been completed. (SR Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.5)
(13) The applicant has provided additional information regarding physical and . electrical separation .n the solid state protection system. Our evaluation of this information has not been completed. (SR Sections 7.2.2.1 and 7.2.2.2)
(14) The applicant has provided additional information regarding Our physical separation in the process analog system.
evaluation of this information has not been completed. (SR Section 7.2.3) I (15) Our evaluation of ATWS has not been completed. (S R Section f 7.2.5)
(16) The applicant has not provided adequate information to confirs the environmental qualification of Category I instrumentation and electrical equipment. (SR Section 7.8)
(17) Our evaluation of the consequences of a postulated cask drop has not been completed. (SR Section 9.2.3) l (18) Our evaluation of .the proposed. design andifications to the l
turbine building to bring about a reduction of the doses in l
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the event of RER leakage during the recirculation phase following a postulated LOCA has not been completed. - (SR Section 15.1) l I
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22-4 (19) With regard to the operational QA program, the applicant has 1
not yet documented his commitmen( to follow the guidance in certain WASH documents. (Item 99 of Appendix A of this report) 4 Cubject to favorable resolution of the outstanding satters described above, the conclusions as stated in Section 22 of .the j SElt remain ucchanged.
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A-1 APPENDIX A CONTINUATI;N OF THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE RADIO 1ACICAL REVIEW
- 89. October 16, 1974 Safety Evaluation Report issued.
- 90. October 22, 1974 Submittal of Ameryinent No. 18 conaisting primarily of a final response to the staff's request for information on tsunami waves caused by near-shore generators.
- 91. November 1, 1974 Letter to applicant requesting additional.infor-nation on the emergency core cooling system. j
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- 92. November 1, 1974 Letter to applicant informing him of changes in {
.the safety review schedule. j i
- 93. November 1, 1974 Submittal of Amendment No.19 consisting primarily j of the applicant's final report on the geology :
of the Southern Coast Ranges and the adjoining :
Offshore Continental Margin of California.
- 94. November 11, 1974 Submittal of Amendment No. 20 consisting pri-marily of revised material for Sectida 2.5 of the FSAR (Geology and Seismology).
- 95. November 20, 1974 Submittal of report on the analysis of off-shore seismicity in the vicinity of the Diablo Canyon i site.
- 96. November 21, 1974 Submittal of Amendment No. 21 consisting pri-marily of responses to the staff's requests for additional information concerning the main j steam isolation valves and the operator requalification program. ,
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- 97. December 5, 1974 Response from applicant to our letter of j November 1, 1974, regarding ECCS.
- 98. December 6, 1974 Request No. 9 to applicant for additional infor- j mation on seismic derign. ;
- 99. December 10, 1974 Letter to applicant requesting information on quality assurane activities for the operations ,
d phase of the Diablo Canyon Units.
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..100. December 16, 1974 Submittal of Amendment No. 22 consisting of 1 additional informative required for the resolution of outstanding items in the SER. ;
101. December 16, 1974 Letter from applicant giving schedule for sub-mittal of additional information on all outstanding items in the SER. ,
102. December 23, 1974- Submittal of Amendment No. 23 consisting of ,
additional information onl environmental qualifi- ,
cation of electrical equipment.
j 103. December 30, 1974 Response from applicant to our request for addi- j tional information of December 6, 1974, regarding !
seismic design. j 104. January 14, 1975 Letter to applicant informing him of changes in !
the safety review schedule.- j 105. January 16, 1975 Submittal of Amendment No. 24 c'onsisting of addi- .i tional information required for the resolution of outstanding items in the SER. ,
106. January 20, 1975 Submittal of report on physical and electrical. a separation in the solid state protection and - ]
process analog systems. ,
j 107. January 24, 1975 Request No. 10 to applicant for additional informa-tion on tsunami wave calculations. ,
a 108. January 29, 1975 Letter from applicant committing to supply addi-tional information regarding the consequences of' ,
postulated ruptures of high energy piping outside j containment.
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l APPENDIX B ,
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BIBLIOGRAPHY j i
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(Documents referenced in or used to prepare Supplement No. 1 to the Safety Evaluation Report for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station, j Units 1 and 2. This list of documents is in addition to those pre- ]
viously listed in the bibliography for the Safety Evaluation Report.)
Hydrology
- 1. U.S. Weather Bureau, Hydrometeorological Report No. 36, " Interim Report, Probable Maximum Precipitation in California," 1961, revised 1969. )
- 2. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Hydrologic Engineering Center.
" Generalized Standard Project Rainflood Criteria, Southern California Coastal Streams," Davis, California, March 1967.
- 3. U.S. Army Corpr of Engineers, the Hydrologic Engineering Center,
" HEC-1, Flood Hydrograph Package, Computer Program 723-X6-L2010,"
Davis, California, January 1973.
- 4. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Hydrologic Engineering Center,
" HEC-2, Water Surface Profiles, Computer Program 723-X6-L202A,"
Davis, California, December 1971.
- 5. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.59,
" Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants," USAEC, Directorate of Regulatory Standards, Washington, D. C., August 1973.
- 6. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.27, )
" Ultimate Heat Sink," USAEC, Directorate of Regulatory Standards, Washington, D. C. (Revision 1) March 1974.
$ l Structural Engineering E
- 7. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.61, j
" Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants,"
USAEC, Directorate of Regulatory Standards, Washington, D. C., ;j October 1973.
Geology, Seismology and Foundation Engineering
- 8. Albee, A. L. , and Smith, J. 'L., " Earthquake Characteristic; and Fault Activity in Southern California"; Special Publication of the ?
Los Angeles Section of the Association of Engineering Geologists, Arcadis, California, pp. 9-3;l, 1966. ;
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- 9. Bonilla, M. G., " Surf ace Faulting and Related Effects," in Earthquake Engineering, Robert L. Wiegel, Coord. Ed., Frentice-Hall, Inc.,
Englevood Clif fs, N. J. ,1970. i Boskins, E. G., and Grif fiths, J. R., " Hydrocarbon Potential of 10.
Northern and Central California Offshore". and American Assoc.
Petroleum Geologists, Memoir 15, pp. 212-228,1971.
- 11. Schnabel, P. B., and Seed, H. B., " Accelerations in Rock for Earthquakes in the Western United States," Bulletin, Seismic Soc.
Am., V. 63 No. 2, p. 501-516,1973.
- 12. Tocher, D., " Earthquake Energy and Ground Breakage," Seiss. Soc.
Amer. Bull., Vol. 48, p.147-153,1958.
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- 13. Algeraiseen, S. T., " Studies in Seismicity and Earthquaka Damage Statistics; Thr:e parts, Summary and Recommendations, 23 pages; Appendix A,142 pagen; and Appendix B, 68 pages," Prepared for the Depa.t.nent of Housing and Urban Development Office of Economic j
Analysis by the Staff and Consultants of the Department of Commerce, ESSA, Coast and Geodetic Survey, 1969.
- 14. Wagner, H. C., " Marine Geology Between Cape San Martin and Pt.
Sal South-Central California Offshore;" U. S. Geol. Survey open file report 74-252, 1974.
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l APPENDIY C f
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY t Orr8CE OF THE CH3EF OF E**GlasLKMS WASHipeGTON. D.C. ss314 t
NE w.
M EN-OiE-S 31 May 1974 Mr. William P. Canseill cy \&
Chief, Site Analysis Branch ' N/
Directorate of Licensing Regulation 6 '
7 V US Atomic Energy Commission j N s ,. Li C.-
Washington, D.C. 20545 D N'Y4 OI4 # ' ~ '
Dear Mr. Cammills Your request for review of the Stability Evaluation of the Pover Plant Cut Slope of FSAR at Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, Cali-fornia has been cocpleted by our Los Angeles District. Their review couments are inclosed. If you have questions on their comments, it is suggested that 213, 688-5470. you contact Mr. Fuquay, Los Angeles District. Area Code Sincerely yours,
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1 Inct H M F B. WILLIS
/$ hk As stated Chief, Engineering Division j Directorate of Civil Works 2 9
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...., DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY j' ~
Los Awottes oisimscT comes OF ENGINEERS
- p. o oox 37:
Los ANGELES. CALIF ORNt A 90043 SFLED-F 14 March 1974 SUEJECT: Technical Assistance to Atomic Energy Cornissien. Diablo Canyon Site Division Engineer 3
South Pacific Division ATIN: SPDED-G
- 1. Reference is made to letter, IAtsOTE-S, dated 16 October 1973 and 2d Ind, EFIID-F dated 10 December 1973, subject as above.
- 2. The data has been received and the review has been inade. The ccaments are attached.
FOR TR. DLSTRICI ENGINEER:
g$ fl;&he.^13 -_
1 Inc1 GARH1 A. FUQUAY as Chief, Engineering Division l
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C-3 SPDED-C (14 Mar 74) ist Ind
SUBJECT:
Technical Asdistance to Atomic Energy Comission, Diablo Canyon Site DA, South Pacific Diviefon, Corps of Engineers, 630 Sanscoe Street Roca 1216, San Frsncisec, California 9'4111 27 March 1974 TO: RQDA (DA1N-CWE-S) WASH DC 20314
- 1. As explained in 2d Indorsement cf references cited in paragraph 1 of basic, the review consnents could rot be furnished in the . time frame originally requested. Submittal of all dats is now coupleted _ and the review concents are inclosed.
- 2. Tw meetings were held with representatives of LAD, AEC, the power plant owner and his consulting soils engineering. company. The last meeting, held 22 February 1974, was also attended by a representative of SPD and at that meeting the site was inspected and the owner and soils consultant answered all questiens with regard to their analyses of the slope stability. The AEC representatives were infomally advised at that time of the LAD findings as enumerated by in paragraphs 11-14 of the inclosed review cocenents.
tun thL DiVib10N MU1ht d:
, u 0cd 1 Inci /JOHEW.GERHART ne j ? Chief. Engineering Division d
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C-4 REVIEW COMMEhTS ON Ct/I S14PE AT DIABLO CAhTON P0kTR [IANT ,
1 MARCH 1974 l
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REVIDT CONMENTS CH CUT SLOPE AT DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT ENERAL i
- 1. The Pacific Gas and Electsic Company's Amendment No. 2 to Final Safety Analysis Report for Units 1 and 2 at Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California was received by Los Angeles District on 4 February 1974. As requested by 1st Ind to letter DAEN-CWE-S, dated 16 October 1973, ,
a review has been made of Appendix 2.5c, stability Evaluation Power Plant l Cut Slope of Final Safety Analysis Report.
- 2. At the request of Atomic Energy Cocamission on 7 September 1973 the applicant, PG 6 E, had been required to provide basic data and analyses to substantiate the e. ability of the existing cut slope east of Units 1 and 2. The following data was requested:
- a. Static and dynamic engineering properties of the soils and rock underlying the slope, based on results of complete field and laboratory test data. ;
- b. Actual properties and the assumptions for soils and rock used in the stability analyses.
- c. Duscripcion and discusesons of stantitty analyses.
- 3. In order to provide adequate assurance of slope stability the AEC also requested the following: .
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- a. Perform static and dynamic stability analysis, using an acceptable method of analysis.
- b. Provide and discuss the failure criteria, the failura modes, and the range of computed factors of safety.
- 4. The need for the above data and analyses was verified by the 1AD at the meeting held on 25 October 1973.
- 5. On 21 and 22 February after a prelimina:y review of the report a meeting and site inspection was held with personnel from 1AD, the AEC, l the applicant and the applicant's Architect-Engineer Harding-Lawson and Associates. The following are comments on the inspection, and review of the investigation, testing, design values and stability analyses for tha subject cut slope.
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C-6 1NVgSTIGATICN AND ANAD OTS
- 6. The surficial conditions of the s, lope appears to be satisf actory..
The exposed soils on the facs of the cut _ are mostly slope wash consisting of black silty clay and sandy clay. In the lower portion of the slope, colluvium consisting of sandy to gravelly clay underlies the slope wash material. The basst soil unit is represented by ancient marine beach.
deposits of silty sand and gravel which rest directly on wave cut terraces.
The underlying bedrock coneists of a tuffaceous tn sitty sandstone and siltstone. In the upper part of the slope a shallow layer of silty clay overlies the bedrock. The lower portion of the slope has been excavated to about 1 vertical on 2 horisontal. The upper portion of the slope was cut to approximately 1 on 3.
- 7. To explore the subsurface conditions the A4 has drilled 12 test holes varying in depth from 30 to 120 feet, and ascevated 8 test pits to depths ranging up to 12 feet. Disturbed and undisturbed samples representative of-the soil overburden were obtained for classification and detailed static and cyclic loading tests. Core samples of the rock were tested to deter-eine the shear strength and permeability of the bedrock.
- 8. From the results of the investigations and laboratory tests it was concluded that the cut slope consists of four predominant materials.
The surficial soils, slope wash, usus11; less than 10 feet thick, are medb.;m stiff to stiff sitty clay containing occasional small rock frag-z:nt: :nd :rc ni detrt:. Th ::11rti u , r sac.dj sta A lly cl.y w.L -
lying the slope wash varies up to.50 feet in thickness. The colluvium is underlain by terrace deposits of silty sand and gravel in the ' lower portion of the slope. These marine-deposited materials range from 5 feet to a maximum of 17 feet thick in the area investigated. The rock unit underlying the alluvium consists of a tan to brown sandstone and occasional siltt es which is highly weathered from about 5 to 10 feet below the bedrock surface. The bedding planes in the rock generally stri'ma east-west and dips to the north. The dip varies from very steep south of Unit 2 to j nearly horisontal in the center of the slope area.
A review of the data in the Final Safety Analysis Report pertaining to the structural features, and field inspection at the site indicates a few minor fault nones were observed in excavations in the bedrock and other larger and more continuous faults were observed within the mopped areas. None of there faults extend upward into the overlying Quaternary deposits.
Information obtained frm the U. S. Geological Survey on their study of fault systems in the offv.ure area has not revealed any recent or active fault trace that would affect the selection of the maximum sina earthquakes to be expected during the life of the project.
