ML20215K314

Forwards FEMA Final Rept of 860402-03 Emergency Exercise.No Deficiencies Identified.Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: Coordination Between State,Local & Util Public Info Staffs at Plant Media Ctr & Offsite Releases in Scenario

ML20215K314
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	10/16/1986
From:	Brownlee V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8610280109
Download: ML20215K314 (1)

Text

Of/}/0 Y OCT IS M Duke Power Company ATT : r. H. B. Tucker, Vice President Nuclear Production Department 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC' 28242 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

FEMA FINAL REPORT - OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY EXERCISE OF APRIL 2-3, 1986 Enclosed is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Final Report for the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Exercise of April 2-3, 1986. As described in the enclosure FEMA did not identify any deficiencies; however, three areas have been identified that require corrective actions. Specifically, the items noted were: (1) a lack of coordination between the State, local, and licensee public information staffs at the Plant Media Center, (2) the need for a larger Pickens County EOC, and (3) the scenario did not provide sufficient offsite releases such that all response capabilities could be exercised. FEMA also identified 31 areas recommended for improvement. These items are discussed in detail in Section IV of the Enclosure.

We encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA. Resolution of the items should be completed prior to the next full scale emergency preparedness exercise.

We also encourage you to work closely with the State and counties in the development of a scenario for the next full scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the above items were disclosed.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely, Original Signed by Virgil L. Brownlee Virgil L. Brownlee, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:

FEMA Final Report cc w incl:

. Tuckman, Station Manager w/ encl:

Resident Inspector

. Nicolaras, NRR 8610280109 861016 PDR ADOCK 05000269 F

@e of South Carolina PDR Uocument Control Desk' RII J RII R RII t/ 3[

ATab k TDe r DCollins TPeebles f// -

10/g/86 10/g/86 10/Jo/86 10////86

r 2 Federal Emergency Management Agency I gl 1 # Washington, D.C. 20472 SEP 2 ' 1986 MEMORANDUf1 FORi Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Pesponse Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulato Ccmnission

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FROM:

Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs

SUBJECT:

Exercise Report for the April 2-3, 1986, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP)

Plans for the Oconee Nuclear Station Attachea is a copy of the Exercise Report for the April 2-3, 1986, full participation joint exercise of the offsite REP plans for the

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Oconee Nuclear Station. W e State of South Carolina and Oconee and Pickens Counties, both located in the 10-mile plume emergency planning zone, fully participated in the exercise.

The exercise report, dated July 17, 1986, was prepared by Region IV of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Were were no deficiencies identified during this exercise. Were were, however, three areas requiring corrective actions and several areas reccmnended for improvement. Based on the results of this exercise, the State of South Carolina and Oconee and Pickens Counties demonstrated the capability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site. Werefore, the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on February 23, 1083, will remain in effect.

FEMA Region IV staff has furnish <c a ccpy of this exercise report to the State of South Carolina and will assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2860.

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Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 OCONEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE Conducted on April 2-3, 1986 Exercise Report July 17, 1986 i

Utility: Duke Power Company Plant Location: Near Seneca, South Carolina l

l Participating State and Local Governments: l State of South Carolina Oconee County Pickens County

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, s TABLE OF CONTENTS Page i

I. Exercise Summary 6

II. Detailed Discussion 6

State of South Carolina 6

Forward Emergency Operations Center (FE0C) 7 Dose Assessment 8

Mobile Radiological Laboratory ,

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Field Monitoring Teams 11 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 11 Media Center 13 Oconee County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 13

. 15 Reception Center Medical Activity 16 Anderson County (Host) 18 18 .

Shelter Pickens County 19 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 19 20 Reception Center g

Greenville County (Host) 21 21 ,

.! Shelter 22 Traffic and Access Control

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' ' Fire Activity .

24 i Ill. Summary Listing of Inadequacies 25 IV. Summary Listing of Areas Recommended For Improvement f

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V. Appendices

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A. Evaluator List and Assignments

! B. Exercise Objectives and Scenario

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I. EXERCISE

SUMMARY

This was a full participation exercise conducted on April 2-3, 1986,

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and was observed by nineteen Federal evaluators representing FEMA, NRC, DOT, DOE, EPA, and USDA. The ' evaluation was based on NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiolo ical Emergency Response Plans in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.p' No NUREG-0654 deficiencies were identified during the exercise. Three NUREG evaluation criteria are recommended for corrective action and several suggestions are given for improvement. These recommendations and suggestions are treated in Section II, " Detailed Discussion".

The following is a brief summary of the Federal evaluators' reports.

State of South Carolina Forward Emergency Operations Center (FEOC)

Activation and staffing of the FEOC was implemented as described in the SCORERP. The FEOC was effectively and promptly secured by the State Law Enforcement Division (SLED). One hundred and fourteen individuals representing 17 agencies, including the Office of the Governor, participated at the FEOC. Emergency operations were managed in a superior manner under the leadership of the Director, Emergency Preparedness Division. Decision making was effectively coordinated with the Governor's Emergency Management Officer and State Radiological Health officials. Installed communications systems are excellent with back-up systems provided in a superior mobile communications trailer. Public alerting and instructions were carried out in an excellent manner with very timely and effective coordination between the FEOC and the Media Center. Radiological Health personnel are prepared to carry out all required monitoring and health protection tasks. The scenario provided prior to the exercise stated that significant radiation releases would occur; however, the releases were insufficient to allow the Radiological Health personnel in the FEOC to fully exercise their capabilities.

Dose Assessment South Carolina Radiological Health appeared to be well prepared for this exercise but, because of.the lack of a source term identification, were prevented from exercising their capabilities.

2-l Mobile Radiological Laboratory The scenario seemed adequate to test the laboratory procedures for emergency response; however, the lack of a radionuclide release from containment did not allow laboratory personnel to fully demonstrate sample analysis techniques. The mobile laboratory operation would not impair the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the Oconee Nuclear Power Plant.

Field Monitoring Teams Although the field monitoring teams appeared to be adequately trained, the scenario was not adequate to fully test field team capability.

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

Space allotment and communications provided at~the EOF for the State representative (DHEC) was adequate. The State representative sought out information and made good use of that available.

Media Center Procedures for the use of the EBS and rumor control were much improved over the performance demonstrated in the last two exercises.

