ML20215K188

Insp Rept 50-412/87-20 on 870316-26.Violation Noted:Failure of Licensee QC Insps to Identify Minor Hardware Deficiencies.Deviation Noted:Failure to Properly Identify Assigned Electrical Chain or Channel

ML20215K188
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	06/16/1987
From:	Asars A, Gramm R, Gray H, Kaplan H, Kamal Manoly, Paulitz F, Strosnider J, Winters R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215K131	List: ML20215K128 ML20215K151 ML20215K164 ML20215K188
References
50-412-87-20, IEB-79-07, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-7, NUDOCS 8706250250
Download: ML20215K188 (56)

See also: IR 05000412/1987020

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U~S.LNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.

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REGION I-

Report:No, . 50-412/87-20

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Docket'No. 50-412

-License No. CPPR-10b Category A'  ;

Licensee: Duquesne Lignt Company

Robinson Plaza Building No. 2

p Suite No. 210, Pa. Route 60

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Facility.Name: Beaver Valley Unit 2

Inspection At:- Shippingport, Pennsylvania

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~. Inspection Conduct  : . March 16 - 26, 1987

Inspectors: A "- '

4[3/87

.R./ Gram ,-Seni r Resident Inspector date

H. Gray, Lead Rea p Engineer

d /3/8 date

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W. bstetm 6/7fr7

H. Kaplan,. Lead Reactor Engineer '

d~ ate

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K. Manol - Lead Rea'ctor Engineer

db/87

date

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F(faulitz, React'6rEngineep ( dat'e

kNint rs Reactor Engineer

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date

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Y9/87

. Asars, Re ident Inspector '

date

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Approved by: 8 f/r/#7

. Strosnider, Chief, Materials and 'date .<

Processes Section

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Inspection Summary: Announced As-Built Team Inspection Conductcd on

March 16 - 26, 1987 (Inspection Report No. 50-412/87-20).

Areas Inspected: A special team inspection was conducted of installed

Mechanical, Electrical, HVAC, Instrumentation and Controls, and structural

hardware. The purpose of the inspection was to verify that the "as-built"

systems and hardware were of acceptable quality and in compliance with NRC

regulations, licensee commitments, and design specifications.

Results: The inspectors concluded, based on the sample of systems and hardware

inspected, that the "as built" condition of the plant systems and hardware are

constructed substantially in accordance with NRC requirements and licensee i

commitments and are of acceptable quality. One violation and one deviation I

were identified. The violation involves multiple examples of failure of

licensee QC inspections to identify minor hardware deficiencies. It was i

determined that none of these deficiencies had the potential to significantly l

affect safe plant operation. However, the number of examples of QC deficiencies !

observed indicates that increased attention to detail is warranted during the l

completion of construction and during plant operation. The deviation involved j

failure to properly identify by color coding the assigned electrical chain or

channel of safety related electrical equipment. I

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Inspection Summary . ..................... 2

1.0 Scope and Purpose of the Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2.0 Persons Contacted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ,

3.0 Piping System Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 4

3.1 Scope and Objective . . . . . . . . . .......... 4

3.2 Inspection Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 'S

3.3 Inspection Activities . ................ 7

3.4 Findings . ,..................... 8 l

3.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ... . 10

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4.0 Piping As-Built Verification and Stress Reconciliation Program 11 1

4.1 Overview of Licensee Program . .... ......... 11

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4.2 Review and Inspection Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

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4.3 Findings . . . ......... ............. 13

4.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

5.0 Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems . . . 14

5.1 Scope . .... . .................... 14

5.2 Inspection Criteria . . . . . . ............. 14

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5.3 Control Room and Control Building HVAC . . . . . . . . . 15

5.3.1 Inspection Activities . . . .......... 15

5.3.2 Fi n di n g s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

5.4 Emergency Battery Room HVAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

5.4.1 Inspection Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

5.4.2 Findings . . ................. 17

5.5 Diesel Generator Building HVAC , . . . . . . ..... 18

5.5.1 Inspection Activities . ............ 18

5.5.2 Findings . . . . ................. 18

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5.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

6.0 Electrical Power Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 ,

6.1 Scope of Electrical Power System Inspections . . . . . . 20

6.2 Inspection Criteria . . .. . ... . , . . . .. .. . . 20

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6.3 Inspection Activities . . . . . . .. . .. . .. .... 22

6.4 Findings . . . . . . . . ... . .. . ... . . .... 23

6.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

7.0 Instrumentation and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

7.1 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 28

7.2 Inspection Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. 28 ,

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7.3 Inspection Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 -

7 .' 4 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. 31

7.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

8.0 Structures . . . .. . ... .. . . ... . . . . . . . . . . 35 l

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8.1 Scope of Inspection . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 35 .

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8.2 Inspection Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 35  :

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8.3 Building Loads Verification Program . . .. . . . . . . . 35 J

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8.4 Inspection Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 i

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8.5 Findings and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 l

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9.0 Followup on Outstanding NRC Bulletins . . . . . . . .. . .. 40 l

9.1 IE Bulletin 79-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

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9.2 IE Bulletin 79-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 )

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10.0 Exit Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Appendix A: Notice of Violation and Deviation

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Attachments:

Attachment I: List of Persons Contacted

Attachment II: Isometric Drawings Used During Piping Inspections

Attachment III: Piping Related Non-Conformance Reports Reviewed )

' Attachment IV: Pipe Documentation Reviewed, Welding

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Attachment V: List of Piping Procedures and Reconciliation Packages Reviewed

Attachment VI: Drawings and Documents Used During HVAC Systems Inspection

Attachment VII: Drawings and Documents Used During Electrical Power Systems

Inspection

Attachment VIII: Drawings and Documents Used During I&C Inspections

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DETAILS .!

1. 0. Scope and purpose'of the Inspection l

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This as-built team inspection was conducted by NRC inspectors to verify I

that selected systems have been constructed with an acceptable level'of. ,

quality and substantially in conformance with-NRC requirements, licensee '

commitments. and design specifications. The inspection included examination

of fluid piping systems; heating,. ventilation, and air conditioning-(HVAC)

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systems; AC and DC electrical. power systems; instrumentation and control

(I&C)l systems; and plant structures. Extensive system walkdowns'were-

performed and various project' specifications, drawings, records and' design

calculations'were reviewed.

Infgeneral, the systems selected for inspection are' associated with meeting >

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reactor safe shutdown and core cooling requirements. In addition, piping

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. system inspections focused on those systems, including the reactor coolant

system (RCS), for which postulated pipe breaks were eliminated (for the-

purpose of defining mechanical loads)- based on " leak-before-break"

evaluations. The inspection-included portions of the following: )

• The Reactor Coolant and High and Low Pressure Safety Injection Systems- i

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• . The control room, control building, battery rooms, and. diesel generator

building HVAC systems

• 'AC and DC electrical power systems

• I&C systems associated with loop 3 of.the RCS; the "C" High Head safety

Injection System pumps; the "B" Low Head Safety Injection System pump and

the control room, contro1Ebuilding, and diesel generator building HVAC

-systems

• The . Piping' Stress Reconciliation Program and the Building Loads Verification

Program

2.0: Persons Contacted'

Numerous licensee and licensee contractar personnel were contacted during

the inspection. Attachment I is a list of the principal individuals

who were contacted by the NRC inspectors.

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3.0 Piping Systems Inspections

3.1' Scope and Objective

The scope of the piping system inspections included piping components, y

equipment and supports in portions of the Reactor Coolant Eystem and  ;

Safety Injection System (SIS). The portions of systems inspected j

were the third loop of the RCS, including the pressurizer and pressurizer j

surge lines, and those portions of Train B of the Emergency Core Cooling l

System (ECCS) piping associated with Mode "D" of SIS operation. This  !

mode represents the case of minimum required safeguards with the "B"

low head safety injection pump and the "C" high head safety injection

(charging) pump taking suction from the Refueling Water Storage Tank

(RWST) and delivering to the reactor through the RCS cold leg connections. ,

(Mode D in Section 6.3.1 of the FSAR). The specific portion: of each j

system inspected are tabulated below:  !

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Reactor Coolant System

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The portion of RCS inspected was loop "3" including the 29" 0.D.

line from reactor vessel to steam generator, the 31" 0.D. line ,

to the reactor coolant pump, the 27h" 0.D. return line to reactor  !

vessel, the 14" line to pressurizer, and the 6" 0.D. line from l

the top of pre;surizer to the relief valve (RV551B).

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High Head Safety Injection System

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P&ID Fig. No. 7-4: 3" and 4" 0.D. piping between the discharge

side of charging pump No. P21C to motor operated valve (MOV)

8133A and MOV 8133B.

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P&ID Fig. No. 11-1: 4" 0.D. piping to MOV 867B and 3" 0D piping

to MOV 867C.

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P&ID Fig. No. 11-2: 3" 0.0. piping to containment penetration

J No. X-113 and two 2" 0.D. branch piping to Globe valves No. 67

l and 68.

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P&ID Fig. No. 11-4: Two 2" 0.D. SC-1 piping to check valves No. l

137 & 139 to 6" 0.D. headers discharging into the RCS cold legs .

No. 23 & 21 through check valves No. 552 and 548. j

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Low Head Safety Injection System

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P&ID Fig. No. 11-1: 10" 0.D. piping between the discharge side

of charging pump No. P21B to.MOV 8888B. Also, the cross-tie 10"

0.D. piping between the A and B trains of the discharge piping

from pumps P21A and P218 respectively.  ;

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P&ID Fig. No. 11-4: 10" 0.D. piping to containment penetration

X-60 to check valve No. 132. 6" 0.D. piping to check valves No.