Free ground water was not encountered during the exploration performed in the slope area. There was seepage water present in the excavation 2 .
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for the Unit' 1 containment structuro et 4; proximately olevstion 60, well below the elevation of the toe of the slope. Test borings.were j drilled deep enough in the slope area to determine _ that ground water .
l was 'well below the bedrock surface and would not be a factor in'the stability of the slope.
- 9. The selected static and dynamic strength parameters including unit l weights were based on results of laboratory tests and field geophysical survey.
- 10. The Modified Bishop's Method was used to analyse the static stability of the slope. The seismic response of the slope was analysed by finite element methods using a computer program developed at the University of -
California at terkeley by Lysser, Udska, Seed and Hwang. The deformation analysis was based on determination of yield acceleration and the resulting amount of movement when the yield value is saceeded. The magnitude of ,.
horisontal displacement is a function of the shear . strength of the ]
materials along the arc analysed. Curves were developed reisting laboratory direct shear data and displacement. In the seismic and. deformation analyses -
the magnitude of acceleration and frequency scales of the designated .q
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earthquake were doubled.
EVA14AT10M l
- 11. The amount of exploration and sampling has been sufficient to determine the type of materials and cross section of the slope. The testing of j j
representative samples is consistent with the practice of the Corps of Engineers. The selected static and dynamic strength' parameters are .repre-sentative values of the various materials on the' slope based'on results of laboratory static direct'and triaxial shear tests, and field geophysical ;
survey'and laboratory dynamic triamial shear test results. j
- 12. Using the adopted unit weights and strengths, checks were made by 1AD of the pseudo-static analyses for critical failure surfaces presented in plates 12 and 13 of the Final Safety Analysis Report. . The' checks were done manually and by computer. In all cases checked, the safety factor was verified. The minimum computed yield acceleration was 0.56 l acceleration is defined as the applied seismic coefficientgravity tims!.. Yield at which movement would start. The failure plane for.the nintaun yield acceleration would be within the soil overburden.
- 13. The nethodelsgy used in t'ne dyumaic analyses it consistent with the latest State-of-the-Art techniques and the results are conservative. It l was reported that throughout the course of the investigation, testing j
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and analyses Dr. H. B. Seed was periodically consulted for the dynamic and displacement analyses. A review of the report " Stability svaluation, ,
Power Plant Cut Slope" by Dr. E. B. Seed has been included in Final ;
Safety Analysis Report.
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- 14. The calculated maxismus displacement of 10 inches, resulting frna j the selected double design earthquake should not cause daange to struc- j l
tures located near the toe of the cut. However, provisions should be '
sade to insure that the condition of the material on the slope is not altered particularly by saturation due to poor surface drainags.
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GEOIA CICAl, St'RVI Y j
- R ESTON, VIRGINI A 2M4
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- JAN 2 81975 T;,fg General L. V. Gossick Nuclear Reguletory Connission
'4ashington, D.C. 20545
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Dear Generel Gossick:
Transmitted hercuith, in response to a request by your staff, is a review of the geologic and seistologic data relevant to the Diablo Canyon Site, Units I and 2 (AEC Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323). l
. l This review was prepared by F. A. McKeown and James F. Devine of the ,
U.S. Geological Survey. I We have no objection to your mating this review part of the public .
J record. t Sincerely yours, A
,w I ahl.
Actg- irector l Enclosure i
tet's Clean Up AmerH:a Tor out 2ooth Birthday
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D-a Pacific Gas and Electric Company Diablo Canyon Site. Units 1 and 2 l
San Luis Obispo Co.nty. California '
AEC Docket Nos. S*- 275 and 50-323 This is a final review of the geological and pertinent seismological data in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Amendments 11.19. and' 20 for the Diablo Canyon nuclear power ;1 ant site. Units 1 and 2. A l preliminary review dated January 23,1974.' of the FSAR was transmitted to the Atomic Energy Comission t,y E. H. Baltz on March 28. 1974 The princip&1 consideration in the preliminary review was that it did not provide information to evaluate ade;uately an offshore fault or-structural zone that had been reported in the literature (Hoskins and Griffiths,1971) since review of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSI.R) . Since the prel inary review of the FSAR the appitcant and-its consultants have conducted extensive geophysical surveys and made geological
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an31yses of them to determine the offshore geology, most of wh'ich is presented in Appendix D of Amendment 19. Prior to the tpplicant's surveys i the U.S. Geological Survey on behalf of the U.S. Atomic Energy Cocnission had made a geophysical survey of a large part of the offshore structural zone. This information (Wagner,1974) ws open filed to the public in l September 1974 and the applicant has used it extensively in Amendment 19. I This final review therefore is directed mostly to evaluation of the data j in Amendment 19. although all parts of the FSAR were reviewed. 'No field examination of the site was made in conjunction with review of the FSAR. 4 The f SAR and its amendrents contale a reasonably accurate description and evaluation of a large a ount of geophysical and geological data.- The geologic naps (Plates III and IV, Amend ent 19) offshore of the southcentral.
'D-3 Califcrnia coast agree in general with th'e offshore geologic rap of ~
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Wagner (1974).- In. detail however the maps dif fer at yany places. )
example, the trends. location, and. number of faults in Estero Bay shown on A' synopsis of the. -i Plate lY differ from those shown in Plate I of Wagner.
!!!, and .lV is that the Of fshore Santa Maria get, logy on Plates I, !!
Further, both basin is bounded on the east and west by major fault zones.
f ault zones are recognized as capable within criteria of the Atemic -)
Energy Cox.ission.
The easternr:ost f ault zone, called th'e East Eoundary zone (EBZ) by the applicant and called the Hosgri fault zone (HFZ) by hagner (1974), is of prirary .irportance because it passes within four miles of the site and is about 90 miles long. As will be' outlined in another 3
part of the review, we do not concur.with the applicant's conclusion that the current structural. environ ent of both the offshore and oeshore area 1 that We do concur with the an,11 rant is dominated by vertical movements.
l the faults exposed in excavation for the site and'in the cliffs near the - 1 However, the age j site apparently are not capable within AEC criteria.
(80,000-120,000 years before present) of.the youngest terrace caterials was inferred by long-distance correlation of terraces (p. 2.5-33). We accept the correlation as probable but an absciute age deterr.ination would be highly desirable. As these faults and foundation ccnditions j
tsve been arply docur.ented and have not appeared to present problems that could not be managed'by engineering practices, they are not discussed in this review. ,
Reoional Ge_olg The applicant's descrip ion of the regional tectonic features given in Amendment 20, (p. 2.5-7 through 2.5-13f) is quite ade:;uate.
In brief the 2
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D-4 plant site is located in the South Coast Ranges structural province which is characterized by northwest trending structural and geomorphic features.
The applicant lists five r.ajor structural features (fault zones) in the region around the site (p. 2.5-9 Amend. 20). These are the San Andreas.
Rinconada-San Marcos-Jelen, Sur-Nacimiento, Santa Lucia Bank and San Simeon faults at distances of 45, 25,18, 28. and 18 miles from the site respectively (Table A, Acend.19). All of these faults are considered capable by the applicant (p. 2.5D 64, 65, Amend 19). The East Boundary fault zone at 2.5 to 4 miles from the site is not listed as a rajor ]
structural feature although it bounds the offshore Santa Maria basin as ;
the Santa Lucia Bank fault does and is commensurate in size with the Santa t.ucia Bank fault. We consider the East Coundary fault zone a r.ajor structural feature.
In the vicinity' of the site, tnat is the Estero Bayaan tuis Range area, three principal fault zones are discussed in addition to the East Boundary fault zone (p. 2.5-13c through 13f, Amend. 2')). These are the West Huasna, Edna, and San Miguelito faults at distances of 11, 4.5, and 2.5 miles from the site, respectively. Nearly all faults trend northwesterly.
Highly defomed Meso:oic and Cenozoic rocks occur between the faults.
The available data do not indicate that any of these faults are ,
capable according to AEC criteria. The trend of the Edna fault when ;
i projected to the northest suggests that it could possibly intersect the I EBZ in Estero Bay. The locatior and discontinac.:s style of faults upped in Estero Bay however by both the applicant (Plate IV A::end 19) and Wagner (1974, Plate !) do not confirm intersection of the Edna fault with l the EBI. As the EBZ is larger and closer to the site, consideration of the Edna fault as a source of earthquakes is of less importance (
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East Boundary Toult Zone As indicated previously in this review and by the applicant (2.5D-9, Anend.19) the East Boundary fault zone has been the structural feature of most interest and importance. Nearly all of the extensive geophysical explorations conducted and analyzed during the past year or so since the FSAR was first issued have been directed especially to defining ,
i this zone and its geologic relationship to contiguous features such as the Santa Maria basin, structures in the San Luis Range, and the Transverse Range structures projected from the southeast. The importance.of the ESZ )l and need to investigate it thoroughly was evident from the facts that it is I
less than four miles from the site, is more than 90 miles in length, and appears to have minor seismic activity associated with it. The applicant has made a comendable effort to define and eFplain the Zone.
"c c r.:ur . tit?. tr.c &;,;,licant's Jesu iv;,iun ui she E6Z and nis conclu-sion that it is a faulted zone of inflection between the offshore Santa Maria Basin and the uplifted Coast Ranges (p. 2.5D-37 through 2.50-42, and 2.5D-98,Arend.19). It appears therefore that the zone once was more closely related to the vertical tectonics associated wf th basin development than to transcurrer. tectonics associated with plate boundaries. As recognized by the applicant, the EBZ may also be a "---part of the San Andreas continental margin transform fault system-- " .(p. 2.50-41, Amend 19).
Such northwest trending fault zones as the EBZ, both offshore and onshore. 4 l
have been considered by others (for exampk Hamilton and Myers, 1966, I l
- p. 522 and figure 2, Atwater,1970, p. 3525) to be part of a s/ stem of i faults with right lateral novement. The applicant presents considerable data and arguments to support the concept"---that the curree.t tectonic ,
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i environment in the southern Coast Ranges and adjacent offshore region is dominated by verti 1.r:ovements associated with general uplift of the' Ej ranges " (p. 2.50-6. . krend. 19) . 1 It is clear froc the offshort: seistic reflection profiles in Appendix A as well as mapping onshore that verticci separations of as much as several thousand feet occur in Pliocene and i i
older strata. Evidence of lateral separation is less clear, probably.
because' lateral separation can rarely be de.monstrated unequivocally. The applicant concluded however that as much as several thousand feet of lateral displacement nay have occurred on the EDZ throaghout its nistory (p. 2.50-41, Amend. 19). Evidence of lateral slip on the EBZ has been given b'y Wagner (1974, figure 13.p.7). Similar evidence is apparent in figure SA (Appendix A) and sections B-B', and D-D' Plate VII, where marked changes in thickness of acousticai units occur across faults and reverse sense of 1 movenent on the see fault is shown. Also, the San Siccon tault, which is considered the eastern boundary of the northern port of the Santa fiaria basin is reported to have about 1500 feet rf lateral displacement.
1 Incomplete fault plane solutions (Smith,1974) are used by tne applicent in an attempt to derenstrate the dominance of vertical novecents. All three solutions gives by S .ith however have significant lateral components to I the inferred fault rechanism. Additional st.iscological evidence that Coast Range faults carrently have lateral nove ent on then is given by Greene a
and others (1973, Sheet 2). These authors sho.1 on Sheet 2 predominant
{
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right-lateral cove ent in fault plane solution
- o' earthquat er in f'onterey '
Bay near projettens of northwest trending Coas: Range faults.
As (1) nearly all of the evidence of lateral movenent is in the youngest recks, scr'e of which may be Po:t "ic:ensinan (Eagner,1974, p.13)
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y-and (2) the ~ecFanier. of current eartMuakes has a significant component of lateral rove ent, vertical noverents ray now be a subordinate co ponent on faults in tre EBZ as well as other rajor faults in southcentral coastal
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California. l Conclusions ;
We concludt frcr. the evid(nce in the F54 and literature that large ]
vertiqa1 displaccrents occurred in the ESZ, mcstly during the latt !!iocene I l
and Pliocene when the offshore Santa " aria basin was rost actively developing.
4 Host current tectonic activity ho. sever is causing as ruch or rore lettral i
as vertical displacement en north.est trendir.; faults in the Coast F.anges and offshore region. Both the East Courdary zone and Santa Lucia Cank 1
fault zcne ray have a first order genetic relation to the. Santa l' aria casin i and consequently are not regional in the sense that they do r.ot trentcet stractural provinces such as the Transvtrse Ranges as the San Andreas fault does. They should te considered inextricably involved, however, l with the strile-slip fault rechanics of plate boandary motions that are !
currently concentrated along the San Andreas fault. Earthquakes along l l
the EBZ presur. ably would nct be as 13rse as expected on the San Andres9 J l
1 fault; however, from the inferrat on i prt'>cntly at hand we can fir.d r.o evidence that would prenlude the cccurrence of an earthquake as larce as events chart.cteristic of subparallel strike slip faults, which bcand basins, such as the Santa ftaria, in the San Andreas systen and which do not trarsect structural provinces.
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LSei'.nolow The portions.of the Final Safety Analysis Report and Amenhents-11,19,20 of the report entitled " Analysis of Offshore Seismicity in the Vicinity of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power' Plant" and the Pacific Gas and Electric Cowany letter dated December 27; 1974, concerning seismic response and its enclosures have been reviewed.
The seismological aspects of this site were previously investigated by the applicant and a review was prepared by'the Seismological Division of the Coast and Geodetic Survey (since changed in organiza-tionintheNationalOce"icandAtmosphericAdministration) dated aptember 21,1967.
As evidenced by the previous discussion of the Geology, a large amount of new data has been developed offshore from the plant site.
