ML20212E863

Affidavit of Case Witness J Doyle Re Case 861230 Partial Response to Applicants 861201 Response to Board Concerns.* Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20212E863
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	12/26/1986
From:	Doyle J Citizens Association for Sound Energy
To:
Shared Package
ML20212E831	List: ML20212E825 ML20212E863
References
OL, NUDOCS 8701050501
Download: ML20212E863 (70)

Text

e i t q..

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00' KE T LE uwr BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of l Docke17NodAN 5G4PE :23 l and 50-446 TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC l .

COMPANY, ~~et al.

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l (App 1IIaI1on3for'an (Comanche Peak Steam Electric l Operating License)

Station, Units 1 and 2) l AFFIDAVIT OF CASE WITNESS JACK DOYLE REGARDING CASE'S 12/30/86 PARTIAL RESPONSE TO APPLICANTS' 12/1/86 RESPONSE TO BOARD CONCERNS

1. Applicants' Response raises far more qttestions than it answers.

2. At this time, we are aware of the OIA Report on NRC Region IV /1/. But while I was aware of NRC Region IV's deviations from their intended mission as early in these hearings as at the time of the SIT Report f2/,atthepresenttimeIwon'tcomment for the most part on the more racent problems contained in this report.

3. Applicants stated (Response page 1):

" Program Flexibility "The CPRT Program has been designed to be flexible. it is flexible in that, as set forth in the several Action Plans, the breadth and depth of the required investigations depend in part on what is found during them. It is also f1/ See Report of Investigation by the Office of Inspector and Auditor (Board Notification No. 86-24), sent to the Licensing Board from NRC's Mr. Noonan, under cover letter of December 11, 1986. 1

/2/ Inspection Report 50-445/82-26, 50-446/82-14, NRC Staff Exhibit 207, I I

bound in at transcript preceding Tr. 6290.

8701050501 861230 1 PDR ADOCK 05000445 0 PDR

e-flexible in that, as a result of the collective evaluation of results, additional investigations may be determined to be warranted. Finally, it is also flexible in that the SRT has from time to time revised the Program Plan, including the Action Plans, and it will continue to review the Program Plan to determine whether, based on findings in progress or comments made by others, or for any other reason, additional revisions to the Program Plan are in order. It is, for these reasons, a virtual certainty that the Program Plan as it exists when the program has been completed and the results are offered into evidence will be different from the Program Plan as it exists today. In fact, a proposed ' Revision 4' to the Program Plan is presently expected to be approved and published in the near future."

This concept creates a need for time at the end of the program to ascertain what program was utilized and what it was utilized for.

Beyond this, if the Plan is so flexible out of necessity, what impact does this flexibility have on areas completed prior to changes in the program?

4. Applicants stated (Response page 2, top of page, Footnote 2 omitted):

". . . No claim has been made that, in its present form, the CPRT Program Plan is necessarily all that will be employed or required to achieve that goal. Nor have the Applicants made any claim that their case for licensing will rest entirely and exclusively on the results of the CPRT Program Plan implementation. A claim of completeness, rather, will be made only when the Applicants have offered their evidence.

"For these reasons, the Applicants respectfully suggest that the Board may be tending toward premature conclusions if the Board proposes to render judgment, at this time, about the adequacy of ongoing efforts to resolve the issues requiring resolution before the Operating License can be authorized."

From the first statement, it is apparent that currently Applicants are not sure or are declining to reveal what is necessary to correct the 2

O multiplicity of errors now revealed at CPSES. We find it unfair of Applicants, with all their resources, to continuously present CASE with moving targets while they, on the other hand, will object to a single word because of alleged ambiguity. Applicants are investing tens of millions of hours in the CPRT Program. Are they anticipating that at completion they will file their evidence, and then the Intervenor will have ten days to answer or some other equally absurd time frame?

5. Applicants stated (page 2, Footnote 2):

"/2/ It is, of course, the Applicants' prerogative, as the party bearing the burden of proof, to determine what evidence they will offer and to defer offering evidence until they are satisfied that it is ready for proffer. Until that evidence has been offered, there is no question regarding its sufficiency (or the sufficiency of the methods by which it is being gathered) before the Board. For this reason, the Applicants respectfully submit that the Board cannot convene to litigate the programmatic adequacy of the CPRT program plan, pre-implementation, absent the Applicants' consent."

Applicants are underscoring their concept of the installation of a moving target rule: that is, no questions may be asked until completion of the program; r.nd completion is at Applicants' discretion.

Applicants' error in this instanc.e involves the duration of the hearings. If all parties work concurrently (as much as possible), the hearing process will be shortened; on the other hand, the hearings could be extended because the hearings are based on extracting the background resulting in the Applicants' final evidence, and if this evidence is found to be deficient, what then do Applicants do -- try for Plan 57 3

6. Applicants stated (page 3, second paragraph):

"Later, the scope of the CPRT mission was broadened, so that, today, the ultimate responsibility with which CPRT is charged is not limited in scope to the issues raised by the TRT (or any other External Source). It was for this reason that Action Plan VII.c (relating to construction) and the

'self-initiated' aspects of the Design Adequacy Program (DSAPs VIII through XI) were adopted. Had it been known at the outset that Action Plan VII.c. would eventually be performed, Action Plan I.a.4 (and a number of the other issue-specific action plans) probably would not have been issued. Nonetheless, a judgment was made at the time CPRT scope was expanded that the original action plans would be continued. One risk created by that decision is that some might perceive the function of the earlier action plans to be broader than was intended, i.e., to respond oaly to the specific TRT issue. This perception, the Applicants suggest, lies behind some of the comments contained in the Concerns Memo and during the pre-hearing conference."

CASE expects and is entitled to a full disclosure of the cause which led to this extensive broadening of the scope over that for which CPRT was initially created. In addition, Applicants fall to explain why, when expansion became inevitable, the Applicants choose to leave room for the confusion by not revising the original action plan rather than creating new parallel plans.

7. Applicants stated (page 3, Footnote 3):

"f 3/ Even as initially framed, the CPRT was a deeper investigation than would normally have been required or undertaken had the same concerns expressed in the TRT letters been received outside of the particular atmosphere in which Comanche Peak finds itself. In the normal course, the specifics of the concern advanced would have been investigated by the applicant. If the applicant agreed that the concern was valid, further investigation and remedial steps would have been devised in the nature of a corrective action program. Where a review of the concern demonstrated that it was invalid, such as has occurred in the case of the 4

e concerns expressed as TRT item I.a.4, the applicant could have elected to proceed no further. Here, an investigation of a population of cable terminations was undertaken nonwithstanding that the expressed TRT concerns did not survive a specific review. We believe this intensity of investigation should belle any concerns that the CPRT is not thorough."

The first statement in Footnote 3 says a lot for the Applicants' perception of the plant and reality. This is particularly true when one considers that the atmosphere referred to by Applicants was the result of Applicants' own failure to design and construct a facility which could stand the test of comparison to their own commitments.

Beyond this, in relation to Applicants' conclusion, this thoroughness was not by design but was the result of necessity. Applicants actually set up their program in an environment of naivete, believing that the only problems that existed were to supply answers to the questions posed by the NRC's Technical Review Team (TRT). The alterations to the program were the result of coupling the design issues to the CPRT vehicle, which was assumed by Applicants to be capable of proving that there were no problems at CPSES, but only a lack of understanding on the part of CASE and the Licensing Board.

8. Applicants stated (page 4, last two sentences of top paragraph):

". . . Testing that hypothesis was the purpose of the Action Plan. To assess this Action Plan based upon any other criterion is not proper."

The use of the word " hypothesis" in place of " finding" or " allegation" or such is a cheap option utilized to lessen the perceived condition at i

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CPSES. CASE made allegations about the design and construction of CPSES. These were charges which we set out to prove (and did indeed prove them; see Board's 12/28/83 Memorandum and Order (Quality Assurance for Design) and Applicants' corrections to affidavits f3/,

among other items). A hypothesis, on the other hand, is merely a supposition, assumption, or theory used as an explanation of facts in evidence. Beyond this, are we to believe that Applicants are spending tens of millions of hours correcting problems that are merely hypothetical?

9. Applicants stated (page 4, middle paragraph):

"It is not humanly possible for the design and construction of a project of the magnitude and complexity of Comanche Peak to be done completely error-free. No more is it possible for the implementation of the QA/QC program for the project to be completely error-free. Finally, it would not be possible to construct a re-inspection /re-analysis program such as CPRT so as to detect every error made during construction or QA/QC implementation and to have assurance that in fact every error had been detected. These propositions are no more -- and no less -- true for Comanche Peak than they are for every other nuclear power plant that has been constructed in the United States, or, for that matter, for every other substantial non-nuclear construction effort, such as a high-rise building or a dam."

The overall context of the above statement leaves an impression that the errors incorporated in CPSES safety-related components are an f3/ 11/12/85 Affidavit of John C. Finneran, Jr. and Robert C. Iotti Regarding Corrections and Clarifications to Affidavits Sapporting Motions for Summary Disposition of Pipe Support Design -1 legations, and Affidavit of Robert C. Iotti and John C. Finneran, Jr., in Response to Board Request for Information on Variation of Field Configurations of Supports Utilizing Cinched-Down U-Bolts, attached to 11/12/85 cover letter from Applicants' counsel Mr. Reynolds to Board.

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average of what one would expect to find in any other equivalent

camplex. This-is an improper perception to convey. In the case of commercial complexes of similar scope, the ratio of error for designed structures is only a minor percentage of the ratio found at CPSE'S .

This postulate evades the responsibility for the conditions which existed at CPSES at the time of the application for an operating license. Applicants seem to have a problem relating to reality. The issues before this Board involve at least two major problems: First, what were the basic causes which led to the necessity for the forming and expanding of the mission of CPSES and how do these causes reflect on future decisions by management at CPSES? Second, and of equal importance, is the modified plant which will be offered at some time in the future for licensing built to a new standard of excellence or does it in fact follow Applicants' previous practices?

10. Applicants stated (page 4, first two sentences of last paragraph):

" Absolute perfection of construction is not required, however, because of the diversities, redundancies and conservative margins that are engineered into a system such as Comanche Peak in implementation of the ' defense in depth' philosophy. It is in the nature of things that only a fraction of the possible errors are such that, if undetected and uncorrected, they would prevent the facility from operating in accorandance (sic) with NRC regulations. . . "

The statement is not complete. The proper statement should read, "While absolute perfection may not be achieved in engineering, it must be pursued, and this is an absolute sine qua non for those involved in the design, construction, and operation of a nuclear power plant."

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Additionally, the question arises: What fraction of the plant is involved in, and where are, these underected er'rors which are tolerated by acquiescence?

11. Applicants stated (page 4, last sentence, continuing through end of paragraph on top of page 5; Footnote 4 omitted):

". . . It is accepted -- indeed, it is a fundamental precept of the ' defense in depth' philosophy -- that the design of a  ;

facility such as Comanche Peak is such that it can tolerate l random failures of construction process or the inspection process without resulting in risk to the public. It is the potential for systematic failures that is the focus of concern."

The thought of this postulate as potentially prevalent in the minds of those executing the CPRT Program is frightening. The concept of engineering is such that, at completion, a reasonable party may state with full confidence that for each element an analysis has been completed and is within the code allowables and therefore will not fail within the limits of the parameters utilized in the design. ,

Questionable engineering is often to be found when unique procedures are introduced because unique structures require non-standard procedures or an advancement in the state of the art of engineering.

In short, engineering procedures that are utilized for structures affecting the health and/or safety of the public are proper only when the results can be quantified. Guessing is not a standard engineering procedure. Beyond this, Applicants are failing to put the proper emphasis on the non-systematic failure. For example: the failure of a single load path caused the Hyatt Regency walkway accident; the failure i

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-of a single seal caused the Shuttle disaster; and the failure of a single hanger. caused the Connecticut bridge collapse on I-95.

12. Applicants stated (page 5, last paragraph, continued top of page 6; Footnote 5 omitted):

"The CPRT was implemented in the face of allegations of widespread, systematic failures of the QA/QC process (and also, of necessity, of the construction and design processes, for, in the absence of construction or design faillures, any failures of QA/QC are moot). CPRT is designed to test the hypothesis that such systematic failures occurred. Where individual significant errors are detected, they are then pursued so that assurance that correction has been or will be implemented may be attained. Where no such errors are detected, CPRT determines that the hypothesis is false."

