ML20210T866
| ML20210T866 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 09/07/1984 |
| From: | Vietti A NRC - COMANCHE PEAK PROJECT (TECHNICAL REVIEW TEAM) |
| To: | Bangart R, Livermore H, Shao L NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209B909 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-59 NUDOCS 8606020105 | |
| Download: ML20210T866 (16) | |
Text
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,(,ca utg), UNITED 3TATES e 35, % NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMiAISSION i, .4 ^ ,I WASHINGTON, o. C. 20555 s, v /
- 5eptember 7, 1984 NOTE FOR: ELivermore LShao RBangsrt The following allegations that fall into your discipline do not appear under any category. Please place in a category or identify why the allegation is not being pursued (i.e., a duplicate of another allegation) and inform the TRT management staff by close of business, September 10, 1984.
OA/QC - H. Livermore AQ-29 AQ-33 AQ-64 AQ-133 AQ-134 AQ-133 AQH-M Lu addi:icn, please complete the attached listing for QA/QC iceluding persor.s assigned and estimated schedule for closur$.
. Jt Macha2ical/ Piping - L. Shao/S. Hou ~i AQW-78 AQW-79 AQW-83 Miscellaneous - R. Bangart l AM-30 Thank you.
5 M .
Annette Vietti Comancho Peak Task Force P!
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c QA/QC Allegation Review Categories Category Eat. Handays Allegation Pschage Assigned Schedule No. Subject -
to Complete Nos. Prepared to Open Close Remarks 1 Design Process AQ-22. AQ-89. AQ-90 AQ-106. AQ-119 .
8 2 Document Control AQ-3. AQ-4. AQ-8 AQ-17. AQ-21. AQ-58 AQ-72. AQ-105. AQ-110 AQ-102. AQ-104. AQ-107 AQ-19. AQ-33. AQ-16 AQ-18. A7-57. AQ-59 AQ-60. AQ-71. AQ-101
, AQE-9. AQ:I-1. AQW-13 3 Records AQ-45. AQ-74. AQ-73 AQ-76. AQ-97. AQ-99 AQ-Il6. AQ-129. AQW-16 4 Training and Qualifications AQ-23. AQ-24. AQ-26 AQ-28. AQ-27. AQ-73.
AQ-91. AQ-108 Constructica Installation / Fabric 5
- a. Miscellaneous AQ-IS. AQ-47. AQ-7 AQ-83. AQ-103.- AQ-ll t .
AQ-49. AQ-131
- b. Management AQ-25. AQ-69. AQ-117
- c. Repair / Rework Maintenance AQ-43. AQ-98. AQ-88 .
. AQ-51. AQ-82. AQ-68 AQ-52. AQ-96. AQ-130 AW-37
- d. Onsite Fabrication AQ-77. AQ-79. AQ-115 I
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QA/QC Allegation Review Categories (continued)
Cctegory Est. Handays Allegation Package Assigned Schedule No. Subject to Complete Nos. Prepared to Open Close Remarks 5 (cont) construction Installation /
Fabric ,
- e. l>ocument Control AQ-84 AQ-100. A0-123, AQ-125
- f. Ilousekeeping AQ-54, AQ-65
- g. Travelers AQ-70. AQ-78
- h. NCRs AQ-32, AQ-120 AQ-124 AQ-36 AQ-85 AQ-30 AQ-31. AQ-34 AQ-87 AQ-95 AQ-80
- 1. Materials AQ-12. AQ-13. AQ-14 AQ-40, AQ-41 AQ-5 AQ-53 6 QC Inspection AQ-ll, AQ-35 AQ 37,
- AQ-86 AQ-ll4, AQ-42 AQ-122. AQ-46, AQ-38, AQ-109. AQE-41 7 QA AQ-127 AQ-121. AQ-61 AQ-6. AQ-126. AQ-9, AQ-20. AQ-ll3, AQ-112, AQ-132 .
8 As-Builts AQ-44 AQ-50 AQ-55 AQ-128 e
~*
- O wwg Miec211Eneou3 Allegttien Ctview Cntegorias - Rrgion IV
- a. .
Cctegory Est. Mandays Allegation Package Assigne-1 Schedule Co. Subject to Complete Nos. Prepared to Open Close Remarks 1 Hearing - 19 issues AH-1 Reclassified to Wessman reclassi-AE-51. AE-50. AQ-Ill, fled and assigned AP-24. AP-25. AP-26 to TRT teams AP-27. AP-28. AQW-69
'AQW-71 2 Reactor fuel 1.5 aM-2 Wise 7/23
. . Reg IV 3 Reactor pressure vessel . l .,5 ,AM-3. AM-23 EC&G 8/6 4 FSAR error (10.2-11 & 12) 0.5 AM-4 EC&G 8/6 5 Radioactive material release 1.0 AM-5 Wise 7/23 Ret IV 6 HP turbine 2.0 AH-6 EG G G/6 7
Pressurizer 3.0 "AM-7 EG&G 7/30 8 condenser 3.0 AM-8. AH-9. AM-10 EG6G 7/30 ,
9 Blank 10 CCW system 2.0 AM-12 Oberg 8/13 Reg IV e
11 Pumps - Hayward Tyler 3.0 'AM-13 Ellershaw 8/9 Reg IV 12 Diesel generator 3.0 AM-14i EC&G 8/6 13 Polar crane -shimming 3.0 AM-15. AM-16 EC&G 8/6
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Miccc11aneou3 Allegation R; view Ccteg:ri~) - Rcgion IV (Continued)
Cctegory .
Eat. Handays Allegation Package Assigned Schedule No.
Subject to Complete Nos. Prepared to Open Close Remarks 14 containment doora 2.0 AM-17 EG&G 8/6 15 Safeguards tunnel -
3.0 AM-18 EC&G 8/6 16 NRC form posting 1.0 AM-19 Wise 7/23 Reg IV 17 Material false statement
18 Drug Abuse 5.0 AM-21 JKelley 8/27 Reg IV and EG&G 19 IIVAC system 4.0 AM-22 E11ershaw 8/9 '
Reg IV 20 Damage to upper internals 1.0 AM-24 e , Hunnicutt 8/13 Reg IV 21 Polar crane electrical cable 3.0 AM-25 EC&G 8/13 and crane rotation problems
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Electrical Allegstion Review Categ2rito i#
Cctegory Eat. Handays Allegation Package Assigned Schedule No. Subject to Complete Nos. Prepared to Open Close Remarks I Electrical Cable (AQE-7 part). (AQE- Marini 7/31/84 Terminations' 8 part), AQE-12.
AE-13. AE-16. AE-18 AE-22. AE-26. AQE-36 (AQE-37 part). (AQE-39 part). (AQE-46 part) 2 Electrical Cable Tray '
(AQE-3 part). (AQE-4 part). Myera 7/31/84 -
and Condiit Installation AQE-10. AE-14. (AE-24
., part). AE-27. AE-29. AE-31 All-14 3 Electrical Equipment AQE-6. AQE-II. AE-15. Johnson 8/4/84 Separation fE-20. (AQE-44 part), and Li AQE-49. AE-51. AE-53
'AQE-54 4 . Control Room Ceiling AE-17 Myers 8/10/84 Fixture Supports 5 Electrical NCR Activities AQE-1. AQE-2.'AQE-3 Selan 7/30/84 AQE-4. AQE-5 (AQE-12 or White
- part). AQE-25. (AE-22 and Laudenbach part). AE-24. (AE-27
- part) . AQE-33. AQE-34
. AQE-35. (AQE-36 part).
AQE-37. AQE-38. AGE-40
, 'AQE-41. AQE-42. AQE-45
! , AQE-47. AQE-48. AE-50
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e unctLaALai nastgataus Keview Lategories (continued)
Cctegory Eat. Handays Allegation Package Assigned Schedule Ns. Subject to Complete Nos. Prepared to Open Close Remarka 6 Electrical QC (AQE-4 part). AQE-6 Selan 7/26/84 Inq.ector Training / part), AQE-8, (AQE-12 and White Qualifications part) 7 Electrical Cable Installation '(AQE-5 part) AE-19 Marini 7/31/84 AE-28, (AE-29 part),
,AE-30, AE-50, SRT-10 8 Electrical Procedures (AQE-6 part), (EE-18 part),
Johnson 8/4/84 (AE-20 part) AQE-23, and Li AQE-32, (AQE-37 part).
AQE-39 AQE-44, AQE-46 AQE-52 9 Electrical Inspection .AQE-7, AQE-43 Selan 8/3/84 Reports. Inspection Item Removal e, Notices, and In-Process Inspections
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o . . _ _ . ~ , 4, w, Cctegory Est. Mandays Allegation Package Assigned Schedule No. Subject to Complete
- Nos. Prepared to Open Close Remarks l
1 Ilot functional testin3r 20 AT-1. AT-2. AT-3 Smith 7/20/84 AT-4. AT-5 AT-6 AT-8, AT-17 2 NRC inspection of 10 AT-9. AT-10 AT-ll Beahm 7/20/84 test program / reporting AT-13 ,
l 3 Unit 2 testing 2 AT-12 Kelmig 7/18/84 4 Containment leak testing 2 AT-7 Mackley 7/20/84 5 Prerequisite test process 4 AT-14 Beahm 8/10/84 6 l'reoperational test 4 ,AT-15 , AQE-21 Smith 7/10/84 procedures ,
7 Management interpretation 2 AT-16 Keinig 8/10/84 of test commitments I 8 No QA/QC surveillance 2 'AT-18 Mackley 8/10/84 of testing activities i
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Civil /Structcral Allegntion Revicw Categories cctegory Est. Handays Allegation Package Assigned Schedule No. Subj ect_ to Complete Nos. Prepared Open Close to Remarks 1 Inadequate materials 6 AC-16. AC-19, AC-20 Philleo/ 8/17/84 used in conc, rete AC-21. AC-27 Devers 2 Concrete placements 6 AC-22. AC-23 Philleo/ 8/17/84
. Devers 3 Poor weather conditions 7 AC-24. AC-35 Philleo/ 8/17/84
- placement of concrete Devers 1
4 Concrete voids / cracked / 9 AC-25. AC-32, AC-34 Philleo/ 8/31/84 crumbled DC-008 DC-009, AC-28 Devers
- AC-33 5 Miscellaneous concrete 10 AC-26 AC-31. AC-36 Philleo/ 8/23/84 Devers 6 Rebar improperly installed / 12 AC-30, AC-37. AC-38 Hofmayer/ 8/31/84 or omitted DC-003, AC-39. DC-004 Tapta/
AQC-12. DC-005 .. Langowski 7 Concrete - Undocumented 7 QC-10 Hofmayer/ 8/17/84 activity / rework Tapia/
Langowski 8 False / wrong documents f* AQC-1. AQC-2. AQC-3, Hofmayer/ 8/17/84 AQC-7 Tapia/
Langowski 9 QC Inspector training 7 AQC-9 .
Hofmayer/ 8/23/84 and qualifications Tapia/
Langowski 10 Improper testing 6 AQC-4, AQC-5. AQC-6 Philleo/ 8/17/84 AQC-8. AQC-11 Devers
t 1v11pstauctuaal allegation McView C.T.tcgorito (continu:d)
Cctegory r.s t , nandays Allegation Package No. Subject Assigned Schedule to Complete Nos. Prepared to Open Close Remarks
!I Se1smic designs / 8 AC-4I Hofmayer/ 8/23/84 construction Tapia/
Langowski 12 Concrete construction 6 AC-29 Philleo/
8/17/84 and deficiencies / tolerances Devers 13 Cracks in concrete pack 6 AC-44 Philleo/
- 8/17/84 beneath the reactor vessel .
Devers .
14 control room aren 15 AE-17 Hofmayer/ 8/31/94
. , deficiences. Tapla/
Langowskt r
15 Rebars . improperly 10 AC-40 AQC-13, AQC-14, licfmayer/ 8/17/84 drilled AQC-15. AC-18 tapia/
< tar;gwskt 16 . Excavation / backfill 8 AQ-64 Hofmayer/ 8/17/84 Tarles/
Langowski <
l 17 Concrete same> ling AQC-45 ,
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Mechanteri end Piping All gntion review Categorico Cctegory Est. Handays Allegation Package Assigned Schedule No. Sub}ect to Complete Nos. Prepared to Open Close Remarks I Welding - incorrect or AW-31. AW-34. AW-35 ECT/CDR 8/31/84 no procedure AW-38 2 Welding - procedure ~AW-36. AW-54. AQW-28 ECT/CDR 8/10/84 4
adherence AQW-30. AQW-10 3 Improper or defective 'AW-52. AW-59. AW-62 EGT/CDR 8/31/84 pipe welds 1 4 Plug Welds AW-51. AW-55. AW-49 ECT/CDR 8/2/84 5 Weld Designs AW-44 DDH 8/10/84 1
i 6 Improper Weld AW-45. AW-46. AW-61 VPF 8/10/84 i preparations AW-66 7 Improper weld examination AW-48. AQW-20. AQW-21 VPF 8/27/84 j and testing 'AQW-23 AQW-77 ,
8 Weld repairs documentation AU-63 CDR 8/2/84 problems 9 Weld rod control AW-56. AQW-24 ECT 7/20/84 e
10 Damaged pipe AP-5. AP-8. AP-10 WPC 7/20/84 11 Pipe installation .AP-4. AP-9. AP-13 WPC 8/5/84 12 Reactor vessel installation AP-Il WPC 8/28/84 AP-15, AP-16 13 Repairs and modifications to pipe . AP-7 AP-16 . AP-15 WPC 8/10/84 i
- hold by 01 14 Hiscellaneous piping problems AP-6. AP-14. AW-47 DDH 8/26/84 i
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Mcchsnical and Piping Allegation Review Categoriz) (continued)
Cct:: gor y Est. Man < lays Allegation Package Assigned Schedule Na, Subject to Complete _ Nos. Prepared to Open Close Remarks 15 Pig.e haager design problems .Ari-5 RJM 8/2/84 16 intimidation to hanger redesign AH-S RJM . 7/30/84 suggestions ,
17 Ancl.or balt installation problema AB-4. AB-5. AB-6 VPF 8/10/84 (A3-7 part). AB-8. AB-9 AB-10. AQB-1. AQB-2 AS-14
~
la S/C lateral support bolts (AE-7 part). AB-12. SRT-9 VPF 8/31/84 improperly shortened 19 Undersised welds and loose nets AW-68. SRT-8 VPF 8/31/84 in a IfX support .
20 Piping and bolts AQP-2. AQB-3
- JHM 8/31/84 material traceability ,
21 NCR activities on pipe and hengers AQP-1. AQH-2. AQH-17 RJM 8/10/84 22 Design change control AQP-3 JHM 8/31/84 and receiving inspection of whip restraints -
23 Blank 24 Improper welding practice AQW-1. AQW-12 AQW-26 RWH 8/10/84 AW-70 25 Incorrect welding documentation AQW-23. AQW-25. AQW-72 RWil 8/24/84 AW-67 26 Unqualiffed welders AQW-2. AQW-3. AQW-4 RWil 7/27/84 L. - - . . ~
?!echanicci and Piping Allagntion R view Catrgirim (continued) i C tegory Est. Mandays Allegation Package Assigned Schedule Mrs. Subject to Consplete ' Nos. Prepared to Open Close Remarks 27 Unquea1ifled weld inspectors AQW-5, AQW-11. AQW-16 RWil 7/27/84
~
AQW-17. AQW-18. AQW-19, AQG-69 28 Unqualified QA/QC personnel 'AQW-6. AQW-7 JHM 8/15/84 for welding documents .
29 Improperly certified AQW-27 JilH 8/15/84 liquid penetrant material 30 Iaproper receiving AQW-15 . RWH 8/10/84 Inspection of welds ,
t 31 dinger wc! ding prot.lems All-6 AP-18. AP-19 RJM 7/20/84 AP-20, AP-21. AP-22 32 Itanger fabrication deficiencies All-3. AH-4. AH-9 RJM 8/27/84 AH-10. AH-11, AH-20, iAH-21. AH-18 ,
33 Ilanger material control 'AH-7, AH-15 AQW-71 RJM 8/6/84 AQH-22 34 Computer program AP-24, AP-25 RJM verification for base plate o
35 Coeputer program AP-26. AP-27 AP-28 RJM verification for piping * ,
8 36 Piping analysis problems SRT-1. SRT-2. SRT-3 VPF found in RII report 37 Ilanger PC inspection SRT-4 SRT-5. SRT-6, RJ'M deficiencies 9
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Mechaniccl and Piping Allegition R;vice Categtrim9 (continued)
Category Est. Mandays Allegation Package Assigned Schedule No. Subject to Complete Nos. Prepared to Open Close Remarks 38 Improper installation .AB-Il VPF procedures for anchor bolts -
9 39 Adequacy of small bore 'AM-29 WPC piping design practice 40 1.ack of QA program for AQP-23 JHM class 5 supports 41 Improper implementation of AQW-8. AQW-9. AQW-29 JHM of landom radiograph program .
42 Questionable welds and weld AQW-13. AQ-32. AQ-41 ECT/CDR procedures in primary systems ;AP-12 43 Poor welding conditions for AW-40. AW-42. AM-II. EGT/CDR spent fuel storage pool liner *AQW-BO AQW-81. AQW-82 .
~ '
44 Defective welds in whip restraints AW-39. AW-50. AW-57 DDH and hangers .AW-58. AW-64. AQ-53. AQW-22 +
45 Miscellaneous welding deficiencies AW-43. AW-60. AW-65 DDH AQW-73 46 Improper veld quenching ;AQW-74 RJM technique 47 Unacceptable vendor welds ,AQW-75. AQW-76 RJM '
in pipe whip restraints
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EDUGH DRAFT date' Tebruary 22, 1984 memo to: John Larkins. USNRC/RES Bill Tarmer, USNRC/RES from: V. H. McCulloch, SNLA subject. Ice Condenser Equipment Survivability Report Here is a copy of the Sequoyah Report as it is going into cur sign-off process. Accord ng to the current procecures, after it i is signed-off here, it wall be formally submitted to you for comments beiore the final draft is prepared, given a NUREG number, and distributed. Could you review this draft so that we might ih:orporate your ccaments in the next rewrite? I think this would significantly speed up the process. Since it hasn t been fully reviewed, this draft shouldn't be distributed further.