107 and 548 to the discharge in the RCS cold leg loop No. 21. p

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The-objective.of the inspection was to verify, by sampling review, l

that.the above' systems were designed and fabricated such that.they l

were capable ofl performing :their . intended functions as specified in -

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the Final, Safety Analysis Report (FSAR): and whether the as-built

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configurations were iniconformance with the'FSAR, the'SER and system .;

specifications'and drawings, i

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11cens Wgidocuments and installed hard, tare to ensure that, for those  !

select 6d systems,: FSAR commitments wert ccrrectly translated into. i

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specifications,: procedures,-drawings, and installed piping systems. '

Inspections: of the "as-built" piping . systems were conducted to -verify

consistency and agreement with the Piping and' Instrumentation Diagrams

(P& ids), pioing. isometrics,, and support detail drawings and to verify

an acceptable : level; of qt; alit) . The P& ids reviewed included those-

that will be used by the crerators during plant operation.

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Review of Quality Assuraned 'and . Control records, relating to the

~ licensee's and. contractor's inspection.of selected piping..and. support'

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y corrponents also was performed during the course.of the ' inspections.

o g In' addition to the w rification of as-built piping and support system

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installations, the inspection also included a review of-the licen-

, see's program for reconciliation of as-built. configurations. This

inspection: activity provided the basis for NRC. review-of the licensee's-

[ actions in response to the requirements of I'.E. BulletinL79-14 for

• ?4 Seismic Analyses of As-Built Safety Related Piping Systems, i

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p 3.2 InspectionCriterfy

, The. governing criteria for the as-built piping. system inspections were:

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Final Safety Analysis. Report (FSAR)

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Safety Evalvdfon Report (SER)

%? ASME Section @ I, Class NB and NC, and Section IX

The veriffcation of correct piping system installation was performed

either by visual inspection or by independent measurements on  !

-accessiblecompoiien$sandsupports.

+VA ( "1hedetailedcriteriausedforthe.inspectionoftheseinstallations

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were .those :descr(bed in the specific . installation specifications.

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'The in's pectick attributes'for piping and fittings included selected

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verification' of the follosing: ,

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' 't ' branch connection types and locations;

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pipihg' bend and elbow radii;-

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support mark numbers, functions.and locations;

proper. flow direction marks on valves;

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. piping wall thickness;-

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correct-sequentialElocation of. valves on piping runs; and,

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. proper identification and orientation 'of valves and Limitorque

operators..

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! The. inspection attributes.for pipe supports' included selected veri-

fication of the following:

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.as-built'. configurations compared ,to support detail drawing (BZ

series), including dimensions of. members;

support orientation;.

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connection to the proper structure;

direction of restraint;

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sizes'and quality of welds on hangers, including welded

attachments to piping;

l baseplate dimensions and location of structural attachments to

basepla.tes;

baseplate bolt (concrete expansion or Richmond insert)

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tightness, edge distance and the bolt mark identification for

Hilti bolts;

restraint bleed holes open and' free of foreign material; 'l

load setting of spring hangers;

grouting of floor mounted baseplates and gap sizes for wall

mounted plates; and,

pipe routing and support locations such that movements of

piping due to vibration, thermal expansion, etc., would not

likely cause contact'with other pipes, supports, equipment or

components.

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3.3 Inspection Activities'

Inspection of the reactor coolant and safety injection systems

consisted of the following activities:

Walkdown inspection of as-built piping components (including

fittings and attachments), equipment and. system supports;  !

Independent comparison of selected piping components and

supports to the attributes identified in Section 3.2;  ;

Verification of valve tag numbers against Stone and Webster

Engineering Corporation SWECs P&ID and plant operation drawings;  !

Review of selected QA inspection records, Non-Conformance and  !

Disposition Reports (N&Ds) and Engineering and Design Coordi-

nation Reports (E&DCRs). Attachment II is a list of the piping

isometric drawings showing the piping components, equipment and ,

support installations examined during the course of the inspection.

A listing of piping related nonconformance reports reviewed is

provided in Attachment III.

The inspectors reviewed representative shop and field data

sheets, associated NDE reports, and material test reports for

base metal and weld filler materials as required by ASME III-NB

and NC, and ASME IX. Procedures to control sensitization (carbide <

sensitization) in austenitic stainless steel as prescribed in

FSAR Section 5.2.3.4.4 and Amendment 12 were reviewed.

3.4 Findings

Based on the review of documents and examination of piping system

installations, the following findings were identified.

a. Specification of weld length was not provided for a weld

connecting structural tube steel TS 3x3x0.25 to an embedment

plate on hanger No. 2CHS-PSR 2604 (shown on drawing No.

BZ-83B-24-2). Further, the distance between the embedment plate

and a reference location was not specified on the support

drawing. Thus, a concern was raised regarding the lack of  ;

information provided on the drawings to specify the minimum i

required weld length fer both construction and QA personnel. In

response to the inspectors observation SWEC indicated that a

full weld length between adjoining members was assured even

though the length was not specified on the drawing. This was

accomplished through the size and location of all embedment

plates specified on structural drawings (RC-Series). When the

tolerances in the installation of both embedment plate and

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piping are considered, the minimum attainable weld length (Sh") )

was equal to the required length according to design calculations.  !

The actual length was measured as 5 3/4". The inspector had no j

further questions.

b. Manufacturer drawing for valve No. C-78, on the HHSI piping No.

'2-CHS-003-70-2 from the discharge side of charging pump P210, ,

was referenced as drawing No. 2006-300-001-116 on SWEC's piping I

isometric drawing No. 108302 but as drawing No. 2006-300-001-112 l

on SWEC's piping isometric drawing No. 108397. SWEC's review of

the discrepancy identified that the correct valve drawing No.

was 2006-300-001-112. Westinghouse [W) records indicated that

File No.116 was for an ASME Class 1 valve (C-88) and file No.

112 was for an ASME Class 2. valve (C-78). The N-5 data package

reflected the as-built condition (i.e. ASME Class 2 valve No.

C-78). SWEC determined that the reference to the W file No. 116

was a drawing error and indicated that it will be corrected.

The inspector concluded that the drawing discrepancy was not

significant since it had not affected the valve installation or

the ASME N-5 documentation.

c. During the piping walkdown inspection, a small clearance was

observed between the pipe clamp of hanger No. 2515-PSST-607 and

an existing structural beam W8x18 in the direction of pipe

movement. The clearance was measured as 11/16". A concern was

raised regarding the effect of the small clearance on piping

axial movement in the unrestrained direction. Another concern ,

was raised regarding the adequacy of QA walkdown inspection of

clearances between safety related structures and components.

With regard to the piping movement concern, the licensee issued

a clearance evaluation report (attachment A-4 to procedure

2BVM-236) for evaluation of the observed clearance. The evaluation

noted that, based on review of the piping stress calculation,

the predicted seismic pipe movement in the axial direction was

0.72", slightly exceeding the available clearance of 0.6875".

Evaluation of the minor contact of the clamp edge and the beam

flange during a seismic event indicated it could be accomodated

by the flexibility of the sway strut's pin connection. The

licensee's disposition of the finding was considered acceptable.

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However, the failure of QC to detect the observed tight clearance

is a failure to effectively implement a procedure 2BVM-236 for

" Engineering and Quality Control Survey.of Component Spacing and

! Clearances" and is an example of the violation of Criterion X

j of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50. (87-20-01)

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d. All operational valve' tags.in the RCS Loop conformed to the.

applicable drawings except the tags were missing on valve numbers

-46 and 18 on 2" 0.D piping. A review of valve tagging records

indicated that the tags were placed on the valves by the licensee

prior to the end of the inspection.

e. Visual inspection of welds in the RCS and Safety Injection.

System revealed exceptionally' smooth ground surfaces, free of

surface irregularitie's. The resultant surface finish is considered l

conducive to meaningful in-service inspection (ISI). j

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f. Independent determinations of. wall thickness at sixty-five- 3

locations using an ultrasonics "D" meter indicated that all

measurements exceeded code requirements minimum wall thickness.

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g. lThe inspector reviewed seventeen non-conformance reports (NCRs)  !

Lincluding.their dispositions. The NCRs were readily retrievable i'

using the licensee's tracking system and were found to be well

' documented and to have appropriate signatures. Disposition  !

included weld repair, replacement, or use as-is. l

h. A loose nut was found on a stainless steel coupling flange in

the safety injection system (Item 6'on-ISO drawing CL-110-177-GAC).

Inspector re'iew

v of the licensee's practice for bolting of' flanged. I

connections: disclosed that no torquing procedures are employed j

for. connections of this type. .(Terquing procedures were only

utilized when torque values were specified by.the vendor). :These

joints were made using standard. pipe fitters. practice of tightening '

the bolts with a hand wrench in a manner that appropriately

compressed the gasket material and maintained the flange faces

parallel to each other. The QC inspection of bolted flanges <

verified proper materials and-fit-up of the joints. lThe joints -  !

were monitored for leakage during the hydrostatic test and any

leaking-joints were tightened or the gasket was replaced as

necessary.

