ML20197J949
| ML20197J949 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Diablo Canyon |
| Issue date: | 07/03/1985 |
| From: | Lear G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082840462 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-197 NUDOCS 8507120605 | |
| Download: ML20197J949 (1) | |
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'o,h UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION p
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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JUL 0 31985 MEMORANDUM FOR: George W. Knighton Licensing Branch 3 Division of Licensing FROM:
George Lear, Chief Structural and Geotechnical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering
SUBJECT:
CODES FOR ALLEGATIONS ON DIABLO CANYON ASSIGNED TO SGEB Per the verbal request of Marilyn Ley the Structural and Geotechnical Engineering Branch has assigned codes to the six allegations listed below.
The provisions of your November 30, 1984 memo, were used in assigning the codes.
ALLEGATION CODE 1166 U
1396 E
1426 D
1427 U
1647 E
If you have any questions contact Harold Polk at x28426.
$, -_~.. Yk Geo e ;3ar, Chief Structural and Geotechnical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering cc:
H. Schierling M. Ley P. Kuo H. Polk d
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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION fj WASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 July 5, 1985 o
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chaiman Palladino Commissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal Comissioner Zech FROM:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations l
SUBJECT:
CONSIDERATION OF POTENTIAL COMPLICATING EFFECTS OF EARTHQUAKES ON EMERGENCY PLANNING The purpose of this memo is to infom you of our progress and direction in preparation of the subject final rulemaking package which I plan to submit to you by early August 1985.
On December 21, 1984, the Comission published a proposed rule change to 10 CFR Part 50 that relates to Emergency Planning and Preparedness at Production and Utilization Facilities (49 FR 49640). The proposed rule stated that neither emergency response plans nor evacuation time analyses need consider the impact of earthquakes which cause or occur proximate in time with an accidental release of radioactive material from a nuclear power reactor.
To date, 61 coment letters have been received. Twenty five (25) letters favnrarf the nrna:1natinn of the proposed rule. The letters favoring the proposed rule were from utilities, consulting fims representing utilities, 2 private citizens and the Department of Energy.
2 Thirty-four (34) letters opposed promulgation of the proposed rule. Many voiced strong displeasure, shock or disbelief at the position the Comission was taking in the proposed rule change. The majority of these letters were from private citizens, and environmental groups.
Additional input was also received from Japan, France, Sweden, Gemany and Taiwan, all of which stated that the potential complicating effects of earthquakes were not specifically considered in their nuclear power reactor emergency planning.
Several issues raised in the public coments (and in particular in coments from The Union of Concerned Scientists) will require substantial technical analysis prior to going fomard with promulgation of a final regulation. For 91 ll1 1,J > > o e b )
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The Commissioners 2
example the staff needs to:
(1) assess whether there are sufficie t facts to support the staff's belief that the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency plans are adequately taken into account by the flexibility that exists in all emergency plans; (2) deal with the issue that defects in seismic design and quality assurance in construction can substantially undemine the seismic strength of plant systems and structures; (3) evaluate the limited existing infomation on the contribution of seismic events to overall core melt risks, recognizing that only a few PRAs assess seismic risks and the treatment entails many uncertainties; (4) deal with the question why emergency plans should not consider the complicating effects of very severe earthquakes (i.e., 2 to 4 times the SSE) whose return frequency is 10E(-4) to 10E(-5) while current emergency plans concern themselves with plant accidents whose estimated return frequency are also in this range.
These complex analyses, which are underway, are not expected to be completed before late July, 1985.
After careful review of both the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon decisions regarding the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency planning, as
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well as the issues identified above, the staff is considering 3 alternative approaches:
Alternative 1: Adoption of the proposed rule into a final rule with minor but important word changes, for example, "no additional emergency prepared-ness measures need be established to account for severe, low frequency natural phenomena than is already required in 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E."
Altern:tive 2: !.c:ving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case batis; accomplished by withdrawing the proposed rule or by requiring consid-eration of earthquakes.
, Alternative 3: Promulgation of a final rule which clarifies the original intent of the Comission to require that emergency response plans shall
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assure that the following capabilities exist relative to the complicating impacts of severe, low frequency natural phenomena.
1.'
Ability to transport necessary personnel to the plant after the event in order to augment the original staff to cope with degraded modes of plant operation.
2.
Ability to obtain damage estimates to the plant and to be able to comu-nicate these estimates to offsite authorities. The infomation should be available to factor into the decisionmaking process, including reco-mmendations for protective actions after severe, low frequency natural phenomena.
3.
Emergency plans for offsite authorities should take into account various degrees and locations of damage to the plant environs. This shall be
r The Comissioners 3
limited to knowing citernate routes of travel as well as hstablishing criteria for determining whether to shelter, relocate or to evacuate.
Having considered all of the above, as well as all connents received, past cperating reactor a.nd emergency preparedness exparience I am leaning teward a recomendation that a final rule be promulgated which would embrece the concepts of Alterriative 3.
This alternative would be a clarification and articulation of the Cemission's nriginal intent as to what is specifically required to assure the necessary flexibility to cope with the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena. on emergency planning.
