IR 05000440/1987021
| ML20236E146 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1987 |
| From: | Foster J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236E144 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-87-21, 50-441-87-05, 50-441-87-5, NUDOCS 8710290088 | |
| Download: ML20236E146 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMISSION.
. REGION III-
. Reports No. 50-440/87021(DRSS); 50-441/87005(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Licenses No. NPF-45; CPPR-149 Licensee: Cleveland Electric. Illuminating-Company.
Post Office Box 5000
' Cleveland, OH '44101
~ Facility Name:
Perry. Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection.At:
Perry Site, Perry, Ohio
. Inspection Conducted: September 28 through October 2, 1987
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Inspector:
'J. Foster Date-l
~ Team Leader f fa W w Approved By:
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/8 /!ff W. Snellt Chief.
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Emergency Preparedness Section
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Inspection Summary Inspection on September 28 through October 2,1987 (Reports No. 50-440/87021(DRSS);,
No. 50-441/87005(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of the following areas of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant emergency preparedness program: ~ action on previous Open Items', activations of the licensee's emergency plan; emergency Ldetection and. classification; dose projection; protective action decisionmaking; notifications and communications; changes to the emergency program; shift staffing and augmentation; knowledge and performance of duties-(training); and licensee audits. This inspection involved one NRC inspector, and one consultant.
Results: ~ No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS.
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Persons: Contacted
- A., Kaplan,. V.P. Nuclear.0perations i
. G. Dunn, Compliance Engineer:
- R. Vondrasek, General: Supervisor, CRS.
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- R. Farrell, Manager, Perry : Services l
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B..Ferrel,.0perations. Engineer-
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- l. Corbett,,E-Plan Training, PPTO
- J.-Anderson, Onsite' Emergency Planner-
- D. Hulbert,-Supervisor, Emergency _ Planning Unit J. Pelcic, QA Engineer L. Pennell, Trainin' Analyst g-M. Nemcek,. Unit Supervisor R. Stiffler, Shift' Supervisor D. Phillips,' Shift Technical-Advisor.
~J. George, Training Section
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In addition to,those' listed, the' inspector contacted other licensee
. representatives and contractors.
- Denotes those persons attending.the exit meeting held on.0ctober 2, 1987.
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Licensee Actions on Previously-Identified Open Items a.
(Closed) Open Items ~440/85009-07; 441/85007-07: Stocking and.
Operability of the medical treatment first-aid facility.
Documents indicated that.the stocking of the in plant'first aid room was completed on March 7, 1986.
The contractor first aid facility in
.the Project Support Area has since been upgraded and equipped as a-Site' Dispensary, staffed with a Registered Nurse and an Emergency Medical Technician. With'the establishment of.the Site Dispensary, the: Medical. Aid Room was discontinued.
Revision 6.of the Emergency:
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y Plan (Section.7.4)'ref_lects this change, and this is acceptable.
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'This item is closed.
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(0 pen) Open Items 440/87010-01; 441/87002-01: Overall evaluation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Heating, Ventilating, and Air. Conditioning System (HVAC).
The inspector reviewed documentation which indicated that the licensee was reviewing-the' overall reliability of the EOF HVAC system. The drive belt component of the air handling unit had been identified as a major q
factor in the system's previous unreliability, and unit modifications / replacement were being pursued. Additional modifications to the system, including installation of equipment to
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allow initiation of the isolation mode from the unit control panel,
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are planned. This item will remain open.
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' Activations of the Emergency Plan
.f The. licensee has had three. actual' activations of the emergency Plan since
- the last inspection, two Unus'ual Events (UEs), and one Alert '
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a.
On March' 2, ~1987, at 3:19 a.m., the reactor' and" turbine tripped due l
to' low water level-(Level.3). - The High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)'
t system initiated at approximatelycthe same time, when the reactor water level reached Level 2.
At approximately 3:45 a.m., an Unusual Event was properly declared, based on " Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiation with flow to the '. vessel." Notification times were as follow:
Ashtabula County 3:54 a.m.
Geauga County 3:55 a.m.
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Lake County 3:56 a.m.
State of Ohio 4:03 a.m.
l US~ Coast Guard 4:08 a.m.
l NRC-4:23 a.m.
' Notification of the State of Ohio was not completed until 4:03 a.m.
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due to telephone ~ difficulties (primary and secondary State telephone numoers were not manned at the time).
