ML20236B572
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| ML20236B572 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 10/16/1987 |
| From: | Bundy H, Carpenter D, Chamberlain D, Constable G, Hildebrand E, Madsen G, Reis T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236B531 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-87-50, 50-499-87-50, NUDOCS 8710260245 | |
| Download: ML20236B572 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1987050
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APPENDIX B '
. U.S. NUCLEAR _ REGULATORY-COMMISSION- . .
. . REGION' IV J
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NRC Inspection Report:' '50-498/87-50- Construction Permitst: LCPPR-128-
L50-499/87-50
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CPPR-129
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Unit'l Lice'nse:' NPF-71 C .
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Dockets: 50-498 ExpirationfDates: ~ December 19871
50-499
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. December 1989L- l
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' Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company-(HL&P). ,
P. O,' Box 1700 .. .
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Houston, Texas 77001. ,
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Facility Name: -South Texas' Project,' Units 1"and 2 (STP) J
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Inspection At:
STP, Matagorda County, Texas-
-inspection Conducted: August 3-31, 1987
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Inspectors: N N /7Ar7>
p. n D. R. Carpenter, Senior Resident Inspector Fate
Project Section C, Reactor Projects Branch
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p T. Reis, Resident Inspector, Project ..
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Section C, Reactor Projects; Branch--
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~ E. Hildebrano Res Ment Inspector, Project a Date
Section C, kiactor Projects Branch
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sWChamberlain, Seni(r Resident Inspector
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troject Section A, Reactor Projects Branch'
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H. F..Bundy, Project thspector. Project. Date,. ' <
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1Section C, Reactor' Projects Branch
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'G E L.;Madsen, Reactor Inspector, cooperations
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Section,. Reactor. Safety Branch. , -
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- Other. R
Assisting' '
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Personnel: ' J. .: P. : Clausner,' French Commissariat: AlL'Eaergie: tomiquel,; ,
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Institute De: Protection Et De'SureteiNtcleaireo o.
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Approved: MY W1 . /(,!91
W stable ' Chief, Project Section C '
Dage :/~
Reactor-Projects-Branch '- -
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection Conducted August 3-31, 1987 (Report 50-498/87-50; 50-499/87-30) ;
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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including-licensee action on
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previous inspection findings, receipt of Unit 1 Operating License, Unit ~1
initial core loading, training program for motor-operated valves, SAFETEAM
. review, Unit 1-preoperational test status, standby diesel generators, rod
cluster control assembly drag testing, Unit 2 test program, radiation alarm
response, quality assurance program implementation, and site tours.
Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation of NRC requirements was
identified (failure to follow the approved procedure for performing
maintenance, paragraph 4).
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DETAILS <
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1. Persons Contacted
*E. L. Brown, Manager, Construction Support l
*J. D. Green, Operations Quality Assurance'(QA) Manager
*J. W. Loesch, Reactor Operations Manager
*S. M. Head, Supervisory Licensing Engineer
*G. L. Parkey, Plant Er.gineering Manager
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*W. H. Kinsey, Plant Manager !
R.'L. Balcom, Senior Technical Consulteht, OA j
D. F. Bednarczyk, QA General Supervisor I
L. H..Breyer, Lead Quality. Control (QC) Inspector
*E. Brown, Licensing Engineer
*J. E. Geiger, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance
l T.-Godsey, Technical Support' Engineer
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W. G. Isereau, QA Surveillance Supervisor
D. Leazur, Reactor Performance Supervisor j
In addition to the above,'the NRC inspectors also held discussions with
various licensee, architect engineer (AE), constructor, and other
contractor personnel during this inspection.
l l * Denotes those individuals attending exit interviews conducted on August 28 ;
- and September 1, 1987.
2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings j.
