ML20204E790
| ML20204E790 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204E784 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-99-01, 50-440-99-1, NUDOCS 9903250132 | |
| Download: ML20204E790 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000440/1999001
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGIONlil
Docket No: 50-440
License No: NPF-58
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Report No.: 50-440/99001(DRP) )
Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Cornpany I
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P.O. Box 97 A200 1
Perry, OH 44081
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Facility: Perry Nuclear Power Plant l
Location: Perry, OH
Dates: January 13 through February 24,1999
Inspectors: C. Upa, Senior Resident inspector
J. Clark, Resident inspector
Approved by: Thomas J. Kozak, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
- 9903250132 8790317
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Perry Nuclear Power Plant
, NRC Inspection Report 50-440/99001(DRP)
This inspection report included resident inspectors' evaluatior of aspects of licensee operations,
engineering, maintenance, and plant support.
Operations
e The licensee continued to safely and effectively operate the plant during pin-hole fuel
leak suppression and reactor power coastdown activities throughout the inspection
period. Operators were fully aware of plant parameter changes as the plant coasted j
down (Section 01.1). i
e The inspectors concluded that the licensee effectively replaced two circuit cards in the
redundant reactivity control system, which was categorized as a medium risk i
maintenance activity, through the use of good briefings, effective command and control,
and clear communications between operations and maintenance personnel
(Section O1.2).
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e Inattention to detail by a licensed operator led to using the wrong section of an !
Operating Instruction for a system restoration activity. The operator identified his error 1
and appopriately notified operations management of the occurrence. Plant
management provided training to operations personnel emphasizing the importance of
self-checking and attention to detail during work activities (Section O1.3).
Maintenance
e The inspectors identified that a surveillance test to monitor the condition of the Unit 2,
Division 3 battery was not conducted in accordance with the procedure. This failure to
follow an approved procedure was considered a Non-Cited Violation of NRC
requirements (Section M1.2). l
- Plant personnel failed to adhere in all cases to plant procedures governing the storage
of items near safety-related equipment. One Non-Cited Violation was identified j
concerning this issue (Section M1.3).
Enaineerina
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e The Unit 2, Division 3 battery was declared inoperable after the licensee identified that
its age was greater than its rated lifetime and that increased frequency testing was
required by Technical Specifications. The battery was subsequently successfully tested.
- The licensee identified that 9 of 60 cells in the Unit 1, Division 3 battery were beyond the
- rated service life of 20 years. However, the battery was determined to be operable
based on the average age of all of the individua! battery cells. An unresolved item
concerning the technical justification for calculating the battery age based on the
average age of the individual cells was identified (Section E1.1).
- The inspectors concluded that there was generally an appropriate amount of
management involvement in the corrective action program (Section E7.1).
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Report Details j
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Summarv of Plant Status l
The plant was being operated at 95 percent power at the beginning of the inspection period due
to a power reduction for rod testing. The reactor was in coastdown throughout most of the
inspection period. Six control rods remained fully inserted for continued fuel leak suppression.
Periodic control rod surveillance testing activities were conducted by reducing power by
10 percent. The plant was briefly retumed to full power on February 7 and February 20,
following the removal of high pressure feedwater heaters from service. High pressure
feedwater heaters will remain out-of-service until the March 1999 outage. The plant continued
coastdown to approximately 98 percent power by the end of the inspection period.
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1. Operations
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Conduct of Operations
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. O1.1 Operation Durina Suporession of Pin-Hole Fuel Leaks and Power Coastdown
a. In_spection Scope (71707)
The inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection Procedure (IP) 71707 in assessing
the licensee's performance in continued plant operation during pin-hole fuel leak
suppression and power coastdown before refueling.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed plant operations with continued pin-hole fuel leak suppression
and power coastdown activities throughout the inspection period. Six control rods
remained fully inserted to maintain the suppression of the three fuelleaks. Chemistry
department personnel continued increased (daily) sampling of the off-gas pre-treatment
and reactor coolant systems to monitor the effectiveness of fuel feak suppression. Due
to fuel burnup, the core reached a state that 100 percent power was no longer
achievable with rnaximum core flow and normal feedwater system alignment.