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DRAFT PRELIMINARY REPORT FOR COMMENT FIN NO. A 1270 HYDROGEN BURN SURVIVAL PROGRAM HECTR ANALYSIS OF EQUIPMENT TEMPERATURE RESPONSES TO HYDROGEN BURNS IN AN ICE CONDENSER CONTAINMENT Prepared by Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, NM 87185 Operated by Sandia Corporation for the U.S. Department of Energy U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NOTICE THIS DRAFT PRELIMINARY REPORT IS ISSUED ONLY TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE DESIGNATED COOPERATIVE PROGRAM This report was prepared in contemplation of Commission action. It has not received patent review and may contain information received in confidence. Therefore, the contents of this report should neither be disclosed to others nor reproduced, wholly or partially, unless written permission to do so has been obtained from the appropriate USNRC office. The recipient is requested to take the necessary acticn to ensure the protection of this report.
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HECTR ANALYSIS OF EQUIPMENT TEMPERATURE RESPONSES TO SELECTED HYDROGEN BURNS IN AN ICE CONDENSER CONTAINMENT Vincent J. Dandini William H. McCulloch February 1984 Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, NM 87185 Operated by Sandia Corporation for the U.S. Department of Energy Prepared for Severe Accident Assessment Branch Division of Accident Evaluation Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and Chemical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering Office.of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, DC 20555 Under Interagency Agre0 ment DOE 40-550-75 NRC Fin Nos. A-1270 and A-1306 e - ,-.
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ABSTRACT The HECTR computer code was used to calculate.the temperature response of three generic surfaces representative of reactor safety equipment in each of three locations in an ice condenser containment building. The results of these accident sequences are summarized. For the S2 D accident sequence, the calculation does not project excessive temperature. However, for other sequences having probabilities of occurrence near that of the S D 2event, component surface temperatures higher than LOCA qualification guidelines are indicated.
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- i se t CONTENTS Page Section 1
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
1.0 INTRODUCTION
. . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.0 SURFACE DESCRIPTION AND MODEL 8
3.0 SCENARIOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10 4.0 RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19 5.0 GENERAL'SUMHARY OF RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . .
34
6.0 CONCLUSION
36 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
37 APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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LIST OF FIGURES Page Figure 5-1 Upper Plenum Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature 21 Response to a TMLB' Event (Case N.02) . . . ...
5-2 Upper Plenum Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature 22 Response to an S 2DFX Event (Case A.04) . . . ...
5-3 Upper Plenum Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature 23 Response to an S1HF Event (Case J.00) . . . ...
5-4 Upper Compartment Transmitter Cover Plate % p-
. . . ... 24 Response to a TMLB' Event (Case N.02) 5-5 Opper Compartment Transmitter Cover Plate 26 Temperature Response to an S 1HF Event (Case J.00).
5-6 Upper Compartment Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature Response to an S DFX 2 27 Event (Case A.04) . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
5-7 Lower Compartment Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature Response to an S1D 28 Event (Case G.00) . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
5-8 Lower Compartment Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature Response to an S 1H 29 Event (Case H.01) . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
5-9 Lower Compartment Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature Response to a TMLU 30 Event (Case L.01) . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
5-10 Lower Compartment Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature Response to an S2 D Event with Upper
. . . . . ... 31 Plenum Ignitor Failure (Case A.13)
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4 LIST OF TABLES Page Table Accident Sequence Event Identification . . . . . . 4 8 3-1 3-2 HECTR-Ice Condenser Analysis Basic 9 Accident Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4-1 Accident Cases Resulting in High Peak Temperatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
. . . . . . . . . . 15 4-2 C.xx Case Combustion Parameters 6-1 Probabilities of Sequences Which Produce High Component Temperatures . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
During certain types of severe nuclear reactor accidents, the possibility exists for the release of large amounts of hydrogen into the reactor containment building.
Concern that this hydrogen could build up to concentrations which, if ignited, could cause pressures high enough to threaten containment integrity, has led to the installation, in many reactor buildings, of deliberate ignition systems.
The purpose of these systems is to burn the hydrogen at lower, nonthreatening concentrations. These deliberate ignitions, while they might prevent the overpressurization of the reactor building, result in thermal environments which could compromise the operation of safety equipment necessary to monitor the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition.
The HECTR computer code has been developed at Sandia to model the pressure-temperature environments resulting from the combustion of hydrogen in reactor containment buildings. Recently, the code was modified to include models of three generic surfaces representative of safety equipment inside containment to estimate the response of The equipment exposed to the hydrogen burn environment.
surfaces are: thin aluminum (.125 inch), thick aluminum
(.67 inch), and the .25-inch thick steel cover plate from a Barton pressure transmitter. For this report, each was modeled at three locations inside an ice condenser
- 1. _ _ _ _
containment: the ice condenser upper plenum, the upper compartment, and the lower compartment. Four basic accident sequences with variations on each were considered. The sequences were: S D, Sy D, S y H, and TML (sequence 2
nomencluture is that used in the Reactor Safety Study Methodology Applications Program, symbols are summarized in Table 3-h. Results are given in the Appendix of this report.
The S D sequence with 75 percent zirconium oxidation 2
is widely used as a quasi-standard case for hydrogen burn analyses. The HECTR analysis of this sequence indicates that component surface temperatures will not reach 440 K (a typical maximum LOCA qualificacion temperature) . However, variations of this sequence, notably S DX, 2 S DFX, 2 and S2 DF, produce high temperatures in all three compartments.
The Sy D and Sy H sequences result in high-peak surface temperatures and large temperature rises in the lower compartment but not in the upper plenum and upper compartment.
Variations of the S EF y sequence produce high surface temperatures in all compartments. The surface temperatures l
l in the lower compartment for this sequence are very high.
l The thin aluminum surface reaches 780 K in some cases and the steel transmitter cover plate exceeds 600 K.
i f
i l
l l
~
)
The TMLU and TMLB scenarios result in surface tempera-tures in the lower compartment which exceed 440 K prior to 1
hydrogen ignition. :
The TMLB' scenarios produce no excessive temperatures in the lower compartment. However, these cases do indicate high surface temperatures in the upper plenum and upper compartment.
A review of the analysis results shows that, overall, the lower compartment is more susceptible to high-peak temperatures than the other two compartments which were analyzed. In large measure, this is due to the hot preburn environment in that locaticn. Surfaces in the lower .
compartment can be exposed to high temperature environments f,or an hour or longer immediately prior to the first hydrogen ignition. Thus, the surfaces are already at high temperatures when the hydrogen starts to burn. This high starting temperature and the large temperature rises due to hydrogen comburtion result in temperatures which can exceed LOCA qualification guidelines.
Consideration was also given to the approximate probabilities of sequences which produced high temperatures in the lower compartment where much of the afety equipment would be located. Four sequences (SyD, S yH, Sy HF, and TMLU) have probabilities of occurrence which are near that for the S D2 event which produces no high temperatures. Thus, when considering equipment survival in a specific plant, it should be demonstrated that:
(1) equipment can survive the higher temperature, (2) a spectrum of probable scenarios fail to produce excessive temperatures, or (3) equipment is adequately protected from
- exposure to the hydrogen burn environment.
i i s l
l
(
i l
1.0 INTRODUCTION
g, One of the many events attendant to the accident at Three Mile Island in March of 1979 was a single hydrogen
/ burn I which caused the pressure in the Unit 2 containment building to rise rapidly to about 193 kPa (28 psi). The integrity of the TMI containment was not compromised, but, the pressure spike at TMI has raised concerns that a similar event in another reactor building might threaten the ability of that structure to isolate fission products from the 1
environment. .
One method proposed to prevent such an event is the deliberate ignition of the hydrogen before it accumulates to concentrations which, if burned, might threaten containment integrity. In this way large pressure pulses can be avoided. However, the thermal environment resulting from this deliberate ignition may have the undesirable side effect of equipment necessary to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition and monitor plant conditions. One of the objectives of the Hydrogen Burn Survival (HBS) program at Sandia National Laboratories is to characterize the hydrogen burn environment and its effects on equipment inside the reactor building.
Given the difficulties, expense, and time involved in
- experimentally characterizing the thermal environment, computer codes offer a fast and relatively inexpensive means of describing the conditions and effects resulting from the deliberate ignition of hydrogen in a containment building.
ggCTL The Hydrogen Event: Containment Transient Response) LEEC-TR7 code 2 was developed for this purpose. Using MARCH to provide the hydrogen and water source terms, HECTR models the pressure-temperature environment in the containment.
Recently, the code was modified to include models of three generic surfacer representative of safety equipment at each of three locations inside an ice condenser containment building.
This report describes the HECTR-calculated temperature responses of the representative surfaces when exposed to some accident scenarios which resulted in hydrogen burns.
The pressure environments from these events are presented in detail, along with a description of HECTR, by Camp et al.4
. . . . o... .- - .
9
- 4 .
2.0 SURFACE DESCRIPTION AND MODEL The containment locations considered in the equipment survivability analysis were: theuppercompartmentg(1a --~~.
large open volume where burns involving relatively large amounts of hydrogen might occur; the upper plenum of the ice condenser c#where a large number of murns in a small volume
)
might occur; and the lower compartment y!where the steam and -
hydrogen are most likely to be introduced into the containment building and where most of the reacto8s safety equipment is located.
All surfaces were modeled as one-dimensional slabs, insulated on the back, using a simple transient, implicit, finite difference calculational technique.5 The surface types were: thin aluminum (.125 inch),
thick aluminum (.67 inch), and the .25-inch thick steel cover plate from a Barton pressure transmitter.
... .........~w.-- - .. ...-._..:..
o . . .
3.0 SCENARIOS The scenario nomenclature follows that of the Reactor Safety Study Methodology Applications Program (RSSMAP).
Event symbols are identified in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1 Accident Sequence Event Identification 6 Symbol Event S1 Intermediate break loss-of-coolant accident (LOC A) (2-6 inch diameter) in reactor coolant system pressure boundary S2 Small break LOCA (2 inch or smaller diameter) in reactor coolant system pressure boundary T Transient D Failure of emergency core-cooling system (ECCS) injection H Failure of ECCS recirculation F
Failure of containment spray recirculation M Failure to maintain coolant inventory in the steam generators and transfer heat to the environment using the auxiliary feed water i system and secondary steam relief U Failure of the chemical volume and control system in high-pressure injection mode B' Loss of power with failure to recover within 1 to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of the initiating event B' Loss of power with recovery L Failure to maintain coolant inventory in steam generators and transfer heat to the environment using the power conversion system and secondary steam relief
. . ~ - -
. . . - . - - - ~ . -
s ,
Four basic scenarios, with variations on each, were considered in the analysis reported here. These scenarios are summarized in Table 3-2. Variations to these basic scenarios involved changes in combustion parameters as well as additional events in the sequences themselves. With few exceptions, the ignition criterion for hydrogen in the analysis was set at 8 volume-percent.
~
Table 3-2 HECTR Ice Condenser Analysis Basic Accident Sequences Sequence Description SD 2 Small break LOCA with ECCS failure SD 1 Intermediate break LOCA with ECCS failure SH 1 Intermediate break LOCA with failure of ECCS recirculation TML Transient with failure to maintain coolant inventory in steam generators and transfer heat using power conversion system, auxiliary feed water system and secondary steam relief
i .
I 4.0 RESULTS The results of the surface temperature calculations are i given in the Appendix of this report.- Three conditions are :
I presented: initial temperature (T ),g peak temperature (Tp), and the temperature increase (d T = T p -Tg).
The initial temperature is the temperature at the initiation of the first burn in the compartment in which the surface is located. When no va lues for Tg and AT are given, no burns occurred in the compartment and T p is the result of the 'LOCA environmer.t and burns elsewhere in the containment.
Particular attention was given to those cases which project temperatures of 440 K (332'F) or higher. This temperature is typical of maximum LOCA qualification teraperature guidelines for safety equipment; higher temperatures exceed the level to which operability has been demonstrated. Those cases which resulted in peak temperatures of 440 K or greater are described in Table 4-1. When obtainable, approximate probabilities per D
reactorgare also given for those cases. These probabilities refer only to the accident sequence and are independent of such factors as the amount of zirconium reaction and code parameters.
S D Cases _
_2 The S D case with 75 percent zirconium reaction has 2
been widely used as a quasi-standard basis for hydrogen' burn analysis (a small diameter LOCA with failure of emergency
. .- .. .__ ~ .- . .
r . o .
Table 4-1 Accident Cases Resulting in High-Peak Temperatures (with hydrogen ignition limit set at 6% unless specified) o Case Description Probability S 2 D Cases (with 75% Zr reaction unless specified) 4.8 x 10-6 A.01 S 2 DX, failure of air recirculation fans 8.6 x 10-9 A.02 S 2 DFX (modified), failure of one fan 1.2 x 10-8 and one spray train A.03 S 2 DF, spray failure 1.6 x 10-8 A.04 S 2 DFX, failure of sprays and fans 2.9 x 10-11 A.05 S2 DF with convective heat transfer 1.6 x 10-8 coefficients increased by a factor of 5 A.06 G% hydrogen ignition limit (All other 4.8 x 10-6 cases 8%)
A.13 Upper Plenum Ignitor Failure B.00 Standard S2 D w/35% Zr reaction 4.8 x 10-6 C.00 CLASIX Combustion Parameters 4.8 x 10-6 w/TVA source term 4.8 x 10-6 C.01 HECTR Combustion Parameters w/C.00 source term 4.8 x 10-6 C.02 COMPARE Combustion Parameters w/C.00 source term D.00 100% Zr reaction, core melt 4.8 x 10-6 D.01 Containment vented D.02 Partial oxygen depletion E.00 37% Zr reaction w/ partial core melt 4.8 x 10-6 S1D Cases (with 75% Zr reaction unless noted) 3.5 x 10-6 --
F.01 Partial oxygen depletion 3.5 x 10-6 G.00 37% Zr reaction 3.5 x 10-6 S 1 H Cases (with 7 5% Zr reaction unless noted) 1.3 x 10-5
.c -
H.00 Standard S 1H sequence I .D K t o - ---
H.01 Partial oxygen depletion (, o w so"
- I.01 , S 1 HF, failure of spray' recirculation 3.0 x 10-6 I.04 1800 sec into accident.- Investigates effects of ice. condenser modeling parameters I.05 S 3 HF, heat transfer coefficients 3.0 x 10-6 increased by a f actor o'f 5 ~N
( j___ . qs
.s.-. w - - -. .... -...... . ..
t . .
Table 4-1 (Continued) i Description Probability Case I.06 S1 HF w/ partial oxygen depletion 3.0 x 10-6 ,
J.00 S1 HF, 100% Zr reaction, core melt 3.0 x 10-6 with vessel breach J.01 J.00 with containment venting J.02 J.00 with partial oxygen depletion K.00 S1 HF, 37% Zr reaction, partial core melt 3.0 x 10-6 K.01 K.00 with partial oxygen depletion TML cases. (with 75% Zr r.eaction unl_ess noted)
~
/
TMLU, failure of Chemical Volume and 1 x 10-6 L.01 control System with partial oxygen depletion M.00 TMLB',kanandsprayfailure, 4 x 10-7 recovered at 8440 see into accident '
M.01 M.00~with partial oxygen depletion TMLB', no recovery, 100% Zr reac' tion,- 1 x 10-6 N.00 core melt, 12% ignition criterion N.01 N.00 with containment venting N.02 N.00 with partial oxygen depletion TMLB', 27% Zr reaction, partial core melt N 1 x 10-6 0.00 0.01 0.00 with partial oxygen depletion TMLB', 65% Zr reaction, partial core 1 x 10-6 P.00 melt P.01 P.00 with containment venting
. . . . . . . .w...--....~......... . . . . .-
- I .
core cooling). This scenario is considered in cases A.00 and C.00. Both cases indicate acceptable component temperatures (except for the thin-walled component in the upper plenum in C.00). Comparison of the two cases illustrates the sensitivity to hydrogen source terms. Case 0
C.00 uses a source term from a TVA analysis while the A.00 case uses a MARCH source term. The A.00 case has no burns in the lower compartment and the C.00 case has one.
Yet, the A.00 case has higher peak surf ace tercperatures.
The somewhat unexpected result of high temperatures in the absence of local burns is more dramatic in cases A.01 through A.04 in the lower compartment. In all four cases, burns in the upper compartmeat result in temperatures exceeding 440 K for the thin-walled component in the lower compartment. Similar peak temperatures occur for the transmitter cover plate in three of the fo!Jr cases.
Reference to Table 4-1 shows that these four cases involve the failure of the air recirculation fans and/or the containment sprays. This underscores the importance of these engineered safety features (ESFs). The failure of these ESFs results in a very hot environment ir. the upper compartment and upper plenum, as evidenced by the high-peak l
temperatures and large temperature increases (some exceeding l
l 200 K) in that location. The occurrence of high-peak l
i temperatures in the absence of local burns is only associated with the few S D Cases A.05
! 2 cases mentioned.
and A.03 are similar except that heat transfer coefficients
~}
for the A.05 case are increased by a factor of 5; thus, component surface temperatures are higher for this case- .
In case A.13 the upper plenum ignit'ers are assumed to have failed. Because hydrogen is not burned in the upper plenum, more is available for combustion elsewhere. This results in two burns in the lower compartment and higher surface temperatures.
The B.00 case is the same as the A 00 case but with zirconium oxidation limited to 35 percent. Surprisingly, though less hydrogen is released in the B.00 case, surface temperatures in the lower compartment are slightly higher.