(Closed) Open Item 498/8739-05, Standby Diesel Generator Endurance Run
This open item concerns the reliability demonstration of the three STP,
Unit 1 standby diesel generators (SDGs). A review by the NRC staff of the
failure record of the three SDGs raised concerns regarding their reliability,
even though the licensee had completed the preoperational test program for
these units as described in the STP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
and Regulatory Guide 1.108. The licensee has completed a 100-hour endurance
run on each diesel without failure. The NRC inspectu s have reviewed this
run data and find it acceptable. Subsequent to the satisfactory completion
of these runs, there have been additional SDG failurt.s; however, the
licensee has responded in an effective and thorough manner to determine
the root cause and make repairs. Their effort included an inspection of
all three SDGs for similar conditions that could' indicate a common mode
failure. ]
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The licensee's actions are considered acceptable to close this open item.
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The NRC inspectors will, however, continue to monitor SDG availability and
reliability. This open item is considered closed.
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(Closed)'Open Item 498/8739-06, SDG' Failure Vendor Report Reviews
This open item concerns the review of the vendor report forlthe failure
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analysis of the SDG cracked nozzle holder-'and.als'o the SDG fuel rack
binding. failure. These. vendor reports'have;been received and' reviewed by
the'NRC inspectors and are considered acceptabic. This open item is,
considered closed.-
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(Closed) Open Item 498/8739-08, Analysis of- SDG Combustion' AirI1ntake
Piping
This open item concerns an engineering review and analysis'of' combustion'
air intake piping 1for all three.SDGs. This was a' concern due to the.long
length of unsupported piping and an instance of loose bolts on a.
turbocharger which supports onetend of the inlet piping.. The licensee
reviewed the engineering calculations;with~the architect engineer _and..
concluded that:the original calculations were correct.and no additional-
support was required. The NRC inspectors reviewed this analysis'and'
considered it' acceptable. This.open item'is? considered closed.-
l 3. Receipt of Unit 1 Operating License
Houston Lighting and Power. Company received Facility Operating
License (0L) No. NPF-71 on August 121,-1987.- Facility operation at upLto-
5 percent of full power is authorized.
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After signed verification of the OL.had been received at STP by panafax. i
from NRC Headquarters, the licensee made distribution to tne NRC resident 'j
inspector, Control Room, and plant' manager. , A briefing was held
including all key licensee' managers and NRC: inspectors to review and- i
discuss the requirements and restrictions of the OL. Crew briefings were l
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heldwiththe.NuclearPlantOperationsDepartment(NPOD).-shiftoperators
and supervisors to discuss the.0L and the sequence of activities leading
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to the commencement of fuel movement. . After the briefing',: alltrequired
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fuel load surveillance and prerequisites were reviewed. Although
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extensive refresher training by all fuel ~ handlers had beenLin-process and
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l- completed during the previous-60 days,-the7 crew that?was scheduled to move
the first fuel assembly completed a transfer- of a. dummy assembly from the l
Fuel Handling Building-(FHB)- storage pool into the reactor l vessel, and :
return to storage as a final.practicelbefore fuel movementL 4Approximately '
8 hours after OL receipt, fuel movement was commenced.' The NRC inspectors
l were on continuous coverage and observed the' licensee's progression from ;
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OL receipt to fuel movement. .
No violations or deviations were identified. l
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4. -Unit 1 Initial Core Loading ,
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During the initial ~ core loading' of Unit 1 continuous inspection' coverage
was maintained by NRC inspectors. The evolution was performed in a: safe..
effective manner and was free of major problems. -One apparent violation-
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(498/8750-01) of NRC requirements was identified involving a failure to
follow procedures during a repair activity. At the direction of the y
control room shift supervisor, an emergency classification was used to ;
stem transfer art shear pin without i
remove and replace the work
fuel handling
request sy(MWR).
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the use of a maintenance Plant Procedure OPGP03-ZM-0003
allows work to commence without the use of an approved MWR when there is a i
danger to equipment ~or personnel. There was no dangerous condition .
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present which allowed this classification. Additionally, the following
observations were made -
. ' Operating staff performance was professional at all times during.the
evolution. Shift turnovers were. performed in a thorough'and orderly
manner.
. Fuel loading records were kept and maintained in.a formal manner and
appeared to be complete and acceptable as required by the fuel
loading procedure.