Operations personnel removed the high pressure feedwater heaters 6A and 6B to
achieve a higher core thermal output. With the changing conditions, the inspectors
noted that items, such as condensate flow, had changed appreciably. Operations
personnel conducted thorough crew briefings and reliefs to update other personnel as
plant conditions changed. Operations personnel took appropriate steps to appropriately
conduct evolutions and tecting with new plant c5aracteristics, values, and parameters
and reactor engineering personnel provided estective support for power changes and
testing activities.
c. Conclusions
The licensee continued to safely and effectively operate the plant during pin-hole fuel
leak suppression and reactor power coastdown activities throughout the inspection
period. Operators were fully aware of plant parameter changes as the plant coasted
down.
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O1.2 Operations Quana Redundant Reactivity Control System Troubleshootina
a. Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors followed the guidance of IP 71707 in assessing the licensee's
performance in coordinating and controlling activities that effect reactor safety.
b. Observations and Findinas
On January 29,1999, the inspectors observed activities associated with a work order
(WO 99-1172) that was initiated to replace two circuit cards in the redundant reactivity
control system (RACS) in response to a locked-in RRCS alarm. The inspectors were
informed that work similar to this had produced a reactor trip several years ago.
Operations and instrument and controls personnel explained to the inspectors that
potential misalignments in the cards, as they were removed or replaced, could produce
either a half or full alternate rod insertion signal. Therefore, the licensee considered this
work to be of medium risk to plant operations.
The inspectors observed the pre-evolution briefing between operations and
maintenance personnel. All personnel appeared to understand the risk associated with
the evolution and freely discussed specific activities and the proper control of the
evolution. Previous plant and industry problems with such evolutions were also openly
discussed at the briefing. Operations personnel clearly stated the termiration criteria of
the evolution and how they would handle spurious trip signals or responses other than
those expected.
The inspectors observed the RRCS card replacements. Operations personnel
maintained positive control throughout the evolution and conducted effective
three-legged communications between themselves and the maintenance personnel.
The operations superintendent provided direct oversight during the evolution. The
RRCS cards were successfully replaced with no abnormal plant signals or responses
and the system was subsequently returned to service.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensee effectively replaced two circuit cards in the
RRCS, which was categorized as a medium risk maintenance activity, through the use
of good briefings, effective command and control, and clear communications between
operations and maintenance personnel.
01.3 Operator Error Durina System Restoration
a. Inspection Scope (71707. 92901)
The inspectors followed the guidance of IPs 71707 and 92901 while reviewing a
licensee-identified operator error on February 8,1999.
b. Observations and Findinas
, While manipulating a valve, an operator identified that he was performing steps in the
l wrong section of system operating instruction SOI-M17," Containment Vacuum Relief
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System." The operator performed Section 4.1 of sol-M17 early in his shift to place a
valve in its startup configuration. Later in his shift, when it was time to place the valve in
its shutdown to standby readiness condition, the operator commenced the steps of
sol-M17; however, the operator repeated the steps in Section 4.1 of the procedure
rather than performing the steps of Section 6.1. The operator recognized his error,
stopped his work, and notified his supervision of the error. Steps 1 through 5 of
Sections 4.1 and 6.1 in SOI-M17 were identical. Therefore, no incorrect positioning or
operation of equipment had been conducted during this error. Operations supervision
informed the inspectors that the individual was counseled and that training was provided
on the event through memorandums and crew briefings. l
d. Conclusions
Inattention to detail by a licensed operator led to using the wrong section of an
Operating Instruction for a system restoration activity. The operator identified his error
and appropriately notified operations rnanagement of the occurrence. Plant
management provided training to operations personnel emphasizing the importance of
self-checking and attention to detail during work activities.
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment l
O2.1 General Plant Tours and System Walkdowns (71707)
The inspectors followed the guidance of IP 71707 in walking down accessible portions
of several systems and areas, including: l
- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)
- Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) i
e High Pressure Core Spray Systern (HPCS)
- Emergency Service Water System (ESW)
e Safety-related Switchgear and Battery Rooms
e Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System (AEGTS)
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The inspectors identified several housekeeping issues and exampler * the storage of
items in the vicinity of safety-related equipment as discussed in Sec .3. Also, the
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inspectors identified material condition issues with the Division 3 baw.. inich are
discussed in detailin Sections M1.2 and E1.1 of this report. Other minor discrepancies
were brought to the licensee's attention and were corrected.
06 Operations Organization and Administration
O6.1 Review of INPO Evaluation Report (71707)
Using the guidance of IP 71707, the inspectors reviewed the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations (INPO) Report, dated August 27,1998. This report documented the findings
from the July 1998 INPO Evaluation at the Perry plant. The licensee informed the
inspectors that CRs were initiated for items requiring additional action.