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The inspector questioned the adequacy of the practice for bolting

flanged connections without more specific procedures. The

licensee responded that' Beaver Valley Unit 2 is committed to the

1971 Edition through Winter 1972 addendum of the ASME Code.

This edition of the Code provides no guidance regarding

installation of bolted joint connections. The ASME code

guidance for control of Bolt stress is contained in the

mandatory Appendix XII, Article XII-1000, first issued in 1981. l

The licensee irdicated that their practices for bolt tightening l

and control of bolt stress are consistent with these code

requirements. Review of the 1983 ASME Code Article XII-1000 by

the inspector confirmed that the licensee's practice was

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consistent with the Code. The licensee'did indicate that torque

values would be specified for maintenance activities during

plant operation to a /oid possible leakage of contaminated water

and to meet ALARA esals.

The inspector had no further questions.

1. The inspector determined that welding and NDE activities

involving reactor coolant and safety injection systems conformed

to the requirements of ASME III Sections NB and NC, respectively,

and Section IX requirements. Field welding was performed by

Schneider Power, Inc. using a manually qualified austenitic

stainless steel weld procedure SPBV 300G (with type 316 filler

metal). The procedure utilized both the Tungsten Inert Gas

(TIG) and Shielded Metal Arc (SMA) process; the TIG process for

depositing the first three layers including consuming the insert

for the root pass and the SMA for the balance of layers. Shop

welding was performed by Power, Piping using a combination of

qualified SMA and TIG procedures. TIG procedure 8001A was used

to weld the root pass (open butt) and SMA procedure 8021 for the

remaining layers. A sampling of welder performance qualification

records indicated conformance to ASME IX requirements. The weld

data sheets and inspection reports verified that the specified

radiographic and liquid penetrant examinations were performed as

required. Filler materials were found to conform to specification

requirements including a 5% minimum calculated ferrite content.

J. A review of random certified test reports indicated conformance

to specified SA material specifications for piping components

including pipe, fittings, valves, flanges and bolting. These

included SA 351 Grade 304 (castings), SA 312 Grade 316 and SA

376 Grade 316 (piping), SA 182 Grade 316 and SA'193 Grade B6

(bolting).

k. The inspector determined that the licensee's subcontractors

implemented and documented the following controls and measures

for controlling sensitization in austenitic stainless steel:

(a) control of heat input as verified by calculation of welding

parameters and corrosion testing (ASTM 708) of field weld procedure

qualification test assemblies, (b) prohibition of post weld heat

treatment, (c) control of welding interpass temperature (350 F

max.) and (d) utilization of materials in the solution annealed

condition obtained by heating to 1800 F - 2000 F followed by

water quenching. For example, the documentation showed that the

27h" I.D. x 2.2" minimum wall thickness reactor coolant piping

, was furnished as a SA 351 -Grade 8A type 304 centrifugally cast

I product, heat treated at 2000 F for 4k hrs. followed by water

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quenching and 100% inspection by liquid penetrant, radiography

and ultrasonics.

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3.5 Conclusions

The installed' piping, piping components and supports inspected'were-

'found generally to be .of good quality and to satisfy the criteria  ;

established in Section 3.2. . Quality records were found to be acceptable  :

and "as-built" drawings-including those to be used by the operators 3

to support plant cperations were found substantially in agreement-

with the as-installed piping systems. One example.of QC failure'to-

identify a smaller clearance'between a piping clamp'and a; structural

beam t 1.specified.by procedure was identified. Analysis of the j

nonce.rorming condition indicated that it would not adversely. affect '

. safe plant operation.

4.0 Piping As-Built Verification and Stress Reconciliation Program .

4.1 : Overview of Licensee Pogram

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The. reconciliation of design.and "as-built" piping stresses was-

performed and documented as part of the N-5. certification program. ,

Documents (calculation, drawings, etc.) generated.for the qualifi-

cation of piping pressure boundary were included 'in the N-5 package

upon completion.of the stress reconciliation.

The major features of the licensee's reconciliation program included: l

Walkdown verification of as-built installations against piping  !

isometric drawings. '

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Incorporation of. final input-to stress analysis in the piping

design specification.

Evaluation for_ disposition of discrepancies between as-analyzed

and'as-installed condition.

Re-analysis, if required, of piping systems involving disparities

identified in the previous evaluation stage. )

i

The piping as-built verification-ef. fort was the responsibility .of the

Installed Condition Verification Group (ICVG) which consisted of

representatives from the contractor, Schneider-Power Corporation  !

(SPC), and SWEC Construction. SWEC's program required the certifi- j

cation of-members of the ICVG to the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6-1978  !

for inspection. l

'

Verification of as-built piping configurations was performed in

accordance with procedure FCP-509, for " Installed Condition Verifi-

cation of Piping". The procedure provided a listing of attributes

.which required verification by the ICVG. These included piping

layout dimensions, elevation, branch connections, valve and support j

locations, etc. The procedure also provided specific tolerances for i

performing installed condition measurements. The acceptable tolerances i

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.of as-built pip'ing configurations from the as-analyzed condition were

consistent with'those in thetspecification-for field fabrication and. -t

erection of piping systems (2BV5-920). Thus,'the total permissible' 1

tolerances were allocated to installation related deviations rather i

than divided among installation and design reconciliation phases.

The procedure;for pipe stress reconciliation (28VM-156) provided.

detailed' description'of the several activities involved.in this

process inc16 ding the requirements for reconciliation of. piping

supports, nozzle. loads, welded attachme.nts and penetration loads'.

The procedure also addressed acceptable methods for the re-analysis

of piping systems which included'the use.of ASME code case N-411 for

alternate damping values for seismic analysis of Class 1, 2 and 3 .,'

. piping. SWEC indicated that when piping re-analysis was required,

neither the Independent Support Motion (ISM) in response spectrum

analysis nor the time history approach was employed in the piping

reconciliation evaluation. Both of these analysis: techniques wotild

be..less' conservative.than'the enveloped response spectra approach.that

was used.

4.2 Review'and Inspection Activities.

Evaluation.of the program for piping as-built verification and stress

reconciliation included the.following review and inspection activities: J

The procedures governing the piping' installation tolerances, l

. installed condition verification and pipe stress reconciliation

were reviewed,

Sample verification of selected piping.-system installations was

performed, and  ;

A sample of piping and support reconciliation packages was

reviewed.

Details of NRC sample verification of various piping systems and the

inspection findings were addressed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. The

sample of piping and support reconciliation packages reviewed, was

selected from the portion of Safety Injection system verified during

the as-built walkdown verification discussed in Section 3.0.

A list of reconciliation packages reviewed is provided in

Attachment V. ,

.

4.3 - Findings

The program for piping as-built verification and stress reconcili-

ation was found to be comprehensive and consistent with overall

industry practice. The. acceptable deviation between as-analyzed and

the as-installed configuration was generally equal to or more

conservative than that provided in the technical position of the

Welding Research Council bulletin WRC-316 on piping installation

tolerances. 1

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One area of concern was_ identified. relating. to the~ lack _ of a' require-

ment for performing-angular measurements between piping segments

.during the'as-built configuration verification effort. .It was noted,

however, that the requirements of the_ procedure which were verifi-

cation of (1) linear segment measurements, (2) the-global-location of:

one point;on each piping isometric,.(3) two measured piping elevations

on each isometric,.and (4).the location of nozzles, when viewed

collectively, was considered adequate' indication of angular orientation .

of. piping. segments.'.-One.possible but rare piping geometry was postulated i

, involving an offset in the piping line,.such as a large U-bend, beyond < '

which the pipe returns to its original. centerline. . In this~ case,-the-

'

segment lengths could remain the same even though..the entire' offset

could be rotated out.of.the~ intended plane of installation. The-

possibility:of such a condition going undetected was' considered. highly.

unlikely, since-it would significantly affect the location and

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orientation of pipe supports. Angular deviations involving rotation 1

of the postulated piping configuration that' might result in linear  :

support deviations within acceptable support installation tolerances

were. considered of no consequence.to the validity of the seismic

,

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analysis.of the affected piping systems.

4.4 Conclusions

Base'd on NRC review of the piping as-built program and examina-

tion of completed-installations, it was concluded that the as-built i

records reasonably depict the actual installed configurations within i

acceptable. tolerances. Further, the system diagrams reviewed and

'

field verified during the course-of this inspection were consistent .'

.with the FSAR and SER descriptions. The quality of workmanship in

this area-was found to be generally good. The program for piping i

as-built = verification and stress reconciliation was either consistent j

with or more conservative than accepted industry practice. .The

overall piping as-built program was found to meet the intent and the

requirements set forth in NRC_IE Bulletin 79-14 for seismic analyses

of as-built safety related piping systems.

Based on the above analysis, the licensee's approach for detection of

piping angularity was considered adequate.

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5.0 Heating,' Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems

-5.1. Scope j

An inspection of . heating, ventilation and air conditioning-(HVAC).

systems for .the control room, ' control building, battery rooms and -

diesel generator building was. conducted; Both normal and emergency

mode equipment was included.in.the. examination; The inspection

. consisted of a walkdown examination of ducts, filters, dampers, fans,

supports and other components. A review was performed of the Stone

and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) building services drawings,

,

flow diagrams, support detail drawings, and of the contractor air

conditioning drawings'to verify their consistency and agreement..with

the as built installations. The verification was performed either by '

visual examination or by. independent measurements on accessible  ;

. components and' supports. SWEC system specifications and. procedures

were. reviewed to assure compatibility with'the FSAR and SER licensing- ,

commitments. Quality Control inspection plans were reviewed to

establish the adequacy of the specified inspection attributes and

'

Quality Control records were reviewed for' selected commodities of the '

HVAC systems. Attachment VI is a listing of drawings and documents ,

reviewed as part of the HVAC systems inspection.  !