Coordination problems still exist, however, and are caused primarily

! by the ineffective physical layout of the news center. The State and i local government public information staffs w~ere isolated from the staff of the licensee, and the lia.ison between the two was unsuccessful in preventing conflicting decisions concerning evacuation ,

of the media center during a press briefing. This inadequacy has been listed in three consecutive exercises.

Oconee County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) i There was excellent participation by personnel from county agencies, Activation and staffing was timely elected officialsThe and volunteers.

staff was knowledgeable, trained and prepared to and complete.

4 carry out their assigned tasks.

The facility itself is excellent with most of the necessary visual aids present although some of the maps could be more effectively used. Communications, both primary and back-up, were excellent.

Management of the facility by the director of the county Emergency

! Preparedness Agency was excellent.

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Coordination by the county on public alerting and notification was excellent although there was some delay for reasons beyond the control of the county.

Protective action recommendations were promptly implemented and the necessary decision making and coordination was demonstrated. However, the resources necessary for implementation were largely simulated.

Reception Center Reception Center capabilities were demonstrated by Oconee County at the Westminster Elementary School. Improvements were noted at this l exercise, and although in a real emergency many problems would surface, Oconee County has done a commendable-job in preparing to t

cope with the situation.

Medical Activity The'Oconee Memorial Hospital was well prepared to receive I contaminated patients through a separate entrance to the emergency room. Inside this entrance is a separate room to allow treatment and i decontamination prior to actually entering the emergency room itself. The room was well prepared to receive contaminated patients, l

and the staff was trained and appropriately dressed out. However, the staff did not have appropriate dosimetry, and one monitoring j instrument was past due for calibration. The two simulated patients )

were treated correctly.

Anderson County (Host) l Shelter l Anderson County demonstrated sheltering capabilities for the first time. Responsible organizations demonstrated that they have been ,

! involved in the planning and preparation process, and with additional l involvement will be able to protect the public. l l

Pickens County i

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) l The leadership and staff of the EOC demonstrated excellent training and capability; however, the physical facility is inadequate in size and construction. The county government plans to correct this l

situation through the construction of a new EOC within the next year.

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Reception Center Pickens County demonstrated reception and decontamination activities in the Table Rock State Park. This location provided adequate facilities and allowed the demonstration of the capability to impound waste water in a lagoon. Generally, well-trained workers were provided with sufficient equipment and decontamination supplies.

The operation demonstrated careful planning and attention to details.

RACES and a well-equipped radio van provided excellent communications. An ambulance and a mass casualty van, with drivers who had paramedical training, provided resources for medical exigencies. A vehicle with an emergency electrical. generator was on site as well as a vehicle to pump water from a stream to supplement the water reserves of two fire engines used for vehicle decontamination. However, emergency workers involved with decontamination should have more appropriate direct-reading dosimeters, and several need further training on exposure record keeping.

Greenville County (Host)

The activities demonstrated atThe theshelter Berea Shelter was staffed by were sufficient to meet the exercise objective.

representatives from eight different organizations. Members of the Red Cross managed this shelter and were assisted by the Salvation Army and Pickens County agencies. Although 25 individuals participated during the exercise, additional staff would be required to support anticipated needs at maximum occupancy (650).

Round-the-clock staffing capabilities were demonstrated through presentation of a roster. All staff carried out their assignments effectively and efficiently. The logistics of the operation were well designed.

Evacuees arrived by bus at appoximately 10:00 a.m. Persons registered at the reception center were processed immediately by shelter staff. Persons reporting medical problems were referred to the nursing station following shelter registration. Four contaminated individuals were processed through a separate area where monitoring and decontamination took place; showers and fresh clothing were available. Menitoring information and personal histories were compiled on a form by the monitoring teams. However, this information form was retained by the individual as each person passed from the decontamination area to the shelter registration area.

Therefore, shelter staff did not have a permanent record of exposure levels for contaminated individuals.

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5-Traffic and Access Control Traffic and access control personnel were well versed in their duties and effectively performed their assignments Lack of evacuation route signs may cause more personnel to be assigned to TCP duties than necessary. Signs at strategic locations may allow "self evacuation", thus reducing personnel requirements.

Information/ warning signs have been erected at boat ramps controlled by Duke Power Company, but no signs are evident on boat ramps which  ;

the Corps of Engineers control.

Fire Activity The ability to handle a routine fire situation was adequately demonstrated by the Oconee Rural Fire personnel.

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11. DETAILED DISCUSSION State of South Carolina Forward Emergency Operations Center (FEOC)

Activation and staffing of the FEOC was implemented as described in the SCORERP. According to participants, the Duke Power Company would notify Highway Patrol and DHEC/BRH which would be responsible for notifying Pickens and Oconee counties.

These procedures provide a 24-hour capability to notify State and local emergency personnel. State personnel did not demonstrate a shift change; however, double staffing was observed. All participants displayed knowledge of the plan, responsibilities and familiarity with operating procedures.

The FEOC was effectively and promptly secured by SLED at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> and was fully operational at 1740 hours0.0201 days <br />0.483 hours <br />0.00288 weeks <br />6.6207e-4 months <br />. This facility had excellent 1

security maintained by SLED throughout the exercise.

i Emergency operations management was under the superior leadership of the Director, State EPD. Decision making was timely, effective and properly coordinated with the Governor's Representative and State Radiological Health officials.

The FEOC is located in the Clemson National Guard Armory. Separate rooms are dedicated for the DHEC/BRH, Operations, and Controllers. l The central auditorium is available for FE0C emergency response personnel. The auditorium was sufficiently equipped with furniture, telephones and lighting.

Visual displays included emergency classification levels, weather data, situation chart, dose projections, and EPZ maps, as well as

, evacuation routes and access control. Congregate care centers were indicated and detailed maps were available. DHEC maintained radiological information. All displays were appropriately updated as i

[ current information became available.

1 Communications between State / local EOC's, EOF and FEOC were i excellent. The primary system consisted of commercial telephones with radios for back-up. The South Carolina communication van located at the FE0C could be.made available for alternative support i

communications. The van is equipped with radios providing l

communications with the following: PIO, Red Cross, National Guard, FEMA, SLED, local, county governments, State EOC, Highway Patrol, Sheriffs Departments', neighboring counties, and States. A radio was packaged and available for Duke Power Company if needed.

1 Adequate telephones were available at the FEOC. The phones have speakers which can provide conference calls with those located in the FEOC and other locations. Selective signaling is provided at the FEOC i

and other strategic locations.