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II. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
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M1.1 Review of Routine Maintenance and Surveillance Testina {Q_2707. 61726)
The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities:
- PTI-E51-P0003, RCIC Terry turbine overspeed trip test
e SVI-D23-T1213, Suppression pool average temperature
e Work Order (WO) 98 2666, RCIC turbine lube oil system flush
e WO 98-10173, RCIC pump suppression pool suction valve lubrication and l
inspection
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e SVI-E31-T5396A, RHR/RCIC Steam line flow high channel calibration j
e SVI-R42-T5232, Unit 1 Division 3 battery charger load test
e WO 98-12840, Repair failed battery charger
- WO 99-01172, Replace failed RRCS isolation module
e WO 96-5471, Clean ESW alternate intake tunnel
e SVI-R42-T5224,125V Battery terminal corrosion and electrolyte temperature
check, Unit 2 Division 3
- WO 98-10973, HPCS room cooler replacement
- WO 96-4070, AEGTS Charcoal replacement
- SVI M15-T1240A, AEGTS Charcoal Filter Adsorber Leakage Test
e SVI-C11-T1003A, Control rod drive exercise
in general, the activities observed were performed satisfactorily. There were
appropriate controls and good coordination for the activities. Procedure adherence was
acceptable except for the Division 3 battery test as described in Section M1.2.
M1.2 Material Condition and Surveillance Testina of Division 3 Batteries
a. Inspection Scope (61726. 62707)
The inspectors followed the guidance of IP 61726 and 62707 in assessing the licensee's
l performance of surveillance testing and maintenance of material condition of safety-
related station batteries.
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b. Observations and Findinas
On February 1,1999, the inspectors toured the Division 3 section of the Unit 2
switchgear room. The inspectors identified apparent plate growth, discoloration, and
, sediment in certain battery cells and what appeared to be corrosion on several of the
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cell posts for the Unit 2, Division 3 battery. The inspectors discussed the observations
with the battery system engineer who subsequently conducted a walkdown of the
l battery with the inspectors. The inspectors were concerned that these were indications
! of advanced cell aging. The system engineer stated that these conditions were minor
and did not affect the operability of the battery; however, the system engineer initiated a
work request to clean the corrosion from the battery posts.
On February 3,1999, the inspectors requested a copy of the latest performance of
surveillance instruction SVI-R42-T5224, "125V Battery Category B Limits, Terminal
Corrosion and Eiectrolyte Temperature Check (Unit 2, Division Ill)," Revision 1
(November 1991). The inspectors were informed that SV;-R42-T5224 had been
performed on January 29,1999, along with the Unit 1, DNision 3 battery SVI. The
inspectors were also informed that readings from the two SVI's were apparently
swapped. Condition Report 99-0235 was written to address this error, and the SVI's
were reperformed on February 2,1999.
The inspectors reviewed the February 2 performance of SVI-R42-T5224. During the
review, the inspectors noted 7 individual steps that had not been performed in
accordance with the procedure. Examples of these items included failure to mark steps
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as not applicable, failure to read meters within required accuracy, and inappropriately
marking the electrolyte level in all cells as zero when some were above or below that
mark. The inspectors also noted several other steps that had ambiguous statements or
classification of the acceptance criteria. An example of such a statement was under the
comments for the appearance of post corrosion. The craft personnel documented a
comment that," cells have dark coloring that is inconsistent with a clean post." However,
the acceptance criteria box for no visible corrosion was checked as satisfactory. The
inspectors determined that the incorrect performance of the steps, and the ambiguous
notes, made it difficult to understand whether or not the SVI was performed
satisfactorily. The inspectors were also concerned that subsequent licensee reviewers
of the SVI had not noted these problems. The inspectors shared their observations with
the system engineer and maintenance supervision. The licensee agreed that these
steps did not follow the procedure and ordered the reperformance of the SVI. The SVI
was performed satisfactorily on February 4,1999.
Technical Specification 5.4.1.a specified, in part, that written procedures shall be
implemented covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Appendix A lists procedure
adherence as one of tnese procedures. Perry Administrative Procedure PAP-528,
" Procedure Adherence," Revision 0.2 specifies, in part, that surveillance instructions are
to be followed step-by-step. The maintenance technician's failure to follow
SVI-R42-T5224 as written is considered a violation of the TS. This Severity Lovel IV
violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the
NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as
- CR 99-0332. (NCV 50-440/99001-01(DRP)).