!

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5.2 Inspection Criteria

i

The criteria utilized for inspection of HVAC duct, components and

supports was derived from the FSAR, SER and SWEC design documents.

The specific attributes for'the walkdown included verification of.the

following;

Duct Inspection Attributes

proper size-and location

proper sheet metal configuration

acceptability of flanged connections

acceptable welding

.

access door location and operation

cleanliness of duct interior

branch connection type and. location

I proper location of duct stiffeners

duct configuration and installation damage

(  : Damper, Fan and Filter Attributes

L

f name plate data consistent with FSAR and purchase order

!- specifications

locations as required by design documents and drawings

accessibility for manual operation and maintenance

. . . . . . . . . .

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _

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component identification and marking

component proximity and potential for operability

interferences

installation of supplementary hardware including air

operated solenoid valves, limit switches and power supplies

Duct Support Inspection Attributes

Location and configuration

weld length, weld size and weld quality

proper attachment to support plates

dimensional verification of support configuration

bolt location and installation

baseplate installation, location and mounting to the

concrete

baseplate dimensions

Equipment Support Inspection Attributes

support or foundation configuration

anchor bolt size, location and tightness

weld size and quality

5.3 Control Room and Control Building HVAC

5.3.1 Inspection Activities

The ducts, duct supports, instruments and component supports

associated with the Control Room normal ard emergency HVAC

systems were examined using the inspection criteria and

attributes described in Section 5.2. The normal system from the

missile protected air intake, through the isolation dampers to

air co,ditioning units 2HVC*ACU201A and 8, and into the main

c v. bi roon. s rea was inspected. The e,nergency system from the

air intake, through dampers 2HVC*DMP204A and B. to the control

room pressurization filter and the duct to tho main control room

also were inspected. Instruments associated with chlorine

detection, radiation monitoring and temperature elements were

examined. The copper tubing and brazing associated with the air

conditioning refrigerant system were examined.

5.3.2 Findings

a. The inlet duct and piping (2HVC-036-2-3) from the

missile protected air intakes to the air conditioning

units 2HVC*ACV201 A and B were examined. From the

intake through the isolation dampers, the installation

was with round ductwork. The isolation dampers were

in the proper locations and the flanged connections

l. - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - - _ _ - - _ - - - - - _ _ - - - - _ _ . _ _

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adequate. 'The transition from this round duct to the

rectangular duct was in accordance with the drawings. q

Supports were verified to be in the. proper locations,

have visually acceptable welds and to_be attached to

the. building as designed. The flow dampers in the

system were as described on the drawings, as were the

access doors.

'

~ b. In the inlet plen n of the air conditioning unit

2HVC*ACU201 B the inspectors noted that the internal

sound. proofing insulation had gaps and frayed edges. .!

that were not in.accordance with the-installation

specification. The. licensee initiated Construction

Deficiency Report (CDR) 4146 to repair this condition.

Failure of the quality control program to identify

this deficient condition is another example of a

violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X as

presented'in Appendix A. Review of the inspection

plan found that it was inadequate in that it did not

identify any inspection attributes for QC verification

of the insulation edge sealing. The. inspectors noted

that the internal' cleanliness of the ductwork and air

conditioner was adequate and that protection of the

interior of the air conditioning unit from damage

during work in progress was adequate.

c. Visual inspection and direct measurement of the

ventilation line 2HVC-012-5-3 showed the welding of

this round duct, fabrication, support locations and

installation of the motor operated isolation dampers

were in accordance with the drawings.

d. During the inspection of the copper refrigerant tubing

on air conditioning unit 2HVC*ACU201A, the inspector

observed that the joints in this nuclear safety related

'

- non ASME system for the Tee below valve 2HVC-79 and

valve 2HVC-113 did not appear to be adequately filled

with braze material. The licensee had previously

recognized that brazing of copper tubing was a problem.

Nine nonconformance reports had resulted in the identi-

fication of a trend in brazing problems,-(reference

DLC/SQCL-0285-GY - Trend No. TN-006). The corrective

action for this trend, in part, involved requalification

of the brazing procedure using a different brazing

flux and alloy combination. However, the licensee had

. not performed a visual inspection of the subject joints.

The licensee attributed this to the lack of quantitative

acceptance criteria in the governing code ANSI B31.5;

however, ANSI B31.5 does require a visual examination

to be performed leaving it to the user to develop

p quantitative acceptance criteria. Futhermore, in

reviewing the quality control inspection reports the

gimmi g i qi*g-it- rua i n-T .yr

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inspector noted the proper annular clearanc'e as required

by ANSI B31.5 was not. included as an inspection attribute.

' Failure of the Quality Assurance Program to include

<, the above requirements of ANSI B31.5 a's committed to

is another example of a violation'of 10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, Criterion X.

e. The inspector observed that the' bolted foundation .

-connection of fan 2HVC*FN241A was improperly. torqued

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in that a bolt could.be turned by hand.

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The.

licensee initiated.CDR SD-006 to correct this.

deficiency., The quality control procedure requires

that a minimum of two bolts be torqued and that the j

inspector verify all bolts are tightened.'

.

Failure to  !

effectively implement the quality control procedure:is

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1

another. example of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix '

B;. Criterion X.

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f. Inspection of the ductwork from the air conditioning l

units into the control room did not reveal any

inconsistencies with the drawings. Welding was

adequate on the supports, access doors were properly

located, 'and discharge vents in the control room were

as described on the drawings.

5.4 Emergency Battery Room HVAC

5.4.1 Inspection Activities

The ventilation system. ducts, supports, inst'ruments and

components associated with Battery Rooms 2 and.3 exhaust systems

were examined using the acceptance. criteria and attributes .

described in Section 5.2. The-inspection included from the air-

inlet fire dampers and'all accessible portions of the. system to

the exhaust missile barriers. Inlet fire dampers 2HVZ*DMPF 231A

and B, fire damper 2HVZ*DMPF 204B, and fans 2HVZ*FN 216A and B -

with associated control circuits were examined. The location,

identification and configuration of the system components were

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checked for consistency with the SWEC design documents.

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H5.4.2. Findings

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., . a. The identification-tags on the two sets of fire dampers .

2HVZ*DMPF 231A and B associated with'the air intake into

Battery' Rooms 2-3.were found reversed although the physical

configuration of the dampers was correct. The licensee i

Lissued a Construction-Deficiency Report to correct-the tags

on these fire dampers.

. b .- Other accessible portions of the system were; inspected and .;

measurements.taken. The name. plates;on the exhaust fans -l

2HV2*216A and B were observed to'be correct and mounting

. bolts' instrumentation and ductwork were in accordance with

,

drawing requirements.

- 5.5 Diesel Generator! Building HVAC

5'.5'.1 Inspection Activities

~The ventilat' ion ' system ducts, supports, components and' instruments. i

associated with the Diesel Generator Building HVAC system were

'

examined using the inspection criteria and attributes described

in Section 5.2. The inspection included a walkdown of the system

.from the' missile protected air intake to the ventilation ports

~

in the A and B~ Generator Buildings.- Included in the inspection

were the intake plenums, axial fans 2HVD*270A and B, dampers t

2HVD*DMP 201A and B and the. exhaust duct and supports to the

floor penetration at elevation 759' 0". Temperature elements

2HVD*TE21A.and B were examined and the associated wiring termi- .j

nations were verified at the instruments. Exhaust fans 2HVD*FN222A '

and.B for elevation.759' 0" were found satisfactory. The duct,-

dampers and outlets for elevation 732' 6" in the Diesel Engine 2~

compartment were examined and found satisfactory.

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5.5.2 Findings

a. One section of horizontal duct in a 36 X 72 inch run'was

found installed in reverse in comparison to drawing SM-7-1.

-The as-built installation was evaluated by SWEC engineering

in Request for Information 3815-QC and found acceptable as

the maximum span between reinforcing angles was less than

the required 24 inch spacing specified by the design. A

drawing revision was initiated to correct drawing SM-7-1 to

reflect the as-built configuration. Failure of QC to

identify this discrepancy is another example of a violation-

of 10 CFR, Appendix B, Criterion X.

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b. No' deviations from the drawing requirements were noted,

except as stated above,.for measurements-taken during

. inspection of accessible duct and supports.

<c. The procurement package for. fans 2HVD*FN271A and 8 was

reviewed. .This package included the procurement specifi-  ;

cation, receiving inspection,-storage and issue '

documentation for. installation. No deficiencies were found

in this' package.

'5.6 ' Conclusions

l

The installed hardware was found generally acceptable,and the i

majority of the items installed in accordance with the design  !

requirements. .However, a number of commodities were identified which

did not meet the design intent.(findings'5.3.2 b, d,.and e; 5.4.2 a;

and 5.5.2 a). These in'cluded failure to note frayed edges on the  !

insulation in the control room air conditioning unit. inlet plenums; l

failure to assure the corrective action of the brazing problems  !

. identified in the trend analysis program was effective; and failure

~

to' identify and correct improper bolt. torquing. .A review of the

inspection records and procedures indicated that inspection personnel

were generally provided appropriate criteria. However, inspection

criteria was-lacking for both visual examination of brazed joints and  !

verification of duct insulation edge sealing.