This is due to a change in the timing of events, such as ice melting and steam injection, brought about by the way MARCH handles the 35 percent zirconium reaction limit. Though the temperature differences between the A.00 and B.00 cases are small, the thin-walled component did exceed 440 K for the B.00 scenario.
The C.xx cares use a source term from a CLASIX analysis done by TVA. Three separate HECTR runs were made using this source term and the combustion parameters (ignition limits, flame speed, and combustion completeness) from three hydrogen combustion codes: HECTR, CLASIX, and COMPARE.'
The cases and corresponding parameter sets are given in Table 4-2. The results indicate moderately different temperatures.
^ - - - -
....____m-l l
Table 4-2 1 1
l C.xx Case Combustion Parameters 1 Case Code Parameters C.00 HECTR C.01 CLASIX C.02 COMPARE The D.xx cases are core-melt scenarios. They assume 100 .
percent zirconium reaction. The resulting temperatures in the loWor compartment are quite high. However, it is not possible to separate the effects of hydrogen combustion from the effects brought about by the vessel breach.
The E,xx cases are also core-melt scenarios, but the gore is assumed to be quenched after 35 percent zirconium reaction and vessel breach. The only high temperature occurs in the upper plenum for the thin-walled component.
Lower compartment temperatures are noticeably lower than for the D.xx cases.
Several S2 D cases result in no excessiv
< temperatures. Cases A.06 through A.09 were run varying the -e --
hydrogen ignition limit between 6 and 10 volume-percent.
Cases A.10 through A.12 were run to check sensitivity to ,
combustion completeness and flame speed. Case A.14 investigated the effects of oxygen depletion of the containment atmosphere. Case A.15 assumes removal of the ice condenser doors. As with case A.14, E.02 examines the effects of oxygen depletion.
........nw~..- - -
l S y D Cases This scenario is the subject of the F.xx and G.xx cases, all of which result in high surface temperatures in the lower compartment but nowhere else. The F.xx cases assume 75 percent zirconium reaction. Though results for the F.00 case are not available, the F.01 case, which investigates -
the effect of oxygen depletion, indicates very high-peak temperatures for the thin-walled model and the transmitter cover plate. Examination of other cases investigating oxygen depletion shows little difference with the corresponding nondepleted case. When large temperature differences do exist between corresponding surfaces, the higher temperatures normally occur for the nondepleted case. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the temperatures for the F.00 case would be at least as high as those of the F.01 case. The G.00 case assumes 37 percent ,
zirconium reaction. Though this amount is only half that of the F.xx cases, temperature rises and peak temperatures are comparable. As with the A.00 and B.00 cases, this is brought about by differences in the timing of the ice melting and steam injection. .
S1H Cases This scenario is covered by the H.xx cases. Both the base and oxygen depleted cases show high temperatures resulting from a large number of burns in the lower compartment.
- .-.-..-.s..a--- ..-..-e .-... -- .
, . , .,..,. . w SyHF Cases This scenario is the S yH sequence with the failuge of spray recirculation. It is covered by the I.xx through F.xx cases. The I.xx cases are for a degraded core while the J.xx and K.xx cases deal with core melt (J.xx for 100 percent zirconium reaction and K xx for 37 percent).
Comparison of the I xx and H.xx cases shows generally similar results for lower compartment temperatures. As expected, the loss of spray recirculation results in generally higher temperatures in the upper compartment and upper plenum.
For the core-melt scenarios, temperatures in the lower compartment are about the same. However, temperatures in the other two compartments are much higher for the J.xx cases. As expected, due to the smaller amount of zirconium oxidized in the K.xx cases, there are fewer burns; there are none at all in the upper compartment.
TML Cases These scenarios are covered by the L.xx through P.xx c'=*=-
gug (w d)
The L.xxgand M.xx cases show high temperatures in the upper plenum but not the upper compartment. Temperature rises in the lower compartment are quite low; however, peak .
temperatures are high. This is because the preburn environment in that compartment is such that initial temperatures are near or above 440 K,
- .c,.__..-..,= ,
.....--.n.. - - -
J
. t .
(MTML4 The ti.xx through P xx casess deal with core melt (N.xx, 100 percent zirconium reacticn; O.xx, 27 percents p.xx, 67 percent). None of the cases show excessive temperatures in the lowet compartment. There are ho burns thers.
Temperature rises and peak temperatures in the upper compartment.and upper plenum tend to follow the amouht of zirconium oxidized with the 100 percent reaction scenario resulting in the highest temperatufes and the 27 percent react. ion the lowest. There are no burns in the upper compartment for the O.xx (27 percent reaction) cases.
l
g . . .
5.0 GENERAL
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS One of the more interesting results of the HECTR runs is that, with few exceptions, the peak temperatures for the thin and thick-walled aluminum components bound the peak temperature for the transmitter cover. A somewhat unexpected result is that, even in the absence of local burns, components can, in some circumstances, reach high t9mperatures. For the TMLU and TML5' cases, surfaces in the lower compartment can exceed 440 K prior to burn initiation.
For sequences involving local burns, high-peak temperatures are generally the result of temperature rises in execss of 100 K. So, even if equipment temperatures have not risen to LOCA qualification levels as a result of the LOCA, hydrogen burns can be sufficiently energetic to push peak temperatures well over that temperature. The converse is not necessarily true, There are several instances, particularly in the upper plenum, in which temperature rises of 100 K do not culminate in high-peak temperatures (gases entering the upper plenum are cooled by the ica condenser pri.or to entry). It is also significant that instances of temperature rises of less than 50 K can result in high surf ace temperatures. This occurs, with one exception, exclusively in the lower compartment where j components are -- -
more likely to be heated by incoming steam to maximum temperatures associated with a LOCA.
Some general results can be stated for each compartment et_._
for sequences in which burns oc Consider f =t th h
@ face temperatures prior to the first burnb through 5-3 show the temperature response of the transmitter Figures 5-1
\( .
cover plate as modeled in the upper plenum for three accident scenarios which result in high-peak temperatures.
At the start of each of the sequences (time = 0) the temperature of the plate is near that of the ice in the ice condenser below the plenum. Of all the scenarios which result in a peak temperature greater than 44C K for the cover plate in the upper plenum, case N.02, a TMLB' event, shown in Figure 5-1 has the lowest value of Tg. From the start of the accident the temperature rises slowly from 280 K te 295 K (15 K in about 9300 sec). Figure 5-2 shows the temperature profile of the plate for an S DFX 2 event, Case A.04. The value of T g for this case is intermediate and so is the ra*.e of temperature rise prior to the first l
burn (22 K in about 4200 sec). Case J.00 has the highest initial temperature for those scenarios with high-peak cover plate temperatures. Figure 5-3 shows that the S HF g event results in a relatively rapid temperature rise prior to the t
burn (58 K in 3300 sec).
- Corresponding results are shown for the transmitter cover plate in the upper compartment. Case N.02 has the lowest initial temperature for cases having a cover plate peak temperature greater than 440 K. Figure 5-4 shows a slow rise followed by a slight decline over 3000 seconds to
I 1
i i i i i i_
460 _i _
i i g i i i g i i i g i i g g 440 -
420 -
c _
7 e _ -
m 400 _
cn380 e _
v w -
m 360 _- _
op _
m _
w
- 340 _
g - _
- 320 _
300 -
=
Z > N f TI _
' 5 ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' '~
280 10000 12000 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 TIME (seconds) ,
Figure 5-3. Upper Plenum Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature Response to a TMLB' Event (Case N.02) 1 F--- =' -
a m _ _ _ _ , _ __ ___ _ _ _ _ _ , ,
.
- g .
l 1
l
~550
. i i i l i i i l i i i l i i i l
i iil i i i l
- 3 i
500 '_- I g -
i e -
M450 -
e -
e -
e o _
cn -
t400
~
w -
gg m -
4 -
cc350 w _
CL -
2 -
m -
F -
300 -
N _
Ti _
l l
' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' '
250 O 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 l
TIME (seconds) t Figure 5-2. Upper Plenum Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature Respo1se to an S 2DFX Event (Case A.04)
-. . - - . . - ~ . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . . , . . _ . . . . . . . .
500 _i i l i i l i l i i l i i l l i i_
l l l l _
475 _- _
450 _ _
.e_ _ _
g e 425 -
e _ _
i
- 400 e
m _ _
cn _ _
e _
3 375 m _ _
m _ _
s350 -
J
% E i t' E m
W sT i _
n.325 g -
F.300 _- _
275 _ _
250 ~I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' '-
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 TIME (seconds) l
[
1 Figure 5-3. Upper Plenam Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature Response to an S1HF Event (Case J.00) l .a 1
525 _i i i ; i i i l
i iijiiil i i ; i i i_
500 _
c475 -
9 ~
~
- a 450 _
o _
g _
u _
08425 o
o _
y _
a: 400 -
3 F : :
l < _
@ 375
- n. _
3 _
w -
F- 3 50 -
325 _- _
Ty 7' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' '_
! 300 O 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 l
l TIME (seconds)
Figure 5-4. Upper Compartment Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature Response to a TMLB' Event l (Case N.02)
..., __ n l
2 T As was the case for the upper plenum, Case J.00, an f.
Sy HF sequence has an intermediate Tg and an intermediate rate of preburn temperature rise (Figure 5-5). The cover plate temperature response for the S DFX 2 event is shown in Figure 5-6. This case again exhibits a relatively rapid rise to T g.
[
A substantial difference exists between the preburn temperature profiles for the cover plate in the upper plenum and upper compartment and the profiles for the same plate in the. lower compartment. This difference is significant because most of safety equipment necessary to maintain the reactor in a safe configuration and monitor its condition is located in the lower compartment.
Figure 5-7 shows the temperature profile of tr.e cover plate for an S D y event (Case G.00) limited to 37 percent zirconium reaction. The plate temperature rises very rapidly to about 390 K at the start of the accident and drops only slightly thereafter. At the start of the first burn it is rising again. Figure 5-8 shows a similar profile for an S yH event (Case H.01).
The profile for a TMLU event (Case L.01) is shown in Figure 5-9. The temperature rise to the plateau is slower I
l l
l but there is a significant increase prior to the first l
burn.
l
! In terms of preburn temperature behavior , Figure 5-10 l
is another striking example of the lower compartment preburn .
environment. It shows the cover plate temperature
l i i i i i i i i_
500 _i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i 480 -
460 -
c _
e440 -
W :
,420 --
E.n _ -
3400 -
w _-
g _
D380 F _
m _
m _
a360 -
I E : _
w _
~
340 _ 3
- - s
- Ti :
320 _
~
l :
' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' '~
l 300 O 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
! TIME (seconds)
Figure 5-5. Upper Compartment Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature Response to an S1HF Event (Case J.00) 4
' - ' " = w
~ w- e-- . _ . _ .
1 i
l l
480 _i i i i i i l i i i l i i i l i i i l i i i ._
460 -
g440 e _
- 420
,e _- _
,400 cn -
y _
~
E380
- 3 5 _
@360
- n. -
3 _
m _
N -
t- 340 -
_ Ti _
l : :
l _ _
320 -
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' -
300 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 TIME (seconds) l Figure 5-6. Upper Compartment Transmitter Cover Plate
[
i Temperature Response to an S 2DFX Event l (Case A.04) l w- , . - , - - - - - . - . . _ . - - - - - - _ .
... . . . . . ~ . _ - _ . .
=
y * ,. .
525 _ , , , , , , i , , , , , , , , ; , , i_
i 500 _
~ .
C
-> 475 -
g _
M : :
e450 m _
n _
,
- 425 _
y _
~
~
$400 g
I :
m _ y _
N E 375 -
Ti E _-
w .-
p .
350 - -.
325- .- _
300
' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' '~
O 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 l TIME (seconds)
Figure 5-7. Lower Compartment Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature Response to an S1D Event (Case G.00)
550 iiigiiigiiiiiiiiiiil iiil iiiiii _
500 -
,c_ _
g o _
e _
e -
e450 a _
. ,e _
w g _
3 F400 4
g -
E -
E -
3i -
W .
g __
i t
350 '-
300 ' ' 'lIIIlII
O 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 TIME (seconds)
Figure 5-8. Lower Compartment Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature Response to an S1H Event (Case H.01) l
550 i,iii;i,,,ig,,,,,ii,,,,,,,,,, _
500 - ,
q g
e _
g
\ _
Tg f450 a
e t
w W -
cc -
3 -
Q g
400 -
W -
- o. _
2 _
w _
y -
- 350 -
300 llIl
O 3000 6000 9000 12000 15000 TIME (seconds)
Figure 5-9. Lower Compartment Transmitter cover Plate Temperature Response to a TMLU Event (Case L.01) l l
,y
\
i i i i i i_
460 _
i i i i i i i i i i i l i i i i l 440 _
~
c S -
.,2 420 g _
~
E \ -
e m
400 -
T1 -
en _- -
e _
t _
v w 380 E _
3 _
F -
m 360 -
w _
a _
3 _
w -
F340 -
320 -
300 O 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 1
TIME (seconds)
Figure 5-10. Lower Compartment Transmitter Cover Plate Temperature Response to an S2D Event with Upper Plenum Ignitor Failure (Case A.13)
, , . - - . - . - - - - - - - - - . - - , -----4 - - - . - - - - - - - . . _ _ _ , . _ _ - - - . _ _ _ - *
~
, , , ,_ . .s....._.... ... . . . . . . . . . . . -
response for an S2D event in which the upper plenum ignitors fail (Case A.13). After quickly reaching an elevated level, the temperature declines somewhat then increases quickly to 406 K just prior ro the first burn.
Considering the environments in each of the compartments for all of the accider.t scenarios investigated, some general observations can e made for each con:partment for sequences in which burns occur. The upper compartment is relatively mild for the S D, y S y H, and variations of the S 2D sequences. It is hottest for the S HFy and TMLB' sequences. In the S yMF seqeence, the sprays have failed and in the TMLB' sequence, lorc of power prevents the use of all except passive heat removal systems (in the T"L'B' case, ---
power is eventually restored). The apper plenum is hot for the S yH F , TMLU , and TMLB' sequences and variations of the S D sequence involving spray and fan failure. The lower 2
compartment, where a large portion of the safety equipment is located, is hot for nearly all sequences except some S2 D variations and the TMLB' events. In terms of the number of cases for which the component surface temperatures exceeded 440 K, the lower compartment has the nos .
Temperature rises in the lower compartment, for cases in which burns occur, are generally the same as those in the other two compartments for corresponding surfaces. The principle reason for the predominance of high temperaturec in the lower compartment is the preburn environment (i.e.,
l
~
the release of superheated steam into the lower compartment during a LOCA) which raises surf ace temperatures of exposed surf aces to high levels prior ' to hydrogen ignition.
Figures 5-1 through 5-9 also indicate that temperatures can remain high for some time. They show the transmitter cover plate to remain above 440 K for 500 to 1000 seconds.
In the L.01 case (TMLU, Figure 5-9), the temperature exceeded 440 K prior to the first burn and remained above that level for about 4200 seconds (70 minutes). An equipment casing whose surface temperature remains elevated for such a long period of time will act like an oven, causing interior component temperatures to reach that of the surface.
.. - 4.,,, .
6.0 CONCLUSION
As mentioned earlier, the S 2D event with 75 percent zirconium reaction has become the quasi-official standard scenario for the industry when considering hydrogen bu.rns.
The A.00 and C.xx cases abA$ b this event indicate generally acceptable surface temperatures. The approximate
~0 per reactor probability of such an accident is 4.8 x 10 year. However, there are other sequences, with comparable probabilities, which do result in high surface tem g _,0t m.,.s.f e # 4 [ peraturesrd4 g#
in the lower compartment. Theses are summarized in Table 6-1.
Table 6-1 Probabilities of Sequences which Produce High Component Temperatures Sequepce Probability per Reactor Year SD 3.5 x 10-6 -
I 1.0 x 10-5 SH 1
S1HF 3.0 x 10-6 TMLU l.0 x 10-6 In view of these probabilities, the primary conclusion to be drawn from the analyses presented here is that i
excessive temperatures, i.e., temperatures above those at which the operability of equipment has been demonstrated, are the likely result of some accident scenarios which have similar probabilities to the S D 2sequence which does not precipitate such high temperatures. Consequently, when considering equipment survival, it should be demonstrated l
I l
i i
that (1) equipment can survive the higher temperature, (2) a spectrum of probable scenarios, at least including those considered here, fail to produce excessive temperatures in the specific plant being treated, or (3) the safety-related equipment is adequately protected from full exposure to the possible hydrogen burns.
{
l l
i l
l L
.~ .. --
. . ' t . . <. o REFERENCES
- 1. H. Alvares, D. Bearson, and G. Eidem, Investigation of Hydrogen Burn Damage in the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor Building, GEND-INF-023, Vol. 1, U.S. Department of Energy, June 1982.
r
- 2. A. L. Camp, M. J. Westeg, S. E. Dingman, HECTR: A Computer Program for Modelling the Response to Hydrogen Barns in Containments, SANDB2-1964C, presented at the second International Workshop on the Impact of Hydrogen on Water Reactor Safety, Albuquerque, New Mexico, October 1982.
- 3. R. O. Wooten and H. I. Avci, MARCH (Meltdown Accident Response Characteristics) Code Description and Users Manual, NUREG/CR-1711, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., 1980.
- 4. A. L. Camp, V. L. Behr, F. E. Haskin, MARCH-HECTR Analysis of Selected Accidents in an Ice Condenser Containment in preparation.
- 5. B. V.Karlek'kr,R.M.Desmond,EngineeringHeat Transfer, West 1977.
