IR 05000440/1986018

Insp Rept 50-440/86-18 on 860623-0804.Violation Noted: Failure to Rept in Timely Manner Loss of Source Range Monitor

ML20206N328
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	08/15/1986
From:	Kaufman P, Knop R, Miller D, Odwyer G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206N319	List: IR 05000440/1986018 ML20206N315 ML20206N322
References
50-440-86-18, IEB-80-10, IEIN-86-002, IEIN-86-2, NUDOCS 8608260220
Download: ML20206N328 (11)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-440/86018(DRP)

Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-45 Licensee: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101 Facility Name: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Inspection At: Perry Site, Perry, OH Inspection Conducted: June 23 through August 4, 1986 Inspectors: J. A. Grobe K. A. Connaughton G. F. O'Dwyer 0 *

'3[tf!76 V Date i [NE Date

. u n #Mi//6 Date g c 4,~

40 proved By: R. C. Knop, Chief I (

Reactor Projects Section IB Date Inspection Summary Inspection on June 23 through August 4, 1986 (Report No. 50-440/86018(DRP))

Areas Ir.spected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident and region based inspectors of previous inspection items, I.E. Bulletins, I.E. Information Notices, operational safety, onsite review committee activities, operating events, preoperational test results, startup test results, and monthly surveillance observation Results: Of the nine areas inspected, one violation was identified in one area (failure to report in a timely manner the loss of a source range monitor

. 8608260220 860015 0 DR ADOCK 0500

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detector containing special nuclear material - Paragraph 7). During this inspection, the licensee entered Operational Condition No. 4 for the first

. time utilizing recirculation pump generated heat. Pipe vibration, thermal expansion, and recirculation flow control startup testing was in progress at the close of this inspection.

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DETAILS i Persons Contacted M. R. Edelman, Vice President, Nuclear Group A. Kaplan, Vice President, Nuclear Operations Division

• C. M. 5huster, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department (NED)

• M. D. Lyster, Manager, Perry Plant Operations Department (PPOD)

• D. J. Takas, General Supervisor, Maintenance Section (PPOD)

R. A. Stratman, General Supervising Engineer, Operations Section,

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R. P. Jadgchew, General Supervising Engineer, Instrumentation and '

,i Controls Section (PPOD)

A. F. Silakoski, Operations Section (PPOD)

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• M. W. Gayrek, Senior Operations Coordinator (PPOD)

• G. Chasko, Operations Engineer (PP00)

, *G. R. Anderson, Lead Electrical / Instrumentation and Control

, . Engineer (PP00)

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• F. R. Stead, Manager, Perry Plant Technical Department (PPTD)

T. L. Heatherly, Licensing and Compliance Section (PPTD)

• G. S. Cashell, Licensing and Compliance Section (PPTD)

• C. S. Orogvany, Senior Nuclear Engineer (PPTD)

, *R. A. Newkirk, General Supervising Engineer, Technical (PPTD)

• E. M. Buzzelli, General Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Licensing and

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Compliance Section (PPTD)

• E. Riley, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance Department (NQAD)-

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• B. D. Walrath, General Supervising Engineer, Operational Quality Section (NQAD)

[ * Denotes those attending the exit meeting held on August 4, 198 '

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' Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)

l- (Closed)-Unresolved Item (440/85016-02(DRP)): Pipe support

calculations lack uniformity with respect.to analyzing weld i joint configuration To resolve this issue, Gilbert Associates,

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Incorporated (GAI) evaluated a representative sample of connections L which may have been designed, modeled, and analyzed as pin

connections instead of fixed connections. In the cases where the

! end connections were calculated as pinned, supplemental calculations were performed modeling the supports as fixed rigid frames. The rigid frames were either reanalyzed by hand calculations using methods found in " Rigid Frame Formulas" by A. Kleinlogel, or STRUDL computer program. A comparison between original and resulting weld and member stresses was then made to determine the acceptability of the original connection as designed. The GAI evaluation has

!- demonstrated that the existing original weld configuration and the overall connection' design had sufficient margin to accommodate the r increase in loads.