The interpretation of these data, as previcusly discussed. ' necessitate the placing of a mocerate to large earthquake on either the East Boundary Zone or the Santa Lucia Bank faults. Theapplicant;in Amendment 20, has addressed the significance of this interpretation and has indicated a " potential for.large earthquakes involving faulting over distances in the order of tens of miles: Seismic activity at this level can occur along offshore faults in the Santa Lucia Bank region (the likely source of the Magnitude 7.3 earthquake of 1927).. .." Elsewhere in the FSAR is stated "The East Boundary zone is considered to be seismically active...." 10ur opinion, is based on these statenents and the current necessity of considering these two structures as having similar seismic potential.
Due to the lack of instrumental data from sites within 10 km ,
of the surface expression of a fault, it is difficult to describe the 1
7
g maximum acceleration, or velocity that would b( recorded in this nearby zone. In addition, the correlation of any of these parameters with damage is suspect in the near zones. On the other hand, there are numerous incidents of structures, extremely close to the fault J
undergoing movement and experiencing earthquakes, that experienced little or no damage. Also, it is apparent that the maximum peak acceleration does not continue to climb as one approaches closer to j and reaches the fault break or as one postulates larger and larger f earthquakes at a given point on the fault. I The efforts by the applicant to consider the effects of earthquakes on existing records of strong motion from sites near to the earthquake fault in terms of the frequency content of the response spectra i
are wortheile. However, a question of transferability still remains (the size of the event in one case and the distance in another).
Nevertheless, this analysis when used to match peaks of the spectr.
(nearby and more distant sources) to the response of critical com-ponents is in our opinion an important technique for assessing pctential damage.
However, in conclusion, we believe that with the limit of the present infomation as to the interpretation of the relationship of the East Boundary fault to the Santa Lucia Bank fault, an earthquake similar to the itovember 4,1927, event but occurring alcng the East ]
Boundary Zone or the Santa Lucia Bank fault zone represents the maximum earthqua(e that is likely to occur near to the site. This event is 4
in addition to the maximum earthquakes considered in the Construction Pemit evaluation and subsequent hearings and reviews. As long 8
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D-10 as-this interpretation renains valid, it is our opinion that the design value of 0.5 g used as a zero period acceleration in the-development of the appropriate response spectra is -inadequate.
References Atwater, Tanya,1970. Implications of plate tectonics for the Cenozoic tectonic evolution of western f; orth Arerica: Geol. Soc. America Bull., v. 81, p. 3513-3536.
Gre:ne, H. G and others,1973. Faults ard earthquakes in the Monterey
-l Bay region California: U.S. Geol. Survey map !W-518. i Hamilton, W. and Myers, W. B.,1966, Cenozoic tectonics of the Western !
l United States: Reviews of Geophysics. V. 4, no. 4, p. 509-549.
Hoskins, E. G., and Griffiths, J. R.,1971 Hydrocarbon potential of Northern and Central California offshore: Am. Assoc. Petroleum Geolog;ns F.emoir 15, p. 212-22u.
Smith, S. W.,1974, Analysis of Offshore Seismicity in the vicinity of the Diablo Canyon fluclear Power Plant. Report to Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
Wagner, H. C.,1974, Marine geology between Cape San Martin and Pt. Sal South-Central California Offshore: U.S. Geol. Survey open file report 74-252.
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1 E-1 APPENDIX E ERRATA TO THE SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT i l
DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 l
Page Line 3-12 20 after " closely spaced frequencies.", the following sentence should be inserted: "An exceptica to this procedure for closely spaced frequencies is Category I piping analyzed by the response spectrum modal superposition method." )
l 3-17 2 delete the coena after " containment" j 1
3-24 10 replace " Systems" with " System" 6-5 19 replace "43.8" with "46.65" 6-8 8-9 replace "the spray pump suction is... spray recircu-lation phase" with "the containment spray pumps are tripped" 6-8 22 replace " required" with "utilised" I
6-15 10 replace "9.14" with "10.5" 6-17 2 replace "375" with "350" 6-20 11 replace " recirculation" with " spray" 10-7 20 replace " heat" with " head" 1
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I END ,: !
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DATE FILMED !,
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- 1 January 31,'1975-SUPPLDfENT NO. 1 TMIT SAFETY' EVALUATION REPORT BY THE DIVISION OF REACTOR LICENSING U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M _THE MATTER OF PACIFIC CAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY D,Ipt0 CMYON NUCIEAR POWER STATION, UNITS I AND 2 SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY. CALIFORNIA o
DOCKET NOS. 50-_2_75 AND 50-323 EjYIS9 inh L.;
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l TABLE OF CONTEIrIS l PACE 1.0 INTRODUCT10N.'..... ...................................... 1-1 2.0 SITE CHARACTERISTICS..................................... 2-1 2.4 Hydrology.......................................... 2-1 l 2.4.1 Hydrologic Description..................... 2-1 I 2.4.2 Flo od De s ig- Cons id er a t io ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 2.4.3 Saf ety Relat ed Wat er Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5 2.4.4 Gr o u nd Wa t e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6 4 2.4.b Conclusions................................ 2-7 2.5 Geology, Seismology, and Foundation Engineering.. . . 2-8 2.5.1 Geology.................................... 2-9 I 2.5.2 Vibra t ory Ground Nation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13 i 2.5.3 Slope Stabi11ty............................ 2-14 .l l
7.0 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTR0LS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1 !
1 7.5 Saf ety Relat ed Display Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1 .
8.0 ELECTRIC P0WER........................................... 8-1 I l
8.4 Physical Independence of Electrical Equipment '
asd Circuits..................................... 8-1 10.0 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM........................ 10-1 1
1 10.3 Main Steam Supply System........................... 10-1 10.4 Other Fastures..................................... 10-1 13.0 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS..................................... 13-1 13.2 Tr a i n i ng P r o g r an . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1
21.0 CONCLUSION
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APPENDICES
~ l P_ age _
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j APPENDIY A - CONTINUATION OF THE CHRONOLOGY OF T1tE RADIOLOGICAL REVIEW.................'..........
A-I-1 B-I
. APPENDIX B - BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................
i APPENDIX C - REPORT OF THE U.S. ARMY' CORPS 0F ENGINEERS, Dated May 31, 1974 ............. C-1 APPENDIX D - REPORT OF THE U.S. CE0 LOGICAL SURVEY, Dated January 28, 1975................ D-1 E-1 APPENDIX E - ERRATA TO THE SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT. . ... ...
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1-1 3 1
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Atomic Energy Commission's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) in the matter of the application by the Pacific Gas and Electric
~
Company to operate Units 1 and 2 of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear j Power Station was issued on October 16, 1974. In this SER, the j Regulatory staf f indicated (1) areas where the applicant had not submitted sufficient information for the staff to complate l 1
its review and (2) items where the staff had only recently received information from the applicant and had not completed its review.
The purpose of this supplement is to update the SER by i
providing the staf f's eveluation of certain matters which were ]
)
not resolved when the SER was issued. In addition, this report l provides ce trections and explanations applicable to information l
provided in the SEE. Each of the following sections of this supplement is numbered tne same as the section of the SER that is being updated.
Appendix A of this supplement-is a continuation of the chronology of the Regulatory staff's principal actions with respect to radiological matters related to the processing of the application.. Appendix 3 is a bibliography. Appendiz C is the report of our soils consultant, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Appendix D is the report of our geologic and seismic consultant, the U. S. Geological Survey.
Appendix E is a listing of errata to the SER.
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'i e 1 2-1 2.0 SITE CHARACTEFISTI_CS_
2.4 Hyd,rology, 2.4.1 Hydrologic Description The plant site is on the California coast in San 1.uis Obfspo ..
J County, near the mouth of Diable Canyon Creek. Plant grade for all I s,afety related structures except the intake structure is 85 feet mean j sea level datum (f t MSL). Potential sources of flooding considered '
in the desigrn of the plant were flooding from Diablo Canyt n Creek, wind-induced and seismic-induced surges in the Pacific Ocean, and site flooding due to severe local precipitation. The Pacific Ocean i is the source of cooling water for the f acility under all conditions. j Ground water sin the s.te area is quite limited, and there is no use of ground water on-site.
3.4.2 Flood Design Considerations Due to the location, topography, and plant site arrangement, flood design considerations for the site are limited to possible ,
j flooding from Diablo Canyon Creek, site flooding due to storns as severe as one producing the local probable maximum precipitation (PMP), and tea wave action from the Pacific Ocean.
Diablo Canyon Creek runs in a general east-vest direction, emptying directly into the Pacific Ocean near the plant site. The total i drainage area is 5.19 square miles, and the maximum elevation of the rugged terrain in the watershed is about 1819 ft MSL. Snowmelt was r.ot considered in this study in view of the relatively 3cw elevations of the basin, the watershed exposure to the Pacific
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Ocean and the latitude. The PMP estimate for the basin was based- f on the l'.S. Weathcr Bureau Hydrometeorological Report (HMR) No. 36,
" Interim Report, Probable Mcximus Precipit ation in California",
including revisions made in October 1969.. 'Precipita ion losses were estimated by reconstituting historical floods for a nearby, hydrolegically similar basin for which records exist, and then transferring the information on possible minieur expected losses to Diablo Canyon Creek (there are no flood flow records for Diablo Canyon Creek). To assure that loss rates were consistent with PMP' conditions, the applicant further reduced the loss rate parameters by 50%. Unit hydrograph parameters were estimated by methods presented in the report, " Design of Small Dams", by the U.S. Bureau of l Rec 1.imtion, and from the reconstitution studies mentioned above.
The resaltant estimated peak discharge of the resulting probable saximus. flood (PMT) is approximately 6900 cubic feet per second (cfs).
Since ti . switchyard fill is constructed over the strear channel with a large culvert underneath, the applicant evaluated the effect of 1
this fill on the PMF. It was assumed that the culvert could be I 1
blocked and that water could be impounded to the crest of the lowest point of the switchyard fill prior to a Phr. With this assumption, the PMF would not be attenur.ted by the storage upstream of the fill.
Since the available storage is small, a maximum cf about 1100 acre-feet, l l w
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] 23 f ailure of the fill during a PMF would not significantly contribute to flood flows. Estimated maximum water surf ace elevation dpring a PMF at a point nearest the plant was approxit ately 6 feet below .
plant grade for the vorst case. Due to the tomgraphy of the i canyon in the vicinity of the pirint', any coincident wind waves would be neglible. ' We have reviewed the flood potential at the site due to a PMF on Diablo Canyon Creek, and have concluded that the.
applicant's ertinates of discharge and water surface elevation are conservative.
i The drainage system for the roofs of safety related buildings var designed for a maximum prectritation rate of 4 inches per -
i hour. In addition, overflow scuppers are provided.in parapet wallo '
at roof level to prevent ponding'of accumulated rainwater in excess of drain capacity. Yard areas around safety related buildings are graded to provide for drainage away f rom buildings. Storm runoff is overland and unobstructed. We have evaluated the effects of a local FMP event on site drainage, including the roof s of safety related buildings, and have ' concluded that safery related I.tructures, systems and components would not be adversely affected.
The only safety related system that has components within the projected sea wave zone is the auxiliary saltwater system (see Section 9.3.1 of the SER). The pumps fo this system are housed in
'8 C_______________
. t 2-4 l separate compartments at the intake structu e. with a separate bay and intake bay gate for each pump. The compartments are made water-tight by means of submarine type doors which are tc, be kept in a closed position, except for inspection and amintenance purpoces. . j i
The opening of theme doors is annunciated in the control room.
l The pumps are designed to operate during high levels to elevation 27.4 ft MSL. This is equivalent to 30.0 f t mean lower low water (MLLW).
Normal floor elevation for the pumps is -2.1 ft MSL. The water- "
tight compartments are venti cated by forced air through a roof -
ventilation shaft with a low point of 31.0 ft MSL.
Design basis high water levels for the suriliary saltwater l system are the result of postulated wave runup caused by a tsunami coincident with a high ambient tide and short period storm waves.
For distant generators (subtc eranian earthquakes, submarine land slides, etc.), the applicant estimated maximum tsunami wave runup of abrut 16 feet. Distant sources relative to the site are probably found in the Aleutian area, the Kuril-Kanichatia region and along the South American coast. A design water level of 25.4 ft MSL was ;
adopted during the CP review. We have reviewed the estimate of l
tsunami runup due to a f ar-field generater, and have concluded that I 3
the design water level is conservative and acceptable.
For local tsunami generators, the applicant originally estimated maximum tsunami wave heights of about 18 feet. However, the original analyses had not considered possible tsunami ranup caused by two
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. t 2-5 nearby offshore f aults, i.e. , the Santa Lucia Bank Fault, located approximately 2S miles offshore of the site, and the Santa Maria Basin Fault (also called the East Bmndary Fault or Hosgri Fault) shich passes within about 3.5 miles offshore of the site. Following discussions with the staff, the applicant provided analyses estimating maximum tsunami runup and drawdown for these near-shore generators, based upon the assumption that these faults could be active (see Amendment 18 to the FSAR). We have concbaded that these local tsunami analyses do not provide adeg2 ate bases for demonstrating the conservatism of the runup estimatee. We have requested the applicant to provide additional information to verify the conservatism of his estimates. Our final evalua: ion of the design b nis water level will be presented in a subsegrent supplement to the SEP..
2.4.3 Safety Related Water Supply The Pacific Geean serves as the source of water to safely achieve and maintain shutdown under all conditions. The auxiliary saltwater system provides seawater to the component cooling i ater system, which in turn removes beat f rom'the nuclear plant equipment and components. As mentiened in Section 2.le.2 of this report, the auxiliary saltvater pin:p motors are hcused in the intake structure in separate watertight compartments. Design basis low water levels, for the auxiliary saltvater pumps are the result of drawdown caused l
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. t 2-6 by a tsunami coincident with low tide and short period storm j 1
j waves. For f ar-field generated tsunamis, the applicant has estimated l
the maximum drawdown unoer these conditions to be -11.6 f t MSL. i i
The bottom of the intake structure is at elevacion -31.5 f t MSL, 1 l
{' and the auxiliary saltwater pumps are designed to operate with I
water levels down to -20.0 ft MSL. We have reviewed the estimate of tsunari drawdown due to a f ar-field generator, and have concluded q i
l that the design water level is conservative and acceptable. Mowever, estimates of maximum tsunami drawdown due to near shore generation have not been completed, as discussed in Section 2.4.2 of this report. l l
Dur final evaluation of the app 11 cent's low water design basis water levels l will be presented in a subsequent supplement to the SEh.