If Applicants will refer to-the record, there was also a sizeable nimber-of isolated allegations; for example, the upper lateral restraint calculational error which led to the uncovering of the cadweld bolt problems. The potential of this type of localized error is not debatable, particularly when a fault tree analysis has not been performed to determine the probability of major accident. In addition, as mentioned above, there is nothing hypothetical about the large numbers of. instability problems, cinched U-bolt problems, inadequate stiffness problems, multiple axial restraint problems, etc., etc. To clarify further, see the the 12/18/86 report on small bore piping by Stone & Webster, Attachment A, page 1, item 4.1 (included as CASE Attachment I hereto /4/), where 29 of 50 pipe stress problems

/4/ "Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Generic Issues Report," by Stone & ,

Webster, referenced in cover letter of 12/19/86 to Board from  !

Applicants' counsel Mr. Wooldridge. We are including page 1 and pages 1 through 5 of Attachment A of this Report as CASE Attachment I to this pleading. We recommend the entire Report for the Board's reading.

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experienced some form of overstressing caused by the following generic causes: M-Rigid type supports (Report Attachment A, page 1, at item 4.1.1); piping that contains Class 5 continuation piping (4.1.2);

piping connected to vendor piping (4.1.3); building displacements (4.1.4); piping containing supports with low stiffness (4.1.5); pipe support mass contribution (4.1.6); miscellaneous concerns (4.1.7),

itemized: concentrated weight (4.1.7.1), modes of operation (4.1.7.2),

and source pipe movements (4.1.7.3). Of these, at least three were thoroughly litigated by CASE (4.1.4, 4.1.5, and 4.1.6). Also, a support failure listed at 4.2.6 was a CASE concern. The conclusion in this Report by Stone & Webster was that the remaining 600 isometrics require reanalysis (see item 6.0, Report pages 4 and 5, under

" RECOMMENDATIONS") . There does not seem to be anything hypothetical involved in this portion of the Stone & Webster Report.

13. Applicants stated (page 5, first three sentences of Footnote 5):

"15/ It is worth recalling -- not for the purpose of denigrating the contribution that such programs can make but only to point out that they do not have sine qua non status

-- that for many years nuclear power plants were constructed without 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B QA/0C programs. This was possible because, in the final analysis, QA/QC neither constructs nor designs anything; it is, rather, just one more check in a process that includes multiple layers of checks.

What is importent, however, is the product, not just one portion of the process by which it was achieved."

The content of the above statement is misleading and inaccurate. While QA/QC does not design or construct in the physical sense, it does ensure (if properly supervised) that the parameters for design and construction are developed and implemented.

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1 Applicants have attempted to have the proceedings degenerate to philosophical diversions and semantic manipulations unrelated to deriving the facts. It was Applicants' previous similar attitude which ultimately forced them into making the statement f5/:

"TUGC0 management is not satisfied with the status of the plant and would not proceed to operate it, even if authority were to be granted, until all of the outstanding concerns have been addressed, their safety significance determined, i generic implications and collective significance considered, and necessary corrective actions have been completed."

There is no rationale for citing what other plants were or were not designed to include as limiting factors. The fact is that the plant in i

controversy, CPSES, was covered by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendices A and B, and Applicants were committed to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendices A and B.

CASE's position is that there is no adequate substitute for Appendix B; however, even under Applicants' criteria, they must at a minimum comply with the intent of the provisions contained therein.

14. Applicants stated (page 6, first two sentences of second full paragraph):

"The only relevant issue, therefore, is whether the sampling process employed by the CPRT is an adequate screen for detection of the existence of deficiencies within a given population. The Applicants believe that it is. . .

These statements are less than accurate. Among the relevant issues are the ultimate quality of CPSES and what went wrong with the pre-1985 4

CPSES facility -- not the sanctification of a specific methodology; addressing just one factor in the overall controversy is insufficient.

f5/ Applicants' 6/28/85 Current Management Views and Management Plan for Resolution of All Issues, page 7.

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15. Applicants stated (Footnote 6, pages 6 and 7, emphasis in original):

"/6/ It should be understood that the '95/5' values are but one statement of the resulting confidence; that which obtains 95% confidence of detecting anything that propagated though (sic) at least 5% of the population has a correspondingly higher confidence of detecting a more pervasive phenomenon and a lower, but.still significant, confidence of detecting a rarer phenomenon. To assert that the sampling approach diminishes in validity as the pervasiveness of deficiencies is hypothesized to increase is therefore backwards; the more pervasive the hypothesized effect, the higher the confidence that the sampling program will detect its presence."

There is no documentation for, nor is there quantification of, the "still'significant confidence of detecting a rarer phenomenon," nor in fact do Applicants qualify where systenatic error leaves off and rarer events begin. The lower level confidence of detecting rarer phenomenon requires an explanation, since single phenomenon can result in severe consequences; for example: the failure of the Zirconium deflector at Fermi 1; the failure of the generator supports in 1966 at Shippingport; and the air valve f ailure at TMI; to name just a few. Again, we have Applicants developing a theory and attempting to pass it off as a fact.

16. Applicants stated (page 8, first full paragraph, and last paragraph beginning on page 8 and concluding on top of page 9):

"Nonetheless, there is a fundamental difference between a program that tests the adequacy and acceptability of a facility and a program that singles out and tests only one aspect (such as OA/QC) of the process by which the facility was created. CPRT is the former. It is designed to lead to a conclusion that the CPSES facility is adequately designed and constructed and tested (and is therefore eligible to be licensed). It will establish reasonable assurance as to the absence of undetected, uncorrected safety significant deficiencies, either by determining that they never existed 12

or that they have been found and are being fixed (i.e;.,

appropriate corrective actions have been defined). In the process, much is expected to be learned about the adequacy of the original acceptance inspection program, but the purpose of the exercise will be accomplished whatever the ultimate verdict about that program might be.

"Thus structured CPRT can, in fact, accomplish what a program that singled out and tested the adequacy of only the original inspection program cannot accomplish. A QA-Program-grounded assessment, for instance, would not test the hardware directly, nor could it assure global coverage of any indirect assessment of hardware. In addition, such a program would not (and could not) test the hypotheses of falsification of records or records unreliability, including any extent to which record reliability might be impaired by the hypothesized existence of harassment and intimidation of inspection personnel. A QA-Program-based assessment is critically dependent upon the accuracy of its determinations (or assumptions) about root cause (since investigations for possible generic implications are limited by those determinations or assumptions), while CPRT's global approach is tolerant both of any imprecisions in the root cause assessment process as well as of any situations in which no determination of root cause is possible. Finally, should a

'QA Program' program lead to a negative verdict on the adequacy of the original acceptance inspection program, nothing of utility would have been accomplished, because a hardware-based program like CPRT would then have to be engaged in order to provide the requisite reasonable assurance that CPRT provides directly."

It is shocking but true: Applicants have no understanding of the QA/QC program, which is one of the principal reasons that Applicants are facing this major corrective action program. Applicants assume that, for example, since one element of the QA/QC program (inspection) is not capable of performing the function of another element (say, the audit) that the QA/QC program is flawed.

The essence of Applicants' statements is that the purpose of Applicants' efforts by way of the CPRT Program is to achieve licensing l

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while disclosing as little as possible about previous errors in the pre-1985 plant.

Applicants' interpretation of a QA/QC program is grossly flawed, particularly as relates to the purpose of such program. Applicants are saying that if you have a QA/QC program, it is not as good as the CPRT Program. Then Applicants expound on several phony explanations which are in actuality meaningless because no QA/QC program has ever done (or was ever designed to do) what they're talking abouc, but this does not mean that a QA/QC program is incapable of such performance per se. For example, the Applicants say that application of a QA/QC program was never intended to test hardware, nor was it intended to assure global >

coverage of indirect assessment of hardware. Beyond this, according to Applicants, such QA/QC program was not intended to test the hypotheses of falsification of records nor to detect the existence of harassment and intimidation. The fact is, for an original facility, these items were to be precluded from the facility due to the overall program and regulations developed under the QA/QC umbrella to design and build the complex. The QA/QC program was merely the tool and only one part of the program to insure that such program and regulations were properly implemented, and so it would be for a facility undergoing corrective action due to a failure of the original QA/QC program or any other reason. Finally, Applicants' comparison of tre merits of CPRT over QA/QC as relates to a QA-based program is baseless, since it only makes claims without foundation and assumes it is the QA program per sjt 14

which must determine the root cause and the generic implications, and further by innuendo, if the program is QA-based, no other vehicle is available within the overall program to uncover root cause or generic implications. In short, Applicants are comparing a complete system (in Applicants' belief, CPRT is a complete system) to only one element of another total system, namely QA/QC, for designing and constructing a facility. In the final analysis, Applicants are comparing one element of a total program to a total program -- because the CPRT program itself doesn't catch generic problems except through one element of the overall program. For example, Stone & Webster's contribution to the overall CPRT program (the reanalysis of the pipe supports) will not, in and of itself, catch root cause, falsification of documents, harassment, etc.

17. Applicants stated (page 9, last full paragraph):

"Under Appendix E, all hardware falls into one of three categories. In the first instance, hardware is either conforming to the design documents or it is not; in the latter case we have a deviation. Deviations are then sub-divided into those that are safety-significant (deficiencies) and those that are not. Deviations that are not safety-significant are assessed as possible trends. If a collection of deviations is determined to constitute a trend, it is further evaluated to determine whether or not it is adverse.

A root cause investigation is undertaken in the case of all deficiencies and adverse trends."

With the inclusion of the caveat " safety-significant" (Applicants' definition), a quality product is not assured. For example, a car could be produced with radios that don't work, heaters that don't work, air conditioners that don't work, bodies that rust, etc., but none of 15

these have any significance on the safety of the product per se,; but the product is of no quality, which affects the crediblity relating to the safety of the product by rendering it impossible for the public to determine whether claims of safety have any validity. This is

- particularly true when a multiplicity of non-safety significant failures (by anybody's definition) indicates a lax management -- which is, in and of itself, safety-significant.

For any product which has been extensively revised, we must have a history of all of the problems which collectively resulted in the need to apply corrective action after completion. It is the complete matrix of errors, code violations, etc., safety-significant or otherwise, that will result in determining the inherent weaknesses that could lead to future problems at CPSES. When a safety-related pipe or support requires modification, the event per se,is safety-significant, regardless of the caveats supplied by Applicants. It is Applicants' ability to recognize and admit to inaccuracies that will determine if they are qualified to cope with the onset of problems in an operating facility.

One of the most frightening aspects of the revelations to ba found on the pages of Applicants' Response can be noted in Applicants' attitude when faced with a fait accompli. Over and over, Applicants' attitude is to state as a fact that there is no way to build a perfect plant. This, coupled with Applicants' caveat of no safety significance, is where we find the cause of Applicants' problems in the 16 4

,--4 -- - .- . . _ _ , _ - - - _ . - _ _ - . _ _ - - _ , _ - . . - - , - . .- - , - , - . . _ _ - . . - - , , - ----m--. - - - .

first instance: a lack of diligent oversight based on lackadaisical attitudes to its cause and effect or in the relationship of noncompliance with codes and accidents or the mitigation of accidents.

Without a fault tree analysis, the term " safety-significant" (a special definition by Applicants) actually, in the real world of CPSES problems , means indeterminancy. This indeterminancy is, in and of itself, safety significant; for example, see Stone & Webster definition of prudency, page 6-13, item 1, Stone & Webster Final Report on Large Bore Piping (included as CASE Attachment 2 hereto) f6,/, which is the jhe facto definition of indeterminancy.

18. Applicants stated (page 10, next-to-last paragraph):

"The result of this process is that only those deviations (hardware or design) or observations (design) that are neither safety-significant nor adverse trends are not subjected to root cause evaluation."

