IR 05000440/1986033

Insp Rept 50-440/86-33 on 861203-870116.No Violation or Deviation Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Insp Items,Part 21 Repts & Operational Safety.Facility Remained Shut Down Pending Repair of RCIC Sys Isolation Valves

ML20210B253
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	02/02/1987
From:	Knop R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210B208	List: IR 05000440/1986033 ML20210B203
References
50-440-86-33, NUDOCS 8702090112
Download: ML20210B253 (10)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reporc No. 50-440/86033(DRP)

Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-58 Licensee: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101 Facility Name: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Inspection At: Perry Site, Perry, OH Inspection Conducted: December 3, 1986 through January 16, 1987 Inspectors: K. A. Connaughton G. F. O'Dwyer Approved By:

gc 16 R. C. Knop, Chief ! 2 ^ 2 ~ d' 7 Reactor Projects Section IB Date Inspection Summary Inspection on December 3, 1986 through Janaury 16, 1987 (Report N /86033(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of previous inspection items, 10 CFR Part 21 Reports, operational safety, engineered safety feature (ESF) walkdown, onsite followup of events at operating reactors, onsite review committee activities, cold weather preparations, Licensee Event Reports, allegation followup, monthly maintenance observation, and monthly surveillance observatio Results: No violation of regulatory requirements or deviation from commitments were identified in the areas inspected. The licensee entered Operational Condition 1 for the first time on December 30, 1986. At the close of the inspection, the facility remained shut down pending repair of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system steam supply isolation valves and modifications to Leak Detection system flow instrumentation associated with the Reactor Water Cleanup syste O 0 Doc 5

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DETAILS i 1. Persons Contacted A. Kaplan, Vice President, Nuclear Operations Division

• C.M.Shuster, Manager,NuclearEngineeringDepartment(NED)

• D. R. Green, General Supervising Engineer, EDS (NED)

• D. Lyster, Manager, Perry Plant Operations Department (PP00)

• R. A. Stratman, General Supervising Engineer, Operations Section, (PP0D)

R. P. Jadgchew, General Supervising Engineer, Instrumentation and Controls Section (PP00)

• A. F. Silakoski, Operations Section (PP0D)

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• G. R. Anderson, Instrumentation and Controls, (PP0D)

L. R. Teichman, Maintenance Planning, (PP00) '

• D. J. Takacs, General Supervisor, Maintenance (PP0D)

• M. W. Gmyrek, Senior Operations Coordinator (PP00)

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F.R. Stead, Manager,PerryPlantTechnicalDepartment(PPTD) *

• S. F. Kensicki, Technical Superintendent (PPTD)

P. A. Russ, Licensing and Compliance Section (PPTD)

• D. C. Jones, Licensing and Compliance Section (PPTD)

• B. S. Ferrell, Licensing Engineer (PPTD)

G.S.Cashell,LicensingandComplianceSection(PPTD)

! *R. A. Newkirk, Technical Section (PPTD)

• L. L. Vanderhorst, Plant Health Physics (PPTD)

• 8. D. Walrath, General Supervising Engineer, Operational Quality

, Section (NQAD)

• V. K. Higaki, Maintenance and Modification Quality Section, (NQAD)

• Denotes those attending the exit meeting held on January 16, 1987.

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2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)

, (Closed)OpenItem(440/86014-01(DRP)): Review of Licensee's actions prior to declaration of an unusual event due to off-gas system charcoal adsorber fire on June 20, 1986. This item was written to track NRC followup inspection activity related to the off-gas system adsorber fire. Subsequent to the identification of this item, a special followup inspection was conducted by resident and regional office-based inspection personnel and documented in NRC l inspection report 440/86020(DRS). Additional followup inspection

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activities will be tracked by items discussed in that inspection repor ' (Closed) Open Item (440/86020-07(DRS)): Licensee response to information indicating a fire in off-gas system charcoal adsorber

beds. This item was written to document inspector concerns that

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licensee actions in response to the off-normal indications of fire in the charcoal adsorber beds were not as aggressive, timely, and effective as they should have been. The licensee was specifically requested to respond to this concern in a letter dated October 3,

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, 1986 from C. J. Paperiello to M. R. Edelman which transmitted NRC inspection report 440/86020(DRS). The inspector reviewed the

, . licensee's. response letter dated November 20,.1986. The licensee expressed the belief that actions taken were timely in that Instrumentation and Control personnel were dispatched quickly to

, investigate the initial high readings on the thermocouples in the t charcoal adsorber beds, and that the Fire Protection Coordinator l was called into the site on the back shift to investigate the situatio ,

,. The licensee did note, however, that an indepth review of the thermocouple data following the initial investigation would have

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register higher temperatures. The licensee, therefore, agreed that actions could have been more aggressive in this regard and,

, therefore, more effectiv In response to these findings and the ir.spector's stated concern, all operators were trained to the lessons learned from the charcoal adsorber combustion event. Based

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licensee actions in response to a charcoal adsorber reignition which, occurred on July 6,1986, the inspector was satisfied that this -

concern has been adequately addresse (Closed) Violation (440/86023-01(DRP)): Failure to control the

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status of instrument sensing line valves. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response letter dated November 14, 1986, and

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determined that corrective actions taken in response to the individual occurrences cited in this violation were satisfactory.