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c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that a surveillance test to monitor the condition of the Unit 2,
Division 3 battery was not conducted in accordance with the procedure. This failure to
follow an approved procedure was considered a Non-Cited Violation of NRC
requirements.
M1.3 Imorocer Eauioment Storaae in Safetv-Related Areas of the Plant
a. Insoection Scope (71707. 62707)
The inspectors followed the guidance of IP 71707 and 62707 and conducted walkdowns
to assess housekeeping and equipment controlin safety-related areas of the plant.
b. Observations and Findinas
During walkdowns of the auxiliary building and the control complex, the inspectors
identified the following instances where items were staged in plant areas contrary to the
plant housekeeping policy and transient combustible program:
- The inspectors identified 2 large piles of items stored near the safety-related
control complex chillers. Desks, chairs, filing cabinets, and carpeting materials
had been moved there due to remodeling of an office space nearby. The
inspectors questioned the practice of storing items near safety-related equipment
when those items were not necessary to support work activities on the
equipment. After further discussions with the fire protection engineer and plant
manager, the inspectors were informed that a transient combustible permit had
been approved for the iteras. The inspectors and licensee determined that
several items were closer to the chillers than allowed by procedure PAP-0204,
" Housekeeping /Oleanliness Control Program." Condition Report 99-0295 was
written on February 9,1999, to document this issue.
- On January 14, the inspectors identified that a ladder was tied to safety-related
conduit in the control rod drive rebuild room. The ladder was promptly removed
and CR 99-0112 was initiated. The investigation did not determine when or why
the ladder was tied to the conduit. This was another example where the
clearance requirement of PAP-0204 was not adhered to.
- On February 1,1999, the inspectors identified another instance where items
stored near safety-related equipment were not necessary to support any work
activities in the area. Desks, boxes, tools, and containers of combustible liquids
were temporarily stored in the Unit 2, Division 2 switchgear room due to an office
rencvation. Transient Combustible Permits had been initiated for some, but not
all of the items. Specifically, there was no permit for the combustible liquids.
The licensee immediately removed the items and initiated CR 98-0223.
The three examples above represent three examples of failure to follow PAP-0204.
Section 6.1.1.7.b of PAP-0204 required a clearance of at least 1.5 times the height of
the stored item. This failure to follow PAP-204 as required by 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V, constitutes a violation. This Severity Level IV violation is being
treated as an NCV. consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This
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violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as CRs 99-0223,99-0112, and
99-0295. (NCV 50-440/99001-02(DRP)).
c. Conclusions l
Plant personnel failed to adhere in all cases to plant procedures governing the storage 4
of items near safety-related equipment. One Non-Cited Violation was identified
concerning this issue.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance lasues (92902)' ,
M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-440/98003-00 & 01: Missed TS Surveillance
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Requirement (SR) on Hydrogen Igniters. The licensee missed a TS SR to perform
increased frequency testing of hydrogen igniters when more than four igniters in one
L; vision were inoperable between March 15 and October 1,1998. Upon discovery of
the missed SR on October 1,1998, the igniters were promptly tested satisfactorily.
The procedure was revised tv ensure that increased frequency testing would be
performed in the future when necessary. The failure to perform the increased frequency
testing between March 15 and October 1,1998, was a violation of TS SR 3.6.3.2.2.
This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as an
NCV, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
111. Enaineerina
E1 Conduct of Engineering
E1.1 Increased Freauency Batterv Performance Testina Not Implemented Accordina to TS
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a. Inspection Scope (37551)
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The inspectors followed the guidance of IP 37551 in evaluating the licensee's operability
determination and review following identification that the Division 3 batteries may not
have been tested at the increased frequency required by TS. This included a review of
the Updated Safety Analysis Report and IEEE 450,1980, which was the standard that
the licensee was committed to.
b. Observations and Findinas
Background
At the Perry Plant, construction on Unit 2 was not completed; however, some Unit 2
equipment, such as the Unit 2, Division 3 battery, is fully installed, safety-related, tested
and maintained operable to support Unit 1 operation. The Unit 1, Division 3 battery is
typically line up to the Division 3 DC bus with the Unit 2 battery used as a backup. On
February 18,1999, following questions by the inspectors regarding Unit 1 and Unit 2
Division 3 battery degradation and aging (see Section M1.2), the licensee identified that
the batteries were placed on a trickle charge in the warehouse in 1978, which
established the beginning of battery life. The licensee's TS SR 3.8.4.8 required
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increased frequency of the battery performance test from every 60 months to every
i 18 months once a battery reached 85 percent of its 20-year service life. The licensee
determined that both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Division 3 batteries had cells that were more
l than 100 percent of the battery service life. The licensee initiated a CR 99-0364 and
performed an operability determination.