(Signee William J.Dircks William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations cc: SECY OGC OPE M. Cutchin Distributinn pE5 Central File Sub,iect Circ /Chren
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- l WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 JUL 0 8 MB5 MEMORANDUM FOR: Comissioner Asselstine FROM:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
DIABLO CANYON - SEISMICALLY INDUCED SYSTEMS INTERACTION Your memorandum of June 17, 1985 requested infonnation on staff actions regarding the subject with respect to IE Information Notice No. 85-45.
The potential for a seismically induced systems interaction (SISI) between the movable in-core flux mapping system and the seal table was identified by PG&E in March 1982 as a result of its SISI program and was reported to the NRC in the Final Report for the program in May 1984 in accordance with the staff approved program. Modifications were completed for Unit 1 in December 1983 and for Unit 2 in June 1985. Enclosure 1 is a listing of events and actions, including references to the Diablo Canyon SISI program which had been developed by PG&E in early 1980 in response to a recomendation by the ACRS in late 1979. The specific modifications are listed in Enclosure 2.
Since the problem had been corrected the staff'did not take a specific action on this matter for Diablo Canyon as a result of the Shearon Harris notification in June 1984. Based on a review of the information for the specific inter-action in the SISI program Final Report and recent discussions with PG&E, the staff finds the specific actions and modifications appropriate. The staff intends to audit the records and modifications in the plant for this system interaction.
Regarding a notification by Westinghouse, the Westinghouse Safety Review Committee reviewed this matter on May 29, 1985 and determined that it was a i
potential unreviewed safety question for operating plants as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 and a potential significant deficiency for plants under construc-tion as defined in 10 CFR 50.55(e). Westinghouse notified the utilities by telephone within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and written confirmation was provided within ten days.
In early June 1985, the NRC staff contacted the Regulatory Review Group of the Westinghouse Owners Group regarding additional information which subsequently was provided to the staff in a letter dated June 10, 1985 (Enclosure 3).
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CONTACT:
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MrP GREEN TICKET (EDOGreen) Ticket #000731 Docket File NRC POR Local PDR PRC System NSIC EDO Control No. 000731 EDO Reading File WDircks DEisenhut/HDenton f
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6 To date the staff has made no detennination if Westinghouse has complied with applicable NRC reporting requirements, and further, is detennining whether this matter should have been separately reported under 10 CFR 21 by PG&E, apart from its subr.ission of the SISIP Final Report. The staff plans to assure that all Westinghouse licensees have received the IE Notice and the Westinghouse notification, and that they have made appropriate evaluations.
This will be accomplished by a Temporary Instruction issued to the Regions.
(Signed) William 1. Direks William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
- 1. Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 SISI History for In-Core Flux Mapping System / Seal Table
- 2. Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 SISI Modification
- 3. Letter from G. T. Goering, WOG, to F. Miraglia, NRC, dated June 10, 1985 (with attachment) cc: Chairman Palladino Comissioner Bernthal Commissioner Zech SECY U Yt.
0GC J. M. Cutchin 1
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- TNovak pson hu WDircks 06/ /95 0f/l/85 Op//85 (785 06/ /85 l
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o Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 In-Core Flux Mapping System / Seal Table Sumary of SISI Activities November 1979 ACRS recomends that PG&E perform a seismically induced systems interaction program (SISIP)
Mid 1980 PG&E develops SISIP for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 (submitttal of a fir;al program in August 1980)
October 1980 In SSER-11 NRC staff reports on initial SISIP results and finds program acceptable.
March 1982 During its SISIP PG8E identifies the potential for a specific SISI between the movable in-core flux mapping system as the interaction source and the seal table as the interaction target.
September 1982 PG8E request Westinghouse to review and analyze the potential SISI.
November 1982 Westinghouse provides PG&E with information and recommended modifications.
June 1983 PGAE issues a Design Change Notice (DCN) for Unit 2 modifications.
July 1983 PG&E issues a Design Change Notice (DCN) for Unit 1 modifications.
October 1983 PG&E submits Status Report on SISIP for containment; no reference is made to the specific SISI.
December 1983 PG&E completes specific SISI modifications for Unit 1.
February 1984 PG&E completes specific SISI verification walk-down for Unit 1.
April 1984 NRC inspects documentation and implementation of selected SISI's for Unit 1 (Inspection Report 50-275/84-09);
the specific SISI is not included.
May 1984 PG8E submits SISIP Final Report, including the specific SISI for Unit 1 (Section 9.3.1.1 and Attachment 7-B).
i October 1984 PG&E submits Unit 1 interaction documentation sheets for SISIP Final Report; includes the specific SISI.
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January 1985 NRC inspects documentation and implementation of selected SISI's for Unit 2 (Inspection Report 50-323/85-05);
the specific SISI is not included.
April 1985 PG&E submits Final SISIP Report, Rev. 1, for Units 1 and 2; includes the specific SISI for Unit 1 (Section 9.3.1.3 and Attachment 7-B) and for Unit 2 (Section I
9.4.1.3 and Attachment 15-B); resubmitted in May 1985.
April 1985 NRC issues SSER 31 which includes its SISIP evaluation (Section 4.2); it does not address the specific SISI.
June 1985 PG&E completes modifications and verification walk-down for Unit 2, inc'iuding specific SISI.
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Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 SISI Modifications 1.
Welded fixed frame base plates to trolley beam.
2.
Replaced 9.375 inch cap screws with ASTM A325 bolts (or equivalent) of same size.
3.
Modified and installed movable frame anchor angles.
4.
Installed seismic anchor bracket.
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