ML20149F233
| ML20149F233 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1987 |
| From: | Betea J, Leaning J, Sholly S, Thompson G MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-I-COMM-005, OL-I-COMM-5, NUDOCS 8802120099 | |
| Download: ML20149F233 (165) | |
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05NRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before Administrative Judges: '88 FEB -2 A8 31 l Ivan W. Smith, Chairman i Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr. t OFFICC 03 SECROhY Dr. Jerry Harbour 00CKEliNG A SEi<vlCE BRAhCH
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In the Matter of ) ,
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'PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket Nos.
HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. ) 50-443-444-OL ;
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) (Off-site EP) !
) tiovember 17, 1987 :
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5 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTED TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY ON THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NRC 1 EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. JAN BEYEA ON POTENTIAL t RADI A' VION DOSAGE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS THAT FORM 4 THE BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. GORDON THOMPSOti ON POTENTI AL RADI ATION RELEASE SEQUENCES, AND i DR. JENNIFER LEANING ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF THOSE DOSES !
I. IDENTIFICATION OF WITNESSES' I
Q. Please state your names, positions, and business addresses.
A. (Sholly) My name is Steven C. Shelly. I am an j Associate Consultant with MHB Technical Associates of San Jose, ,
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O O V U A. (Beyes) My name is Dr. Jan Beyea, I am the Senior Energy Scientist for the National Audubon Society in New York City.
A. (Leaning) My name is Dr. Jennifer Leaning, I am Chief of Emergency Services for the Harvard Community Health Plan in Boston, Massachusetts, and instructor in medicine at Harvard Medical School.
A. (Thompson) My name is Dr. Gordon Thom9 son. I am Executive Director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Cambridge, tiassachusetts.
O. Briefly summarize your experience and professional gaalifications.
A. (Sholly) I received a B.S. in Education from Shippensburg State College in 1975 with a major in Earth and Space Science and a minor in Environmental Education. I have seven years experience with nuclear power matters. In particular, for four and one-half years I was employed by the Union of Concerned Scientists where I worked on matters related to the development of emergency plans for commercial nuclear power plants and the application of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to the analysis'of safety issues related to commercial nuclear power plants. I have been a consultant with MHB Technical Associate for two years, during which time I have been involved in a variety of projects related to the safety and economics on nuclear power plants, including the evaluation 2-
(J ,V of severe accident issues for light water nucles- power plants generally,-and for the Seabrook Station, Unit 1, spect'ically.
I have testified as an expert witness in proceedings before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other bodies, including the safety hearings on Indian Point Units 2 and 3 (Docket Nos. 50-247-SP and 50-286-SP), the licensing hearings on Catawea Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414), and the licensing hearings on the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (Docket No. 50-322-OL-3). I have also provided expert testimony before the Sicewell 3 Public Inquiry in the United Kingdom. I have served as a member of a peer review panel on regulatory applications of PRA (NRC report NUREG-1050), as a member of the Containment Performance Design Objective Workshop (NRC report NUREG/CP-0084),.ss a member of the Committee on ACRS Effectiveness, and as a panelist at the Severe Acci' nt Policy Implementation External Events Workshoo, Annapolis, Maryland (presentation on seismic risk assessment, 1937 forthcoming Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report). The details of my education, experience, and professional qualifications are included in my resume, which is contained in attachments to this testimony.
(Beyea) I received my doctorate in nuclear physics from Columbia University in 1963. Since then I have served as an Assistant Professor of physics at Holy Cross College in Worcester, MA; as a member for four years of the research staff 3-
r of the Center for E'nergy and Environmental Studies at Princeton University; and, as of May 1980, as the Senior Energy Scienttst for the National Audubon Society.
While at Princeton University, I worked with Dr. Frank von Hippel to prepare a critical quantitative analysis of attempts to model reactor accident sequences. The lessons learned from this general study of nuclear accidents and the computer codes written to model radioactivity releases were then applied by me to specific problems at the request of governmental and non-governnental bodies around the world. I have written major reports on the safety of specific nuclear facilities for the President's Council on Environmental Quality (TMI reactor), for the New York State Attorney General's Office (Indian Point),
for the Swedish Energy Commission (Barsebeck reactor), and the state of Lower Saxony (Gorbleben Waste Disposal Site). I have also examined safety aspects of specific sites for the California Energy and Resources Commission, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office and the New York City Council.
While at Princeton, I wrote a computer program useful for reactor emergency planning for the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. This program, appropriately modified, has been used for some of the calculations presented in this testimony.
After joining the National Audubon Society, I continued to work as an independent consultant on nuclear safety issues. I participated in a study, directed by the Union of Concerned 4
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r Scientists -at the request of the Gove:nor of-Pennsylvania, concerning the proposed venting of krypton gas at Three ' tile Island. The U.S.C. study, for which I made the radiation dose calculations, was the major reason the Governor gave for approving the venting.
7 I participated in the international exercise on consequence modelling (Benchmark Study) coordinated by the Organi:ation for Economic Cooperation 5 Development (0.E.C.D.). Scientists and engineers from fourteen countries around the world calculated radiation doses following hypothetical "benchmark" releases using their own consequence models. Participants from the United States, in addition to myself, included groups from Sandia Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Batelle Pacific-Northwest, and Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. I also served as consultant from the environment community to the N.R.C. in connection with their development of "Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plants."
At the request of the Three Mile Island Public Health Fund, I supervised a maior review of radiation doses from the Three title Island Accident. This report, "A Review of Dose Assessments at Three Mile Island and Recommendations for Future Research" was released in August of 1984. Subsequently, I organized a workship on TMI Dosimetry, the proceedings of which were published in early 1986.
In 1986, I developed new dose models for the Epidemiology Department of Columota University. These models are being used 6
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O O to assess whether or not the TMI accident is correlated with excess health effects in the local population. The new computer models account for complex terrain, as well as time varying meteorology (including changes in wind direction).
Insights gained from this project have been applied to the Seabrook situation.
In addition to reports written about specific' nuclear facilities,.an article of mine on resolving conflict at the Indian point reactor site, an article on emergency planning for reactor accidents, ano a joint paper with Frank von Hippel'of Princeton University on failure modes of reactor containment systems have appeared in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
I have also prepared risk studies covering sulfer emissions from coal-burning energy facilities. And I have managed a 4 project that analyzed the side effects of renewable energy 4
l sources.
! I regularly testify before congressional committees on
- energy issues and have served on several advisory boards set up
! by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment.
l I currently participate in a number of ongoing efforts 5- aimed at promoting dialogue between environmental organizations and industry.
I was assisted in the early stages of my studies of Seabrook' by Brian Palenik, who has worked with me on other reactor studies in the past. In subsequent answers to questions, I will use the pronoun, "we," to describe out
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collective e.fforts. However, all work was carried out either i by me or under my direct supervision.
i Brian Palenik received his Bachelor of Science ir. C;vil j i
Engineering degree with honors from Princeton University. l While an undergraduate at Princeton, Mr. Palenik worked with me on "The Consequences of Hypothetical Major Releases of Radioactivity to the Atmosphere from Three Mile Island"--my report to the President's Council on Environnental Quality.
After graduation, Mr. Palenik joined the staff of National Audubon's Policy Research Department. While there, he and I wrote, "Some Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Indian Point and Their Implications for Emergency Planning," as part of out testimony before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, July 1982.
Mr. Palenik is currently a graduate student in the Civil Engineering Department at M.I.T.
A complete resume is included in the attachments to this testimony.
(Thompson) I received a Ph.D in applied mathematics from Oxford University'in 1973. Since then I have worked as a consulting scientists on a variety of energy, environment, and international security issues. My experience has included technical analysis and presentation of expert testimony on issues related to the safety of nuclear power facilities.
In 1977, I presented testimony before the Windscale Public Inquiry in Britain, addressing safety aspects of nuclear fuel
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i reprocessing. During 1973 and 1979, I p-articipated in an international scientific review of the proposed Gorleben '
nuclear fuel center in West Germany, this review being ;
sponsored by the government of Lower Saxony.
Between 1962 and 1984, I coordinated an investigation.of safety issues relevant to the proposed nuclear plant at 31:ewell, England. This plant will have many similarities to the Seabrook plant. The investigation was sponsored by a group of local governments in Britain, under the aegis of the-Town
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~ lhd Country planning Association. This investigation formed the basis for testimony before the Sizewell public !nquiry by myself and two other witnesses.
From 1980 to 1985, first as a staff scientist and later as a consultant, I was associated with the Union of Concerned Scientists.(UCS), at their head office in Cambridge, MA. On ,
cehalf of UCS, I presented testimony in 1993 before a licensing board of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), concerning ,
the merits of a system of filtered venting at the Indian point nuclear plants. Also, I undertook an extensive review of NRO research on the reactor accident "source term" issue, and was co-author of a major report published by UCS on this subject
- (Sholly and Thompson, 1986).
Currently, I am one of three principal investigators for an i emergency planning study based ut Clark University, Worcester, MA. The ooject of.the study is to develop a model emergency
- plan for the Three Mile Island nuclear plant. Within this i i i !
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effort, my primary responsioilities are to address the characteristics of severe reactor accidents.
My other research interests include: the efficient use of energy; supply of energy from renewable sources; radioactive waste management: the restraint of nuclear weapons proliferation; and nuclear arms control. I have written and made public presentations in each of these areas.
At present, I am Executive Director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies, Cambridge, MA. This organization is devoted to research and public education on the efficient use of natural' resources, protection of the environment, and the furthetsnce of international peace and security.
- A detailed resume is included in the attachments to this testimony.
(Leaning) I received an M.O. from the University of Chicago Priteker school of Medicine in 1975 and completed a residency in internal medicine and a fellowship in emergency medicine at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston, Massachusetts. For six years from 1978 through 1984 I practiced emergency medicine as an attending physician at Mount Auburn Hospital, o e of the J
Harvard teaching hospitals. Since 1984 I have served as Chief of Emergency Services for the Harvard community Health Plan, responsible for the organization and delivery of e'nergency services to the approximately 300,000 members enrolled in the Plan.
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since 1979 I have actively pursued an interest in disaster medicine, with a particular focus on emergency response to radiation disasters, whether resulting from accidents at nucles: power plants or from explosions of nuclear weapons. In 1980 ! participated in a five-day course at Oak Ridge, e
tennessee in the management of radiation emergencies. I have lectured extensively on the organization of disaster response, the assessmeat of radiation injury, and the management of mass -
casualties. For the last three years I have taught the acute radiation and emergency response sections of the Harvard Medical School course on nuclear war. I am the author of E
several publications on radiation injury and medical response, '
including a chapter on the health effects of radiation in a book I co-edited, entitled The Counterfeit Ark. I I serve as co-chair of the Governor's Advisory Committee on the Impact of e ,
the Nuclear Arms Race on Massachusetts and am a member of the Board of Directors of the Disaster 'tanagement Center at the University of Wicconsin. The details of my education, training, and professional experience are contained in my l resumb, which ic included in the attached to this testimony. ,
- II. CONTENTIONS Q. To what contentions does your testimeny refer?
A. (All) Town of Hampton revised contention VIII, SAPL revised contention 16 and MECNP contention RERP-S. These
- contentions and their bases are set out in full in i
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l Exhibit 2. Our: testimony;also addresses matters raised in the '
Federal Emergency Management. Agency (FEMA) June 4, 1987
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"current" position- on :hese' contentions. In addition, cur
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.WH testimony bears on aspects of other contentions in this ,
b ' e. proceeding.
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. Q. What is the purpose of your testimony and how does it
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relate to the specific contentions cited here?
A. (All) Thase three interrelated contentions and the
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FEMA position or. them all concern-the. issue of protection from
. radiological releases of the beach populations in the vicinity oi! the Seaorock Plant. Opr testriony first describes the standard guidaace used byD he Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and; FEMA ict the initiation and duration of radiological
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releases t6 be' considered in emergency planning. .Then, and using postulated accidents at Seabrook consistent with the 4
s spectrum of accident scenarios called for in the NRC guidance, the testimon estimates and describes the radiation dosages w s
(. which could affect the beach populations near the Seabrook
- r. a Plant site. We then describe the health consequences of -those dosages on the beach population.
The testimony as a whole demonstrates that NHRERp Rev. 2 is f
fundamentally flawed and is of no real or practical use because the beachgoing public in the vicinity of the Seabrook plant will not be adequately protected in the event of an emergency.
In particular, this testimony shows that because at the size of the beach population in the innediate vicinity of the plant I
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site, the long evacuation times,.and the lack of effective sheltering, many thousands of individuals will die, suffer serious. injuries or face the prospect of increased likelihood of cancer if one of any number of the accidents required to be planned for by the NRC occurs. Thus, because of the radiation dosages that would reach the beach population, there is no reasonable assurance that NHRERP Rev 2 can and will be implemented.to provide adequate protection to the public in the event of an accident.
III. OVERVIEW Q. Please summarize your portion of this testimony.
A. (Sholly) My testimony describes the technical basis for the current NRC emergency planning rules. The testimony discusses the use in the NRC reports NUREG/CR-1311, NUREG-0396, ,
and NUREG-0654, of the risk assessment results for the Surry Unit 1 planc (as set forth in the NRC report WASH-1400) to derive dose-distance relationships for a spectrum of accidents, including severe accidents beyond the design basis of light water nuclear power plants. The testimony further describes the nature of that spectrum of accidents, including release characteristics, release frequencies, and uncertainies.
Finally, the testimony describes how the risk-based insights from the Surry Unit i risk assessment were utilized by the NRC i
to arrive at the generic emergency planning zone distances and I other guidance contained in the rules and in the applicable NRC guidance documents (including NUREG-0654, Rev. 1).
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. A. (Beyea) The situation around the.Seabrook Nuclear
' Power Plant is unusual in the context of emergency planning for-
. nuclear plants, because.-large populations make use of nearby beaches in the summertime. In order to determine the-extent of-protection 4fforded the summer beach population by current emergency plans, we have modelled the radiation doses to the population that.would follow releases of radioactivity from the Seabrook plant. A range of releases has been studied, patterned after the range used in the NRC's report, NUREG-0396.
In NUREG-0396, a set of generic accident sequences (PWRl-PWR9) were defined that apply to pressurized water reactors like the Seabrook plant. -These sequences span the entire range of physically-plausible release scenarios, making them useful for assessing, at least on a theoretical basis,-the effectiveness of emergency plans. For my testimony, we have chosen accident sequences that are similar to the NRC's generic versions, but which take into account reactor-specific differences at Seabrook.
In order to understand the conditions under which the population would not be protected from "early death" (death .
,. within 60 days of the release), doses were modelled for these '
release categories using a range of weather parameters, plume rise heights, and dose contribution assumptions. The results l
l indicate that the potential consequences of severe accidents increase greatly during the summer months, due to the increased population in the area and the unique conditions of a beach L
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release: Beach-goers ' caught in the open'would not be shielded from radiation, and could be expected, by our calculations, to
~ receive' doses as much as five times' higher'than generally considered in nuclear emergency planning. This means that certain accident releases,.not normally projected to cause early fatalities, are projected to do so in the~Seabrook case.
As 'a result, it is necessary to consider a range of accident scenarios, from those with very small releases to those with very large releases.
In addition to the risk of early death, we have considered other potential accident consequences, including delayed c'ancer incidence. These potential outcomes dominate the risk for accident releases in classes PWR4-PWR9.
The proximity of the reactor to an unshielded summer beach population makes the Seabrook case a special and difficult one for emergency planning. The doses that would be received following a range of releases at the Jeabrook site, with emergency plans in effect, are higher than doses that would be received at most other sites in the complete absence of -
emergency planning. t Our results demonstrate that, with current plans, the immediate safety of the beach population is threatened for a wide range of releases and meteorological conditions. For the i
accidents studies in our testimony, many thousand of people i could receive life-threatening doses.
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. A. (Thompson) The issues I address are:
(1) The potential for an-atmospheric release, similar to-that designated as PWR1 in the Reactor Safety Study, to occur from a steam explosion or high-pressure melt ejection event.
(2) The range of variation of two parameters which affect plume rise during a "PWR1-type" release,.specifically the location of containment breach and the thermal energy release rate for the plume.
(3) The potential for "PWR1-type" releases to contain greater amounts of certain isotopes, such as those of ruthenium, than other categories of releases.
A. (Leaning) The purpose of my testimony is to discuss what is known about the acute and long-term health consequences that can be expected to befall human beings exposed to ionizing radiation in the range of dose levels that might eventuate from nuclear power plant accidents such as those described in the testimony of Mr. Sholly, Dr. Beyea and Dr. Thompson. I describe the kinds of injuries that would be received by the population in both the short and long term.
IV. SYNOPSIS OF WASH-1400 SURRY ANALYSIS Q. Please identify and describe the nature of the NRC l
report WASH-1400.
A. (Sholly) WASH-1400 (N.C. Rasmussen, et al., Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory i
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Comaission, WASH-1400, NUREG-75/014, October ~1975) represents a probabilistic risk assessment of two nuclear power-olants, namely Surry Unit 1 and Peach Bottom Unit 2. The report consists of a Main Report and eleven Appendices.. WASH-1400 represents t'e first comprehensive application of probabilistic risk assessment methods to the analysis of'the risks posed by commercial nuclear power-plants. That-is, WASH-1400 includes system analyses, s.ource term estimates, and accident consequence estimates. In the parlance of the NRC's PRA Procedures Guide, WASH-1400 is a Level 3 PRA of two plants.1!
Q. Please briefly describe the Surry Unit i nuclear power plant and compare its design with that of Seabrook Station, Unit 1.
A. (Sholly) The Surry Unit 1 nuclear power plant is a three-loop, Westinghouse pressurized water reactor with dry, subatmospheric containment. The Surry Unit 1 plant has a design thermal power level of 2441 megawatts, and entered commercial operation in December 1972. Surry Unit 1 is operated by Virginia Power Corporation under operating license DPR-32, issued on'May 25, 1972. Seabrook Station Unit 1 is a four-loop, Westinghouse pressurized water reactor with a large, 1/ Jack W. Hickman, et al., PRA PROCEDURES GUIDE: A Guide to
- the Performance of Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear
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Power Plants, American Nuclear Society and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, prepared for the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR 2300, January 1983, pages 2-2 to 2-3.
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- o. o dry containment. Seabrook has a design thermal power level of 3650 megawatts. .