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f (Closed) Open Items (440/85022-21(DRP) and 440/85022-22(DRP)):

Noble gas effluent and containment high radiation monitors. These

. monitors have been installed. Preoperational test 1D19-P-001, Revision 1, has been completed, and the monitors are considered operational. During. testing, the licensee discovered a voltage

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fluctuation problem with the high voltage supplies for the Kaman noble gaseous monitors. The licensee notified the equipment manufacturer and wrote an internal Deviation Analysis Report

(DAR) No. 262. The high voltage problem was corrected by the manufacturer. The Deviation Analysis Report was closed and no further power supply problems have been experienced. No additional problems were identified during the inspector's revie (Closed) Open Items (440/85060-01(DRP) and 440/85060-02(DRP)):

Installation of NMC constant air monitors in the Technical Support

' Center and Emergency Operations Facilit These monitors have been installed, calibrated, preoperationally tested, and are considered  !

operationa No problems were noted during the inspector's revie (Closed) Violation (440/05006-01a(DRP)): System Operating Instruction-(S0I) found to be technically inadequate. During this

inspection the licensee completed re-reviews and revisions of SOIs i

in accordance with the licensee's response letter from M. R. Edelman

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to R. F. Warnick, dated April 23, 1986. Previous inspections of l licensee actions in response to this item, documented in NRC Inspection Reports No. 440/86011(DRP) and No. 440/86014(DRP),

determined that SOIs requiring re-review and revision prior to initial fuel load and initial criticality had been complete These inspections also included NRC review of a sample of revised

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SOIs for technical adequacy. The NRC reviews disclosed no additional concerns and aetermined the licensee's process of SOI re-review and revision to be effective.

i Of the 68 SOIs required prior to exceeding 5% reactor power or prior

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to turbine synchronization, only one S0I was judged to be adequate i

"as is." All others were revised. Completion of licensee actions i required by this item also satisfied License Condition B4 of

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Attachment 1 to the Perry Unit 1 Facility Operating License NPF-45.

! (0 pen) Violation (440/86008-04(DRP)): Inadequate procedural controls for establishing the operating status of plant instruments.

t During this inspection period, the licensee completed walkdown of l instrument piping, established valve lineups,. issued engineering l approved interim as-built drawings, and completed tagging of instrument valves for all instruments required to support plant operation. Previous inspections of licensee actions required by j this item were documented in NRC Inspection Reports No. 440/86011(DRP)

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and No. 440/86014(DRP). These inspections determined by review of interim as-built drawings and inspector walkdowns of instrument e piping that licensee actions required to be completed prior to fuel '

load and initial criticality had been completed and were effective

in establishing and controlling the operating status of instrument __ _ . _ _ . - _ . _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ ___ _

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This item will remain open, however, pending completion and issuance of controlled final as-built drawings prior to startup after the first refueling outage. . Completed licensee actions required by this item also satisfied License Condition B5 of Attachment 1 to the Perry Facility Operating License, NPF-4 (Closed) Open Item (440/86011-01(DRP)): Plant vent radiation monitor operability considerations when isokinetic probe sample blowers are out of service. As discussed in Inspection Report No. 440/86011(DRP), the inspector questioned whether or not plant vent radiation monitoring instrumentation was rendered inoperable when the sample blowers associated with the plant vent isokinetic probes were taken out of service. During this inspection period the inspector held discussions with licensee personnel as well as NRC personnel from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation regarding this questio Based upon these discussions, it was determined that plant vent radiatiui m itoring instrumentation would be considered inoperable when the isokinetic probe sample blowers are out of service. However, operation of the plant vent radiation monitors without the isokinetic probe sample blowers would satisfy the technical specification action statements requiring backup methods for plant vent radiation monitorin Licansee personnel agreed to implement technical specification requirements for vent radiation monitoring instrumentation consistent with this determinatio The inspector has no further concerns regarding this matte (Closed) Open Item (440/86011-06(DRP)): Control rod drive (CRD)