- 6. D.D. Carlson et al., Reactor Safety Study Methodology Applications Program: Sequoyah #1 PWR Power Plant, SAND 80-1897, NUREG/CR 1659, Sandia National Laboratories and Battelle Columbus Laboratories, February 1981.
fM M ---
- 7. Infc:mel vuuvussati+n with S. W. Hatch Systems Safety Analysis Division 6412.,SNLA Reactor
- 8. Letter from L. M. Mills, Tennessee Valley Authority to E. Adensam, Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, ,
USNRC, December 1, 1981.
- 9. R. G. Gido, A. Koestel, Hydrogen Burn Analysis of Ice Condenser Containments, NUREG/CR-3278, LA-9749-MS, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Draft 1983.
p
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e APPENDIX RESULTS OF EQUIPMENT TEMPERATURE RESPONSE CALCULATIONS
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Crcating tho ,signen
$ F.) f / [-
o8 6 Docurnant Y %%#
- 1. Choose Create Document in the TYPING TASKS =enu.
- 2. Name the document: signon
- 3. Choose Change Document Format in the CREATE OR REVISE DOCUMEhT menu.
- 4. Choose Change Page Format in the FORMAT SELECTION menu.
- 5. Change the First Typing Line, First Page to 1.
- 6. Press ESTER enough times to go to the typing area.
- 7. At the lef t margin, in icwercase, type: ,signon
. 8. Space once.
- 9. Type the local address for your Displaywriter. Do not space af ter the local address. .
- 10. If a password is required:
- a. Type a ec=ma.
- b. Type the password.
- 11. Press END.
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Sendf.ng and Receiving (IS.'! 33:0) 6-147 N' '- ~- "~
, _.__-,.w __ -- --
___ r ,- __ y 7 y
Tha D'istributa Document m
The , distribute command identifies the destination of the document. The , distribute command is followed by a node ,
name and the local address of the final destination to which the document should be sent.
A node name is the name assigned to the IBM 5520 to which the local address is attached. The local address identifies the final destination point. The combination of ID.node name and a local address is called a destination For example:
, distribute DEN 5520, DEN 6670 l I Node Local Address
,Name (Final Destination),
t Destination ID #1 The node name and local address may be up 'to eight characters each.
Check with your communications coordinator for the node name of the IBM 5520 and local address of the destination
. point.
The , distribute command (typed in lowercase letters) is typed as a separate document. It must be sent as a separate document immediately before each document added to the send queue. ,
Depending on whom you communicate with, you may need more than one distribute document. For example, if the regular document is being sent to different preduct types that require different send formats, a separate distribute document (preceding each regular document with a different send format chosen) is required.
I e
1 4
8-148 i
,,w - --
. a ,. .- ,- , , - - - , - , - . , - - - - -- -
. Crcoting tho , distribute s
Document
- 1. Choose Create Document in the TYPING TASKS menu.
- 2. Name the document.
- 3. Choose Change Document Format in the CREATE OR REVISE DOCUMEVr menu.
- 4. Choose Change Page Format in the FORMAT SELECTION menu.
- 5. Change the First Typing Line, First Page to 1.
- 6. Press ENTER enough times to go to the typing area.
- 7. At the left margin, in lowercase, type: , distribute
- 8. Space once.
- 9. Type the node name of the IBM 55%0. Do not space af ter the node name.
- 10. Type a comma.
- 11. Type the local address of the destination point.
Sending and Receiving (IBM $320) 8-149
. + 12. d:stin:tien If tha d: cum:nt is to be stne to moro than cna using tha scma stad format:
a.
b.
Type a comma.
Type the node name of the IBM SE 20. Do not space.
) '
- c. Type a comma.
- d. Type the local address of the next destination point.
- e. Repeat Step 12a through 12d for each additional destination point.
Note: If the destination ID's require more than one line, always end the first line with a comma and begin typing the next line at the left margin.
Remember, if the same send format will not be used for each dest: nation, a :. parate distribute document must be created for each destination and the regular document must follow.
- 13. Press END.
Tha Obtain All Document .
Just like the ,signon and , distribute ecmmands, the
.,chtain all command is typed in lowercase letters and /
)
must be created as a separate document on the Displaywriter.
If communicating with the IBM 3320 or.ly to obtain documents being held for your location, add the document containing the ,obtain all command after the ,signon document in the sord queue.
If you have regular documents to communicate to the IBM 5520 in the same session, add the ,obtain all document to the end of ths send queue, 4-150
Cre; ting tho Obt in All Document
- 1. Chcose Create Decument in the TYPING TASKS menu.
- 2. Name the document: obtain all
- 3. Choose Change Document Format in the CREATE OR REVISE DOCUMENT menu.
- 4. Change the First Typing Line, First Page to 1.
- 5. Press ENTER enough times to go to t.he typing area.
- 6. At the left margin, in lowercase, type: ,chtain all.-
- 7. Press END Note: Depending .on the procedures in your of fice, the obtain .t11 accument may need to contain additional
.information. Chuck with yeur ccmmunications coordinator.
Sending and Receiving (IBM !313) 8-151
' CEMMUNICATION CONSIDERATIONS WHEN SENDING Send Format %
The send format is different depending on whether you are communicating through an IBM 5520 to an IBM 5520 Display Station, or through an IBM 5520 to another communicating product.
Sending to an IBM 5520 Display Station Page image with Format Line is the send format chosen when communicating to an IBM 5520 Display Station.
Page Image means the Displaywriter will convert certain text and formatting controls to a formatted image of the page and send the formatted page to the IBM 5520. For example, if the document contains header and footer text, the Displaywriter will format the text and send the header and footer text with each page of tha dochment.
Format Line means that the Displaywriter converts certain format change controls that may appear within the document to Format Line controls that are understood by '
the IBM 5520. J These format line controls are:
Line spacing (Single or Double only)
Tab settings Adjust line endings Yes/No
- Line length (Right Margin) -
Prior to sending to the IBt! 5520, the document should be edited and paginated.
Note: Displaywriter records (files) can be sent to an IBM 5520 Display Station as a text document. Use the Reportpack Feature diskette to output the Displaywriter file to diskette to create the text document. Then, send the text document to the IBM 5520 Display Station. The IBM 5520 Display Station operator can convert the text document to a file document that can be used at the IBt!
5520. The Display Station operator may need to revise the k text document (for example, delete file headings from each page) prior to converting the document to a file document.
8 152
S:nding Thr: ugh tha IBM 5520 to An thcr Communic ting Product
. '(Displaywriter, IBM OS/6 Product, IBM Mag Card it, or IBM 6240)
The send format chosen depends on the product type at the finsi destination of tha document. (
I When yon communicate docu=ents through the IBM 5520 to another communicating product, the communicatien consideraticns are the same as the considerations you use to coimunicate directly to that product. The IBM 5520 only stores the dor ument and then forwards it to the final destination. Only the steps to conduct the ccmmunication session are diffsrent. The steps are included in this section.
Determine the final destination product type frem the list on the next page. Then, turn to the appropriate page in this chapter. Read the information presented about
. the product type, except for the steps to send and receive. When finished, return to this sectien.
Note: When communicating to another Displaywriter, the send format usually is Media Image. However, Media Image cannot be used when communicating through an IBM 5520 to another Displaywriter. The send forma: usually chosea is Page Image with CCL. In most cases, the Displaywriter resembles an IBM OS/6 when communicating to another Displaywriter through an IBM $520. Therefore, when communicating to another Displaywriter through an IBM 5520, refer to the IBM OS/6 pages in this chapter, rather than the Displaywriteri pages. Displaywriter records (files) can be sent as a text document to another Displaywriter through an IBM 5520. Use the Repor: pack Feature diskette to output the Displaywriter file to diskette to create the text document. Then, send the text document. The receiving Displaywriter can conver: the text document back to a file document. Note: The receiving Displaywriter operator may need to revise the text document (for example, de.lete file headings from each page) prior to converting the document back :o a file document.
The send format can vary depending on your applica icn requirements. Check with your communications coordinator for the appropriate send format.
Sending and Receiving (IBM 5520) 8-153
IBM Dispicywritor (Rafer to IBM OS/6)
IBM OS/6 Information Processor . . . . . 8-21 IBM 6640 D: cum:n: Printer. . . . . . . . 8-53 IBM 6670 Information Distributor . . . . 8-85 IBM Mag Card II or IBM 6240 Mag Card Typewriter. . . . . . . . . . 8-117 C nsiderations When Building tho Send Queue The 't.11owing considerations are important when building a se:.1 queue to communicate with an IBM 5520.
The signon document is always thh first document added to the send queue.
A distribute document must precede each regular document to be communicated.
Remember, if you change the sending order for a regular document (Selec: Ner.: Send Job), you also need to change the sending order .of the distribute document which precedes the regular document.
A maximum of 20 documents can be added to the send queue at one time. ')
Remember, the command documents, such as signon and distribute, are counted as separate docu=ents in the send queue.
To add more than 20 documents to the send queue wha.n the active ecm unication setup specifies Delete Send Queue Entry After Sending No:
Press REQST after some of the documents have been sent.
Choose Delete Send Jobs in the REQUEST TASKS menu and delete some of the documents that have already been sent.
Choose Send Document in the REQUEST TASKS menu to add more documents to the send queue.
6-134
If tha cctivo communicctiens setug Dalots Send Quti,t2 Entry Aftor S:nitg,,,- ,',j',,,,,,;f:=*fer, can etntinuo to chotso Send Dtcumang .. e , t =
documents to the send queue as doi n,,,'"
, ra queue are automatically deleted. '
If the obtain all document is in the s,,,,,, , , , , , ; *-
must appear only once, and it must i . ,, ' ' , , . , r. s '
document in the send queue.
When building the send queue, you must li, g .,', %
specify the correct send format in the s q fyjG'8 menu.
All (fordocuments consisting example, signon, of IBM 532n , ,py distribute, ,, 4,,
should be sent using the Page Imng ,; #j,, 'f. ', 7 send format.
Regular documents should be sent Image with Format Line send formatuni,i,, \.'. , , ,- 5 -A- 4 %,*
destination is an IBM 5520 Display Si,,, , , ,',
The send format chos en fo r other ,, ,,,,,,,,,,,, , ,s .
't products depends on the product typ., ,,, , ' , .
A destination.
Sending and Receiving (IBM n;.. .- -
s
~
- , t9eUdMWMLMsFCDNSIDErtATIONS SYHEN RECEIVING Becauso you can receivo documents from many different 3 j
product types, you should be aware of the following considerations.
Docums..ts Received From An i IBM 5520 Display Station The IBM 5520 Display Station sends a page image of the docue, ant to the Displaywriter.
Page image means the IBM 5520 converts certain text and i formatting controls to a formatted image of the page and '
sends the formatted page to the Displaywriter.
, For example, if the document contains header and footer text, the IBM 5520 formats the text and sends the header and footer text with each page of the document.
Note: The IBM 5520 Display Station can send records (files) to the Displaywriter. Records are sent as text documents from the IBM 5520 Display Station and received as text at the Displaywriter. If the text document is to be used as a Displaywriter file, use the Reportpack Feature diskette to convert the text document to a Displaywriter file. The IBM 5520 Display Station can send the log number field (record ID field). Unlike the -
Displaywriter, the log number field can be any field in the IBM 5520 record. Check with ycur communication coordinator to determine the necessary procedure to follow when converting the text document to a file
. document at the Displaywriter.
I Receive Format Defaults Documents sent from an IBM 5520 Display Station are received to the BSC Feature diskette Receive Format Defaults specified in the active communication setup (the Document Format Format or the Alternate Format) .
The IBM 5520 can send a Format Line for the following format controls:
Line spacing (Single or Double only)
Tab settings Line length (Right Margin)
S-156 s
- - - - --------s - w-9 --,--r-- + - = = - - - ---'=:-- '
Tha Dispicywriter honors theso formte controls, rathor
., . than tha Receiva Formet Dafcults.
/ For example, if the IBM 5520 sends a Format Line for double spacing, the Displaywriter honors the double spacing, even though the Receive Format Default may i
indicate another line spacing choice.
The IBM 5520 also can send stop codes for format changes, or it can send text only (no format changes).
The format you receive depends on your application requirements. Check with your communications coordinator.
Receive Keyboard ID Number During communications, the ' IBM 5520 only supports one Keyboard ID. It cannot send the Keyboard ID number to the Di.splaywriter.
You should receive documents using the Keyboard ID of the reacte IBM 5520 Display Station. The correct Keyboard ID should be specified in the CHANGE SETUP SESSION OPTIONS men 2 in the active communication setup.
The Keyboard ID number also must be listed as one of the
_ alternate keyboard numbers in the WORK STATION DESCRIPTION menu on the Vol. 01 Textpack program diskette in order to edit and/or print the document correctly, i
Sending and Receiving (IBM 5520) 8-157 l
\
M
bocuments Received Thr: ugh tha 1 IBM 5520 From An:;ther Cemmuniccting Product.(Displaywritar, IBM OS/6 Product, IBM Mrs Card 11, or S !
IBM 6240)
Documents received through an IBM 5520 from another communicating product (Displaywriter, IBM OS/6 Product, IBM Mag Card II or IBM 6240) are received to the BSC Feature diskette Receive Format Defaults specified in the active communication setup. In some cases, the format received with the document overrides the Receive Format Defaults. The format received with the document depends on the product used to create the document.
- In most cases, documents received from another Displaywriter through an IBM 5520 resemble documents received from an IBM OS/6. Therefore, refer to the IBM OS/6 pages in this chapter, rather than the Displaywriter pages. Displaywriter records (files) can be received as a text document from another Displaywriter through an IBM 5520. Use the Reportpack Feature diskette to convert the received text document to a file document. The receiving Displaywriter operator may need to revise, the text document (for example, delete file headings from each page) prior to converting the document.
If you have not already done so, determine the sanding ;
product type from the list below. Then, turn to the '
appropriate page for the product type in this chapter.
Read the information presented. When finished, return to page 8-159.
Sending Product IBM Displaywriter (Refer to IBM OS/6)
ILM OS/6 Information Processor. . . . .
l
. 8-21 IBM 6640 Document Printer . . . . . . . . 8-53 IBM 6670 Information Distributor. . . . . 8-85
! IBM Mag Card II or IBM 6240 Mag Card Typewriter . . . . . . . . . . 8-117 l
l l
t 8-158
HOW'TO COMMUNICATE WITH AN IBM 5520 f
The following steps to communicate assume:
An individual is present at the Displaywriter.
- The Displaywriter is communicating documents to the IBM 5520, and then receiving documents that are scheduled for forwarding from the IBM 5520 to your location.
Before communicating, you should have read:
- Chapter 7--General Information Additional Information beginning on page 8-165.
Information such as interrupting a session, unattended communications, and what to do if there is a communication problem during the session, is included in this section.
- In addition:
If you are communicating to and IBM 5520 Display Station, read the ihformation presented about .
compatibility considerations beginning on page 8-169.
If you are communicating through an IBM 5520 to another communicating product, see page 8-184.
STEPS TO COMMUNICATE DISPLAYWRITER RESPONSE
! 1. Load the Vol. 01 Textpack The TASK SEIICTION menu displays.
program diskette.
- 2. When the TASK SEIICTION menu displays, remove the Vol. 01 Textpack program diskette.
Sending and Receiving (IBM 5520) 8-159
STEPS TO' COMMUNICATE .m DISPLAYWRITER RESPONSE I
- 3. Choose Feature Tasks. Insert desired feature diskette; press ENTER prompts.
- 4. Insert the BSC Feature The BINARY SYNCHRONOUS COMMUNICATIONS diskette, and then press SETUP SELECTION menu displays.
- 5. Choose the appropriate The Session Summary frame displays, communication setup. and the Communication Status field is blank.
- 6. Insert the work diskette (s) The work diskette (s) name displays containing the IBM 5520 on the second status line.
command documents and the regular documents to be sent. .
- 7. Press REQST to start building The communications REQUEST TASKS the send queue. menu displays.
- 8. Choose Send Document. Type document name; . press ENTER prompts.
- 9. Type the name of the Type diskette name; press ENTER '
signon document.
,)
prompts.
- 10. Type the name of the The SEND DOCUMENT menu may display diskette containing the if additional send option signon document.
selections need to be made.
Or, (document name) added to send queue message displays.
- 11. If the SEND DOCUMENT When finished with this menu, menu displays, choose the (document name) added to send Page image Text only queue message displays.
send format.
- 12. Choose Send Document. Type document name; press ENTER prompts.
i 8-160 l
STEPS TO COMMUNICATE DISPLAYWRITER RESPONSE
- 13. Type the name of the Type diskette name; press ENTER distribute document that prompts.
contains the destination ID's for the first regular document to be sent.
- 14. Type the name of the The SEND DOCUMENT menu may display diskette containing the if additional send option distribute document. selections need to be made.
Or, (document name) added to se nd queue message displays.
- 15. If the SEND DOCUMEhT menu When finished with this menu, displays, choose the (document name) added to send
. Page image Text Only queue message displays.
send format.
- 16. Choose Send Document. Type document name; press ENTER prompts.
- 17. Type the name of the Type diskette name; press ENTER first regular document to prompts.
to be sent.
- 18. Type the name of the The SEND DOCUMENT menu may display diskette containing the if additional send option regular document. -
selections need to be made.
Or, (document name) added to send queue message displays.
- 19. If the SEND DOCUMENT menu When finished with this menu, l
displays, choose the (document name) added to send appropriate send format for queue message displays.
the regular document.
l l
i I
l Sending and Receiving (IBM 5320) 8-161
STEPS TO . COMMUNICATE DISPLAYWRITER RESPONSE
^
- 20. Repeat Steps 12 through 19 Same as Steps 12 through 19.
for each regular document added to the send queue. In .
Step 13, type the name of the distribute document that contains the destination ID's for each document added to the send queue. When all the regular documents are added to the send queue, continue with Step 21.
- 21. Choose Send Document. Type document name; press ENTER prompts.
- 22. Type the name of the Type diskette name; press ENTER obtain all document. prompts.
- 23. Type the name of the The SEND DOCUMENT menu may display diskette containing the if additiotal send option obtain all document. selections need to be made.