The delay in reaching the
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State of Ohio' delayed subsequent notification of the Coast Guard.-
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Notification times were therefore considered acceptable.
The Unusual Event was terminated at 4:35.a.m. when reactor water level had been restored by the activation of HPCS and the restart of a motor-driven reactor feed pump, allowing de-activation of HPCS and stabilization of. reactor water level. A News Release was issued by the licensee.
The inspector reviewed documentation associated with.the event, including a chronological description of actions during the event, Unusual Event checklist, initial and termination notification forms, pager message forms, notification log and Event Summary Report, and found them to be acceptable.
In addition, Surveillance 87-063,
" Unusual Event of March 2, 1987" and the response to the surveillance was reviewed and found to be acceptable.
b.
On March 16, 1987, at 9:14 p.m., Control Room alarm annunciators were lost when an electrical bus was inadvertently de-energized by a plant operator accidentally dropping a tool on a circuit breaker.
The operator contacted the Control Room, advised them of his actions, and was directed to close the circuit breaker.
At 9:19 p.m., power was restored to the annunciators.
An Alert was properly declared, per the Emergency Action Levels, at 9:20 p.m.
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Notification times were as follow:
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Ashtabula County.9:35 p.m.
Geauga' County
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' Lake County-9:35 p.m.
' State of Ohio 9:38~p.m.
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..US Coast Guard 9:42 p.m.
.NRC 9:34 p.m.-
L Notification times were reduced for this event due to 'he
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- availability' of a' five-way dedicated telephone line. The State
of Ohio did not answer the five-way line, and the. State of Ohio Disaster Service Agency Answering service was contacted-via L
commercial telephone line.. Notification'of the U3-Coast Guard was L
somewhat delayed by calling the. State of 0hio via commercial line.
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Notification. times were considered acceptable.
The Alert was terminated at 9:54 p.m...as power had.been restored to the Control Room Alarm annunciators. The Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations' Support Center (OSC) were not activated, based on the Emergency Coordinator's (Shift Supervisor) judgement. As the event was essentially terminated prior to classification, this
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decision was considered acceptable. A press release was made by the'
licensee.
l The inspector reviewed documentation associated with the event, including the Alert checklist, initial and termination notification
. forms, pager message. forms, and Event' Summary Report, and _found them.
to be acceptable.
In addition, Surveillance 87_-077, " Alert of
. March 16, 1987" was reviewed and found to be acceptable.
c.
On September 9, 1987, during a periodic test, a reactor. feed pump
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was tripped, causing the feed control system'to increase flow from other feed pumps. The increased feed pump flow increased reactor water level to.the, trip setpoint, tripping the' reactor,.which caused a reactor water. level decrease, and an inadvertent' initiation of the High: Pressure Coolant System. An Alert was properly declared, per the Emergency Action Levels, at 8:36'p.m.
Notification times were as follow:
Ashtabula County 8:45 p.m.
Geauga County 8:45 p.m.
Lake County 8:45 p.m.
State of Ohio 8:53 p.m.
US Coast Guard 9:09 p.m.
NRC 9:02 p.m.
t Notification times were considered to be acceptable, but it was noted that the notification to the US Coast Guard could have been more prompt.
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The event was terminated at 9:12 p.m., when plant conditions h stabilized.
a The inspector reviewed documentation associated with the event including the Untsual Event checklist, initial and termi and found them to b? acceptable. notification forms, pager mes
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" Unusual Event of September 9, 1987" was reviewed and fin additio
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acceptable.
ound to be
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commitments were identified.No violations of regulatory require 4.
Emergency Detection and Classification (82201)_
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Section 4.0, Table 4.1 of the PNPPEP details the Emergency Acti (EALs).
EAls in the PNPPEP and the implementing instructi on Levels previous inspection.
and the Plan are alike, with the exception that the EALs in r ng the not refer to specific instrument nomenclature or Technical Specificat an do numbers.
on Walkthroughs were emergency program. conducted with three personnel a individuals responsibilities, and the classification of sev scenarios as presented by the inspector.
eral BWR.
use of Perry Emergency Procedures.of their responsibilities and priate) the It was noted in the previous inspection that responsibility for an action level was not listed as a non-delegable responsibility fo classifying Emergency Coordinator.
The procedure now properly specifies that r the classification of events is a non-delegable responsibility assigned the Emergency Coordinator.
o No violations of regulatory requirements or deviations from
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were identified.
commitments 5.