The interpretation of safety significance is flawed, particularly in light of the fact that safety significance is based on an arbitrary decision of what is safety-significant and what is not safety-significant by Applicants alone -- and all of this without the benefit of a fault tree analysis based on the life of the plant. This position by Applicants is at best presumptive. There is also, while not mentioned specifically, the preemptive elimination of generic f6/ " Piping and Pipe Support Requalification Program, Unit 1 Large Bore Piping Final Report," by Stoae & Webster, referenced in cover letter of 11/17/86 to Board from Applicants' counsel Mr. Wooldridge. We are including page 6-13 of this Report as CASE Attachment 2 to this pleading. We recommend this entire Report also for the Board's reading.

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categories of error by way of categorizing; for example: latest industry practice; prudency; etc. (see above) -- and it is Applicants' desire that CASE and the Board be barred from questioning a vast number of problems assigned to this limbo created by Applicants. But the feature point we have is the Applicants who tied us up for over four years claiming the plant design and construction was safe and proper are now attempting to usurp the Board's prerogative and assuming charge of deciding which errors require explanation and which ones do not.

The CPRT program is sidestepping the intended requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, as discussed above at item 16. But Applicants must provide coverage as is required by the Code of Federal Regulations and that includes the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, XVI.

CORRECTIVE ACTION, which states:

" Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.

In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. The identification of the significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be documented and reported to appropriate levels of management."

It must be noted that the test for reporting the cause of significant conditions involves significant conditions adverse to quality -- not the far more limited category resulting from applying Applicants' artificial test, which is " safety significant," which is by Applicants' definition. Or can it be that Applicants have overruled 10 CFR Part 18  ;

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50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. CORRECTIVE ACTION, and its provisions for determining cause? (See also NRC Guidance - 10 CFR 50.55(e), CASE Exhibit 300; and discussion in CASE's 8/22/83 Proposed Findings cf Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), especially pages XXIX

- 1 and XXIX - 9 through -14). Beyond this, Applicants have not' complied with their own commitments; see ANSI N45.2 - 1971, " Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants," CASE Exhibit 687, bound in following Tr. 6414.

In the final analysis, we have a large number of safety-related components which were incorrectly designed or were installed, which were not only indeterminate at the time, but are still indeterminate after massive testing and analytical procedures which press the state of the art, and which are now being swept under a Persian rug.

19. Applicants stated (page 11, " Response," first paragraph and first two sentences of second paragraph):

"The Applicants are confident that the comparison (i.e.,

of the CPRT Program to ' full implementation of Appendix B for design and construction') will be favorable, that is to say, that the result of the CPRT program will be that the level of assurance of safety that will be produced by implementation of the Program Plan will be comparable to the level that may be hypothesized from an adequate Appendix B QA/QC program adequately administered. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co.

(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-763, 18 NRC 571, 593 & n.86 (1984)."

Considering the different conditions controlling the revamping of the Diablo Canyon facility, I would be hesitant to cite anything related to that facility as proof of adequacy.

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"As noted in the ' Introduction' above, it is neither.

possible nor required that construction be error-free; the same is true of a QA/QC program. However, it is possible, expected and required that the construction / inspection process be free of pervasive weaknesses that systematically permiit inadequate products (i.e., hardware containing safety-significant deficiencies 7 to be accepted. . . "

' Applicants are insistent that error will exist. It is the negative view of Applicants which requires some interpretation and is one of the main reasons CASE believes that it is necessary to determine root cause and management implication.

20. Applicants stated (page 13, first full paragraph):

"With respect to pipe supports (the specific area referred to in the concern), there is of course no need of a separate investigative technique to bound the intra-population generic implications, since the redesign /

requalification effort is essentially 100%. With respect to other design activities, the Design Adequacy Program is an investigation that will determine whether deficiencies (as a result of whatever cause) exist; this fulfills any need for extra population sampling to bound the effects of the identified deficiencies in the pipe support area."

I must state again with all the vigor at hand that the reinspection program does not relieve Applicants from determining what errors existed prior to the reinspection and why.they existed. Also, when was management first aware of when these errors existed and what was management's reaction?

21. Applicants stated (page 14, last sentence of first paragraph at top of page; Footnote 8 omitted):

20

e

". . . Thus, not only will the piping be requalified (thus extirpating any and all errors that may have resulted from inadequacies of the original design or design OA), but also the implications of what happened in piping for other disciplines will have been captured."

How does such program lay waste to a fait accompli (the fact that an error was made) which is descriptive in nature and can only be purged if the error was falsely assumed and in fact no error existed?

22. Applicants stated (page 14, Footnote 8):

"f8/ CPRT is essentially an investigative program.

Assuming the investigation reveals a systematic problem, then the necessity for a corrective action program to rectify the problem has been demonstrated. However, there is no a priori reason why one must complete the investigative phase before proceeding to a corrective action program where, for whatever reason, the utility has elected to proceed directly to global-scope corrective action. One implication of the Applicants' undertaking a 'do-over' in any area, such as piping, therefore, is that there is no purpose to be served in lingering over the design deficiencies that might have existed in the superseded designs or in the process by which those old designs were created: in short, if root cause is indeed one means to an end (e.g., finding all the bad pipe supports), there is no function for that means if the end has been otherwise satisfied."

Applicants were aware that a number of supports would fail (for example, see Applicants' correction to affidavits on summary disposition fZ/), and it was the root cause, generic implications, and peripheral impact of the original supports that CASE believes were within the scope of the Board's Order and not necessarily limited to superseding corrected supports. Replacing all the supports of a genera does not lessen the impact of such Order. This stonewalling reduces f2/ See reference at Footnote 3, page 5.

21

E the credibility of the Applicants to a point of nonexistence and calls into question Applicants' understanding of the clean hands doctrine.

The devious nature of the future operators of two nuclear power plants is obvious from the following:

1. The Applicants have on several occasions requested that the issues before this Board be mooted, since Applicants were performing a reanalysis which would correct any problems if they existed. The Board declined to go along with Applicants' request. In the above paragraph, we essentially have the Applicants attempting to overrule the Board and establishing de facto mootness /8/.

2. The facts concerning the status of the supports so vigorously defended by Applicants are critical to determining why the Applicants put such effort into the defense; for example, is or was Applicants' management so incompetent that they believe(d) the supports were adequate or was there another reeson? In either case, there are serious unanswered questions directly related to the safety of this plant.

/8/ See Board Memorandum and Order (Case Management Plan), May 24, 1985, page 2 continued on page 3 "Mootness." There are two points of interest to be found here: (1) The Applicants have not complied with the Board's criteria for mootness since, among other reasons, CASE retains a justiciable issue which precludes mootness; (2) Applicants are currently in the fourth phase of these proceedings, phases 3 and 4 of which went beyond the phase 2 final chance discussed by the Board at 2 in the above referenced material (the four phases in these hearings being (1) the initial phase lost by Applicants by Board Order of 12/28/83, (2) the second phase, the three pronged plan submitted after reconsideration by the Board 2/8/84, (3) a confirmatory inspection by Stone & Webster which was supposed to prove that only minor modifications were required, and (4) the current major reconciliation required by Stone & Webster af ter major problems were uncovered both by Applicants' corrections to the affidavits in their motions for summary disposition and Stone & Webster findings relative to CASE allegations in trying to qualify cinched-down U-bolts, etc.).

22

3. The roughshod arrogance of CPSES management is directly affecting the course of justice. I believe that Applicants' arrogance in i

sidestepping the Board's concern relative to root cause is, in ( s itself, safety-significant. If Applicants feel that they can waive Board concerna (for whatever reasons) Applicants would also waive NRC rules and regulations for plant operation for similar t reasons. In short, Applicants' position is clear: corporate policy justifies the means. And I submit that it'was not the m intent of the Congress in the Atomic Energy Acc of 1954, as amended, to allow the nuclear power industry to proceed under the f rules of random disorder. _) ,

s

23. Applicants stated (page 14, beginning with " Concern," continuing through end of paragraph at top of page 15):

1

" Concern:

"' Applicants . . . do not plan to inquire into whether there were errors made in filing before this Board the technical materials that were part of Applicants ['] first Plen . . . .

" Source:

" Concerns Memo at 4.

" Response:

"It is correct that the Applicants have not requested CPRT to make such inquiry. The reasons are as follows:

"The Applicants intend to assess and then to demonstrate the present acceptability of the CPSES design and construction by inspection. With respect to construction, ,

hardware will be inspected, to acceptance criteria determined , '

by CPRT to be relevant and material to acceptability and 1 23

which CPRT is prepared to defend (not necessarily to the acceptance criteria employed during original acceptance inspections). With respect to design, current design documents will be inspected, again to CPRT's interpretation of the appropriate criteria. (' Current design documents' means, in the case of areas of the plant to be redesigned or reanalyzed, such as piping and pipe supports, the redesigns or reanalyses. CPRT assessments are based either on third-party work or work by others with third party oversight.)

CPRT's goal is to detect, with reasonable assurance, safety significant deficiencies and to establish a means of assuring that the found deficiencies, together with any other deficiencies produced by the same root cause, have been or will be corrected. Implementation of this methodology will achieve CPRT's goal regardless of the skill or lack of skill that might have been employed in prior assessments of the same construction or of the same (or of different) designs by prior witnesses."

Applicants have sidestepped the Board's concern and are answering a question more to their liking. CASE would have prefe red e that Applicants answer the Board's question; we believe that candid answer to the actual question would have been, at a minimum, more interesting than the ficticious question answered by Applicants.

The changes were prior to determination of root cause and by j Applicants' arguments due to the changes being made, the root cause has been mooted. This represents 40% of the supports. (See answer to item J

22 above.) The last remark by Applicants clearly indicates the past errors have found little interest for Applicants nor are they finding a prominent place in Applicants' scheme to achieve a license.

24. Applicants stated (page 15, first full paragraph):

"Indeed, the fact that a prior witness's assessment of a particular area of design might, were it to be reviewed by CPRT, be determined to be deficient would add no useful i

24 ,

1 l

l

~

Information to the casessment, for the scope of CPRT's investigation could not be enlarged (it is already essentially 100% of the design of the safety significant aspects of tha facility, minus certain ' givens' that CPRT is prepared to defend). Neither would the depth of CPRT assessment be changed (it is already required to be of sufficient depth to provide reasonable assurance). If, on the other hand, such a review of the work of a prior witness led to the conclusion that the witness was competent and knowledgeable, or correct, CPRT could not (at least in the absence of a change in the Program Plan) relax its investigative efforts of the adequacy of the design itself."

But weak witnesses are not classified and many of these people are supervising the various components in the CPRT Program or Applicants' corrective actions to the CPRT's findings, and others of these people were accepted by Applicants as their best experts. The question arises: What is the capability of this management to select and direct, in view of their past track record, other experts who will be responsible for operating this plant and preventing accidents whatever the initiating cause?

25. Applicants stated (page 15, last paragraph, continued top of page 16):

"That the review suggested would be meaningless is perhaps most convincingly so in the case adverted to by the Board, namely piping and pipe supports. Here the Project has already determined to engage in redesign / reanalysis efforts.

This is effectively an abandonment of the prior efforrs, and it renders moot the adequacy of the prior designs. If the adequacy of prior designs is itself moot, then we are hardpressed to see the utility of assessing the adequacy of some prior assessment of those designs. Neither has any impact upon the ultimate question of the adequacy of the CPSES piping and pipe support designs and analyses 'now.'"

This is the second iteration by Applicants of mootness. These supports were vigorously defended by Applicants and their experts as being

. 25

acceptable. Now we find out, as far as Applicants are concerned, because the faulty sapports are replaced the error did not exist. (See also answer to item 22 above.)

i

26. Applicants stated (page 16, first full paragraph):

"In addition, as a practical matter, the Board has already indicated its lack of acceptance of the testimony of some prior witnesses. Were the CPRT to review the testimony and conclude that it was accurate and reliable, and should have been accepted, the Applicants would then be in the position of having to convince the Board that its earlier conclusions were erroneous. There seems to be no point in undertaking this additional burden."

Applicants' answer is designed to cover up the actual conditions which existed at CPSES prior to 1985; and in addition, Applicants would then be relieved from the real burden which they face, and that is explaining their conduct in over four years of defending the indefensible. Beyond this, it was Applicants' experts who changed 3

their testimony, revealing serious flaws in their defense of CPSES --

not CASE nor the Licensing Board (see corrections to affidavits f

referenced in Footnote f4/ preceding; see also answer 22 above).