4 The FEOC successfully established and maintained communications with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

South Carolina has devised an excellent system for developing the EBS message in the FEOC and transmitting it to the Media Center for dissemination. The activation of sirens and the transmitting of EBS messages were within the specified time frames.

At approximately 2230 hours0.0258 days <br />0.619 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.48515e-4 months <br />, three NBC reporters (simulated) entered the front door of the Clemson Armory and were stopped by SLED officers positioned at the front entrance security checkpoint. These officers responded to the situation in an appropriate manner, preventing the reporters from entering further. One of the officers summoned the Director who directed them to the Media Center.

Deficiencies

None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None.

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Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. We would recommend that the Scenario Development Committee

always include, as a minimum, representation from the utility, the State EPD, DHEC, and participating counties.

Dose Assessment South Carolina Radiological Health personnel appeared to be prepared to effectively carry out all required monitoring and health protection tasks. Staffing and resources were excellent. Interviews with staff members indicated that they were knowledgeable and enthusiastic about their assignments. Dose assessment using a computer program (using default values) was effectively demonstrated.

Back-up capability using a hand calculator and instruction sheet was available, but not demonstrated.

Unfortunately, the lack of a simulated source term prevented South Carolina from actually exercising their capabilities.

Except for a thorough discussion and decision on the use of KI, dose assessment capabilities could not be observed because of the lack of~

radiation release data during the exercise.

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2 The scenario provided prior to the exercise stated that significant i radiation releases would occur; however, the releases were insufficient to allow the Radiological Health personnel in the FEOC to l; fully exercise their capabilities.

Superior Items:

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1. Emergency Operations management.

1 1 Deficiencies: None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:

1. N.I.a. - Future scenarios should provide sufficient off site release to assure that all radiological response capability is adequately exercised.

Areas Recommended for Improvement: None. j Mobile Radiological Laboratory Mobile laboratory equipment is of research grade and represents current methods and techniques for environmental sample analysis for a comprehensive library of fission radioisotopes. Personnel were well trained, and an excellent capability was demonstrated to handle and analyze a large number.of environmental samples. No environmental i releases were experienced, thus laboratory personnel provided analyses j on background samples only. Discussion with laboratory personnel

indicated technical operations would be conducted properly. The scenario seemed adequate to test the laboratory procedures for emergency response; however, the absence of a release of radionuclides did not allow laboratory personnel to fully demonstrate sample

analysis techniques. Nevertheless, the mobile laboratory operation would not adversely affect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the Oconee Nuclear Power Plant.

Superior Items: ,

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1. NUREG criteria I.7., I.8., I.9., I.10., H.10., J.11. A.4..

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None. l

, i Areas Recommended for Improvement: None.

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Field Monitoring Teams ,

The field teams were prepositioned. The teams departed from Columbia at approximately 0900, about four hours before the_ declaration of the Alert. According to discussions with the field team members, DHEC has a duty. officer who would be contacted in the event of an emergency at a FNF. Key personnel are equipped with pagers, and additional staff would be contacted by phone.

Prior to departing from the FEOC to their field assignments, the field teams checked their equipment against a checklist, were briefed on the current plant status and meteorological conditions, and checked their radio communications.

i The radiological equipment in the kits consisted of a count rate meter equipped with a GM pancake probe, an ionization chamber rate meter, and an air sampling device which operated on various portable power supplies. One team's equipment lacked a pair of sampling tongs. The vehicles used were sufficiently large to accommodate the field teams ,

and equipment.

! All radiation-measuring equipment was marked with calibration stickers which indicated the last calibration date and.the date on which the next calibration.was due.

One air sampling pump had no indication of the last calibration date; i

however, the field team members affirmed that the sampling pump had l been calibrated. A sticker indicating calibration data should be attached to this piece of equipment.

Equipment was set up properly without referring to written SOP's which

. were available but not used. The teams demonstrated use of the radiation measuring equipment including the air sampling equipment.

One team collected a water sample and transferred it to a courier for transport back to the mobile laboratory at the FEOC. Another team collected water and soil samples. A series of TLD's was distributed at locations which were determined by the FEOC, and several of the fixed air-sampling stations which are used for routine environmental

sampling were changed to a 24-hour duty cycle. One team was directed i by the FE0C to various sampling locations and was given directions on sampling tasks by the FE0C. The monitoring kit map did not accurately indicate the current road system. Most team members were familiar

! with the area and were abic to compensate for the map problem; i however, the map should be reviewed and updated where appropriate.

1 The primary means of communication was by radio. Team vehicles were i equipped with 2-channel radios; some teams had a back-up hand-held radio with the same two channels. Back-up communications would have been by commercial phone; however, in the areas assigned for

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monitoring, very few commercial phones were observed. At least one team did not have direct radio contact with the FEOC during most of the exercise and had to rely on relayed information and pay telephones for transmission of messages.

Radio communications were difficult in many areas. A relay station was established to aid in monitoring radio contact. In several instances two, and sometimes three, relays were required to get messages from the FE0C to and from the field teams. The State should consider the installation of a repeater to aid in the radio communications. Had the scenario been a greater challenge,.the difficulty in maintaining radio contact would have-decreased the efficiency of the field teams.

Protective clothing was available and its use was demonstrated by one of the field teams. Another team did not have an adequate supply of protective clothing.

Only one set of self-reading dosimeters, 0-200MR and 0-5R, was availabic for one three-man team. The two BRH staff wore TLD's.

Additional self-reading dosimeters and a TLD for the driver are d recommended. Another team had available, in addition to the low- and mid-range instruments, a high-range dosimeter. Potassium iodide was available for team members use.

The scenario was not adequate to test the field team capability. The scenario transmission letter to FEMA indicated that at 2300 (1100 on day 2) a "significant radiological release begins". The exercise contained no release according to information transmitted to the field teams from the FE0C. The radiation field data available to the controllers indicated that the release which was occurring resulted in extremely low doses, unmeasurable with the State equipment beyond about 2-3 miles.

Although the scenario contained a tornado event and substantial nighttime play, the field monitoring teams took little cognizance of these facts.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Additional dosimetry for all fi-1d team personnel, including EQC drivers. Not all personnel sad both self-reading dosimeters and TLD's.

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2. Use different radio call signs for field teams, not normal

> 3-digit numbers. This caused confusion between road numbers and wind direction.

3. Improve contamination control for air-sampling equipment in the plume area.

4. Review current maps against the present road system.

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5. Improve radio communications between field teams and FEOC.