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6.0 Electrical Power Systems

6.1'. Scope of Electrical Power System Inspections

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-This' inspection was conducted to ascertain whether the installed

' electrical power systems were in conformance with requirements of

110CFR50' Appendices A and B and the commitments of the Final Safety .f

Analysis Report (FSAR), and Safety Evaluation Report (SER). The i

-ability to achieve _the surveillance requirements of the Technical

Specifications was also examined. l

!

The objective of'the. inspection activities was to determine, by  ;

selective sampling, if the above requirements and commitments were .j

translated into design, purchase, and installation documents; studies; _

and drawings and_into the installed hardware. The. inspection consisted j

of a' review of these-selected documents and visual inspection to '

verify that the installed hardware reflects the design commitments' 1

and is of acceptable quality. The specific documents, reviewed'during'

the electrical power systems inspection are listed in' Attachment VI.

.

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The selected systems were as follow's: ]

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A niliary transformer 2B ,ource to.4KV bus 2D 4

o

Station Service transformer 20 source to 4KV bus 2D . i

Bus' tie between 4KV bus 2D to 4KV bus 20F [ Class 1E, Train B, l

purple] l

Emergency Diesel Cenerator 2-2 supply to 4KV bus 20F  !

_4KV bus 20F supply to Charging Pump 2B [High head safety

injection (HHSI)]

4KV bus 20F supply to Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pump '

2B

4KV bus-20F supply to 4KV/480v Load Center Transformer 2-9P-

Load Center Transformer 2-9P 480V supply to Load Center l

2-9P

.

Load Center 2-9P 480V supply to Motor Control Center (MCC)  ;

I 2-E06  :

480V MCC 2-E06. supply to Battery Charger 2-2 l

Battery Charger 2-2125VDC supply to 125VDC bus 2-2 l

Battery 2-2, 125VDC supply, to 125VOC Bus 2-2

125VDC Bus 2-2' supply to 125VDC Distribution Panel 2-2 l

125VOC Distribution Panel 2-2 supply to 120VAC Inverter 2-2

120VAC Inverter 2-2 supply.to 120VAC Vital Panel '

2-2A[ Channel 2 white]'

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6.2 Inspection Criteria l

The "as-built" electrical power systems were inspected to verify

their ability to provide reliable power to the class 1E loads. The j

ability of the installed hardware to provide the proper magnitude and

quality of electrical power was evaluated. The electrical systems  !

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H _w ere examined to determine that the supplied voltage would not exceed

the high-and low design limits when the off-site source. voltages vary

plus or minus 5%. The electrical system design was. examine'd to verify-

that when-the low voltage-limit is. reached,'the class IE portion of

the 4KV. system would be separated from the preferred off-site. source

and supplied power from its respective on-site Emergency Standby

Diesel Generators; to verify that electrical distribution components .

.would be ' operated.within their steady state and transient voltage,

current and frequency design limits;.and to sustain a single failure

and'the ability of the unaffected redundant-. system to perform.its

safety function. This requires that physical separation be maintained

to preclude' electrical failures or external conditions,such as fire,

flooding, high energy missiles or high energy pipe ruptures from

~

causing common mode failures. The electrical protection features

were inspected for their ability to minimize system' disturbance ~for

' overload or faulted conditions.

The following attributes were inspected to ensure that the abov'e

criteria were satisfied and that the installed equipment has an

acceptable level of-quality:

Alpha numeric and color identification of electrical cables,

raceways and equipment as specified in the FSAR and installation

specification. 9'

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Location and configuration of the electrical raceways and

equipment as shown on drawings.

The. electrical raceway and equipment supports as specified on-

drawings and in procedures.

Electrical cable raceway routings as shown on the cable pull I

tickets.

Cable manufacture, insulation type, Jacket type and conductor

type and size as listed on the purchase specification and cable

pull ticket.

Cable terminations as specified on the termination tickets.

Physical damage to cables, raceways and equipment.

Installed electrical equipment maintenance as specified by

procedures.

Electrical equipment design name plate data as indicated in

purchase specifications.

Updating of electrical load flow, voltage fault current and

protection coordination studies to "As-Built" conditions as

identified on drawings, cable pull tickets, manufacture test

data, name plate data, and purchase specification vendors data. l

Agreement of electrical power systems with their purchased l

design limits.  !

Protective relay setpoints as specified on setting sheets and l

relay coordination curves (verified by review of calibration

sheets and visual inspection).

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'. . Acceptable battery capacity test .results for each class 1E battery.

Proper engineering disposition of Nonconformance and Disposition

Reports

6.3 Inspection Activities

For.the equipment and systems inspected, the'name plate design data-

was recorded for comparison with the purchase specification, test ,

results, one 'line diagrams, three line diagrams, inputs. to the load

' flow-voltage study and fault current study. Protective relay types &

setpoints were recorded for comparison with setpoint data and

coordination curves. A walkdown of the Train "B" Class-1E electrical

system from the 138KV and 22KV off-site power sources and the on-site

emergency diesel generator source to selected components covered the  !

following:

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. Cable bus from transformer 2B 'to 4KV bus 20 breaker 2D7

Cable bus from transformer 2D to 4KV bus 20 breaker 203

!

Cables.2NNSDNH305 & 306 from-4KV bus 2D breaker 2010 to

4KV bus 20F (Train B purple) breaker 2F7. .

Generator lead cables 2EGSBPH300 & 301 from the generator  !

to the Excitation Panel.

Generator output cables 2EGSBPH302 & 303 from'the  ;

Excitation Panel into the duct bank. (No further walkdown i

'

of these cables and raceways could be conducted because

they remained within the concealed duct bank untilithey

reached the 4KV bus 2DF breaker 2F10.)  ;

Cable 2CHSBPH301 from 4KV bus 20F br!aker 2F12 to High Head j

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Safety Injection (Charging Pump) CHS*P218. <

Cable 2SISBPH301 from 4KV bus 20F breaker 2F8 to Low Head

Safety Injection Pump 2 SIS *P218.

Cable 2ENSBPH301 from 4KV bus 20F breaker 2F11 to Load

Center Transformer TR*2-9P.1

Bus duct from TR*2-9P, 480 volt secondary to Load Center

,480VUS*2-9, input breaker 38. l

Cable 2EHSBPL210 from Load Center outgoing supply from

breaker SB to 480 volt Motor Control Center MCC*2-E06.

Cable 2VBA2P1001 from MCC*2-E06 starter 1C to to Battery

Charger BAT *CHG2-2.

• Cable, 2VBA2PL002 & 3, to a disconnect switch on 125VDC

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transition bus. Also connected to this bus was the battery,

BAT *2-2, output breaker BAT *BKR2-2,

,

Cables 2VBB2PL600 & 601 from this breaker to battery BAT *2-2.

Cables 2VBB2PL602 & 603 from transition bus to 125VOC

switchboard DC*SWBD2-2.

<

Cable 2VBB2PL604 & 605 to uninterruptible Power Supply

Inverter UPS*VITBS2-2. The 125VDC input fuse and breaker

data for the inverter were recorded.

Cable 2VBS2WL507 from inverter manual by pass switch to

Junction Box 2JB-8857. The cable was spliced in the

junction box and continued as cable 2VBS2WL501 from the

switchgear train B(Purple) area in the service building to

panel, PNL*VITBS2-2A located in the control building.

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6.4 ~ Findings

a. Transformer. Nameplate Data and Impedance Calculations

!

Station service transformers 2A and 28 and unit  !

transformers 2C and 2D test impedance values were either,

partially omitted or shown incorrectly on the main one and

three-line diagrams. Also, the impedance values'for

transformer 2A and 20 name plates were given at a different:

MVA base than specified. Further, the test. impedance values

for transformers 2A and 2B were transposed in the station

service voltage and load analysis, E-68, and in the station

service fault analysis, E-74. The licensee issued an

Engineering & Design Coordination Report (E&DCR), number ,

2PS-4731, dated March 25, 1987 to correct the above drawing

deficiencies,

i

The voltage drop and short circuit study calculations (E-68 &  !

E-74), which were completed after transformer test data was

received, utilized the transposed impedances. Following

identification by NRC the licensee used the correct impedan'ce

values in the computer model to evaluate the effects. The

computer run was.made using the corrected impedances for each. l

transformer and indicated that the worst case was a 0.5%.

increase in interrupting current and a worst case voltage drop

on the 4160 volt system of 0.3%. Neither of these current or  ;

voltage changes would affect the adequacy of the design or

installed equipment. Although this error did not have any

effect upon the "As-Built" electrical system,.it is indicative

of lack of attention to drawing and calculation quality control.  ;

This is another example of_ failure.to effectively implement the

requirements of 10 CFR, Appendix B, Criterion X.

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The inspector questioned if the serial numbers on the name I

plates of transformers TR 2A and 2R had been interposed. The  ;

licensee contacted the manufacture (McGraw Edison) and were i

advised to compare the number on the load tap changer (LTC) i

switch compartment for verification. The comparison verified i

that the correct manufacture's nameplates are on the correct I

transformers. However, the licensee stated that new name plates i

would be obtained to reflect impedance on a 32 MVA bases to

agree with the purchase specification and test report.

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b. Color Coding of Electrical Equipment

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations part 50.55a i

Codes and Standards invokes IEEE Standard 279-1971. IEEE

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Standard 279-1971 in paragraph 4.22 requires that identification j

n of electrical equipment and circuits be'provided. The standard I

states that this identification.shall distinguish between-

redundant portions of the protection system'during the design,. j

construction, maintenance and operation of the plant.