hydraulic control unit (HCU) holddown bolting found to be improperly torqued. Licensee investigation to determine the root cause of the improperly torqued holddown bolts on CRD HCU's determined that installation drawings supplied by General Electric specified the '

mounting configuration, including the types of bolts to be used, but did not include quantified torque value The General Electric environmental qualification report (NEDC-30208, October 1983)

for the HCU's specified that seismic qualification testing was conducted with baseplate bolts torqued to 50 foot pounds and beam support bolts torqued to 20 foot pounds. The HCU's at Perry had been installed prior to the issuance of the environmental qualifica-tion repor Following discovery of the bolting deficiencies and determination of the required torque values, all HCU holddown bolts were re-torqued. Further inspector review of this matter will be conducted'during a future inspection to close out Licensee Event Report 86-014 which was issued by the licensee to report this matter in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.7 . Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin (IEB) Followup (92703)

(Closed) I.E. Bulletin (440/80010-BB): Contamination of nonradioactive systems and resulting potential for unmonitored, uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment. The licensee has completed their

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review of this I.E. Bulleti As a result, additional sampling requirements have been added to their routine sampling progra The licensee's review and corrective actions appear adequat . I.E. Information Notice Followup (92717)

(Closed) I.E. Information Notice (IEN 86-02): Failure of valve operator motor during environmental qualification testing. Documentation of initial inspector review of the licensee's response to this information notice and the referenced Service Information Letter was provided in NRC Inspection Report No. 440/86006, Paragraph 20. After the completion of that inspection, the licensee provided on March 10, 1986, further mechanistic evaluation of the use of Reliance Motor Corporation motors with magnesium rotors on Limitorque operators at the Perry facility. The inspector has reviewed the licensee's further analysis and evaluation and has concluded that the motor operators utilizing magnesium rotors in PNPP Unit 1 are suitably environmentally qualified to perform their safety function. The inspector has no further concerns in this are . Operational Safety Verification /ESF Walkdown (71707, 71710)

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators routinely during the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of the Unit 1 reactor building, fuel handling building, control complex, diesel generator building, and offgas building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. On July 30, 1986, the inspectors walked down the safety-related Divisions I and II DC electrical power distribution systems to verify operabilit The inspectors utilized Electrical Lineup Instruction (ELI)-R42, "DC Systems:

Batteries, Chargers, Switchboards (Unit 1)," Revision 1, effective June 24, 1985, with Temporary Change Number (TCN)-004, effective February 14, 1986, to walk down bus ED-1-A and ED-1-B breakers, distribution panels EDIA06, ED1806, and ED1B08 and motor control centers ED1A09, and ED1809. Of the 113 breakers, fused disconnects and switches examined, the following discrepancies were noted:

• One mispositioned disconnect,

• Thirty-four missing labels,

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• Thirteen' inexact labels,

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• Three incorrect labels, and

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-* One "Out'of. Service" tag.with incomplete information (Tag No. 16-2657-6)

.The mispositioned disconnect was a spare and was subsequently properly positioned by the' licensee. . All other devices were properly lined-up or properly controlled in a non-normal position. .The components missing

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labels included both spare and active devices. The Out of Service tag did not include the.name of the individual authorized to operate the equipment as required. The licensee is investigating the scope and depth of these types of procedural and equipment labelling discrepancies. This item will remain unresolved until that investigation is complete (440/86018-01(DRP)).