. A fuel hadling operator was not aware of the drag -force-limitation ;
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for lifting a rod cluster control assembly (RCCA). While fuel- R
handling proceduras were generally available, the operator did not
have a complete set required for all potential . activities .that could
have been required. Fuel Handling Procedure P0P8-FH-0002, which
would have provided the drag force-limit was.not readily available to
the operator. This concern was immediately corrected by the licensee
upon notification.
. The fuel transfer trolley cart failed several times during the-
evolution due to a drive gear. shear pin repeatedly bending or
breaking. The vendor has a system upgrade design to resolve this '
problem but it has not been purchased for installation at STP. .The
licensee .is now evaluating this upgrade for possible incorporation
into both units at STP.
. A drop light cord was sheared while lowering at assembly into the !
core resulting in the light fixture dropping into the reactor vessel.
Core load was immediately stopped while the light was retrieved. The ;
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entire light fixture assembly was recovered intact. This occurrence
was handled in a professional manner. Fuel load recommenced after
rearrangement of the lighting.
One apparent violation was identified and no deviations were identified i
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above. Other observations discussed above were considered ~ isolated.
Prompt and effective corrective action was taken by.the licensee.
5. Training Program for Motor Operated Valves (MOVs) '
The NRC inspectors reviewed the course given .to the NP00 electrical
maintenance personnel authorized to perform maintenance on MOVs. The-
course placed emphasis on the importance of M0Vs by detailing industry
incidents that have occurred due to their failure.
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The course graphically illustrated the. construction of all Limitorque
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Model SMB actuators which are commercially _available and provided for
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periodic examination of the students. A final. written and practical
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examination was also required. The course is of 80 hours _ duration.
Due to two recently discovered i_mproperly set ' limits on essential cooling
water (ECW) valve operators, the' practical portion of'the examination'is !
to.be repeated. The mockup is to more realistically represent "in plant" ,
conditions. This course provides adequate training for personnel to 1
perform maintenance on MOVs.
No violations or deviations were l identified. g
6. SAFETEAM Review j
In preparation for consideration of a request for.a' low power operat'ing
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license for Unit 1 of STP,' a spot check of concerns received by the ;
licensee's SAFETEAM since the_last NRC inspection, was conducted. The j
computer output of all concerns received from June 29 through August 11, j
1987, was reviewed. This listing included a short narrative and'a j
classification of the concerns. There were a total of 115 specific l
concerns, some individuals having more than one concern. Of the'115 l
concerns, 50 were classified as safety-related, which would receive an i
investigation by the SAFETEAM investigators. )
The NRC inspectors reviewed the listing to determine if the concerns had
been classified properly. If there was not enough information provided in
the short narrative or if questions about a specific concern were raised,
the complete SAFETEAM file on that issue was reviewed. The complete file
for 20 completed and in process concerns classified as safety-related were j
reviewed as well as 15 nonsafety-related files. The NRC inspectors
concluded that the SAFETEAM concern classification for the reviewed time <
period was correct and that the concerns were being processed in
accordance with SAFETEAM procedures.
Of the 50 safety-related concerns, one individual had 14 concerns, another ?
had seven concerns and several had two or more concerns each. Of the 65-
nonsafety-related concerns, 23 dealt with the ventilation and drinking
water supply in the Unit 2 reactor containment building (RCB) during a
particularly hot period of the summer. Other nonsafety-related concerns
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dealt.with industrial safety, industrial security and personnel management-
issues.
It appears that no last minute concerns were received by the SAFETEAM that
would have significant bearing on the issuance of a low power license for
STP. Some of the safety-related concerns had already been investigated,
reviewed and closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7. Unit 1 Preoperational Test Status-
The following is an update of Unit'l preoperational test completion'~ status
during this inspection period. These test procedures were identified as-
being incomplete in NRC Inspection Report 50-498;499/87-47, paragraph 3.
Test IR 50-498/87-47.- Current-(August 31,'1987).