Q. 'Please summarize the results of the WASH-1400 analysis of the surry Unit 1 plant.
A. (Sholly) The WASH-1400 report calculated a median core melt frequency for Surry Unit 1 of about 5 x 10 ' per~
reactor-year (or about 1 in 20,000 per reactor-year).2/ The MUREG-il50 analysis estimated the core melt frequency for Surry
-5 to be 2.6 x 10 per reactor year. See, NUREG-ll50, draft, page 3-2. The dominant accident sequences for Surry Unit 1 which contributed ,to this core melt frequency are identified along with their estimated sequence frequencies in Table A, which is attached to this testimony. WASH-1400 also defined nine release categories or source terms which defined the release characteristics and release frequencies for Surry Unit
- 1. These release categories were designated PWR-1 through PWR-9. Release categories PWR-1 through PWR-7 correspond to 2/ The Surry core melt frequency estimate in WASH-1400 has been cited as several different values. For instance, the NUREG-ll50 report cites a value of 4.6 x 10-5 per reactor '
year. See M.L. Ernst, et al., Reactor Risk Reference Document, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-ll50, Vol. 1, "Main Report", draft for comment, February 1987, page 3-12 (hereinafter "NUREG-ll50 d A technical report supporting NUREG-1150 cites 4.4x10gaft).
per reactor-year. See, Robert C. Bertucio, et al., Analysis of Core Damage Frequency ,
From Internal Events: Surry Unit 1, Sandia National Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-4550, SAND 86-2084, Vol. 3, November 1986 page V-68. In fact, as indicated in Attachment 3 to this testimony, if one adds the point estimate frequencies for the WASH-1400 dominant accident sequences, one obtains a core melt treguency of 1.2 x 10'" per reactor-year.
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Release Categories PWR-8 and PWR-9 are non-core melt accidents, and are roughly equivalent to the design basis accident with (PWR-8) and without (PRR-9) containment spray operation. The Surry release categories are
, ' described and their characteristics and estimated frequencies defined in Table B, which is attached to this testimony. Many -
of the WASH-1400 release categories (especially PRR-1 through PWR-4) could result in-significant ground contamination offsite should accidents leading to such releases occur.
V. USE OF WASH-1400 RESULTS IN NUREG-0396 Q. Please identify and describe NUREG-0396.
A. (Sholly) NUREG-0396 (Task Force on Emergency Planning, ,
Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Wate'r Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Environmental Protection. Agency, NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, December, 1987), set a revised planning basis for commercial nuclear power plants. In essence, NUREG-0396 concluded that a spectrum of accidents shculd be used in developing a planning basis.3/
i 3/ H .' E . Collins, B.K.' Grimes & F. Galpin, et al., Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power P l a n t s , T a s '<
Force on Emergency Planning, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, NUPEG-0396, EPA l 520/1-78-016, December 1978, page 24 (hereinafter "NUREG-0396").
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o o NUREG-0396 recommended.the establishment of two generic emergency planning zones (EPZs) for nuclear power plants; a 1
plume-exposure pathway EPZ about 10 miles'in radius and an ingestion exposure pathway EPZ about 50 miles in radius.- Thess EPZs were. designated as "the areas for which planning is recommended to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the'public in the event of an accident."A#
A significant part of the basis for these planalng zone distances was derived from accident consequence analyses (specifically dose-distance calculations) using the WASH-1400 release categories and frequencies for Surry Unit 1.
Q. Please describe how the WASH-1400 results for Sdery Unit 1 were utilized in' NUREG-0396.
A. (Sholly) The Task Force on Emergency Planning, which wrote NUREG-0396, utilized the Surry Unit i results from WASH-1400 to perform consequence calculations to "illustrate the likelihood of certain offsite dose levels given a core melt accident."E! While the Task Force members debated various aspects of the WASH-1400 report and considered its results to have limited use for plant-and site-specific factors, it was judged to provide "the best currently available source of information on the relative likelihood of large accidental 4/ Id. at 11.
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O O releases of radioactivity given a core melt event."5/
WASH-1400 results for Surry were also utilized to provide guidance concerning the timing of radiological. releases resulting from core melt accidents, and the radiological characteristics of such releases.1/ The planning basis distance, the_ time dependent characteristics of potential releases and exposures, and the kinds of radioactive materials that can potentially be released to the environment were identified by the Task Force as the three planning basis elements needed to scope the planning effort.E! WASH-1400 results for Surry Unit 1 were used to define.all three of the planning basis elements in NUREG-0396.
Q. Please describe the rationale used by the Task Force in establishing the size of the EPZs recommended in NUREG-0396.
A. (Sholly) The Task Force on Emergency Planning considered a number of possible rationales, including risk, :
probability, cost effectiveness, and the accident consequence spectrum. Following a review of these rationales, "The Task Force chose to base the rationale on a full spectrum of accidents and corresponding consequences tempered by probability considerations."A/ The rationale used by 6/ Id. at 6. .
7/ Id. at 18-23.
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9/ Id. at 15.
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th'e Task Force in establishing the EPZ planning. distances is more fully described in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0396.
Q. :Please describe the spectrun of accidents considered
=by the Task Force'in flUREG-0396.
A. (Sholly) The Task Force on Emergency Planning considered a complete spectrum of accidents, including those discussed in environmental reports prepared.by_ utilities as part of the operating license review (the so-called Class 1 through class 8 accidents), accidents postulated for the purpose of evaluating plant design (design basis accidents in the Final Safety Analysis Report), and the spectrum of accidents identified in the WASH-1400 report. The Task Force concluded that the Class 1 through Class 8 accident discussions in environmental reports were too limited in scope and detail 2
to be useful in emergency planning, and instead relied on design basis accidents and the WASH-1400 release categories.
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Q. Please descrite specifically how the Surry Unit 1 results from WASH-1400 were used by the Task Force.
- A. (Sholly) Concurrently with the operation of the Task l Force, a report was being prepared for the NRC by Sandia Laboratories (now Sandia National Laboratories) which examined offsite emergency response measures for core melt accidents.
10/ Id. at 1-4.
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This. report, designated SAND 78-0454, was pu lishec in June 1978.11/ The Sandia report grouped the hASE-1400 release categories for Surry Unit 1 into "Melt-Througn" and "Atmospheric" release g roups (based on the'iccation of containment failure i6entified for the WASH-1400 release categories).
Surry release categories phR-1 through PKR-5 cens:s: of accicents in which the containment was conc 1;ded to fail directly to the atmosphere as a result of structural failure or containment isolation failure. These release categories were grouped into the "Atmospheric Release" class. Surry release categories PhR-6 anc PhR-7 consist of accidents in which the containment base was penetrated by core debr s. These release categories were grouped into the "Melt-Throu-h Release" class.
The likelihood of the " Atmospheric" and "Melt-Th rough" classes were estimatec by summing the probabilities Of the contributing HASH-1400 release categories; "Atmospheric" releases were estimatec to have a frequency of 1.4 ,x 10-5 per reactor-year, anc "Melt-Through" releases were estimatec :: have a frequency of 4.6 x 10 -5 per reactor-year 12/
11/ David C. Alcrich, Peter E. McGrath & Nerman C. Rasmussen, Examination of Offsite Radiological Protect;ve Measures for Nuclear Reactor Accicents Involving Core Me.:, Sanc:a Lacoratories, preparec for the U.S. Nuclear .:egulatory Commission, SAND 78-0454, June 1978 (hereinaf:er "SAND 78-0454"). This repcr t was reissuec as SUREG/CE-1.3. In October 1979 f ollowing the Three Mile Islanc accicent .
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1 The-characteristics of these release classes were then used as_ input to-the WASH-1400 accident consequence code, referred ;
The
. t o a s C RAC (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences),
calculations were carried out using meteorological data from one reactor site and an assumed uniform population-density of 100 persons per square mile.11# The CRAC code calculations implemented for the Sandia study used hourly weather data for one year and 91 accident start times (a four day, thirteen-hour shift was assumed to take place for each start time; this results in each hour of the day being represented in 24 samples and a total of 91 samples are taken from one year's data).11! The wind direction is assumed to be held constant during and following the release; other weather changes are modeled as indicated in the data.1E/ A revised model of public evacuation (ultimately implemented in CRAC2, an improved :
version of the code) was also used.15/
The most frequently cited curve in NUREG-0396 which was 1
derived from the Surry Unit i risk study results is a curve which plots the probability of whole-body dose versus ;
! _13/. _Id. at 36.
i 14/ According to a recent Brookhaven National Laboratory report, weather data from a typical year for New York City were used in calculations. See, W.T. Pratt & C. Hofmayer, et al.,
Technical Evaluation of the EPZ Sensitivity Study for Seabrook, i Brookhaven National Laboratory, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 1987, page 6-2. ,
15/ Aldrich, et al., suora note 11, at 37-39..
16/ Id. at 59.
.O O distance. (This. curve, Figure'l-ll from NUREG-0396, is attached to this testimony as part of Table C). The curves on this figure were not calculated directly by the CRA'C' code, however. .As explained in a recent Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) report, these curves were interpolated. BNL used the-newer CRAC2 code to recalculate the dose vs. distance The results of these calculations are shown in curves.
Table D, which is attached to this testimoni (this calculation is only for the 200 rem whole-body curve).
-Q. What results from the Sandia study were used in NUREG-03967 A. (Sholly) NUREG-0396 contains a. series of figures which are drawn from the Sandia report. These figures are Figures 1-11 through 1-18. These figures are reproduced as Table C, attached to this testimony.
VI. USE OF WASH-1400 INSIGHTS IN SETTING EPZ DISTANCES Q. Please describe the insights from NUREG-0396, Figures 1-11 through 1-18, that were drawn by the Task Force on Emergency Planning.
A. (Sholly) The Task Force derived a number- of insights from Figures 1-11 through 1-18. These insights were set forth in terms of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
"Protective Action Guide" (PAG) doses. PAGs are expressed in units of radiation dose (rem) which "represents trigger levels or initiation levels, which warrant pre-selected protective 4
f n
/
a L.j actions fcr the public if the projected (future) dose received by an individual in the absence of a protective action exceeds the ?AG."12! The EPA PAGs used by the Task Force were those for whole-body exposure and thyroid exposure. These PAGs have a range of 1-5 rem whole-body and 5-25 rem to the thyroid.
According to EPA guidance, the lower dose in the PAG range is to be used if "there are no major local constraints in providing protection at that level, especially to sensitive populations." If local constraints make the lower value impractical to use, in no case should the higher value be exceeded in determining the need for protective action.18/ 1 Based on the figures, the Task Force concluded that given a core melt accident, there is about a 70% chance of exceeding the whole-body PAG doses at two miles, a 40% chance of exceeding the whole-body PAG doses at ten miles. Similarly, given a core melt accident, there is a near 100% chance of exceeding the 10-rem thyroid PAG dose at one mile, about an 80%
chance at ten miles, and about a 40% chance at 25 miles. Based in significant part of these observations, the Task Force recommended that EPZs of 10 miles be established for the plute exposure pathway and 50 miles 19/ for the injection exposure 17/ Collins, et al., supra note 3, at 3.
18/ Office of Radiation Programs, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-520/1-75-001, September 1975, Revised June 1980, page 2.5.
19/ Collins, et al., suora note 3, at 1-41 and 1-43.
y
O O-pathway.20/
Q.- Please describe how NUREG-0396 is related to the NRC's emergency planning regulations.
A. (Sholly) In October 1979, the Commission endorsed a policy of having a "conservative emergency planning policy in addition to the conservatism inherent in the defense-in-depth philosophy," and' stated that a 10-mile plume EPZ and a 50-mile injection EPZ should be established around each nuclear power plant. 1/ Subsequently, these EPZs were codified in the NRC emergency planning rule when the final rule was adopted in 1980.12/ Indeed, NUREG-0396 is explicitly referenced in the final rule.S1/ ,
NUREG-0654, which provides detailed guidance for the preparation and evaluation of radiological emergency plans for nuclear power plant accidents, also references the NUREG-0396 report. NUREG-0654 states that the 10-mile radius plume EPZ was based primarily on four considerations:AA/
20/ Io. at 1-37, 1-41, and 1-43.
21/ Federal Register 61123, 23 October 1979.
22/ Federal Register 55402, 55406, 55411, 19 August 1980.
23/ 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 1, fn 2.
21/ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency
, Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and. Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.
1, November 1980, page 12.
i
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.a . projected ~ doses from the traditional design basis accidents would not exceed ~ Protective Action Guide levels outside the zone;
- b. projected doses from most core melt accidents would not exceed Protective Action
. Guide levels outside the zone;-
- c. for the worst core melt accidents, immediate
-life threatening doses.would generally not occur outside.the zone;
- d. detailed planning within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in th? event that this proved necessary.
Quite clearly, two of these four considerations (i.e.,
considerations "b" and "c", above) are derived from the NUREG-0396 evaluation of doses from core melt accidents (which is based on the Surry analysis in NASH-1400). In addition, NUREG-0.654 guidance on the timing and duration of releases and radiological characteristics of the releases.issalso derived from the NUREG-0396 evaluation of core melt accidents (which is based on the surry analysis in WASH-1400) .
VII. CONCLUSION REGARDING THE TECHNICA'L BASES FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING.
Q. What is your conclusion concerning the degree to which the NRC's emergency planning requirements are based on the analysis of Surry in WASH-1400?
A. (S' olly) It is evident, based on the above, that the current planning basis in NRC emergency planning regulations l for nuclear power plants is substanthally based on
! dose / distances insights derived from the risk assessment of l
l l
l
.O o Surry performed.in WASH-1400. Thus, the"spectrum of acciden's" t
which were considered in establishing the EPZ distances in the NRC emergency planning rules explicity included core melt accidents (up to and including those core melt accidents which were predicted to retult in early containment failure and a large radiological release to the environment). A site-specific analysis which exacines dose-distance relationships based on similar accidents would therefore provide useful information concerning the effectiveness of
. offsite emergency planning measures for the Seabrook site.
Q. Have you reviewed the release categories utilized by Dr. Jan Beyea in his calculations as set forth in his testimony in this proceeding?
A. (Sholly) Yes.
Q. Are the. release categories utilized by Dr. Beyea ,
consistent with the spectrum of releases utilized by the NRC in setting the technical basis for the energency planning zones?
I A. (Sholly) Yes, Dr. 9 eyes's release categories are very i similar to the PWR-1 through PWR-9 release categories utilized in the t10 REG-0 39 6 report , which sets forth the technical basis
- for the NRC's emergency planning zones. ;
Q. Does this conclude your testimony? l A. (Sholly) Yes.
E d
b 28 -
t E
--s t j ( i v tj VIII. RADIATION RELEASES FROM ACCIDENTS WITHIN THE PLANNING SPECTRUM Q. Dr. Beyea, before presenting the results of your calculations, describe in general terms how radioactive material is released to the environment and dispersed.
A. (Beyea) For a large release of radioactive material to occur following an accident, a "release pathway" from the reactor core to the environment is required. (See testimony of Steven Sholly.) One set of these pathways is generated by failure of the reactor's pressure vessel followed by failure of the containment building surrounding the vessel due to overpressurization. Researchers have outlined some, though not all, possible sequences and conditions for these failures.
Other pathways include releases occurring through a containment penetration system. Massive steam generator failure due to aging steam generator tubes might lead to a large release through the secondary cooling system. A so-called check-valve failure could connect the containment directly to the environment.
If a large release of radioactive material to the environnent occurs, the material will leave the reactor as a "plume" of gases, aerosols and water droplets. Most of the large releases discussed in our testimony are assumed to occur over a period of thirty to sixty minutes; a few are assumed to take longer.
E
~
O O Ihis escaping plume will rise to a height which is depend'ent on such variables as 1) the amount of heat released in the accident, 2) the:weath'er condition existing at the time, and 3) whether or'not the release takes place at the top or bottom of the structure. As will be shown later, there is no satisfactory formula that predicts the magnitude of plune rise.
The plume will be carried by the prevailing wind. Under the action of wind fluctuations and other weather conditions,.
~the plume will' spread in both the horizontal and vertical directions, so that the average concentration of radioact'i'le material in the plume will decrease with time as it travels away from the reactor. (See Figure I). After a short time, the expanding edge of the plume will "touch" ground, and the non-gaseous radioactive aerosols will be dispersed along the ground, on vegetation, buildings, cars, people, etc. The rate at which material is removed from the plume, referred to as the deposition rate or "velocity", will also cause the concentration of material in the plume to decrease with time.
For the most energetic release categories, particularly the t
steam explosion categories which cause rapid rise of gases into 4 the atmosphere, tnere is the possibility that escaping water vapor may condense to significant amounts of (radioactive) rain.
The plume may disperse radioactive material along the ground for more than a hundred miles if there is no reversal of wind direction. Much of the area where the plume has passed
O -
O WIND DIRECTION REACTOR INVISIBLE CLOUD OF MOVING R ADIOACTIVITY 4
! REGION OF DEPOSITED R ADIO AC TI VITY i
- TOP VIEW OF PLUME
- FIGURE I I
l l
l
O 'O will.be contaminated for decades and "permanent" evacuation'of the original population will be required there. In addition, as much as 10 percent of the material will be resuspended by the action of wind and blown about in succeeding weeks.21/
The area of contamination will increase, causing residents who live outside'the initial plume path to be exposed to radiation.-
Immediately after the release, the plume will be visible, due to the escape of large amounts of cloud-forming water droplets. As the plume travels downwind and as the water
_ droplets evaporate, the plume will most likely disappear from view, making it impossible for any,one without instruments to know where radioactivity is heading.
Q. How does the population receive radiation doses?
A. The population in the area under the plume would receive most radiation doses via three dose pathways.21/
(See Figure II):
- 1) From external radiation received directly from the radioactive plume itself. (In the 25/ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, (Washington, D.C., WASH-1400 or NUREG-75/014, 1975).
The Reactor Safety Study assumed a 50 percent retention rate for radioactivity deposited on vegetation. (See Appendices E and K] Although most of this loss is probably caused by subsequent rain, experimental data indicates that removal begins immediately afte_r deposition. This initial loss must be due to wind action. Ten percent removal by wind seems a reasonable estimate.
26/ See Volume VI of WASH-1400, supra.
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most serious accidents, the main part of the plune is projected to pass by very -quickly, within one half to one hour, well before any significant evacuations of beach oopulat. ions-could occur.)