27. Applicants stated (page 16, second full paragraph):

"The suggested inquiry, therefore, is not one that will lead to evidence relevant or material to whether the Beard should find Contention 5 resolved satisfactorily to permit authorization of an Operating License."

Except for the fact that Applicants have attempted cijt facto to oserrule the Board Memorandum of May 25, 1985 (Case Management Plan) at least as 26

a relates to pages 2 and 3, "Mootness." And further, Applicants appear to be forcing the hearings in the directions which they desire without regard for the Board's Orders; there is little that can be said favorably for Applicants' Response to the Board's concerns.

28. Applicants stated (page 17, last full paragraph, quoting from Applicants' response to the Board's 14 Questions on I.a.4):

"'The first thing done by the CPRT Electrical Review Team was to analyze the six TRT-found terminations. Our analysis, which is set forth in the Action Plan Results Report, demonstrates that none of the six terminations was in fact mislanded so as to cause the associated circuit to function incorrectly. ...

But this is not the point. The fact that the mislanding was incorrectly accepted is the point of concern, not whether or not the mislanding created a safety problem.

29. Applicants stated (page 17, last paragraph continued top of page 18, still quoting from Applicants response to the Board's 14 Questions on I.a.4):

"'We did not review QA/0C documentation. Such a review might have been required in order to assess the cause of a deviating termination, had the reinspections found any deviations. No deviations were found. As is discussed in the Results Report, we believe that the alleged problem . ..

did not occur.'"

If Applicants' statements were correct, then the allegations by NRC Staff were incorrect, and this would lead us down a new avenue on the credibility of the NRC Staff. Further, Applicants have a propensity for designing a rationale to discard problems and, once this verbal design is developed, proceeding as if their rationale were unchallengable.

27

30. Applicants stated (page 18, third full paragraph):

"More generally, any assertion that the work of any constituent in the construction / inspection process

'may not (have been] fully represented in the sample,' is, taken literally, a rejection of the well-accepted principles of random sampling. Putting aside the fact that in Action Plan I.a.4 the Staff's examples were, as noted above, reviewed specifically, the design of the sampling program employed in Action Plan I.a.4 was such that, within practical limits (in this case 95% confidence), the work of each constituent in the population was of necessity equally represented in the sample."

The statement also may be interpretted to mean "but not assuredly included." For example, it is possible that, if 6 out of 1600 items have deviations and if a sample size of 1500 were to be used, the 6 deviations could all escape detection. But most sample sizes used by Applicants are less significant; for example, 16% of the population for small bore piping was used; that is, 122 isometrics (isos) of 232 total isos19/.

I 31. Applicants stated (page 20, Footnote 12, first sentence):

"/12/ While it was not a part of the activity called for in the Action Plan, the Issue Coordinator for Action Plan I.a.4 did in fact review the OA/0C paperwork for the ' rolled leads' in order to see what could be learned about why the leads were rolled."

There is no statement documenting why the rolled leads were accepted, which is perhaps the most important point. There are times that the non-statement speaks louder than the rhetoric.

f9/ See page 1, "Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Generic Issues Report," Stone & Webster, CASE Attachment I hereto.

I 28

32. Applicants stated (page 20, Footnote 12, third sentence):

". . . In the case of one of the pairs, moreover, there is evidence from the physical state of the conductors themselves that the leads had been lifted after initial termination and then reversed when relanded."

A critical question arises if leads, polarity notwithstanding, can be rolled without detection or without question after their discovery by Applicants. Can this be true in other areas? For example, can critical plant protection systems whose polarity must be maintained also be rolled by a craftsman or others after installation and acceptance?

i

33. Applicants stated (page 21, Response):

"As noted above, the 'other' populations are subjected to the same Action Plan VII.c screen; if there is a systematic problem capable of causing an undetected deficiency in those other populations (whether or not caused by a root cause associated with a found deficiency in a different population), it will be detected. This screen is applied to what is believed to be a complete list of safety significant attributes associated with the other population.

The screen for deviations, therefore, envelopes any more focussed and more limited screen for potential extra-population generic implications that might otherwise have been required were Action Plan VII.c not a part of the Program Plan."

I must admit that Applicants' answer assaults grammatical sense or, in fact, any sense. If a systematic problem is capable of causing an undetected error, what now is being done to ensure detection? The statement by Applicants is without substance. Beyond this, I can't comment except to say that this certainly is a new method of confusing the issue. It is indeed a classic example of what in the District of Columbia circles is referred to as " gobbledygook."

29

34. Applicants stated (page 22, first paragraph, third sentence):

". . . If and to the extent that the products pass muster, CPRT does not intend to investigate the process in detail nor, given the global scope of the products investigation, is such necessary. . ."

This veiled statement indicates Applicants' desire to avoid culpability for the mess that has occupied our time and resources for over four years.

35. Applicants stated (page 23, third paragraph, first sentence):

"First, as noted above, for years nuclear power plants were constructed with no 10 C.F.R., Part 50, Appendix B QA/0C program at all, and many other projects with a potential for risk to persons are constructed that way every day; no

, demonstration of ' perfection' is required in order for i inspection programs to yield significant additional assurance of the adequacy of construction."

First, how many 1,000-megawatt plants were designed without 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B? This statement by Applicants brings me back to the days of Mr. Vivirito (Gibbs & Hill) during the hearings. Applicants have their minds made up that requirements for nuclear power plants are overstringent, unnecessary, and only function to handicap Applicants; therefore, Applicants lack the commitment to require compliance with the codes and regulations to the letter required, much less going beyond the minimum requirements.

36. Applicants stated (page 23, third paragraph, third sentence):

". . . Second, it is accepted among experts in the QA/QC fields that one of the causes of degraded inspector reliability is repetition. .."

30

I didn't find a reference for this alleged statement of fact in my copy of Applicants' filing. Until I have such reference, I find it difficult to respond to Applicants' statement.

37. Applicants stated (page 23, third paragraph, fourth and fifth sentences):

". . . In the case of CPRT, however, the inspections are quite focussed and they are being done in the limelight of NRC Staff and public scrutiny. These factors tend to reduce the potential for inspector oversight."

l Although I stated earlier (item 2 preceding) that I wasn't going to get heavily into the OIA Report at this time, I believe it is required in this regard to the statement by Applicants. It cannot be assumed that unbiased scrutiny by the NRC Staff is a credible argument, particularly in light of the OIA Report.

! 38. Applicants stated (page 24, first full paragraph, first and last l sentences):

"The bottom line, however, is that the Applicants do not expect CPRT to make a quantitative statement about safety, l nor does it believe that any such quantitative statement I

could ever be proved or disproved. . . Given the intensity of the inspections, re-inspections, document reviews, surveillances, audits, procedural reviews, testing and other inputs into that process, the Applicants believe that that should be regarded as undeniable."

I find this statement incredible. I have on several occasions stated the same argument to Applicants' unfounded statement that "there are no safety-significant problems" with the 30%-40% of the pipe supports being modified (not to mention cable tray su'pports, construction, 31

etc.). As for the last statement in Applicants' response above, I must point out that I was told the same thing about the pre-1985 plant that now is undergoing major corrective actions, and I believe that that statement should be regarded as undeniable.

39. Applicants stated (page 25, Response):

"Please see our discussion supra at note 4. All margins required by applicable codes will be preserved, except to the extent that waivers or exceptions may have been approved by the Staff. Similarly the benchmark for design adequacy is currently applicable FSAR commitments (though, of course, the Applicants may propose, and the Staff may approve, FSAR amendments at any time during the life of the facility)."

In answer, I can only point out that prior commitments weren't met or waivers would not be required. And there, I suppose, are another class of error which are closed to discussion by order of the Applicants.

40. Applicants stated (page 26, Response, first paragraph and first sentence of second paragraph):

"We believe it is not correct."

"Except in the case of certain of the TRT-responsive action plans, the CPRT goal is not to make a statement about the adequacy of the QA/QC process per se,."

To generate no statement is not the requirement of the Board for pre-1985 issues. For me again to go into the specifics of the significance of the pre-1985 supports would be redundant; therefore, see above item 22.

32

41. Applicants stated (page 26, Response, second paragraph, second sentence through end of paragraph):

". . . As is set forth above, its goal is to make a statement about the as-designed, as-installed and as-tested products of the aggregate process by which they were created. That effort may require an evaluation of the effectiveness of the OA/0C portion of the process, but such is done as a means to the stated end, not for its own sake. However, as is pointed out supra in 'The Difference Between Process Reviews and Product Reviews' and infra in response to the concern expresed at ));. 24434, implementation of the CPRT Program Plan wil'. generate a good deal of direct evidence about the adequr.cy of the CPSES 0A/QC programs and the collective evaluatiens will make a statement about the adequacy of 0A/0C based on the results of CPRT investigations."

But again, no statement was made by Applicants as to why they spent fsur years defending what we stated so long ago was the indefensible.

Applicants seem intent on evading anything associated with Comanche Peak prior to 1985.

42. Applicants stated (page 27, Response, first paragraph, second sentence):

". . . Where the deviations are safety significant (and therefore classified as ' deficiencies'), an assessment of the OA/0C implications of the fact that a deficiency existed will be assessed. Where the deviation is not a deficiency, it will be assesssed for its potential for being an adverse trend, as defined in Appendi E to the Program Plan, and, if so, then the OA/0C implications of these failures will also

assessed."

Since the determination of safety-significance or non-safety significance individually and particularly collectively over the life of the plant cannot be proved, why have Applicants taken it upon themselves to eliminate large numbers of errors in design and 33

construction based on an ambiguous loophole of their own design?

Applicants appear to be plagued by duplicity. See items 22 and 38 above.

43. Applicants stated (page 27, Response, first paragraph, third sentence):

. . . As a result, the only place in which the possibility that a found deviation may have been caused by a OA/QC l

failure that will not be specifically investigated is where the deviation has been determined to be neither safety significant nor an adverse trend."

Here again, this will result in a significant number of omissions.

l l

44. Applicants stated (page 27, Response, first paragraph, fourth and fifth {

sentences): l

". . . The set of identified deviations will be assessed again during the collective evaluation process. Essentially the same process is employed in the Design Adequacy Program with respect to failures of the design effort to conform to applicable standards, codes and criteria."

Applicants fail to understand that the plant which they discuss is not l

the plant as originally offered for licensing, and therefore their I answer is not responsive to the Board's request and CASE's desire for an explanation of why Applicants are developing a new plant,

, particularly in view of the fact that Applfcants still insist that I

there were few errors in the original plant.

45. Applicants stated (page 27, Response, second paragraph):

"The Applicants believe that this is to be more than sufficient to demonstrate the ' reasonable assurance' required for licensing. First, the deviations and observations for 34

which a root cause assessment is not made have no potential for adversely affecting whether the state of the installed hardware (or of the final design) is such that it would prevent the facility from operating in conformance with NRC regulations. Rather, the potentially useful information that might be gleaned from a dissection of the circumstances leading to a deviation would be limited to situations in which, had the same failure occurred elsewhere, the result would likely have been an undetected deficiency. That situation, however, is captured in the Appendix E definition of an adverse trend."

One problem to be found in not pursuing root cause may be noted in one of the factors discussed in the Board's concerns, and that is management's possible involvement in the large numbers of errors incorporated in CPSES. Are Applicants declaring that management's role, if any, is not open to question, and that if management had a role in the error prone plant that this is not safety-significant in itself?

46. Applicants stated (page 28, first Response):

"To the extent set forth in the Program Plan, Appendix B, at 12: 'A collective evaluation of the CPRT findings, observations and conclusions that relate to the adequacy of the CPSES construction QA/QC program,' and Appendix A, at 18:

'A final Design Adequacy Program Report documenting a Collective Evaluation related to the adequacy of the CPSES design program . . . , ' which requires a statement regarding the adequacy of design QA.)"

These conclusions by the perpetrator are of less value than the original conclusions derived by Cygna for their Phases 1 and 2 independent assessment. Cataloging of failures and cause is what is required. In the present plan, as has been the ongoing position of the Board, Applicants were to keep the Board advised of potentially 35

e significant matters relating to these proceedings /10/. But Applicants have chosen instead to proceed sub rosa.

47. Applicants stated (page 28, second Response, continued top of page 29):

"The quoted assertion is not quite an accurate statement of the Program Plan. We interpret ' glaring errors' to refer to 0A/0C documentation failing to record as 'unsat' installed hardware that did not conform to construction instructions.