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2.4.4 Ground Water 1
Ground water at the site is generally limited to the stream bed of Diablo Canyon Cred., and no significant ground water has been encountered outside the stream-bed gravels. During excavatics for the Unit I containment structure, some seepage of t/ound water was encountered. Although the finw of water into the excavrtion was slight, the applicant installed two collector loops under each containment structure to detect the presence of water. These loops l
are connected to observation wells which will be monitored and pumpe d if water should accumulate. There is no en-site use of ground water.
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l 2.4.5 Conclusions With regard to plant design, we have analyzed the flood pctential, safety related water supply and ground water. We have concluded that the plant is protected from conservatively postulated precipitation- 1 1
i induced floods f rom Diablo Canyon Creek, site drainage and distantly- l J
generated tsunamis. We have further concluded that the plant will have an adequate water supply for shutdown and cooldown in.the event i
of drawdown caused by distantly-generated tsunamis and that ' ground j j
water in the vicinity will not adversely affect, or be affected by, j l
i operation of the plant. However, for near-shore generated tsunamir. l l
{
l auditional information is required from the applicant before we j l
can complete our evaluation of design basis flood and low wete r levels i
l Our conclusions as to the adequacy of.the applicant's design rcJative l l l l to near-shore tsunami potential will be presented in a < at l supplemert to the SER. ) l l
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a i 2-8 2.5 Geology, Seismology, and Foundat.on Enaineerina i'
This geology and seismology evaluation reflects our review of investigations conducted since 1969. These investigations are der- j cribed in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Diablo f Canyon Nuclear Plant site and in a report by Wagner (1974). The geology and seismology of the Diablo Canyes site were reviewed by j i
the AEC staf f and its geological and seismological advisors, cne U. S. !
Geological Survey (USGS) and the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, I
during the construction permit review.
The findings of that review were published on November 18, 1969, ,
l as part of the SLA for Unit 2. With respect to salsaic design input, !
i the SER concluded:
(1) "There are no identifiable major faults or other geologic structures in the area that could be expected to localize seismicity in the immediate vicinity of the site. The nearect j i
seismically active major fault is the Nacimiento fault, a !
l northwest-trending f ault zone that approaches to within about i 18-20 miles of the site to the northeast," and l (2) ".... the Coast and Geodetic Survey agrees with the applicant's statement of 0.20g at the site and on rock for the predicted maximun ground accelerations of the design earthquake and twice that value. 0.40g on the rock for the safe' shut-down conditions."
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2.5.1 Geology l l
Since publication of the 1969 SER , studies of the geologic structure offshore of the site heve been reported (Hoskins and i
Griffiths, 1971; Wagner, 1974). These studies revealed significant geologic structure offshore of the Diablo Canyon site. To determine the detailed structural relationships in the launediate offshore j region, the applicant conducted extensive high resolution geophysical investigations along that reach of the structure. Pro iles obtained' by the applicant were made available to the USGS and I j
i those obtainod early in the investigation were included in the I 1
independen: interpretation of the offshore structure by Wagner (1974).
The applicant's interpretation, together with a susmary of the results presented by Hoskins and Griffiths (1971) and Wagner (1974), are included in the FSAR for the Diablo Canyon site. J The Hoskins and Criffiths (1971) paper gives the results of an I
interpretation of extensive deep penetration seismic reflection surveys along the California Coast. The surveys revealed a structural basin offshore of the r outhern Coast Ranges which they called the Santa Maria basin. It is described as being a shallow, synclinorita about 140 miles long and 25 to .30 miles wide. Structural grain within the basin trends northuest parallel to the trend of the basin. Major faults bound the basin on both the east and west. The eastern border fault as identified by Hoskins and Griffiths passes within about 5 miles of the Diablo Canyon cite.
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Wagner (1974) utilized deep penetration seismic reflection methods and high resolution seismic acoustic surveys. The configuration of the sea floor vaa obtained using precision bathymetic data and, l
locally, by side-scan sonar. These provided a considerab12 refine-ment of the structure along the eastern boundary of the Santa Maria basin in the region between Cape San Martin and Point Sal.- The basin is indicated to have formed in Middle to Post-Miocene (26 a.y.) time.
It contains from 2000 to 5000 f t of Kiocene sediments unconformable overlain by up to 3500 f t of Pliocene (7 m.y.) section. An erosion surface is indicated to have formed on these Tertiary beds during 1
Pleistocene time. Post-Wisconsinan sediments, deposited during the 1
past 20,000 years, overlie much of the Tertiary erosion surface.
Wagner (1974) concurs with the interpretation of Hoskins and j Crif fiths (1971) that a major fault none forms the eastern boundary l l
of the of fshore Santa Maria basin. He calla it the Hosgri fault. 1 i
4 in structural detail the Hosgri fault is a aone containing tros 2 tu 5 subparallel splays. These faults locally offset Tertiary and Pre-Tertiary rocks with apparent vertical offsets ranging between 1500 and 6000 f t. The fault is discontinuous and sesmanted in the late Tertiary and Quaternary section. The applicant interprets the East Boundary Zone (the Hosgri f ault zone of Wagner,1974) as being the boundary between synclinal downwarping of the offshore Santa Maria basin and regions 1 uplift of the southern Coast Ranees. The style of faulting in the zone is extensional as abown by its locali-zation along the flank of a regional upwarp and by its pattern of 4
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L basin down-normal' faults and crested faulto eleng th212cnk of local structural highs at Point San Imla ord Point Piedras Blancas. Reverse i
drag downfolding is also shown in the strata adjacent to the normal g i
faults, and is likewise characteristic of extensional deformation.-
Normal faults with east-facing scarps'have also been identified aJ }
are interpreted as being antithetic faults of the overall extenstoca!
system. The applicant states that due to the lack of evidence for-compressional deformation in the Pliocene and Pleistocene and the presence of the positive evidence for extensional deformation, the
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Sants Marf a basin is in a region that has probably been characterisad -
by. (sxtensional strain during much of the time since initial deposition l l
in the basin during the Miocene.
While the movement en the fault sone was predominantly' vertictl during Tertiary, Wagner (1974) cites evidence of lateral (strike-slip) '
moven-nt in the upper section. Earthquake focal mechanisms for this I
zone determined by the applicant support a strike-slip component of i movement.
Thus vertical movanent en the faalt may currently be sat- j ordisate to strike-slip.
Evidence of recency of movement on the Ho'esti fault zone is 'found in e.ffsets of the sea floor together with offsets of the Post-Wisconsinan sedtsents.
Wagner (1974) found these offsets on three of his profile creasings of the zone.
On other high resolution seismic profiles, offsets of the base of the Post-Wisconsinan sediments are observed but with no offset of the sea floot. Still other profiles show ac offart of the Post-Wisconsinan sediments. This pattern of offset is f
a
T l 2-12 large'.y supported by the applicant's investiga'tions. We, therefore, conclude that the Hongri fault r.one must be considered capable within the meaning of 10 CFR Part 100 Appendix A, Section III (1). .
The applicant places the east boundary of the Santa Maria basin I
in his seismic potential category of level III which is defined as
" Potential for earthquakes resulting chiefly from movement at depth with no surface faulting, but at least wit'h some possibility of sur-face faulting of as much as a few miles strike length and a few feet of slip."
In its geological input to the Safety Evaluation Report, dated 28 January,1975 (Appendix D to this report), the USGS concluded that-the East Boundarv (DZ) zone and the Santa Lucia Bank zone "should be considered inextricably involved with the strike-slip fault mechanics .
of plate boundary motions that are currently concentrated e.long the San Andreas fault." De USGS further concluded that earthquakes along the EBZ should not be expected to be as large as thoet expected along the San Andreas, but that based on the limited information on the Santa Lucia Bank fault, "the occurrence of an aarthquake as large as events characteristic of subparallel strike slip faults, which bound basins, such as the Santa Maria ...." could not be precluded.
In the Seismology section of that report the USGS concluded that
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"with the limit of the present information as ' to the interpretation' l
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of the relationship of the East boundary f ault to the Santa Lucia l l
Bank' fault, an earthquake similar to the November 4,1927, event but occurring along the East Boundary Zone o. the Santa Lucia Bank fault- l sone represents the maximum earthquake that is likely to occur. near
,to the site." These conclusions consider the structural properties ]
I I
and extent of the Santa Lucia Bank !ault to be the came as_those of }
the Hosgri f ault zone and, further, ihat the Santa Lucia BacF fault was the source of the November 4,1927, earthquake. We are pursuing' z
'l a comparative evaluation of these two tectonic zones and vill report 1
the results in a future suppiament to the SCR. 'j 2.5.2 vibratory Ground Motion Our SER (1969) for the Diablo Canyon Unit 2 concluded that one
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1 of the following four possible earthquakes would result in maxfzum accelerations at the site:
Earthquake A: Magnitude 8-1/2 along the San Andress fault 48 miles from the site, resulting in a ground acceleration of 0.10s at the site.
l Earthquake B: Magnitude 7-1/4 along the Nacimiento foult 20 miles i
from the ite, resulting in a ground acceleration of 0.12g at the site. -
Earthquake C: Magnitude 7-1/2 along the off-shore extension of the Santa Ynez fault 50 miles from the site, ~resulting in a ground acceleration of 0 05g at the site. .
Earthquak __D_: Magnitude 6-3/4 aftershock near the site associated i
with Earthauake A which results in a ground acceleration of 0.20g at the site. ,
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For design purposes, an envelope of the B and D response spectra was used. %e operating basis earthquake (OBE) encompassed Earthquake B with a horizontal acceleration of 0.15g and Earthquake ti with a l l
horizontal acceleration of 0.23 The use of two earthquake response l 1
spectra for the OBE was selecteJ because the freque.ncies of ground motion for the two earthquakes would ,be dif ferent in consequence of 1
unequal attenuation due to earthquake location, i.e.. earthquake D would have relatively higher accelerations in the high frequency part of its spectra. The same spectra and 0.4g were used for the SSE.
The earlier conclusions regarding the geologic structure of the region and its relationship to earthquake occurrence have been altered by the subsequent detailed of f shore investigations discussed previously.
Our evaluation of the earthquake potential of the Boogri fault tone j is continuing; we will provide our conclusions on this matter in a future supplement to the SER.
2.5.3 Slo 2e_ Stability The stability of the cut s*4 opes adjacent to the plant was evaluated by the staf f ar.d its advisor, the Corps of Engineere. The report of the Corps of Engineers, which is enclosed as Appendix C to this report, states that the exploration, sampling, and testing was suf ficient to define soil properties, the methodology used in the dynamic analysis is consistent with the latest state-of-the-art techniques, and the results are conservative. They concluded that
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"the calculated maximum displacement of 10 inches, resulting from the selected double design earthquake should not cause damage to 1 However, provisions should structures located near the toe of the cut.
be made to insure that the condition of the material on the slope is not altered, particularly by saturatico due to poor surface drainage "
The applicant has stated in Appendix 2.5C of the FSAR that ,
l the soils on these slopes have exhibited very low permeability. !
- e. g. , 10-6 cm/sec. Because of this low permeability and the con-figuration of the slope, an alteration of material conditions that would allow impoundment of water suf ficient to cause saturation of the soil is extremel- unlikely.
We have reviewed the stability of the cut slopes and the provisions for drainage to preclude saturation by groundwater, and have concluded that the slopes will remain stable during the occurrence of the SSE, and that Category I structures will not be damaged.
n man
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7-1 7.0 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS 7.5 Safety Related Display Information With regard to the safety related display informatica, we stated in the SER that the applicant had not provided a descrip- l tion of the bypass and inoperable status indication.
In Amendment 22 to the FSAR, the applicant provided a l description of the safety system status display which includes the inoperable, bypass, systes alignment and annunciator displays.
The s,re ty related display provides data to enable the operator to perform the required maausi safety functionr, and also provides informathn for post-accident surveillance. The instrumentation provided is similar to that for the Zion Nuclear Plant, except for the physical configuration. As mentioned in the SER, we have reviewed the drawings for this instrumentation and verified the implementa-tion during a site visit.
We have concluded that the safety related display will provide j We the required information to the operators, and is acceptable.
1 consider this matter to be resolved. 1 l
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8.0 ELECTRIC POWER i 8.4 T%ysical Independence of Electrical Equipitent and Circuits In the SER, we stated that the applicant had not prov) dei a description and analysis of the criteria for protection of Class IE j
cabling and equipment in hazardous areas, e.g., missile prone areas. j J
1r. Amendment 24 to the TSAP, the applicant provided a descrip- 1 tion and analysis, of tha criteria and procedures for (1) providing physical independence of safety related circuits and equipment and (2) providing protection of Class IE cabling and equipment in We have reviewed the criteria and procedures and hazardous areas.
verified that they have been prewrly implemented during our initial site visit. Subject to f avorable resolution of our f additional concern regarding physical separation in the process I
analog system (SER Section 7.2.3) we have concluded that the sepkration criteria meet the rosed.ssion's requirements and are, therefore, acceptable.
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10-1 10.0 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM 10.3 Main Steam Supply System l
We stated in the SER that we woul report in a supplement our evaluation of an analysts concerning the ability of the main steam line check valves to remain functional following a steam line break i
upstrean of the valves. l i
In Amendment 21 to the FSAR the applicant submitted an analysis of the capability of the main steam isolation and check valves to withstand closure loads followieg a postulated main steam line break. l l
We have evaluated this analysis and find the analytical methods and procedures used to calculate energy impact levels and stresses l in the valve disc, tail link assembly, valve sest, and those portions !
1 of the valve body subject to closure impact to be acceptable. We have concluded that the analytical and design procedures used in the analysis give reasonable assurance that the main steam check i
valves will perform their function and maintain their integrity ;
under closure impact in the event of a rupture of a main steamline.