Protective Action Decisionmaking (82202)
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Protective Actions and Guides EPI-88, was reviewed.
This instruction all protective action recommendations.provides that the Emergenc proval of Protection Assistant, based on Offsite Dose Calcula EPI-B7) and Radiation Monitoring Team reports.
rocedure a benefit analysis of sheltering vs. evacuation. The procedure includes
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Thel definition 'Section 3.1,;" protective actions, has been. changed since.
thellast= routine inspection'and now-includes those emergency measures
- taken before or after an uncontrolled release of radioactive material j
has occurred.-
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No. violations.of regulatory. requirements.or-deviations from commitments were identified.
6.
Notifications and Communications (82203)
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's emergency notification system as described.in EPI-B1 (Revision 5 with TCNs 1, 2 and 4).
It was noted that
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in order.to prevent compromise of the message authentication-scheme, the-initial and follow-up notification forms (Forms:
EPI-B1-2b and EPI-B1-3b)
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have been changed. The forms now show the telephone numbers of the.
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Control Room, TCS and EOF, precluding the necessib af giving the state J
and counties these. numbers over the telephone.
l The inspector reviewed the instructions and test results '(last six months)
for the following telephone equipment monthly tests:
Dedicated Lines (PTI-R50-P0001)
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OPX (CEI)
(PTI-RS6-P0001)
Radios (RMT)
(PTI-R57-P0001)
i Pagers (PTI-Gen-P0003)
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With a few minor exceptions, the tests of telephone circuits and radios
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Documentation related.to pager testr was also reviewed.
It was noted that the tests were conducted at the same time each month (day and hour),
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and out.of the 18 pagers tested on each occasion, on the average, there
were at least'three follow-ups per test.
These follow-ups were required i
'due to pagers not being physically with the individuals, pagers set on I
" silent" mode, pagers failing to work, etc..It was further noted that,
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on the days of the observed exercise and the semi-annual augmentation drill, only.one or no pager follow-ups were required. This point is discussed further in the section on Shift Staffing and Augmentation.
The inspector observed an unannounced test of the back-up communications circuits in the EOF.
This test verified the operability of back-up equipment at that location as well as the validity of back-up telephone l
numbers for the State and counties. The licensee, through experience, has-found it necessary to verify the back-up numbers monthly, and this is tracked on the repetitive task program.
No errors were noted.
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The event was terminated at 9:12 p.m., when plant conditions had
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stabilized.
The inspector reviewed documentation associated with the event, including the Unusual Event checklist, initial and termination notification forms, pager message forms, and Event Summary Report,
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and found them to be acceptable.
In addition, Surveillance 87-218,
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" Unusual. Event of September 9, 1987" was reviewed and found to be acceptable.
X No violations of regulatory requirements or deviations from j
commitments were identified.
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4.
Emergency Detection and Classification (82201)
Section 4.0, Table 4.1 of the PNPPEP details the Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
Differences in the format and content were noted between the EALs in the PNPPEP and the implementing instruction (EPI-la)during the previous inspection.
This has been corrected, and the EALs in-the EPIPS and the Plan are alike, with the exception that the EALs.in the Plan do I
not refer to specific instrument nomenclature or Technical Specification l
. numbers.
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Walkthroughs were conducted with three personnel assigned to the Perry
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emergency program. Walkthroughs consisted of questions relating to each
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individuals res' possibilities, and the classification of.several BWR scenarios as presented by the inspector. All personnel were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and adequately demonstrated (as appropriate) the use of Perry Emergency Procedures.
It was noted in the previous inspection that responsibility for classifying j
an action level was not listed as a'non-delegable responsibility for the
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Emergency Coordinator.
The procedure.now properly specifies that classification of events is a non-delegable responsibility assigned to the Emergency Coordinator.
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No violations of regulatory requirements or deviations from commitments were identified.
5.
Protective Action Decisionmaking (82202)
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Protective Actions and Guides EPI-88, was reviewed.
This instruction provides that the Emergency Coordinator is responsible for approval of all protective action recommendations.
Protective Action Recommendations are developed by the Offsite Radiation Advisor and the Radiation Protection Assistant, based on Offsite Oose Calculations (procedure EPI-B7) and Radiation Monitoring Team reports. The procedure includes a benefit analysis of sheltering vs. evacuation.