2)-From-radiation received following inhalation.
The inhalation pathway would be the most 4,;
important contributor to the thyroid' dose. -
- It could also be the major contributor to early health effects for accident sequences in which large quantities of ruthenium are released (PWR-1 type releases), i.e. steam explosion or high-pressure melt ejection.
. 3) From radiation received froh material deposited on the ground or other surfaces (cars, skin etc.). It is this "ground dose" which would usually be the most important contributor to early fatalities because it would continue after the plume has passed.
Even if evacuation is too slow to prevent 4
inhalation of rabiation, evacuation is still
! needed after the plume passes by to stop the i
l accumulation of "ground dose"; the faster the i evacuation, the lower the total "ground dose".
We have concentrated on these three pathways in our testimony, using standard methodology to calculate doses whenever b
32 -
9 4
0 0 1
O, -
O-possible. Because generic models do not consicer beach situations, it was necessary to make special calculations for contributions to ground dose not normally considered in accident computer codes, but which are of special concern to unshielded beach populations. For instance, beach users caught in the plume would like}y receive significant doses from radioactivity deposited on their skin and hai-r.
Other important dose pathways exist for persons not under the original plume. These include inhalation and ground dose from resuspended and redeposited radioactivity. (As has been stated earlier, as much as 10 percent of the plume's material may be resuspended within a few weeks.)21/ Also of concern is raciation from contaminated vehicles and personal possessions brought to emergency reception centers.. Finally, doses are also possible though ingestion of contaminated food 2
or water.
Q. In what units are doses measured?
A. (Beyea) Doses to organs or to the whole body are measured in "rems," an indication of the amount of biologically-damaging energ/ absorbed by tissue or
. bone. The units are useful because a dose in rems can be used to project the likelihood that an exposed person will be injured.
! 22/ WASH-1400, supra.
O O Q. What are the dose levels that enter:into your
, I calculations?.
A. (Beyea) The health consequences of radiation depend upon the magnitude of the dose received. Radiation doses to the whole body on the order of 100 rems or higher
--doses that occur relatively close to the lant--may lead ,
to immediate sickness (e.g., nausea) and "early death." -
At a dose of 125 rems for example, 50 percent of exposed persons would suffer from nausea.28/ -
Although not fatal by itself, nausea and vomiting should be considered in emergency planning--especially in estimating [
evacuation times. It is quite conceivable that outbreaks of nausea could precipitate panic in an evacuating population, ,
thereby interfering with an orderly escape.
"Early death," a technical term in the radiological health ,
field, refers to death within sixty days of exposure to a given t
dose. The threshold for early deaths is between 100 and 200 rems to the whole body, while the probability of early death
, increases with increasing dose and changes with "supportive" >
medical treatment 2S/ standard practice, we have taken 200 rem !
28/. See Volume VI of WASH-1400.
29/ In this proceeding, we do not testify as expert witnesses in the biological effects of radiation. Instead, we have relied on the testimony of Jennifer Leaning and standard !
references to convert doses to health effects, f "Supportive" treatment is defined in the Reactor Safety Study ,
Appendix VI, as such procedures as reverse isolation, r sterilization of all objects in patient's room, use of ,
laminar-air-flow systems, large doses of antibiotics, and i L transfusions of whole-blood packed cells or platelets. ,
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as,a. reference standard practice, we have taken-2009:em,as a
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reference dose to indicate the onset of'significant' probability of early death. /
Q. How have you modclied the plume movement and dose
. r' pathways?
A. (Beyea) The plume movement and the three major dose pathwa s1 S/ discussed previously have been modelled by us'in ,
several compute'r programs. The pecgrams have'been checked against other consequence codes in use around the world.11/
The original programs have been cited in other reports,11/
30/ The major sources of radiation that contribute to early death or delayed cancer are inhaled radiciodine, as well as external radiation (whole-body gamma) from the plume and from contaminated ground. In the case of PWR1 releases, there are situations where inhaled isotopes such as ruthenica can cause pulmonary syndrome, leading to early death.
31/ International Exercise in Consequence Modelling (Benchmark Study), sponsored by the Organizaticn of Economic Cooperation g and Development (0.E.C.D.), Nuclear Energy Agency, 38 Boulevard Suchet, 75016 Paris, France. j 32/ 'Jan Beyea, Program BADAC-1, "Short-Term Doses Following a Hypothetical Core Meltdown (with Breach of Containment)"
(1978), prepared for the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. -
Jan Beyes and Frank von Hippel,; "Some Long-Term Consequences of Hypothetical Major Releases of Radioactivity to the Atmosphere ^
from Three Mile Island," report to the president's Council on Environmental Quality, Center for Environmental Studies, Princeton University, (1979), Appendix E.
A detailed discussion of the basic dose calculations used in these programs can be found in the Appendices of "A Study of the Consequences of Hypothetical Reactor Accidents at Barseback," Jan Beyea (Stockholm: Swedish Energy Commission, 1978).
(footnote continued) v
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h/ while come modifications have been made for this study.11I It was not necessary for these proceedings to use our most recent set of' programs which directly include time-varying weather such as changing wind speed and changing turbulence.
In the Seabrook beach case, doses are so high that these smaller probability events do not dominate the risk.
The dose to the population caught directly in the plume for the release categories under consideration has been calculated by these programs as a function of time after release for a g range of weather conditions and for a range of model parameters. Ranges of model parameters were used because the appropriate values of parameters are currently uncertain.
./
The basic modelling used is similar to the approach taken by radiologica protection agencies around the world, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the New Hampshire Department of Public Health.11 (footnote continued)
Brian Palenik and Jan Eeyea, "Some Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Indian Point and Their Implications for Emergency Planning," direct testimony on behalf of New York State Attorney General, Uniot of Concerned Scientists (UCS), New York Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG), N e a- York City Audubon Society, before NRC Acomic Safety and Licensing Board, July, 1982, 11/ For this study, we have used appropriate dose scaling factors, as discussed in detail later, to include dose contributions from material deposited directly on the cars and skin of evacuees.
, 34/ D.V. Pergola, R.3 Harvey, Jr., J.G. Parillo, "S3 Metpac, A
' Computer Software Package Which Evaluates the Consequences of an off-Site Radioactive Release Written for the Seabrook Station Site at Seabroo , New Hampshir.e" (Yankee Atomic Electric ~ Company, Framingha9, Mass., May 1986).
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The only specialized aspects of our calculations involvt the following:
- 1) Radiation shi.elding: Radiation shielding factors for cars used.in the 1975 Reactor Safety Study have
'ceen updated to account for changes in car construction that have beer made to improve fuel ecohomy in the intervening years.
- 2) Accounting for dispersion over water. Certain beach sites, like Seabrook, nave wator between them and the reactor. We have madI adjustments for decreased dispersion using standard methodology.1E/
- 3) Radioactivity deposited on vehicle surfaces: In some of our calculations, we have accounted for radioactivity that would be deposited on cars caught in the plume. This radioactivity could cause a significaat dose to riders and should not be ignored.
4L Radroictivity deposited on the skin and clothing of beach-scers: In some of our calculations, we have accoarated for radioactivity that would be deposited on beach occupants while stnnding either on the teach. in parking lots, or outside their cars waiting for traffic to move. Although not gene:all/ a ma]or 35/ In such a case (Seabrook Beach), we have shifted dispersion parameters by one stabililty class. See footnote 39.
1 37 -
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- 3' effect to be considered at other sites, we-have found that;the. dose from skin contamination is significant at Seabrook because of the.large beach population ,
- that could be caught outdoors.
Because doses from contaminated skin and vehicles have not
~
to our knowledge been considered in past. consequence modelling, ,
.our calculations have been presented with and without their inclusion. Their17 pact is to increase, in comparison to other sites, the number of meteorological conditions during whi'ch early death would occur.
Q. In what ways have your calculations taken into account the uncertainties in the current state of consequence modelling?
-A. (Beyea)
Plume Rise The treatment of. plume rise due to thermal buoyancy
' illustrates the current uncertainty that exists in dose calculations due to inadequate knowledge of model parameters.
Since calculated doses can be very sensitive to whether or not the edge of the plume has "touched" ground, knowledge of the initial rise of tne plume can be cri.tical for projecting doses. Yet, lack of understanding, both experimental and theoretical, about plume rise makes prediction of this parameter difficult.
Figure III shows the enormous range in airborne concentration of radioactivity (and therefore inhalation and ground doses) predicted for the same release of radioactivity
O O
~
by modellers from different countries under one set of weather
~
conditions.15# Most of this range arises because of different predictions of plume rise. These results from the-international exercise in consequence modelling-demonstrate that dose predictions from a particular computer code may be
~
highly uncertain within about 20 miles from the reactor if based on one set of model parameters. (Output from'the computer codes used to develop our testimony were included in this consequence modelling exercise.) ,
If a range of weather conditions is examined, the range of doses predicted b.y different computer codes shows much less of a spread. It is for this reason that we considered a range of weather conditions in this study rather than relying exclusively on predictions using one set of model parameters.
The dose ranges used in our testimony fall well within the full range given in Figure III.
At Seabrook, plume rise is a critical issue only for the PWR1-type releases. The other releases are not characteri:ed by sufficient thermal bouyancy to make it an issue, 11/ Figure III has been taken from S. Vogt, CNSI Benchmark Study of Consequence Models, International Comparison of Models Established for the Calculation of Consequences of Accidents in Reactor Risk Studies, Comparison of Results Concerning Problem 1. SINDOC(81) 43. .
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'O O Deposition Velocity A range of deposition velocities has not been examined in this testimony. (Deposition velocity governs the rate at which radioactive ~ material deposits on surfaces). Like plume' rise, this parameter is also uncertain, but does not have a critical impact on any of our calculations. For simplicity we have used a mid-range value of I cm/sec.22/
Sea Breezes .
Because of the complexity involved in modelling sea breezes, we have treated them qualitatively. To obtain an uncerstanding of the sea breeze phenomenon, it is useful to begin with a simple case, where the inland wind speed is very low. A circulating cell' structure would result from daytime heating of the land,:, extending many miles over both land and water.S$l i- .
In this example, the wind would blow toward the reactor away from the beach,.yet radioactivity would still reach the beach for either low-rising or high-rising plumes, as radioactivity became entrained in the cell and circulated within it. However, in this scenario, because it would take several hours for the radioactivity to reach the beach, it is 37/ A complete discussion of this parameter can be found in tHe Barseback Study, supra.
J8/ C.S. Keen, "Sea Breezes in the Complex Terrain of the Cape Peninsula," in Third Conference Meteorology of the Coastal Zone (American Meteorological Society, Boston, Mass., January 1984, pp. 129-134).
h
O- O i not possiole to say, without detailed study, whether or not.the radioactivity would arrive before the beach goers had left.21/
~
In many other sea-breeze cases, the inland wind would be too strong to ignore. The resulting structures can be very' complex, either causing plumes to rise above the beach and reduce doses or to slow plumes down, producing higher doses.
If the inland wind is very. strong, it will eliminate the cell structure entirely or drive it offshore.
In general, turbulence at the beach should increase under sea breeze conditions, leading to the possibility that above-ground plumes will be brought quickly to the ground (fumigated) once the region of excess turbulence has been reached.
The possibility must be considered that a moisture-laden plume could produce its own rain, following rapid mixture with cold, turbulent sea air that would be filled with salt particles capable of nucleating water droplets. Rain would be 29/ W.A. Lyons, "Lectures on Air Pollution and Environmental
. Impact Analysis," American Meteorological Society, Boston, Mass., 1975. See also, S.J. Mass and P.R. Harrison, "Dispersion Over Water: A Case Study of a Non-Buoyant Plume in the Santa Barbara Channel, California," in Joint Conference on Applications of Air Pollution Meteorology, Nov. 29-Dec. 2, 1977 (American Meteorological Soctoty, Boston, Mass., pp. 12-15),
i See also, S. Barr, W.E. Clements, "Diffusion Modeling:
, Principles of Application," in Atmospheric Science and Power l Production, (Report DOE / TIC-27601, Department of Energy, ,
i Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 613).
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l extremely serious for the beach goers, because unusually large l amounts of radioactivity would be carried to ground level along with the drops.
In considering the various meteorological combinations that could occur, it is possible to find some conditions that i increase doses at the beach and some conditions that decrease doses--sometime during the course of the same day.
In light of this variation, we have assumed that our calculations without sea creeze effects represent a mid-range case.
Q. What are the characteristics of the release types you have considered and why have you chosen to use them?
A. (Beyea) Because the number of possible accident sequences is very large, it would be prohibitive to perform consequence calculations for every possibility. Instead, following standard practice, we have pickod surrogate release categories that are intended to span the range of possibilities. As mer.:ioned in the summary, releases have been chosen that generally fall into the release categories used in NUREG-0396, but which take into account site-specific differences. The basic reference documents utilized relating to site-specific accident sequences at the Seabrook Plant are
- 1) the Licensee's Seabrook Probabalistic Safety Assessment (PSA),dS and the review of the PSA carried out by analysts 40,/ Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment, 6 volumes, December, 1983.
4
a l o o .
l at Brookhaven National' Laboratories for' the NRC.Il# !
In our study, we have generally accepted the-3rookhaven recommendations, although for completeness we have considered l some PSA categories without modification. 'In such cases, we have included them as part of our generic release categories.
In the release categories used for our testimony, we have.
picked one specific sequence to' define the release magnitude for -
each category. However, it is important to bear in mind that the probability of the category is not the probability of the specific accident analyzed. The true probability is the sum of r the probabilities of all accident sequences, known or unknown, that have similar release magnitudes. ,
- 1. Category 1 (PWRl-type): Early containment !
Failure with Core Oxidation. This category is I represented by an "S1" sequence as-defined in the Seabrook (PSA). Also included in this category is~a high-presure melt ejection i sequence. .
One of the questions raised by the Brookhaven I review of the PSA concerns the assumed rate at i which heat would be released during an ;
accident--a variable which governs plume rise. .l The PSA assumes uniformly high values. In particular, for the S1 case, the PSA assumes
- 3. such a high release of thermal, energy that the .
I plume passes high overhead, causing rela vely low doses to the beach population, according to j 41/ M. Khatib-Rahbar, A.K. Agrawal, H. Ludewig, W.T. Pratt, *
"A Review of the Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety ;
Assessment: Containment Failure Modes and Radiological Source i Term," Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, Long Island, ;
prepared for U.S. NRC, draft, September, 1985. .
j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, ,
j (Washington, D.C., WASH-1400 or NdREG-75/014, 1975). [
4 i
=
l
- l ? 1
%d L d' conventional consequence models. As indicated by Gordon Thompson (at p. 76 inf ta) it will no*.
be possible to resolve this discrepency since a large range of heat rates is possible, depending on the dynamics of the accident. Because the Brookhaven assumption on heat rates represents a mid-range value in the spectrum found by Thompson, we have used it in our calculations of doses from S1 releases, recognizing that the actual doses could be significantly higher or lower.
- 2. Category 2 (PWR2-type): Severe Containment Byoass. We include in this category an "S6V-total" sequence as defined by analysts at Brookhaven. In this release category, a direct pathway to the atmosphere is opened as a result of containment bypass. 43% of radiciodine, 43%
of radioce'ium, s and 40% of radiotelluriun in the core are projected to escape.
In addition to the "interfacing systems accidents" used to define this accident in the PSA, we include in this category thermally-induced steam generator tube failures.
~
We also specifically analyze the PWR2 release overpressurization scenario utilized in the Reactor Safety Study and NUREG-0396. Note that this clease category is generally similar to the preceeding rapid bypass category represented by S6V-total.
- 3. Category 3 (PWR3-type) Slow containment Bvoass. The Seabrook PSA modelled a containment bypass release as a "puff" release in which radioactivity is assumed to escape at different times, for periods of varying duration. We refer to this release category in the Tables with the notation used in the PSA to label the first and most dangerous puff (S6V-1).
Brookhaven, in its review of the PSA assumed radioactivity would be assumed to escape over a period of one hour. For our testimony, we have made consequence calculations using both sets of assumptions. S6V-total in Category 2 represents the Brookhaven approach; S6V-1 in Category 3 represents that taken in the PSA.
O O
- 4. Category 4;-(PWR4-PUR9 -types) The less severe accidents utilized in NUREG-0396 are grouped in this category. Although such accidents can cause doses in excess of ,
protective action guidelines and can increase delayed cancer risks in exposed populations, they are not generally projected to lead to early health affects.
A summary of the characteristics of the first three release categories is given in Table 1.
-Q . What special characteristics around Seabrook a#!ect the consequences of a release there?
A. (Beyea) Our investigation of the consequences of releases of radioactivity at Seabrook concentrates on the summer months. The potential consequences, especially with t
resp,ect to early death from a serious accident at the Seabrook plant, increase greatly during these months due to a large summer population in the area. These surmer residents, day visitors, etc. increase the exposed population, and by increasing the evacuation time necessary to clear the area,
.they increase the potential time exposure. Furthermore, the consequences to a beach area population may be greater than the 4
j consequences to an inland population under similar conditions due to a lack of shielding normally provided by buildings. The
} addition of increased consequences due to material deposited directly on the skin of a beach population must also be considered for the Seabrook plant. Taken together, these j factors make summer release scenarios at Seabrook worthy of l a .
f e
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- 43
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,mtiaton B T U ,' h r ) 520 Low' 170 ':x-Plume RLse fm)** 200-350 30 30-300 .' ;
Release Fra:tLons Nocle Gases .34 .37 0.90 ..!
Iodine 75 .43 0.7 Cestu . '5 .43 0.5 .
Telartu- 1) .40 0.3 .:
Ba r t u . .J93 .049 0.06 '4 Ru tnen tum .46 .033 0.02 :'4.
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_=
- 3roo<haten s2;;ests a ma:h lower re; ease ratto than does tne 3e4: r.. ?-
However. One piume rtse ts Low in : tn cases.
- Calculatt n3 for stact.1.y :; asses A-E. Piu.e rtse vartes ..tht- 2 because of dtfferent wand speeds. Variattons for S6V releases are eney can be 14nored. F: an 51 re. ease, tne following ca.ucs s p p . ,.
Wind Speed Stabtltty C' ass 2 - 'se: 4 sese S -/se:
A-C 350 m 440 - 230 .