Or, (document name) added to send queue messge displays.
2/+. If the SEND DOCUMENT menu When finished with this menu, 'l displays, choose the (document name) added to send Page image Text only queue message displays.
send format.
S-162
~.
STEPS TO COMMUNICATE DISPLAYWRITER RESPONSE
- 25. (Optional Step)
If you want to change the session options, for example, the Receive Diskette Slot and/
or Print After Receive:
- a. Press REQST. The communications REQLT.ST TASKS menu displays.
- b. Choose Change Session The CHANGE SESSION OPTIONS menu Options. displays.
- c. Change the appropriate options.
- d. When finished, press ENTER The Session Su==ary frame displays, to return to the Session Summary frame.
- 26. Press COMM START. SWITCHED LINE .
READY displays in the Com=unication Status field.
DEDICATED LINE CONNECTED displays in the Communication Status field and is replaced by ON-LINE SEND. The documents in the send queue are sent to the IBM 5520. After the last document is sent, ON-LINE RECEIVE displays, and the IBM 5520 sends the document (s) it has for your location. After each document is received, a completion message is entered in the Session Summary. Continue with Step 29.
l l Sending and Receiving (IBM 5520) 8-163 i
STEPS TO COMMUNICATE DISPLAYWRITER RESPONSE
- 27. Go to Talk on the telephone and call the remote location.
Attanded remote: Tell the individual at the remote location that you are ready to communicate and give them any information about the session.
Unattended remota: Continue with Step 28.
- 28. Go to Data on the telephone CONNECTED displays in the after the remote location Communication Status field and goes to Data. (You should is replaced by ON-LINE SEND.
hear a high pitched tone after The deduments in the send queue the remote location goes are sent to the IBM SS20. After to Data.) the last document is sent, ON-LINE i
I RECEIVE displays and the IBM 5520 sends the document (s) it has for your location. After each l document is received, a completion message is entered in the Session Summary. Continue with Step 29. -
- 29. At the end of the session, End of Session displays in the
]
press DISC, and then press Session Summary frame, and then END.
the BINARY SYNCHRONOUS CO.TfUNICATIONS SETUP SELECTION menu displays.
- 30. Choose Go to Task Selection The TASK SELECTION menu displays.
to continue with your regular work.
(*) Omit this step if using a dedicated line.
i e
8-164
, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Interrupting the Session Press HOLD on the keyboard anytime you want to interrupt the communication session--for example, to change diskettes or to change the Receive Diskette Slot. HOLD will be honored upon completion of the current Session Summary entry. HOLDING displays in the Communication Status field. Press COMM START to resume the communication session.
Cancelling a Document l
Press JOB CANCEL to cancel a document currently being sent or received. A Document Cancelled entry is added to the Session Summary. Communications continues with the next document to be sent or received, if any. -
Altering the Send Queue As you read in Chapter 7, you can press REQST anytime during the session to alter (change) the send queue.
Refer to Chapter 7, if necessary. Remember, if you alter a regular document in the send queue, you also must alter the distribute document that precedes the regular document.
Unattended Communications Documents can be queued for unattended communications--for example, after hours or any time you will be away from the Displaywriter for an extended period of time.
To communicate unattended, your modem must have the Auto Answer capability. The IBM 5520 will call your Displaywriter to initiate the ' communication session.
Sending and Receiving (IBM 5520) 8-165
Steps for tJnattend:d Communications 3
- 1. Follow Steps 1 through 26 on pages 8-159 through 8-163.
In Step 25, choose Attended No and Summary to Diskette Yes in the CHANGE SESSION OPTIONS mee.u .
- 2. After pressing COMM START (Step 26), setup the modem :for Auto Answer.
Notes:
- 1. During unattended communications, the diskette (s) containing the documents in the send queue must be loaded in the Diskette Unit.
Otherwise, the Di,splaywriter automatically cancels the document from the send queue if the diskette is not leaded when the document is ready to be communicated. A Document cancelled error and number are listed in the Session Summary.
- 2. Any documents received from the ' IBM SS20 are stored o~n a work diskette loaded in the Diskette Unit. The diskette should have adequate space for storing received documents.
- 3. If you want to Print any received documents,
../
choose Print After Receive Yes in the CHANGE SESSION OPTIONS menu.
However, when printing in an unattended mode:
The printer does not stop to prompt for element /printwheel changes or to change to a dif ferent paper size.
Tha Displaywriter does not Cancel on Error whnn a printing error occurs (for example, because of a long line or a long page).
Printing stops if a paper jam occurs in the Sheet Feed Paper Handler.
If the document (s) does not print correctly in an unatterded mode (Print After Receive Yes specified), you can revise and/or print the document later because it is stored on a work diskette.
8-166
. . OCL Supptrt and Rclet:d Publicaticns IBM 5520 supports other document distribution The commands and instructions (OCL). If the established procedure in your office will include sending other document distribution OCL as part of the communication session, a complete OCL listing can be found on page 8-177. The intent of this guide is not to teach you the additional OCL. A related publication, the IBM 5520 Administrative System Remote Device Operator's Guide, Form No. SC23-0746, teaches how to type the additional commands and instructions. Check with your communications coordinator or IBM Marketing Support Representative. You also may need to check with the IBM 5520 coordinator.
Sending and Receiving (IBM 5520) 8-167
. Probl ms During a Ccmmunicatitn Szssisn
- 1. Review the Session Su= mary entries for indications of Error conditions or Document cancelled conditions. '
Refer to Chapter 9--Messages, Su= mary Codes, and Status Terms in this guide for the cause and the action.
- 2. Check for an unresolved communication prempt or message. Refer to Chapter 9 in this guide for the cause and the action.
If you need to perform Work Diskette or Program Diskette Tasks as a result of the pro =pt or message, first press DISC and then press END to exit the communication session.
- 3. Check for an unresolved non-communication prompt or message: .
If using Textpack 1, 2, or 3: Refer to the IBM Displaywriter System Operator Reference Guide for the cause and the action.
If using Textpack 4: Refer to the IBM Displaywriter System Prompts and Messages Guide, Textpack 4/Reportpack , Form No.
S544-2122.
}
If you need to perform Work Diskette or Program Diskette Tasks as a result of the proc:pt or message, first press DISC and then press END to exit the communication session.
- 4. Refer to Chapter 10--What Happened? in this guide.
- 5. For suspected machine problems, refer to Step 1 in the IBM Displaywriter System Problem Determination Guide, Form No. S544-0860.
8-168
COMPATIBILITY CONSIDERATIONS WHEN SENDING
, TO.AN IBM 5520 DISPLAY STATION You should be aware of the following compatibility considerations when creating documents to send to an IBM 5520 Display Station.
Printers The IBM 5520 supports three printers.
IBM 5258 Ink Jet Printer IBM 5257 Printwheel Printer IBM 5219 Printwheel Printer Left Margin The minimum left margin is:
5258 Printer = 3 5257 Printer = 2 5219 Printer = 1 When sending Page Image with Format Line, a left margin .
change is sent as a Stop code. See Format Changes on page 8-172.
Printing Lines Per Inch
{
The supported printing lines per inch are:
5258 Printer = 5.3 and 6 5257 Printer = 5.3, 6, and 8 5219 Printer = 5.08, 5.3, 6, 8, and 24 Sending and Receiving (IBM 5520 Compatibility) 8-169 l
Lina Spacing
-m The IBM 5520 supports single, one and c'ne-half, double, '
and triple line spacing. However, when sending Page Image with Format Line, only single and double spacing ,
are sent correctly. Any other line spacing choice is sent as a Stop code. See Format Changcs on page 8-172.
First Line, First Page First Line, Following Pages The minimum first typing lines are: ,
5258 Printer = 3 5257 Printer = 2 5219 Printer = 1 Hrader First Printing Line -
- The minimum First Header Lines are:
5258 Printer = 3 5257 Printer = 1 5219 Printer = 1 -
Line Alignment Justify and Justify 1/2 may produce slightly different distribution of white space between wcrds on .a line when printed at an IBM 5520 printer. The last line of each page will not justify because the Dispicpriter inserts a Required Carrier Keturn at the end of each page.
8-170
- =
o Typsstyl? Changss Typestyle changes to a different pitch are sent as Stop Codes. See Format Changes on page 8-172.
Keyboard Changes Keyboard changes are not supported. When sending Page Image with Format Line, the Displaywriter sends text according to the Keyboard ID specified in the CHANGE SETUP SESSION OPTIONS menu in the active communication setup.
If the character (s) is on the keyboard specified, the character is sent correctly. If it is not on the keyboard specified, an underline (which represents a substitute character) is sent to the IBM 5520 Display Station.
If a substitute character is sent, the message Underlines
- substituted for characters in document is added to the Session Summary entry. Tell the IBM 5520 Display Station operator to review the received document for underline substitutions and to revise the document.
l Documents with Symbols If a document is created on the Displaywriter that contains KYB CHG instructions for symbols, the symbols are sent to an IBM 5520 Display Station as substitute characters. See Keyboard Changes above.
Sending and Receiving (IBM 5520 Compatibility) 8-171
Whsn sending Pags Imags with Format Line, the only format changts that are sent are line spacing (Single or Double ,
only), Tab Settings, and Line Length (Right Margin).
Some format a Typestyle changes Change to aare sent as Stop codes--for example different ,
margin change. pitch and or a left -
at all, such as a first line or keyboard change.Other f You or formatshould tell represents.
change the IBM 5520 operator what each Stop code telling the operator are: Three suggested methods for 1.
Use the note instruction to send a format setup name or use the comment command to send up to 60 characters of special instructions.
Administrative System Remote See the IBM 5520 Device Operator's Guide for further instructions.
2.
Type thesent.
document information as the last page of the a regular 3.
Type the information in a separate document and add it to the send queue where appr'opriate. -
l
-172 -
9
Fgematting Ccntrels When sending page image documents to an IBM 5520 Display Station, the Displaywriter automatically resolves the text formatting controls listed below. Documents should be paginated before sending.
DISPLAYWRITER FORMAT IBM 5520 DISPLAY STATION CONTROL RECEIVES Begin/End Keep Instruction Not communicated. Resolved by pagination prior to sending.
Begin/End Tables Not communicated. Resolved by pagination prior to sending.
Begin/End Underline Instruction Text /Reqqired Backspaces /
Underlines Block Overstrike Instruction Text / Required Backspaces /
Overstrike Text Center Instruction Required Backspaces / Text Center Tab Regular Tab / Required Backspaces /
Text Comma Tab -
Regular Tab / Unit Backspace /
Required Backspaces / Text Decimal Tab Regular Tab / Unit Backspace /
Required Backspaces / Text Flush Right Tab Regular Tab / Unit Backspace /
Required Backspaces / Text Index Return Index Return Normal Tab Regular Tab Page End Instruction Page End Required Backspace Required Backspace Required Hyphen Required Hyphen Required Page End Required Carrier Return Required Tab Required Tab Stop Code Stop Code Superscript / Subscript Superscript / Subscript (Half Index) (Half Index)
Switch Code Switch Code Word Underline Instruction Word Underscore Sending and Receiving (I3M 5520 Coopatibility) 8-173 F
.' Pag 3 Imaga Fermtt Lina Supp:rt IBM Displ ywrit:r and tho IBM 5520 '
3' DISPLAYWRITER FORMAT )
CONTROL IBM 5520 DISPLAY STATION RECEIVES Change Format Line Spacing
- Format Line Control 1/2 Spacing Single Spacing and Stop Code Single Spacing Single Spacing One end ont.-half Spacing Single Spacing and Stop Code Double Spacing Double Spacing Triple Spacing Double Spacing and Stop Code Tine Alignment 1/2 Justify Not communicated Justify Not communicated Left Play Right Margin Right Margin Tabs Tabs
- Typestyle*
Stop code if changed after beginning of document Lines /cm. or in. Not communicated Adjust Line Endings Adjust Yes/No Zone Width Not communicated
- Left Margin
- Stop code if changed after First Typing Line, the first line, first page Not communicated First Page* .
First Typing Line, Not communicated #
}
Follcwing Pages*
Last Typing Line Not communicated Paper Size Not communicated Paper Scurce Not communicated
(*) See pages 8-169 through 8-172 for additional information.
E 8-174 b
~~
Additianal Ftrm tting Consid raticns Wh n Sanding Because the Displaywriter resolves many formatting controls when sending page image, you may want to consider the following when creating documents to send to an IBM 5520 Display Station.
Header / Footer Text If the document to be sent contains header / footer text, the Displaywriter sends the header / footer text on each page of the document. If the document is to be repaginated at the IBM 5520 Display Station, you may want to delete the header /focter text before sending, and tell the IBM 5520 operator to add the text after the document has been received.
First Line The Displaywriter always sends a first line of 3 followed by the proper amount of indexes to cause printing to begin on the correct first typing line. This information is sent with each page of the document. If the document is to be repaginated at the IBM 5520 Display Station, the indexes may no longer be at the beginning of each page.
To prevent indexes from being sent, you may change your First Typing Line to 1 in the PAGE FORMAT menu when ,
creating the document. Tell the IBM 5520 operator to '
change the first typing line for the document prior to repaginating.
Begin/End Underlines When a document contains Begin/End Underline Instructions, the Displaywriter converts and sends these i
' instructions as a series of Text / Required Backspaces / Underlines. If the document is to be repaginated at the IBM 5520 Display Station, line endings may rearrange and the underlines may print incorrectly.
If the document is to be repaginated at the IBM 5520 Display Station, delete the Begin/End Underline Instructions before sending. Tell the IBM 5520 operator i
i l Sending and Receiving (IBM 5520 Co=patibility) 8-175
to cdd tha undorlinsa, whara sppropriato, after tho dccument hco botn repaginctsd.
3 i j
Block Overstrike When a document contains Block Overstrike Instructions, the Displaywriter converts and sends these instructions as a series of Text / Required Backspaces /0verstrike Text.
If the document is to be repaginated at the IBM 5520 Display Station, lit.e endings may rearrange and the overstrike text may print incorrectly.
If the document is to be repaginated at the IBM 5520 Display Station, delete the Block Overstrike Instructions before sending the document. Tell the IBM 5520 operator to add the overstrike text, where appropriate, after the document has been repaginated. ,
Required Carrier Return During communications, the Displaywriter 'nserts i a Required Carrier Return at the end of the last line on each page. If the document is to be repaginated at the IBM 5520 Display Station, the last line of the page sent may no longer be the last line of the repaginated ,
document. Tell the IBM 5520 operator that he/she may need to delete the Required Carrier Return prior to repagination in order to print the document correctly.
. Note: When communicating documents with an indented format (Required Tab) that is carried over from page-to page, the indention level is automatically re-established by the Displaywriter at the beginning of the first body text line of each page.
If the document is repaginated at the IBM 5520 Display Station and the first body text line is no longer at the top of the page, the document will have double the amount of indention levels somewhere within the page.
The remote location operator should delete the unnecessary Required Tabs, after deleting the Required Carrier Return.
i 8-176
Document D!stributi:n OCL Support IBM Disp'aywrit!r and IBM 5520 The Displaywriter does not generate document d t s '
OCL. The following list of document distribut s "*'
- be typed on the Displaywriter, and then sent b' 5520 during a communication session.
- d'
,signon destinatioig
, password password
, distribute priority
,obtain acknowledg.
,obtain all document
,obtain list personal
, list note
, cancel block size
,off .
, originator
, comment Note: Commands and instructions are generaliv by additional information to further describe i t I *,*
or instruction. Check with your *"~
coordinator, IBM 5520 coordinator, or IBM "D comii.nU,')"k Support Representative. e e - - _;
Sending and Receiving (IBM 5520 Coopatibility ,
$~ _
,' COMPATIBILITY CONSIDERATIONS WHEN RECEIVING .
FROM AN. IBM 5520 DISPLAY STATION 1
Header / Footer Text '
As you have read, the IBM 5520 sends an image of each page. If the document has header text, the IBM 5520 inserts the proper number of carrier returns between the header text and the first line of the body text. See First Typing Line on page 8-179.
If a document has footer text, the IBM 5520 inserts the proper number of carier returns between the last line of the body text and the first line of the footer text.
If the document has no header text, the IBM 5520 inserts the proper number of carrier returns frem the header line to the first line of body text. .
The IBM 5520 Display Station operator should tell you what the First Header Line and First Footer Line should be.
Rcquired Page End The IBM 5520 inserts a Required Page End at the end of each page when sending documents to the Displaywriter.
If the received document is edited at the Displaywriter, the Required Page End instructions must be deleted if the document is to be repaginated.
i l
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l 8-178 l
l l
First Typing Lina
, The IBM 5520 does not send the First Typing Line with the document. The IBM 5520 operator should tell you what the First Typing Line should be.
Typestyle Changes The initial typestyle used to create the document and any typestyle changes within a document are not sent by the IBM 5520. However, if the IBM 5520 is set up to send Format Lines for format changes, it will send a For=at Line for the margins and tabs if the document contains a typestyle change to a different pitch.
If the IBM 5520 is set up to send Stop codes for format changes, a Stop code is received for each typestyle
, , change in the document.
In either case, the IBM 5520 Display Station operator should indicate the initial typestyle and any typestyle changes within the document. See Format /Stop Code List on page 8-181.
Indented Text During communications , the IBM 5520 does not carry over any indention levels (Required Tab) from page to page.
~
The Displaywri;er operator cay need to re-establish any indention levels on the appropriate pages.
Sending and Receiving (IBM 5520 Compatibility) 8-179
1 ina gnment y
The IBM 5520 Display Station sends a Required Carrier Return at the end of the last line on each page. If the document is to be justified during printing, the last i
line on each page will not justify. The Displaywriter operator should delete the Required Carrier Return before printing.
Left Margin The initial lef t margin used to create the document and any left margin changes within the document are not sent by the IBM 5520.