We consider this mattar to be resolved.
10.4 Other Fastures We stated in the SER that we had requested the applicant to provide design modifications w the turbine building to ensure that flooding resulting from a rupture of remaining exposed portions of the circulating water pipe, i.e. , failure of a condenser waterbox I
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i 10-2 manhole cover, would not icpair the safe operation of the emergency diesel generators which are located in separate compartments on the ground floor of the turbine building. We further stated that the l l
applicant had proposed a two foot high door separating the entrance to the diesel generator hallway from the' main turbine building floor. I 1
1 In Amendment 21 to the FSAR, the applicant stated that in the ]
Q event of failure of a waterbox manhole cover-to seal the manhole, -l either from materisi failure or from operating.orror, the flow would 1
fill the sump and equipment pit storage areas below floor level in l
15 minutes if the building drains are assumed 'to be fut.ctioning, and j in 10 minutos if the drains are not functioning. During this time, alarms would be given for turbine building sump high level and for water in the condenser pit. The addition of the door separating the emergency generater hallway from the main tutbine building floor will 1 l
allow at least 12 additional minutes (aesuming no flow of water from i the b+iilding) during which corrective action may be taken to avoid flooding of the diesels. The door will be locked closed and under administrative control during plant operation. An alare will sound in the control room when the door is opened for maintenance or other purposes.
We have reviewed the proposed design modifications to the turbine building and have concluded that the minimum time interval of 22 minutes (assuming that the building drains are clogged) available for corrective action is acceptable. We consider this matter to be resolved.
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13-1 13.6 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS _
13.2 Training Program We stated in the Safety Evaluation Report that certain revisions in the applicant's operator requalification program would be needed sti order to meet the requirements of Section 50.54 (1-1) of 10 CFR j j
Part 50 and Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 55. These revisions involved i
the proposed lectare series, on-the-job training, and evaluation and records, i in Amendt.ent 21 to the FSAR, the applicant submitted appropriate revisions to the operctor requalification program. The program now adequately describes the following items: I '
(1) The lecture series to be administered. Including subjects and j
duratior.;
)
(2) The specific manipulations of controls; (3) The methods to be employed to assure individual review of design, procedure, and license changes; (4', The, methods to be employed to assure individual review of abnormal and emergency procedures; (5) The specific evaluation criteria for determining attendance at a cpecific lecture, required participation in an accelerated requalification program, and'other additional training, as applicable; (6) The records to be maintained to document each individual's participatic in the program.
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13-2 Based on the revisions to the operator requalification program sub-mitted by the applicant, we have concluded that the program.is 4 1 1
acceptable. We consider this matter to be resolved.
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22.0 CONCLUSION
S _
f In Section 22 of the SER we stated that several items were I stil}
outstanding, and that favorable resolution of these items would be required bef ore operating licenses for Diablo Canyon Units
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I and 2 could be issued. A number of these have been resolved in The remaining itama which must be resolved (and this supplement.
their present status) are summarised belows (1) The applierat has provided additional information on the program for control room monitoring of meteorological part.reters.
Our evaluation of this information has not been completed.
(SER Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.6)
(2) The applicant must provide addit f anal information on tbs effects of tsunami wavea caused by near-shore generators.
(Sections 2.4.2, 2.4.3 and 2.4.5 of this report)
(3) Our comparative evaluation of the Ecagri and Santa Lucia :
l Bank f aults, and our evaluation of the aarthquake potential of the Hongri f ault have not been completed. (Sections 2.5.1 1 and 2.5.2 of t'his report). I (4) The applicant has agreed to provide additional information 1 l
on the potential consequences of pipe break outside con- I tainment. Our evaluation of this item will be completed when i i
(SER Ser, tion this additional information has been received.
3.6)
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(5) The applicant has not yet submitted required information coniirming the seismic qualification of Category I )
instrumentation and electrical equipment. (SR Sections 3.10 and 7.8) l (6) Documentation has been provided in a WCAP report justifying the use of the results of tests of 7-grid assemblies to prove the acceptability of the 3-grid design. Our evaluation of this report has not been completed. (SElt Section 4.2.1)
(7) The tesults of the single rod burst tests have been documented in a WCAP report. Our evaluation of this report has not been completed. (S R Section 4.2.1)
)
(8) Our evaluation of the 17 x 17 fuel rod surveillance program j han not been completed. (SR Section 4.2.1)
(9) The applicant has not yet documented evidence co:21raing l resolution of the uncertainties in the thernal and hydraulic design. (S R Section 4.4) j l
(10) The applicant has not yet wbmitted the results of certain subcompartment pressure calculations using the Transient Mass Distribution (TMD) Program. (SER Section 6.2.1)
(11) The applicant has not yet documented his commitment to remove power from the electrical system to lock certain motor-operated ECCS valves in their pref erred safety positions. (SR Sections 6.3.1 and 7.3.4) e
22-3 I
(12) Our evaluation of 'the plants' comp 1'iance with the RCCS Final Acceptance Criteria has not been completed. (SER Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.5)
(13) The applicant has previded additional information regarding physical and electrical separation .n the solid state protection system. Our evaluation of this information has
-l not been completed. (Sn Sections 7.2.2.1 and 7.2.2.2) j (14) The applicant has provided additional information regarding d Our l physical separation in the process analog system. !
evaluation of this information has not been completet.. (SER Section 7.2.3)
J (15) Our evaluation of ATWS has not been completed. (SER Section 7.2.5) 1 1
(16) The applicant has not provided adequate information to confira the environmental qualification of Category 1 instrumentation f
1 and electrical equipment. (SER Section 7.8)
(17) Our evaluation of the consequences of a postulated cask drop has not been completed. (SER Section 9.2.3)
(18) Our evaluation of the proposed design modifications to the turbine building to bring about a reduction of the doses in the event of RER leakage during the recirculation phase following a postulated LOCA has not been completed. (SER Section 15.1)
22-4 (19) With regard to the operational QA program, the applicant has not yet documented his constituent, to follow the guidance in certain WASH documents. (Item 99 of Appendix A of this report)
. Subject to f avorable resolution of the outstanding matters described above, the conclusions, as stated in Section 22 of the j
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SElt remain unchanged. i i
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A-1 APPENDIX A CONTINUATION OF THE CHRON014CY OF THE RADIOLDCICAL REVIDf
- 89. October 16, 1974 Safety Evaluation Report issued.
- 90. October 22, 1974 Submittal of Amendment No. 18 consisting primarily of a final response to the staff's request for information on tsunami waves caused by near-shore generators.
- 91. November 1, 1974 Letter to applicant requesting additional .infor-nation on the emergency core cooling system.
- 92. November 1, 1974 Letter to applicant ir. forming him of changes in the safety review schedule.
- 93. November 1, 1974 Submittal of Aneminent No.-19 consisting primarily of the applicant's final report on the geology of the Southern Coast Ranges and the adjoining Offshore Continental Margin of California.
- 94. November 11, 1974 Submittal of Amendment No. 20 consisting pri-marily of revised material for Sectida 2.5 of the FSAR (Geology and Seismology).
- 93. November 70, 1974 Submittal of report on the analysis of off-shore seismicity in the vicinity of the Diablo Canyon site.
- 96. November 21, 1974 Submittal of Amendment No. 21 consisting pri-marily of responses to the staff's requests for additional information concerning the main steam isolation valves and the operator requalification program.
- 97. December 5, 1974 Response from applicant to our letter of November 1, 1974, regarding ECCS.
- 98. December 6, 1974 gequest No. 9 to applicant for additional infor-nation on seismic deeign.
- 99. December 10, 1974 Letter to applicant requesting information on quality assurane activities for the operations phase of the Diablo Canyon Units.
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A-2 100. December 16, 1974 Submittal of Amendment No. 22 consisting of additional information required for the resolution of outstanding items in the SER.
101. December 16, 1974 Letter from applicant giving schedule for sub-mittal of additional information on all outstanding i items in the SER. j 102. December 23, 1974 Submittal of Ammad=*nt No. 23 consisting of additional information on environmental qualifi-cation of electrical equipment.
103. December 30, 1974 Response free applicant to our request for addi-tional information of December 6, 1974, regarding i j seismic design. i l
l 104. January 14, 1975 Letter to applicant informing him of changes in i the safety review schedule.
105. January 16, 1975 Submittal of Amendment No. 24 c'onsisting of addi- j tional information required for the resolution '
of outstanding itemis in the SER.
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I 106. January 20, 1975 Submittal of report on physical and electrical separation in the solid state protection and !
process analog systems. ]
107. January 24, 1975 Request No. 10 to applicant for additional informa- !
tion on tsunami wave calculations, j 108. January 29, 1975 Letter from applicant committing to supply addi-tional information regarding the consequences of postulated ruptures of high energy piping outside containment.
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B-1 APPENDIX B BIBLIOGRAPHY
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(Documents referenced in or used to prepare Supplement No. IL to the Safety Evaluation Report for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. "his list of documents is in addition to those. pre-viously listed in the bibliography for the Safety Evaluation Report.)
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Hydrology 9
- 1. U.S. Weather Bureau, Hydrometeorological Report No. 36, " Interim .
Report Probable Maximus Precipitation in' California," 1961, revised 1969.
- 2. U.S. Army. Corps of Engineers, the Hydrologic Engineering Center, ._
" Generalized Standard Project Rainflood Criteria, Southern California _
Coastal Streams," Davis, California, March 1967. ,
- 3. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Hydrologic Engineering Center,
" HEC-1, Flood Hydrograph Package, Computer Program 723-K6-L2010,"
Davis, California, January 1973.
- 4. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Hydrologic Engineering Center,
" HEC-2, Water Surf ace Profiles, Computer Program 723-X6-L202A',"
Davis, California, Dececher 1971.
- 5. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.59,
" Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants," USAEC, Directorate of Regulatory Standards, Washington, D. C., August 1973.
- 6. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.27,
" Ultimate Heat Sink," USAEC, Directorate ci Regulatory Standards,- '
Washington, D. C. (Revision 1) March 1974.
Structural Engineering
- 7. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.61, ,
" Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants,"
USAEC, Directorate of Rejulatory Standards, Washington, D.-C., i October 1973.
Geology Seismology and Foundation Engineering i
- 8. Albee, A. L., and Smith, J. 'L., " Earthquake Characteristics and .!
Fault Activity in Southern California"; Specist Publication of the ,
I Los Angeles Section of the Association of Engineering Geologists, .,
Arcadis, California, pp. 9-3), 1966.
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- 9. Bonilla, M. G., " Surface Faulting and Related Ef fects," in Earthquake Engineering Robert L. Viegel, Coord. Ed., Frentice-Hall, Inc.,
Englewoor' Clif f s, M . J. , 1970.
- 10. Boskins, E. G., and Griffiths, J. R., " Hydrocarbon Potential of Eorthern and Central California Off shore" and American Assoc.
Petroleum Geologists., Memoir 15, pp. 212-228,1971.
- 11. Schnabel, P. B., and Seed, 8. B. , " Accelerations in Rock for Earthquakes in the Western United States," tulletin, Seismic Soc.
Am. , V . 63. No. 2, p. 501-516, 1973.
- 12. Tochcr, D., " Earthquake Incrgy and Ground Breakage," Seiss. Soc.
Amer. Bull., Vol. 48, p.147-153,1958.
- 13. Algeraiscen, S. T., " Studies in Seismicity sad Earthquaka Damage Statistics; Thrre parts, Summary and eehations, 23 pages; Appendix A,142 pagen; and Appendix B, 68 pages," Prepared for the Depa.tment of Housing and Urban Developoset. Office of Economic Analyris by the Staff and Consultants of the Department of Comsarce, ESSA, Coast and Cecdetic Survey,1969.
- 14. Wagner, H. C., "Ar!ro Geology Retween Cape San Martin and Pt.
Sal South-Central Calif ornia Of f shore;" U. S. Geol. Survey open file report 74-252, 1974.
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) APPENDIX'C
DEPARTMENT Or THE ARMY C#FJCE OF THE CHIEF or teoctestEsts f'
) WASHlfoGTOed. O.C. sesle '
t y ' ' 3 5 7n % on.
MEN 6-S 31 May 1974 I
_l av \ ' c '.,w. h Mr. Willias P. Canseill .
V Chief, Site Analysis Branch '
Directorate of Licensing Regulation US Atomic Energy Commission j
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Washington, D.C. 20545 '.~
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Dent Mr. Cammi11: 1I W Ytrur request f or review of the Stability Evaluation of the Power Plant Cut Slope of FSAR at Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, Cali-fornia has been coupleted by our Los Angeles District. Their review concents are inclosed. If you have questions on their ccaments, it is suggested 213, that you contact Mr. Fuquay, Los Anaeles District. Area Code 688-> 70.
Sincerely yours, 1 Inct HCHEF B. WILLIS
/b h As stated Chief, Engineering Division l Directorate of Civil Works e-s- %
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LOS ANSELES DISTRICT. CORPS OF ENGINEERS P.o.som avis Los ANutus, caciroRNia soons
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$ PLED-F 14 March 1974
SUBJECT:
Technical Assistance to Atcunic Energy Commissico, Diablo Canyon Site Division Engineer South Pacific Division AT11: SMC-G
- 1. Reference is made to letter, DAEN-CWE-S, dated 16 October 1973 and 24 Ind, SFIID-F dated 10 December 1973, subject as above.
- 2. The data has been received and the review has been made. The comments are e.tached.
FOR ThT ESTRICI ENGINEER:
G.-?= :n; 1 Inci GARTH A. FUQUAY as Chief, Engineering Divistor. ,
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'1 SPDED-C (14 Mar 74) Ist Ind
SUBJECT:
Technical As.41 stance to Atomic Energy Commission, Diablo Canyon Site ;
DA, South Pacific Divicion, Corps of Engineers, 630 Sansome Street Room 1216, San Frsneisec, California 9'4111 27 March 1974 70: BQDA (DA1.N-CWE-S) WASH DC 20314
- 1. As explained in 2d Indorsement cf references cited in paragraph'l of basic, the review commenta could rot be furnished in the time frame originally requested. Submittal of all dats is now coopleted and the review concents are in:losed.