The Beaver Valley Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 'q

commits to follow IEEE-Standard 279-1971 and IEEE Standard-  !

384-1974 " Criteria for Separation of Class 1E Equipment and. 1

Circuits". The standard IEEE 384 requires that all electrical'

systems and components be~ identified.to distinguish redundancy

down to the channel level. l

f

FSAR section 8.3.1.1.9 states in part that " Each piece of safety j

related electrical ' equipment. can be readily identified' by the  !

aster.isk that forms part of the identification mark number.-This

identification is physically attached to the equipment.in a.

conspicuous location along.with a color coded marker that

identifies the assigned emergency train or channel, This is

further addressed in section 8.3.1.3 for identification of j

cables, raceways and electrical equipment. The identification  !

. . method as implemented during design, construction, and testing

operations will support the evaluation of system availability,  !

goals during operations and the' performance of maintenance tasks."

During an inspection from September 29 to October 3, 1986 the j

licensee was informed that the electrical equipment had not been 1

identified by color as committed.to in the FSAR. The' licensee

stated that the. methods used for identification at unit 1 would  ;

be applied to unit 2. j

On. March 18, 1987 the inspector observed that the following j

types of safety related electrical equipment had'not been '

identified by' color as committed-to in the FSAR:  !

!

4,160 volt switchgear

480 volt unit substations

480 volt motor control centers .

125' volt DC batteries  !

125 volt DC battery chargers l

125 volt DC battery distribution panels

120 volt AC Inverters 4

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120 volt AC vital bus distribution panels j

Failure to identify by color the above listed electrical equip- )

ment.is a deviation.

'

(412/87-20-02)

The licensee took prompt corrective action to place the

respective train or channel color designation next to the

equipment name plates. Therefore, written reply to the ,

deviation is not required. {

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c. Discrepancy Between Vendor and Licensee Battery Test Report  ;

!

.The inspector reviewed the Battery 2-2 vendor's (Exide) capacity.- t

test which was conducted to demonstrate conformance.to the j

licensee's specification.;The inspector also reviewed the i

licensee's Battery 2-2 Discharge Test Procedure which was used: 1

to conduct the acceptance test. The inspector noted that the 4

vendors.100% measured capacity time.had been increased'15.5% as  !

determined by the licensee's test. The reasons for the  !

difference in measured times are as follows: I

The' vendor's test was conducted per.IEEE Standard ')

450-1974 i

~The licensee's. test was conducted per IEEE Standard I

450-1980

The vendor terminated the test with a average cell. l

1 voltage of 1.8558, which corresponds to 111.35 volts for j

the battery.  !

The licensee terminated the test when the battery .

j

voltage reached 110 volts, which is an average of 1.84

'

volts per cell.

~ No deficiencies were identified,

d. Emergency Diesel Generator Nameplate Ratings

The inspector noted that the emergency' diesel generator had a. i

name plate rating of 4662 KW for both the 160 hour0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br /> and the 2 of

l

24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ratings. The FSAR lists the 160 hour0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br /> rating but not the 1

2 of 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> rating. The vendor (Colt Industries) stated that I

both ratings.are correct. DEMA standards call for the 2'of 24 ]

hour rating to be 110 % of the continuous 4,238 KW rating, which  !

is 4662 KW .The 160 hour0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br /> rating is also 110% of the continuous j

rating. The vendor recommends that a major overhaul inspection 1

be performed if the unit is operated for 160-hours continuous '

at 110% or for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> out of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for 80 times in succession

at 110%. Neither the 160 hour0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br /> nor the 2 of 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> rating are

limiting because the worst case emergency diesel loading listed

in the FSAR is 3725 KW and the Technical Specification surveillance

requirements limit the auto connected loads-to not exceed the I

2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> rating of 4535 KW The inspector had no further concern.

No deficiencies were identified

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6.5 Conclusions ,

The inspector found that the state of workmanship of the electrical I

systems inspected conformed to the criteria of paragraph 6.2 with the

exceptions noted in findings 6.4 a and b.

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7.0 Instrumentation and Cont'rol 1

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7.1 Scope' ,

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The' inspection of~the. Instrument and Control (I&C) systems

consisted of. a walkdown'.exumination of impulse lines,- .

!

instruments,: instrument cables, control panels, instrument racks,

control cables and control functions. 'I&C systems associated

with the reactor coolant system (loop 3), high head. safety

_

injection' system (pump C), low head safety injection system (pump.

.8), control room HVAC system,. control building HVAC and the

diesel generator building HVAC were inspected.

.The'SWEC design' specifications, procedures and drawings were ,

~

,

reviewed to assure that FSAR and SER licensing commitments had

. been properly translated into the design.- Quality control

-

documentation was reviewed for selected components. Attachment ~VIII'

-lists the drawings and documents used.~during the I&C inspections.

7.2. ' Inspection Criteria

Theas-built'walkdown'of the'I&C systems examined'the installed

commodities with respect to the following attributes which were

' derived.from the FSAR and SWEC design documents:

Impulse Line and Support Inspection Attributes

-

tubing and fitting cleanlin'ess-

'

-tubing and component identification

minimum bend.'and slope requirements

. tubing integrity

. tubing restraints and anchors properly. located

redundant channels properly separated

seismic clearances maintained

support configuration, dimensions and welding. quality

acceptable

~

Instrument and Control Cables and Terminations

l

cables properly identified

cable integrity

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conductors properly located and terminated

redundant cables properly separated  ;

cable routing in accordance with design criteria

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Controls Inspection Attributes l

redundant components. properly identified.

functional requirements for controls achieved

7.3 Inspection Activities

Instrument Impulse Lines

The instrument impulse lines listed below were. visually examined. l

The. location and' identification of components and root valves were ').

. , . verified. Tubing slope, configuration and integrity..were examined  !

from the root valve to the associated instrument. Tubing supports l

were. inspected for location, configuration, member size, weld quality  !

,

and weld size.

Impulse line RK*305AB was visually inspected from the high head- .

safety injection line 2CHS-750-270-2 to pressure indicator  !

2CHS-PI1538.

l

' Impulse line RK-305AA was visually examined from the high head j

safety injection line 2CHS-750-481-2 to the pressure indicator  ;

<

2CHS-PI153A.  !

Impulse'line.RK-326N was visually examined from.the reactor- l

coolant system' piping to flow transmitter 2RCS*FT43A. i

Impulse line RK-3260 was examined from the reactor coolant

. system piping to pressure transmitter 2RCS*PT402.

'

Impulse line RK-332F was examined from the low head safety

-

injection system piping to flow indicating ' switch 2 SIS *FIS970A.

Impulse line RK-332G was examined from the low head' safety

injection system piping to flow indicating switch 2 SIS *FIS9078

.

Instrument Cables

The instrument and control cables and terminations listed below were

visually examined.

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Cables 2HVCBBC001 and 2HVCBYC001 for the control room _ 1

HVAC: chlorine detectors were examined in the' reactor  ;

protection rack RK*2RC-PRT-B.

Terminations.for cables 2RCSIRX025, 2RCSIRX007, and

~

2RCSIRX013 associated with reactor coolant system flow,

pressure and temperature transmitters were examined in 1

rack RK*2PRI-PROC 1. .l

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1

Terminations for cables 2RCS2WX011 and 2RCS2WX025

associated with reactor coolant system temperature and .,

- pressure transmitters were examined-in rack l

RK*2PRI-PROC-1.

Termination of cable 2 SIS 3BX004 for safety injection

. system flow transmitter 2 SIS *FT-940 was examined in

rack RK*2PRI-PROC 3, #

-

- Terminations for cables 2FWS3BX002, 2RCSIRX026,

2RCS3BX018,-2RCS2WX026 and'2CCPWPX006 were examined at

the following instrument connections: 2 FWS * LT497,

'2RCS*FT434, 2RCS*FT436, 2RCS*PT402 and 2CCP*FT107C

respectively.

Cable 2RCSIXR014 at reactor coolant system temperature

element 2RCS*TE433'was examined.

Cable terminations 2HVDARX002 and 2HV0BWX002 at diesel

generator HVAC temperature elements'2HVD*TE21A and B'

respectively.

Cable 2RMS10X005, 2RMS10X006, 2RMSINC005, 2RMSINX003,

2RMSINK500 and 2RMSINX006 terminations at the radiation

monitoring system panel 2RMC-RQI301.

Cables and terminations for 2SISAOC053 and 2SISAOC054

from the safety injection system flow switch

2 SIS *FIS970A to junction box 2JB*1023 and to the

Limitorque operator for valve 2 SIS *MOV8890A.

Cables and terminations for 2SISBPC053 and 2SISBPC054 I

,.

l1 from the safety injection system flow switch

i 2 SIS *FIS9708 to junction box 2JB*1024 and to the

Limitorque operator for valve 2 SIS *MOV88908.

Cables 2HVCAOC089 and 2HVCBPC091 terminated at control  !

room HVAC temperature switches 2HVC*TS151A and B

respectively, i

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-' Cables and terminations' associate'd with reactor' coolant

. system instrumentation at.the inboard and outboard

sides of the containment. penetration 2RCP*20D.

The cables were verified for proper! termination' point-at the

pane.1 or instrument. ' Cable _ lugs-and crimping, cable ~ separation, ,

training and bend radii were also examined.

'

The cables and.~ .l

terminations were examined'for co'nsistency with SWEC and vendor! l

' wiring diagrams.

Instrument Components-

The following.' instruments and components were examined:

.

