ML20212A555
| ML20212A555 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1986 |
| From: | Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212A539 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-86-14, TAC-60875, NUDOCS 8607290072 | |
| Download: ML20212A555 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000346/1986014
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/86014(DRP)
Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3
Licensee: Toledo Edison Company
Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, OH 43652
Facility Name:
Davis-Besse 1
Inspection At:
Oak Harbor, OH
Inspection Conducted: May 1 through June 15, 1986
Inspectors:
P. M. Byron
D. C. Kosloff
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Approved By:
I. N. Jacki
' Chief
Date
Reactor Pr ects Section 2B
Inspection Summary
Inspection on May 1 through June 15, 1986 (Report No. 50-346/86014 (DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of
licensee action on previous inspection findings, operational safety, licensee
event reports, maintenance, surveillance, emergency planning, performance
enhancement program, strike activities and management meetings.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8607290072 860723
ADOCK 05000346
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
a.
Toledo Edison
J. Williams, Jr. , Senior Vice President Nuclear
R. Crouse, Senior Vice President-
D. Amerine, Nuclear Mission Assistant Vice President
T. Murray, Assistant Vice President, Administration
- L. Storz, Plant Manager
T. Myers, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Director
- P. Hildebrandt, Nuclear Engineering Group Director
G. Grime, Nuclear Security Director
- S. Smith, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance
M. Schefers, Information Management Director
W. O' Conner, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations
L. Ramsett, Quality Assurance Director
J. Fay, Nuclear Engineering General Manager
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S. Jain, Nuclear Safety Manager
J. Ligenfelter, Operations Engineering Manager
M. Stewart, Nuclear Training Director
R. Peters, Nuclear Licensing Manager
J. Wood, Nuclear Plant Systems Director
T. Bloom, Senior Licensing Specialist
R. Flood, Technical Support Manager
J. Stotz, Technical Support Group
- R. Cook, Senior Licensing Specialist
B. Beyer, Nuclear Projects Director
E. Salowitz, Planning Superintendent
b.
NRC
- P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those personnel attending the June 17, 1986, exit meeting.
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including
members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training, health
physics and nuclear materials management department staff.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (346/86012-02):
Seismic Qualification of 1E
Electrical Cabinets Not Maintained.
The inspectors determined that, during
a November 1985 site visit, Cyberex personnel told the licensee that the
cabinet doors were probably required to be bolted to meet seismic require-
ments.
On January 10, 1986, the licensee's engineering group issued
Surveillance Report No.86-022, which identified the potential problem on
the Cyberex cabinets and asked whether other electrical cabinets in the
plant might have a similar problem.
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On February 11, 1986,.the vendor informed the licensee by telephone that
the' bolts in the cabinet doors were required to maintain the seismic
qualification of the cabinets. The licensee received written confirmation
of this on February 24, 1986, and issued Deviation Report (DVR)86-043 on
February 28, 1986.
Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 86-11 was issued on
March 27, 1986.
Later the licensee discovered that a 1974 Westinghouse seismic
qualification report stated that, to maintain seismic qualification, the
SCR balance potentiometers in the Cyberex rectifiers and battery chargers
were required to have their settings fixed with locking compound.
Surveillance Report 86-170, dated April 22, 1986, documented this require-
ment and stated that the locking compound was not present.
The problem was-
brought to the attention of station operations personnel by DVR 86-102 on
May 5, 1986, fourteen days after it had been originally documented.
Plant
personnel placed the required locking compound on the equipment within hours
of receiving the DVR.
At the May 1, 1986, exit meeting for inspection report 86012 the inspectors
informed the licensee that their inspection of other electrical equipment
for missing bolts or screws was inadequ:te. On May 12, 1986, the licensee
found that required bolts were missing from Emergency Diesel Generator
control cabinets.
The safety significance of this issue is mitigated by the fact that the
plant has been in cold shutdown since June 9, 1985.
However, the untimely
communication between engineering and operations could have a serious impact
on the operability of equipment.
The licensee must make a concerted effort
to improve interorganizational communications.
The new deficiency reporting
system, Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) should assist the
licensee in surfacing problems, as all PCAQ's must be reviewed by the shift
supervisor and an overview committee.
Timely issuance of PCAQ's will be
required to prevent reoccurance of the tbove problems.
The inspectors will
continue to follow the licensee's timeliness of handling issues.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Licensee Event Reports Followup
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine
that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action
was accomplished, and corrective acticn to prevent recurrence had been
accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
(0 pen) LER 86-17: Thermal Degradation of Fire Barrier Penetration Fill
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Material.
The inspector visually inspected the penetration and verified
that it had been filled with Kaowool.