1 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The State representative arrived at the EOF prior to resumption of the exercise on the second day. He was familiar with the facilities and people involved.

A duty officer system is in effect with key personnel available by telephone and/or beeper.

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Communications provided appeared to be adequate. In addition, the State representative had a radio in his car which served as a back-up when failure of the telephone systems occurred.

Meteorological data, i.e., a tornado in a stable atmosphere,

! unrealistic stability conditions for winds reported, and sudden

changes in stability, appeared to be unrealistic.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement: None.

Media Center The news center was once again located adjacent to the plant in the visitors' center, and the same, ineffective physical arrangement of public information staffs was used. That is, the licensee staff was separated from the State and local government staffs, which resulted in some difficulties in coordinating press briefings, news releases and other public information activities. Even'though a liaison person from the licensee attempted to provide a coordinating function between the two governmental staffs and the licensee's, it was not successful. (G.4.b.) Until all public information staffs are co-located in a conmon work room, the potential for coordination t

failures will continue.

l Procedures for use of the EBS and for rumor control were much improved over those used in the last two exercises.

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P10's did not effectively use visual aids available during press briefings, especially EPZ maps, when explaining evacuation and 4 sheltering zones.

There was no capability demonstrated in the news center to monitor i media treatment of news and information concerning the emergency.

i Except for a single telephone located in the licensee's staff room, j no capability to accommodate incoming telephone media queries was demonstrated. The single phone was listed as the news center number j

for media use, but obviously would have been overwhelmed very quickly l

! in an accident such as that postulated in this exercise scenario. I The public information staffs were not adequately exercised by the play presented to them during the drill. There was little or no real media interest or play, and only a handful of cursory questions were asked by one controller / evaluator.. The use.of several mock media players is strongly recommended to ensure the public information staffs will be exercised in their ability to respond to what will obviously be a high level of media interest and demand for information.

Deficiencies: None.

! Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:

1. G.4.b. - Coordination between State / local government public information staffs and licensee staff was inadequate.

Recommend all public information staffs share a common work room of the news center and procedures developed to ensure i coordination of all information before release to the l

public.

l Areas Recommended for Improvement:

! 1. Equipment (radios, TV's) is needed in the public information i staff area so media treatment of the emergency can be monitored.

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2. All spokespersons should make better use of visual aids during press briefings.

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3. Equipment and procedures are needed to handle incoming telephonic media queries.

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Oconee County Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Activation ~and staffing of the Oconee County EOC was adequately l

! demonstrated although there was some prepositioning prompted by the tornado disaster portion of the exercise. The initial call came in l

from Duke Power Company at 1310 on Day 1. Staffing was essentially complete by 0814 on the second day of the exercise during the Alert l

1evel. Almost seventy persons participated in the exercise on the second day representing all necessary E0C agencies as well as other supporting agencies. There was also good support from elected county ,

officials. All staff demonstrated. adequate knowledge of their i

i responsibilities. The objective relating to mobilization was met.

Round-the-clock staffing capability was addressed for each agency by a combination of double staf fing and presentation of roster. This was done about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> into the exercise at 1316 on Day 2. The objective 1 relating to 24-hour staffing was met.

The E0C facilities are excellent. Located in the Law Enforcement Facility, there are adequate security and support facilities suchStatus as .

cots, kitchens, back-up power, space, lighting,'and furniture.

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) boards and maps were numerous and clearly visible. However, the 1 emergency action level was not clearly displayed other than being written as an entry on the status board. We recommend that a large sign be clearly displayed in the EOC in a prominent position, e.g.,

over the clock. Moreover, while there were many maps displayed, these were not marked in any way to show current wind conditions,-plume locations, or status of protective actions. The objective on adequacy of facilities and displays was met.

Communications for the EOC were excellent. Primary and back-up communication links were available to the FEOC, Pickens County, the licensee, the EOF, the Media Center, and the EBS stations. These were all demonstrated and worked adequately. A secondary back-up was provided by RACES operators although they were given very little r message traffic. Future exercises should make greater use of this i volunteer organization as it is an excellent and reliable resource.

The ability to communicate with all appropriate _ locations, 4

organizations, and personnel was demonstrated.

i j There was no hard-copy facsimile device available in the EOC. This capability has proved to be invaluable at other sites, and we strongly recommend that the county obtain this capability especially to provide

links to the FEOC and the Media Center, i

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l The EOC was well managed by the Director of the County Emergency Preparedness Agency as specified in the plan. He thoroughly briefed a the EOC staff often and delegated some briefings to the County PIO, county attorney. The P10 did an excellent job, especially in his agency polls, in promoting communications between agencies and to insure the availability of back-up resources for each agency.

Copies of county plans and SOP's were readily available. Message seem flow to appeared adequate although the multipart message form did not be effectively used.

l The EOC was notified of the Alert at 1310 on the first day. The Site Area Emergency was received at 0930 on the second day while the General Emergency was received at 1018. The first protective action

recommendations were also received at this time.

The alerting of the public at the Site Area Emergency was simulated at 0944. An actual sounding of sirens and coordination of EBS occurred at the General Emergency. The sirens sounded at 1036, the EBS tone was transmitted at 1040, and the TV EBS message was broadcast at i 1040. The EBS coordination with the sirens was excellent as was the information content of the messages. The objective of disseminating an initial message to the public within 15 minutes was demonstrated.

The initial protective action recommendations-were described to the EOC staff promptly and simulated implementation begun although little realistic agency interaction was observed. Registration and monitoring centers were opened and demonstrated. The objectives related to the implementation of the evacuation protective action were partially met in that the organizational ability was demonstrated, but the resources necessary were not demonstrated. The objective dealing l

with decision m'aking and coordination of emergency activities was

• demonstrated.

Lists of mobility-impaired persons within the county, obtained from mail-in cards in the utility-provided emergency information brochure and from county agency sources, were available in the EPA director's l office. They listed each person's needs. The county EMS is charged  ;

with moving these people in the event of an emergency; this was

! simulated in this exercise.

r Adequate dosimetry and monitoring equipment was available in the EOC 4

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although it was not issued since it was not required by the scenario.

However, the county RADEF officer did check out the equipment early in  !

the exercise. The RADEF officer was generally familiar with  !

procedures, the equipment, and decontamination stations. i

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The ability to provide advance coordination of information to the ,

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public was demonstrated by the county public information officer.