With regard to corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence, the inspector reviewed current revisions of Plant Administrative Procedure (PAP)-0205, " Operability of Plant Systems," and PAP-0905,

" Work Order Process." The procedures had been revised as stated in the licensee's response to note that operation of instrument related valves was to be performed by Instrumentation and Controls Section 3 personnel only. Additionally, the inspector reviewed a memorandum issued by the Perry Plant Operations Department Manager to all

project personnel re-emphasizing that only Instrumentation and

Controls Section personnel were authorized-to operate instrument related valves and also notifying personnel of the potential for disciplinary action associated with. failures to follow these directions. The inspector believes the foregoing actions to be responsive to the identified violation since the violation stemmed from a lack of guidance to individuals outside of the Instrumentation and Controls Section whose work activities required the manipulation of instrument related valves. With the control of these valves now uniquely assigned to Instrumentation and Controls Section personnel, unauthorized operation of these valves by other personnel should not recur. The inspector has no further concerns in this are (Closed) Open Item (440/86023-03(DRP)): The index of the log book utilized to track technical specification Limiting Conditions for

Operation-(LCO) was not procedurally controlled. In response to

this item, the licensee eliminated the index to the LC0 log boo I i

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l This action eliminated the possibility that operators would rely upon'the uncontrolled index to facilitate required reviews of active LC0 log sheets. The inspector has no further concern regarding this matte . -10 CFR Part 21 Report Followup (92701)

By letter dated December 9,1986, Transamerica DeLaval, Inc. (TDI) ._

notified the NRC of a potential defect in relays manufactured by Basler Electric which were utilized in the field flashing circuit of standby diesel-generators manufactured by TDI. . The letter, submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21, indicated that the potentially defective relays were utilized in the standby diesel generators supplied to Perry. The licensee received and reviewed the subject 10 CFR Part 21 Report and determined it to be in error. The K1 relays utilized.at Perry were not manufactured by Basler Electric but instead were manufactured by ITE/Gould. By letter dated December 17, 1986,'TDI confirmed to the licensee that its earlier report was in error and that the K1 relays utilized at Perry were not involved in the reported failures. Based upon discussions with licensee personnel and review of the foregoing correspondence, the inspector is satisfied that no additional actions by the licensee to address the reported defect are necessar . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during this inspection period. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tag-out records, and verified tracking of Limiting Conditions for Operation associated with affected component Tours of the intermediate, auxiliary, reactor, and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, excessive. vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for certain pieces of equipment in need of maintenance. The inspectors by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedure During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's proposed Amendment 1 to the Perry Unit 1 Operating Licensee (Licensee NumberNPF-58). The proposed Amendment was transmitted to the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation by letter dated December 15, 1986 from M. R. Edelman to W. R. Butler. The proposed Amendment contained a revision to surveillance requirement 4.6.5.1. '

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The surveillance requirement currently requires that the containment vacuum breaker isolation valve opening setpoints be maintained at areater than or equal to 0.0 psid and less than or equal to 0.112 psid (containmenttooutsidecontainment). The proposed change to this surveillance requirement would instead require that the setpoint be .

established and maintained at greater than or equal to 0.100 psid with an allowable value of greater than or equal to 0.052 psid. Based upon the inspector's review and discussions with NRC Region III office management, a concern was identified regarding this proposed chang The proposed change did not provide an upper bound on the vacuum breaker isolation valve opening setpoint. The valves, which serve to permit containment vacuum breaker operation to relieve a negative containment to atmosphere differential pressure, are also required to automatically close upon receipt of a group 5 isolation signal under conditions where the vacuum relief function is not required (i.e., when containment to atmosphere differential pressure is greater than the maximum opening setpoint). If the opening setpoint is established at a high enough value, the automatic containment isolation function of these valves would be impaired. The inspector informed the licensee as well as cognizant personnel in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Reagulation of this concern which will be tracked as open item (440/86033-01(DRP)).

5. Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown (71710)

During this inspection period, the inspector performed a detailed walkdown of the Low Pressure Core Spray System (LPCS). The system walkdown was conducted utilizing Valve Lineup Instruction (VLI)-E21, Revision 3, dated February 2, 1986. Prior to conducting the walkdown, the inspector verified VLI-E21 against controlled piping and instrumen-tation diagrams for the Lew Pressure Core Spray System. No discrepancies were identified as a result of this verificatio During the system walkdown, the inspector directly observed equipment conditions to verify that hangers and supports were made up properly; appropriate levels of cleanliness were being maintained; piping insulation, heaters, and air circulation systems were installed and operational; valves in the system were installed correctly and did not exhibit gross packing leakage, bent stems, missing handwheels, or improper labeling; and, that major system components were properly labeled and exhibited no leakage. The inspector verified that instrumentation associated with the system was properly installed, functioning, and that significant process parameter values were consistent with normal expected values. By direct visual observation or observation of remote position indication, the inspector verified that valves in the system flow path were in the correct positions as required by VLI-E21; that where required, power was available to the valves; valves required to be locked in position were locked; and, that pipe caps and blank flanges were installed as require At the time of the system walkdown, the Low Pressure Core Spray System had been declared operable and was being maintained in standby readines *

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The inspector verified that documentation required by licensee administrative procedures pertaining to technical specification limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations, and equipment tagouts was consistent with the system's declared statu No violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Followup of Non-Routine Events at Operating Reactors (93702)

At approximately 7:55 P.M. on December 30, 1986, while in Operational Condition 1 with reactor power at 8%, licensee chemistry personnel reported that reactor coolant conductivity had risen to 1 micrombos/cm. Operating personnel began an orderly plant shutdown in accordance with the facility's technical specification Further sampling by chemistry technicians at the cros'sover piping between the intermediate and high pressure condensers measured 78 micrombos/cm.,

thereby indicating a pcssible condenser tube leak. Operating personnel, therefore, decided to conduct a fast reactor shutdown from 6% power by inserting a manual scram at 8:54 Following plant shutdown and cooldown, the licensee examined all three condensers and found that most of the 1/16 inch stainless steel shrouding on feedwater heater 2A, located in the low pressure (LP) condensers, had.come off and damaged a number of condenser tubes. The sheets of shrouding were attached to each other and to the feedwater heaters by tack weld The inspector observed that some tack welds on feedwater heater 1A, also located in the LP condenser, were cracked. The inspector also noted pieces of metal in the hotwell at the bottom of the LP condense Licensee's Engineering personnel concluded that heater 2A tack welds failed because of unusually long periods of operation at low power with the No. I bypass valve continuously open. The No. 1 bypass valve discharge impinged upon feedwater heater 2A. The licensee determined that operation without the 2A feedwater heater shrouding, was acceptable pending development and implementation of a modification to the 2A feedwater heater shrouding. The licensee repaired broken tack welds on shrouding of the other feedwater heaters and removed all metal debris from all areas of the LP condenser. All tubes identified as nicked or cut by the loose shrouding were plugge . Onsite Review Committee (40700)

The inspectors reviewed the minutes of the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meetings No. 243, 245 through 248, 250 through 252, a through 256 conducted prior to and during the inspection period to verify conformance with PNPP procedures and regulatory requirement These observations and examinations included PORC membership, quorum at PORC meetings, and PORC activities.

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No violations of regulatory requirements or deviations from commitments were identified in this are . Cold Weather Preparations (71714)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's response file for I.E. Bulletin 79-24, dated September 27, 1979. As a result of licensee review of this Bulletin, the licensee conducted a design evaluation to determine the adequacy of protectiva measures taken to assure that safety related process, instrument, and sampling lines did not freeze during extremely cold weather. Additionally, the licensee developed periodic inspection and maintenance requirements for these protective measures including calibration of heat trace equipment, and visual examination of insulation to verify integrity. The inspector reviewed documentation associated with Perry Plant Maintenance Information System Repetitive Tasks which accomplish these tests and inspections. Documents associated with the following repetitive tasks involving inspection of piping insulation were reviewed:

Repetitive Task N R85015548 R85015549 R85015550 R85015552 R85015556 R85015557 R85015558 R85015559 Documentation of the following repetitive tasks involving calibration of heat trace equipment were also reviewed:

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Task N R85007373 R86003598 R86003599 R85007377 R85012556 R85006010 R85006011 R85007371 R86002787 R85013346 R85012390 The foregoing repetitive tasks which were scheduled to be performed annually between August 15 and October 15 of each year were performed as scheduled for 1986. The inspector verified by direct visual observation that the following heat trace panels had been placed in service:

Heat Trace Panel N OR36P0003 1R36P0001 1R36P0004 1R36P0006 1R36P0005 OR36P0008 OR36P0009 1R36P0010 The inspector visually examined insulation on heat traced piping and i instrument lines associated with the condensate storage storage tank, the Emergency Service Water system, the Plant Vent Radiation Monitors, and

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the Post Accident Radiation Monitoring system. Additionally, the

inspector conducted a tour of the intermediate building, turbine power t complex, heater bay building, cmcrgency service water pump house, and

the radwaste building to identify areas where piping and instrument lines may be subject to freezing during extreme cold weather conditions

in order to verify that heat-tracing and insulation were provided where appropriate. The inspector did not observe any instances where cold-weather protective measures were inadequate.

