ML20212A555

Insp Rept 50-346/86-14 on 860501-0615.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety,Lers,Maint, Surveillance & Emergency Planning

ML20212A555
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	07/23/1986
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212A539	List: ML20212A534 ML20212A555
References
50-346-86-14, TAC-60875, NUDOCS 8607290072
Download: ML20212A555 (9)

See also: IR 05000346/1986014

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-346/86014(DRP)

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3

Licensee: Toledo Edison Company

Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue

Toledo, OH 43652

Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1

Inspection At: Oak Harbor, OH

Inspection Conducted: May 1 through June 15, 1986

Inspectors: P. M. Byron

D. C. Kosloff

Approved By:

I. N. Jacki

9' Chief

7,U- /

Date

Reactor Pr ects Section 2B

Inspection Summary

Inspection on May 1 through June 15, 1986 (Report No. 50-346/86014 (DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of

licensee action on previous inspection findings, operational safety, licensee

event reports, maintenance, surveillance, emergency planning, performance

enhancement program, strike activities and management meetings.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

8607290072 860723

PDR ADOCK 05000346

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

a. Toledo Edison

J. Williams, Jr. , Senior Vice President Nuclear

R. Crouse, Senior Vice President-

D. Amerine, Nuclear Mission Assistant Vice President

T. Murray, Assistant Vice President, Administration

• L. Storz, Plant Manager

T. Myers, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Director

• P. Hildebrandt, Nuclear Engineering Group Director

G. Grime, Nuclear Security Director

• S. Smith, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance

M. Schefers, Information Management Director

W. O' Conner, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations

L. Ramsett, Quality Assurance Director

J. Fay, Nuclear Engineering General Manager ,

S. Jain, Nuclear Safety Manager

J. Ligenfelter, Operations Engineering Manager

M. Stewart, Nuclear Training Director

R. Peters, Nuclear Licensing Manager

J. Wood, Nuclear Plant Systems Director

T. Bloom, Senior Licensing Specialist

R. Flood, Technical Support Manager

J. Stotz, Technical Support Group

• R. Cook, Senior Licensing Specialist

B. Beyer, Nuclear Projects Director

E. Salowitz, Planning Superintendent

b. NRC

• P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector

D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector

• Denotes those personnel attending the June 17, 1986, exit meeting.

The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including

members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training, health

physics and nuclear materials management department staff.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (346/86012-02): Seismic Qualification of 1E

Electrical Cabinets Not Maintained. The inspectors determined that, during

a November 1985 site visit, Cyberex personnel told the licensee that the

cabinet doors were probably required to be bolted to meet seismic require-

ments. On January 10, 1986, the licensee's engineering group issued

Surveillance Report No.86-022, which identified the potential problem on

the Cyberex cabinets and asked whether other electrical cabinets in the

plant might have a similar problem.

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On February 11, 1986,.the vendor informed the licensee by telephone that

the' bolts in the cabinet doors were required to maintain the seismic

qualification of the cabinets. The licensee received written confirmation

of this on February 24, 1986, and issued Deviation Report (DVR)86-043 on

February 28, 1986. Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 86-11 was issued on

March 27, 1986.

Later the licensee discovered that a 1974 Westinghouse seismic

qualification report stated that, to maintain seismic qualification, the

SCR balance potentiometers in the Cyberex rectifiers and battery chargers

were required to have their settings fixed with locking compound.

Surveillance Report 86-170, dated April 22, 1986, documented this require-

ment and stated that the locking compound was not present. The problem was-

brought to the attention of station operations personnel by DVR 86-102 on

May 5, 1986, fourteen days after it had been originally documented. Plant

personnel placed the required locking compound on the equipment within hours

of receiving the DVR.

At the May 1, 1986, exit meeting for inspection report 86012 the inspectors

informed the licensee that their inspection of other electrical equipment

for missing bolts or screws was inadequ:te. On May 12, 1986, the licensee

found that required bolts were missing from Emergency Diesel Generator

control cabinets.

The safety significance of this issue is mitigated by the fact that the

plant has been in cold shutdown since June 9, 1985. However, the untimely

communication between engineering and operations could have a serious impact

on the operability of equipment. The licensee must make a concerted effort

to improve interorganizational communications. The new deficiency reporting

system, Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) should assist the

licensee in surfacing problems, as all PCAQ's must be reviewed by the shift

supervisor and an overview committee. Timely issuance of PCAQ's will be

required to prevent reoccurance of the tbove problems. The inspectors will

continue to follow the licensee's timeliness of handling issues.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Licensee Event Reports Followup

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and

review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine

that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action

was accomplished, and corrective acticn to prevent recurrence had been

accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.  !