During tours of the facility, the inspector noted a decrease in the i

previous high standard of equipment protection and housekeepin In the Division III diesel generator room, the inspector noted the access panel

to the north air start motors and flywheel was removed with no work in i progress and empty glass fuel oil sample jars on the floor near the fuel l- oil day tank. In the electrical power distribution areas, the inspector i

noted that cubical and compartment doors were not always properly secured following access. In the safety-related battery rooms rubber aprons, gloves and cloth rags .either sat on the floor or were stuck behind wall mounted conduit. The licensee acknowledged these-findings and the inspector will closely examine these areas during future inspections to ensure that this trend does not continu .These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility

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operations were in conformance with the requirements established under

technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure . Onsite Review Committee (40700)

The inspectors reviewed the minutes of the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meetings No.86-117 through 86-150, conducted prior

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to and during the inspection period to verify conformance with PNPP procedures and regulatory requirements. These observations and

examinations included PORC membership, quorum at PORC meetings, and

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PORC activitie No violations of regulatory requirements or deviations from commitments were identified in this area.

l Onsite Followup of Events--Operating Reactors (93704)

i l - On July 2,-1986, at 2:15 p.m., the licensee telephonically reported to Region III pursuant to 10 CFR 70.52 that they had lost a source range monitor detector which contained 2.7 milligrams of uranium 235, a total

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, activity of 5.85 E-9 curies, encapsulated in a sealed metal cylinder

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, approximately one quarter inch in diameter and one inch long. That telephonic communication was confirmed on July 2, 1986, by written notification to the Regional. Administrator of Region II In mid-April 1986, during a review of administrative procedures

.- controlling special nuclear material by the reactor engineer, the licensee determined that Perry Administrative Procedure (PAP)-0802,

" Control of Special Nuclear Material," was deficient in that it did not

} require the control of all special nuclear materia The procedure had been written .to control only items containing special nuclear material in excess of one kilogram. As a result, the material control and accountability program did not cover. nuclear instrumentation, including the source range,' intermediate range, and local power range. monitors, which contained special nuclear material in quantities less than one gram.

4 On April 19,-1986, one of the source range monitors installed in the core

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was removed from the core and replaced because it was defective. That detector had never been irradiated. The source range monitor detector

was severed from its cable and temporarily stored in the Health Physics offices. In late April 1986, reactor engineering requested health

physics personnel to take all.special nuclear material including tha source range monitor to one location in the fuel handling building for

storag Reactor engineering then attempted to establish a baseline l inventory of nuclear instrumentation special nuclear material by reviewing shipping, receipt and installation documentation. During that-document review, reactor engineering personnel were unable to establish a baseline inventory of special nuclear material contained in-nuclear

. Linstrumentation. On June 13, 1986, the licensee attempted to inventory

all detectors onsit At that time, it was identified that this so9ece

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range monitor which had been removed from the core could not be located.

I Subsequently, another extensive review of documentation and physical l searches was undertake Based on the results of those activities, on i June 25, 1986, it was again concluded that one detector, the source range monitor, could not be accounted fo Another more detailed series of physical searches was conducted.and concluded on July 2, 1986, with the

same result, that one source range monitor could not be accounted for.

i The licensee then reported the lost special nuclear material in i accordance with 10 CFR 70.52. 10 CFR 70.52(a) requires that each l licensee shall report immediately to the appropriate ND.C regional office

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any loss of special nucicar material.

, On June 13, 1986, the licensee had identified that one source range

{ monitor detector containing special nuclear material could not be located i and this information was confirmed on June 25, 1986, and again on July 2, i 1986. The lack of timeliness of the licensee's report to the regional office regarding this loss of special nuclear material is a violation of i

the requirements contained in 10 CFR 70.52(a). (440/86018-02(DRP)).

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The licensee calculated that the exposure rate at one centimeter.from the

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. detector is.about 85 millirem per year, and about 0.09 millirem per year at one foot from the detecto This exposure rate is not detectable using routinely used hand held portable survey instruments. It appears

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that the detector may have been inadvertently discarded to nonradioactive

' trash and buried in a landfill. The inspector informed the licensee after review and concurrence with their radiological hazard assessment that search of the landfill to retrieve the detector is not considered necessary because the detector poses no significant hazard to public health and safety either intact or with its capsule breache CFR 70.51, " Material Balance, Inventory, and Records Requirements,"

Section (c), requires that each licensee who is authorized to possess

.special nuclear material in excess of one kilogram shall establish, i

maintain, and follow written material control and accounting procedures

. sufficient to enable the licensee to account for materials in his

, possession. The licensee has revised PAP-0802 to ensure that all special nuclear materials are accounted for. -The revision of that administrative procedure will be reviewed by Material Control and Accountability Specialists from the Region III office during a future inspectio That

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inspection activity will be tracked as an open item (440/86018-03(DRP)).