Instrument transmitter rack 2CES*RAK1300 and the. i

associated reactor coolant system instruments and 1

,

tubing were examined.

Pressure indicators and supports for 2CHS-PI153A/B on

the high head safety injection system '

Reactor coolant system flow transmitter 2RCS*FT434'

Reactor coolant pressure transmitter:2RCS*PT402 l

i

Low head safety injection system flow switches

2 SIS *FIS970A/B and associated supports .j

i

Diesel generator HVAC temperature elements 2HVD*TE21A/B - j

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Battery room HVAC flow switches 2HVZ-FS217 and i

'2HVZ-FS204-  !

1

Control _ room HVAC temperature elements-2HVC*TE24A/B,

differential pressure transmitters 2HVC*PDS201A/B,

radiation monitoring device 2RMC*RQI301, isokenetic

velocity probe 2RMC*RN301, chlorine detectors.

2HVC*AIT21A/B/C and temperature.. switches 2HVC*TS151A/B

Reactor coolant system temperature element 2RCS*TE433  :

hi Chemical and volume control system flow transmitter.

2CHS*FT122

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Safety injection system flow transmitter 2 SIS *FT940

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7.4' Findings l

The inspectors had the.following findings:

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a. The vertical welds on a mounting bracket for instrument

2RCS*LIS1321 were found 31/2 inches long in lieu of the

drawing requirement of 4 inches. The inspector informed

the licensee of this condition and the licensee issued i

Nonconformance aad Disposition Report 34729. The nonconformance.  !

report dispositioned the condition " accept-as-is". The licensee 1

stated that the associated drawings and calculations will be

revised to incorporate the actual weld length. Quality Control i

did not detect that engineering requirements were not fully i

! satisfied. This is another. example of the failure to satisfy

the requirements of 10.CFR, Appendix B, Criterion X.

b. A Girard tubing clamp was found improperly installed on anchor

2RCS-TSA134A. One half of the clamp was rotated 90 such that

the radius of the clamping surface did not not match that of  :

the tubing. The licensee was informed of the condition and

took corrective action. Startup Work Request 13931 documents >

the satisfactory reinstallation and inspection of this clamp.

This is a QC deficiency as bolted hardware and tubing clamps are j

required by procedure to be inspected for proper assembly and 1

torque. This was an isolated example of an improperly installed

clamp. However, it is another incidence-of failure of Quality

Control to identify a nonconforming condition and is another

example of the failure to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR,

Appendix B, Criterion X. j

c, The inspectors identified a loose flex conduit connection to a

limit switch on valve 2CHS-MOV8133B. The licensee was notified l

of this condition and the conduit was tightened in accordance ,

with Startup Work Request 12789. The procedure requires that Quality '

Control verify proper assembly of flexible conduit. Failure  !

of QC to identify this nonconforming condition is another example. l

of the failure to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR, Appendix

B, Criterion X.

b

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d. The inspectors identified a loose ultraseal tubing coupling near

valve 2FWS*303. The licensee was informed of the condition and

Startup Work Request 13689 was issued and the coupling was

tightened. The procedure requires that QC verify that couplings

l are installed hand tight. Failure of QC to identify the loose

coupling is another example of not implementing the requirements

of 10 CFR, Appendix B, Criterion X.

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e. -The inspector identified an oil leak near the high head safety

% injection oil pump 2CHS-P21C. The licensee issued Startup Work

y Request 12263 to. replace the outboard bearing housing covee

X gasket. The inspector reviewed post maintenance test and

quality control records from a' prior. gasket replacement on this-

pump.. The pump, appears;to have operated satisfactorily.immediately

after the first gasket replacement. Operator walkdownstof the.

. pump compartment had not yet identified the oil leak at the time

it was found by the NRC inspector.

f. .The inspectors observed that flex hose on tubing isometric

'

-RK-305Slwas not' properly installed in that the antitorque arrows

were. misaligned. :The licensee issued.a Construction Deficiency.

Report as a' result of this observation to rework the installation.

..The installation procedure requires that QC verify alignment.of

the antitorque markings on the flexible hose after installation.

' Failure of QC to identify this non-conforming condition is another

L

"

example of the failure to effectively implement the requirements

of 10 CFR,. Appendix B, Criterion.

lg. While examining instrumentation equipment in the safeguards

.- building, the inspector identified an anchor bolt for auxiliary ,

feed pump 2FWE*P22 installed beyond the specified allowable l

angular offset from perpendicular to the skid. ~The licensee

. issued Nonconformance and Disposition Report 34611 to add a

beveled washer under'the anchor bolt nut. ' Failure of QC to-

' identify'this nonconforming condition is another example of the  ;

-failure to effectively implement the requirements of 10 CFR, i

Appendix B, Criterion X. i

h. Melted polyethylene fire retardant material and black adhesive

tape;were found on stainless steel piping located near the root "

The inspector was informed

~

valve for instrument 2RCS*PT402.

that the examination of the exposed stainless steel piping in

accordance with specification 2BVS-901 had not yet been performed.

The licensee's Assistant Director for QC indicated that a

nonconformance and disposition report had been generated to l

clean the surface of the piping.

1. The impulse line to flow transmitter 2 SIS *FT940 was observed to

be 1/8-inch from the inside of wall sleeve S-6201. Nonconformance

and Disposition Report 35360 issued.during the team inspection

dispositioned the installation accept-as-is based upon the lack

of seismic differentia 1' movement between the tubing and the wall

sleeve. The licensee indicated that a previous specification i

requirement for a minimum gap of 1/2 inch between the tubing i

runs and the sleeve interior had not been completely backfitted. l

The licensee committed to investigate all tubing through sleeve

installations that had been accepted prior to the specification

change.

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J3 Conclusions <t ,.

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The'qualiCy of the. installed system hardware was found generally J'

i

'N , acceptable and in accordance with licensing commitments and

,

design requirements. . However, several minor examples were found

*

where the as built'phnt deviated from the design specifications.

'r (Findings 7.4 a, b, c, d, f, and g). Two loose connections, one

involving flexible conduit and the second involving a loose tubing

. connection, were identified. While the associated QC inspection

g '

. , i it. tributes explicitly addressed the need to verify tight connections,  ;

yp~

ii

the possibi)ity exists that unauthorized rework was performed and -i

reto(ted in the loose connections. The examples of an under length

ki ' i '; y

.seld; ,(mproperly installed tubing clamp, misaligned flexible hose,

t- s

anchor tsolt excessjve angularity, and lack of separation between a ,

. ly

@  !

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addreslsedb./qQCfuspectionattributesandshouldhavebeendetectedtubin9

,, <- during performance of the QC inspection. The identified deficiencies

,

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i are not signfficant concerns since they would not have resulted in

p f '? adverse. consequences on operational plant safety. However, these j

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it. ems jndicate that QC personnel should give more attention to detail '

(,',during'cbnductofinspections.

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L8.0 . Structures ~

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i8.1' Scope of Inspection.:

' Inspection in'thisL area focused on licensee' activities regarding 'the

-. evaluation ofj Category -I structural systems for' fin'al as-built loads

from mechanical and, electrical components.in; addition to.other design

x loads. The inspection objective was to verify, through sampling.

review and examination,-that fina1' structural attachment loads were

etracked and evaluated foritheir effect on.. structural components'

allowable stresses and loads.

>>

To achieve this objective,-the inspection focused:on:

'

Review of the structural' calculation confirmation program,

' '

-

Performance of walkdown ~ inspections of selected areas for.

identification of attachments to the bui.1 ding structure, and

,

> Review'of structural design packages performed for the

evaluation of final. attachment loads on structural elements.from

the areas selected above.

8.2., Inspection Criteria

The ' criteria used for the- evaluation of licensee activities in this

area were:

.

10.CFR 50

Fina1L Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

<

'

.. Safety Evaluation Report'(SER)- .l'

• '

.

Standard Review P.lan (SRP)

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AISC Steel Construction Manual, Seventh Edition -

8.3 Building Loads Verification Program

i

The verification.of building loads was conducted under the struc- '

tural~ calculation confirmation program (Procedure 2BVM-168). The

program was established by SWEC and consisted of the following

activities:

1

Maintenance and review of existing calculations, I

i

Identification of need for new/ revised calculations,

l

Generation of new/ revised calculations, and i

Close-out of calculation confirmation.

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The need'for-new/rev'ised' calculations was intended to ensure that

major structural ~. elements (slabs, walls,' columns, beams, etc.)~were

either specifically evaluated for final loads .orfqualified by com-

parison to other structural elements'. Specific activities performed

during the confirmation effort . included:

'

' Confirmation ,of. concrete ; structures for support loads

,

Qualification'of equipment anchorages, and

Confirmation of support' loads on structural steel.

For.each of.the above activities, the procedure addressed the  !

general requirements for selection of structural elements or i

components-to be reviewed, data collection, and the method for '

- performing the confirmation calculation. .The major features of the i

confirmation program with regard to'the above activities are

presented below.

.

Concrete Structures ,

'!

The original design of various Category I concrete structures

included a. live load allowance to account for anticipated system

support' attachment loads. 'Four heavily loaded concrete slabs in.the

fuel, control-and auxiliary buildings and the main steam cable vault.

were selected for evaluation by the inspector. SWEC indicated that a

100"4 walkdown was performed in the selected areas to account'for

attachments from conduits (larger than 1".0.D.), cable trays, HVAC

duct.and pipe supports. Supports from major piping systems, rupture

restraints'and equipment supports were not included in_the walkdown

since they were explicitly accounted for in the original design.