However, the effectiveness of the P10 would be enhanced by the addition of a hard-copy facsimile machine to allow a better review of public information released pertinent to the county. The ability to establish and operate rumor control on the county level was only partially demonstrated as very few simulated rumor messages were generated in the scenario.

I Superior Items:

1. There was excellent participation by county agency j personnel, elected officials and volunteers. .

2. Management of the E0C by the Director of the County .

Emergency Preparedness Agency was excellent. I I

l Deficiencies: None.  !

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None.

l Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. A sign denoting the current emergency action level should be l prominently displayed. l l

2. A facsimile device is needed to receive hard-copy messages '

, from the emergency news center and other locations.

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3. Media relations and rumor control need to be more fully demonstrated in future exercises.

Reception Center Two of Oconee County's objectives in this exercise were to demonstrate adequate procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of 1

evacuees, and to demonstrate the adequacy of mass care facilities.

The Westminster Elementary School was activated as a reception center, and 25 junior high and senior high school students were processed through monitoring, registration, and assignment to shelter, if needed. The participation level was high. Personnel from Oconee County Emergency Management, Department of Social Services, American Red Cross, Westminster Police and Fire Departments, and Seneca, Westminster, Oakway, and Salem Rescue Departments were present. All personnel interviewed had adequate knowledge of their responsibilities. The Department of Social Services personnel, who have primary responsibility for reception centers, particularly demonstrated good knowledge of correct procedures.

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Direction both inside and outside the facility was good. All suggestions for improvement made at the last exercise had been addressed. The monitoring location had been moved away from the front door to preclude bottlenecks; a contingency plan had been effected for inclement weather; and strip maps were on hand to direct evacuees to

! shelter.

Monitoring personnel at the Reception Center stated that contaminated persons would be transported to the West Oak High School (seven miles 1

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distant'and directly on the way to the shelter), where they would be decontaminated and then brought back to the Reception Center to re-enter the registration process. This plan seems cumbersome _and

problematical; however, the Emergency Management Director stated this would not be done in a real emergency. .

J Improvement was noted at this year's exercise. It i s apparent that l Oconee County has the resources and capability to protect the population.

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, Superior Items:

i 1. The participation level in Oconee County was excellent.

f Deficiencies: None.

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i Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement: None.

Medical Activity The first notification of the medical drill came to Oconee Memorial Hospital (OMH) at 1325 via the EBS dispatcher as the ambulance was dispatched to Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS). The ambulance arrived at ONS at 1335. At about 1340 the supervising nurse began calling the i

The Chief Radiation Safety.

4 necessary staff to support the response. His back-up was also Officer was alerted and availabic at 1346.

j alerted at this time and responded at 1438. A radiation technician arrived with monitoring instruments at 1347.

1 The equipment, a Victoreen 498 rate meter and an Eberline Model E-120 l

geiger counter, was appropriate for the necessary monitoring tasks.

l However, the Victoreen 498 was lastThe calibrated in 1985 and was due for instruments were properly calibration on September 24, 1985.

wrapped in plastic to protect them from contamination.

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w-ie.---ecwy-eis--,w----,w---,--rwye4=-y-- eeymm-=,.---eye- emy *n-qw-t----w--w- e ---res,ww-y --we-e ,w u---- me,--er< y, r-w g-p y-e..-+--,9-> = - e.-,-e- -w- -

--y-&-+= g--r---= e-s-q>

i The contaminated patient facility at OMH is excellent. It is a small room off the emergency room with a separate entrance from the ambulance receiving area. The room allows decontamination and' treatment before .c entry to the emergency room. The room was promptly and properly prepared to prevent the spread of contamination by taping stiff paper to the floor and by sealing off the return air ducts. The ambulance receiving area was also prepared with paper.

The paper comes in a large, heavy and bulky roll we recommend that i appropriate length pieces be measured and cut beforehand and rolled

- into smaller and lighter rolls that will be more manageable by the nursing staff. The room and ambulance receiving area were prepared by 1428.

One nurse and one physician began dressing out with anti-contamination l

clothing at 1453 and were prepared for the arrival of the ambulance at 1504. ,They had only one dosimeter, a CDV-742 with a range of l

0-200 R. In addition, they should have a dosimeter with a range of 0-5 R or 0-20 R and a permanent recording device such as a thermoluminescent dosimeter or film badge.,

Contamination was not contained within the room. The staff and the Duke Power Company representative accompanied the patients into the emergency room after the initial treatment. The flo,or outside the door had been covered, but a shelf containing hospital supplies was next to the covered area. At one point, a nurse walked'onto the covered area to get supplies for an unrelated activity.. Subsequently,

the staff removed their anti-contamination clothing in this area as well. A step-off pad was laid down even further into the euergency ,

The pad was not taped down and was slippery.

o room.

No monitoring of the ambulance or the receiving area was noted.

However, the emergency room itself was well monitored.

Superior Items:

1. The design for the separate entrance and separate room for treatment of contaminated patients is excellent.

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2. The nursing staff and physicians involved were well trained I in procedures and prepared well for the drill'.

Deficiencies: None. '

l Areas Requiring Corrective Actionsi None. s Areas Recommended for Improvement: ,

1. The paper used to cover the floors should be cut into appropriate lengths and stored for ready use to prevent having to move the heavy bulk roll. .

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2. Multiple layers of step-off pads should be taped down to ensure that they do not slip and to allow the simultaneous removal and replacement of the contaminated pad.

3. Assure that all instruments are calibrated according to specified and necessary frequencies.

4. The medical staff should be provided a mid range, 0-5 R or 0-20 R, dosimeter and a TLD or film badge.

5. Training and procedures for contamination control need to be reviewed by personnel charged with that responsibility.

Anderson County (Host)

Shelter Anderson County, a host county, demonstrated the opening of a shelter. The New Prospect High School was staffed-by the American Red .

Cross, Anderson County Department of Social Services, Emergency L Management, Anderson County Fire Department, and the Ham Radio Club.

Signs were prominently displayed and standard Red Cross shelter forms and supplies were on hand. The County has recognized the possibility of evacuees arriving without having gone through the Reception Center, and, accordingly, has planned for monitors to be on hand to monitor and decontaminate evacuees, if necessary.

For this exercise, all staff was prepositioned. Personnel present appeared to have adequate knowledge of their own responsibilities but very little insight into others' responsibilities. There were no law enforcement or traffic control personnel on hand.

The facility is excellent. There is a question regarding the number of evacuees that could be sheltered. American Red Cross officials do not agree that over 1000 evacuees (the county figure) could be adequately handled at this location. This needs to be resolved by local government.