Unit 1 Division 3 Batterv
The licensee's Operability Determination documented that although 9 of the 60 cells
were original cells and were approximately 21 years old, the other cells had been
replaced over the years for mechanical or electrical reasons. The licensee calculated
the age of the battery to be 9.7 years based on the average age of the 60 individual
cells. As a result, the licensee determined that the frequency of testing required by
TS SR 3.8.4.8 was 60 months for this battery. It did not appear to the inspectors that
calculating an effective age for the battery was technically justified. The last
performance test had been completed on October 7,1996; therefore, if the 18-month
frequency was applicable, the surveillance test was past the 25 percent grace period
since August 23,1998. Also, the inspectors observed that the oldest 9 cells visually
appeared to be older than other cells and had sediment in the bottom of the jars. The
licensee held discussions wito % battery mant.facturcr, who had no concerns the
battery wouH failin the near term. The inspectors consulted with subject matter experts
in the Offict 'f Nuclear Reactor Regulation and needed to review this issue further.
Unit 2 Divit ,13 Batterv
Since all 60 cells on this battery were approximately 21 years old, and TS SR 3.8.4.8
had not been completed since July 29,1996, the licensee immediately declared the
battery inoperable and initiated plans to perform the performance testing. The test was
past the 125 percent grace period since June 13,1998; however, the Division 3 bus had
not been lined up to the Unit 2 battery since June 6,1998. Therefore, there was no past
operability concern regarding this battery. However, the Unit 2 battery had been
considered fully operable and the SO.' could have allowed its use at any time. The
performance test was completed satisfactorily on February 28,1999 and the Divisi7n 3
bus was lined up to the Unit 2 battery. The results of the test showed 88 percent of
rated capacity, with a TS acceptance criteria of greater than or equal to 80 percent.
Applicable Limitina Conditions for Operation
On February 19,1999, the licensee identified a leaking relief valve on the RCIC system
that required the RCIC system be secured and declared inoperable. With RCIC
inoperable, TS 3.5.3.A required that HPCS be verified to be operable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be
in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. If both batteries were past their
TS SR frequency as discussed above, TS SR 3.0.3 would be applicable, which requires
that when it is discovered that a surveillance was not completed within its specified
l frequency, then declaring the associated LCO may be delayed for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to
allow performance of the SR. The licensee did not enter the TS SR 3.0.3 due to its
l method of calculating the average life of the Unit 1, Division 3 battery and determining
i that the battery was operable. Pending further NRC review of the acceptability of
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calculating an average battery age, this is considered an unresolved item.
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c. Conclusions
The Unit 2, Division 3 battery was declared inoperable after the licensee identified that
its age was greater than its rated lifetime and that increased frequency testing was
required by Technical Specifications. The battery was subsequently successfuPy tested.
The licensee identified that 9 of 60 cells in the Unit 1, Division 3 battery were beyond the
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rated service life of 20 years. However, the battery was determined to be operable
based on the average age of all of the individual battery cells. An unresolved item
concerning the technical justification for calculating the battery age based on the j
average age of the individual cells was identified. I
E7 Quality Assurance in Engineering l
E7.1 Licensee Corrective Action and Self-Assessment Activities
a. Inspection Scope (71707. 37551. 40500) ,
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The inspectors followed the guidance of IP 71707,37551, and 40500 to review ano
evaluate portions of the licensee's corrective action program,
b. Observations and Findinas
During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed multiple activities associated with
the licensee's corrective action program, including:
- Daily Manager Meeting - discussion of new CRs
e Corrective Action Review Board (CARB), February 1R 1999
- Closed Condition Reports
The self-assessment activities observed were generally offective. At the daily
Manager's Meeting, the manager responsible for each new CR provided a summary of l
the issue, the assigned category, and a contact person who would be working on the '
investigation. At the CARB rneeting, the inspectors observed thorough discussion of
planned corrective actions for several higher level CRs. In one case, the board rejected
the CR and requested additional corrective actions to be specified. This CR was
brought back to another CARB meeting 2 weeks later and was approved. The
inspectors determined that there was an appropriate amount of management attention 1
to the corrective action program,
in one case, the inspectors questioned whether issues identified during an " extent of
condition" review were adequately dispositioned upon identification. Condition
Report 98-2480 was written on December 1,1998, after the inspectors questioned the
absence of weep holes for certain electrical junction boxes in areas of the plant
categorized as environmentally harsh. The CR documented that the missing weep
holes in an AEGTS heater controller resulted in a condition that did not match the
drawing; however, an operability determination provided technical justification for
operability of the AEGTS. The inspectors had no concerns with the initial investigation
of the issue, but the " extent of condition" re' view did not clearly address operability of
other items found not to match the drawing. On January 27,1999, the licerisee
l completed the " extent of condition" review which identified additional junction boxes that
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did not have weep holes as specified on the drawing. Further review of the condition
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was scheduled for completion by the end of March 1999. This did not appear to follow
the licensee's corrective action program guidelines, which would have called for
communicating the additional items to the control room and performing a prompt
(24-hour) operability determination. After further discussion with engineering
department management, the CR investigation was revised to clearly address the
operability of the items.