So interpreted, the last sentence of the quoted concern would be accurate if it were modified to read 'if none of those visible things have safety significance where found oj; the potential'for being nafety significant if replicated elsewhere, you won't investigate the OA/0C process that led t:l j enem,' in which case it would be accurate. The reason why the Applicants believe this to be adequate is because, in those circumstances, the OA/0C failures would produce no information likely to affect a judgment about the present adequacy of the installed hardware. The ' visible things' not spotted would, by hypothesis, have to be unrelated to safety."

Applicants have problems understanding that it is the plant as it was presented for licensing which has been one of the thrusts of the hearings, not solely the revised plant which is the result of persistent actions by others and not by actions of Applicants.

48. Applicants stated (page 29, Response, first sentence):

"As stated during the pre-hearing conference, the CPRT has no concern about the present adequacy of installed protective coatings, because those coatings are not safety related. . ."

J

/10/ See, for example, Board's 10/20/81 Order; Tr. 119-124; Board's 1/4/83 Memorandum and Order, especially pages 4 through 6; Board's 9/1/83 Memorandum and Order (Motions to Reopen the Record and to Strike), page 2, Footnote 3.

36

The Applicants are sidestepping the issue, since coatings were safety related when they were applied, and management's role in the original violations must be documented. And at that point in time, they were in violation of Applicants' commitments. Therefore, the root cause and management's possible role in the original violation must be documented.

i i

49. Applicants stated (page 29, Response, second sentence through end of paragraph):

". . . However, the CPRT is concerned that the information available about QA/QC problems in the coatings area might lead to hardware deviations or deficiencies in other populations. There are two ways in which this concern is addressed. First, the Action Plan VII.c reinspections of other populations should detect the presence of deficiencies caused by such breakdowns, whether or not causally related to coatings. Second, the available information from the prior investigations and allegations regarding coatings was reviewed by the Quality of Construction Review Team Leader to determine whether it suggested areas of investigation not already covered by the Program Plan. The results of this assessment will be a part of the program output."

The Applicants' answer does not address the question raised by the Board.

50. Applicants stated (page 30, first Response): -

"The answer is yes: where a deficiency or adverse trend is found, the root cause of the deficiency or adverse trend will be investigated and, if possible, determined, including any ' management' failures that may be a part of the root cause. However, this does not mean that CPRT automatically assumes that ' management' is the root cause of all found deficiencies or adverse trends."

Apparently Applicants are attempting to establish the rules by which -

they will proceed.

37 l

51. Applicants stated (page 30, second Response):

"The portion of the quoted concerr that starts with

'therefore' is not accurate. The scope of the self-initiated investigations of construction and design is not determined by the nature or scope of the matters raised by others.

Moreover, because it is believed that that scope is already essentially all-inclusive (i.e., covers essentially 100% of the safety-related construction and design activities), it is not apparent how unexpressed concerns could cause the scope to be enlarged."

Since the route to a 100% reinspection was based on major rework required as a result of outside allegations, Applicants' attempt to assume the credit is devious at best.

52. Applicants stated (page 31, first Response, Footnote omitted):

"As stated above, the Applicants believe that its screen is fine enough to detect the phenomenon of concern, namely the sort of systematic combined failure of the construction and inspection process (or design and design reivew process) that would lead to deficiencies of a nature that would tend to prevent the facility from operating in conformance with NRC regulations. Such deficiencies would not be expected to be produced by random failures of parts of the process. They require, rather, a flaw of the nature of inadequate procedures, inadequate training or qualifications, or intentional conduct, of a nature capable of affecting multiple parts of the process. Such systematic weaknesses by definition tend to affect either the whole, or at least significant portions, of the items to which they are applied.

As a result, it is not necessary to assess each constituent of the population in order to detect the presence or absence of such a problem - and once detected, the pree nce or absence of such a problem - and once detected, the problem can then be further explored by additional means."

From this and previous statements, it is apparent that Applicants' program only addresses systematic problems. I do, however, agree with Applicants' assessment of systematic problems; that is, when 38

a errors become generic (to Comanche Peak), the cause lies beyond acceptable chance and lies in the wake of " inadequate procedures, inadequate training or qualifications, or intentional conduct." Having stated this, the problem trail itself is safety-significant and, by definition, so is each error which is a party to this trail.

53. Applicants stated (bottom of page 31, second Response, continued top of page 32):

"As is stated above, the CPRT investigations should detect precisely such failures in other populations, if they exist, whether or not causally related to the found weaknesses, which were systematic in nature, of the process employed in the construction and inspection of the fuel pool

] liner."

This non-answer is a position, not a proof.

1

54. Applicants stated (ptge 32, Response, middle of page):

" Action Plan I.a.4 was designed to test a specific hypothesis, which it did. Testing that hypothesis did not require looking at 'the possibility that the QA/QC supervisors let some items go by' beyond the extent to which this was, in fact, investigated (i.e., whether there was evidence of mislar.ded conductors that would result in circuits functioning improperly). For the purpose for which this stated concern is addressed, one should look to the re-inspections performed under Action Plan VII.c."

This is yet another of Applicants' non-answers. The fact that QC bought off incorrect landings is an error per sjt regardless of the effects.

I 39

55. Applicants stated (Response at bottom of page 32, continued top of page 33):

"The stated propositions are true for Action Plan I.a.4.

/15/. They are not true for the investigation of terminations in connection with the populations of cables being investigated under Action Plan VII.c.

"/15/ Except as noted in rote 12, supra."

We again have another non-answer without an evaluation of the QC position in the question.

56. Applicants stated (Response, bottom of page 33, first two sentences of first paragraph):

"It is true that the rolled leads discussed in the Results Report for Action Plan I.a.4 'did not correspond to the drawing 100 percent . . . .' It does not necessarily follow that, because conductors are found terminated differently than as shown on drawings when inspected today,

'therefore, the QA inspector passed something that did not correspond exactly to the drawings . . . .'"

The first comment to be made is in reference to the 100% statement.

The innuendo in the statement is that 100% accuracy is not required.

Further, QA/QC cannot deviate or allow deviation from procedures, codes, or other requirements due to their own conclusions. The fact that a particular deviation has no impact on function does not negate the fact that the deviation existed. The fact that this event was never questioned raises questions as to what Applicants have learned over the past four and a half years.

40

, e

57. Applicants stated (Response, bottom of page 33, second paragraph, continued top of page 34):

"The thrust of this question, however, is whether the greater the breakdown assumed, for any reason, to have occurred during implementation of the original acceptance inspection program, the less acceptable one must conclude that a sampling re-inspection program must be. Our position is that, for the reasons set forth supra at note 6, precisely the reverse is true. The function of the sampling program is

, to screen for the existence of evidence that a population may have been affected by the sort of systematic failures that are grounds for concern. If so, further investigative techniques are emplcyed. If the sampling re-inspection detects no evidence of such failures, however, the population is determined not to have been so affected. To hypothesize a greater breakdown in the historical programs is to diminish the potential that a population could be so affected and still pass the screen, for any such hypothesis necessarily means that the frequency of deficiencies would be higher and the potential for their detection by a sampling program correspondingly higher. The existence of two isolated cases of drawing non-conformance of no potential adversely to affect circuit function or safety does not in any respect suggest the inadequacy of a screen based on sampling."

While the fact that undetected deviations exist may not suggest inadequacy of sampling program, it also does not add to confidence in the implementation of the program and also allows room for questions.

58. Applicants stated (Response top of page 35, second paragraph, first

-three sentences):

"As is discussed above, if the construction process for something like Comanche Peak were perfect, then the QA/QC process would be moot. Similarly, if the design process plus either the construction process or the QA/QC process were perfect, then the testing process would be moot. In the real world, however, testing is another screen and a part of the overall process that leads to the determination that the facility has been designed and built such that it is capable of being operated in conformance with NRC regulations. . . ."

41

In the past, I recall hearing that CPSES was in conformity with all NRC regulations and codes because the Applicants stated it over and over again. The question is: Was the plant as originally offered for licensing in fact able to operate and could Applicants now prove the plant was in conformance with NRC commitments and regulations? If not, l

I believe such event to be, in and of itself, safety-significant. '

59. Applicants stated (Response, bottom of page 35, second paragraph continued top of page 36, first two sentences):

"Any failure of the hardware to conform to the drawings to which it was constructed is classified as a ' deviation' i for purposes of Action Plan VII.c. The deviation may be l classified as a ' deficiency' if it is ' safety significant,'

using the special definition of ' safety significance' contained in Appendix E. .. ."

What about non-safety significant deviations such as designs based on engineering judgement which even Applicants now know werg at best indeterminate? It is mindboggling to consider that with thousands of supports requiring modification and entire piping systems being overstressed (see preceding citation on Stone & Webster small bore report), Applicants refuse to admit that each error is a component of a

. mosaic which is a safety-significant breakdown. Therefore, no element of this mosaic is immune from criticism on the basis of Applicants' I

pleasure. Of more frightening consequence, the NRC Staff has accepted by acquiescense Applicants' position on this issue of deletion from consideration by declaring issues of error to be moot due to non-safety significance.

42

60. Applicants stated (top of page 36, continued from page 35, last sentence of top paragraph):

". . .The only deviations that would not be trended, therefore, are those that do not meet the definition of a possible adverse trend; trending of this class is not believed to be of any useful function."

The removal of many errors from consideration handicaps CASE's ef forts to catalog the various root causes that could explain why the initial and indeed the ongoing efforts to design and construct CPSES have failed to materialize. Beyond this, the finding of any number of diverse errors, while minor per se, would be significant in itself as will be more fully explained below. If most of the errors are dismissed under any guise, then the major safety-significant deficiency of CPSES -- incompetence -- may fell through the cracks.

61. Applicants stated (Response middle of page 36):

"As we pointed out in our responses to CASE's interrogatories (see ' Answers to CASE Document Requests and Interrogatories on Results Report I.a.4' filed June 5, 1986, at 15), the digit that was missing on the drawing employed for purposes of the re-inspections was not a digit required to identify the cable, and the omission was incapable of causing any ambiguity with respect to the cable intended to be referred to, a fact that is consistent with the fact that the proper conductor was in fact landed on the proper terminal (if one assumes that the digit was also missing on the copy of the drawing actually used for construction).

Regardless of where or how often replicated (and, in fact, in all the samples examined by CPRT and all the samples examined by the Staff, this is the only known occurrence of the missing digit), such an omission was incapable of affecting proper interpretation of the drawing (much less of affecting safety). An isolated discrepancy of this type is not pursued further."

43 I

t

O In 1983, Applicants spent a great deal of time describing their iterative nine-step program to detect errors and the effectiveness of such program.' Here is a case where error slipped through the cracks.

The importance of this error is primarily that it existed, as did another error on the mislanding of terminals. In both cases, effort was required to prove the error to be of less than major importance; therefore, it is up to the Applicants to chronicle what caused the error and its impact, and not dismiss the fact that the error existed in the first instance. Applicants' dismissal of error is analogous to cleaning up the remnants after a stack of dishes have been shattered and then stating that the accident itself never occurred.

62. Applicants stated (Response, bottom of page 37, continued top of page 38):

"The Applicants cannot agree with the first quoted sentence (assuming the reference was to Action Plan VII.c) because the term discrepancy is not used in Action Plan VII.c. Any case where there is a ' difference [] between the component and the drawing' is a deviation. Please also note that the terminology ' safety significant discrepancy' is a term not used in Action Plan VII.c and Program Plan Appendix E. It is, as is noted above, accurate that there is no investigation (or need therefor) of root cause of deviations that are neither deficiencies nor adverse trends."

It would appear that while Applicants find no significant importance in error (see above), they place a high degree of significance on semantics.

44

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63. Applicants stated (Response, just above middle of page 38):

"Under Action Plan VII.c, there is nothing other than deviations and deficiencies."

By Applicants' procedures, many deviations get laundered out due to the semantic detergent or, in the case of deficiencies, by preemption by Applicants.

64. Applicants stated (Responne bottom of page 38, second paragraph, last sentence):

". . . In other cases, the Applicants believe that such information would be of little or no value in determining whether there is reasonable assurance that the final design of the facility is free.of undetected and uncorrected safety significant deficiencies that would prevent it from operating in conformance with NRC regulations."