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- 2. Two meetings were held with representatives of LAD, AEC, the power l plant owner and his consulting soils engineering. company. The last j meeting, beld 22 February 1974, was also attended by a representative i l
of SPD end at that meeting the site was inspected and the owner and soils consultant answered all questiens with regard to their analyses of the slope stability. The AEC representatives were informally advised at thet time of the LAD findings as enumerated by in paragraphs 11-14 of the inclosed review coments.
run ar. va nwa Ed ne..A:
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, c oada 1 Inci /J015 d. GEEHART ne j " Chief, Engineering Division i 1
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REVIEW COMMEhTS )
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CUT 514PE AT DIABLO CANYON POWEk IIMI ]
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MMLCE 1974 l
w a REVIEW COMMENTS ON CUT $1AFE AT DIAB 14 CANYON POWER PLAbT -
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- 1 WNERAL )
- 1. The Pacific Cas and glectsic Company's Amendment No. 2 to Final Safety )
Analysis Report for Units 1 and 2 at Diablo Canyon Site, gan Luis Obispo County, California wea received by Ims Angeles District on 4 February -
1974 As requested by let lad to letter DAEN-CWE-8, dated 16 October 1973, I a review has been made of Appendix 2.5c, Stability Evaluation Power Pir.nt i Cut Slope of Final gaiety Analysis Report.
- 2. At the request of Atomic F.nergy Commission on 7 geptember 1973 the l' applicant, PG & E, had been required to provide basic data and analyses to substantiate the stability of the existing cut slope east of Units 1 and 2. The following data was requested:
- a. static and dynamic engineering properties of the soils.and rock underlying the slope, based on results of couplete field and laboratory )
test data.
- b. Actual properties and the assumptions for soils and rock used 1 in the stability analyses. I
- c. Lessription and discuences of staatatty analyses.
- 3. In order to provida adequate assurance of slope stability the AEC also requestad the following: -
2
- a. Perform etatic and dynamic stability analysis, using an acceptable j asthod of analvu s.
i
- b. Provide and discuss the failure criteria, the failure modes, and J the range of computed factors of safety. 1 1
4 The need for the above data and analyses was verified by the 1AD at the meeting held on 25 October 1973.
- 3. On 21 and 22 February after a preliminary review of the report a meeting and site inspection was held with personnel from LAD, the AEC, the applicant and the applicant's Architect-Engineer Harding-Lawson and j Associates. The following are comments on the inepection, and review 'i of the investigation, testing, design values and stability analyses for j the subject cut slope.
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- 6. The surficial conditions of the e, lope appears to be satisfactory.
The exposed soils on the face of the cut are mostly slope wash consisting of black sitty clay and sandy clay. In the laver portion of the slope, colluvium consisting of sandy to gravelly clay underlies the slope wash material. The basal soil unit is represented bv ancient marine beach deposits of silty sand and gravel which rest directly on wave cut terraces.
The underlying bedrock consists of a tuffaceous to sitty sandstone 'and siltstone. In the upper part of the slope a shallow layer of silty clay overlies the bedrock. The lower portion of the slope has been excavated to about 1 vertical on 2 horisontal. The upper portion of the slope was cut to approximately 1 on 3.
7 To explore the subsurface conditions the A-E has drilled 12. test holes varying in depth from 30 to 120 feet, and eacavated 4 test pite to depths 1 ranging up to 12 feet. . Disturbed and undisturbed samples representative of the soil overburden were obtained for classification and detailed static and cyclic loading tests. Cere samples of the rock were tested to deter-adas the shear strength and perusability of the bedrock.
- 8. From the results of the investigations and laboratory tests it was concluded that the cut slope consists of four predcainant materials.
The surficial soils, slope wash, usually less than 10 feet thick, are andNa stiff to stiff silty clay containing occasional small rock frag-c:nt: :nf :rt:ni: d:tri;. Th: ::11.ti s , sr sendj 6:46.117 si.i w.J u -
lying the slope wesh varies up to 50 feet in tnickness. The colluvius is underlata by terseca deposits of silty sand and gravel in the lwer portion of the slope. These a:arine-deposited materials range from 5 feet to a maxims of 17 feet thick in the. area investigated. The rock unit underlying the alluvium consis's of a tan to brown sandstone and occasional siitt me which is highly weathered from about 5 to 10 feet below the bedrock surf ace. The bedding planes in the rock generally strika east-west and dips to the north. The dip varies from very steep south of Unit 2 to nearly horisontal in the center of the slope area.
A review of the data in the Final Safety Analysis Report pertaining to the structural features, and field inspection at the site indicates a few minor fault sones were observed in excavations in the bedrock and other larger and more continuous faults were observed within the mapped areas. None of these faults extend upward into the overlying Quaternary deposits.
Informati.oa obtained from the U. S. Geological Survey on their study of f ault systems in the offshore area has not revealed any recent or active f ault trace that would af fect the selection of the maximum sisa' earthquakes to be expected during the life of tne project.
Free ground water was not encountered during the exploration performed in the slope area. There was seepage water present in the escavation 2
- C-1 for the Unit 1 containment structuro et a; proximately olevation 60 well below the elevation of the toe of the slope. Test borings were drilled deep enough in the slope area to determine that ground water-was well belou the bedrock surface and would not be a factor in'the stability of the slope.
- 9. The selected static and dynamic strength parameters including un'it weights were based on results of laboratory tests and field geophysical survey.
- 10. The Modified Bishop's Method was used to analyse the static stability of the slope. The seismic response of the slope was analysed by finite element methods using a computer program developed at the University Of California at Berkeley by Lysmer, Udaka, Seed and Hwang. ' The deformation analysis was based on determination of yield deceleration and the resulting amount of mover.ent when the yield value is escoeded. The magnitude of horisontal displacement is a Onction of the shear strength of the materials along the are analysee. Curves were developed relating laboratory direct shear data and displacement. In the seismic and deformation analyses the magnitude of acceleration and frequency ocales of the designated earthquake were doubled.
EVALUATION
- 11. The amount of exploration and sampling has been sufficient to determine the type of materials and cross section of the slope. The testing of representative samples is consistant with the practice of the Corps of gngineers. The selected static and dynamic strength parameters are repre. )
sentative values of the.various materials on the slope based on results of )
laboratory static direct and triaxial shear tests, and field geophysical j survey and laboratory dynamic triamial shear. test results. )
- 12. Using the adopted unit weights and strengths, checka.were made by ~l LAD of the pseudo-static analyses for critical failure surfaces presented in plates 12 and 13 of the Final Safety Analysis Report. The checks were done manually and by computer. In all cases checked, the safety factor J was verified. The minimum computed yield acceleration was 0.56,. Yield acceleration te defined as the applied seismic coefficient tiesi gravity at which movement would start. The failure plane for the miniansa yield acceleration would be within the soil overburden.
- 13. The methodology used in the dynamic analyses is consistent with the ,
latest State-of-the-Art techniques and the results are conservative. It was reported that throughout the course of the investigation, testing and analyses Dr. H. B. Seed was periodically consulted for the dynamic and displacement analyses. A review of the report " Stability gvaluation, Power Plant Cut slope" by Dr. M. B. Seed has been included in Final safety Analysis Report.
3
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- 14. The calculated maximum displacement of'10 inches, resulting from the selected double design earthquake should not cause damage to strue-tures located near the toe of the cut. However, provisions should be made to insure that the condition of the material on the slope is not altered particularly by saturation due to poor eurface drainap.
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- ~" ': - United States Department of the Interior i RLS . \1 1.N I. 2 2 s .g Rtedvt0 '
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General L. V. Gossick j,gg JAN 2 81975 naa seam Nuclear Reguletory Comission j s l Washington, D.C. 20545
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Dear Genert. Gossick:
Transmitted hercuith, in response to a request by your staff, is a l
review of the geologic and seistologic data relevant to the Diablo j Canyon Site, Units 1 and 2 (AEC Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323). l This review was prepared by F. A. M:Keown and James F. Devine of the U.S. Geological Survey.
lie have no objection to your rakir.g this review part of the public l record.
Sincerely yours, i r
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Let's Clean Up AsiefH:a For Out 2coth Birthday
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Pacific' Gas and Electric Company {
Diablo Canyon Site. Units 1 and 2 i San Luis Obispo Canty, California i AEC Docket Nos. $>275 and 50-323 j This is a final review of the geological and pertinent seismological , I l
data in the final Safety-Analysis Report (FSAR)- and Amendments 11,19, and i 20 for the Diablo Caryon nuclear power plant site. Units 1 and 2. A preliminary review dated January 23,1974 ' of the FSAR was transmitted to the Atomic Er.ergy Comission by E. M. Baltz on March 28,1974 -
The principal consideration in the preliminary review was that it did j not provide.information to evaluate adeguately an offshore fault or structural zone that had been reported in the literature (Hoskins and Griffiths,1971) since review of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report l (P5t.R) . Since the prel inary review cf the FSAR the applicant and its consultants have conducted extensive geophysical surveys and made geological !
I analyses of them to determine the offshore geology, most of w4ich is l presented in Appendix D of Amendment 19. Prior to the applicant's surveys i the U.S. Geological Survey on behalf of the U.S. Atomic Energy Comission l
had made a geophysical survey of a large part of the offshore structural zone. This information (Wagner,1974) ws open filed to the public in September 1974 and the applicant has used it extensively in Amendment 19 This final review therefore is directed mostly to evaluation of the data in Amendment 19, although all parts of the FSAR were reviewed. 'No field examination of the site was made in conjunction with review of the FSAR.
The FSAR and its amendments contain a reasonably accurate description and evaluation of a large amount of geophysical and geological data. The geologic r:aps (Plates III and IV. Amentent 19) offshore of the southcentral,
Califcrnia coast agree in general with the offshore geologic rap of For Wagner (1974). In deteil however the riaps differ at many places.
exar.ple, the trends, location, and number of faults in Estero Bay shown on i Plate IV differ from those shown in plate I of Wagner. A synopsis of the ger., logy on Plates I, !!, III, and IV is that the offshore Santa Maria Further, both basin is bounded on the east and west by major fault zones.
f ault zones are recognized as capable within criteria of the Atcmic The easternmost fault zone, called the East Boundary Energy Co. mission.
zone (ESZ) by the applicant and called the Hosgri fault zone (HFZ) by Wagner (1974), is of prinary inportance because it passes within four miles of the site and is about 90 miles long. As will be outlined in another part of the review, we do not concur with the applicant's conclusion that the current structural environ ent of both the offshore and or. shore area that is dominated by vertical covements. We do concur with the annlirant the faults exposed in excavation for the site and in the cliffs near the !
However, the age t te i apparently are not capable within AEC criteria.
(80,000-120,000 years before present) of the youngest terrace r.aterials We was inferred by long-distance correlation of terraces (p. 2.5 33).
accept the correlation as probable but an absc' lute age detert:ination would be highly desirable. As these faults and foundation cc9ditions f I
have been arply docur.ented and have not appeared to present proble-s that l could not be managed by engineering practices, they are not discussed in this review, Regional Geolm e The applicant's descrd s:fon of the regional tectonic features given in Amendment 20, (p. 2.5-7 through 2.5-13f) 1:, quite adequate. In brief the 2
plant site is located in the South Coast Ra'nges structural province which is characterized by northwest trending structural and geomorphic features.
The applicant lists five r.ajor structural features (fault zones) in the i region around the site (p. 2.5-9 Amend. 20). These are the San Andreas.
Rinconada-San Marcos-Jelen, Sur-Nacimiento, Santa Lucia Bank and San Simeon f aults at distances of 45, 25,18, 28 and 18 miles from the site
. '1 respectively (Table A. Acend.19). All of these faults are considered capable by the applicant (p. 2.50-64, 65. Amend 19). The East Boundary.
fault zone at 2.5 to 4 miles from the site is not listed as a major structural feature although it bounds the offshore Santa Maria basin as the Santa Lucia Bank fault does and is' conwnsurate in size with the Santa Lucia Bank fault. We consider the East Coundary fault zone a r.ajor structural feature.
In the vicinity of the site . tnat is the Estero Bay-han Luis Range area, three principal fault zones are discussed in addition to the East Boundary fault zone (p. 2.5-13c through 13f, Amend. 2')). These are the i West Huasna Edna, and San Miguelito faults at distances of 11, 4.5, and 2.5 miles from the site, respectively. Nearly all faults trend northwesterly.
Highly deforned Meso:oic and Cenozoic rocks occur between the faults.
The available data do not indicate that any of these faults are capable acccrding to AEC criteria. The trend of the Edna fault when projected to the northcest suggests that it could possibly intersect the EBZ in Estero Bay. The locatior and discontinaces style of faults mapped inEsteroBayhoweverbyboththeapplicant(PlateIVAmend19)and Wagner (1974, Plate I) do not confirm intersection of the Edna fault with the EB2. As the EBZ is large* and closer to the site. consideration of the Edna fault as a source of earthquakes is of less importance $
l
East Boundary Teult Zone As indicated previously in this review and by the applicant (2.50-9, Anend.19) the East Boundary fault zone has been the structural feature of most interest and importante. . Nearly all of the extensive geophysical explorations conducted and analyzed during the past year or so since the FSAR was first issued have been directed especially to defining this zone and its geologic relationship to contiguous features such as the Santa Maria basin, structures in the San Luis Range, and the Transverse Range structures projected from the southeast. The importance of the EEZ and need to investigate it thoroughly was evident from the facts that it is less than four miles from the site, is more than 90 miles in length, and appears to have minor seismic activity associated with it. The applicant has made a comendable effort.to define and explain the zone.