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c. Conclusions l
The inspectors concluded that there was generally an appropriate amount of
management involvement in the corrective action program.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-440/97002-02(DRP): The inspector identified an inadequate ,
Safety Evaluation (SE) for a modification to the emergency closed cooling system. The l
corrective actions included a revised SE, training to engineering department personnel,
and a self-assessment of the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation process. The
corrective actions were reviewed and considered appropriate. This item is closed.
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E8.2 (Closed) URI 50-440/98020-02(DRP): The licensee had identified that a TS SR was
potentially missed for a secondary containment isolation valve and initiated CR 98-2142. ;
The licensee was able to demonstrate that several small (3/8" and 1/4") valves !
addressed by the CR were not required to be classified as secondary containment
isolation valves by calculation E61-009, Revision 1.. The inspectors reviewed the
completed investigation of CR 98-2142 and the calculation. The inspectors determined
that the calculation supported the conclusion that the valves are not secondary
containment isolation valves; therefore, the TS SR was not applicable. This item is
closed.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the
inspection on February 24,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
H. Bergendahl, Director, Nuclear Services Department
N. Bonner, Director, Nuclear Maintenance Department
B. Boles, Manager, Plant Engineering
R. Collings, Manager, Quality Assurance
H. Hegrat, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
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T. Henderson, Supervisor, Compliance
W. Kanda, General Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Department
F. Kearney, Superintendent, Plant Operations
B. Luthanen, Compliance Engineer
L. Myers, Vice President, Nuclear
J. Powers, Manager, Design Engineering
T. Rausch, Operations Manager
l S. Sanford, Senior Compliance Engineer
l R. Schrauder, Director, Nuclear Engineering Department
i J. Sears, Manager, Radiation Protection
l J. Sipp, Manager, Radwaste, Environmental, and Chemistry
W. Slack, Responsible System Engineer
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
l IP 37551: . Onsite Engineering
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in identifying, Resolving, and Preventing
j Problems
IP 61726: Surveillance Observation ,
l IP 62707: Maintenance Observation )
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support
IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor !
Facilities
l lP 92901: ' Followup - Operations
IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance
j . IP 92903: Followup - Engineering
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ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
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Opened
50-440/99001-01 NCV Failure to Follow Battery Surveillance Procedure
50-440/99001-02 NCV improperly Stored Equipment in Plant
50-440/99001-03 NCV Missed TS SR on Hydrogen igniters
50-440/99001-04 URI TS SR on Division 3 Batteries
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Closed
50-440/97002-02 VIO Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation
50-440/98003-00 & -01 LER Missed TS SR on Hydrogen Igniters
50-440/98020-02 URI Secondary Containment isolation Valves SR -1
50-440/99001-01 NCV Failure to Follow Battery Surveillance Procedure !
50-440/99001-02 NCV Improperly Stored Equipment in Plant
50-440/99001-03 NCV Missed TS SR on Hydrogen Igniters !
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
AEGTS Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR Condition Report l
DRP Division of Reactor Projects
ESW Emergency Service Water
HPCS High Pressure Core Spray ;
INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations j
IP - Inspection Procedure i
IR Inspection Report
LCO
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Limiting Condition for Operation i
LER Licensee Event Report
NCV Non-cited Violation
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
PAP Plant Administrative Procedure
PDR Public Document Room
RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RG Regulatory Guide
RRCS Redundant Reactivity Control System
SE Safety Evaluation
sol - System Operating Instruction
SR Surveillance Requirements
l SVI . Surveillance Instruction . l
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Transient Combustible Permit
TS Technical Specification
URI Unresolved item
l VIO Violation
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