However, if the IBM 5520 is set up to send Stop codes for format changes, a Stop code is received for each left margin change in the document.' The IBM 5520 operator should indicate what left margin changes to make. See Format /Stop Code List on page 8-181.
Information Documents received from .the IBM 5520 are preceded by an '
information command. The information is displayed in the Session Summary frame. The information contains:
- Destination Name: (Local address of your Displaywriter)
- Document Name: (Distribution Document Name)
- Note: (Format Identifier)
- Comment: (Up to 60 characters of information)
I a-180 .
Rectivo Document Err:r ;
If you do not receive a document from the IBM 5520 because of communication errors, the IBM 5520 sends the document again during the next cemmunication session.
Transmission Document The last document received from an IBM 5520 is always a transmission document. It contains a summary of the documents sent to your location.
Format /Stop Code List When receiving documents that contain Format Lines or Stop codes, the IBM 5520 Display Station operator may also send a Format /Stop Code list as the last page of a document or as a separate document p' receding the regular document.
The Format /Stop Code list tells you the foruattins .
changes to make at the beginning of the regular document and the formatting changes to .make at each Stop code or certain CHG FMT's.
Note: If, after receiving a document, any format changes
- are made to the document at the Display %riter, the document should be repaginated prior to printing. Specify Adjust Line Endings No and Adjust Page Endings No in the PAGINATE DCCUMENT menu.
Sending and Receiving (IBM 5520 Cocpatibility) 8-181 4- g@
Fcrmatting Ccntrcls When receiving page image ,i resolves the text formatting ..[,'"' "'ones , the IBM 5520
' ' "Is lis tec belcw.
IBM 5520 FORMAT CONTROL Backspace 1 DISPLAYWRIit ig 'IECElVES Backspace 1 Begin/End Keep Not communic a q Pagination g,, Resolved 67 Center Instruction Center Set Tab Required Bact. g ";'""' to sending.
""! Tex Regular Text Tab /Ito,'D . in1B ackspaces/
Comma Set Tab Regular Text Tab /lto,I,' lB ackspaces/
' "'I Decimal Tab Regular Text Tab /k,,,'"I 'B "'I ackspaces/
Index Return Index Return Instruction Start /End Not communica..,,
Line Center pagination i.,, "".olved by Normal Tab Regular Tab /s ,,,,,'" '.. sending.
Normal Tab "'
Repeat Instruction Received but i Required Backspace Required Carrier Return RequiredBacke.,I,"""l Required Cari ."*
Required Hyphen .
Required Hyp6,.' "* ' 'irn Required Page End Instruction Required Pag. :
and Page En. ,,,'"'l '
Required Tab Required Tab Right Set Tab Regular Tab /S,,,,
i Secp Code Backspaces /h ,,'/luired SCCp Code Superscript / Subscript Superscript /S.,,
(Half Index) (Half Inde,', , , ' ' , M Switch Code Switch Code Word Underscore Word Underlin.
8-182
i, o PrgE im:gb Ferm;t Lino Suppert IBM 5520 and IBM Displaywriter IBM 5520 SENDS DISPLAYWRITER RECElVES Format Line Change Format !
Line Spacing Single Spacing Single Spacing Double Spacing DoubleSpacing Line Length Right Margin Tab Settings Tab Settings 2
i i
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1 Sending and Receiving CISM 5520 Co:patibility) s . t r. 3
..v *-
COMPATIBI'LITY CONSIDERATIONS WHEN SENDING .
THROUGH AN IBM 5520 TO ANOTHER COMMUNICATING '
PRODUCT (DISPLAYWRITER, IBM OS/6 PRODUCT, IBM MAG CARD 11, OR IBM 6240)
When sending documents through an IBM 5520 to another communicating product, you should be aware of the compatibility considerations for the final destination product.
Determine the final destinationproduct type from the list below. Then, turn to the appropriate page and
. read the information presented.
Nots: When communicating to another Displaywriter, the send format is usually Media Image. However, Media Image cannot be used when communicating through an IBM 5520. The send format chosen is usually Page Image with OCL.
In most casen, the Displaywriter resembles an IBM OS/6 when communicating to another Displaywriter through an, IBM 5520. Therefore, when cortmunicating through an IBM 5520 to another Displaywriter, refer to the IBM OS/6 pages in this chapter, rather unan the Displaywriter pages.
Final Destination .
IBM Displaywriter (Refer to IBM OS/6 pages)
IBM OS/6 Information Processor. . . . . . . 8-36 IBM 6640 Document Printer . . . . . . . . . 8-68 IBM 6670 Information Distributor. . . . . . 8-102 IBM Mag Card II or IBM 6240 Mag Card Typewriter . . . . . . . . . . . 8-132 1
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8-184 l
i l
i COMPATIBILITY CONSIDERATIONS WHEN RECEIVING THROUGH AN IBM 5520 FROM ANOTHER COMMUNICATING PRODUCT (DISPLAYWRITER, IBM OS/6 PRODUCT, IBM MAG CARD 11, OR IBM 6240)
When receiving documents through the IBM 5520 from another communicating product, you should be aware of the compatibility considerations for the originating product. Determine the product type from the list below. Then, turn to the appropriate page in this chapter and read the information presented.
Originating Product IBM Displaywriter (Refer to IBM OS/6 pages)
IBM OS/6 Information Processor . . . . . . . 8-45 IBM 6640 Document Printer. . . . . . . . . . 8-77 IBM 6670 Information Distributor . . . . . . 8-112 IBM Mag Card II/ IBM 6240 . . . . . . . . . . 8-140 l
Sending and Receiving (IBM 5520 Compatibility) 8-185
__ . - . . _ ., 4
..e m .
, .; STEffS TO COMMUNICATE DISPLAYWRITER RESPONSE a.-
- 25. (Optional Step)
If you want to change the session options, for example, the Receive Diskette Slot and/
or Print After Receive:
l l a. Press REQST. The cc==unications REQUEST TASKS menu displays.
i l b. Choose Change Sessien The CHA.NGE SESSION OPTIONS cenu
- Options. displays.
- c. Change the appropriate options.
- d. When finished, press ENTER The Session Su==ary frame displays.
to return to the Session Su==ary frame. ,
- 26. Press COMM START. - SWITCHED LINE
_ ,= READY displays in the Cc==unicarica l Status field. !
l DEDICATED LINE !
_ CONNECTED displays in the Cc==unication Status field and l is replaced by ON-LINE SEND. The 8 \ documents in the send queue are '
sent to the IBM 5520. After the l[ last docu=ent is sent, ON-LINE 1
RECEIVE displays, and the IBM 5520 l t '
sends the document (s) it has for ycur locatien. After each ,
doce :ent is received, a ce=pletien
=essage is entered in the Session Su==ary. Continue with S:ep 29.
4 4
l Sending and Receiving (IBM 5520) S -1:53
_y .
yq, a n . i ; .
. . , e STEPS TO COMMUNICATE DISPLAYWRITER RESPONSE 2
- 27. Go to Talk on the telephone and call the remote location.
Attended remote: Tell the individual at the remote location that you are ready to communicate and give them any information about the session.
Unattended remote: Continue with Step 28.
- 28. Go to Data on the telephone CONNECTED displays in the after the remote location Communication Status field and goes to Data. (You should is replaced by ON-LINE SEND.
hear a high-pitched tone after The documents in the send queue the remote locacion goes are sent to the IBM 5520. After to Data.) the last document is sent, ON-LINE RECEIVE displays and the IBM 5520 sends the document (s) it has for your location. After each document is received, a co=pletion messagb is entered in the Session Su= mary. Continue with Step 29.
]
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- 29. At the end of the session, End of Session displays in the press DISC, and then press Session Su= mary frame, and then END. the BINARY SYNCHRONOUS COMMUNICATIONS SETUP SEI.ECTION menu displays.
- 30. Choose Go to Task Selection The TASK SEI.ECTION menu displays.
to continue with your regular work.
(*) Omit this step if using a dedicated line.
8-164
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of l 1
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING l Docket Nos. 50 445-1 COMPANY, et al. l and 50-446-1 l
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station l Station, Units 1 and 2) {
CASE'S PARTIAL ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING__THE UPPER LATERAL RESTRAINT BEAM in the form of AFFIDAVIT OF CASE WITNESSES hCK D0YLE AND MARK WALSH L
SSRS. WALSH AND D0YL
- 1. Applicants state:
"The primary purpose of the upper, as well as the lower, lateral restraint beams is to provide restraint to the steam generator during a design basis accident caused by postulated breaks in the primary coolant loop and the main steam line (Affidavit of Dr. Robert C. Iotti, at 13)."
We disagree with portions of this statement. Although it may have been Applicants' original intent that the primary purpose be as stated above, the upper lateral restraint will also be restraining the concrete walls, which may provide the largest stress within the member.
Therefore, it could be argued that the primary purpose should be restraining the concrete walls; certainly this is a purpose which cannot be ignored.
F0;A-35-59
, us
i . ' .
As far as the lower lateral restraint is concerned (as admitted by ,
Applicants in their statement 2. following), this has never been an issue at these hearings, and was never brought up before by CASE or anyone else (except ascoveredin(koylhDeposition/ Testimony, Exhibit 669), until Applicants filed their Motion for Summary Disposition. (In the jk yle] Deposition / Testimony, it was discussed at some length, but during the hearings, only the upper lateral restraint was the subject of concern and testimony.) We believe it has been brought up now only as a red herring to distract the Board from the actual issue of concern to CASE. Applicanos also used the lower lateral restraint to decrease theloadduetothbrmalexpansion,aswillbediscussedbelow. (They have deviated from their original approach and introduced sophisticated methodology relying on coupling of components rather than individual analysis.)
- 2. Applicants state:
"In response to the Board's December 28, 1983, Memorandum and Order (Quality Assurance for Design), Applicants performed extensive analyses to demonstrate the adequacy of the upper lateral restraint beams and of the associated reinforced concrete supporting walls (id,. at 2).
Although the discussion of this issue has centered on the ef fects of a LOCA on the upper lateral restraint and the supporting walls, Applicants' analyses were performed to examine the ef fects of both a
' LOCA and a main steam line break on both the upper and lower laceral restraints and associated steam generator compartment walls (id,. at 2-3).
l 2
The analyses measured the effects produced by the thermal expansion of the restraints, as well as the effects produced by concurrent mechanical pressure and seismic (for LOCA only) loads which were postulated to occur (id,., at 2, 5-10, 13, Tables 1 and 2).
Further, the model used by Applicants in their enalyses properly accounted for all stiffness contributions to the restraining walls from adjacent floors and walls (id. at 3)."
We agree with the first sentence.
Applicants' second sentence confirms CASE's discussion in answer
- 1. preceding.
The obvious thrust of Applicants' second, third and fourth sentences, as well as the overall thrust of this entire item, is to attempt to persuade the Licensing Board that the upper lateral restraint has now been properly analyzed and proven to be acceptable as is. We disagree with this premise, as discussed below.
Applicants have finally stated why they didn't consider LOCA (see Iotti Affidavit, footnote 5, pages 13 and 14); they quote from their FSAR, Section 3.8.3.3.3, 2(b):
" thermal loads are neglected when they are secondary and self-limiting in nature and when the material is ductile."
However, Applicants neglected to consider the forces exerted on the concrete walls which are non-ductile; they did not check shear stresses of the bolts or the beam itself. They cannot dismiss the shear stresses, because the shearing stresses in the beam also have a potential for non-ductile f ailure, as referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.124 (CASE Exhibit 743, admitted into evidence at Tr. 5901, " Service Limits and Loading Combinations for Class 1 Linear-Type Component Supports," page 1.124-2, B.1.b. Allowable Increase of Service Limits),
which states:
3
_y
C>' .
. "The increase permitted by NF-3231.1 and F-1370(a) of Section III for shear stresses or shear stress range should not be more than 1.5 times the level A service limits because of the potential for non-ductile behavior."
In addition, the bolts for this beam are derived from censile and shear stress limits and their non-linear interaction; again quoting f rom Regulatory Guide 1.124, page 1.124-2, B.1. Design by Linear Elastic Analysis, b. Allowable Increase of Service Limits.:
" Allowable service limits for bolted connections are derived from tensile and shear stress limits and their nonlinear interaction; they also change with the size of the bolt. For this reason, the increases permitted by NF-3231.1, XVII-2110(a), and F-1370(a) of Section III are not directly applicable to allowable shear stresses and allowable stresses for bolts and bolted connections."
Since the shear stresses have a potential for a non-ductile f ailure, the LOCA environmental ef fects must be considered for the upper lateral restraint (and all pipe supports). -
It is also noteworthy to observe that in their Motion for Summary Disposition, Applicants did not show the effects on the bolts that support the upper lateral restraint due to the mechanical load or LOCA.
In fact, it appears that Applicants have not analyzed steel structures due to the results from a LOCA, based on the premise that all stresses in the steel will result in ductile failures. This premise is not true for shear stresses within the steel members and the shear stresses of the bolted connections.
In addition, even assuming that Applicants' statements were true, they have ignored another major aspect of this problem. They are 4
~
?
l offering a parametric study of procedures leading to design decisions - I I
which were non-existent at the time of design execution and construction. They have offered no documentation (and CASE is convinced none exists) which initially justified the construction. i Rather than relying on design base documentation and calculations, Applicants relied on e gineering judgement or unsupported assumptions in their design of the upper lateral restraint (as they did regarding numerous other structures, systems, and components at CPSES). This is yet another example of Applicants' not being able to produce the analysis which led to the original design and construction, and r.herefore puts them in the position of waffling to produce justification which they hope be accepted.
This concept of offering one design analysis which fails to qualify a support under the most a'dverse postulated situation followed a second procedure which, in all charity, was fatally flawed; and ultimately of fering a' finite element procedure of dubious accuracy is better known as pencilwhipping to justify a construction fact which at this point in time remains debatable.
l Had the Applicants been on firm ground with their original design basis, then the introduction of their first postulated premise i
f justifying the design would have sufficed. By Applicants' own statements above, they have in effect admitted that they did not have a sound basis for initiating construction of the support on which the i
5
\
prevention of LOCA is dependent. Since this critical support required an entirely new approach to qualification (for example, a time-history analysis, a redefinition of loading, and a composite finite element (computer) analysis including members never considered in the first instance), the effect to justify the support is far in excess of that which was undertaken for the original design which led to construction.
The safety questions which have arisen because the original analysis was insufficient to insure the safety of the support place this question in the realm of 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3) and (4) reportability.
(See, for instance, CASE Exhibit 300, copy attached, page 5(c), NRC Staff Guidance - 10 CFR 50.55(e), Construction Deficiency Reporting; see especially items 3.(11), 3.(111), 4., 5., 6.b. second paragraph, and 6.c. first and second paragraphs.) (We realize that the Board has on occasion held that matters such as reportability under 10 CFR _
50.55(e) are legal questions not requiring expert testimony. However, we must point out that decisions are being made every day at Comanche Peak as to whether or not to report deviations or deficiencies under 10 CFR 50.55(e), and such decisions are not being made by attorneys.
Perhaps the individuals making such decisions are only somewhat knowledgeable in this important regard and this-is one of the problems at the plant.)
Applicants in this Motion for Summary Disposition are therefore in 4
effect requesting that the Board issue judicial sanctification for a
! violation of the law.
6
, e Y ?A &
In effect, everything Applicants have said regarding the matter of the upper and lower lateral supports is totally irrelevant to any issue which has been raised in these hearings, because in order to qualify this support, a report under 10 CFR 50.55(e) was a prerequisite in order for whatever procedure was ucilized to have had the authorization of the Commission.
- 3. Applicants state:
"The assumptions underlying the analyses were conservative.
First, it was assumed that compartment pressure and temperature ef fects due to a LOCA would occur in combination with seismic loads (id. at 5 and 14), though an earthquake was not assumed to occur colmeident with the postulated main steam line break, which is in accordance with the NRC Staff position (id,. at 5-6).
Second, mechanical loads such as jet impingement were postulated at their maximum values in combination with maximum thermal and differential pressure effects, though this is not required in view of their time histories (id,. at 5 and 7).
Third, the maximum actual temperature in the lower restraint was assumed to occur simultaneously with the maximum in the upper restraint, while in fact the respective maximum temperatures occur at different time s ( id,. a t 8 , n. 4 ) .
Fourth, for purposes of the main steam line break analysis, Applicants used a split break at 30% power at the steam generator outlet nozzle, since this results in the highest temperature in the compartment out of all the breaks considered (id, at 9).
Fifth, 450 psi was used to represent the absolute upper-bound estimate of the tensile strength of concrete at Comanche Peak even though a more t
appropriate value would have been 400 psi; this insured the I
conservatism of the reaction loads produced by constraint of the i
thermal expansion of the restraint beams (id. at 11-12)."
We do not agree with the first sentence and in some instances, l
t i
l l
l
~
7
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m with the underlying premises set forth in the suceeding sentences.
Applicants have gone into great detail to convince the Board that they have used conservative assumptions. However, when one looks at the specific items Applicants have indicated to support their assertion, it can readily be seen that their assumptions are in actuality not conservative. In some instances, they are actually not conservative, and on others, they are only reasonable and what Applicants should have assumed (which is far different from Applicants' claimed conservatism).
For example, regarding the first assumption, it is only reasonable to assume that a LOCA would occur with the seismic load, because the seismic load may be an aftershock and, as CASE has seen (through CASE Exhibit 669B, items 8T and 8U, where the OBE load was greater than the SSE load), if an SSE load caused a break, the aftershock or the OBE load would be greater. If the Applicants had not considered this load condition, they would not have been in compliance with their own FSAR (Applicants Exhibit 3). At Section 3.8.3.3.2, equation 2c lists this very load combination.
In regard to the second assumption (third sentence), the maximum LOCA temperature due to a main steam line break can occur at the same time there are jet impingement loads from the stean generator due to the same accident conditions. This is net a conservative assumption, since the Applicants' FSAR (Applicants' Exhibit 3) requires them to do so at Section 3.8.3.3.2, equation 2d, for the concrete internal structures.
