ML20135D317

Forwards RAI Re Licensee Responses to Bulletin 96-02, Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel,Over Fuel in Reactor Core,Or Over Safety-Related Equipment

ML20135D317
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	12/06/1996
From:	Labarge D NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Hampton J DUKE POWER CO.
References
IEB-96-002, IEB-96-2, TAC-M95615, TAC-M95616, TAC-M95617, NUDOCS 9612090337
Download: ML20135D317 (4)

Text

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g UNITED STATES j

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j NUCLEAR FIEGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 30seMo01 j

k.....,/ December 6,1996 i '

i i Mr. J. W. Hampton l l Vice President, Oconee Site  !

Duke Power Company i P. 0. Box 1439 i j Seneca, SC 29679  !

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO BULLETIN 96-02, p " MOVEMENT OF HEAVY LOADS OVER SPENT FUEL, OVER FUEL IN THE REACTOR  !

i CORE, OR OVER SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT" - OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 (TAC NOS. M95615, M95616, M95617)

Dear Mr. Hampton:

j t

t l The NRC staff has evaluated the responses to Bulletin 96-02, " Movement of Dry Storage Casks over Spent Fuel, Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Safety-Related  !

i Equipment," and found that some licensees without single-failure-proof cranes  !

i have analyzed or are planning to analyze postulated spent fuel storage cask  ;

. and transportation cask drop accidents to establish design basis accidents for >

their facilities. .

I i j Typical cask drop analyses for in-plant cask movement have addressed the i

! effects of a drop on plant equipment and/or cask integrity. Those analyses j have assumed that the cask was in its final condition with its structural lids

bolted or welded in place and that the fuel remained in the cask at all times,  ;

though the integrity of the cask might be breached during the cask drop.

~

! Howsver, since most cask lids are not secured until after the casks are j l removed from the pool, it is conceivable that a cask could drop in a tipped- '

over orientation. The cask could also be dropped back into the spent fuel

! pool or adjacent area, possibly dislodging the cask lid or dislodging the cask 1 j lid and ejecting some or all the spent fuel elements onto the top of the spent  ;

fuel racks, the floor of the pool, or adjacent areas. 1

! This accident scenario involves the potential for dropping the cask during i movement from the spent fuel pool to the area within the plant building where ,

F activities such as drying, inerting, and final securing of the cask lid are l

{ completed. Offsite dose effects are not expected from a cask drop and tip-  !

over event in which there is a loss of both the cask lid and fuel confinement. i i However, the effect of such an event on the operation of the facility needs to  !

j be assessed. For example, evaluations may need to determine if any vital 1

plant areas are rendered inaccessible and if operations or maintenance

activities would be significantly hampered. Such evaluations would involve, i i but are not limited to, the cask and crane designs, the load paths, and the Os l l' extent to which the licensee can demonstrate its capability of performing V <

actions necessary for safe shutdown with resulting plant damage and in the presence of radiological source term.

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1 i 9612090337 961206 NBC RECETISM 4

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PDR ADOCK 05000269 )

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.h, Mr. J. W. Hampton December 6, 1996 To support further NRC staff evaluation of this potential cask drop scenario while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled), please provide the following:

1. An evaluation of your crane design, load path, and cask loading and l unloading processes that supports a determination that the scenario  ;

described above is not credible at your facility, or

2. If you determine that the event is credible, please provide the following:

(a) An analysis of a possible drop of a spent fuel storage or transportation cask involving a drop that results in the tipping I over of the spent fuel cask, loss of the cask lid, or loss of the cask lid and ejection of the spent fuel from the cask into the spent l fuel pool or areas adjacent to the pool. This load drop / consequence i analysis should include a dose analysis to personnel involved in the '

cask movement for the time immediately following the accident.

l Also, the analysis should address personnel exposure resulting from .

required entry into plant areas affected by the event and the impact  !

of elevated dose fields on the ability to reach safe shutdown or continue normal plant operation.

(b) An evaluation addressing the potential for criticality resulting from the postulated cask drop accident scenario described above.

(c) An evaluation that addresses possible means of recovering from the 1 postulated cask drop accident scenario described above. I (d) An evaluation that addresses whether the potential impact of the scenario described above on other parts of the facility (e.g., the spent fuel pool) is bounded by previous load drop analyses.

Please provide your response within 60 days of your receipt of this request l for information.

Sincerely, Original signed by: i David E. LaBarge, Senior Project Manager i Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 cc: See next page Distribution:

Docket: File PD 11-2 Rdg. JZwolinski ACRS PUBLIC SVarga 0GC EMerschoff, RII RCrlenjak, RII IE**Tp*y *wS*E.T.cYm*."n*ifNo,*. Y I$p*y iin .et. chm.nti.ncio.or.

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1 i

Mr. J. W. Hampton  !

i i

! To support further NRC staff evaluation of this potential cask drop scenario while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than cold shutdown,

) refueling, and defueled),.please provide the following:

l'

! 1. An evaluation of your crane design, load path, and cask loading and

, unloading processes that supports a determination that the scenario

. described above is not credible at your facility, or

2. If you determine that the event is credible, please provide the following:

i (a) An analysis of a possible drop of a spent fuel storage or transportation cask involving a drop that results in the tipping over of the spent fuel cask, loss of the cask lid, or loss of the t

i cask lid and ejection of the spent fuel from the cask into the spent

' fuel pool or areas adjacent to the pool. This load drop / consequence analysis should include a dose analysis to personnel involved in the cask movement for the time immediately following the accident.

l Also, the analysis should address personnel exposure resulting from i

required entry into plant areas affected by the event and the impact of elevated dose fields on the ability to reach safe shutdown or continue normal plant operation.  ;

(b) An evaluation addressing the potential for criticality resulting from the postulated cask drop accident scenario described above.

1 (c) An evaluation that addresses possible means of recovering from the

, postulated cask drop accident scenario described above.

(d) An evaluation that addresses whether the potential impact of the scenario described above on other parts of the facility (e.g., the spent fuel pool) is bounded by previous load drop analyses.

Please provide your response within 60 days of your receipt of this request for information.

L

Sincer ly, 4

7 m David E. LaBarge, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate 11-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 cc: See next page

t e .

j d

l Mr. J. W. Hampton

Duke Power Company i

Oconee Nuclear Station

[

cc:

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' Mr. Paul R. Newton Mr. Ed Burchfield legal Department (P805E) Compliance i

Duke Power Company Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Oconee Nuclear Site Charlotte, North Carolina 28242-0001 P. O. Box 1439

Seneca, South Carolina 29679

' J. Michael McGarry, III, Esquire Winston and Strawn Ms. Karen E. Long

1400 L Street, NW. Assistant Attorney General 1

Washington, DC 20005 North Carolina Department of Justice l Mr. Robert B. Borsum P. O. Box 629 Framatome Technologies Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 i Suite 525 l

1700 Rockville Pike Mr. G. A. Copp Rockville, Maryland 10852-1631 Licensing - EC050 Duke Power Company Manager, Lls

{ NUS Corporation 526 South Church Street I Charlotte, North Carolina 28242-0001

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2650 McCormick Drive, 3rd Floor Clearwater, Florida 34619-1035 Mr. Dayne H. Brown, Director Senior Resident Inspector Division of Radiation Protection North Carolina Department of U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Environment, Health and Route 2, Box 610 Seneca, South Carolina 29678 Natural Resources P. O. Box 27687 Raleigh, North Carolina 27611-7687 Regional Administrator, Region II U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, NW. Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Max Batavia, Chief Bureau of Radiological Health South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201 .

County Supervisor of Oconee County Walhalla, South Carolina 29621 I

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