(0 pen) LER 86-17: Thermal Degradation of Fire Barrier Penetration Fill i

Material. The inspector visually inspected the penetration and verified  !

that it had been filled with Kaowool. The licensee is performing the Fire

Barrier Penetration Test, ST 5016.11, as part of the corrective action for j

this LER. So far, numerous fire barrier deficiencies have been identified. )

This LER will remain open until the licensee completes ST 5016.11 and the 1

corrective action for the deficient fire barriers. '

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(0 pen) LER 86-21: Inadequacies in Raychem Installations. The licensee is l

inspecting or evaluating all existing class 1E electrical wire and cable I

terminations and splices. So far the licensee has inspected 21 installa-

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tions in addition to the 71 reported in the LER. All 21 were unacceptable.

The licensee is also evaluating 20 taped installations to determine if  ;

Raychem installations are required. The licensee is developing a program

to have a testing laboratory environmentally test samples of unacceptable  !

installations. The testing program will attempt to qualify some types of

currently unacceptable installations so that they can be used without

repair or replacement. This LER will remain open until all Raychem

installations and taped connections are repaired or considered acceptable.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Operational Safety Verification

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs

and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of

May and June. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency

systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of

affected components.

Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe

plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks,

and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been

initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by

observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan

was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions and

verified in.plementation of radiation protection controls. During the

months of May and June, the inspector walked down the accessible portions

of the Fire Water and Essential 480 Volt AC Distribution systems to verify

operability.

On June 4, 1986, the licensee was testing valve DH 1518, the No. 2 Decay

Heat (DH) Pump Suction Valve. Due to earlier maintenance work on the No. 2

DH Pump, the No. 2 DH loop had been drained and a pump vent valve opened.

When DH 1518 was opened from the control room, the control room operator

observed pressurizer level decreasing and immediately shut DH 1518.

Pressurizer level stopped decreasing and the equipment operators shut the

DH pump vent valve to stop reactor coolant leakage from the isolated DH

loop. Pressurizer level was restored by adding 751 gallons of burated

water to the reactor coolant system (RCS). Approximately 150 gallons had

been discharged to the Emergency Core Cooling Systems room sump, the

balance filling the DH loop. The licensee did not document the loss of RCS

inventory as a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ). The inspector

considers this to be an Unresolved Item (346/86014-01) and is reviewing the

cause of the condition and whether it should have been documented as a PCAQ.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility

operations were in conformance with the requirements established under

technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Monthly Maintenance Observation

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components

listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted

in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes

or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting

conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed

from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;

activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected

as applicable; functional testing and calibrations were performed prior to

returning components or systems to service; quality control records were

maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and

materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were

implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to

assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance

which may affect system performance.

• The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

Inspection of Raychem installation in 4160 volt AC electrical

distribution system.

• Silt removal from intake area for the Service Water (SW) system.

• Repair of SW pump 1-1. The inspector noted deficiencies in the storage

of pump parts that had been removed for repair of the pump. The

inspector notified the licensee and the deficiencies were corrected.

Deficiencies in the storage of SW pump 1-1 parts is an unresolved

item (50-346/86014-02) pending review of the licensee's program for

temperary storage of safety-related equipment.

Following completion of maintenance on the 4160 volt AC distribution system

and the Service Water system, the inspector verified that these systems had

been returned to service properly.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance

testing on the Steam and Feedwater Line Rupture Control System, ST 5031.10,

" Steam Feedwater Rupture Control Instrument Input Response Time", verified

that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that

test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation

were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were

accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and

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procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the

individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during

the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management

personnel.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Emergency Planning

a. Tornado

A tornado passed within five miles of the station between 8:30 p.m.

and 9:00 p.m. on June 10, 1986. Several buildings were destroyed and

other minor damage occurred. There was no damage near the site. At

9:03 p.m. site security personnel monitoring the Ottawa County

Sheriff's radio frequency heard reports of possible sightings of funnel

clouds. The licensee contacted the sheriff's office by telephone and

was informed that a " severe storm watch" was in effect but that no

tornado sightings had been confirmed. At 9:13 p.m. the sheriff's

office formally notified the licensee that a tornado warning had been

declared and the control room was notified. At 9:15 p.m. che licensee

took the actions required by Administrative Procedure AD 1827.06,

" Tornado". The tornado warning was cancelled at 10:07 p.m. A check

of the U.S. Weather Service logs indicates that a tornado warning was

declared at 9:11 p.m. for Ottawa County.

Section 1 of AD 1827.06 requires that the Load Dispatcher notify the

station that a tornado watch, or warning, exists for the vicinity of

the station. A review of the load dispatcher and unit logs indicates

that the load dispatcher did not notify the shift supervisor of the

tornado warning. This is an unresolved item (50-346/86014-03).