8
The third assumption (fourth sentence) which Applicants are ,
claiming is conservative is that they are assuming the temperatures for the lower and upper restraints occur simultaneously; however, although this sounds on the surface as though it would be conservative, this is in fact an unconservative assumption.
The reason this is unconservative is that they are allowing no restraint at the bottom; by allowing the bottom to grow at the same rate due to a temperature rise, there are no stresses induced within the structure due to the thermal gradient. The bottom is actually restrained and is not expanding at the same rate as the upper lateral restraint, but they are analyzing it as if there were no restraint and as if it were expanding at the same rate as the upper lateral restraint; they are not allowing for the stresses which are developed, as a result of thermal expansion. They are not showing in their analyses that those thermal expansion stresses within the concrete wall or the beam itself even exist. If the lower lateral restraint does not expand, that does not allow the wall to expand; therefore, it is restricting the upper lateral restraint from expanding; consequently, the stresses within the beam and the wall increase.
The fourth assumption (fifth sentence) which Applicants claim is conservative does not seem conservative; it just seems appropriate.
- The fifth assumption (sixth sentence) which they claim is conse rvative is actually unconservative due to cracking of the me 9
1 ;
< n _
concrete. As Applicants' witness Scheppele testift'ed in the June 1982 ,
hearings, concrete has no tensile strength; it is the reinforcement that provides the strength. He stated:
"In the design of reinforced concrete, primarily they use concrete as a compression element. Concrete really is never used as tension because concrete in itself -- as a tension element because concrete as tension is a very weak material.
"As a consequence, we marry the compressive strength of concrete and the tensile strength of steel, and basically that's a marriage which has worked out well for many, many hundreds of years." (Tr.
852/14-21.)
"If you can visualize something like concrete, which is a brittle material when it's subjected to a tension it would tend to crack, and basically the design of reinforced concrete structures does indeed involve cracking, because in order for the reinforcing steel to physically work it is necessary for the concrete in most instances to crack." (Tr. 853/6-11.)
"As I mentioned previously, concrete is not used as a tensile resistant material, witnout the use of reinforcing steel, which, in effect, provides the tensile strength in reinforced concrete."
(Tr. 866/8-11.)
"I think that when you get this tension force which I mentioned previously, concrete is not good at withstanding. L' hen you get this tensile force resulting from the shrinkage, then the concrete dcas have hairline cracks, which seek out the most -- the stakest point in the concrete matrix." (Tr. 871/11-15.)
In addition, the Applicants state (Iotti Af fidavit, page 12):
"Another beneficial ef fect that has been ignored so as to overestimate the reaction loads is the heating of the inner surface at the concrete walls surrounding the compartment during the accident. This surf ace heating would tend to introduce compressive stresses at the inner surface and tensile stresses at the outer surface. The latter could lead to cracking and additional relief."
Although this could lead to additional relief, it also means there 10
r is no tensile strength now and a less stif f section for seismic -
considerations. And, although assuming an uncracked section (that is, the 450 psi tensile strength) is conservative for thermal loadings, it is unconservative for seismic and mechanical loadings. In addition, when evaluating the stresses induced due to the loadings prescribed (i.e., seismic, mechanical, thermal), the use of zero censile strength should be included due to the fact that there will be a cracked section. As Applicants' witness Vivirito stated (Tr. 6044/17 through 6045/1):
"Following some of the f acts that reflect the forces of concrete members that cannot be accurately depicted. One, the state of cracking in the concrete. Concrete cracks under load. You don't know exactly how much it is going to crack, or whether it is going to remain uncracked, and that has a big effect on the question."
"The modules of elasticity. That has an impact on the deflection.
For reinforced ccncrete, there is at least a 10-percent error in predicting modules of elasticity. Shrinkage and compression of the concrete, especially after the wall has been up for six or seven years. That shrinkag;n will tend to increase the deflection."
This is just addressing the items the Applicants have stated if their Motion for Summary Disposition which they supposedly thought were conservative, only to hope that we would not have time to look at them.
This is not the first time we've had to discuss the Applicants' calculations on the upper lateral restraint where we found unconservative errors or assumptions that were presented to this Board.
In particular, we call the Board's attention to the calculation performed by Gibbs & Hill and in CASE Exhibits 763, 763B, and 838, and 11
as discussed in the transcript at Tr. 6017-6034/9. We feel quite confident that there were other "conservatisms" that may not in reality be conservative, that Applicants know this and that is why they did not expand on them and provide that information to the Board.
On the subject of the proper use of engineering, one must be aware that conservatism is a way of life to ensure structural survivability.
For example, if a professional engineer were commissioned to design a warehouse, the building commission obviously would not allow claims of code conservatism as an excuse for exceeding code allowables.
4 Applicants state:
"The results of the analyses of the reinforced concrete walls show that the stresses in the concrete and reinforcing steel produced by the maximum thermal expansion of the upper and lower lateral restraints are within the allowable stress limits of the walls (id,. at 12 and Table 1)."
Based on the unconservative assumptions discussed in answer 3.
above, it is hard to tell if the reinforced concrete walls are within allowable stress limits as claimed by Applicants. The results shown in Table 1 (referenced by Applicants in their statement) do not include the stresses due to seismic and mechanical loads. Therefore, any statement that the maximum thermal expansion of the upper and lower lateral restraints are within allowable stress limits is unsubstantiated and without merit.
12
= _
1 1
- 5. Applicants state:
"With respect to the lateral restraint beams, the mechanical loads f rom the assumed breaks occur at 0.2 seconds and exist for less than 0.5 seconds.
The thermal expansion builds up to its maximum over the next few minutes (id. at 13).
Therefore, during the time the thermal expansion builds up to its maximum, the restraint has already served its primary function of resisting the mechanical loads produced by the postulated accident ( id,.
at 13)."
We do not agree with the thrust of Applicants' argument in this item, especially the third sentence. As discussed in answer 3. above, the assumed break can occur after a main steam line break, and this was not considered. Applicants' last sentence above is not correct, and it could be argued that the primary function of the restraint is to resist the mechanical loads at the same time there is a LOCA from a main steam line break; in any event, this possibility cannot be ignored.
- 6. Applicants state:
" Table 2, showing the stresses in the beams, demonstrates that, even though the beam has already performed its function by the time the temperature reaches its peak, the stresses in the beam due to the peak temperature are well within the allowable limits."
We disagree with this statement. Applicants' underlying premise that "the beam has already performed its function by the time the ,
temperature reaches its peak" is incorrect. As discussed previously in _
answer 5., the mechanical loads can occur af ter a main steam line break, and this beam would at that time be required to perform its intended function. ,
1 13
r .
In summary, to address the overall thrust of Applicants' entire Motion for Summary Disposition, 1,n the case of the upper lateral restraint, Applicants have a structure critical to the health and safety of the public which is designed, f abricated, constructed, etc.,
but for this structure, we have three dif ferent methodologies for justification:
(1) The original design analysis for engineering judgement. This was the original analys.is caed te produce the design which CASE alleged to be inadequate.
(2) The second attempt at justification which was offered at the hearings and was not only shown to be fatally flawed, but Applicants and NRC Staff concurred. When this equation proposed by Applicants was correctly pursued, it proved the upper lateral restraint would fail.
(3) Now we have this attempt to couple half the building to dismf oate forces in order to justify the support, and this is also a method which we dispute. Not only because it is not a standard industry procedure to of fer specific analysis af ter-the-fact, but as shown above, the procedure is flawed.
What we have in these procedures are two facts: CASE alleges that improper or in fact no procedures (which amounts to engineering judgement) were used to produce a specific or generic design.
Applicants arguejcie facto that this is no problem, since their staf f and agents can produce excuses faster than they can be proved to be 14
flawed, particulary when the NRC Staff never challenges (and in fact ,
concurred in all previous cases) with each subsequent attempt to justify by analysis in this moving target concept.
As the Board is no doubt already awart, there are many questions which have been raised by the NRC Staff regarding this particular issue, and we do not believed that the Staff will be answering regarding it anytime soon. However, we believe that the Board and other parties should be made aware of the information we have included herein, and are submitting it as a partial answer. We do not intend it as a complete answer, and ask that the Board allow us to supplement it upon the receipt of additional information which the Staf f (and CASE) has not yet received.
Attachmenet CASE Exhibit 300, NRC Staf f Guidance - 10 CFR 50.55(e), Construction Deficiency Reporting 15
~
The preceding CASE's Answer to Applicants' Statement of Material Facts As To Which There Is No Cenuine Issue was prepared jointly under the personal direction of the undersigned, CASE Witnesses Jack Doyle and Mark Walsh. We can be contacted through CASE President, Mrs. Juanita Ellis, 1426 S. Polk, Dallas, Texas 75224, 214/946-9446.
Our qualifications and background are already a part of the record in these proceedings. (See CASE Exhibit 842 Revision to Resume of Jack Doyle, accepted into evidence at Tr. 7042, and CASE Exhibit 841, Fevision to Resume of Mark Walsh, accepted into evidence at Tr. 7278; see also Board's 12/28/83 Memorandum and Order (Quality Assurance for Design), pages 14-16.)
We have read the statements therein, and they are true and correct to the best of our knowledge and belief. We do not consider that Applicants have, in their Motion for Summary Disposition, adequately responded to the issues raised' by us; however, we have attempted to comply with the Licensing Board's directive to answer only g pecific statements made by Applicants.
(Signed) Mark Walsh l STATE OF TEXAS On this, the M 3 day of [ M M , 1984, personally appeared 6,rka Walsh] known to me to be f e person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for the purposes therein expressed.
Subscribed and sworn before me on the M7 day of CLW/t/4*[ ,
1984 [
,5$n:] 9h 9fabhi ^
Notary Public in and for*the State of Texas My Commission Expirest U"UEl. W. NESTCR My Camm,ss,en g,;; reg 131.a5 ;
T
The preceding CASE's Answer to Applicants' Statement of Material Facts ,
As To Which There Is No Genuine Issue was prepared jointly under the personal direction of the undersigned, CASE Witnesses ackDoy1}andQark) 1426 h ish We can be contacted through CASE President. hrs. Juanita Ellis, S. Polk, Dallas, Texas 75224,214/946-944}
Our qualifications and background are already a part of the record in these proceedings. (See CASE Exhibit 842 Revision to Resume of ackDoyh, accepted into evidence at Tr. 7042, and CASE Exhibic 841, Revision to Resume of rk Walsh accepted into evidence at Tr. 7278; see also *doard's 12/28/83 Memorandum and Order (Quality Assurance for Design), pages 14-16.)
We have read the statements therein, and they are true and correct to the best of our knowledge and belief. We do not consider that APflicants have, in their Motion for Summary Disposition, adequately responded to the issues raised by us; however, we have attempted to comply with the Licensing Board's directive to answer only the specific statements made by Applicants.
9 Eli .
J (Signed) Jack oyle* /
Date l Ly* E'A IllVY STATE OF N a m v b u o CCCNTY OF d e-eths m On this, the *L54k day of hu. s t.d , 1984, perscnally appeared ack J. DoyleQ known to me to be the person whose nane is subscribe to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to ee that he executed the same for the purposes therein expressed.
Subscribed and sworn before me on the 1S b day of h umu h ,
u 1984 wc b. L,.
Notary Public $n and fo,r the .
State of M c- % t., ,
My Commission Expires:
MY CO*AvlSS:O'l EXP!RES JANUARY 9.1287 E
CASE EXHIBIT 3CD lssue Date: 4/1/80 Guidance - 10 CFR 50.55(eh Construction Deficiency Reporting .
- 1. PURPOSE Deficiency reporting be:ed on the requirements of Part 50.55(e) is designed to provide the NRC staf f with prompt notification and timely information of deficiencies encountered during construction of nuclear power plants.
The intent of the Rule is to provide a basis for evaluation on the part of the NRC with respect to potential safety consequences of deficiencies and the need for further action by NRC.
- 2. DISCUSSION - GENERAL The conditions of construction permits are contained in 10 CFR 50.55.
> Subpart 10 CFR 50.55(e) imposes a reporting requirement on construction permit (CP) holders to report each deficiency found in design and construction which if it were to have remain uncorrected could have
- adversely affected the safety of operations of the nuclear facility at any time throughout the expected lifetime of the plant. Reporting is limited to deficiencies which meet certain other requirements as discussed below.
- 3. RESTATEMENT OF THE REGULATION The entire subsection of 10 CFR 50.55(e) is included here for convenience.
i 50.55(e)(1) If the permit is for construction of a nuclear power I plant, the holder of the permit shall notify the Commission of each deficiency found in design and construction, which, were it to have remained uncorrected, could have affected adversely the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant at any time throughout the expected lifetime of the plant, and which represents:
i (1) A significant breakdown in any portion of the quality assurance program conducted in accordance with the requirements of Appendix B; or (ii) A significant deficiency in final design as approved and released for construction such that the design does not I conform to the criteria and bases stated in the safety analysis report or construction permit; or (iii) A significant deficiency in construction of or significant damage to a structure, system, or component which will l
require extensive evaluation, extensive redesign, or extensive repair to meet the criteria and bases stated in the safety analysis report or construction permit or to otherwise establish the adequacy of the structure, system, or component to perform its intended safety function; or i
l
- Issua Date: 4/1/80 (iv) A significant deviation from performance specifications which will require extensive evaluation, extensive redesign, or extensive repair to establish the adequacy of a structure, system, or component to meet the criteria and bases stated in the safety analysis report or construction permit or to otherwise establish the adequacy of the structure, system, or component to perform its intended safety function.
(2) The holder of a construction permit shall within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> notify the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office of each reportable deficiency.
(3) The holder of a construction permit shall also submit a written report on a reportable deficiency within thirty ,
(30) days to the appropriate NRC Regional Office shown in Appendix D of Part 20 of this chapter. Copies of such report shall be sent to the Director of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission, Washington, D.C. 20555. The report shall include a description of the ,
deficiency, an analysis of the safety implications and the '
corrective action taken, and sufficient information to permit analysis and evaluation of the deficiency and of the corrective action.' If sufficient infonnation is not available for a definitive report to be submitted within 30 days, an interim report containing all available information shall be filed, together with a statement as to when a complete report will be filed.
(4) Remedial acticn may be taken both prior to and after noMfication of the Division of Inspection and Enforcement subject to the risk of subsequent disapproval of such action by tha Commission.
- 4. APPLICABILITY Subsection 10 CFR 50.55(e) applies to the Cp holder and his contractors.
The Cp holder is resconsible for reportino each deficiency in accordance with the criteria and requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e). The regulation applies to design and construction and encompasses all of the activities inherent in design and construction even though they may be performed by agents, contractors, subcontractors or consultants. The Cp holder must establish and implement a system that assures all reportable deficiencies are identified and reported and the reporting requirement must be imposed on his agents, contractors and subcontractors. ,
- -~ , -, , , -
,w - , -<% - . - - - --- - Y- -ev,- v - - -- ' __
Issue Date: 4/1/80
- 5. CRITERIA FOR REPORTING
- a. Deficiency (1) must have been identified, i.e., found (2) related to activities conducted as authcrized by a construction permit holder (design, construction or modification)
(3) could adversely affect the safe operation of a facility if it were not corrected, i.e., it is significant (4) significant deficiency relates to one or more of the following:
(a) breakdown in QA program (b) design released for construction (c) damage to a structure, system or component (d) construction of a structure, system, or component (e) deviction from performance specifications
- b. Timeliness (1) Initial report - within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (2) Written report - within 30 days (initial or final)
(3) Supplemental written report (s) as necessary to provide all informa tion.
- c. Reoortino Oroanization The CP holder is responsible for implementing instructions which will provide for licensee reporting of all reportable deficiencies identified by organizations authorized by him to conduct construction phase activi ties .
- 6. CLARIFICATION OF 50.55(e) PHRASES
- a. Could adversely affect If a deficiency meets all the criteria and it could affect adversely safe operations of the facility, it is reportable. "Could" does not imply that it would absolutely adversely affect safe operations. It implies a probability that safe operations may be adversely affected if the proper conditions existed. "At any time" means tnat all service and accident conditions of operation must be considered.
b -
Issue Date: 4/1/80
~
The fact that a deficiency is obvious and could not possible go uncorrected and therefore could not adverse'y affect rafe operacion does not negate the requirement to formally report the deficiency if l
it meets the criteria of 50.55(e).
. b. Significance To be reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e) a deficiency must be significant.
Significant is interpreted as having an effect or likely to have an effect on, or influence, the safe operation of tue facility in an adverse manner.
Although "significant" is not defined in 50.55(e), it is not the intent that trivia be reported. Significance primari'y pertains to operational safety and not to the cost of the corrective action.
However, as indicated below, the cost to repair or. redesign provides i
on indicator of the term " extensive." -Trivial situations such as cosmetic defects are not reportable.
The test of significance includes but is not limited to safety related items / activities as discussed below.
(1) It is imoortant to note that the regulation does not specifically state tnat 50.55(e) applies only to safety related structures, systems and components althcugh tt.is may be inferred from the wording.
The 50.55(e) reouirement acolies to any structure, system or component (SSCs) if it contains a deficiency which were it to have remiined uncorrected could have affected adversely the safety of operation of the facility. This includes those SSCs that, even if not classified as safety related, could cause or contribute to +.he degradation of integral plant safety as a result of an adverse interaction with safety related SSCs.
Primary examples of this are underitable conditions or failures l
in a nonsafety system, structure, or component which could impact or degrade safety systtms or a safety function.
The inspector must use caution in applying 50.55(e) to nonsafety SSCs and must satisfy himself that the licensee has considered the interactions that a deficiency in a ncnsafety SSC could create.
, (2) If a deficiency involves inadequate management reviews, it may be significant.