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4 O O-special consideration, and we have included them in out investigation of the potential consequences of accidents-at Scabrook.
Figure IV shows-the location of the Seabrook beaches.
It should be noted that for-the most severe accident categories considered, as will be discussed below, doses are so far above threshold for overcast conditions, that early deaths are possible at any time of the year. Nevertheless, the number of people who would die would increase greatly during the sunmer. Furthermore, intermediate accidents--those that would usually not cause early deaths--would be expe'eted to cause early deaths at the beaches. In other words, during the summer, there is a much wider spectrum of accidents that can cause early fatalities.
Q. What are the assumptions behind the evacuation times o
you have used?
A. (Beyea) At some point during the operation of a reactor, the nuclear facility operator (NFO) may notify the appropriate state and local officials of an "unusual event," an occurrence that may lead to an eventual release of radioactivity. Depending on the seriousness of the event or of following events, a higher emergency level may be reached. The NFO may eventually recommend, in consultation with offici'als and technical support staff, that an evacuation is necessary of all or part of the surrounding population. The appropriate 46 -
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O O local officials, who may or may not have received prior 1
warning, are then notified, and the emergency warning system will presumably be activated as soon as possible.
8 Time elapses between an initial indication to the operator and the moment state and local o'fficials begin notification of the population. CONSAD (a consulting firm to FEMA) estimated 7
this time to take 19-78 minutes during the day and 50 minutes at night. 12 Their review of historical data shows these kinds of estimates can range from one to many hours for a range
.i of natural disasters and false alerts. Our work here assumes
, 45 minutes. In addition, some time will be needed to actually notify the population that an evacuation is needed. We take 15 minutes for this time, so that evacuation is assumed to begin one hour (45 plus 15 minutes) after the decision is made to evacuate.
1 We also assume that the NFO receives an indication of a pending release before the release. This warning time is taken
]
8 j as 18 minutes for a steam explosion, one hour for a rapid i
~
containment bypass (S6V-total), one hour for a PWR-2 release, and 1.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> for a slow containment bypass (S6V-1). These are, l the assumptions made by the analysts (Brookhaven, Seabrook PSA, Reactor Safety Study) who devised the release categories 12/ CONSAD Research Corportion, "An Assessment of Evacuation I
Time Around the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station," June 20, 1980; revised June 23, 1980, p. 2.7-2.9.
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O O studied. When the one hour delay involved in starting the actual evacuation is accounted for, the results are as follows.
Steam explosion: evacuation starts 42 minutes after radioactivity begins escaping.
PWR-2 and rapid containment bypass (S6V-total): evacuation starts at the same time as radioactivity begins to escape.
Slow containment bypass (S6V-1): Evacuation starts 42 minutes before radioactivity begins to escape.-
The evacuation time estimates themselves are based on '
assumptions aoout conditions during the evacuation, the state of readiness of an evacuation system, etc. These assumptions vary, leading to differences in evacuation times. The evacuation times for five earlier studies of a Seabrook area evacuation are listed in Table 2. Some of the evacuation times in the table for a two mile radius (and five mile radius) appear to be for a selective evacuation from within that radius. We have used five hours as a representative estimate for beach site evacuation, current emergency plans at Seabrook call for notification of beach populations at an earlier stage in an accident than for the general population. However, for PWRl-PWR3 categories, there is doubt as to how much time would actually be gained by this procedural modification. Although we have not taken credit for extra warning time to the beach population, our results can be easily modified to do so. It is only necessary to relabel the evacuation time assigned to our tables. In
- 43 -
l
\ . i l
' TABLE 2 i
SEABROOK EVACUATION CLEAR TIME IiT! MATES #
SUMMER DAY SCENARIO RADIUS DEOREES HMM b)
Vorhees c) d) e; '-
Maguire NRC KLD' 0-2 360 4:50 5:10 * ---- 4:4; 0-3 190 East 5:20 ---- --- ---- ----
0-5 3 30 5:50 '
10-5: 40 ---- ----
6:22 0-10 360 6:05 5:10-6: 10 3 : ::25 6:40 a) Time (Hoursrminutesi ter .he populatton to clear the indlested area after nottfteatton, b) "Prelistnery Evacuatton Clear TLme Estimates for Areas Near isa .
Statt:n," HMM Document No. C-30-004A, HMM As.% ' ates, !ne., May 1990.
on "Tanal Report. Estimate of Evacuation Times," Alan M. Vornee1 -
Assectate4, Ju.y .350.
di "Enervency Planning Zon, evacuation C. ear Time Eattmates. O.E.
Maquire. Inc., Tectuary 1993.
el "An Independ.nt Assessment of Eva cu,a tion Time Estimates f:r a P+s-Populatton Scenario in the Emergency Planning Zone Of the Seabro:-
Nuclear Power Station," M.P. Mueller, et S i, Pacift: Northzest Lacoratory. NUREG/CR-2903 PNL-4290.
f) "Evacuation Plan Update. Progress Report No. 3," KLD As4::: ite4. ,
Br:ajway, Huntingt n Station, NY ;;'46, Januaray 20. ; ri: Tac.e .3. ,
Scensrto ;A. Tnese calculattons refer to tne ceacn popu;4tton, but assuma tne enstre ftve alle population is evacuated effte.aily in: t.st 22 of the p o p u '. a t t o n t* yond ftve males evacuates spontaneously. It ;s farther assumed that ceaches are at 30% of espacity and tnst :tft:'a.s .
attempt to nottfy tne ceach population at the Site Alert stage. 5 mt.utes before a General Site emergency is called. To make inese
~
est1 mates conststent wtth tne assumptions ased in our :alculattens. :
minutes snould ce added to the numbers shown. On the other hand, .:
minutes should be subtracted to avotd d uele counting tne delay associated wtta nott*'etng cea:n occupants, whtch is already inc lu de : .-
the KLD time estimat: 4.
o .
o other words, if'oesch* populations are assumed to begin evacuating 15-minutes earlier than normal, the equivalent evacuation time in our calculations would be 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> minus 15 minutes, not 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
According to testimony by Thomas Adler in this proceeding, actual evacuation times from the contaminated area would be
~
much, much longer. Some of the persons exposed in an accident 4
will therefore likely receive larger doses than presented in our tables. Our tables, therefore, lead to conservative estimates of the numbers of persons exposed to possible early death.
l Q. Is the population around Seabrook subjected to possible "early death" for releases during the summer?
A. (Beyea) We have investigated the conditions under j
which the nearest beach population, at 2 miles and 4 miles, might be exposed to doses at a threshold level for early death
! (200 rem) for the release categories discussed previously.
1 According to standard references (see Moeller, et al.)11/ At 200 rem, a few percent of exposed persons would die within a i
two month period, a few percent of women under 40 would be 43/ J.S. Evans, D.W. Moeller, D.W. Cooper, "Health Effects
! Model for Nuclear Power Plant Accident Consequences l Analyses," (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., NUREG/CR-4214, 1985) The "LD50" for nausea is given as l 1.4 Gy in Table 1.3, page II-29, 1.4 Gy equals about 125 rem.
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1980.
I j ,
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permanently sterilized, and a few percent more would develop l cataracts. Table 3 illustrates some of our findings for 2 miles. Weather stability class, wind speed, and the time it ,
would take for the beach population to receive a 200 rem dose under those conditions are listed.
We have found'these estimates for two sets of assumptions. The first set assumes that all the population is inside cars when the release occurs so that skin and clothes do not get contaminated. Doses are also reduced _
because of the partial shielding provided by the car from the radioactivity on the ground. The fractional decrease in dose from shielding, here referred to as a ' dose scaling factor", is calculated to be .53 .78 for this set of assumptions. The time it takes for a person in a car waiting within the plume to receive a 200 rem dose is then listed in the table. We assume that vehicles remain stalled in traffic within contaminated ground and then move rapidly <
out of the area once the roads are cleared at the end of l five hours. We also assume that a person once evacuated 1
receives no additional dose once outside the plume path.
On the basis of our consideration.of a Seabrook-type [
j evacuation, we have decided to also use a second set of i assumptions. Some of the population will not have reached ,
their vehicles before plume passage. (Maguire, for example, assumes up to an hour for the beach population to "mobili:e" !
l 50 -
e
O ,
TABLE 3 EX?OSURE OT 2-MILE SEAJM POPULAT -':
70 R.: S K CT EARLY DEATM ON A S U ::M E F AY (SKIN AND CAR DEPCSITION NOT INCLUDE 0)
Time an H:utt t. Reaca Risk of 200 R ?. Early Oestn?
Stab ..nd PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 titty Speed S6V- 56V-C; ass im/se ) -- e ) -- e l Si Total 56V-1 31 t, t t . 36v :
A 2 14. -21 IS. ->24 >24 50g N N chance A 4 20. ->24 >24 >24 "
N N A 9 >24 >24 >24 "
N N B 2 >24 5. -7 >24 "
Y N B 4 9.5-14 13. -19 >24 N N B 6 1,. -21 >24 >24 "
N N C 2 >24 <1 19. -24 "
Y N C 4 >24 2.6- 3.7 >24 "
Y N C 9 7.7-12 9.3-12 >24 N N D 2 >24 <1 b. 7.0 25% Y Y chance D 4 -24 <1 12. -17 "
Y N D 9 >24 1. -
1.5 24 "
Y N a) The populatton two miles from tne plant. out not directly across the Lagoon. Ttmes would be shorter for populations with water between :nem and the reactor due to reduced d ts pe rs tons .
b) Persons caugnt in the plume are assumed to be parttally sn.eide3 ft:m contaminated ground by their vant:;es. Ground shtelding fa: tors are assumed to range from 0.53 to 0.?3, depending on the i
type of automobtie. See Questa:n 13 for further detstis, c) Pasqutil stabtLity class.
- 1) "Y" tndteates exposure to a 200-rem dose o r nighe r. An evacuatton time of 5 nours is assumed. A questton mark by an entry tndteases that even :nough doses do not reach the 200-rem early death thresneld. the 130-rem thresneld for nausea has been reached. :-
such cases. tne assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
e) If the plume rises htqh. as at Cnernobyl. the populatton wtl'. ce protected against ear'y death for this release.
. Otherwise. tne populattor will ce oxposed to risk Of early death, iB:th the thermal release rate and tne plune rise equatton are un:ertain.
See text of question 12 for discuss 1:n of procactitttes in tat;e.
- ,a .
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itself for an risevation.)11# Of those that do reach their vehicles before plume passage, some will leave their windows open and some will not enter their cars until traffic starts to move. Thus, some of the population will have radioactive material deposited directly on their skin and hair. We refer to the dose from this material as a "skin deposition" dose.
Similarly, we take into account material deposited directly on cars in the plume and the dose resu'. ting from this material *
(a "c.ar deposition" dose).
For this second set of assumptions, we have estimated that the dose to a person shielded by a car, but exposed to both 1 kin deposition and car deposition doses, would be 1.0 to 1.3 times the dose to an unshielded person exposed to a plane of contaminated ground (see celow). The dofe scaling factor range is tnus 1.0-1,3 Results using this range are shown in Table 4 A great deal of information is contained in Tables 3, 4 snd similar Tables to be presented later. Consider, for example, 0-stability conditions.
Note that the times shown refer to "clearing" time, that is the time for the last person in the area to be evacuated. But even a 1-hour evacuation time, which might apply to the earliest evacuees, is it.suf ficient to keeo 4
41/ C.E. Maguire, Inc., "Emergency Planning Zone Evacuation Clear Time Estimates," February 1983.
51
c -
O TABLE 4 EXPC3URE OT 2-MILE BEACH POPULATION 70 RISK OP EARLY DEATH CN A 3 *,'X M I R l t.
INCLUDES DOSE FROM SKIN & CAR DEPOSITION Time in Hours to Reaca Risk cf ,
200 Rem Ear "
Deatn?'
'1 Stab Wtnd FWR1 PWR2 PW33 titty Jpeed JoV- 36V-Class --
Si e) - e)
(m/ sect total S6V-1 Si tot. SiV ',
9 A 2 S.2-11 11-14 >24 50% N N-chance A 4 12. -15 >24 >24 N N A 9 >24 >24 >24 "
N N B 2 19. -24 3.1 . >24 Y N 8 4 5.5-7.3 ".9-10 >24 N? N B S i.4-11 17.4-23 >24 N N C 2 >24 <1 12. -15 "
Y N C 4 >24 1.7-2 >24 Y N C S 4.4-5.9 5. -6.5 >24 "
Y N D 2 >24 <1 3.5-4.2 256 Y Y chance D 4 >24 <1 7.6-i.6 Y N?
O 9 >24 (1 17.4-22.5 "
Y N a) The population two miles from the plant, but not direct 1, across the lagoon. Times would be shorter for populations with water between them and the reactor due to reduced dispe rs ions ,
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by thete ventcles. They are assumed ::
recetve a dose component f rom radioactive matettal depostted en the car and directly on the Individual. The effective ground shtelding factors range from 1.0 to 1.3. depending on the type of automobile. See Question 13' tat further details, el Pasqutil stabtitty -lass, d) "Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or h t g he r. An evacuation time of 5 nours ts assumed, A question mark by an entry tndtcates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death thresnold, the 100-rem tnreshold for nausea nas been reached. In such cases, the assumed $-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
'e ) If the plume rises htqh, as at Chernobyl. the populatten wI'1 . te protected agatnst early death for this release. Otherwtse, ine p o p u l a r, t o n wtil be exposed to risk of early death. (Sotn t :.e enermal release rate and the plume rise equation are uncertaan.
See text of q u e s t '.o n 12 fos discusston of pr:cabtitttes in tac;e.
O O G ,
doses below 200 rem for an S6V-Total release, on the other hand, the first of the evacuees to leave 'during an S6V-1 release would escape a 200-rem dose.
If the time to reach a 200-rem dose shown in the tables is compared with a 5-hour evacuation time, one arrives at a "yes/no" indication of whether or not the population at 2 miles is exposed to risk of early death. This is noted in .
the last set of columns in each table.
Some of the entries are marked with a question mark. A question mark indicaten that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for ;
nausea has been reached early in the evacuation. In such cases, a 5-hour evac'uation time calculated from traffic models may oe optimistic. Because we were unable to determine a quantatative estimate of the likely delay in evacuation that would result from cases of nausea, we have not been able to do more than indicate uncertainty, Note that no entries are shown in the Tables for a PWR-2 !
release. The results turned out to be so similar to, or
, worse than, the SV6-total release that it was not necessary to include separate entries.
Several caveats about the tables should be kept in mind, especially when exposure of the population is indicated.
First of all, risk of early death is much higher for persons V
very close to the plant where doses reach high levels very rapidly.
r I
I 4
r O O Second, we have not looked at slower wind speeds for.the l
{
i various stacility classes nor have we examined changing
, weather conditions. Both of these situations can lead to !
higher doses. Thus, Tables 3 and 4 do :iot include the worst !
possible weather conditions but only the.most probable. l A third caveat is that, while D conditions generally ,
represent overcast days, we have not looked at actual precipitation conditions that sometimes catch populations on the beach. The time for a dose to reach 200 rem is greatly decreased in this case (for the same wind speed) due to the ,
increased deposition of radioactive material. Evacuation time is also increased.
On the other hand, overcast conditions in the morning woald deter people from coming to the beach. The lower populations would mean reduced clear time estimates.
Recall, however, that there is a multi-hour underestimate of clear times in our work for most of the beaches (see Adler). In any case, doses tend to be so high under D-conditions for the S6-V total release that reduced clear times are insufficient to provide protection. The same is true for the Si release for low thermal release rates and low plumes rise.
P Finally, it should be emphasized that the population's exposure may be increased if the shown evacuation times are, for whatever reason, longer than assumed here.
i e
v s,
p) t v
In any case, the results of Tacles 3 and 4 can be comoine5 sith weather frequency data (Table 15) to show that for the
$6V-total release which represents the severe-containment-oypass categories, if the 2-mile beach population is downwind, it will ce exposed to risk of early death under meteorological conditions that sould be expected to occur about 70-75% of the time.
In contrast, the results in Tables 3 and 4 for the slow-containment-oypass release, S6V-1, indicate that the population at 2 miles is generally not exposed to early death for this release.
Surprisingly, the SI-steam-explosion release, which represents the largest release of all, in some circumstances might causes fewer problems for the beach population at 2 9iles than the PWR-3 type release. The reason for this is that the projected plume rise may be so great, as occurred at Chernobyl, that the plume passes high over the nearby populations. We estimate a 50-percent chance that this will be the case for A, 3 and C stability conditions and a 75-percent chance during 0 conditions. Our rationale is that the height to which any radioactive plume rises is uncertain, as was discussed earlier.
Should the true plume rise be a factor of two less than the mid-range value predicted by standard plume rise formulas, which is within the range of uncertainty (see Fig. 5), early 54 -
O' Figure $
VARIATION IN PLUME RISE ACCORDING TO SOME WELL-KNOWN FORMULAS tocco l
~ s# w too ,
/
/ '
i.
1 le 100 1000
- g. =
Tne vertical line at Q 15C megawatts corresponds to an Ti release. At thi s he at'gr = ate , the spread in predictions made ov different formula is about a factor of two.
The graph has been taken from G.A. Briggs, "Plume Rise Predictions" in Lectures on Air Pollution and Environmental Imoact Analyses, American Meteorological Society, 45 Beacon street, Boston, Mass. 02108 U.S.A., 1975.
We quote from page 60: "It is no wonder Pat so many plume rise formulas have been developed. What is par:icularly distressing ts the degree to which they diverge on predicting Ah for a given source and given conditions.
l
(
I.
l
Im
%)
n)
(J deaths from external gam.ma exposures cecome frequent for A, 9, and C stability classes. .!: should also be borne in mind that the PNR-1 releases are projected to include copious amounts of
!sotopes that can give high lung doses. Thus, 1-day lung dose can contribute to early death when whole body dose is below 200 rem.
dhen these factors are all included, the combined uncertainty is so broad that it is a toss up (50%) as to whether or not early deaths would occur following an S1 release for A, 3, and C stability classes. As for D-stability class, two independent-events must conspire to produce early deaths:
both the heat rate must be low and a low plume rise formula must be correct. As a result, we estimate that there is a 25%
chance that doses will exceed 200 rem to the whole body or the equivalent 1-day long dose under D-stability class for this release.