The Red Cross and the Department of Social Services appear to be planning together well; however, more involvement and interaction with local emergency management is needed.

This was the first shelter demonstration for Anderson County.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None.

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Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Participation at the shelter by more entities is recommended. For example, any situation where large crowds are expected will require law enforcement and traffic control.

2. Clarify capacity of facility for sheltering. The county indicates a capacity of 1,075 and the Red Cross officials estimate 250-300.

3. More involvement between participating entities is needed to determine who is responsible for what and how they should interact to form a shelter " team".

Pickens County Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

The Pickens County EOC was activated and staffed promptly according to procedures. Command and control was effectively demonstrated by the E0C Director and his assistant. Briefings were conducted for the operations room personnel at appropriate times, and agency representatives were asked for reports of their activities.

The EOC facility is inadequate in size, as has been observed during the last two exercises. (H.3.) According to the Director and the Chairman of the County Council, a new EOC is planned for construction within the next year.

Communications facilities and map displays were adequate. The message handling system was demonstrated adequately.

Twelve agencies were represented in the EOC. ' Personnel of these agencies appeared to be well trained in their responsibilities. The County Administrator and two members of County Council were present during a portion of the exercise. RACES staff handled communications excellently.

Superior Items:

1. Excellent communication resources were provided by RACES and i the radio-equipped van.

2. There_were excellent procedures for the impoundment of contaminated waste water.

3. Knowledgeable and very capable leadership was provided by the Director of the EOC.

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Deficiencies: None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:

1. H.3. - A larger and better arranged EOC is needed.

Areas Recommended for Improvenent:

1. We would recommend the installation of a separate, permanent ,

status board to record significant events such as emergency I classification levels and times, protective action recommendations, and sectors affected.

Reception Center The Reception Center and decontamination center activated for this exercise were located in the Table Rock State Park Barn and bathhouse, respectively. The Barn, a gymnasium, is an adequate facility for a reception center. It has sufficient tables for registration, adequate space for evacuees, and toilet facilities. The bathhouse has only four showers; however, in view of the small population of the sectors i

it would serve, it is adequate for decontamination.

The operation had excellent personnel, equipment, and supplies.

Registration was done by four employees from the County Department of Social Services. One registrar, a social worker, and her supervisor, demonstrated professional insight-in their handling of an evacueee who simulated mental instability. Four persons provided adequate radiation monitoring of 53 evacuees in 40 minutes. A sufficient number of protective gowns, slippers, gloves, and caps was available for the monitors. The Director of Nursing at Cannon Memorial Hospital provided excellent supervision of the decontamination operations.

Small plastic bags for valuables, as well as large plastic bags and trash' cans for the disposal of contaminated clothing, were available.

Radioactive waste water from the decontamination of both persons and vehicles would be impounded in a nearby lagoon. Water from the showers is piped to the lagoon, and fire personnel indicated that contaminated vehicles would be washed down at a location where the waste water would drain into the lagoon. To wash down vehicles there were two fire engines with a total of 1,750 gallons of water at the site. If additional water had been needed, there was a vehicle that could pump water'from a nearby stream.

Excellent communications were provided by RACES and a van with a panoply of radio communication equipment. There was an ambulance on site as well as a mass casualty vehicle. The drivers of these vehicles had some paramedical training.

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Generally, Pickens County demonstrated excellent reception /decontami-nation capabilities. Careful planning with attention to detail was evident. For example, one vehicle had an emergency generator and floodlights so that the Barn's parking lot, where evacuees were monitored for contamination, could be illuminated at night. There were; however, a few areas for improvement. Emergency workers, who could be exposed to radiation from contact with contaminated persons, clothing, or vehicles,_cach had only one dosimeter that had a range of 0-200 R. If such workers are to be issued only one dosimeter, it should have a maximum range of between 5 and 20 R. Also, several emergency workers with dosimeters did not have an exposure record sheet, indicating the need for refresher training.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Reception Center personnel who could be exposed to radiation from contact with contaminated persons or vehicles should be issued mid-range dosimeters to supplant the high-range dosimeters or mid-range or low-range dosimeters to supplement the high-range dosimeters.

2. The personnel mentioned above should receive refresher training in exposure control record keeping.

Greenville County (Host) ,

Shelter The shelter contained sufficient amenities for extended care and procedures were in place for obtaining additional supplies and services. Considerations had been given to persons with special needs and specific medical problems.

The primary communication system linking the shelter with the Pickens l County EOC was the telephone. Back-up was provided by the Red Cross i and RACES radios. All messages were logged by the communications officer. The communications area was maintained in a separate portion of the high school recreation section.- Contact was maintained with key shelter staff by hand-held radios and runners.

Personal dosimetry was limited to 0-200 R d'osimeters. Although.the shelter is outside the EPZ, the potential exists for contaminated evacuees coming to the shelter directly, by-passing the Reception Center. Dosimetry was not available for all participants and its need should be assessed. ,

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Appropriate dosimeters are needed as well as training for staff.

2. A carbon copy of the monitoring form should be availabic and retained by the shelter staff.

Traffic and Access Control Not all of the public boat ramps have signs advising the public of evacuation procedures.

The EPZ map does not use the same designators that are shown in the written SOP's issued to the Highway Patrol depicting TCP's.

Evacuation route signs are not installed.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None. _

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Install information/ warning signs at all public boat ramps.

2. Correlate TCP designations on the EPZ map with the Highway Patrol instruction sheets (SOP's).

3. Install evacuation route signs.

4. Depict public boat ramps on the EPZ map.

Fire Activity The scenario response dealt with a simulated tornado that hit the plant. An of f site fire department was requested to respond to help ,

the on site fire brigade search vehicles, trailers and the surrounding ,

parking area for possible victims and also extinguish a flammable liquid fire on the ground near two vehicles that'had collided.

Responding of f site units arrived within five minutes af ter the site fire brigade arrived on the scene.

Of f site Oconee units, upon arrival, were directed to the scene. Once in the area, the plant fire brigade Captain directed the units where he wanted them. Pre-connect hose lines were pulled (one for exposure

The lines were charged protection, the other for foam application). A second pumper laid a supply by use of the pumper's booster tank.

line from the hydrant to supply the first pumper. The other two pumps were in a stand-by position.

The following additional comments further summarize the demonstration by the off site response units:

- Off site units responded quickly. Response times were estimated ~

by responders to be 9 and 14 minutes.