The licensee is performing the Fire
Barrier Penetration Test, ST 5016.11, as part of the corrective action for
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this LER.
So far, numerous fire barrier deficiencies have been identified.
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This LER will remain open until the licensee completes ST 5016.11 and the
corrective action for the deficient fire barriers.
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(0 pen) LER 86-21:
Inadequacies in Raychem Installations.
The licensee is
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inspecting or evaluating all existing class 1E electrical wire and cable
terminations and splices.
So far the licensee has inspected 21 installa-
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tions in addition to the 71 reported in the LER. All 21 were unacceptable.
The licensee is also evaluating 20 taped installations to determine if
Raychem installations are required.
The licensee is developing a program
to have a testing laboratory environmentally test samples of unacceptable
installations.
The testing program will attempt to qualify some types of
currently unacceptable installations so that they can be used without
repair or replacement.
This LER will remain open until all Raychem
installations and taped connections are repaired or considered acceptable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operational Safety Verification
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs
and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of
May and June.
The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency
systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of
affected components.
Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe
plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks,
and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been
initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector by
observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan
was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions and
verified in.plementation of radiation protection controls.
During the
months of May and June, the inspector walked down the accessible portions
of the Fire Water and Essential 480 Volt AC Distribution systems to verify
operability.
On June 4, 1986, the licensee was testing valve DH 1518, the No. 2 Decay
Heat (DH) Pump Suction Valve.
Due to earlier maintenance work on the No. 2
DH Pump, the No. 2 DH loop had been drained and a pump vent valve opened.
When DH 1518 was opened from the control room, the control room operator
observed pressurizer level decreasing and immediately shut DH 1518.
Pressurizer level stopped decreasing and the equipment operators shut the
DH pump vent valve to stop reactor coolant leakage from the isolated DH
loop.
Pressurizer level was restored by adding 751 gallons of burated
water to the reactor coolant system (RCS).
Approximately 150 gallons had
been discharged to the Emergency Core Cooling Systems room sump, the
balance filling the DH loop.
The licensee did not document the loss of RCS
inventory as a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ).
The inspector
considers this to be an Unresolved Item (346/86014-01) and is reviewing the
cause of the condition and whether it should have been documented as a PCAQ.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility
operations were in conformance with the requirements established under
technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components
listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted
in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes
or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed
from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;
activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected
as applicable; functional testing and calibrations were performed prior to
returning components or systems to service; quality control records were
maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and
materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were
implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to
assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance
which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Inspection of Raychem installation in 4160 volt AC electrical
distribution system.
Silt removal from intake area for the Service Water (SW) system.
Repair of SW pump 1-1.
The inspector noted deficiencies in the storage
of pump parts that had been removed for repair of the pump.
The
inspector notified the licensee and the deficiencies were corrected.
Deficiencies in the storage of SW pump 1-1 parts is an unresolved
item (50-346/86014-02) pending review of the licensee's program for
temperary storage of safety-related equipment.
Following completion of maintenance on the 4160 volt AC distribution system
and the Service Water system, the inspector verified that these systems had
been returned to service properly.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Monthly Surveillance Observation
The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance
testing on the Steam and Feedwater Line Rupture Control System, ST 5031.10,
" Steam Feedwater Rupture Control Instrument Input Response Time", verified
that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that
test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation
were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were
accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and
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procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the
individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during
the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management
personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Planning
a.
Tornado
A tornado passed within five miles of the station between 8:30 p.m.
and 9:00 p.m. on June 10, 1986.
Several buildings were destroyed and
other minor damage occurred.
There was no damage near the site. At
9:03 p.m. site security personnel monitoring the Ottawa County
Sheriff's radio frequency heard reports of possible sightings of funnel
clouds.
The licensee contacted the sheriff's office by telephone and
was informed that a " severe storm watch" was in effect but that no
tornado sightings had been confirmed.
At 9:13 p.m. the sheriff's
office formally notified the licensee that a tornado warning had been
declared and the control room was notified.
At 9:15 p.m. che licensee
took the actions required by Administrative Procedure AD 1827.06,
" Tornado".
The tornado warning was cancelled at 10:07 p.m.
A check
of the U.S. Weather Service logs indicates that a tornado warning was
declared at 9:11 p.m. for Ottawa County.
Section 1 of AD 1827.06 requires that the Load Dispatcher notify the
station that a tornado watch, or warning, exists for the vicinity of
the station.
A review of the load dispatcher and unit logs indicates
that the load dispatcher did not notify the shift supervisor of the
tornado warning.
This is an unresolved item (50-346/86014-03).
Section 4.3.2 of AD 1827.06 lists actions which must be initiated when
a tornado warning is issued.