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- Issue Date: all/80 )
l 1
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.. Extensive An item is reportable if it requires extensive evaluation to determine if it is adequate to perform its intencec safety function or will not impair the accomplishment of a Jafety function through bdverse interaction.
Extensive means the expenditure of resources (time, manpower, money) '
to o degree disproportionate with the original design, test or constryction expenditure. The inscector should use caution - this ,
requires judgement and experience. For example, the lack of extensive
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evaluation may be used as a justification for not reporting. But it -
also may indicate an inadequate evaluation due to expense involved or ,
a failure to consider interactions and therefore should be considered suspect.
Redesign may appear to be not extensive; the inspector should verify that all interactions and interfaces have been considered and that sufficient design margin is available.
- d. Significant Breakdown in Ouality Assurance A breakdown in the QA program related to any criteria in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, may be a reportable deficiency depending upon its significance.'
This applies to those design and construction activities affecting
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the safety of plant operations, including activities such as design verification, inspection, and auditing. For example, QA program breakdown may result from an improper identification system for safety related materials. More specifically, the implementing procedures may be incomplete or otherwise inadequate, or the execution of adequate procedures may be incomplete, improper or completely ignored. In the latter case, not following established procedures to assure that specified quality related requirements are met, for example, may constitute a breakdown in the OA program that is reportable.
Similarly, an inadequate record keeping system that makes it impossible on a broad scale to determine whether quality requirements have been met, is another example. In such a case extensive evaluation and testing may be required to establish that applicable requirements have been met.
Conversely, occasional, incomplete or otherwise inadequate records that do not indicate a significant breakdown in the OA program nor an unsafe condition are not considered reportable. For example, if during site construction, delivery times (from mixing to placing) of a few of many truckloads of concrete are not recorded as required, and it can be shown by other records that requirements important to safety have been met, the matter would not be reportable. These other records may be related concrete truck trip tickets, batch plant records or acceptable test results of concrete samples representing concrete from these trucks. The lack of complete records in this example would not lead to unsafe plant operation, nor would it con-stitute a significant breakdown in the OA program.
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Issua Date: 4/1/80
- e. Notificatir;n and Recortino .
(1) Ngification - Reportable Deficiency 10 CFR 50.55(e)(2) specifies that the CP holder shall notify the appropriate NRC Regional Office within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of each reportable deficiency. Notification means: (a) telephone report; (b) telegraphic report; and (c) verbal report to the NRC Regional Office after becoming aware of a reportable deficiency, excluding holiday or weekend elapsed times. A notification to a NRC representative present at the CP holder's facilities does not satisfy the regulation.
The threshold for notification (not reporting) is considered to be within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after licensee (CP holder) becomes aware of the reportable deficiency (or potentially reportable deficiency as clarified below). Aware of the deficiency means that any cognizant licensee individual has knowledge of the deficiency as a result of:
(d) observation of condition (e) a formal submittal by any organization involved in the design, construction, evaluations or inspection of the facility ,
(f) an infonnal report, or allegation, by any organization or person.
(2) Notification - Potentially Reportable Deficiency All of the reportability criteria of 50.55(e) may not be satisfied when a deficiency is initially discovered. It is not always possible for the licensee to decide promptly during an evaluation whether the identified deficiency is reportable. However, in most cases, significance can be partially satisfied, or sound judgement will indicate potential significance. In these cases, it should be considered that the deficiency is a potentially recortable deficiency, and the Regional Office should be notified. The CP holder should specify that it is a potentially reportable deficiency.
The following IE position has been established to alleviate the apparent conflict between prompt notification and necessary evaluation time for those cases where an extended period of time could lapse in completing a adequate evaluation of the identified deficiency:
Notification by telephone to the Regional Office within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after a cognizant licensee individual becomes aware of a potentially reportable deficiency is considered acceptable.
A potentially reportable deficiency is considered to exist
Issue Date: 4/1/C0 when: (1) an intial prompt review of available information indicates that the problem could be significant (i.e. -
- partial significance is established) but, for various .
reasons, additional time is required to complete the evaluation; and (2) the deficiency may be considered significant, but neither a prompt review or full evaluation can be completed within 14 days due to lack of specific information.
For example, an extensive evaluation period may exist when the licensee cannot determine without testing and analysis whether the physical properties relative to the material used for a section of reactor coolant piping were met, the licensee should promptly notify the Regional Office of this matter. If the results of the above analysis indicates that the material is not acceptable, extensive evaluation and/or rework may be required. If this is the case, it is clearly a reportable deficiency. Conversely, if the analysis in the above example confirns acceptability of the material, the licensee should document these results in his records and notify the Regional Office that this deficiency was determined not to be significant based on the results of '
further analysis or investigation. Consequently, some matters which require notification may not, subsequently, require a
- written report. -
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In summary, the intent is to require a prompt notification in cases where a potentially reportable deficiency has been identified but the formal evaluation required to confirm whether the item is reportable can not be completed immediately.
(3) Interim Report The CP holder rey meet the 30 day written report requirement by submitting an interim report in lieu of the complete report if sufficient information is not available for a definitive report.
The interim report should specify:
(a) the potential problem and reference the notification (b) approach to resolution of the problem (c) status of proposed resolution (d) reasons why a final report will be delayed (e) projected completion of corrective action and submittal date of the complete report.
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Issue Date: 4/1/80
. 8 (4) Complete Report The regulation requires that the CP holder submit a written report to the appropriate Regional office within 30 days af ter initial notification. If an interim report is submitted the final report shall be due on the date conunitted in the interim report. ,The complete report shall contain:
(a) description of the deficiency (b) ' analysis of the safety implications. This should include an. identification of interfacing systems and possible inter-actions.
(c) corrective actions taken. Corrective actions should be sufficient to correct the deficiency and prevent future identicci or similar occurrences. To prevent future occurrences the causec of the deficiency must be fully explored and identified.
(dI sufficient information to permit analysis and evaluation of the deficiency and of-the corrective action.
- 7. ENFORCEMENT If a CP holder is aware of a reportable deficiency and it can be shown by objective evidence that he has not met the time reporting requirements, then be is in noncompliance with the reporting requirement of 50.55(e) and enforcement action should be taken.
The licensee should be. encouraged to discuss ~ "raportability" with the responsible IE inspector whenever he has a question or douot regarding this matter. It is appropriate for the inspector to indicate his views on whether a particular matter is reportable, but the licensee should understand that the ultimate responsibility remains with the licens.ee, and the inspec' tor's judgement may change during a future inspection X wherein he has an opportunity to fully review the circumstances asso-ciated with the matter.
Another aspect of this Regulation related~ to ieportability detennina-tion pertains to judgement--judgement used by the licensee in deter-mining whether a matter is reportable. The licensee has toIfmake a
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the judgement based on his (or others) evaluation / analysis.
licensee decidas, on the basis of the above, that a matter is not reportable, he may have satisfied the intent of this part of the Regulation. However, the inspector can exercise his option and challenge the licensee's decision of nonreportability. A challenge may be valid if:
the evaluation is clearly faulty by way of omission of facts
. engineering or othercalculations are in error
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. 10 CFR 50.55(e) i i
Issue Date: 4/1/80
- the evaluation is not supported by adequate records
- the evaluation has not considered interactions
- past IE experience (including that of the inspector) provide a basis as precedent for reportability
- the licensee has established a trend or pattern of habitually evaluating deficier.cies as non-reportable
- evaluation is performed by a person (s) or organization without expertise in the subject. .
The inspector has the right and the responsibility to examine the technical validity of the licensee evaluation and if an inappropriate or unsupported decision of nonreportability has been made by the licensee, enforcement action should be considered. Regional management should review and, when valid, determine the appropriate enforcement action to take. If there is evidence that superficial evaluations are being made to procedurally satisfy or bypass NRC requirements, strong escalated enforcement action should be considered. (MC-0800 will be changed, accordingly)
- 8. RELATION TO APP. B REQUIREMENTS 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, requires procedures to be established and records maintained to handle required actions relative to resolution of identified deficiencies. Procedures and records (as in (1) and (2) below) are required to assure prompt notification and adequate reporting under 50.55(e). Means to do this should be an integral part of each licensee's QA program.
(1) Imolementing Procedures Although the specific requirements of 50.55(e) are few (notify, evaluate, report), implementing procedures to assure that these requirements are met should be established by the CP holder. For example, some means (such as procedures or instructions) are required to assure that deficiencies found in design and construction activities delegated by the licensee to others are handled properly and reported in a timely manner to the CP holder. The procedures should assure that the evaluation of the significance of the deficiency to the safety of plant operations is performed by a person (s) with adequate expertise in the subject and that adequate management review is provided.
(2) Records The licensee should maintain records to demonstrate that adequate evaluation / analysis of all deficiencies was made regarding the impact on safe operations. It is appropriate for the IE inspector to inform the licensee that without such records the appropriate licensee management cannot establish whether such evaluations were made or whether the NRC requirements associated with this activity were overlooked.
Issue Date: 1/1/80
- 9. RELATIONSHIP TO 10 CFR 21 REPORTING Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances (10 CFR 21) imic3es a recorting reouirement on licensees and permit holders to immediately notify the Commission of defects, in basic components or the facility which could create a substantial safety hazard. There are certain situations which can result in duplicate reporting of the same defect under 50.55(e) and Part 21 requirements. Guidance that duplicate reporting is not the intent of the NRC regulations has been promulgated via NUREG-0302, Rev. I and in correspondence supplied to the Atomic Industrial Forum. This guidance is reproduced below:
(1) NUREG-0302 Rev.1 Guidance Q.
Must items reported as Significant Deficiencies (under 50.55(e)) or Reportable Occurrences (under 50.36) also be reported as required in 10.CFR 21?
A. Duplicate reporting is not required. Care should be exer-cised, however, to a'sure "that the Commission has been adequately in 521.21(b (3)) informed" (521.21b) is provided should and theparty's the reporting information specif evaluation show that a no,tification is required.
Q. How do we determine when to report a "problen" under the provisions of 50.55(e) vs the provisions of Part Z1?
A. 550.55(.e) requires initial reporting in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the time licensee or his agent first identifies a significant defi-ciency. A followup report is required in 30 days. If evaluation requires substantial time to complete, interim report (s) are acceptable.
521.21(b)(1) requires reporting within two days of when the director or responsible officer obtains infonnation reasonably indicating a failure to comply or a defect with a written report required within five days.
In all cases, the exercise of raasonable judgement is expected in reporting potentially reportable problems to avoid the severe penalties, which could be imposed should the problen turn out to be reportable.
Q.
10 CFR 50.55(e), Conditions of Construction Permits, requires that the holder of a permit notify the Comission of certain designs and construction deficiencies which are also the subject of 10 CFR 21. Why has not 10 CFR 50.55(e) been deleted?
. Zssue Date: 4/1/80 A. 550.55(e) requires reporting that would not be reported under Part 21. For example,1) significant damage to a basic component following delivery to the site is report-able under 50.55(e) and not under Part 21; and 2) a signifi-cant break down in quality assurance is reportable under 50.55(e) and not unoer Part 21.
Q. Is the determination of a " defect" based on the same cri-teria as provided in Part 50.55(e) and/or the requirements for technical specifications for operating plants?
A. Na. In the case of the permit holder, however, a defect reportable under Part 21 would also be reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). In the case of the licensee some items could be reportable under Part 21 that are not reportable as LER.
Q. For possible problems noted under 10 CFR 50.55(e) we report to the Commission "possible significant deficiencies." Will we be allowed to report "possible defects and noncompliances" under the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21?
A. Yes, a report may be made du. ring the evaluation before the conclusion is reached that the deviation is a defect. A report is not required, however, until 2 days after the responsible officer or director is informed of the conclu-sion reached as a result of the evaluation.
Q. It appears to us that there will be more reports filed with the Comission under the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 than under 10 CFR 50.55(e). Does the Commission have this same belief?
A. No. The majority of items subject to reporting under 50.55(e) would not fit the definition in Part 21 for a " defect" involv-ing a " substantial safety hazard." For those cases where l
both 50.55(e) and Part 21 reporting requirements may apply, l tt is expected that permit holders will report only under 1
50.55(e) as long as they include the information required by Part 21 to adequately inform the Ccmmission.
l (2) Supplemental Guidance Sucolied to Atomic Industrial Forum on 0/A 15 and 16 Under 21.21(b)(1) of NUREG 0302, Rev. 1 The regions are authorized to use the enclosed staff positions on l .
1C CFR Part 21 in connunications with licensees. These positions were prepared in response to inquiries from AIF and supplement those of NUREG 0302, Rev. 1. In particular, until pertinent reporting regulations are amended, the staff position response to AIF should be used in answering licensee questions on how and when 50.55(e) reporting may be used in lieu of dual reporting under
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both 50.55(e) and Part 21.
Issuo Date: 4/1/80 When a combined 50.55(e)/Part 21 event is reported by a licensee to the regional office by telephone, the region should use 150.55(e)(3) and 121.21(b)(3) information recuirements for guidance to assure that the Commission is " adequately inforced." Where an event is reported under 50.55(e) and it is (subsequently) established that the event is also reportable under Part 21 the licensee should be informed that it is acceptable for the licensee to provide the information recuired under 121.21(b)(3) via a supplement to the initial 50.55(e) report.
(From N. Moseley to Reg. Director memo of 5/8/79 forwarding 4/26/78 letter sent to AIF)
It is the staff's position that the licensee is not required to report under Part 21 an occurrence that falls within the scope of either Part 21 or 50.55(e) or Reg. Guide 1.16 if that occurrence is reported in accordance with 50.55(e) or Reg. Guide 1.16 requirements. In such cases, it is also the staff's position that the time requirements (oral, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> under 50.55(e) and R.G. 1.16) of the reporting method used would be controlling and, for the licensee, the Part 21 reporting times would not be applicable. (Does not change' prior staff position relative to information (21.21(b)(3)) requirements)
However, a director or responsible officer of a non-licensee organization upon receiving information of a reportable defect would be subject to Part 21 reporting time requirements unless
- he has actual knowledge the Cannission has been adequately i nformed. Therefore, in those cases where a non-licensee has provided the licensee, 0:' licensees (i.e., the defect is generic in nature) with the reportable infonnation and that information is in fact reported by the licensee (s), the non-licensee is not required to duplicate the reporting.
In this instance it is also the staff's position that the non-licensee must have actual knowledge that the reporting was exe-cuted prior to expiration of applicable Part 21 reporting time
- requirements before he would be relieved of reporting the defect.
It should also be noted that non-licensees are not relieved of reporting until the Commission is " adequately informed." Your attention is s'pecifically directed to 321.21(b)(3)(vi). If '
licensee 50.55(e) report (s) do not adequately address the generic applicability, i.e., information on all such components, which the non-licensee may'be uniquely quaTTfied to provide, the Part 21 reporting responsibility wculd remain with the non-licensee for providing that part of the unreported infonnation.
The reverse is not true because Section 50.55(e) does not have a provision like that included under 521.21(b) (last sentence) to '
relieve the licensee of reocrtinc under 50.55(e) where he had actual knowledge that the Commission has been adequately inforced via a Part 21 report. However, the staff has stated that where
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Issuo Date: 4/1/80 13 -
the Part 21 report includes all information recuired for 50.55(e) reporting it would be acceptable for the licensee's 50.55(e) report to simoly reference the oreviously suomitted Part 21 re ort.
(3) Additional Guidance - Information Notice 79-30 Recent IE experience (i.e., enforcement issued to S&W, S&W and 5 Region II licensees) clarifies "The staff position permitting alternate reporting via 50.55(e) or LER of a defect was intended to avoid duplicate reporting of the same event. The use of alternate reporting methods by a licensee does not relieve him from assurino compliance with 10 CFR Part 21. Therefore, each licensee must maintain a system which will assure compliance with all requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 and, in particular, in cases where the deficiency being reported under an alternate method is also a ' defect', to assure that all information required under Part 21 is forwarded ta the NRC via the initial or a followup written report."
- 10. 10 CFR 50.55(e) EVENT FLOW DIAGRAMS The flow diagram on the following pages illustrate the sequence of steps and considerations relative to determining whether an identified construction deficiency is reportable.
Figure 1 is a duplication of the guidance previously made available to licensees via NUREG-0302, Rev. 1.
Figure 2, incorporates the IE position for assuring prompt reporting of reportable and potentially reportable deficiencies.
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6
Zssue Date: 4/1/80
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FIGURE 1 l
IDENTIFIED PROBLEM l l l
r l ,
r 1r 1 f
BREAKDOWN DEFICIENCY DEFICIENCY DEVIATION FROM IN IN IN PERFORMANCE FINAL DESIGN CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS QA PROGRAM I I I OR OR OR OR I
I AND
, r DEFICIENCY ADVERSELY AFFECTS SAFETY OF OPERATIONS I
AND
, r DEFICIENCY IS SIGNIFICANT I
AND l
r DEFICIENCY IS IN DESIGN OR CONSTRUCTION 1 r LICENSEE ACTION REQUIRED
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',. 10 CFR 50.55(e)
I58"' D't' #'I'80 15 -
FIGURE 2 l 10 CFR 50.55(e) - IE POSITION -
l DEFICIENCY, PROBLEM OR POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCY IDENTIFIED v
i l
BREAKDOWN DEFICIENCY DEFICIENCY DEVIATION FROM IN OR IN OR IN OR PERFORMANCE QA PROGRAM FINAL DESIGN CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS w
CONCLUSION OF PROMPT CONSIDERATION
,, y COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT _
POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANCE SAFE OPERATION - I.E., ~
IS ESTABLISHED - ADDITIONAL A REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY INFORMATION IS REQUIRED MAKE NOTIFICATION OF MAKE POTENTIAL REPORTABLE NOTIFICATION DEFICIENCY SUBMIT CONTINUE EVALUATION l
REPORT l l REPORT SUBMITWhTH9RAWAL DEFICIENCY OF NOTIFICATION h
_