- Responding firemen accepted the command of the fire brigade leader. They were properly outfitted in full protective gear and SCBA's.

- The two main responding pumpers (one f rom each station) were new, very well equipped pumpers carrying 1000 gallons of water on ,

board.

- Proper foam was applied to the combustible liquid fire.

- Tactical methods used were proper, i.e., protect exposure, contain and extinguish.

- Safety and caution was used.

- Decontamination procedures were discussed (beczuse the liquid involved was unknown) and demonstrated to a degree.

- Proper search and rescue procedures were demonstrated.

The time between water flow from the booster tank of first-in units and a continuous supply from a fire hydrant was approximately 18 minutes. If the fire had been significant in size there would have been a period of about 10 minutes without water.

- Off site fire departments were active, aggressive, and effective.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Radio communication between the plant brigade and the responding off site units is recommended.

2. It is recommended that consideration be given to the simulated fire activity being located in a secured area of the plant during future exercises.

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III.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF INADEQUACIES Scheduled Facility or Corrective Date of Action Completion Activity NUREG Item Deficiencies None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions State N.1.a. Future scenarios should provide sufficient off site release to assure that all radiological response capability is adequately exercised.'

Media Center G.4.b. Coordination between State / local government public information staffs and licensee staff was inadequate. Recommend all public information staffs share a common work rcom and procedures be developed to ensure coordination of all information before release to the public.

Pickens County H.3. A larger and better EOC arranged EOC is needed.

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IV.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Facility or Activity Areas Recommended For Improvement FEOC 1. We would recommend that the Scenario Development Committee always include, as a minimum, representation from the utility, the State EPD, DHEC, and participating counties.

Field 1. Additional dosimetry for all field team personnel, Monitoring including EQC drivers. Not all personnel had both Teams self-reading dosimeters and TLD's.

2. Use different radio call signs for field teams, not normal 3-digit numbers. This caused confusion ,

between road numbers and wind direction.

3. Improve contamination control for air-sampling equipment in the plume area.

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4. Review current maps against the present road system.

5. Improve radio communications between field teams and FE0C.

Media Center 1. Equipment (radios, TV's) is needed in the public information staff area so media treatment of the emergency can be monitored.

2. All spokespersons should make better use of visual aids during press briefings.

3. Equipment and procedures are needed to handle incoming telephonic media queries.

Facility or Activity Areas Recommended For Improvement Oconee County 1. A sign denoting the current emergency action level EOC should be prominently displayed.

2. A facsimile device is needed to receive hard-copy messages from the emergency news center and other locations.

3. Media relations and rumor control need to be more fully demonstrated in future. exercises.

Medical 1. The paper used to cover the floors should be cut Activity into appropriate lengths and stored for ready use to prevent having to move the heavy bulk roII.

2. Multiple layers of step-off pads should be taped down to ensure that they do not slip and to allow the simultaneous removal and replacement of the contaminated pad.

3. Assure that all instruments are calibrated according to specified and necessary frequencies.

4. The medical staff should be provided a mid range,-

0-5 R or 0-20 R, dosimeter and a TLD or film badge.

5. Training and procedures for contamination control need to be reviewed by personnel charged with that responsibility.

Anderson 1. Participation at the shelter by more entities is County recommended. For example, any situation where Shelter large crowds are expected will require law enforcement and traffic control.  ;

2. Clarify capacity of facility for sheltering. The county indicates a capacity of 1,075 and the Red Cross officials estimate 250-300.

3. More involvement between participating entities is needed to determine who is responsible for what and how they should interact to form a shelter " team".

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Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement Pickens 1. We would recommend the installation of a separate, County permanent status board to record significant events EOC such as emergency classification levels and times, protective action recommendations, and sectors affected.

Pickens 1. Reception Center personnel who could be exposed to County radiation from contact with contaminated persons or Reception vehicles should be issued mid-range dosimeters to Center supplant the high-range dosimeters or mid-range.or low-range dosimeters to supplement the high-range dosimeters.

2. The personnel mentioned above should receive refresher training in exposure control record keeping.

Greenville 1. Appropriate dosimeters are needed as'well as County training for staff.

Shelter

2. A carbon copy of the monitoring form should be available and retained by the shelter staff.

Traffic and 1. Install information/ warning signs at all public Access boat ramps.

Control

2. Correlate TCP designations on the EPZ map'with the Highway Patrol instruction sheets (SOP's).

3. Install evacuation route signs.

4. Depict public boat ramps on the EPZ map.  :

Fire 1. Radio communication between the plant brigade and Activity the responding off site units is recommended.

2. It is recommended that consideration be given to the simulated fire activity being located in a secured area of the plant during future exercises.

V. APPENDICES A. Evaluator List and Assignments.

B. Exercise Objectives and Scenario i

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SECTION .V APPENDIX A EVALUATOR LIST AND ASSIGNMENTS i

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FEDERAL EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS PLANT OCONEE EXERCISE April 2-3, 1986 CHIEF OF EVALUATORS AND RAC IV CHAIRMAN Glenn C. Woodard (FEMA)

STATE FORWARD EOC - CLEMSON, SOUTH CAROLINA John Heard (PtMA)

Anna Hart (USDA)

Dick Payne (EPA)

Jerry Dumas (DOE)

EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY (EOF)

Ron Marston (NRC)

MEDIA CENTER Jack Glover (FEMA)

MOBILE RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY Ray Boyett (FEMA)

MEDICAL ACTIVITY Tony Foltman (FEMA)

RADIOLOGICAL FIELD TEAMS Joe Keller (FEMA)

Mary Goodkind (FEMA)

Caroline Herzenburg (FEMA)

MOBILE EVALUATOR l Al Hall (DOT) l l

FIRE ACTIVITY l Gordon Veerman (FEMA) l 1

OCONEE COUNTY Tony Foltman (FEMA)

Virginia Baker (FEMA)

Jerry Staroba (FEMA)

PICKENS COUNTY Tom Hawkins (FEMA)

Sue Ann Curtis (FEMA)

Phil Kier (FEMA)

OBSERVERS Jeanne=Jendro (FEMA) t l

D a

SECTION .V APPENDIX B EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND SCENARIO i

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I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE On April'2-3, 1986, an emergency preparedness exercise will be conducted at the Oconee Nuclear Station to test l the inte3 rated capabilities of FEMA, NRC, State of South Carolina, the affected counties and the basic elements of the emergency preparedness plans. The simulated test 4

will require the mobilization and the deployment of state and local response forces to verify their capabilities to  ;

respond to an actual emergency at the Oconee Plant. i l

The exercise will determine the state and local's ability to work efficiently with- the utility under emergency condi- .'

tions. Qualified evaluators will determine the strengths  ;

i and weaknesses of the emergency response forces, and the '

deficiencies will form the basis for corrective actions.