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The definition Section 3.1, " protective actions,"'has been changed since the last.r'outine inspection and now includes thc'se~ emergency measures taken before or after an.. uncontrolled release af radioactive material-has occurred.
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-No violations of regulatory requirements or deviations from commitments'
were-identified.
6.
Notifications and Communications (82203)
The inspector revie'wed the licensee's emergency notification system as described in EPI-B1 (Revision 5 with_TCNs 1, 2 and 4).
It was noted that
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in order to prevent compromise of the message authentication scheme, the.
initial and follow-up notification forms (Forms:
EPI-B1-2b and EPI-B1-3b)
have been changed. The forms now show the telephone numbers of the-
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Control Room, TCS and E0F, precluding the necessity of giving the state and counties these. numbers over the telephone.
The inspector reviewed the instructions and test results (last six months)
for the following telephone equipment monthly tests:
Dedicated Lines (PTI-R50-P0001)
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i PBX (Site)
(PTI-R55-P0001)
OPX(CEI)
(PTI-R56-P0001)
Radios (RMT)
(PTI-R57-P0001)
Pagers (PTI-Gen-P0003)
With a'few minor exceptio'is, the tests of telephone circuits and radios indicated no problems.
Documentation related to pager tests was also reviewed.
It was noted that the tests were conducted at the same time each month (day'and hour),
and out of-the 18 pagers tested on each occasion, on the average, there
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were at least three follow-ups per test. 'These follow-ups were required'
due to pagers not being physically with the individuals,' pagers set on
" silent" mode, pagers failing to work, etc.
It was further noted that, on the days of the observed exercise and the semi-annual augmentation drill, only one or no pager follow-ups were required. This point is discussed further in the section on Shift Staffing and Augmentation.
The inspector observed an unannounced test of the back-up communications circuits in the EOF. This test verified the operability of back-up equipment at that location as well as the validity of back-up telephone numbers for the State and counties.
The licensee, through experience, has found it necessary to verify the back-up numbers monthly, and this is tracked on the repetitive task program.
No errors were noted.
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The inspector _ reviewed t'e licens'e's Emergency ResponseLTelephone h
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Directory and the document maintenance. procedures as specified.in EPI-82 0"
' Revision 2.. The directory (Revision 9, TCN 1):which is revised ' quarterly,
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was'found to be current, complete and welltorganized. As discussed in the
section on-Training, the EP Unit Supervisor ensures the: persons assigned
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a to EP-positions in the. directory are properly _ qualified for the assignments A review of exercise and drill comments and results indicated that-communications.with the offsite radiation monitoring teams have been-reliable and effective.
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'No violations of regulatory requirements cr deviations from commitments were identified.
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Changes to the Program (82204)
l-K Through discussions with licensee Emergency Planners and random reviews of selected procedures, facilities and equipment, the inspectorLverified'
that-no major' changes have been made to the licensee's program since the last inspection.
The inspector reviewed documentation which indicated that the~ Radiological,
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Environmental and Chemistry Subcommittee had reviewed changes to-the i
Emergency Plan and comments received. Also' reviewed were letters
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documenting that the Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Levels (EALs)
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- had been sent to State-and local officials for their review and comment.
Responses from each agency were on file.
The. Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Unit, is directly responsible for
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supervising'nine~ Emergency Planners in the maintenance and coordination of the program.. The inspectors interview with licensee representatives-i verified that there' had been no significant changes in the organization or assignment of' responsibilities for the Emergency Plan Or9 nization since.the last inspection.
The interviews also revealed '.o significant changes in the organization ' f offsite agencies'since the last
o inspection.
J Discussions with emergency preparedness personnel indicated that numerous l
minor improvements have been made to the program.
These improvements include:
an upgrading of forms (to condense their size and for human
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factors considerations), status board upgrades in the TSC and EOF,
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addition of-an " auto-broadcast" telefax machine with the capability for i
automatically telefaxing information to several parties, a pilot program to test a tone-alert /public address system for notifying personnel outside of. the plant proper (but onsite), development of a telephone module for the simulator Control room (to essentially duplicate equipment in the i
= Control Room), and re-organization of the TSC to locate dose projection j]
equipment to an adjacent room (for space and noise considerations).
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!No violations of' regulatory requirements or deviations from commitments i
were identified.