If Applicants.see a dichotomy in error such that only errors that have obvious major impact on the safe operation of the plant are of consequence, it is possible that a large number of non-obvious safety errors could slip through. Since the reinspection is managed by those who initially built the plant, the entire matrix of errors is required to formulate the areas of weakness intrinsic in Applicants' program.

65. Applicants stated (Response, page 39, third paragraph, last sentence):

". . . It is not, however, the intention of CPRT to approve flawed assessments of root cause."

It should be the intent of the CPRT progran also to ensure that the root cause is not skewed.

45

M

66. Applicants stated (Response, top of page 40):

"As is described more fully above, the Applicants do not concur with this statement. A review of a sample of the (relatively sr.all) populations constituting each Homogeneous Design Activity (HDA) is sufficient to determine whether any cause of deficiencies in other HDAs also caused

-discrepancies in the HDA of interest. A review of 100% of l the members of an HDA may, of course, be required if a deficiency or adverse trend were detected in the HDA. The validity of sampling as a screen is not sensitive to assumptions or conclusions about the existence of deficiencies in the population or the process by which it was created. See note 6, supra." l This is a prime example of my point at item 16 preceding. A single component of any program is not sensitized to answer all questions which the total program is supposedly designed to cover.

67. Applicants stated (Response, bottom of page 40, first paragraph):

"If the question is whether the intervenor might have the opportunity to attempt to prove that the CPRT's determination of the root cause of a given deficiency is something other than what CPRT has determined, we assume that the answer is yes. If the question is whether ' management' is a potential root cause of deficiencies, the question cannot be answered without some definition of ' management' and probably also some specification of context; nonetheless, the Applicants can state that nothing has been categorically excluded from consideration as a possible root cause. Please

, see our reponse supra to the concern at T1 24437-38."

While Applicants have ber- under Staff orders which the Board also apparently supports (as is evidenced by the concerns covered by Applicants' 12/1/86 Response to Board Concerns) to look into root cause, generic implications, and management's role, Applicants at this late point now state that they don't know who the management is.

46

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68. Applicants stated (Response, bottom of page 40, second paragraph continued top of page 41):

"However, we believe that the way this question has been framed, what the Board has described as 'Y' is not a root cause of any deficiency, which means that which caused the deficiency to come into existence.- Rather, what the Board has defined as 'Y' is the reason why deficiencies, produced -

by some other root cause, were not previously detected in some fashion (in this case, by ' management'). That issue does not go to the tracing of the causes of inadequate design or construction for the purpose of giving confidence that other deficiencies produced by those causes have been detected. There is a difference between root cause and ultimate responsibility; pursuit of the latter will not detect heretofore undetected deficiencies."

In fact, problems may exist due to multiple root causes; for example, management may not have the ability to determine the qualification of the personnel under their direction, and the personnel under their direction may be incompetent, leading to the defective designs.

It is not necessarily the low man on the totem pole who actually deviates from criteria who is the ultimate cause, but it is rather those who place the incompetent in the position of responsibility and then ensure his position by creating the atmosphere of "go along to get i

along" while turning a deaf ear to criticism.

69. Applicants stated (Response just above center of page 42, second sentence):

". . . In addition, in the case of desien deviations, definition of a corrective action by the CPSES Project and CPRT concurrance therein is a requirement."

This statement does not address the issues of root cause for design or if those root causes are to be addressed. Even by Applicants' 47

d criteria, safety-significant items must be subject to'a root cause analysis if a deficiency occurs. This would, as a matter of rational definition, require root cause analysis for all safety-related components which exhibit deviations.

70. Applicants stated (Response bottom of page 43, second paragraph, first sentence):

"If the Board meant ' inspection documents' to mean the record of the original QA/QC acceptance inspection, this will be identified only as a result of root cause investigations and, therefore, only in the case of deficiencies or adverse trends."

If errors are detected which form any trend, no matter how minor, it is adverse per s3L. A trend of error cannot be otherwise.

71. Applicants stated (Response middle of page 45):

"This characterization of 'the definition of the CPRT[s']

scope' is wrong. The scope of CPRT is not limited to matters within the set of External Source issues. The quoted assertion ignores the so-called self-initiated studies, both in construction and design."

If Applicants consider the reinspection to preclude all consideration of pre-1985 problems, the fact that self-initiated studies exist is of little consequence on the overall mission of the CPRT since their effort is flawed per sjt. This is based on the fact that Applicants would like to dodge the explanations required for the massive defense in these proceedings of a flawed plant.

l 48

1 1

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72. Applicants stated (page 46, Statement, through third pararaph of Response, and second full paragraph on page 47):

" Statement:

"[During the implementation of Action Plan I.a.4, things] were marked ['U]nsatisfactory['] by somebody. And then later, they stopped calling it ['] unsatisfactory ['), but they marked it as something else."

" Response:

"This assertion is false.

" Attached is a list of all the places where a report of

'Unsat' was returned by the inspectors performing the re-inspections. They aggrregate 31.

"One set of 'Unsats' involved those conductors designated as spatas, i.e., that were not intended to be landed on any terminal. In a number of cases, the conductor designated as

' spare' was observed not to exit from the enclosed wireway containing the cable and therefore the end of the conductor was not visible to the inspector. In these cases, the inspector returned a report of 'Unsat' with the notation of either ' unable to locate' or 'inside wireway.' These conductors were removed from the sample as a matter of conservatism and to avoid any argument that since the 1 inspector couldn't actually see the end of the conductor, they shouldn't be counted. In reality, the fact that the conductor did not exit the wireway is proof positive that the conductor was not landed to any terminal and, therefore, that it was not mislanded (these being designated spares). This set accounts for 17 of the unsats. .. ."

". . . In three cases, the 'Unsat' was returned with the notation 'No tag.' (Tagging of the cable was an inspection attribute (for identification purposes) for Action Plan I.a.4 tho"sh not relevant to the acceptance criteria.) In each case, the conductor was a designated spare, which is not required to be tagged. This accounted for three of the

'Unsats.'. . ."

The statement is not false. The items were marked unsat and later were removed from the samples which, in effect, precluded the unsat condition. In addition, Applicants state that the removal of these 49

g items from consideration was conservative. The fact that such statement is absurd is self-evident, since it removed an unsat

. condition even though it expanded the sample. The removal was a matter of expediency, not conservatism, because these items could not have been counted as part of an active sample without raising the error ratio of such sample. Also, in the second statement by Applicants, it appears that the unsat tag was changed to "something else"; for example, "the Unsat was returned with the notation 'No tag;'" "the conductor was a' designated spare, which is not required to be tagged."

73. Applicants stated (Response, page 48, first two paragraphs, and third

. sentence of third paragraph):

"In context we read this as asserting that the described events occurred and were detected during the implementation-of I.a.4. The assertion is false.

"Of all the 'Unsats' observed during the implementation of Action Plan I.a.4, only two instances occurred where somet'hing appeared to have been done improperly. One was the missing digit on the drawing described above. The second involved an anomaly in the number appearing on the tag attached to a cable (which inspectors were instructed to verify even though tagging was not associated either with the TRT issue or with the acceptance criteria for the Action Plan).. In this case, a cable prefix appeared to read 'EC' rather than 'EG.' Given that 'EC' is not a valid prefix, as well as that the prefix is not necessary for cable identification, this error (if in fact an. error was made) was truly minor. . . ."

". . . In the case of the drawing error, it was and is our opinion that the error was minor, probably not the result of any incorrect judgment on the part of anyone, and not of a potential to mislead or miscommunicate. . . ."

The statement in the first paragraph by Applicants, "The assertion is false," is incompatible, especially in view of the contents of the last 50 i

__ _ . . - . ~ - - . . . - , , _ - _ . _ , _ _ _ , _ - - , - - _ _ , _ . _ _ . . . . . - - - - - . . _ _ _ - _ , . . . - - ._. -

O 8

statement above which dismisses such irregularities with the comment "this error . . . was truly minor."

74. Applicants stated (Response top of page 51):

"The assertion that appears to be made by this statement is that ability to identify the potential root cause of deficiencies is required in order to have assurance that the deficiencies will be detected; further, that in the hypothesized case of an inherently undetectable root cause any deficiencies attributable to that root cause will escape detection. The assertion is erroneous because the power of the CPRT program to detect deficiencies is not dependent upon one's ability to hypothesize or identify root cause. Please see 'The Difference Between Process Reviews and Product Reviews,' supra."

Applicants read one question but actually answered a question of their own construction. The question was relative to the fact that some of management personnel have the ability to direct CPRT activities without accountability. On this point, Applicants have consistently displayed a reluctance to be candid; that is, whenever management's role is questioned. See also answers to items 22 and 25.

75. Applicants stated (second Response on page 51):

"Please see our responses to the previous concern and to the following concern."

Also please see our answer to items 22 and 25.

76. Applicants' stated (first paragraph, top of page 52):

" Persons hired by SWEC to work on the piping and pipe support design effort who were previously employed by NPS are working to SWEC procedures, as concurred in by the CPRT (third party), and under the direct supervision of SWEC line supervisors and higher levels of SWEC management. The products produced by SWEC are subjected to the SWEC quality assurance procedures, and will also be subject to oversight by the CPRT (as set forth in DSAP IX). For these reasons, 51

l the Applicants believe that the number of previous NPS employees, whether many or few, is irrelevant to the ability of the SRT to accomplish the tasks set forth in DSAP IX."

It may be noted that we believe, and as a result of the expansion of the CPRT effort feel corroborated, that these people couldn't follow the original procedures and therefore we have no assurance that they could follow another set of procedures. See also our response in item Nos. 22 and 25.

77. Although not contained in a specific statement in Applicants' Response but related to their mindset, Applicants' position before the Board on the numerous errors in design and engineering of pipe supports at CPSES is legendary. But in many cases, their defense is not only debatable, it is highly questionable. One striking example of this can be found in Appendix B of " Civil / Structural Generic Issues Report," 11/20/86, by Stone & Webster /11/. Among the deficiencies listed are several which CASE pointed out early in these hearings and which Applicants have made at least two attempts to justify. However, Stone & Webster apparently concurs with CASE; quoting specifically from page B-2, under 1.2, item (A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations, are the following:

General concern on lack of accident temperature design for structural nembers

". Thermal design of concrete wall in vicinity of upper and lower lateral restraint for concurrent maximum change in temperature would exceed concrete allowable stress limits

/11/ Portions of which are attached for the Board's convenience to the 12/30/86 letter to the Board from CASE's Mrs. Ellis, under subject of:

Potentially Significant Items, being sent the same date as this pleading.

52

c W

". Material substitutions were made for the upper lateral restraint which were not addressed in the modeling of its interface with the supporting shield wall

". Shield wall needs to be evaluated for lateral movement of restraint beam during LOCA

". Upper and Lower Lateral Restraint Beams inadequately designed

". The use of 450 psi for the tensile strength of concrete may not be conservative" From these findings of Stone & Webster, it appears that at a minimum the upper lateral restraint and shield walls are still exhibiting an area of distress which is open to question. Further, it appears to me that this is another instance when Applicants should have immediately informed the Board of this new potentially significant information A*bich affects not only Applicants' attempts to justify, but also affects the confirmation by Brookhaven (NRC Staff consultant) of Applicants' procedures. As I recall it, Brookhaven proceeded on the same assumptions I did (i.e., that all parameters were as stated).

i In conclusion:

From Applicants' filing, several factors emerge which demonstrate Applicants' thinking and their position:

1. Root cause will be pursued at Applicants' convenience.

2. Applicants have devised a number of buzz words designed to eliminate errors from serious consideration (for example: (1) prudency; (2) latest industry practice; (3) safety significance; etc.) -- all of which are defined by Applicants alone.

53

7 8

3. Applicants have no intention of complying with mootness criteria established by the Licensing Board.

4. Applicants are not pursuing non-systematic errors with enthusiasm (to say the least).

5. Applicants consider themselves as sole arbitor of what is to be considered for obtaining an operating license.

6. Applicants consider 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, to be (at best) a nuisance (see quote by Applicants at 35).