These actions are necessary to prepare
the station for the effects of a tornado and are based on the assump-
tion that the licensee will have sufficient warning to take the actions
before a tornado occurs.
As shown above, it is possible that the
warning may not come until after a tornado has occurred. This event
demonstrates that the licensee should review their Emergency Plan
Supporting Procedures to determine if there are other events requiring
anticipatory actions where the event could precede the notification.
The inspectors have informed both the licensee and Region III of this
need. This is an Open Item (50-346/86014-04).
b.
Flood Watch
Lake Erie is at its highest recorded level for the season and continues
to rise.
The still level is approximately one foot above the still
level that existed just before the wind-driven floods of 1972 and 1973.
The licensee informed the inspectors that there is a high potential
for flooding during November 1986.
In the worst case water level
would remain two feet above site access road level for four days.
Although the station would be isolated from highway and railroad
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traffic their would be no flooding of the station.
Such flooding
could impact' area evacuation times.
The licensee is preparing
contingency plans for this event.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Performance Enhancement Program (PEP)
The PEP'has changed form since its inception.
Many items are now included
in the licensee's Course of Action (C0A) Program and many. items have been
completed. The following items were reviewed by the inspectors during this
inspection period.
(Closed) Item (346/RP-88001):
A-1, Guidelines For Use of Consultants. The
inspectors reviewed the licensee's April 2, 1986, internal memo in budget
and cost controls which provides guidelines for the use of consultants.
The memo details an implementation schedule and the inspectors have reviewed
some of the detailed implementation schedules.
The inspectors consider
that the licensee's actions satisfy the PEP action item.
(Closed) Item (346/RP-99619):
D/SM-3, Corporate Nuclear Review Board
.(CNRB) Meeting with Corporate Management. The CNRB met with corporate
management in August 1985.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Strike
Local 245 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)
contract with the licensee terminated April 30, 1986, and the 30 day
cooling off period was invoked.
The membership voted on June 1, 1986,
not to ratify the licensee's proposed contract and a work stoppage was
initiated at 12:01 AM, June 2, 1986.
At Davis-Besse the work stoppage
affe..au licensed and unlicensed operators, maintenance, station
services, and chemistry and health physics personnel. Approximately 20%
of Local 245 members are employed at Davis-Besse.
The inspectors were on site prior to the work stoppage and observed
preparations and the transition including control room turnover.
The
transition was smooth and orderly.
The inspectors monitored post-
transition activities and noted no operating problems; however, the
picketers refused to allow a woman who had brought her husband to work
to leave the site.
Later in the day the licensee provided helicopter
transportation for the woman.
The picketers blocked all entrances to the site with vehicles and would
not allow accr,s to or egress from the site.
The Senior Resident Inspector
was denied access most of the first day.
Region III management contacted
Local 245 officials and, subsequently, NRC personnel have not been denied
access.
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Before the strike, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Emergency
Operating Procedure (EOP) Plan.
The inspectors determined that the E0P
staffing did not meet both security plan and technical specification
requirements. The licensee was notified and the E0P was revised to
comply with all staffing requirements.
The inspectors reviewed the
qualifications and training of the individuals temporarily assigned to
fill positions which require specific training and determined that they
had received training and maintained qualifications where required. The
inspectors verified the adequacy of the size of the Contingency Guard
Force (CGF) and reviewed their training.
Additionally, the inspectors
verified that the licensee's backup communication systems were adequate.
The inspectors observed the licensee's implementation of their E0P and
determined that the organization responded in accordance with the E0P.
Technical Specifications minimum staffing levels are being exceeded.
In
addition to onsite observations, the inspectors observed the operation at
the corporate command center.
The command center was staffed at the vice
presidential level which ensured that decisions could be readily obtained.
The licensee sequestered essential personnel prior to the strike.
By the
second day access conditions had stabilized sufficiently to allow the
licensee to relax the sequestering requirements.
In addition, contract building trades personnel crossed the picket line
after the first week of the strike.
The building trades are performing
non-represented work, such as facility change requests and construction
of the new maintenance building.
The licensee is making progress in
completing maintenance work orders and testing.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Management Tour
The Regional Administrator and the Senior Vice President, Nuclear, with
members of their staffs, met on June 4, 1986, to discuss the licensee's
progress in achieving plant startup.
Significant technical issues were
also discussed.
A plant tour followed the discussions.
11.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or
deviations.
An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is
discussed in paragraph 4.
12.
Open Items
Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which
will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action
on the part of NRC or licensee or both.
An open items disclosed during
the inspection is discussed in paragraph 7.
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13.
Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection and
summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The'
licensee acknowledged the findings. After discussions with the licensee,
the inspectors have determined there is no proprietary data contained in
this inspection report.
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