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Shift' Staffing and Augmentation (82205)
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's normal and augmented manning as.
shown in the Emergency Plan. The number of individuals assigned and
their capabilities were judged to be adequate to meet the goals of--
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-NUREG-0654.
t The licensee utilizes the annual exercise and semi-annual augmentation
- drills to evaluate his ability to meet augmentation time goals. Due to.
i several factors, the conclusions drawn from these exercise and drill results may not be. fully valid.
In the case of the annual evaluated exercise, the day.of the exercise was known and the exercise occurred
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during the day-shift.
Unlike the average number of the pager follow-ups'
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experienced during the monthly tests, the data sheet for the exercise g
test indicated no follow-ups were required on the day of the. exercise.
Last November,1the licensee conducted his semi-annual augmentation drill as part of the monthly check of pagers (i.e., at 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br /> on the first Wednesday of the month).
In this case, there was only one pager follow-up l
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required, compared to the usual average of three or more.
This suggests-
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that the element of surprise was absent-from the exercise and drills.
No violations of regulatory requirements or deviations from commitments
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were identified. However, the following item is recommended for j
improvement:
Conduct the semi-annual augmentation drills as pager checks
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on unannounced dates at various times of.the day in order to obtain a more reasonable estimate of likely augmentation times.
9.
Knowledge and Performance of Duties (Training) (82206)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for training and qualifying i
personnel involved in the emergency preparedness program. A sample of individuals listed as qualified for given positions in the Emergency
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Response Telephone Directory were interviewed and their training records were reviewed for completeness and compliance with the requirements specified in EPI-C3, Revision 1 (Emergency Preparedness Training Instruction). No errors were noted.
Several new, position specific training modules are in place. The inspector reviewed the following modules:
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04 - Control Room 10 - Offsite Radiation Advisor 11 - Radiation Protection Coordinator 13 - Radiation Monitoring Team
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It was noted that the formalized procedures to qualify individuals for EP positions consist:of completion of applicable classroom' training modules and required reading.
There are no practical, on-the-job training requirements specified.
Persons-qualified or requalified-in accordance with EPI-C3 are listed on'a computer printout maintained in the EP Unit a
office. On a' quarterly basis, the EP Unit Supervisor determines which of
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the: qualified persons are to be shown as qualified for which EP positions
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in the next update of the Emergency Response Telephone Directory. With the exception of-noting.which trainees have participated in a half-day.
drill, the EP Unit office does not keep track of the individuals t
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practical EP experience - i.e., which individuals participated in which q
drills,and e'xercises and in which EP positions.
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No violations of regulatory requirements or deviations from commitments j
were identified.
However, the following item is recommended for i
improvement:
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Maintain a record of the real and exercise experience of individuals
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in each of the more senior, responsible EP positions and use this information in making future drill and exercise position assignments (actual and trainee)_to provide personnel with the maximum amount of'
practical training experience.
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10. Dose Calculation and Assessment (82207)
.j The inspector reviewed the procedures for automated dose calculation I
(EPI-87a Revision.1, with TCN 1 and 2), manual dose calculation (EPI-B7b Revision 6), and protective actions and guides (EPI-8 Revision 4., with TCN 1, 2 and 3).
Further, as indicated in the section on Training, he reviewed the training modules applicable to dose calculation and assessment.
An individual from each group of EP positions currently l
responsible for dose calculation and protective action recommendations was interviewed - i.e., an Offsite Radiation Advisor, Radiation Protection Coordinator, Radiation Protection Assistant and a Shift-Technical Advisor.
The training records of these individuals were also reviewed to verify l
their qualification for the positions assigned. The instructions were considered complete and adequate.
The level of knowledge and qualification of those interviewed was excellent.
Individuals interviewed were well versed in the manual calculation and assessment procedures utilized as back-ups to the automated programs. They were able to demonstrate their ability to use the MIDAS program on the VAX and DOSEPROJ on the personal computer. A minor deficiency was that those interviewed were not always able to explain the reason for the
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various default values used in the programs.
They demonstrated a good understanding of the information which they could expect to receive from
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offsite monitoring teams and how this data could be used.
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-The training module for Dose ssessment is currently under, revi_ sion by: a contractor.
Licensee personnel-indicated that the new module should be
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The. licensee is currently developing four accident scenarios-with four different meteorological conditions with which to compare the MIDAS.
output with the requirements of NRC Reg. Guide 1.109 and the output of 00SEPROJ.