It should also be racogni:ed that a real accident may be less severe than the S1-case assumes. Paradoxically, because of lower plume rise, a small breach of containment following a steam explosion could be more severe than a large breach as far as nearby populations are concerned.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that turbulent interaction with the sea breeze and/or condensation of radioactive rain could bring radioactivity down to ground level. An enormous amount of radioactivity would be passing
p .
p .
V V overheadi even a relatively weak meteorological process, one normally not considered in reactor accident dispersion modelling, could couple the upper air with air at ground level, causing high doses.
Note that we have not shown results for release classes PWR4 through pWR9. Athough these releases can cause doses in excess of protective action guides, they rarely lead to doses in excess of 200 rem. Doses for those categories are dominatsi oy noble gases, so that ground deposition can be ignered. As a result, the dose ends after plume passage. Without. effective sheltering, the only emergency measure that has any imoact on doses for these release classes is pre-plume evacuatir;n.
IX. RADIATION DOSES FROM ACCIDENTS WITHIN THE PLANNING S?,ECTRUM Q. How were your dose scaling factors obtained?
A. (Beyea) The basic dose scaling factor, with car ind skin deposition ignored, was calculated to have a range cf 0.53-0.78, assuming that an evacuee is inside a car in the plume deposition area. This range represents an updating of the 0.4-7 shielding factor range used in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), cars are lighter today (and will be more so in the future) compared to the 1975-vehicles analyzed in the Reactor Safety Study. Assuming that vehicles involved 56 -
i
+
o o A,
j in'an evacuation will be 30% lighter than 1975 4 vehicles,dS/ the appropriate shielding f acter range turns dut to be 0.53-0.76A5/
M i .
Th6 relative contribution of various doses, including car'and skin deposition'coses, can ce obtained as follows.
f-Dose per unit time (Relative to dose f rom a flat, contaminatec plane):il/
I
" A) to person stancing on contaminated bes:h, parking Act, reac, etc. 1.0 X 5911/
B) Dose inside car from contaminated grc.r.o 1.0 X Scil /
! 35/ Due especially to the cecrease in the arount of steel 4
usec in U.S.-built cars, the matertal weight of U.S. cars droppec 154 between 1975 and 1951 anc is prc:ected to crop c another 154 by 19E5. (Table 4.3, p. 122, Transportation Energy Data Book, edition 6, G. Kulp, P..C. E 1 comb, CRNL-5683 (special), boyes Data Corporation.J 16/ Shielcing varies exponentially with mass per unit area. Thus (.4)*7 = 0.53: (.7)*7 = 0.76.
12/ In the absence of cetaileo calculations, we assume that absorption ef f ects in air can be handlec oy neglecting all absorption at distances less than 100 meters and by treating i absorpticn neyond 100 meters as tctal. 7nus, we replace the
- exact pro lem of a contaminatec plane of int; nite extent by a finite circular surface of ractus 100 meters. Since the integral over tne cisk turns out to be logar;tnmic with j radial cistance, tne total dose is insensit
- ve to the cutoff j cistance enosen. These calculations are cor.servative since
- they ignore grounc scattering ef f ects whier. ;ncrease L
relative coses froc ceposition close to the receptor.
Deposition is assumec to proceec uniformly cr any external surface.regardless of the surface's orientat; n. Inus, a square centimeter of ground is assured to re:eive the same i contaminstion as a square centimeter of sxtr..
)
i 18/ En:elcing factor, 59 = 0.47-C.ii. See f ctnotes 26 and L
60.
11/ sn:e;c ng f actor, sc = 0.53-;. i. 5++ ::::r.r:es 26 and 60.
f j
i ,
b 6 hl r 8
()
i
,( 'J C) Dose inside car from radioactivity deposited on outside of vehicle .22 x sc 12/
D) Dose ir3r.de car from radioactivity deoosited on inside of-vehicle with open window's .04 .211/
E) Dose from skin contaminated while-outside vehicle .35 52/
F) Dose'[romskincontaminatedwhilainside vehicles with open windows .1711/
50/ Based on numerical ~ integration over an idealized automooile, depesition is assumed to take place on the underside of the vehicle as well as on the tot surface.
51/ This case would occur 1) if windows had been left open, or 2) if evacuees reached their vehicles and opened windows before plume cassage were complete.
- The low number corresponds to low wind speeds: the high number corresponds to high wind speeds.
52/ An estimate of the ' relative contribution of skin contamination to the total dose can be obtained by replacing the complex shape of th? human body with a set of bounding geometic sc.rfacas:
- 1) sphere: the dose re.te at the center of a sphere contaminated with N curies of radioactivity per square centimeter is 43% of the dose rate 1 meter'above a circle of 100 meter radius that has also been contaminated with N curies per unit area.
Although a cylindrical model would be more accurate, the results will not differ by a large amount, as shown below.
- 2) .right circular cylinder: numerical integration in the case of a cylinder with radius 1/10th of the length indicates that the average centerline dose is approximately 17%
greater than the sphere center dose discussed previously.
. For a cylinder with radius 1/5th of the '. e n g t h , the average centerline dose is slightly less than the sphere case.
The results of these rough calculations suggest that direct contan.ination of people must make a significant contuibution to the totai duse. We take the numerical relationship to be 33%, that is, the 741n contribution is ascuned to be 35% of the dose from centr.?inated ground.
53/ At take this .iose to be ha.lf of the value f or a person standing in the open, tesuming that half of a person's surface area is pressed against a sest and, therefore, not subject to deposition.
1 1
'h 3 0 (V (V 1
The total dose can be obtained by multiplying each of the above dose-components by the amount of time spent under each !
'I set of ccnditions. Unfortunately, there are a number of time ,
- parameters that must, in principle, be specified to calculate a dose precisely. Rather than make a complex model, we have chosen to simplify the calculations by ignoring a number of effects that should tend to cancel:
- 1) We ignore the finite duration of the plume, that is, we assume radioactivity is deposited instantaneously. This is equivalent to adding 30 minutes to the evacuation clear time for S6V releases, 15 minutes'for the S1
-release.
- 2) We ignore doses from skin and car received after evacuees reach reception centers. This-neglected dose should compensate for the above simplification.
- 3) In cases when skin contamination is assumed to take place, we assume that at least some evacuees remain outside vehicles during the entire time that the plume passes. This appears to be a reasonable assumption, given the fact that traffic will be stalled and it will be uncomfortable inside vehicles that do not have air conditioning.
- 4) In cases when car deposition is included, we assume that ts significant number of evacuees who leave their i
vehicles to cool off (while waiting for traffic to move) will stand next to, or lean on, a contaminated vehicle.
1 l 's *
, .____2______
V :
th O' v
The net result is that we numerically calculate doses to beachgoers in one of two' ways:
When skin deposition is neglected, we assume that the last group of evacuees remains inside or close to cars, stalled in traffic, while exposed to contaminated ground. Doses do not '
begin to accumulate until the wind carries the plume to the vehicle. Doses continue to accumulate until the clear time ~is reached, at which point evacuees are assumed to leave contaminated ground instantaneously and exit their vehicles.
When skin deposition is not neglected, evacuees are assumed to receive the above dose plus the dose from skin contamination that is accumulated up until the clear time.
These assumptions lead to an effective dose shielding factor range of 1.0-1.3, when skin contamination is included, and a range of 0.65-0.95 when it is not.
In our judgment, the net effect of thene simplifications is to underestimate the high end of the dose spectrum.
Tables 10, 17, and 18 (to be presented later) were calculated for winter populations, which are initially indoors. In these cases we have assumed cloud and inhalation sheltering factors of around 0.75. We have also assumed, for simplicity, a building shielding factor range that is identical to the automobile case (0.53-0.78).
Q '. How many people are located near the plant?
A. (Beyea) The size of the beach area population around Seabrook is uncertain. One estimate of this population has been made by Public Service of New Hampshire and is found in Figure 6. Although its accuracy is uncertain, this estimate f e
" e n Je - I .-,,-y ,,n , - , ---y-w ,-
e} ^s
[1060:]
l6289 l N 3346 '
NNW 4264 NNE 1234 33658 l15101 L7678]
NW NE 1414 10 witts 12900 216 1185 3427 WNW 2893 1224 8022 ENE
[ 8254l $
3624 371 0 l-'"O soSa 731 I ##
- 2 627
/
1425 .
4 ',p, W 2919 4154 '
18907 l ,1f' O O [
'J77 [ ,,i 5147 ,f, g 'N O 7431 9707 2194 0 2853 13299 ESE ns*1 29e3 u2--i 11191 0
bN
$E 441:11 40) 14274 6]c3 y
) 1222' ssW 1022 ssE (21134 g R
[ j Total Segraent popwiation 0 to 10 Wif e s {l 5 9 78. l
- POPULATION TOTALS AlHG. WILES l ,;,yyNflCN '*
A TOTAL WIL E S kg,j('[7[0N 02 27596 il o2 4<ove 25 A0237 o5 88133 5 10 agoci o .10 179394 10-9 l_ 47632 ! 0-9 l225726 }
l Figure 6 Scenarios 3 and 4: Sur=e r Neekday I Population l
10-52
-- P..
1 A /^\ ~
V V-does indicate that a substantial number of people are located within two miles of the plant. Estimates by other wi'tnesses in
~
this' proceeding are much higher.
The number of persons who would be. located within a plume obviously varies not only with wind direction but also with stability class and distance from the plant. - At two miles the
. plume could be viewed as being between'a 29-wedge (A stability class) and a 13-wedge (D stability c1' ass)ES/ compared to the 22.5 population wedges in the table.
Q. How large are doses likely to be and how do they compare with doses that would be received at other sites?
A. (Beyea) In order to gain a better appreciation of the higher risk faced by the beach population (higher than that faced by residents at comparable distances at other sites for cohparablereleases), we present a series of Tables that show radiation doses likely to be received under various scenarios.
Table 8 shows the highest-risk case, which applies to the Seabrook beach population that is separated from the reactor by a lagoon. (Because plumes disperse less over water, the plume is more concentrated by tne time it reaches the population than had it. traveled over land.)
The doses shown apply to a person assumed to leave the contaminated area after 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The doses are truly enormous for the S6V-Total release. (Note that a 500-rem dose has a 51/ Wedges are assumed to have plume widths of 3 times the horizontal dispersion coefficient, 61 -
L
, p 3 s
G' a
)
.P .
DOSES RECEIVED :N A SUMMER DAY BY HIGHE5T-RISK POPULAT:0N ON SEAS?DD SIA..
(SKIN & CAR DEPOS'T:DN DOSE INCLUDED)
Dose 5 Hrs Aft-r b)
Evacuation s, t a r t s Risk c: d (In Rem) Ear.y D e a t '. ? " )
Stab C Wind FWR1 PWR2 PWR3 titty Speed S6V- 56V-Class (m/sec)
-- e) -e)
Si total S6V-1 51 tot. HV-:
A 2 63-74 230-270 <50 N Y N A 4 160-190 120-150 < 50 N? N? N A 3 .20-140 65 7^ <50 N? N N 3 2 <50 530-d B5-98 N Y N 3 4 <50 320-?30 49-55 N Y N 3 5 160-220 70-2. ( 50 Y Y N C 2 <50 1600-1900 230-270 N Y Y C 4 900-1100 130-150 N Y N C 9 490-590 70-93 N Y N D 2 2';0-3200 379-449 N Y Y D 4 1~,00-1900 222-264 N Y Y D : 340-1000 '20-143 N Y N?
a) Th pcpulation at 2 mt. with bay water cetween reactor and beach.
b) Persons caught in *he plume are assumed to be partially shielded from conta inated ground by thetr ventcles. They are assumed to receive a dose component from radica:tive matertal depostted on the car and 3 rectly on the t nd iv id ua . .
. The effective ground shielding f ac to rs range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on tne type of automobtie. See Question 13 for furtner detatis.
c) Pasqutil stabiltty class. Dispersten parameters were snitted by one stactitty class to account for reduced dtspersion over water.
{See W.A. Lyons, "Turbulent Diffusion and Pollutant Transport in Shoreltne Enytronments", in Lectures on Air Pollutton and E "tronmental Impact Analyses, American Meteorological Society, 45 Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02.03, t1995). Pages 141, 142. and espectally Figure 25 on Page 149.)
! d) "Y" t r.d t e a t e s exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher. An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed. A question mark by an entry indt:stes
! Onat even enough doses do not reach the 200-cem early death l n res no ld, the 100-rem threshold for nausea .as been reached. In sucn cases, .t n e assumed 5-hou evacuation :...e may be suspect.
e )- Assuming mid-range plume rise.
A e y pO
O '
O U V mortality' rate. greater than 70%.) As discussed below, doses exceed'the threshold for meteorological conditions that hold' 93%.of the time.
1
~
The doses for an S6V-1 release are smaller than for S6V-Tot'al, but still exceed threshold for meteorological conditions that hold about 33% of the time. Dosss shown for the high-rising S1 release have been calculated using a standard plume rise formula, so they almost always temain below threshold. (However, as mentioned earlier, the occurrence of a low-rising plume is expected frequently.
For this reason, we continue to list probability values under the yes/no columns in Table 8 that indicate whether or not there is a risk of early death.)
Not all of the 2-mile beach population is separated from the reactor by water. Table 9 shows the results for populations separated by land. The doses are still extraordinarily high for the S6V-Total release, but.are significantly less serious for an S6V-1 release. It is of interest to compare these results with doses that would be-accumulated at the median reactor site around the United States. The results are shown in Table 10. We have taken 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for the evacuation clear time within 2 miles, based on an NRC estimate of the median time.bb!
55/ T. Urbanik II, "An Analysis of Evacuation Time Estimates Around 52 Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, NUREG/CR-1856 (1981),
Vol. I, Table 10, p. 21.
62 -
g ,
(,/
TABLE 9 DOSES RECEIVED ON A SUMMER DAY BY 2-M:;- BEACH POPULATION' (SKIN & CAR DEPOSITION DOSE .N;;)DED)
Dose 5 Hrs After 1
Evacuatton starts Risk of .
(In Rem) Early Death?
Stao- Wind PWR1- PWR2 PWR3 titty Speed S6V- 56V-
-- e )
total S6V-1
-e) 51 tot. 36V-:
Class (m/sec) Si A 2 122 '.43 95-l'.0 <50 N N N A 4 92-109 50-51 <30 N N N A B 53-62 <50 <SO N N N B 2 63-74 230 _'70 <50 N Y N B 4 160-190 120-150 <50 N? N? N B 9 ~120-140 65-76 <50 N N N C 2 (50 530-650 35-98 N Y N C 4 (50 320-330 48-55 N Y N C 6 190-220 170-200 (50 Y Y N D 2 <50 1600-1900 230-270 N Y Y D 4 <50 900-'.00
. 130-150 N Y N D r <50 490-590 70-93 N Y N a) The p;pulation two miles fr:: the piant, but not directly acr0ss tne lagoon.
c) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be parttally snielded from contaminated ground oy tnetr vehtcles. They are assumed To r et"e a dose ccaponent from radtcactive material deposited :n ene car and direc tly on the indtvidual. The effective ground shi 1 ding factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type :t a u t . r. o b i l e . See Question 13 for further detatis, c) Pasqu11. stability class.
d) "Y" indicates exposure to a 202-rem dose or higher. An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed. A question mark by an entry indt:a.ss that ev+n though doses do net rescn the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem thresnoid for nauswa has been reached. 1-such cases, the assumed 5-hour evscuation time may be suspect.
e) Assuming mid-range plume rise. ,
n
( s
- V i
U TABLE 10 DOSES R E C E I'.'E D BY 2-MILE POPULATION
- AT A MEDIAN REACTOR SITE IN THE UN*TED STATES (CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED)
Dose 1.5 Hrs After b)
Evacuation Starts Risk of ,,
(In Rem) Early Deat.?
Stab- Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 iltty Speed F6V- 56V-
--e) --e)
Class (m/sec) Si total S6V-1 31 tot. 36V ' .
A 2 53-60 <50 <50 N N N A 4 <50 <50 <50 N N N A 8 <50 <50 ( N N N B 2 <50 13-110 N N N B 4 71-92 52-58 (50 N N N 3 8 52-61 <50 <-O N N N C 2 <50 220-250 .50 N Y N C 4 <50 130-140 <50 N N? N C 3 76-91 67-76 <50 N N N D 2 <50 540-o10 77-37 N Y N D 4 320-370 <50 N Y N D 3 liC-200 (50 N Y N a) The population two miles from the plant.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially sh.elded from contaminated ground by buildings a.n d thetr ventcles. The',
are assumed to receive a dose c om po..e n t from radteactive mater ai .
depostted on the car, but they are not assumed to have nad i n e t' r skin contaminated. The effective ground snielding factors range from 0.65 to 0.95, depending on the type of automobile. Cloud and inhalation shielding factors are taken to be 0.75. See Question 13 for fur ser details, c) Pasquill s' : titty class.
d) "Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or nigher. An evscuattan time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed. A question mark by an entry and.:stes tnat even though doses do not reach tne 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem thresnold far nausea has oeen reached. Ir j such cases, the assumec 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
e) Assuming a m 'i d - r a n g e plume rise.
s I
(~)%
\-
J Taale 10 shows that. doses, even for S6V-Total, get very I high only_for two meteorological conditions (D-stability, '
l wind speeds 2 and 4 meters /second). Doses for'the other releases never rise above early-death threshold. In general, doses at these other sites are less than one-fifth~
the doses for the highest-risk Seabrook beach case.
Q. Are the beach populations beyond two miles exposed to risk of early death during a summer day?
A. (Beyea) Yes, certainly for an S6V-Total release.
Taoles 11 and 12 show the calculated results for beach populations at 4 miles and an evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. Note that the beach population is not protected for a low-rising S1 release either.
Additional insight i nto how far from the reactor threshold doses are likely to occur for an S6V-Total release can be gained from examining Table 13. It shows early death radii for D-stability. class and a five-hour evacuation time. This means t what 1;. individual remaining in the plume at a radius given in the lass . lumn of the table for five hours under the given weather conditions will receive at least a 200-rem dose. These are the individuals who have not been able to evacuate earlier
) due to traffic congestion, etc. It should be noted, however, l that individuals at this radius who have evacuated earlier may still receive a 200-rem dose due to the continuing dose contribution from material deposited on their skin and car.