7. CASE and indeed even the Board shall not query Applicants until Applicants state that the time is ripe.

8. Applicants appear to be trying to overwhelm by purposely complicating the content of their reply, as may be noted in Applicants' pomposity in this, their Answer to the Board's Concerns.

9. From the day Applicants started to pursue the development of a complex to produce energy from twin nuclear reactors at CPSES, they were under a handicap due to a lack of understanding of the requirements of Congress as expressed in the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and codified by i the NRC in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendices A and B, as is more obvious from the above.

10. Applicants have had their minds made up and do not wish to be confused by the introduction of facts; and among these facts are how extensive were the errors incorporated in safety-related components at CPSES?

11. By Applicants' statements and actions, one receives the message i 1

that of the vast number of errors found in safety-related components, the 1

54

o

'de.

o only responsibility or cause lies with those who created the problems, and once these components are modified or replaced, a blanket pardon is bestowed by Applicants which effectively erases the fact that the error occurred.

12. The introduction of the vast catalog of designer words by Applicants must be viewed with skepticism. These words are being defined by Applicants and the result of.their choice of definition is erosion of their 4

own culpability for all which has occurred in the plant and before the Board to date. With Applicants' track record for lack of candor, such definitions

, must be viewed in the light of reality and equity, with the safety of CPSES as 'the paramount objective. See also item 77 preceding.

13. Applicants' position before the Board on the numerous errors in

-design.and engineering of pipe supports at CPSES is not only debatable, it is highly questionable. One striking example of this is contained in

" Civil / Structural Generic Issues Report," 11/20/86, by Stone & Webster; from the findings of Stone & Webster, it appears that at a minimum the upper lateral restraint and shield walls are still exhibiting an area of distress i

which is open to question. Further, this appears to be yet another instance

i. of Applicants' lack of candor which affects not only Applicants' attempts t

] justify, but also affects the confirmation of the NRC Staff consultant of

' Applicants' procedures regarding this matter. See item 77 preceding.

14. If Applicants' position is as set forth in their 12/1/86 Response to Board Concerns, they do not have a program equivalent to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B (or,- for that matter, to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A).

55

o I have read the foregoing affidavit, which was prepared under my personal direction, and it is true and correct to the best of iny knowledge and belief.

/~ l..'n ' (, h hLt N (Signed) / /

Date: by . FC, /QE6 STATE OFDD<2u..ci%cIIc ?

COUNTY OF d<nha80 On this, the 36 day of d / <4'ireiri,198h personally appeared fn 0 d.' . . /[a,/$ , known to me to be the person whose

// Cl name is subs / to the foregoing-instrument, and acknowledged to me that cribed he executed the same for the purposes therein expressed. ..

Subscribed and sworn before me on the el4 day of /[S' e rm dn e ,

198 [ .

[(l, ?( .

d . /)L [

Notary Public in and for the State of ) R . ow K..~ G L'l My Commission Expires: MY COMMISSION EXPlRES MARCH12,1933

9 'd CASE ATTACHMENT 1 N UTOLG7 DES CENERATING CO.

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION

/ *'4,.

.a >

tjgg g SMALL BORE PIPlNG AND PlPE SUPPORTS GENERIC ISSUES REPORT STONE & WEBSTER

2 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - UNIT 1 SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORT GENERIC ISSUES REPORT 1.0 INTF0 DUCTION This Generic Issues Report for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) Unit 1 Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports describes the method, scope, and responsibilities for resolving the CPRT design adequacy issues for small bore piping and supports. The objective is to demonstrate a licensable design in accordance with the CPSES FSAR and other licensing criteria.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) has been retained by Texas Utilities Generating Company (TUGCO) to requalify all the ASME Class 2 and 3 piping and ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 pipe supports for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) - Units 1 and 2. The requalification pro-cess for Unit I small bore piping (2 in. nominal pipe size and smaller) within this program was originally specified in the SWEC Project Proce-dure CPPP-15, Revision 0 (Reference 5.1). All the small bore piping and supports that are included in the Class 1, 2, and 3 large bore stress ,

problem boundaries are requalified by complete reanalysis. High-energy piping requiring pipe break postulation and the piping subjected to sig-nificant fluid transients are requalified by complete reanalysis, while all the other small bore piping and supports were to be requalified on a sampling basis.

A sample of small bore pipe stress problems of Unit I was selected. This sample encompassed the applicable attributes in CPPP-15 and resulted in a sample size of 122 piping isometrics (grouped into 50 stress problems) from a total population of 732 isometrics (16 percent). Scope, method, results, conclusions, and recommendations of the pipe stress and support reanalysis of this sample are presented in Attachment A.

4 This sample was reanalyzed to meet the requirements in SWEC Project Procedure CPPP-7 (Design Criteria, Reference 5.2) and CPPP-6 (Unit 1 Requalification Procedure, Reference 5.3). The results of SWEC evalua-tion of the Unit 1 sample have also identified some generic issues that affected the stress levels and loads on the small bore piping and sup-ports. As a result of the sampling evaluation, it was recommended to TUGC0 that all Unit I small bore piping and pipe supports be reanalyzed and requalified.

This report and its appendixes summarize SWEC's resolution of each issue and identify specific sections of the pertinent project procedures that incorporate the resolutions.

< 3.0 SCOPE The corrective action to be implemented consists of the small bore piping and pipe support generic issues as well as generic issues for large bore

- 0045-1545405-HC4 1

I l

l J.0. No. 15454.25 ATTACHMENT A I

I RESULT OF CPSES UNIT 1 I SMALL BORE PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORT SAW LING EVALUATION I

TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COWANY (TUGCO)

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 1 f .

I I

I I

I I

I lI 1

I I

l Page 1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

I The Unit I small bore class 2 and 3 piping an1 pipe supports not subjected to 1

l complete reanalysis were intended to be requalified on a sampling basis as indi- '

cated in paragraph 2.7 of Project Procedure CPPP-15. The purpose of this report

, I is to summarize the sampling evaluation results and to propose recommendations  ;

for the requalification of the small bore piping and pipe supports.

2.0 SCOPE 2.1 PIPE STRESS A sample of 50 stress problems was selected on an engineering basis such that i

the stress problems encompassed the attributes listed in Attachment 1. This

! selection resulted in a sample size of 122 isometrics from a total population j of 732 isometrics (16%). See Attachment 3.

2.2 PIPE SUPPORTS A minimum of four pipe supports, or 10% of the number of supports, whichever was greater, from each stmss problem selected above, wem selected for evaluation.

The pipe supports that appeared to be the most highly stressed, and those that I encompass the attributes listed in Attachment 2, were selected. This selection resulted in a sample size of 270 supports from a population of 6428 supports (4%). See Attachment 3.

3.0 METHOD The pipe stress and pipe support mqualification effort was perfomed in acconiance l with the technical requirements contained in Project Procedum CPPP-7, including snubber optimization.

4.0

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS 4.1 PIPE STRESS RESULTS I Twenty nine of the 50 selected stress problems experienced some fom of overstres-sed condition. The stress problems that exceeded allowable stresses can be cate-gorized as follows: (1) piping containing M-Rigid type supports, (2) piping con-I taining Class 5 continuation piping, (3) piping where support mass contribution is a factor, (4) piping connected to vendor piping, (5) piping that is subjected i to diffemntial building displacements, and (6) piping containing supports with stiffness values less than the generic values specified in Project Procedure CPPP-7 (See Attachment 4 and 5). Generally, the overstressed conditions can be attributed to differences in methodology between the design criteria used by the previous design group and the design criteria as specified in Project Procedure CPPP-7. The details of each of the above categories are described in the following sections.

4.1.1 PIPING niHICH CONTAINS M-RIGID TYPE SUPPORTS The stress problems containing M-Rigid type supports generally failed due to equipment nozzle overload. Nine of 22 stress problems failed due to this attri-bute.

In the previous analysis, M-Rigid type supports were modeled as non-active j

, restraints for themal analysis. However, when these supports are modeled as '

rigid restraints per CPPP-7, the 1 i

I t l Page 2 piping is restrained resulting in an increase of the loads on the adjacent equip-ment nozzles due to equipment displacements and thermal expansion of the piping.

See Attachment 6. .

4.1.2 PIPING THAT CONTAINS CLASS 5 CONTINUATION PIPING Seven of 21 stress problems containing Class 5 continuation piping were overstres-sed due to the effects of the Class 5 piping on the ASME portion of the stress problem. In the previous design, there are generally only two seismically designed supports in each direction on the Class 5 piping beyond the ASE class break.

I This upporting configuration is usually not consistent with SWEC procedures for isolating the ASME piping from the effects of a postulated failure of the Class 5 piping. See Attachment 7.

4.1.3 PIPING CONNECTED TO VENDOR PIPING f Similar to the condition described above, when vendor piping that extends beyond l the pipe stress problem boundary is considered in the analysis for its effect  !

on the ASE piping within the problem boundary, the ASME piping becomes overstres-sed due to the thermal displacement of the equipment and associated vendor piping.

One stress problem was evaluated for this attribute.

, 4.1.4 BUILDING DISPLACEENTS Three of 11 stress problems were overstmssed due to the effects of differential ,

building displacements. When the 08EA values are combined per CPPP-7 and included into the stress analysis, overstressed conditions occur in situations where the piping is supported from structure in different buildings. See Attachment 8.

4.1.5 PIPING CONTAINING SUPPORTS WITH LOW STIFFNESS The stiffness values for some pipe supports were deter 1 mined to be lower than the generic values. When the piping associated with these supports was reanalyzed using the criteria in CPPP-7, the piping was overstressed, generally in the vicin-ity of concentrated masses. Four of 50 stress problems were overstressed due to this attribute. See Attachment 9 for example.

4.1.6 PIPE SUPPORT MASS CONTRIB TION When the pipe support mass contribution was considered in the stress analysis ,

in accordance with CPPP-7, the additional weight caused the piping to be over- i stressed and to exceed nozzle allowables. Three of 31 stress problems failed

' due to this attribute. See Attachment 10 for example.

4.1.7 NISCELLANEOUS CONCERNS In addition to the items discussed above there are other miscellaneous areas i of concern. These items are described below.

4.1. 7.1 CONCENTRATED WEIGHT One case was identified where the piping was overstressed due to a concentrated weight on 3/8" tubing. This situation appears to be isolated. l

,,em. - - - - - , . . - - - - ,-,nn.,,-,~,_w-_.nn~__. . . , , - _,,-,,-,,,,.,.n,,-- - - -- - - - - - - - - , ---,.. --- -- , ~ , - - - - - - - - - - - -

Page 3 4.1.7.2 MODES OF OPERATION The modes of operation have not been developed for the isometrics within the sampling effort. In the absence of this information SWEC used either the TUGC0 I line designation list or used the values provided for the corresponding Unit 2 lir.e. In one situatiu.1 the temperature used in the analysis caused the movements to exceed the allowable movements for the elastomer seal. The modes of operation used in the analysis were as specified in the thermal mode sketch for the associ-ated large bore stress problem.

4.1.7.3 SOURCE PIPE MOVEENTS Another attribute that resulted in overstressed conditions is the effect of the large bore source pipe movements. In some cases the small bore piping is rigidly I supported relatively close to the connection to the large bore line. Consequently, when the large bore movements are considered in the stress analysis the small bom line becomes overstressed due to the lack of flexibility of the small bore piping configuration.

l 4.2 PIPE SUPPORTS RESULTS There are 270 pipe supports within the scope of the sampling effort. There are 128 supports that are associated with the stress problems that were overstressed.

Since these stress problems were overstressed, the pipe support loads derived from these analyses wem not considered appropriate. Thus, the pipe supports l associated with these stress problems were excluded from the sampling effort.

Consequently.142 supports were evaluated. Thirty five of the 142 pipe supports did not meet the acceptance criteria based on the specified geometry depicted i

I on the support drawings. However, 28 of these 35 supports were qualified based upon field verification of the installed conditions. The other seven supports require physical modification (See Attachment 11). The attributes associated I with the 35 pipe supports requiring physical modification or field verification i of the installed condition can be categorized as follows: (1) weld length of l 2-sided welds, (2) embedment length of anchor bolts, (3) member lengths, (4) snubber and strut orientation. (5) anchor bolt location on base plates, (6) pipe l

l movement in the unrestrained direction, and (7) component capacity.

