IR 05000440/1986012

Safety Insp Rept 50-440/86-12 on 860430-0522.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Neutron Monitoring Sys Noise Troubleshooting & Manual Scram Response Time Testing

ML20199E038
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	06/03/1986
From:	Darrin Butler, Phillips M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199E023	List: IR 05000440/1986012 ML20199E019
References
50-440-86-12, NUDOCS 8606230165
Download: ML20199E038 (4)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-440/86012 Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-45 Licensee: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101 Facility Name: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Inspection At: Perry Site, Perry, OH Inspection Conducted: April 30 through May 22, 1986 Inspector: D. S. Butler C/r/86 Date Approved By: Monte P. Phillips, Chief FM(

Operational Programs Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on April 30 through May 22, 1986 (Report No. 50-440/86012(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Special safety, announced inspection of licensee actions on Neutron Monitoring System noise troubleshooting and corrective actions, and manual scram response time testin Results: No violations, deviations, or unresolved issues were identifie B606230165 860617 DR ADOCK 05 j 4o

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DETAILS

~ 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Personnel

• M. D. Lyster, Manager, Perry Plant Operations Department (PP00)

• C. M. Shuster, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance Department (NQAD)

• F. Stead, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department (NED)

• W. R. -Kanda, General Supervising Engineer (GSE), Technical, Pe.rry Plant Technical Department (PPTD)

R. P. Jadgchew, GSE, Instrument and Control, PPTD J. J. Lavsbury, Supervisor, Operations Quality Engineering, NQAD

• V. K. Higaki, Supervisor, Operations Quality Section, NQAD

• J. L. Hoge, Lead Instrument and Control Engineer, PPTD G. R. Anderson, Lead Electrical / Instrument and Control Engineer, PPTD

• P. A. Russ, Compliance Engineer, PPTD R. A. Newkilk, GSE, NED A. G. Migas, Senior Project Engineer, NED M. Minns, Licensing Engineer, NED

• J. R. Waters, Licensing Engineer, NLFMS

• G. S. Cashell, Licensing Engineer, NLFMS V. J. Concel, Systems Engineer, PPTD

• T. L. Heathealy, Operations Engineer, PPTD

• T. E. Hicks, Operations Engineer, PPTD USNRC

• J. A. Grobe, Senior Resident Inspector

• Denotes those attending the exit interview held on May 22, 198 Additional plant technical and administrative personnel were contacted during the inspectio . Neutron Monitoring System (NMS)

Three Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuations have occurred from Intermediate Range Monitors (IRMs) upscale channel trips during the month of April, 1986. The Average Power Range Monitor (APRM), channel D, has indicated an upscale trip condition and immediately reset without actuating RPS during this same period. Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.2 requires the NMS to be in a non coincidence mode, RPS shorting links removed, during initial fuel loading. Removing the shorting links will provide a reactor trip on a single neutron monitoring instrument upscale trip. No channel trips have occurred from th'e Source Range Monitor The IRM upscale trips have been attributed to grounding bus nois The licensee has performed Time Domain Reflectometer (TDR) testing and is continuing with frequency spectrum analysis of the instrument ground. System walkdowns and testing have located several faulty grounds in connectors, one marginal penetration, and inadequate grounding to four IRM preamplifiers. These items have been

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repaired; subsequent to repair, additional upscale trips have occurre The licensee has expanded their search for other possible noise source Review of the licensee's long tenn IRM noise reduction corrective actions will be tracked as an open item (440/86012-01(DRS)).

4 A short duration noise pulse caused APRM Channel D to trip upscale and reset during fuel loading. The RPS shorting links were removed. A full scram did not occur and the reactor operator had to manually complete the full scra The non coincident scram circuitry completes the full scram through the manual scram circuitry. The full scram should occur when APRM D, K13D, relay drops-out manual scram Channel C relays K15C and K14 The pre-op manual scram response times were reviewed. The K15C relay response time was 92 milliseconds (ms). The Agastat EGP power relay (K15C) maximum response time is 85 ms. Retests of the K15C relay were performed. Response times were 92 and 97 ms. The relay was replaced and the new response times were~36 and 48 ms. The relay is being sent to Agastat and a formal report has been requested. Review of the report, root cause determination, and determination if a relay race condition prevented a full scram will be tracked as an open item (440/86012-02(DRS)). The Sequence of Event Recorder (SER) was used to evaluate the above event. Do to uncertainties in the information provided by the SER, it could not be determined if the slow relay prevented a full scra The SER was inoperable for a second APRM D incident. The status lights indicated a trip condition without control room annunciatio The downtime and questionable information provided by the SER will not support operational event analysis. Review of the licensee's evaluation of SER operability (preventive'/; corrective maintenance priorities) and qualifying SER information (determine accuracy and ability to record events) will be tracked as an open item (440/86012-03(DRS)).

The licensee was continuing their investigations. They were adequately addressing the NMS noise problem . Manual Scram Response Time Testing There were no TS requirements or design bases to quantify the manual scram response times. Pre-0p testing was performed to obtain base line dat TS required only a functional tes Bench testing of the slow K15C relay, when cold, found the relay less than the vendors 85 ms maximum specification. Allowing warm up time, the relay response time increased to 92 and 97 m m

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The inspector recommended response time testing of the manual scram circuitry. This would provide preventive maintenance information, over the 40 year life of the plant, to identify manual scram relays that may exceed vendor specification . Open Inspection Items Open inspection items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3.a, 3.b, and . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 throughout the inspection period and on May 22, 1986. The inspector sununarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of the inspection report. The licensee did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in natur