Similarly, individuals beyond the early death radius for a i
t
-e Ie- ., -
_i-g . . - . - _- - ---,.,nyy 4 ,,_ , . . - - . , - _ _ _ _ _ . -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ m_ ---_
____7____
)
TABLE .1 DOSES RECEIVED ON A SUMMER DAY BY-4-MILE BEACH FOPULATION"
, (SKIN AND CAR DEPOSITION DOSES INCLUDED)
Cose 5 Hrs After b)
Evacuatton Starts Risk of ,,
(In Rem) Early Death?"'
Stab #' Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 ility' Speed _ _ .
S6V- S6V-Class (m /sec) 51') total __ e }
SrV-1 Si tot. S6V ' .
A 2 61 ?l 48-55 <50 N N N A 4 <50 <50 <50 N N N A~ 8 <50 (50 <50 N N N B 2 82-96 59-69 <50 N N N B 4 64-75 ' <50 <50 N N N B 8 (50 <;0 <50 N N N C 2 <50 160-190 <50 N N? N C . 4 98-120 - -110 <50 N N N C 3 93-110 52-61 <50 N N N D 2 (50 540-640 77-89 N Y N D 4 <50 340-410 50-53 N Y N D -) <50 190-230 <5C N Y N a) Tne population 4 miles from the plant.
b) Pe sons caugnt in the plume are assumed to ba partially shteided f rom contaminated ground by thele vehicles. They are assumed c recetve a dose component frem radioactive matertal depestted On t .e car and directly on tne indtvtdeal. The effective ground shtelding factors range from .0 to 1.3, depending on tne type of automobtie. See Question 13 for further detatls, c) Pasquill stability class.
d) "Y" indicatet exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher. An evacuation t'me of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed. A question mark by an entry indicates
- nat even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death areshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached. In such cases the assumed 5-hcur evacuation time may be suspect.
e) Assuming a mtd-range plume rise.
) I a s'
. TABLE 12 EXPOSURE OF 4-MILE BEACH POPULATICN TO RISK OF EARLY DEATH ON A SUMME? CAi (SKIN & CAR DEPOSITIDN DOSES INCLUDED:
Time in hou rs to Reach Risk of ,,
_, 200 Rem Early Death?"'
Stab ' Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 Litty Speed S6V- S6V-Class -- e) -- e )
(m / s . ;) Si total S6V-1 Si tot. S6V '.
A 2 19-24 23. ->24 >24 N N N A 4 >24 >24 >24 N N N A B >24 >24 >24 N N N 3 2 13-17 13. - 23 >24 N N N 3 4 18-24 >24 >24 N N N B 8 >24 >24 >24 N N N C 2 >24 3.4- 6.7 12-15 N Y N C 4 11-14 10.5-13.5 23->24 N N N C 8 12-15 21.6->24 >24 N N N D 2 >24 <1 3.5-4.2 N Y Y D 4 >24 1.7- 2 6.S-8.6 N Y N?
D : >24 4- 5.2 14-10 N Y N a) ~'e popu.itt:n 4 mLlet from the plant.
b) Perso a caught in .he plume are assumed ta be partially shtelded from contaminated ground by their vehicles. They are assumed to receive a Jose component from radioactive material depostted on the car and directly on the individual. The effecetve ground s h t e ld t ..g factors range from 1.0 to . 3. depending on ene type of automobile. See Question 13 for furthe: details.
c) Pasqutit stabtitty class.
d) "Y" indtestes exposure to a 200-rem dose or h tg he r. An evacuatten time of 5 nou.s ts assumed. A question mark by an entry t r. d t c a t e s that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death th re s ho ld , the 100-ren threshold for nausea has been reached. In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
e) Assuming a m*d-range plume rise.
t e
.O 0 given set of conditions are not necessarily protected from a 200-rem dose,'because we have not accounted for the doses.they might receive outside the plume from skin and car deposition material.
As noted previously, if evacuation times for the beaches beyond 2 miles are longer than 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, as is documented by Adler, the consequences of these releases for a given set of conditions will be more serious. The early death radii will be larger and many more people will be exposed.
Q. How would a summer evening scenario affect your results?
A. (Beyea) There is evidence that there weuld still be a substantial population on or near the beaches on summer
~
evenings. Although evacuation times might be reduced due to a smaller evacuating population, it is~not clear that this reduction would be enough to ensure that no early deaths occurred in the population--especially since night-time plumes are more concentrated and therefore are more dangerous. In order to investigate the consequences of a summer evening scenario, we have obtained an estimate from our model of the doses at 2 miles which would be received for typical evening
- weather scenarios assuming a clear time of 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. We have t
assumed, in contrast to the summer scenario, that the l
population is wearing more clotnes and could remove them after exposure to reduce the skin deposition dose. While it is very uncertain how much this would reduce the skin deposition dose,
(-
A
O O
'we have also_ assumed for simplicity that removing clothes would eliminate it, including the-contribution from contaminated hair. We have still assumed a' dose component from material deposited on-cars. _The
( dose scaling factor range for this -
scenario becomes .65 .95.)
The results of our model are shown in Table 13a. The time to reach 200 rem :s usually one hour or less for the S6V-total release, which means that any reduction of evacuation times -
during the evening is not going to protect the population for this release category.
Q. How frequently do the various weather condit' ions occur?
A. (Beyea) The frequencies of the Pasquill stability classes, as reported in the SB 1&2, ER-0*S,E1/ are given in Table 14. The frequencies of the A,B, and C stability classes increase during the summer months, with C the most frequent of the three. D and E_are the dominant stability classes.
Although not indicated in the Table (which is based on 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> data), C and D stability classes would probably dominate during daytime hours because the E, F, and G stacility classes tend to occur primarily in the evening or early m0rning hours.
The consequences during C, D, and E classes are all serious in terms of early death. Consequences would also be serious 51/ Public Service of '*ew Hampshire, "Seabrook Station -
Units 1 & 2, Environmen:al Report, Operating License Stage,"
Figure 2.1-19.
4 4
,- p ,
O L TABLE 13 EARLY DEATH RADII FOR A 5-HOUR EVACUATION T I .V. E ON A SUMMER DAY, 56V-TOTAL RELEASE I
E A'R LY DEATH S T A B I '. I T Y WIND SPEED PADIUS CLASS (m/see) (mi.es)a)
B 2 2-3 B 4 1-2 8 8 1-2 C 2 3-4 C 4 2-3 C 8 1' D 2 1-6 D 4 6-7 0 8 4-5 a) An individual in the plume at this radius under the given
-c o n d i t t o n s will receive, assuming a.ftve-hour esr t L .e , at least a 200 rem dose. Indtviduals at this radius who nave evacuated etr.ter may sttil receive at least a 200 rem dose due co the conttnuing dese contribution f rom material depostted on tnetr skin and car.
Ind iv id ua ls at f arther dis ances may still receive 200 rem doses due t.
skin and car deposition deses after leaving the plume.
A dose scaling factor range of 1.0-1.3 ts assumed. This ts equtvalen-to assuming 1) that some individuals are' caught +n
. the open during plume passage. 2) that the last to evacuate are stuck in traffic and spend the full five hours in concamtnated ground, and 3) that all doses cease after five hours. See Question 13 for further details.
i a
"'W, F*
V U TABLE 133 DOSES RECEIVED ON A SUMMER EVENING SY TWO-MILE BEACH POPULAT;0N I (CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED, NOT SKIN DOSE)
Dose 3 Hrs After b)
Evacuation starts Risk of d (In Rem) Ea rly Dea th ?')
Stab ~1 Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 titty Speed 56V- S6V-Class (m/seci
-e) 51
- e) total 56V-1 Si tot. 56V '.
D 2 <50 820-970 120-140 N Y N D 4 400-560 72-91 N Y N D 3 260-310 (50 N Y N E 2 1300-1600 200-220 N Y Y E 4 790-950 120-130 N Y N E 6 430-520 64-73 N Y N a) The population 2 miles from the plant, not directl- across the lagoon. Doses would be highe r should the plume ba b. sing over the lagoon.
b) Persons caugnt in the plume are assumed to ce parttally shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles. They are assumed te recetve a dose component fros radioactive matertal de:os t ted on the car. No skin dose is included on the assumption that a)clotnes keep radteactivity from reaching skin; and b)that clo thes are discarded once evacuees enter their cars. The effecttve ground shtelding factors range from 0.65 to 0.95, depending on the type of automobile. See Question 13 for furtner detatis.
c) Pasqutil stability class, d) "Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or h tghe r. An evacuatton time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed. A que5 ton mark by an entry ;ndicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early deatn thresnold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has ceen reached. In such cases, the assumed 5-hour ,cacuatton time may oe suspect, e) Assaming a r. t d - r a n g e plume rise.
I l
l l
1
A d
. r~%
k) ('"
\
TABLE 14 FREQUENCY OF PASQUILL STABILITY CLASSES AT SEABRCCK'ai (Values Ln % of Time)
Month } B C D E F G Apr 1979 1.27 2.11 .30 49.65 ;9.40 7.88 5 . 9 '.
May 1.20 2.86 4.82 52.86 26.51 5.27 6.45 Jun 2.92 6.69 12.26 39.93 25.49 6.13 6.69 Jul 4.90 6.94 11.56 29.12 28.84 12.65 5.99 Aug 2.91 4.71 9.97 43.07 26.59 7.34 5.40 Sep 1.25 7.64 11.81 30.69 27.36 10.83 ;3.42 Oct 0.91 2.96 5.79 39.30 34.05 10.09 7.00 Nov 0.00 0.56 4.76 43.92 34.83 9.37 6.57 Dec 0.00 0.41 2.70 47.03 41.35 5.31 2.70 Jar 1990 0.13 1.SS 6.59 51.88 30.38 5.78 3.36 Feb 0.44 2.03 5.37 50.36 34.69 5.66 1.45 Mar 10.68 1.64 5.34 43.15 24.66 6.03 s.49 Yearty 2.22 3.37 7.06 43.31 30.39 7.76 5.5~
a) Perted of Record Apr11 1979 -
March 1980. Stab 11 tty class calculated using 4 3 ' - 2 .' 9 ' delta temperature. Source:
SB 142, ER-OLS, Table 2.3-24 I
I I
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9 ___ ,
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/ 'a [#v i LJ \-)
TABLE 15 JOINT F R E Q *l E N C Y D I S T R I B U T_I, OF AIND SPEED, AND STABILITY CLA3S FOR SEABROOK2) (209-FOOT LEVEL)b)
APRIL '79 - MARCH '90 Stability Class Wind Speed (mph) Wind Speed (m/sec) 4 Within :
'.tas A <4 <1.3 1.04 4-7 1.0-3.1 S.35 S-12 3.6-5.3 31.77
>12 >$.3 58.33 B <4 <1.8 1.03 4-8 1.3-3.1 10.65 S-12 3.6-5.3 . 4. 7
>12 >$.3 4' 5 C <4 (1.8 2.2i 4-7 1.8-3.1 17.5 8-1: 3.6-5.3 36.5
>12 >5.3 43.
l 0 <4 <1.8 3.34 4-7 1.8-3.1 17.92 S- 2 3.6-5.3 36.'O (12 >5.3 42.33 E <4 <!.S . 5-4-7 !.8-3.1 '6.?S S-12 3.6-5.3 4. 32
>12 >5.3 34.33 a) Source: SB 152, ER-OLS, Table 2.3-27 b) Frequency d L a t ribut to n would vary with measurement level and Se3SCn.
i i
n - - - . - - -. , ,,
{ . ,
O O for F and G conditions though we have not considered them.
Our results are not based on'an infrequently occurring weather scenario.
The distribution of wind speeds within the stability classes is given in Table 15.51/ Note that these distributions are not disaggregated by season, and the summer distribution might be different.
Although the frequency data given in Tables 14 and 15 are not precisely applicable to earlier tables, it is possible to use the information to make a rough assessment of the probability that the population would not be protected from early death should a severe release occur with the wind blowing toward a beach. For instance, it was indicated in Table 9 that for an S6V-total release, the 2-mile beach population on a ,
summer day was not protected from early death under C and D conditions. These meteorological conditions are likely to occur 75% of the time during summer days.18/ The probability is even higher for the highest-risk Seabrook beach population -
around 93%.
2 What about the S6V-1 release?
57/ New Hampshire Emergency Response Plan, Rev. 2., Vol. 6,
- p. 10-52.
58/ This assumes that C and D stability classes occur with a 75% probability on a summer day (E, F, and G do not occur during the day and about one half of the D percentages in Table 14 occur at night.)
66 -
. - -o O O -
A. In this case, a similar analysis suggests that
- doses exceeding threshold would occur about one-third of the
~
time for the highest-risk population at Seabrook beach, if it were downwind'11/ .
Q. How many people would be contaminated during a .
summer release?
. A. (Beyea) It must be recognized that, based on Tables 6, 9, and 11, thousands of people might be exposed to life-threatening doses should a release occur on a summer day.
In order to put some bounds on the health consequences to a beach area population, we have done a simple calculation of the number of people who might be contaminated due to a release at Seabrook. An unknown fraction of this nJmber would receive doses at or above 200 rem. The others might suffer a range of consequences, from nausea within a few hours to cancer many years in the future.
The lower bound to this limit is zero; that is, with enough warning time, it is possible that no one will be contaminated.
The maximum number of persons contaminated within ten miles 59/ The S6V-1 co'lumn in Table 3 indicates that the early death threshold would occur for 1) D stability class and ;
, wind speeds of 2 and 4 m/sec, and 2) C stability class and wind speeds around 2 m/sec.
According to Table 15, the D wind speeds would occur 60% of the time, while the C wind speeds would occur 18% of the time. The net result, based on the data for summer months in Table 14, is a 28% chance of early death threshold under ,
D conditions and a 5% chance under C conditions.-
A
^
O O-during an accident on a summer weekday is listed in Table 16, for a low estimate of weekday population t -sn from New Hampshire Seabrook Plan. (See testimony of other experts in this proceeding for an explanation of why the actual population may be considerably higher.) The table shows a range of between 10,000:and 23,000 people who may be exposed.
The table assumes no one within ten miles w:ill have had sufficient time to evacuate before passage of the plume. The purpose of the table is basically to show the size of the population that may.be of-~immediate concern--those persons within ten miles who will know they may have been exposed, later will presumably learn that they have been exposed, and who will wonder what the potential consequences will be.
The maximum number is so large that it is questionable whether medical facilities will be adequate to treat those seeking treatment. (See the Testimony of Jennifer Leaning).
Q. Is the population exposed to "early death" during other times of the year?
A. (Beyea) Yes. We prepared Tables 17 and 18 in a manner similar to those for a summer day beach scenario and found that i the population is not always protected f rom "early death" -( 200 l
l rem) at two and four miles for the rapid bypass sequence, S6-V l total, although the population is protected for other sequences g considered.
For those tables we examined evacuees who would take about three hours to evaculate as shown in Table 19. During plume
- 4 L
4
~
(~
V 'V TABLE 16 VARIATION IN POPULATION EXPOSED IN SSE SECT.R WITHIN 10 MILES ON A SUMMER WEEKDAY PLUME ANGLE #)
STABILITY CLASS AT 5 MILES (d eg ree s ) MAXIMUM EXPOSED POPULA. :N-A 26 23,000 3 20 19,000 C 15 13,000 D 11 13,000 al Assumes 3 plume angle of three times the ho r iz on ta l d i s p e r s '. c n
- eff' . ent.
b) Calculated as the population in the SSE sector (20,000) ac:Ording to figure 6 multiplied by the ratto of p lu me a ng le to 22.5 degrees. Mi tm.-
popu'ation could be zero if the wind were blowing towards the ocean and the re were sufftetent warntng time of a release.
, , s
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4
.v)
TABLE l' DOSES RECEIVED AT 2 MILES ON AN CFF-SEASON 'a E E X O A Y '
(CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUCED)
Dose 3 Hrs After Evacuation starts b) Risk af d (In Rem) Early Death?')
Stab #' Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 titty Speed 56V- 56v-Class (m/sec)
- e1 -e)
S1 total S6V-1 Si tot. 56V-:
A 2 62-73 43-55 <50 N N N A 4 47-56 <50 "
N N N A B <50 "
N N N 9 2 110- .0 "
N N N S 4 83-94 62-72 N N N B 3 60 '3 <50 "
N N N C 2 <50 270-3:0 "
N Y ., N C 4 <50 15 .30 "
N N? N C s93-110 31-94 N N N D 2 (50 690-140 97-120 N Y N D 4 '50 410-490 59-68 N Y N O i
<50 220-270 <!' N Y N a) The restdent population two attes f r o .m the plant.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially snielded item ejntaminated ground by butldings and thete vehicles. 7 hey assumed to recetve a dose component from radioacttve ma ertal de astted on the car. The effective ground shielding fact:rs es e from 0.65 to 0.95, depending on the type of automobtle.
Cl .d and inhalation shielding factors are taken to be'0.75. See Question 13 for further details, c) P squtil stability class.
d) i Andicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or highet. An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed. A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do net reach the 200-rem early death nresnold, the IOC-rem enresnold for nausea has been reached. In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
e) Assames .td-range plune rise.
O
~
O O passage, residents were assumed.to be.inside buildings with cloud and inhalation shielding factors of 0.75. '4e assuned a ground-dose scaling factor-of 0.65-0.95, implying that the evacuees were in cars within the plume, and that the cars had radioactive material deposited on them. No skin deposition
, dose was assumed.
Although Table 17 shows several "unprotected" cases for the rapid bypass sequences at two miles,,it should be noted that !
the actual doses above threshold would'be considerably higher in the summer time. Doses to the highest-risk beach population would be about four times as high as those projected for an off-season accident. (At four miles the corresponding ratio would be two to one.) As a result of these higher doses, the total number of injuries would be greater in the summer even if the exposed populations were the same.
] Furthermore, because the population during the off-season H scenarios is smaller than for summer scenarios, fewer people 4
would receive radiation doses during off-season scenarios.
4 Therefore, there would be less of a chance that medical facilities would be overwhelmed, and more of a chance that most of those exposed to doses about 200 rem would receive the "supportive" medical treatment that would be needed to raise the early death threshold above 200 rem. This would be particularly important for the 4-mile case shown in Table 18.