No violations of regulatory requirements-or deviations from commitments were identified.
'11.
Licensee Audits (82210)
The licensee's procedures provide for conducting an independent annual audit of the Emergency Program.
In addition, the surveillance program, as applied to Emergency Plan: activities, was reviewed.
Perry Operations' Procedures (POP 0208, Revision 2, dated September 14,
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1987), in Section 3.9, indicated that the. Supervisor,. Emergency Planning Unit, is responsible for assuring that'an independent group performs _a detailed annual review of the Emergency Plan.
The Perry Quality Assurance (QA) Plan, Appendix A (Revision 4, dated March 18,' 1987) provides.for review of audits of the_PNPP Emergency Plan and implementing procedures by the Nuclear Safety Review. Committee.
Appendix E of the QA Plan (Revision 2, dated May 21,1987), provides'a
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. matrix indicating which sections'of QA Plan requirements lare applied to emergency planning activities. An annual. audit of emergency planning I-activities is scheduled.
The annual Emergency Plan Audits follow the standard audit pattern, which provides for_ the production of an Audit Plan, review and_ approval of'the
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Audit Plan, development of an Audit Checklist, and notification cognizant personnel of a pending audit.. Audit findings are' classified as Action Requests (ARs), or Corrective Action Requests. Audits may also contain Open Items, Observations, and Recommendations, a
i The inspector reviewed the 1987 Emergency Preparedness Program Audit Report (" Emergency Plan," Audit PIO 87-13) dated June 30, 1987, which
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' documented an audit conducted on May 13, 1987, and May 26 through June 18, 1987. The audit was performed by a four person audit team, and appeared
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to be quite detailed and comprehensive.
One Audit Request (AR001) was generated as a result of the audit, which found that the Semi-annual j
Health Physics drill had not been conducted during the second half of
1986.
Corrective action involved improving the tracking of drills _and I
clearly assigning responsibility for coordinating drills.
Corrective j
actions had been completed prior to the audit's issuance.
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A~ section of'the' audi k. report '(Sect' ion 7, " Coordination with Offsite LGroups")- fulfilled the requirement in 10 CFR50.54(t) that the review cover.the adequacy of 'he interface with State and. local-governments.
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By letter of July 7',19J7, the. Audit, in' its' entirety, was provided to State'and local governments, fulfilling the requirement that the portion of the Audit' deal.ing with.the adequacy of the offsite' interface be made available to offsite authorities.
'In addition to required responses to the-Action Requests, the Emergency Planning unit staff. review the annual Audit, extract comments, observations and recommendations, and track each on a tracking system.
The inspector reviewed tracking packages PIO87-13-01 through PIO87-13-13, which were' items associated with Audit PIO 87.
Each package contained a cover sheet designating the item as an improvement. item, providing a description of the item, and signature blacks for preparation, and review. The relevant portion of the audit was included in the package, along with documentation of corrective action. Also reviewed were items EPER-87-01 through EPER-87-26, " Evaluated Exercise Improvement Items,"
documenting corrective action for items identified by the li.:ensee during the last evaluated exercise.
- The QA Plan, table.18-1 indicates that surveillance are conducted in addition to the annual audit.
Surveillance are conducted by a separate group in the Quality Assurance organization.
The inspector reviewed surveillance 86-253, " Maintenance of Emergency Plan Equipment" (onsite),87-014, " Maintenance of Emergency Plan Equipment" (offsite),87-060, Maintenance of Emergency Plan Equipment" (telephones),87-063, " Unusual'
Event of March 2,-1987,"87-117, " Emergency Plan Practice Exercise April 8, 1987,"'and~87-218,'" Unusual Event of September 9, 1987." All reviewed surveillance were well detailed and adequate.
Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that a surveillance is-performed on each actual Emergency Plan activation, although-this is-not required by procedure.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's report documenting the 1987 Emergency Preparedness Exercise. The report was well detailed,
- comprehensive, and concise.
Exercise findings and comments were noted in sections related to a particular facility or portion of the exercise, and assigned a tracking number if considered an item in need of correction or improvement. A separate section of the report summarized all tracked items', described proposed actions (if known) and dates where available.
No violations of regulatory requirements or deviations from commitments werecidentified.
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During the inspection, Ticensve-Event Reports (LERs) for Unit 1, i
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. properly classified under:thebEP program. ;The inspector reviewed the
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[.ERNo.