1 i

4.2.1 WELD LENGTH OF 2 SIDED WELDS Fifteen of 76 pipe supports, containing members welded on 2-sides only exceeded the allowable stresses for the weld specified on the support drawing when analyzed I in accordance with Project Procedure CPPP-7. All fifteen cases were inspected by pipe support engineers and were found to contain sufficient weld length to qualify the supports.

4.2.2 ANCHOR BOLT EMBEDMENT LENGTH Eleven cases were identified where anchor bolt loads exceeded allowables per I the CPPP-7 design criteria. Ten of these supports were qualified based upon field inspection of the actual embedment length by the support engineer. One support requires physical modification.

I I

I Page 4 4.2.3 HEMBER LENGTH Many of the currently issued pipe support drawings specify a maximum dimension instead of an actual dimension for pipe support member length. In five cases I l the pipe supports exceeded allowable stress when using the maximum dimension )

specified on the support drawing. However, all five of these supports were quali-  !

fied based upon field inspection by the engineer.

l 4.2.4 ANCHOR BOLT LOCATION Anchor bolts on the support drawings are located with minimum and maximum dimension with respect to the base plate. In ten cases the anchor bolts exceeded allowables when the worst combination of anchor bolt location dimension were used when qualifying the support. All 10 of these supports were qualified based upon field inspection l by the engineer.

4.2.5 ORIENTATION The orientation of ' struts and snubbers are currently assumed to be within 2 degrees of the angle specified in the pipe support drawing. In seven cases the pipe I movement from the cold to hot position would cause the snubber paddle end to bind in the rear bracket, (exceed the'5 degree allowable), unless the support is installed to accommodate this movement. Field verification of the actual installed angle of the support was used to qualify these pipe supports. Four I supports however, require adjustment.

4.2.6 PIPE MOVEMENT IN THE UNRESTRAINED DIktCTION In one case, the pipe movement in the unrestrained direction of the support exce-eded the space provided by the support member. Physical modification is requimd

I to qualify this support.

4.2.7 COMPONENT CAPACITY i

Using the loads derived from the SWEC analysis, the load on one snubber exceeded the rated load supplied by the vendor. A physical modification is required to qualify this support.

5.0 _ CONCLUSION The results of the sampling effort for the requalification of the Unit 1 small l bore Class 2 and 3 piping and supports indicate that additional stmss analysis and pipe support requalification is required.

6.0 RECOMENDATIONS The Unit I small bore piping and pipe supports can be requalified by evaluating I and reanalyzing, as required, only those isometrics and supports which contain attributes that caused overstressed conditions. However, this approach would require reanalysis for approximately 500 of the 600 remaining isometrics (See Attachment 4). Further evaluation and justification would have to be provided l for the remaining 100 isometrics not reanalyzed. SWEC believes that it may not be cost effective nor timely to pursue further evaluation and justification for I .

--.-,.m.___ _ - . , _ . - . _ . , - - - . _ . , , , - . - , - _ . , . _ - . . . - - - _ - - - _ _ . , . . - , , , _ _ . , -- - , - _ , , _ , _ _ _ , . _ . _ - _ _ _ , . , , - - , - ~ _ - - - - - - ,

I Page 5 these 100 remaining isometrics and therefore recommends that all of the Unit l 1 small bore Class 2 and 3 piping be reanalyzed and requalified. The requalifi-cation effort described above includes the piping not currently subjected to 100% reanalysis. Consequently, the sampling effort and the evaluation of the I decoupled piping and the piping affected by the addition of clamp anchors shall be discontinued as currently described in paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 of CPPP-15 and be requalified on a 100% basis.

1 7.0 REQUALIFICATION PLAN 7.1 GENERAL APPROACH l

The isometrics shall be reviewed to define proper stress problem boundaries.

Once stress problem boundaries are defined, the piping shall be qualified in I accordance with the technical requirements described in Project Procedum CPPP-7.

7.2 STRESS PROBLEMS CONTAINING M-RIGID TYPE SUPPORTS (Attachment 12)

I M-Rigid type supports will be modeled as rigid supports in accordance with CPPP-7 and qualifien using the simplified method described in PM-56 where practical, l or by computer analysis. The nozzle loads resulting from this analysis will I be compared to the existing vendor nozzle allowables. If the allowable nozzle load is exceeded, new nozzle allowables can be obtained.

l 7.3 _ STRESS PROBLEMS CONTAINING CLASS 5 CONTINUATION (Attachment 13)

Stress problems containing Class 5 Continuation piping will be reviewed to deter-mine if the stress problem boundary can be extended to nearby equipment or large l bore piping. If this is feasible, the pipe supports within the new problem bound-ary will be seismically qualified. If this option is not feasible, the stress problem will be reviewed to detemine if the pipe supports beyond the existing i

I problem boundary can be qualified seismically to develop an equivalent anchor.

If these approaches do not work, a clamp anchor shall be added to the piping to teminate the stress problem.

7.4 EQUIPMENT N0ZZLE ALLOWABLES As stated in paragraph 5.1.1 the stress problems associated with M-Rigid type l supports generally failed due to equipment nozzle overload. Since nozzle allow-ables can generally be increased, it is necessary to develop a program to calculate nozzle allowables currently provided by the vendor. This would pemit SWEC to I qualify some stress problems without requiring costly construction modifications and permit the requalification effort to proceed in a timely manner since vendor concurrence for nozzle loads would not be necessary.

7.5 TYPICAL SUPPORTS Typical pipe supports shall be qualified on a generic basis where feasible.

I These supports can be qualified on a " Load comparison" basis by comparing the loads derived from the SWEC analysis to the capacity of the typical support as defined in tic SWEC generic calculations. There are approximately 1000 typical I supports that can be qualified in this manner. See Attachment 14.

7.6 OTHER SUPPORTS

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CASE ATTACINENT 2 TEXAS UTOLOTOES GENERATING CO.

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION

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7im cp PlPING AND PIPE SUPPORT l REQU ALIFIC ATION PROGR AM ,

UNIT 1 L'ARGE BORE PIPING FINAL REPORT i

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l STONE & WEBSTER

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-- J.O.No. 15454.05-N(C)-008 Job Book R4.8

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a PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORT REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM CPSES - UNIT 1 LARGE BORE PIPING FINAL REPORT TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)

November 7, 1986 t

/

g; _ _ _ -

R. R. Wrucke, Project Engineer R. P. Klause, Project Manager l

I l

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The implementation of the resolution methodology of external source tech-nical issues, compounded by the expanded criteria of NUREG-0800 and support optimization, required many pipe support modifications. In order to identify the primary cause of support modification, the major contrib-uting factors for the modification were categorized as follows:

1. Prudent - Because the iterative nature of the analysis and as-sociated costs, physical modification is more expedient than analytical justification.

2. Recent Industry Practice - Modification to eliminate snubbers to enhance plant maintainability, reduce inservice inspection, and minimize worker exposure.

3. Adjustment - Modification such as retorquing, realigning, or shimming.

4. Cumulative Effects - Modifications due to the combined effect of the multiple issues.

Table 6.2.3 sunnarizes the categorization and number of Unit I large bore I pipe support modifications in each category to date (October 31, 1986).

This table also contains description of the types of modifications by these categories.

The extent of plant modifications resulting from this requalification program is of a magnitude that has been determined by TUGC0 to be poten-tially reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). TUGC0 reported '

to the NRC the large bore piping modifications in the Significant Devia-tion Analysis Report SDAR-CP-86-36 (Reference 22) . Periodic status re-ports are submitted to the NRC describing the continuing evaluation and I the extent of the modifications that are being made.

6.2.4 Final Reconciliation The purpose of final reconciliation is to reconcile and resolve any re-maining pipe stress reanalysis results, such as the pending detailed analysis for IWAs and interfacing requirements (nozzle loads, valve ac-I celerations, etc). Final reconciliation is the last step of the stress analysis process to be conducted. This step follows the completion of revised as-built info rmation reflecting as-analyzed problem boundaries E and the revised pipe support configurations as dictated by either the stress analysis or by support modifications necessa ry to meet the requalification requirements.

I Final concurrence and/or resolution of stress results and pipe support reactions at structural / vendor interface also is accomplished during this phase.

The final clearance walkdown, Hardware Validation Program (Reference 13) g results, and removal of all " Confirmation Required" items from the pipe g stress and pipe support calculations to incorporate CPPP-7, Revision 3, amendments are accomplished during this phase. The majority of the NRC staff positions in supplementary safety evaluation reports (SSERs) will 2018F-1545405-HC4 6-13

C A S E == '

(CITIZENS ASSN. FOR SOUND ENERGY)

December 30, 1986 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

In the Matter of Application of Texas Utilities Electric Company, et al. for An Operating License for Comancne Peak Steam Electric Station Units #1 and #2 (CPSES)

Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446 CASE's 12/30/86 Partial Response to Applicants' 12/1/86 Response to Board Concerns.

Attached is the signed and notarized affidavit of CASE Witness Jack Doyle, which

. is attached to subject pleading.

Thank you.

Respectfully submitted, CASE (Citizens Association for Sound. Energy)

I

& Y~

s.) Juanita Ellis resident cc: Service List Attachment 1

i 1

r-q l

y 4 ,

COUETED uwc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFILt t -L 4 l BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 80ChEijtg L]ji 8 N.I.

In the Matter of }{

}{

TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC }{ Docket Nos. 50-445 COMPANY, et al. }{ and 50-446 (Comanche PUklteam Electric }{

Station, Units 1 and 2) }{

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE By my signature below, I hereby certify that true and correct copies of -

CASE's Partial Response to Applicants' 12/1/86 Response to Board Concerns have been sent to the names listed below this 30th day of December ,198J, by: Express Mail where indicated by

• and First Class Mail elsewhere.

Administrative Judge Peter B. Bloch N'.cholas S. Reynolds, Esq.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell Atomic Safety & Licensing Board & Reynolds Washington, D. C. 20555 1200 - 17th St., N. W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Judge Elizabeth B. Johnson Oak Ridge National Laboratory Geary S. Mizuno, Esq.

P. O. Box X, Building 3500 Office of Executive Legal Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom Commission 1107 West Knapp Street Washington, D. C. 20555 Stillwater, Oklahoma 74075 Dr. Walter H. Jordan Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Carib Terrace Board Panel 552 North Ocean Boulevard U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Pompano Beach, Florida 33062 Washington, D. C. 20555 1

r ma Chairman Renea Hicks, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Assistant Attorney General Board Panel Environmental Protection Division U. S. Nr Regulatory Consission Supreme Court Building Washington. . C. 20555 Austin, Texas 78711 Mr. Robert Martin Anthony Z. Roissan, Esq.

Regional Administrator, Region IV Trial Lawyers for Public Justice U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2000 P Street, N. W., Suite 611 611 Ryan Plaza Dr., Suite 1000 Washington, D. C. 20036 Arlington, Texas 76011 Mr. Herman Alderman Lanny A. Sinkin Staff Engineer l Christic Institute Advisory Committee for Reactor 1324 North Capitol Street Safeguards (MS H-1016)

Washington, D. C. 20002 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Dr. David H. Boltz 2012 S. Polk Dallas, Texas 75224 Robert A. Wooldridge, Esq.

Worsham, Forsythe, Sampels William Counsil, Vice President & Wooldridge Texas Utilities Generating Company 2001 Bryan Tower, Suite 3200 Skyway Tower Dallas, Texas 75201 400 North Olive St., L.B. 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esq.

Ropes & Gray I Docketing and Service Section 225 Franklin Street (3 copies) Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Office of the Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. Nancy H. Williams Washington, D. C. 20555 Project Manager Cygna Energy Services Ma. Billie P. Garde 101 California Street, Suite 1000 Government Accountability Project San Francisco, California Midwest Office 94111-5894 3424 N. Marcos Lane Appleton, Wisconsin 54911 Mark D. Nozette, Counselor at Law Roy P. Lessy, Jr., Esq. Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell Wright & Talisman, P. C. 1025 Thomas Jefferson Street, N. W.,

1050 Seventeenth St., N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D. C. 20036-5566 Washington, D. C. 20007 DmW Aful ?

p s.) Juanita Ellis,' President

~ ~

' CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy) 1426 S. Polk Dallas, Texas 75224 4 214/946-9446 2

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