!!c c0.:ar '.iith ths &pplicant'6 Jesu i,4 ion of .he E62 and nis conciu-sion that it is a faulted zone of inflection between the offshore Santa Maria Basin and the uplifted Coast Ranges (p. 2.50 37 through 2.50-42, and 2.50-98,Arend.19). It appears therefore that the zone once was more l closely related to the vertical tectonics associated with basin development than to transcurrent tectonics associated with plate boundaries. As recognized by the applicant, the EBZ may also be a "---part of the San Andreas continental margin transform fault system-- " (p. 2.5D-41, Amend 19).
Such northwest trending fault zones as the EBZ, both offshore and onshore, have been considered by others (for example, Hamilton and Myers, 1966,
- p. 522 and figure 2 Atwater,1970, p. 3525) to be part of a s/ stem of faults with right lateral novement. The applicant presents considerable data and argu ,ents to support the concept"---that the current tectonic ,
4
.. . D-6 environment in the southern Coast Ranges and adjacent offshor^ cegion -
is dominated by vert 4 1 r:ovements associated with general uplift of the ranges. (p. 2.5D-6. kend.19).
It is cicar fror the offshori: seistic reflection profiles in Appendix A as well as mapping onshore that verticci separations of as much as several' thousand feet occur in Pliocene and older strata. Evidence of lateral separation is less clear, probably because lateral separation can rarely be de..onstrated unequivocally. The applicant concluded however that as much as several thousand feet of lateral displacement r.ay have occurred on the ECZ throaghout its nistory-(p. 2.50-41, Amend. 19). Evidence of lateral slip on the EBZ has been given b'y Wagner (1974, figure 13,p.7). Similar evidence is apparent ir. figure SA (Appendix A) and sections B-B', and 0-D' Plate Vil, where tarked changes in thickness of acoustical units occur across faults and reverse sense of movenent on the see fault is shown. Also, the San Sircon tault, which is considered the eastern boundary of the northern pcrt of the Santa flaria basin is reported to have about 1500 feet rf lateral displace ent.
Incorpitte fault plane solutions (Scith,1974) are used by tne applic:nt in an attempt to derenstrate the dominance of vertical novements. 'All three solutions given by 5.ith however have significant lateral components to the inferred fault rechanism. Additional st.iscological evidence that Coast Range faults carrently have lateral nove ent on them is given by Greene and others (1973, Sheet 2). These authors shoa on Sheet 2 predominant right-laterci coverent in fault plane solstion* o' earthquater in f'onterey Bay near pro}tcticos of northwest trending Coas: Range faults.
As (1) nearly all of the evidence of lateral movenent is in the youngest recks, we of which may t,e Po:t-Mis:cnsinan (L'agner,1974, p.13) ,
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g .
and (2) the echani g.-of current' earthquakes has a significant component of lateral reve ent, vertical novecents ray now be a subordinate cc .ponent j on faults in tre ESZ as well as other rajor faults in southcentral coastal.
i Conclusions j
)
We concludc f rcr. the evidence in the FSM and literature that large (
vertiqa1 displaccrents occurred in the EEZ, mettly during the late !!iocene .
1 and Pliocene'when the offshore Santa Paria basin was r'ost actively developing. l Most current tectonic activity ho.vever is causing as r.uch or r: ore lettral f l as vertical displacement en north.est trendits faults in the Coast F.anges f 1
i and offshore region. Both the East Ecurtary zone and Santa Lucia Cank i fault zcne ray have a first order genetic relation to the Santa Paria casin )
)
and consequently are not regional in tre sense that they de r.ot trenstet J
structural provintes such as the Transverse Ranges as the San Andreas !
l fault does. They should te considered inextricably involved, ho.ever, with the strile-slip fault rechanics of plate boundary motions that are currently concentrated alor.g the San Ar.dreas fault. . Earthquakes along the EBZ presur.atly would not be as larse as expected on the San Andreau f ault; ho.iever, from the inferr:aden pecsently at hand we can find r.o I evidence that would preclude the occurrence of an earthquake as large as ;
events chart.cteristic of subparallel strike slip faults, which beur.d basins, such as the Santa ftaria, in the San Andreas syster and which do not transect struct'eral provinces.
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- ' ' 'Seisnology.
-The portions of..the Final Safety Analysis Report and Amenhents l 11[19,20 of the report entitled " Analysis of Offshore Seismicity in the Vicinity of-the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power " Plant" and the Pacific Gas and Electric Cowany letter dated December 27,1974, concerning seismic tesponse and its enclosures have been reviewed.-
The seismological aspects of this Site were previously investigated-by the applicant and a review was prepared by the Seismological Division of the Coast and Geodetic Survey (since changed in organiza-
~
tionintheNationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration) dated ,
'eptember 21,1967. 1 y
As evidenced by the previous discussion of the Geology, a large amount of new data has'been developed offshore from the plant site.
The interpretation of these data, as previcusly discussed, necessitate-the placing of a mooerate to large earthquake on either the East Boundary Zone or the Santa Lucia Bank faults. The applicant, in-Amendment 20 has addressed the significance of this interpretation and has indicated a " potential for large earthquakes-involving faulting over distances in the order of tens of miles: Seismic activity at this level can occur along offshore faults in the Santa Lucia Bank region (the likely source of the Magnitude 7.3 earthquake 1 of 1927). . . ." Elsewhere in the FSAR is stated "The East Boundary zone is considered to be seismically active...." Our opinion, is based on these statenents and the current necessity of-considering these two structures as having similar seismic potential. ]
Due to the lack of instrumental data from sites within 10 km of the surface expression of a fault, it is difficult to' describe the
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maximum acceleration, or velocity _ that would b( recorded in this 1 nearby zone. In addition, the correlation of any of these parameters with damage is suspect in the near zones. On the other hand, there-are numerous incidents of structures, extremely close to the fault ur.dergoing movement and experiencing earthquakes, that experienced little or no damage. _ Also, it is apparent that the maximum' peak l
acceleration does not continue to climb as one approaches closer to and reaches the fault break or as one postulates larger and larger earthquakes at a given point _on the fault.
The efforts by the applicant to consider the effects of earthquakes on existing records of strong motion from sites near to the earthquake fault in terms of the frequency content of the response spectra are worthwhile. However, a question of transferability still remain:,
(the s ze of the event in one case and the distance in another).
i Nevertheless,- this analysis when used to match peaks of the spectr:.
(nearby aid more distent sources) to the response of critical com-i ponents is in our opinion an important technique for assessing potential damage.
However, in conclusion, we believe that with the limit of the !
present infomation as to the interpretation of the relationship of the East Boundary fault to the Santa Lucia Bank fault, an earthquake similar to the flovember 4,1927, event but occurring alcng the East Boundary Zone or the Santa t.ucia Bank fault zone represents the maximum earthqua(e that is likely to occur near to the site. This event is in addition to the maximum earthquakes considered in the Construction Pemit evaluation and subsequent hearings and reviews. As long 4
8
D-10 as this interpretation renains valid, it is our opinion that the design value of 0.5 g used as a zero period acceleration in the development of the appropriate response spectra is inadequate.
References-
. Atwater, Tanya,1970, Implications of plate tectonics for the Cenozoic tectonic evolution of western North Arerica: Geol. Soc. America Bull., v. 81, p. 3513-3536..
Greene, H. G. and others,1973 Faults and earthquakes in the Monterey Bay region, California: U.S.. Geol. Servey map PE-518.
Hamilton, W. and Myers, W. B.,1966, Cenozoic tectonics of the k'estern United States: Reviews of Geophysics, V. 4, no. 4, p. 509-549.
Hoskins, E. G., and Griffiths, J. R.,1971 Hydrocarbon potential of Northern and Central California offshe-e: Am. Assoc. Petroleum i
Gwivg6s Femoir 15, p. 212-220..
4 Smith, S. W.,1974, Analysis of Offshore Seismicity in the vicinity of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. Report to Pacific Gas l and Electric Company.
Wagner H. C.,1974, Marine geology between Cape San fiartin and Pt. Sal South-Central California Offshore: U.S. Geol. Survey open file report 74-252.
O i
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1 APPENDIX E ERRATA TO THE SATETY EVALUATION REPORT DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 i Pajte Line 3-12 20 after " closely spaced frequencies.", the following sentence should be inserted: "An exceptica to this procedure for closely spaced frequencies is Category 1 piping analyzed by the response spectrum modal l l
superposition method."
3-17 2 delete the causna after " containment" 3-24 10 replace " Systems" with " System" 6-5 19 replace "43.5" with "46.65" 6-8 8-9 replace "the spray pump suction is... spray recircu-lation phase" with "the containment spray pumps are i tripped" 6-8 22 replace " required" with "utilised" 6-15 10 replace "9.14" with "10.5" 6-17 2 replace "375" with "350" 6-20 11 replace " recirculation" with " spray" 10-7 20 replace " heat" with " head"
4 END ;
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Washington, D. C. 20545 -7 f
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Re: DocketbO-273-D Q g
- y 50-sea-uL p g
Dear Mr. Parr:
- p 1
l In response to your request for additional;information dated December 6, 1974, the seismic response of typical Design Class I structures, systems, and components at Diablo Canyon has I been determined using the modified input response spectra speci-fied in your letter and damping values given in AEC~ Regulatory Guide 1.61.
The modified input spectra were derived from the' ac-celeration time historics for the Parkfield - 5, 1966, N85E
! component and the Castaic, 1971, S69E component, each normali::cd l to a peak ground acceleration of 0.5g. The spectral content of l
these records is considered representative of the vibratory ground motion expected at a site with foundation material similar to Diablo Canyon and generated from a nearby source.
A comparison of these modified spectra with the spectra and damping used in the Diablo Canyon design confirms-the seicmic design adequacy of typical Class I structures, systems and compo-nonts at Diablo Canyon. The detailed results of this work are included in the attachment to this letter.
Very truly yours, 4 .. 5 q
.t. 01.w Attachment (15) b
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CC w/ attachment: See Page 2 i (
\ '
\ l
@ x h
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e fg Mr. Olan D. Parr 2 December 27, 1974 CC w/ attachment: Mrs. Elizabeth E. Apfelberg Richard L. Black, Esq.
l Elizabeth S. Bowers, Esq.
1 Mr. Glenn O. Bright Mr. William P. Cornwell Mr. Frederick Eissler Mr. John J. Forster Mr. Lonnie Valentine Mr. Angelo Giambusso Nathaniel H. Goodrich, Esq.
Dr. William E. Martin Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq.
Secretary - Attn.: Docketing and Service Section Mrs. Sandra A. Silver i 1
l Andrew Skaff, Esq. l l
James R. Yore, Esq.
l-
\ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
Dec;mbar 26, 1974 l
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I DIABI4 CANYON UNITS 1 AND 2 ;
- I INVESTIGATION OF EFFECT ON SEISMIC DESIGN USI!C !
j PARKFIEl.D-5,1966, N85E AND CASTAIC,1971, S69E RECORDS (SCALED TO 0.5G PEAK ACCELERATION) AS INPlTI i
l
- 1. INTRODUCTION i I
The time-histories of the Parkfield-5,1966, N85E component and the Castaic, j 1971, S69E component are plotted in Figures 1 and 2. The time-histories are scaled to have a peak acceleration of 0.5g. These components (normalized to l 0.5g) will hereafter be referred to as simply Parkfield-5 and Castaic. The
]
Double Design Earthquake (DDE, as defined in the FSAR) response spectra for 5% damping is compared with 7% damping response spectra for the Parkfield-5 and Castaic records in Figure 3. The particular choice of damping values for spectral comparison is based on the damping value used in the DDE analysis (5%) and that recommended by AEC Regulatory Guide 1.61 (7%) for !
reinforced concrete structures such as the containment structure.
Table 1 provides information on the period ranges where the various spectra envelope the others. It is apparent from Table 1 that for structures, sys- )
tems, and equipment having significant natural modes with. periods in the ranges: T < 0.08 sec and 0.34 < T < 1.0 sec, the Parkfield-5 or Castaic ground motions may induce a greater response than the DDE. All of the I Category I concrete structures, viz., the entire containment structure, including the interior structure, and the auxiliary building, have significant periods in the range 0.08 < T < 0.34 see and thus their seismic design is not likely to be governed by Parkfield-5 or Castaic ground motions. The steel structure above the fuel handling area in the auxiliary building has periods in the range of 0.35 see to 0.52 sec and its seismic response could possibly be governed by Parkfield-5 or Castaic ground motions. However, as discussed in Section 5, 2% damping was used for bolted steel structures in the DDE analysis whereas Regulatory Guide 1.61 recommends 7%.
In the next section, the results of a dynamic analysis of the containment structure with Parkfield-5 as input ground motion are compared with those from the DDE analysis. Section 3 gives a comparison of floor response spectra for selected points in the containment structure. Section 4 discusses the
~
. s Section 5 compares analy' sis results from Park-
~
effects on NSSS components. l field-5 and DDE on the auxiliary building. Section 6 discusses Design Class I tanks located at grade elevation, j
- 2. CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE t
The same analysis procedure as described in Section 3.7 of the FSAR was used.
The axisymmetric finite element model of the containment structure and the foundation rock mass is shown in Figure 3.7-5 of the FSAR. The input I boundary motions corresponding to Parkfield-5 free ~ field ground motion are derived by the same deconvolution procedure described in Section 3.7 of the FSAR. The comparison of the response spectr;um of the original free field motion and that of the recomputed surface motion is made in Figure 4.
Natural mode periods and mode shapes were found to be identical as in the previous DDE analysis. These are given, respectively, in Table 3.7-1 and Figure 3.7-6 of the FSAR. In computing the responses for Parkfield-5, damp-ing of 77. of critical was used for the concrete structure vs. the 57. used in the DDE response computations.
Table 2 through 5 compare the analysis results using the Parkfield-5 motion with corresponding responses obtained using the DDE motion. The responses compared are maximum absolute accelerations, displacements, total shears and total overturning moments. Except for the acceleration at the base slab, the Parkfield-5 responses of the containment structure are auch less, or in the case of nodal point 38, only very slightly greater than the corresponding DDE 3 1
responses. The higher acceleration response at the base slab for Parkfield-5 ;
1 is to be expected since the peak acceleration in ground adjacent to the slab l is specified as 0.5g for Parkfield-5 compared to 0.4g for DDE. The natural periods of the containment structure are all less than 0.25 sec. Noting from Figure 3 that for T < 0.30 see the Parkfield-5 and Castaic response spectra are in approximately similar relation to the DDE spectrum, and that the natural mode periods of the containment structure are all less than 0.30 sec, one may also conclude that the Castaic responses of the containment structure would be generally in the same proportion to the DDE responses as are the Parkfield-5 responses. .