, kief Description 87-001'
RWCU Design Problems
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RCIC System Isolation.
@ 003 RCIC. Steam Supply. Valve.
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J87-C04
' Bumping Of IRM Cables, RPS_ Actuation 87-004 Deficient Surveillance Instruction, RPS
.t 89)f135 RCIC Leak Detection Design' Problem
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. Pressure Transient,,RRCS & Reheter Scram
'87-008.
' Q ' Battery Test Tech. Spec. Violation
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87.009
% Af r Solenoid 'talve Failure, Siese1' Generator-4.
, 87f010 7ech. Spec. Violation, Ch66eM Not Tripped
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- 87-C W Effluent Monitor Tech. Specl: Violation
.87-0'O Hot Surge Tank Switch Causes/Riactor Scram 87-01'f RWCU Isolation.0n Differe%ial' Flw 87-011. t Inadvertent HPCS Initiatier., No Injection
- 87-015 i%
Containment. Vessel a Oryvell, Purge Isolation 87-016 t, Partial Balarde.0f-Plant Isolation 87-0 7,'.
Error Causes 'Los's Of' Coni.ainment Integrity f %
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- 87-0 3 i.hl';RCICIsolationsDueTo.tvasterminateCause RCICjIsolation,-FdilutejTo 87.19 r llow Procedure o
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87f20 f Error Causes Backup My#cgbn Purpe Isolation 8% D21
' 4 4Pl@ Actuation Due To imi Fluctuation
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, Diesel Ge:ierator. Ved ilatior. System Autostart Mi Reactor Protectd,n System Manual Actuation v.
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j 9 87-024 P9S-Actuation Due1To Electrical Noise Spikes
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, // i4, 87-026%', 87-@& '
.RHR Shutdown Cooling Isolations
. RWCU Higb 0 differential glc% solstfon
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.Q' V Reactor Shutdown Due To Cor. denser Vectum Loss- 87-028 Contro W dd Drive Installat Gn Problems 6 87-029
, RCIC Sw ton Valve Logic Overafdcan
' Loss Of. ~eedwater And Masui,'@iacts87-030 ir.in FajiureToTestLOCA-16iayCan 87-031 87-032 L+ak Detection Power Ms,' kEU Isolation
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87-033 3tanc.by Liquid Control JnoperaSl"e
'87-034 RCIC Cooling System Isolation i
3+ Condensate Drain Lire FClure,jgram,',
87,-035-87-036 11ssed Rod Pattern Cont-h,ller S2rgeillance 87-037 Feedpump Controller railuie, Reactor Scram-87-038 DieselGeneratorFuelOutDfSpec)fication 87-039 Isalation Of Main Steam Erain, Lire 87-040 RCIC Inoperable, Leak (btecti6n Problems
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B ief Description-l 87-041-
- Backup Hydrogen Purge System Isolation-
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RPS Bus Failure,.MSIV Closure, Scram
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'87-043 AEGTS Differential Pressure Switch Drift'87-044, RCIC Isolation Due To Pressure anomalies87-045
. Manual... Scram, Bushing Failure 87-046
.RWCU Isolation Due To.High' Temperature Signal-87-047 Tech.; Spec. Violation, Time Misinterpretation
.87-048 Open Containment Isolation Valves87-049 Unexpected Shutdown Cooling Isolation Closure 87-050 IRM Noise, Reactor Protection Sys. Initiation
'87-051 Primary Containment Leakrate Exceeded 87-052-Tech. Spec. Viol., IRM Monitors. Inoperable 87-053 Surveillance Not Met, Tech. Spec. Violation 87-054 Six Pool Swell. Deflectors Not Installed i
87-055 APRM Electrical Failure,. RPS Actuation
Containment Iso. Valve Inadvertently Shut.87-059.
RWCU Containment Isolation,. Flow Indication 87-060 Inoperable Effluent Rad ~ Monitor
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All-events-were found to be properly classified as either not falling under the-EP program (no emergency Action Level had been met), or a proper Emergency Classification had been made.
No violations of regulatory requirements or deviations from commitments were identified.
- 13. Exit Interview (30703)
l The inspectors met with the applicant representatives denoted in Paragraph 1.on-October.2,.1987. 'The inspectors summarized the scope
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-and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of the inspection report. The. applicant did not indicate that cny n'
he information disclosed during the inspection could be cont W red proprietary in nature.
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