1-BR-P-01 0% 75%
1-CN-P-01 99% 100% I
1-EW-P-05 100% retest required 100% retest required j
1-FW-P-01' 10%- 66% i
! 1-HB-P-01 99% 99% I l 1-NK-P-01 0% -0% '
1-PS-P-01 99% 99%
1-RA-P-04 98% 100% l
1-RA-P-18 100%'
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99%
1-HC-A-02 98%- 100%
1-RC-P-06 99% 99%
1-RC-P-07 99% 99%
i 1-RC-P-08 99% 99% l 1-RC-P-11 98% 98% 'i
1-SP-P-03 95% 95%
1-WL-P-02 0% 0%
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l 1-WL-P-03 50% 99% l 1-WS-P-01 0% 0%
1-WS-P-02 25% 75%
1-CU-A-01 Field work complete 100%
1-CV-A-01 50% .75%
1-FA-A-01 90% 90%
1-LA-A-02* 75% 30%
l 1-LA-A-04 80% 100% l 1-LA-A-05 70% 90% l 1-LA-A-06 90% 100% ,
1-LA-A-08 0% 75%-
*This acceptance test required a complete retest.
Some of these tests are restrained by plant conditions. The required
, plant operating mode must be established before testing and data.. l collection / reduction can be completed. The NRC inspectors are monitoring ' l the licensee's activities on selected tests.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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8. Standby Diesel Generators-(SDGs)
During a licensee's inspection program, several fuel injector nozzles.in
Unit 1 SDGs were found.to have internal cracks. The' cracked injector
nozzles have been traced to Bendix Lot No. 001124. A total of 176
injector nozzles were manufactured with this lot number in 1979.
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There has been two diesel failures attributed to cracked injector nozzles
but both failures had indications of external nozzle cracks. So far in
this licensee inspection, no external cracks have been identified. There
has been no SDG failures resulting from the internal cracks.
HL&P has determined that 31 injector nozzles' from this lot number were
installed in No.12 and 13 Unit 1 diesels. Of the 31 nozzles,16
contained internal cracks.; All 31 nozzles have been replaced.
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SDG No.~ 11
has not been inspected at this time.
An inspection of Unit 2 SDGs indicated no cracked injector nozzles and no
nozzles-from Lot No. 001124 were present.
A cracked cylinder head was discovered on SDG 13. The crack was small and
' did not allow leakage. .The crack was identified during maintenance after
the completion of the 100-hour reliability run. During the run, there was
no indication of. reduced performance attributable to this cracked.
cylinder. The cracked head has.been sent off site for laboratory
analysis. Results of the analysis are not yet available. The cracked
injector nozzles and cylinder head will be_followed as'an open item.
(498/8750-02)
No violations or deviations were identified.
9. Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) Drag Testing
On August 28, 1987, while pulling control rods'to perform drag testing of i
each RCCA, Control Rod H-10 failed the test acceptance criteria. .The ;
upper internals were disassembled and the H-10' Fuel Assembly with its- !
control rod was removed. A small ball bearing was discovered lodged in
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the RCCA guide tube assembly. The RCCA was replaced with a spare and Fuel- l
Assembly H-10 was reinstalled. A drag test was performed on Control 1
Rod H-10 and was found to be acceptable. It appears'that the ball bearing
was lodged in the guide tube assembly prior to the hot functional test (HFT)
program because of the consistent magnetite film on the ball bearing and
surrounding guide tube area. After HFT, a failure of the invessel. full
flow filters was identified. As a result of this failure, the Reactor
Coolant System (RCS), support systems, and' reactor vessel assemblies were
flushed and inspected. The reactor vessel head and internals were
hydrolazed and' inspected by television several times in an attempt to
verify cleanliness and accountability of missing filter screen. The area,
where the ball bearing was. located, is fairly' inaccessible but 'was
subjected to the above cleaning and inspection.
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There is no equipment failure in the reactor coolant system which would
account for a' ball bearing being released into the system. Drag testing
on all 57 control rods has been completed satisfactorily.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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10. Unit 2 Test Program
STP Unit 2 has completed construction (approximately 81 percent overall)
to the extent that many mechanical systems are being turned over to
startup for cleanliness flushing. Prerequisite testing is in progress on
several systems. Preoperational test procedures are being written using
the completed Unit 1 procedures as base documents. The NRC inspectors
have started to receive copies of preoperational test procedures which
have completed joint test group review, e.g.,1E AC power distribution
(Train A), essential cooling water system (all trains).