Section 4.3.2 of AD 1827.06 lists actions which must be initiated when

a tornado warning is issued. These actions are necessary to prepare

the station for the effects of a tornado and are based on the assump-

tion that the licensee will have sufficient warning to take the actions

before a tornado occurs. As shown above, it is possible that the

warning may not come until after a tornado has occurred. This event

demonstrates that the licensee should review their Emergency Plan

Supporting Procedures to determine if there are other events requiring

anticipatory actions where the event could precede the notification.

The inspectors have informed both the licensee and Region III of this

need. This is an Open Item (50-346/86014-04).

b. Flood Watch

Lake Erie is at its highest recorded level for the season and continues

to rise. The still level is approximately one foot above the still

level that existed just before the wind-driven floods of 1972 and 1973.

The licensee informed the inspectors that there is a high potential

for flooding during November 1986. In the worst case water level

would remain two feet above site access road level for four days.

Although the station would be isolated from highway and railroad

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traffic their would be no flooding of the station. Such flooding

could impact' area evacuation times. The licensee is preparing

contingency plans for this event.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Performance Enhancement Program (PEP)

The PEP'has changed form since its inception. Many items are now included

in the licensee's Course of Action (C0A) Program and many. items have been

completed. The following items were reviewed by the inspectors during this

inspection period.

(Closed) Item (346/RP-88001): A-1, Guidelines For Use of Consultants. The

inspectors reviewed the licensee's April 2, 1986, internal memo in budget

and cost controls which provides guidelines for the use of consultants.

The memo details an implementation schedule and the inspectors have reviewed

some of the detailed implementation schedules. The inspectors consider

that the licensee's actions satisfy the PEP action item.

(Closed) Item (346/RP-99619): D/SM-3, Corporate Nuclear Review Board

.(CNRB) Meeting with Corporate Management. The CNRB met with corporate

management in August 1985.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Strike

Local 245 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)

contract with the licensee terminated April 30, 1986, and the 30 day

cooling off period was invoked. The membership voted on June 1, 1986,

not to ratify the licensee's proposed contract and a work stoppage was

initiated at 12:01 AM, June 2, 1986. At Davis-Besse the work stoppage

affe..au licensed and unlicensed operators, maintenance, station

services, and chemistry and health physics personnel. Approximately 20%

of Local 245 members are employed at Davis-Besse.

The inspectors were on site prior to the work stoppage and observed

preparations and the transition including control room turnover. The

transition was smooth and orderly. The inspectors monitored post-

transition activities and noted no operating problems; however, the

picketers refused to allow a woman who had brought her husband to work

to leave the site. Later in the day the licensee provided helicopter

transportation for the woman.

The picketers blocked all entrances to the site with vehicles and would

not allow accr,s to or egress from the site. The Senior Resident Inspector

was denied access most of the first day. Region III management contacted

Local 245 officials and, subsequently, NRC personnel have not been denied

access.

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Before the strike, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Emergency

Operating Procedure (EOP) Plan. The inspectors determined that the E0P

staffing did not meet both security plan and technical specification

requirements. The licensee was notified and the E0P was revised to

comply with all staffing requirements. The inspectors reviewed the

qualifications and training of the individuals temporarily assigned to

fill positions which require specific training and determined that they

had received training and maintained qualifications where required. The

inspectors verified the adequacy of the size of the Contingency Guard

Force (CGF) and reviewed their training. Additionally, the inspectors

verified that the licensee's backup communication systems were adequate.

The inspectors observed the licensee's implementation of their E0P and

determined that the organization responded in accordance with the E0P.

Technical Specifications minimum staffing levels are being exceeded. In

addition to onsite observations, the inspectors observed the operation at

the corporate command center. The command center was staffed at the vice

presidential level which ensured that decisions could be readily obtained.

The licensee sequestered essential personnel prior to the strike. By the

second day access conditions had stabilized sufficiently to allow the

licensee to relax the sequestering requirements.

In addition, contract building trades personnel crossed the picket line

after the first week of the strike. The building trades are performing

non-represented work, such as facility change requests and construction

of the new maintenance building. The licensee is making progress in

completing maintenance work orders and testing.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Management Tour

The Regional Administrator and the Senior Vice President, Nuclear, with

members of their staffs, met on June 4, 1986, to discuss the licensee's

progress in achieving plant startup. Significant technical issues were

also discussed. A plant tour followed the discussions.

11. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in

order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or

deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is

discussed in paragraph 4.

12. Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which

will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action

on the part of NRC or licensee or both. An open items disclosed during

the inspection is discussed in paragraph 7.

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13. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection and

summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The'

licensee acknowledged the findings. After discussions with the licensee,

the inspectors have determined there is no proprietary data contained in

this inspection report.

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