The following specific elements will be tested in the l exercise:

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1. Communications and Warning. l

2. Accident Assessment.  :

Field Monitoring. l 3.

4. Implementation of Protective Action Guidelines.

5. Public Information.  !

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6. Evacuation Methodology. l

7. Direction and Control. )

8. Activation of Emergency Operation Center.

9. Accident Alert and Notification.

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10. Radiological Emergency Medical Care. 1 II. -SPECIFIC EXERCISE OBJECTIVES DFF-SITE PLUME. EXPOSURE PATHWAY OBJECTIVES (0-10 MILES)

A. The State of South Carolina will:

1 1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and acti-vate facilities promptly.

2. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coor-dinate emergency activities.

3. Demonstrate ' ability to communicate with all appro-

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priate locations, organizations and field personnel.

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4. Demonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion.

5. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.

6. Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on PAG's, avail-able shelter, evacuation time estimate and all other appropriate factors.

7. Demonstrate ability to alert public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminste the initial instruc-tional message within 15 minutes.

8. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.

9. Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely fashion. .

l B. Pickens and Oconee Counties will:

Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and acti- )

1. h vate facilities promptly, l

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities  !

and maintain staffing around the clock. l l

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coor- '

dinate emergency activities.

4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appro-priate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

6. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instruc-tional message, within 15 minutes. l

7. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

8. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to dea ~1 with impediments to evacuation, inclement weather or traffic obstructions.

. 9. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

10. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.

11. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

12. Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

13. Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.

14. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees.

15. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.

16. Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.

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.OCONEE FULL PARTICIPATION EXERCISE 2-3 April 1986 SCENARIO ga.V. M On Monday, 3pri1% 1986, a low-pressure system formed in West Texas. As it crossed the Midwest, it increased in Strength. The hot, dry air from the southwest gathered moisture from the Gulf of Mexico and met with cold dry air from the interior of the continent, creating an unstable air mass. By the morning of Wednesday, April 2, heavy The rain and Nation-strong winds were being experienced in Georgia.

al Severe Storms Forecast Center of the National Weather Service issued a Tornado Watch for northeast Georgia' and At 10 a.m., Cleveland northwest South Carolina st 8:30 a.m.

Georgia reported heavy winds and hail had knocked out power, a

overturned mobile homes, and inflicted several casualties.

A Georgia state trooper reported a large funnel cloud nearA Toccoa moving northeast at 1215 p.m. , along US Hwy 123.

tornado Warning was issued by National Weather Service at 1230 p.m. for all areas 100 miles either side of a line from Gainesville, Georgia to Hickory, North Carolina.

Plant Status At 1200 hrs. on 2 April 1986:

Reactor il - Refueling in progress Reactor $2 - Cold shutdown for leak repair Reactor $3 - 100% full power Diesel Generator (Keowee fl) - down for maintenance Diesel Generator (Keowee (2) - on standby l

Tornado Watch since 0830 a.m.

Event Sequence: on 4/2/86 Time Event T366 A tornado strikes Oconee Nuclear Plant, collapsing walls in the West Penetration Room and severing "B" emergency feedwater line near the reactor --

building. Major power line damage causes switch-yard isolation and all offsite power is lost. . Unit 3 trips and all power is lost for 31 seconds while i

backup diesel power (Keowee 42) comes on line.

Phone systems are damaged but microwave and radios SCEPD are operable. An Klert should be declared.

and county EOCs.shon16'be notified.

1310 Additional tornado touchdowns are reported in Seneca, Pickens, Clemson and Liberty. Heavy damage to businesses, mobile homes, power lines and bridges is reported along with numerous casualties.

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and trees down, blocking I-85, US-123, US-76, and SRs 24, 178, and 183.

Reactor Unit 3 in hot shutdown. Emergency feed-1315 Severe damage to buildings water lines leaking.

Severe injuries and parking lots at Oconee Plant.

reported.

1330

• SCEPD notified Pickens and Oconee counties

• SCEPD fully activates SEOC which had been on standby since Tornado Watch

• SCEPD dispatches FEOC to Clemson National Guard Armory.

• Oconee and Pickens counties alert EOC staff and open their EOCs.

• Most phone lines are out but microwave and radio communications are still operating. )

1345

• Additional tornado touchdowns reported in West Greenville, Paris Mountain, and Greer.

• Greenville and Anderson counties alert their EOC staffs and open their EOCs.

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• South Carolina, Pickens and Oconee counties dispatch PIOS to Oconee Media Center.

• TSC established at Oconee Nuclear Station 1400

• Plant damage assessment

• 100 KV line to CT-5 down

• 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> estimate to restore offsite power via CT-5

• 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> estimate to close PCBS to restore offsite power via switchyard

• West Penetration Room inaccessible due to damage

• Reported additional damage to plant facilities and personnel injuries

• Access to and egress fr~m o plant blocked by downed trees.

1400-1800 TSC deals with shutdown, power damage, and injury problems l 1730

• FEOC assumes control from SEOC

1800

• CMC activated ,

- Break -

April 3, 1986 p 0800

• Drill time same as 2000 hrs. on 4/2/86 (2000) 0900

• Keowee 42 trips causing station blackout (2100) 0900

• Site Area Emergency should be declared l

(2100) Offsite authorities notified with appropriate protective action recommendations

• FEOC, Oconee, and Pickens coordinate siren and EBS activation times (simulated).

• Media Center coordinates and activates EBS l (simulated)  ;

• 2-mile road blocks established

• Appropriate reception centers and shelters pre-pared for opening  !

1000 - Turbine driven emergency feedwater pump bearings (22001 fail. General Emergency should be declared

• offsite authorities notified with protective r l

action recommendations ,

• pas relayed to counties

• Sirens and EBS coordinated and activated (Actual) ,

• Shelters opened for evacuees 1100 - Significant radiological releases begin (2300) Cannot be isolated or contained 1300 - Power restcred, cooldown continues  !

(0130)

}

1400 (0200) - Exercise terminated

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