The NRC inspectors have been observing general testing activities
including such items as electrical prerequisite testing, release for test
activities, test group work practices, and NPOD support; _The NRC q
operations inspection activities for Unit 2 are starting to accelerate. ;
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Radiation Alarm Response
A reactor operator, during routine checks of equipment in the control room i
for Unit 1, noted that on the radiation monitoring panel (RM-11) both unit j
vent radiation monitors (RT-8010A and RT-80108) had alarm conditions for !
loss of sample flow and loss of channel flow. - Both sample pumps had been 1
deenergized for about 6 hours. This was noted on the alarm printout.
With both sample pumps out of service, Action Statement 53 of STP TS, ]
Section 3.3.3.11, which requires sampling with auxiliary sampling. equipment, l
should have been implemented. The operators were unaware of the sample
pump status and did not perform the action statement requirements. .This
condition was identified by the licensee. The significance from a safety
point of view is minor due to the fact that the reactor has no operating )
history. When the alarm condition was discovered the licensee took
prompt action to restore sample flow.
This event leads to a concern that plant equipment, alarms and controls
that have safety or TS significance are not in all cases clearly
identified and/or protected from inadvertent activation or deactivation. l
In this specific instance there was no control room window annunciator l
alarm or any visual .que on the RM-11 screen that would indicate'the-
significance of this condition. The licensee has committed to reviewing ,
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the plant from a human engineering standpoint for plant conditions where
inadequate identification of the significance of alarms. and controls or
physical protection of switches that have TS or safety implications' exist.
The completion of this study by the licensee and review by the NRC
inspectorsare.consideredanopenitem(498/8750-03).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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12. -Quality Assurance (QA) Program Implementation:
The purpos0 of this inspection wa's to assess the implementation of the
licensee's QA and quality control (QC) programs for startup and
operations. The NRC inspectors reves included the following:
. Organi2ation
The QA and QC organizations are es'entially
s the same as previously
evaluated. The position of general . supervisor of-QC is presently
vacant. 'The operations.QA manager is providing coverage for this
vacancy. .j
. Initial Core Loading
,The NRC inspectors' observations of work activities, review of
records, and discussions with personnel revealed that'QC was
providing continuous coverage and was performing general inspection,
QA surveillance was performing inspection to previously prepared
checklists-and the test engineers were performing detailed control
for the initial core loading. The overall effectivenestoof-the . . l
licensee's quality verification'. activity for.the initial core loading
provided adequate covercge.
. Maintenance Work Requests
The NRC inspectors witnessed the work and quality verification
activities associated with the following two'MWRs:
MWR-II-87022502 - Installed Incore Flux Thimbles and Connect -i
Seals
MWR-RC-87017167 - Install Reactor Vessel Upper Internals
The observed activities were performed in an organized'and complete
manner.
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. Audit Program '
The annual audit schedule was reviewed with the: acting operations QA
supervisor. It appeared that audits we're beint performed as ;
scheduled and that audit coverage'of quality ~attivities was' adequate. .j
Completed Audit Packages D2,-D3, and D10'were reviewed by the NRC l
inspectors'. Findings were adequately identified and documentation. -
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indicated appropriate and timely corrective actions'for' findings were' i
being implemented.
No violations or deviations were identified. .
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13. Site Tours
The NRC inspectors conducted site tours both independently and accompanied
by licensee personnel. These tours were made primarily to. assess-the
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condition of Unit 1 for fuel load activities And~to observe ongoing
testing and work activities in both units. The-areas. toured include:
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. Unit-1 - mechanical electrical auxiliary building (MEAB),; reactor ;
containment building (RCB), FHB, emergency diesel generator.
building (EDGB), and the isolation: valve cubicle (IVC).
. Unit 2 - MEAB, RCB, FHB, EDGB, and IVC
No violations or deviations were identified. ')
14. Exit Interview ;
The NRC inspectors met with ' licensee representatives (' denoted in
paragraph 1) on August 28 and September 1, 1987, and' summarized the scope
and findings of the inspection period. Other meetings between NRC
inspectors and licensee management were held periodically during the
l inspection to discuss identified concerns. H
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