'The procedure required the evaluation of all out-of plane support

-

attachment design loads, forces and movements. The individual dead

weight contributions from attachments were summed and converted to an

equivalent' uniform dead weight. Variable loads from system attachments

were summed using the square root of the sum of the squares technique,

and converted to an equivalent uniform variable load.

'

SWEC indicated that results of the evaluation had confirmed the-

adequacy of the original design of concrete slabs for the selected

areas. The scope of structural confirmation for concrete slabs was

not expanded based on results of evaluation from the selected areas.

, The qualification of embedded plates was also required as part of the

concrete structures confirmation effort. The evaluation was based on  !

a load file which included plate number, locations, types, applied '

loads from attachments, and source of load by support drawing numbers.

Embedded plates were identified by plate number or structural drawings

RC-800 series, and by location on drawings RC-700 series. The method

for qualification of embedded plates was provided in procedure BVM-153. i

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The approach was based on three levels of analysis. The firs.t was l

based on a screening ~ approach of applied attachments' load ve'ctors

'against allowable load vectors. Embedded plates which' failed the:

screening test required an evaluation using:two interaction. equations

for out-of plane and in plane forces and moments, respectively. Plates

which failed.'the second level of analysis,. required more detailed-

calculations using an in-house computer code APE (Approximate Plate'

Evaluation) developed by SWEC or a more refined finite element i

l- analysis using the in-house computer code BAP. l

Equipment Anchorage

E

>

Activities related to the confirmation of equipment -Tnchorage

, ' included the evaluation of anchor bolts and embedded plates using

!

design loads generated from the equipment seismic qualification

~(2BVM-176). The qualification was required for Category I and

,

non-category I equipment identified by procedure 2BVM-165 :" Hazard

Analysis Program".

f.

li Structural Steel

lJ ^ '

' The original sizing of structural steel members was ' based on the

.

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addition of concentrated loads (5,10, 20 & 50 kips) to account for

anticipated attachment loads on beams, girders, columns, etc. The '

initial phase of evaluation was based on site walkdowns by SWEC. 1

Twenty-four. heavily loaded areas were selected for this purpose. A' l

tracking System of all large bore (L/B) pipe, duct and. cable tray. j

support loads was started'in 1983. The tracking system was merged in

1985 with the Pipe Hanger Information System (PHIS) developed by the

' Engineering Mechanics Division (EMD).

-

The PHIS covered attachments

.from pipe hangers and duct supports (87-Drawings). 'As a result ~of

'

. required structural modifications based on the above evaluation, a

second phase review.was. initiated to address all' safety related ,

structural steel elements in category I 2 areas. This review included

'the remaining areas which were not covered in the first phase.

Procedure 2BVM-160 provided details of the tracking system, the

method for performing the evaluation of local effects from attach-

ments to structural steel and standard stiffner selection table for

W-shapes. The evaluation for local effects was based on

original piping support loads or reconciled loads when they exceeded

the design values. Identification of field-run attachments to

structural steel was addressed in procedure 2BVM-184.

SWEC indicated that approximately thirty-five (35) modifications were

required in the annulus racks area (between the crane wail and the

containment) and three (3) modifications in the auxiliary building

roof as a result of the first phase evaluation. However, no

modifications were required as a result of.the second review.

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - -

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8.4 Inspection Activities. I

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' Inspection of. licensee activities in this area consisted of:

,

'(1) visual walkdown examination of selected safety related areas for-

identification'of-type'and density of attachments to structural

]

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steel; and (2) review of sample evaluation packages'of structural j

concrete steel elements to assess their conformance to establish .

procedure guidance.  !

4

The listing below identifies the areas examined during the walkdown-

and the structural elements selected for further review:

I

.

Reactor. Bldg.'EL.- 756'-0", annulus area: Beam No. 7 (W 18/60) *

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between column lines 10 & 11 (Owg. No. RS-853-A)

Reactor Bldg..EL. 767'-10", annulus area: Beam No. 117;(W 24/68)

~

.

E

between column lines 9 & 10 (Dwg. No RS-850-A) l

Reactor. Bldg. EL. 740'-3", cubicle "C" platform between columns j

3,,4 &~5 (DWG, No. RS-850-E).

"

NOTE: Qualification was performed for the platform

'

in cubicle "A". Platforms in cubicles "B" & "C'! I

were qualified based on similarity of steel layout- l

and general loading in the area. Calculations.for-

'

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beams Nos. 33 arid' 42 in cubicle. "A"Jwere examined.

Reactor Bldg. EL.' 7178-0", annulus area: Radial Beams

No. 146 & 184 on column lines 10 & 13. Major loads on these

beams are from racks No. 27 & 35.

o Reactor Bldg. annulus rack-No. 5~and lateral trusses at

elevations 701' - 11" and 710'-2" (Bet. Column lines 1&4).

Reactor annulus Column No. 15.

Auxiliary Bldg. roof beams No. 81 & 109 (DWG. No. RS 836-A)

Control Bldg. concrete slab (28'-0" x 20'-9") at El. 725'-6":

42'-6" east of column line No. 12 and 27'-3" south of column

-line No. C.

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8.5 Findings and Conclusions )

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<

Based on the NRC review of the licensee program and examination of i

activities in the area of building verification, it was concluded  ;

that the program adequately accomplished the objectives-in this area. ,

The program was also found to provide adequate guidelines regarding q

the performance of the confirmation effort. Documentation of i

evaluation for selected areas was consistent with established, j

required and typical design practice. In general, the activity was i

found to meet the intent of the regulations and no violations were

identified. i

1

4

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9.0 Followup on Outstanding NRC. Bulletins- i

.9.1 (Closed) IE BulleEin 79-14-

Bulletin 79-14. addressed the requirements for seismic analysis of- I

as-built safety related piping systems. The criteria for. performing .!

'

the seismic analysis of Beaver Valley Unit'2 safety related piping

systems.was addressed in the FSAR and was reviewed and found acceptable

by.the NRC in the Safety Evaluation Report. The program for piping.  !

as-built'and stress reconcillation was~ reviewed in Section 4.0 of.  !

'

.this report and found acceptable. Walkdown inspection of piping and. i

, support installations for two systems (Reactor Coolant and Safety - 1

Injection) during this inspection confirmed that as-built records

reasonably depict the actual 1 installation configurations within

acceptable tolerances. Based on the above conclusions, the licensee's.

activities in this regard are considered sufficient to close this -l

7 bulletin.

9.2 -(Closed) IE Bulletin 79-07

Bulletin 79-07 addressed significant discrepancies identified in l

some piping stress analysis computer codes regarding 'the' summation

of codirectional spectral components and intermodal responses'during'  ;

the performance of seismic response spectrum' analysis. The bulletin q

required that all piping' computer programs be checked against either i

piping benchmark problems or compared to other piping computer

programs.

-l

The' licensee response letter of May 16, 1979.to the.NRC indicated i

that none of the computer c" des.used by U7C for piping stress

analysis at Beaver-Valley, Unit No. 2 were-identified to have the i

summation. discrepancies noted above. -The response further indicated

that the computer codes NUPIPE 03/01 through 03/10 were used in the

piping seismic analysis. Verification of the computer code (NUPIPE  !

03/10) was addressed'in response to the April 2. addendum to the  !

March _13, 1979 order to show cause for Beaver Valley Unit No. 1.

.SWEC confirmed that in-house benchmarking linked all major versions

of NUPIPE to version 03/10. In addition, the verification of NUPIPE

against other NRC piping benchmark problems was found to be

acceptable (NRC letter from L. Shao to W. White (SWEC) on l

December- 18,1979). Based on the licensee response and the NRC con-

firmatory evaluation, I.E. Bulletin is closed.

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40

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10,0 Exit Meeting

The Inspectors met with licensee representatives on March 26, 1987 and

presented the findings of the inspection. The licensee did not identify .

l

any proprietary information contained within the scope of the inspection. 1

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ATTACHMENT I: LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Duquesne Light

C. E. Ewing, Manager Quality Assurance

D. K. Rohm, Assistant Director Quality Control

R. J. Swiderski, Manager

T. P. Noonan, Superintendent Operations & Maintenance

W. Reimer, Supervising Engineer

J. P. Godlecki, Sr. Test Engineer

L. M. Rabenau, Lead Compliance Engineer ,

S. A. Loehlein, Sr. Test Engineer '

O. L. Claridge, Compliance Engineer

S. C. Fienner, Director Quality Control

C. P. Williams, Director Start-up

J. R. Kanynick, Director Maintenance

R. P. Harris, Materials Engineer

Stone & Webster

R. C. Wittschen, Licensing Engineer

N. F. Kokot, FA Engineer

G. M. Byrnes, Asst. Project Engineer

A. P11zga, Lead Structural Engineer

A. Wong, Principal Structural Engineer

P. Talbot, Asst. Superintendent Engineering

P. Castrichini, Principal Engineer

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

J. Strosnider, Section Chief - Materials & Processes

E. Gray, Lead Reactor Engineer

F. Paulitz, Reactor Engineer

K. Manoly, Lead Reactor Engineer

H. Kaplan, Lead Reactor Engineer

R. Gramm, Sr. Resident Inspector

R. Winters, Reactor Engineer

A. Asars, Resident Inspector

J. Beall, Senior Resident Inspector

l

L. Prividy, Resident Inspector

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