Q. What difficulties are associated with reducing the i
- health consequences of a large release at seabrook?
t 2 :
4
. m ,m v) t V
\
TABLE 13 DOSES RECEIVED AT 4 MILES ON AN OFF-SEASON WEEKDAY
Dose 3 Hrs After b)
Evacuation Starts Risk of d'
iIn Rem) isrly Deatn?
Stab- Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 -
ality Speed 56V- S6V-Class (m/sec)
-e) total S6V-1 e) 56V-;
Si T1 tot.
A 2 <50 <50 <50 N N N A 4 s N N ?.
A 3 N N N a 2 N N N B 4 N N N B 3 N N N C 2 73-92 N '
N s
C 4 50-58 47-55 N N N C 0 47-36 <50 N N N D 2 <50 240 ^90 N Y N D 4 160 1/0 N N?
O - 93-100 N N N a) The cestdent population four miles from the plant.
c) Persons cau:ht in the plume are assumed to be partially sntelded from contaminated ground by buttatngs and their vehicles. They are assumed to receive a dose component fec= radteactive materia.
d* posited on the car. The effective ground snielding f ac t: rs range from 0.65 to 0.95, dependtr.g on the type of automootle.
Cloud and tenalatton shielding factors are taken to be 0.75. See guestion .3 for further details.
- ) Pasquill stabtitty class.
- 1 "Y" indtcates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher. An evacuatt0n time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed. A quest.on mark by an entry indt:ates that even though doses do not reach -he 200-rem early death th re s no ld , the 100-cem threshold for nausea has been reached. In suen cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
e) Assumes mid-range p.ume rise.
rg Q O V TABLE 19 SEABROOK EUACUATION CLEAP TIME ESTIMATEE 1 OFF-SEASON WEEKDAY SCENARIO b) d a RAD *US DEGREES HMM Vorhees') Maguire") NRC' ,
0-2 360 3:10 - - -
0-5 360 3: 10 - -
0-10 360 4: 30 3:40 3:00 4 of a) Time (Hours: minutes for the population to clear the Indicated area afts.
notification.
P "Preliminary Evacuation Clear Time Estimates for Areas Near Seabrtok Station," HMM Document No. C-30-024A, HMM Associates, Inc., May 20, .?iO.
- ) "F na'. Report. Estimate of Evacuation Times," Alan M. Verhees 5 Assettates, July 1990.
di "Emergency Planning Zone Evacuation Clear Time Estimates," C.E. Maq-.re.
Inc., Feoruary 1393.
el Letter it M;tzte Solberg, Emergency Prepatedness Development Sr sn:. U.J.
N.R.C. from A.E. Destosters, Hea.th Physics Technology Section, Batte'.2 .
Pacif17 Northwest Laboratories, August 20, 1982.
1 e
i r r
+ ., , .
. O O A. -(Beyea). Limited options exist for reducing.the severity of accidents at Seabrook.
. i~
None of the extraordinary emergency measures that we, or a
'other nuclear analysts have been able to devise are'likely to ,
.g )
eliminate' or effectively reduce the serious radi'at$on doses that wo'u'id resuIt from a range of releases at Seabrook.
a (A) possibility of reddcino skin and car deoosition dose.
8
\
Our work.here has shown.that skin and car deposition doses could make~important contributions to the. total dose ;
e to an individual, but no consideration has been given to reducing these doses in emergency planning. We have - i t-considered whether or not extraordin'ary emergency measures could be ta' ken to protect against.them. For instance, evacuees could be instructed to leavel t.he evacuation vehicle -
as soon as possible, to shower (skin and hair) as soon as possible, and perhaps to remove hair with scissors.
Automated car spraying devices could be installed,near
\
i npo rtah: beach exit points in an attempt to remove some of the' material from cars as soon as p(ossible, thus reducing i
, doses to the occupants. The effectiveness of various
\
- methods for removing radioactivt aerosols from skin, hair, y -
and cars must be investigated, however, before credit:can be !
! t j taken for them. The logistics of washing every car in the ,
beach area would be. formidable and would likely add to t ,
i t
70 l i l . 1 L
.__ _ _ _. ,. ..,-_ _ __, _ _ - - - - -- - C'
W_/ U evacuation times. (Remo, val of aerosols is complicated by s
i the fact thatl radioactive aerosols attach themselves too strongly to clean surfaces to be removed easily. On the other hand, the fraction depositing on dirty or oily surfaces could be removed at the same time as dirt and oil were removed.)
All these measures, if they worked, could be helpful in reducing the number of delayed cancers that would show up in later years. However, their implementation would not change the significance of our tables with respect to early health e f f ec t.n . This is because post-evacuation doses are not even considered in our calculations and because not all cars could be decontan'nc'ed. Also, populations are no't protected, even when car deposition doses are excluded.
- 3) Possibility of relyinc on shelters.
In principle, on; way to reduce the chances of early death occurring in the beach population would be to provide shielding by means of sheltering, especially from ground dose, while people wait forroqdstoclear. However, shelters would only be useful if they are suitably massive, which seems doubtful in this case.6A/ Serious questions exist as to whether they 60/ Z.G. Burson and A.E. Profio, "Structure Shielding from Cloud and Fallout Gamma Ray Sources for Assessing the Consequences of Reactor Accidents," cG & G, Inc., Los Vegas, 11 e v . , EGG-ll83-1670.
71 -
w
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g: j; a p pyt- p 1 x &
(]
~~
t ;f -
h *
\c . would actually!be used by a majority of'the population. As
. . \ 'c r:'
is: indicated ~by the testimony of other experts in this A
proceeding, sheltering is not a'reili.stic option for the .
beach populations. ,
.The possibility of having beach occupants shield themselves by immersing themselves in ocean water has been N_ rejected by us because of the low temperature of the water.
On the other hand, it would be physically possible for TP 1 exposed persons to partially shield themselves from ground dose by covering themselves with sand prior to evacuation.
However, che notion that people will wait away from their ,
cars buried in the sand or immersed in the water while 4
traffic cengestion cleats seems grotesquely unrealistic.
C) Pof_sibility of c,acuat;ina on foot or by bike.
The beach population night be inst::ucted to walk out of the area. If the release has occurrcd, has blown towards
- the beaches, and has been confined to a relatively narrow area, this might be the best strategy to reduce doses from a l theoretical nuclear physics perspective. In this way, no one would wait within the plume area accumulating doses from the radioactive material on the ground or on cars. Our
?~ .
calculations show that a person walking out in certain circumstances vould have received, about five hours after the it <
f._
release, between a 30 to 401 lower dose than a person who has l
f l
72 -
, , e r , - - - ., ,. . . -- - _ , - - - ., -------.e m ,
E O O remained in a car within the plume wnile trying to evacuate.51/ However, this type of forced march strategy flounders when faced with normal human behavior.
Providing bicycles for beachgoers might be a strategy since it would-offer the hope of relatively rapid escape.
Nevertheless, it is not clear what percentage of beachgoers would utilize the bikes and what the traffic impact woulb be.
In fact, access to bikes might increase the disorderliness of the evaculation. For exam 71e, consider those beachgoers who opted for driving (with or without official permisssion), only to return for bicycles after being stuck in traffic for an hour or so. Their abandoned automobiles could well block traffic for those remaining. Certainly no credit could be given in emergency planning for reliance on bicycles without a full-scale test of the process. Yet, a convincing test woulc be impossible. How could a test reliably simulate the stress and fear that would be generated in a real accident?
61/ We calculated the dose to an individual on the beach who waits for about one and a half hours after the release (dose scating factor of 1.35), who then leaves the plume, but accumulates doses from skin deposition (dose scaling factor .35). We also calculated the dose to an individual in a car within the plume, accumulating doses from the plume on skin and car depcsition material (dose scaling factor of 1.0-1.3). By comparing the coses for about five hours after l the release, we found a 30-40 percent lower dose for those individuals walking out.
i l
1 i
l i . . __ [
()
C'\
GJ D) Possibility of cre-distributing ootassium iodide.
The value of pre-diser :ating potassium iodide near nucles:
power plants has been discussed by us previously. However, pre-districation will not work for a transient beach population, unless the authorities are willing to hand out taolets every day to everyone who visits the'beachee. Also, potassium iodide would be of limited usefulness for the high-dose scenarios that would develop at seabrook beaches.
Q. What about the probability of the releases discussed in your testimony?
A. (Beyea) PWRl-PWR9 releases are established by NUREG-0396 as the spectrum of releases that must be considered in emergency planning for nucicar power plants. The NRC took the probability and credibility of these accidents classes into account in developing NUREG-0396. Every emergency plan, therefore, must address the entire range of these releases, and should also examine the site-specific equivalent of these generic releases.
Q. What is your overall assessment of the doses that might be delivered at Seabrook?
A. (Beyea) The summer Seabrook situation is the worst case I have ever examined in connection with emergency planning or hypothetical reactor accidents. The doses that would be received following a range of releases at the Seabrook site, even with the proposed emergency plans in effect, are higher
~
O O ,
'than doses that would be received at most other sites in the ,
completefabsence of emergency planning.
Q.- Dr. Beyea, does that complete your testimony?
A. (Beyea) Yes, it does.
-t X. PWR-] RELEASES AT SEASROOK
~
Q. Dr. Thompson, what is the basis for your statements .
in your testimony?
A. (Thompson) As mentioned earlier, I have co-authored a review (Sholly and Thompson, 1986) of various "source term" issues. This review was current through mid-1985. I ,
used that review and the documents cited within it as a basis for my statements. In addition, I have studied a variety of more recent documents, which collectively form the remaining basis for my statements. These more recent documents include the draft NRC report NUREG-1150 (NRC, 1987a) and the documents generated as a result of a January 1987 technical meeting sponsored by the NRC (Kouts, 1987; NRC 1987b). (See attached references.)
f Q. Please describe the potential for a "PWRl-type" release.
A. (Thompson) The Reactor Safety Study (NRC, 1975) ;
i described the PWR1 release category as being "characterized ,
by a core meltdown followed by a steam explosion on contact t of molten fuel with the residual water in the reactor i
r i
75 -
i j _ _
o- - _ . . . _ . . . _ _ _ s __ .
~ '
o o
- vessel." More recent work has imentified the potential for
- a similar release through a different mechanism--high-pressure melt ejection. In this case, molten-core materisl is expelled from the reactor vessel under pressure of steam and gases within the vessel.
Q. Where might the containment breach occur during an accident sequence leading to a "PWR 1-type" release?
t A. (Thompson) For either steam explosion or L high-pressure melt ejection sequences, the location of the breach cannot be predicted. The breach might occur anywhere from the base of the containment wall to the containment ,
e deme. In addition, a co-existing bypass pathway could lead to some release through buildings adjacent to the main ,
containment building. ,
Q. Please describe the range of thermal energy release ,
rates which could be experienced during a "pWR l-type" release.
- A. (Thompson) This range is illustrated by Figure 7, which is drawn from the Seabrook Station probabilistic Safety Assessment (PLG, 1983). For present purposes, release category S1 is relevant. The table shows that the estimated energy release rate for this release category ,
could vary from 21,000 million STU per hour to 60 million BTU per hour, according to the size of the containment leak area. Present knowledge of containment failure modes is i
1 y t- - .- -, n - - - - - - . - - , ,w y- - . , y - .r- + ,-e r
TABLE 11.6-4. ENERGY RELEASE RATES FOR RELEASE CATEGORIES 5T ET, 53V, AND 54V Energy Release Rate (109 Btu /hr)
Release Category Energy Released
' Blowdown Duration h
(108 Btu) 10 Seconds / Minutes 10 Minutes 30 Minutes 1 Hour ST 0.58 21 3.5 0.35 0.12 0.06
$T 1.26 25 7.6 0.76 0.25 0.13 53V 2.0 70 12 1.2 0.4 0.2 54V 1.6 57 9.6 0.96 0.32 0.16 Leak Area (f t2 ) 250 25 2.5 1 0.5 Equivalent Diameter 18 6 1.8 1.1 0.8 O (feet)
T?
%t 22
. 5 .
f_!
0997P121SIl3
. 1 O O
-such that the energy release rate cannot be predicted within, this range, and perhaps within a wider range. ,
t Q. Please describe the potential for "PWR 1-type" releases to be relatively enriched in certain radioactive ;
i isotopes?
A. (Thompson) In Appendix VI of the Reactor Safety Study (NRC, 1975)', release category PWR1 is shown as having a relatively large release fraction for the ruthenium group of 4 i
radioactive isotopes--40% for this release category as opposed to 2% for release category PWR 2. Such~an enhanced. release is predicted to. occur becau-se of the physical and chemical behavior of a steam explosion event. More recent studies have ,
shown that a high-pressur melt ejection event could also lead to enchanced release of certain isotopes including those of ruthenium, molybdenium and tellurium.
Q. Mr. Thompson, does this complete your testimony?
A. (Thompson) Yes, it does.
4 I
XI. HEALTH EFFECTS FROM RADIATION DOSES FROM ACCIDENTS WITHIN THE PLANNING SPECTRUM ;
Q. How does radiation cause injury?
A. (Leaning) The radiation emitted from a nuclear pcwer [
i plant accident is called ionizing radiation because it c r,n t a i n s 1 .
- energy sufficient to remove one or more electrons from an atom
! and thus change its electric charge. This process of 1 ;
j ionization creates an ion which is chemically reactive and can :
damage living tissue. The extent of the damage depends upon i the intensity of the energy delivered and the radiation i .
L
O O sensitivity of the' target cell. In general, those cells that
. divide most rapidly or are metabolically most active are the most radiosensitive. Bone marrow, lymph tissue, and gastrointestinal epithelium are among the tissues most susceptible to radiation injury.
At the lower range of energy intensity and cell sensitivity, radiation may affect a cell by reducing its functional capacities or by altering its genetic material and thus possibly inducing malignant changes in later cell lines.
At higher ranges, radiation may destroy _the cell's capacity to replicate. At still higher ranges, radiation may result in the death of that particular cell or organ.12/
Q. What radiation exposure levels are considered safe?
A. (Leaning) Residents in the United States currently c receive radiation from a variety of background and man-made sources, resulting in an annual exposure of approximately 0.05 to 0.3 rads. Much controversy is attached to what effects low levels of radiation may exert in inducing cancer and genetic defects among exposed populations. It is prudent to begin from the perspective that any level of radiation may carry some risk. The question is the magnitude of this risk and its relationship to other risks individuals or societies may incur.
f2/ Committee on the Radiatior (BEIR III),
Biological Effects of Ionizing The Effects on Repulations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizino Radiation: 1980, National Academy
! Press, Washington,.D.C., 1098, pp. 11-35.
(VD ' {}
V The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRp) has established guidelines that define the permissible limits for additional radiation exposure (over and above current background levels). A member of the general public may receive an additional 0.5 rems (for these purposes, 1 rad equals 1 rem) per year; and a worker in a peace-time industry may receive an additional 5 rems per year.51 Q. What is known about the health consequences of exposure to high levels of radiation?
A. (Leaning) There is also much uncertainty in the scientific and medical community about the health consequences of exposing human populations to radiation at higher dose levels. The principal reason for this uncertainty is th'at our data on human response at these higher ranges is very meagre. Our main source for data comes from the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, each exposed in 1945 to an airburst of a nuclear bomb and each still part of an ongoing thorough epidemiological study.
Three'other populations also exposed to radiation at relatively high levels and also undergoing prospective investigation are the approximately 5,000 radium dial 4 painters of the 1920'st the 253 residents of the Rongelap and Utrik Atolls in the Marshall Islands, exposed to fallout 63/ 10 C.F.R. Part 20, S 1959.
. ,.c O O from the 15 megaton SRAVO thermonuclear test in 1954; a Utah population exposed at school age to fallout from above-ground tests conducted in the years 1951 to 1958; and the 135,000 people downwind from Chernobyl, exposed in 1986 to plume and fallout effects from the world's most serious nuclear power accident known to have occurred to date, other data results from occupational exposures (uranium miners), from industrial accidents, and from the experience of patients involved in medical therapeutic protocols.
.. The circumstances surrounding the radiation exposures of the majority of people in these populations precluded comprehensive, accurate, and detailed data collection during the initial events that created the exposure and during the first few days thereafter. In retrospective analysis it has usually been impossible to define with any precision the following key variables: the nature and intensity of the radiation received, the duration of exposure, and the relative individual susceptibility to a given dose received.
Within the limits of the data available, a few central general points about health consequences of radiation exposure have been identified and substantiated. Four main factors are involved: radiation quality, radiation dose, radiation dose rate, and the age of the exposed population. ,
Radiation cuality Linear energy transfer (LET) is the term used to describe radiation gudlity and refers to the density with 4
80 -
e p. .
k,) U which radiation ionizes matter per unit distance traveled.
Alpha radiation, with high LET, ionizes more densely per unit distance traveled than does gamma or beta radiation.
This quality is frequently specified in terms of its different biological effects on different tissues. The relative biological effectiveness, or RBE, of a given kind of radiation is directly related to its'LET. The higher the LET, the greater the RSE. Alpha radiation has an R3E of 10 to 20, beta and gamma of 1.
These differences translate into the difference between a rad dose and a dose expressed in rems. A rad, (or radiation absorbed dose) reflects only the amount of radiation absorbed by tissue. A rem, (or roentgen equivalent man), expresses the biological impact of that dose on human tissues. For a given rad dose of radiation whose RBE is 1, as with gamma radiation, a rad equals a rem. For a given rad dose of radiation whose R9E is 10, as with alpha radiation, a rad equals 10 rems.
In situations where it is difficult to estimate the various components of the radiation released, it is the convention to assign an RBE of 1 to the radiation dose, according to which rads are equal to rems. Such a convention underestimates the actual biological effects of 1
the dose received.
S1 -
O O Radiation dose The_ existing data on radiation exposure indicates that most' people who receive radiation doses below 200 rems will survive, in the short-term, and that most people exposed to radiation doses in excess of 500 rems will die. Much controversy surrounds the issue of where to assign with more precision the threshold for what is termed the LD50/60, or the lethal dose for 50 percent of the people exposed, followed for 60 days from time of exposure. (Deaths occurring after that period are assumed to result from other causes.) One estimate for the LD50/60, arising from study of people exposed in industrial accidents and in medical protocols, established the range of 360 to 450 rads, depending on whether the dose is measured directly at the
, organ target level (the midline dose) or at the body surface.51# In the WASH-1400 report, the LD50/60 was estimated to be 340 rads, given minimal support to victims, and 510 rads, if supportive treatment were extended.