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- 3. FIDOR RESPONSE SPECTRA - CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE Acceleration time-histories at several nodal points of the containment structure model were derived. Acceleration response spectra for Parkfield-5 using 37., and in some cases 4% damping were calculated at the following nodal (
points (see Figure 3.7-5 of the FSAR for the location of nodal points).
i Nodal Point Elevation Remarks , j 1
14 231.0' Dome spring line j l
19 140.0' Top of interior structure )
32 111.0' Interior structure I i
34 120.5' Exterior structure i l
47 88.5' Base sleb 1 1
Figures 5 through 11 compare these response spectra with DDE floor response l spectra for 1/27. and 1% damping, respectively, at corresponding nodal points.
Damping of 1/2% was used in seismic (DDE) analysis of piping systems vs. the l
3% damping value suggested by AEC Regulatory Guide 1.61 for large piping systems under SSE. Similarly,17. damping was used in seismic (DDE) analysis l of NSSS components vs. 4% damping now accepted by AEC-DRL for the Westinghouse I i
NSSS. The DDE floor response spectra given in FSAR section 3.7 are smoothed l
l versions of the corresponding computer generated plots used in Figure 5 through 11.
It is immediately apparent from Figures 5 through 11 that except for T < 0.075 see at NP 47, the Parkfield-5 floor response spectra are always much lower i
then the DDE floor response spectra. Making the same argument as made at the end of previous section, the above conclusion can be assumed to be valid for the Castaic component also. ,
- 4. NSSS COMPONENTS The nuclear steam supply system is supported in the containment (interior) structure and applicabic response spectra are those at NP 47 and NP 19 for the steam generators and reactor coolant-pumps (Figure 3.7-5, FSAR). The following are the fundamental period ranges of some of the important components of NSSS.
l L
so -
c' .
Component Period Range, see Steam Generator 0.11 - 0.12 Reactor Coolant Pump 0.13 - 0.14 . ;
I Reactor Vessel 0.06- l
'i 1% damping was used in the NSSS seismic analysis for DDE. However, 4% damp-in the SSE seismic analysis has been accepted by AEC-DRL for the Westinghouse NSSS. Thus, using the spectra in Figures .10 and 11, it may be concluded that the Steam Generators and Reactor Coolant Pumps are likely to see smaller seismic forces under Parkfield-5 motion than under the DDE motion. The reactor vessel is supported on the interior concrete structure at elevation 102. Comparing maximum absolute accelerations for Parkfield-5 and the DDE (see Table 2, NP 38) indicates that seisade forces on the reactor vessel are essentially the same for either seismic input. Similar conclusions may also be made for the Castaic component on the same basis as the conclusion made in the previous sections. ;
- 5. AUXILIARY BUILDING The saae analysis procedure as described in Section 3.7 of the FSAR was used.
The model for the auxiliary structure is shown in Figure 3.7-13 of the FSAR.
The natural mode periods and mode shapes of the structure were found to be identical to those obtained for the DDE analysis. The natural periods are given in Table 3.7-8. In the DDE analysis, 2% damping was used in the steel portion of the structure (Mass No. 6 in Figure 3.7-13 of FSAR) and 5% damping in the concrete portion of the structure. In the present analysis, Parkfield-5 ground motion is used as input and 7% damping is used for both the concrete and steel portions of the structure (the steel structure has bolted connections) in accordance with AEC Regulatory Guide 1.61. .
)
The results of the present analysis are compared with those from the DDE !
analysis in Tables 6 through 10. The DE analysis results are given in Tables 3.7-9 through 3.7-13 of the FSAR and the DDE responses are simply twice 6
the DE responses.
. The results presented in Tables 6 through 10 show that at no point in the structure does the Parkfield-5 ground motion govern the seisade design of!
the auxiliary building. This is explained by the fact that the dominant
,a- ...
]
natural' mod'e period of the concrete structure is 0.105 sec where Figure. 3 and' Table ' l show DDE response spectrum controlling. The steel structure.
periods are in the range of 0.35-0.52 sec, in which either Parkfield-5 or Castaic spectra controls. However, 27. damping was used in the DDE analysis and if the 27. damping DDE response spectrum is compared with the 77. Parkfield-5 response spectrum, the DDE response spectrum is found. to be controlling.
Noting that the steel structure's dominant period in the E-W direction is 0.516 and observing from Figure 3 that the Castaic response spectrum is l substantially above the Parkficid-5 response spectrum, it was felt that the steel structure's response in the E-W direction may be controlled by Castaic.
An approximate modal analysis, using the intermediate results (periods, mode shapes, and modal participation factors) of the Parkfield-5 computer analysis, was made for the Castaic ground motion. It.was found that the Castaic responses were almost equal to (actually 5% smaller) the DDE responses. For example, '
the absolute acceleration of Mass No. 6 (see Figure 3.7-13 of FSAR) was 1.03g for Castaic compared to 1.10g for DDE.
Thus one may conclude that neither Parkfield-5 nor Castaic governs the seismic design of the auxiliary building.
- 6. DESIGN CIASS I TANKS The Design Class I tanks located at grade respond at periods greater than 3 seconds. Therefore their seismic design is governed by the DDE (see Figure 3).
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TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF RESPONSE SPECTRA ,
J 1
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j Period (T) range Governing Spectrum h{S,(P-5) ors,(C),7% Damping [
,(max S (DDE), 5% Damping I
, a j
T < 0.08 see Parkfield-5 1.39 -
0,08 < T < 0 34 DDE <1
0'34 < T < 0.41
. Parkfield-5 1 34 l i
0.41 < T < 1.0 Castaic - 1 30 'l l
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TABLE 2. MAXIMUM ABSOLtJTE ACCELERATION!15, CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE .
Maximum Absolute Structure Nodal Elevation Acceleration in g Point
- ft
- PARKFIELD-5 DDE Analysis 2 301.64 1.207 2.083 1
8
, '274.37 ,
1.069 1.736 )
. 10 258.27 0.985 1.567 E
3 14 231.00 0.789 1.177 E
- b 17- 205.58 0.637 1.358 m )
i 5 23 181.08 0.558 1.369
'E S 26- 155.83 0.523 1.292 !
34 130.58 0.545 1.080 37 109.67 0.537 0.793 ca 19-22 l'40.00 0.762 1.195 l 5
0.709.
t 24 127.00 ,
0.982 g .) g '
4 M 27-30 114.00 0.657 0.773 h 32 i10.00 0.645 0.726 E .
E 38 102.00 0.608 0.601" Base Slab 47-58 ,88.58 0.556 0,483 ,
. ' I l
-
- See Figure 3'.7-5 of FSAR
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+ i JOHN A. Ot.UMC (k AGSOCI ATf?i. ENGIN!.5 :4.,. g
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TABLE 3. MAXIMUM DISPLACEMEllTS, CONTAltlMENT STRUCTURE Maximum Displacements Structure Nodal Elevation in inches Point
- ft PARKFIELD-5 DDE Analysis 2 301.64 0.734 1.063 8 274.37 0.657 . 0.967 10 258.27 0.618 0.911 l 14 231.00 0.522 0.807 l
~
17 205.58 0.425 0.695
[o 23 181.08 0.348 0.587 1
l 26 155.83 0.263 0.459
- 5 34 130.58 0.185 0.327 37 109.67 0.121 0.212 g 19-22 140.00 0.124 0.139 a
24 127.00 0.109 0.114
! U 27-30 114.00 0.095 0.090 32 110.00 0.091 0.084 38 102.00 0.080 0.068 Base Slab 47-58 88.58 0 063 0.050 See Figure 3.7-5 of FSAR l
JOHN A. OLUMC ik A SSOCI AT (~ G. l~ N(*.INf.'l ' * .
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L__-._-._ . _ - - _ . . . _ .
TABLE 4 MAXIMUM TOTAL SilEARS, CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE Structure Associated Elevation flaximum Shears-kipsx103 Nodal Points
- ft PARXFIELD-5 DDE Analysis 2 301.64 0.19 0.66 1
8 274.37 6.04 9.38 10 258.27 9.01 13.91 14 231.00 12.97 19.55 h$ 17 205.58 16.92 25.02 tt 3E 23 181.08 19.74 29.98 M
26 155.83 22.28 36.66 34 130.58 24.24 44.18 37 109.67 26.67 49.42 57 88.58 27.49 51.39
$_E .19&22 140.00 8.94 13.23 35 b8 27&30 114.00 13.07 16.87
%b
~m 49854 88.58 25.71 30.96 Total Base Shear 49,54&57 88.58 37.64 . 59.99 f
- See Figure 3.7-5 of FSAR e
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. JOHN A. UL.U F. R ASOOC ATI G. R a ', r f i l
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TABLE 5. f1AXIMUM TOTAL OVERTUP.NING MOMENTS. !
CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE i
Maximum Overturning Structure Associated Elevation Moment - kip-f tx106 )
Nodal Points
- ft -
i PARKFIELO-5 DDE Analysis l 2 301.64 0.00 0.00 j 8 274.37 0.li 0.18 1
1 10 258.27 0.27 0.41
]
i 14 231.00 0.63 0.97 j
,g ;17 205.58 1.10 1.67 oo 1: 0 23 181.08 1.68 2.50 1 3E )
dj e? 26 155.83 2.08 3.08
)
34 130.58 2.79 4.07 37 109.67 '3.18 4.58 57 88.58 3.76 5.48 19&22 140.00 0.05 0.10 uu
.{y 27&30 114.00 0.19 0.33 eo jjg 49&54 88.58 0.81 1.24 1
l Total 0.T.M. at Base 49,54&57 88.58 3.85 5.62
- See Figure 3.7-5 of FSAR
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l JOHN A. Ot UMC % A9'OCI ATE 4. CNC.tr.f ' .i'3
. i
- i
TABLE 6, MAXIMUM ABSOLUTE ACCELERATIONS, ,
AUXlLIARY BUILDING ,
Maximum Absolute Accelerations l
N-S Direction E-W Direction Mass Elevation Horizontal Rotational Horizontal Point * (ft) Acceleration Acceleration Acceleration (g) (rad /sec2 ) (g)
It 2t 1 2 1 .l - 2 1 6 188.00 0.80 1.38 0.010 0.018 0.77 1.10 1 163.00 1.09 1.96 0.074 0.180 -. 1.17 2.40 2 140.00 0.85 1.16 0.063 0.158 0.89 1.60 3 115.00 0.70 0.84 0.045 0.108 0.72 1 .08 1 0.61 0.62 l 4 100.00 0.034 0.084 0.61 0. 7,4 5 85.00 0 56 0 54 0.018 0.044 0.55l054
- See Figure 3 7-13 of FSAR l l
TABLE 7. MAXIMUM RELATIVE DISPLACEMENTS -
l Maximum Relative Displacements l N-S Direction E-V Direction Mass Elevation Translation Rotation Translation Point * (ft) (In.) (radians x 10 ) (in.)
1 2 1 2 1 i 2 6 188.00 1 524 2.688 1.551 1.814, 1.866 i 2 756 1 163.00- 0.137 0.224 2.105 4.934 0.154 0.276 2 140.00 0.089 0.122.._ 1.835 .4.426 0.101 0.172 3 115.00 0.057 0.076 1'.282 3.096 0.065 0.104 4 100.00 0.035 0.044 0.977 2 364 0.039 0.060 5 85.00 0.020 0.028 0.464 1.120 0.019 0.028
- See Figuie 3 7-13 of FSAR .
tColumn 1 gives responses to Parkfield-5 Column 2 gives responses to DDE
. JOHN A. OLUMC (k AS SOCI ATC S. E NGINL'.t !H'i L_______________________________________.____ _ _ _ .
a-TABLE 8. MAXIMUM STORY SilEARS, -
AUXILIARY DUILDING ,,
Maximum Story Shears -
)
3 (kips x 10 ) )
Member
- i H-S Direction E-W Direction )
It 2t 1 2 5 2.08 3.'50 2.00 2 78
]"
1 10.65 20 72 13 90 27 06 2 ,64.05 90 70 '61.04 115 18 3 110 37 142.84 111.05 184.82 4 69.62 98.84 62.13 96.56
- See Figure 3 7-13 of FSAR .
TABLE 9 HAXIMUM OVERTURNING MOMENTS Haximum 0.T. Moments 6
(kip-ft x 10 )
Member
- N-S Direction E=k' Di rection
~
1 2. 1 2 5 0.100 0.168 0.094 0.134 1 0.250 0.486 0 327 0.636 2 (top) 0.237 0.472 0.276 ,0.646 2 (bottom) 1.818 2.740 1.802 3 526
'3 .
3.444 4.882 3.447 6.298' 4 4.488 6.366 4.355 7.746 )
- See Figure 3 7-13 of FSAR ,
t Column 1 gives responses to Parkfield-5 i Column 2 gives responses to DDE -
6 e
JOHN A.13LUMC & AGGOCIATCS. CNGINLCliti t_______ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ !
1
- .- j TABLE-10.
MAXIMUM TORSIONAL MOMENTS 00E TO EARTH-QUAKE IN N-S DIRECTION, AUXIL I ARY BUILDlHG-Maximum Torsional
- Member
- Moments (kip-ft x 10 5)
It 2t-5 0.088- 0.172 1- 0.804- 1.738 2 34.033' 81.782- l 3 52.494 126.034 4 -
40 333 97.888-
- See Figure 3 7-13 of FSAR
- t olumn 1 gives responses to Parkfleid-5 C
Column 2 gives responses to DDE- :-l J
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JOHN A. DLUMC & ASSOCIATCS. ENGINCCitS
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