During the review of-records, the licensee identified discrepancies in

~ the documentation of installation o' local power range c:onitors in the

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reactor cor Each local power range monitor is identical in quantity of special nuclear materials and the licensee confirmed that the proper number of detectors are located either in the core or in storage onsite or in storage at the General Electric offices in San Jose, California.

i However, because of the documentation discrepancies, the licensee is unable to identify by serial number exactly which detector is in which

location in the core. Because of the small amount of special nuclear l material contained in these detectors, the licensee's accurate piece

count of materials, and the identical amount of special nuclear material I

contained in each detector, the Region III Material Control and i Accountability Specialist concluded that it is not necessary to remove detectors from the core to identify which detector is in which location i by serial number. However, it was considered prudent that the licensee l identify specific locations of each detector. This issue was discussed with the licensee and the licensee acknowledged that when the opportunity arises to resolve these discrepancies because of detector failure and replacement, the discrepancies would be resolve . Preoperational Test Results Evaluation Verification (70329)

The inspector verified that the following. deferred preoperational test results were documented, reviewed, and approved by the licensee in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.68, the Test Programs Manual (TPM), Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Safety Evaluation Report (SER), and Quality Assurance (QA) Program.

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TP 1C51D-P-0001, " Neutron Monitoring System: Traversing Incore Probe Calibration Syster," Revision 2 No violations or deviations were identifie . Startup Test Results Evaluation (72301)

The inspector verified that the following startup test results were documented, reviewed, and approved by the licensee in accordance with the requirements of Perry FSAR, appropriate administrative procedures, and applicable Regulatory Guide STI-C51-0006 " Source Range Monitor (SRM) Performance and Control Rod Sequence," Revision 1, Section STI-C95-0099 " Emergency Response Information System," Revision 1, Sections 8.2.12 and 8. STI-C11-0005 " Control Rod Drive (CRD) System," Revision 1, Sections

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8.1, 8.2, and STI-G42-0119 " Suppression Pool Cleanup (SPCU) System," Revision 1, Section No violations or deviations were identifie . Startup Test Results Review (72524)

The inspector reviewed the results of the following test and determined that the licensee documented, reviewed, and approved the results in accordance with the requirements of the FSAR, appropriate administrative procedures and applicable Regulatory Guides and found them satisfactor STI-J11-0003 " Fuel Loading," Revision 1, Sections 8.1, 8.2, and No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

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On July 28, 1986, the inspector observed the performance of technical specifications required testing of the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) D trips contained in Surveillance Instruction (SVI)-C51-T0027-D,

"APRM D Trips Channel Functional," Revision 1, with Temporary Change Nos. 1, 6, and 7, and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation (Fluke Multimater No. L70-N056U) was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by per:onnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne .

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, Three trip setpoints were found to be outside of their respective " leave-as-is zones" but less than the technical specification allowable value The instrumentation and control systems technician initiated a work request to recalibrate those setpoint The total test time exceeded the two-hour time period that the APRM was allowed to be out of service and the unit supervisor appropriately initiated the potential LC0 documentation.

No violations of regulatory requirements or deviations from commitments were identified in this are '

1 Unresolved Items J

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required

. in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, a violation

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or a deviation. An unresolved item is identified in Paragraph . Open Inspection Items 1 Open inspection items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open inspection items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 7.

1 Exit Interviews (30703)

i The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 throughout the inspection period and on August 4, 198 '

The inspector summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of the inspection repor The licensee

did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the

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inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.

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