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had ,

been accomplished in accordance with technical specification LER 86053-0 Procedure Error Causes Opening of Containment and Drywell Vacuum Breakers i

LER 86057-0 Failure to Correct Limitorque Nonconformance Results in Technical Specification Violation

! LER 86058-0 Procedure Deficiency Results in an Operating Mode Change

with Inoperable Instruments

LER 86061-0 Faulty Switch and Personnel Error Cause Reactor Water

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Cleanup System Isolation

LER 86074-0 Deficient Work Package For Changing Transformer Grounding Results in 80P Isolations

, Regarding LER 86057-0, the existence of unqualified wiring in Limitorque

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valve motor operators was reviewed during an inspection documented in NRC i inspection report 440/86023(DRP). Additional review to determine whether f or not enforcement action is warranted is being tracked as unresolved

item (440/86023-02(DRP)). Followup on an Allegation (RIII-86-A-0196) (99014)

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1 (Closed) Allegation (RIII-86-A-0196). On December 8, 1986, the resident inspector received a telephone call from an individual who stated that i g

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licensee personnel in the Service Building Machine Shop were machining e ,

, control rod drive mechanism that had previously been installed in the reactor and which was, therefore, contaminated. The individual expressed concern that machining of the contaminated item in the machine shop was

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Inspector Followup The inspector proceeded immediately to the Service Building Machine Shop and observed two machinists in the process of cutting a metal piece utilizing a milling machine. A representative of General Electric and a licensee Health Physics technician were also present. The inspector asked the G. E. representative what was being cut and why. The G. representative informed the inspector that the piece being cut was a control rod drive mechanism buffer piston. The buffer shaft which passes through the buffer piston had become bound to the piston. The buffer piston was being cut in half longitudinally to allow separation of the piston and shaft and to determine the binding mechanis The inspector asked the Health Physics technician for results of contaminationanddoseratesurveysofthepiston/shaftassemblyagdwas informed that the contamination survey results were 150 cpm /100 cm fixed and dose rate survey results were less than .1 mr/hr. on contact. The Health Physics technician had been assigned to provide continuous coverage for the cutting operation as well as collection and removal of contaminated filings generated by the cutting. The inspector observed that the machinists were wearing protective clothing and that the piston shaft assembly was surrounded by Visqueen so as to contain the metal filing Based upon the radiation levels involved, continuous coverage by the Health Physics technician, and contamination controls in place, the inspector determined that the activity was conducted safel The inspector determined by document review and discussions with licensee Health Physics personnel that the cutting operation had been evaluated from a radiological safety standpoint and was being conducted in accordance with documented conditions specified on a Radiation Work Permit (RWP). The inspector reviewed licensee procedures which specify conditions under which a RWP must be issued and determined that cutting,

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grinding, and milling operations involving contaminated items was not

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specifically identified as requiring a Radiation Work Permit. This j matter, while unrelated to the specifics of the allegation, will be l referred to Region III Health Physics Inspection Specialists for followup l and will be tracked as an open item (440/86033-02(DRP)).

This allegation is considered close :

11. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

< 5tation maintenance activities af safety related systems and components listed below were observed /revfewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the l work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were l inspected as applicable; quality control records were maintained;

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activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials

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'used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention' controls were implemente The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

l Installation and retermination activities associated with Diesel i

Generator Building Ventilation System damper actuators 1M43-F080A and

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IM43-F081A.

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

On January 12, 1987, the inspector witnessed various portions of r Surveillance Instruction (SVI)-C11-T0224A, Revision 1, " Rod Pattern

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Control System (RPCS) Rod Withdrawal Limiter High Power Setpoint

(HPSP) Functional Test for IC11-N654C." The inspector verified that

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the procedure in use was the latest revision and had received required

licensee reviews and approvals. Communications between test personnel

and operations personnel were observed to be adequate. The system was

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properly removed from and returned to service, meeting all Limiting

Condition for Operations (LCOs). Test data was accurate, complete, and

] met the acceptance criteria. Test Personnel were adequate in number

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and knowledgeable about the test.

j- No violations or deviations were identified.

13. Open Inspection Items i'

Open inspection items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which i involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open inspection items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in

Paragraph 4 and 1 . Exit Interviews (30703)

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The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph

1 throughout the inspection period and on January 16, 1987. The

! inspector summarized the scope and results of the inspection and '

j discussed the likely content of the inspection report. The licensee did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection

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