(Supportive treatment is described as including "barrier nursing,. copious antibiotics, and transfusions of whole blood, packed cells, or platelets.")51# Figure 8, from 14/ Clarence C. Lushbaugh, "Human Radiation Tolerance," in Space Radiation Biology and Related Topics, Cornelius A. ,
Tobias and Paul Todd, eds., Academic Press, New York, 1974, pp. 494-499.
15/ United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor l Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. I Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, WASH-1400 (NUREG 75/014), ,
dashington, D.C., 1975, Appendix VI, 9-3.
e
- P
r p)
TMRI 3 p
'd Esti=ated Dose-Response Curves for LD50/60 NH M9 -
MS -
n ,. -
M - .
s 95 8
M -
2e e -
t M -
a 8 3
g 10 - -
1o - -
1
. W - 162e el -
1
- n - -
5 g 30 -l j m - ?
8 -
io -
2e 5 - x -
4 2 -
0$ - -
02 - -
o* - -
s 1 3 5 s
. 200 400 @ 8o3 1000 1200 1400 Sose mi.
Estimated dose-response carves for 50% mortality in 60 days with minimal treat.sent (curve A), supportive treatmen- (curve 8), and heroic treat.ent (curve C).
Origin if tata points: 1. NCRP Report 42 (conver ed to rads us.ng f actor tven in NCPS Report 42): 2,
- anc -
hops (1957. Table 12,. estimate for "nortaal man?")
3, Marshall Islar.ders i;rotracted exposure): 4 r l't tien therapy ser, s, 22 patients (Rider and Hasse Ja (,
1968): 5, clinica. group III accident patients (T:- tr and Wald, 1959, .ith newer cases added): 6, Pittssu: h accelerator accident patient (E.D. Thomas, 1971: 44. .
1975) 7 37 leuke:sia patients (E.D. Thomas, 197~
8, "best estimate
- of the Biceedical and Environr ant .
Assessment Group s0 t.e Brookhaven National Laborste f.
Sou rc e : WASH-1400, Appendix V1, 9-4 6
e i
A
.Q the DASH-1400 study, illustrates the various dose-response curves as derived from a range of exposure experiences analyzed in arriving at this overall summary estimate.
Another' authoritative review of the existing database has~ stated that the LD50/60 for humans is approximately 250 rems, measured as a midline dose.51# See rigure 9. A
~
recent re-analysis of the Hiroshima data has. prompted the
, suggestion that for populations in war or major disasters (aho may already be debilitated and for whom medicil support would be minimal) the LD50/60 may lie within the range of 2
150 to 250 rems.51/ To the extent that the dosimetry estimates from Chernobyl are reliable, experience from that accident indicates that all people exposed to levels of 200 rads or less survived, and that death occurred to the majority of people exposed to levels of 600 rads or more, despite the advanced technical support they received.51#
66/ Joseph Rotblat, Nuclear Radiation in warfare, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oelgeschlager, Gunn
& Hain, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., 1981, pp. 34-35.
11/ Joseph Rotblat, "Acute Radiation Mortality in a Nuclear
' War," The Medical Imolications of Nuclear War, Fredric Solomon and Robert Q. Marston, eds., Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1986, pp. 233-250, 18/ Roger E. Linnemann, "Soviet Medical Response to the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident," Journal of the American Medical Association 258 (1987): 637-43.
l
-S3-
~
O O FIGURE 9 Probability of Death from Acute Effects
! 2 3 4 5 6 7
. I Y I I I . I .
- 00 - - - : 'C 0
,1-. .>
1 90 - . -f 2 90 1
so f iso 1
- .]
70 ,' ~70 m .I f ,' --
'i 6e 4 50 g
g
,-l :
2 SC l
^b0 g .
- l 5 40 _,
- 40
-I -
. 2 r :
3C f.
l30 20 - ,' {20 l
,- .i r
iC -
f ito 1-T [ I
_)
1 2 3 4 5 6 ese ta.onae ossaitGy1 l
Source: Rotblat, 1981, 35,
O O -
Dose rate The literature suggests tnat a given dose of radiation
~
will inflict more severe immediate damage if given all at once, in a' single dose, than if fractionated and given in multiple, smaller doses over time. The dose fractionation effect pertains only to the acute effects of radiation,
- however. For long-term effects like cancer induction, it may be in fact that dose fractionation 'enchances development.
of malignant cell transformation,bl#
Fractionating a given dose reduces prompt effects because it is thought that all bio _ logical systems have inate mechanisms which can serve to repair cellular damage and compensate to some extent for the initial radiation injury received. Estimates vary as to the rate at which biological repair can be predicted to occur. Very large doses of radiation will overwhelm any biological repair mechanisms.
Below lethal thresholds, different species, different individuals within a species, and different tissues within each individual all have different rates of repair.
Ace of exposed population Children in all stages of development--those in utero, infants, and toddlers--are known to be particularly 69/ John B. Little, "Cellular Effects of Ionizing Radiation," New England Journal of Medicine 278 (1968):
308-15, 369-76.
Arthur C. Upton, "The Biological Effects of Low-Level Ionizing Radiation, Scientific American 246 (1982): 41-9.
- sensitive to the acute effects of radiation and to the.
induction of long-term sequelae.- It has also been suggested that the elderly are also more susceptible to acute radiation._ The data are too limited, however, to allow a quantitative adjustment of-the LD50/60 for people at either end of the age spectrum.1E! [
Q. How does radiation injure people?
A. (Leaning) There are three main ways in which radiation can injure people: whole body irradiation, external contamination,.and internal contamination.
Depending on the type and severity of exposure, people can experience a range of acute, intermediate, and long-term effects. Early radioactive fallout from a nuclear power' plant accident primarily exposes people to risk from whole body irradiation and external contamination. Internal contamination becomes a hazard if air containing radioactive particles is inhaled or if food or water containing radioactive particles is ingested.
Q. Describe whole-body radiation and its treatment.
70/ H. Aceto, et al., "Mammalian Radiobiology and Space Flight," in Tobias and Todd, eds., p. 374.
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), Radiological Factors Affecting Decision-Making in a Nuclear Attack, NCRP Report No. 421, Washington, D.C.,
November 15, 1974, p. 42 Rotblatt, 1981, p. 53.
i
' O
\_/ -
l A. -(Leaning) Acute effects of whole-body irradiation occur when the whole body, or most of it, is subjected to external radiation doses in excess of 20 rads.21/ The time of onset and the severity of 'this initial or prodromal stage of radiation exposure indicates the intensity of dose received and helps predict whether or not the course will progress to one of the three recognized acute radiation syndromes. The sympton of mildest exposure within this prodromal complex is anorexia, occurring within minutes to hours of exposure. With larger doses of radiation, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea may occur. Fatigue is also considered one of the 71/ Lushbaugh, 1974, pp. 485-486. For discussion of whole Body irradiation, see:
Ibid., pp. 476-488.
G.A. Andrews, "The Medical Management of Accidental Total-Body Irradiation," in The Medical Basis for Radiation Accident Preparedness, K.F. Hubner and S.A. Fry, eds.,
Elsevier/ North-Holland, New York, 1980, pp. 297-3210.
H. Fanger and C.C. Lushbaugh, "Radiation Death from Cardiovascular Shock Following Criticality Accident,"
Archives of Pathology 83 (1967): 446-6'O.
Stuart C. Finch, "Acute Radiation Syndrome," Journal of the American Medical Association 258 (1987): 664-667.
Robert Peter Gale, "Immediate Medical Consequences of Nuclear Accidents," Journal of the American Medical Association 259 (1987): 625-628.
J.S. Karas and J.B. Stanbury, dFatal Radiation from an Accidental Nuclear Excursion," New England Journal of Medicine (1959): 421-47.
G.E. Thomas, Jr., and N. Wald, "The Diagnosis and Management of Accidental Radiation Injury," Journal of Occupational Medicine (1959): 421-47.
r-
,1 ,
9 9
3 i
symptoms in this complex. Since individuals vary widely in !
i response to la given radiation-dose, the symptom complex is best' described in terms of statistical probability. Table -
20_shows the percentage of people who will experience one or more of the prodromal symptoms at a given level of radiation exposure. ;
If exposed to radiation in the lower range of these dose i levels, an individual would experience these prodromal symptos.;s for several days jand .would then recover. The symptoms of people exposed to doses in the higher range woald, after a latency period of relative well-being that l might last for days or weeks, then progress to one of the three acute radiation syndromes descrioed below. The clinical manifestations of these syndromes overlap. In '
general, larger doses of radiation will result in more rapid i onset of more severe symptoms.
i a) Hematopoetic syndrome Hematologic abnormalities predominate at doses between 200 and 600 rads. The hematologic picture yields :
i important information on prognosis and therapy. Lymphocytes ;
in the peripheral blood plummet almost immediately. Changes I
in other white blood cells, in platelets, and in capacity to make new red blood cells will also be seen. From a .
hematological standpoint, the peak risk of death from h
37 -
. N
%. %)
TABLE 20 Radiation Doses Producing Sy=ptoms of Exposure Prodre e (in rads)
Percentage of Extvud Perulatton Symptom 10 % %%
- 40 100 240 Anoreua 50 170 320 Nausea Vominng 60 210 W Charrhea w 240 3%
Source: W.S. Langha=, ed., Radiobiological Factors in Manned Snace Flight, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1967, 248; cited in Rotblat, 1981, 33, i
i L
~
O O infection and hemorrhage occurs about th'ree weeks from time of exposure, when the worst declines in platelets.and white '
blood cells converge. Depending upon dose received, individual susceptibilities, and extent of intensive care, recovery may or may not proceed from that point on.
b) Gastrointestinal (GI) syndrome Within a few days to a few weeks of exposures-to 700 rads and above, loss of GI mucosa and bone marrow depression contribute to a clinical picture marked by sudden onset of nausea, vomiting,-and bloody diarrhea. These symptoms-can progress to intense fluid loss, electrolyte imbalances, and severe hemorrhage from all mucosal surfaces. Death ensnes from infection or hemorrhage. '
c);Neutrovascular syndrome Neutrovascular symptoms arise from exposure to over 2,000 rads and occur within the first hour to first two days. Victims initially experience confusion, drowsiness, and weakness. Delirium and convulsions then ensue, followed within a matter of hours to days by death from cerebral edema (brain swelling).
Treatment of whole-body irradiation a) Triage. Since the treatment of people exposed to whole-body irradiation depends upon the dose of radiation received, the first task involves efforts to estimate exposure. In disaster settings, where large numbers of people may have been exposed, the task becomes one of
L O O triage, or sorting people into exposure categories on the-basis of their presenting symptoms. Since many people in these circumstances will be agitated and anxious, it may be difficult in the first few hours to sort out psychological factors from those induced by radiation. However, although nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea are normal physiological responses to stress of any kin'd, the time from exposure'to onset of vomiting appears to be sti'.1 the most reliable indication of severity of dose received. Redness of the conjunctiva and skin erythema may appear within several hours to days of_ exposure, b,ut these findin'gs have variable thresholds and, from the perspective of early triage, are
- less useful as indicators of exposure levels. Epilation of any significance usually arises.from exposures to over 200 rads, but because its occurrence lags until two to three weeks from time of exposure it also cannot be relied upon to guide initial triage efforts.
Specific laboratory studies and careful questioning of exposed individuals are the techniques yielding the most useful information. Both of these interventions can be invoked if the number of people exposed are relatively few and time permits. Determining the precise location of tha individual at key points in time and the exact timing of onset of symptoms will help define the dose received.
S9 -
'A V}
Results of a baseline complete blood count and chromosomsl analysis', if resources are available to permit these tests, sill also serve to define the exposure level. Based on this information, treatment protocols can be instituted.
c) Treatment. An individual exposed to 500 to 1000 rads and who received intensive car.e therapy might recover, although he or she would require a protracted convalescence of two to six months. Intensive care in this context would need to include reverse isolation techniques, matched allogeneic bone marrow transplant, fluid resuscitation, antibiotics, white cell, red cell, and platelet transfusions--performed in a setting with skilled hematology, oncology and burn unit capabilities. The medical interventions needed in this setting fall into the category termed "heroic" by the WASH-1400 report and characterize the response given to the Soviet victims of the Chernobyl accident. Soviet physicians have testified that the effect to care for the 200 most exposed victims of the Chernobyl disaster stressed their entire national health care system to the limits of its capacity.11/ Teaching hospitals in the greater Boston area could probably each absorb approximately 5 to 10 such patients, with a total treatment potential of about 50 to 100 victims.
12/ H. Jack Geiger, "The Accident at Chornobyl and the Medical Response," Journal of the American Medical Association 256 (1987):
609-12.
90 -
O -
O People exposed,to dos,es of 1,000 rads or more would-present with extensive GI hemorrhage in the first four days after the event and woulo have little chance of. survival, even if treated most. aggressively and appropriately.
With exposure under 500 rads, intravenous fluid and electrolyte therapy with parenteral antibiotics might support patients through the initial stages of fluid loss and, if bone marrow depression were not too severe, chances of recovery would be good.
A suggested protocol for treatment of an individual exposed to a potentially lethal radiation dose is found on Table 21.
Q. Describe external contamination and its treatment.
A. (Leaning) External contamination. hhen radioactive material emitted from either a nuclear power plant accident or as fallout after the explosion of nuclear weapon is deposited on the skin or clothing, external contamination is said to have taken place.11/
13/ For discussion of external contamination, see:
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Manual on Early Medical Treatment of Possible Radiation Injury, Safety Series No. 47, IAEA, Vienna, 1978, pp. 33-36, 60-62.
R.V. Leonard and R.C. Ricks, "Emergency Department Radiation Accident Protocol," Annals of Emerger.cy Medicine 9 (1980):
462-70.
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCNP), Management of Persons Accidentally Contaminated with Radionuclides, NCRP Report No. 65, NCRP, Washington, D.C.,
1980, pp. 113-119.
G.A. Poda, "Decontamination and Decorporation: The Clinical Experience," in Hubner and Fry, eds., pp. 327-332.
4 A
k*
o o s -
c .
TABLE 21 Treatment Protocol for Potentially_f. ethal Radiation Exposure Immeduttely after diagnosts of exposure to 100 rad cr more*
Avoid hospitahnng panent except in stente environment faality. Look for preensting infections and obtain sultures of suspiaous areas-consider especauy canous teeth, gtnpvae. skatt and vapna. Culture a clean-caught unne speomen. Culture stool speomen for idennricanon of au or5anisms: run appropnate sensinvity tests for Staph. aurrus and Gram.neganve rods. Treat any infecton that is discovered. Start oral nystann to reduce Candtda organisms. Do HLA typing of panent's fimdy, especauy siblings, to select HLA matched leukocyte and platelet donors for later need.
If penulocyte count falls to less than 1500&':
Start oral anubiotics-vancomyon 500 mg liquid P.O. q. 4 hr. gentamy-on 200 mg liquid P.O. q. 4 hr. nystaan 4 = 10' uruts liquid P.O. q. 4 hr. 4 x 10' uruts as tablets P.O. q. 4 hr. Isolate panent m iammar flow room or life island. Daily annsepne bath and shampoo with chlorheudine gluco-nate. Tnm hnger and toenads carefuuy and scrub area daily. For female panents, dady Betadme douche and insert one nystann vapnal tablet b t.d. Culture nares. oroph.arytts unne, stool. and skin of groms and anuae twice weekJy. Culture blood if fever over 101 degrees F.
If granulocyte ccunt falls to less than ?$0 mm':
In the presence o! fever (101'F) or other signs of infecton pve a nnbiotics
)_ while wainng results of new cultures (especauy blood cultures). The repmen suggested is nearallin 5 gm q. 6 hr I.V., gentamyon 1.25 mgm kg q. 6 hr ! V. For severe infecnon not respondmg within 24 hrs.
pve supplemental white ceUs. and it platelet count is low pve platelets from preselected matched donors. When cultures are reported. modify annhouc repme appropnately. Watch for tounty trom annhones, and reduce medicanons as soon as pracncable When grenulocyte ccunt nses to ete 1000imm) and us clearly smrrenny Disconnnue isolanon and annsepne baths, annbionet conunue nystatm for 3 addinonal days.
Source: Andrews , in H2r.2r and Pt y, eds. , 307.
O O The health risk of such contamination varies with the kind of contaminating particle and the duration of exposure.
If the contaminating particles emit ganma radiatiot.,
then skin and organs in the path of the gamma radiation will be exposed to a given dose. If the individual is effectively covered in gamma-emitting particles, the health consequences to that person are the same as if the person had been exposed to a whole body radiation dose. That person should also be considered a danger to others, in that until decontaminated he constitutes a source of radioactivity. If the person is contaminated with beta particles, the radiation is delivered over a very small distance (measured in millimeters) with relatively high intensity. Beta burns are local tidiation skin burns created by exposure of s<4.n to beta par *icles. These burns can inflict extensive damage to local tissues, and, if the dose is sufficiently severe, could produce elements of the whole oody radiation syndrome. Alpha particles exert effects over even smaller distances than beta particles (measured in micrometers) but at much higher levels of intensity. Alpha radiation is most damaging to humans when ingested or inhaled internally.
The time consumed and number of personnel required to decontaminate a large number of people exposed to external contamination can be envisioned by considering the medical 92 -
>k a m; <,. s yp -
- - i 1 O 0"' 1 l
dO protocol currently' recommended for the external decontamination .
t of one person. See Table 22. 1 x !
Q. Describe internal contamination and its treatment, j
<;c ,
A., (Leaning) c' l
. Internal contamination. Whenever radioactive mateiial I' '
k; ' i t, inhaled or ingested, internal , contamination occurs.74/ -
i 3;
~
u Inhalation of aerosolized radioactive particles, consumotion of n '
particles dusting food or water, and absorption of particles !
through mucus membranes or wound surfaces may all con ^ tribute to the internal oody burden of radioactivity. Ifala'rhe-scale i i
- elease-of radioactivity has taken place, food chain :
i contamination, incorporating radioactivity in cojcentrated l
.i forms into the food supply, creates an additional and more ;
t long-term source of internal contamination. This form of ;
i contamination adds to whatever radiation dose an individual may [
?
u have received from whole body irradiation or from external j
contamination with radioactive particles. !
The amount of radiation a persor, received from inhalation !
t or ingestion of radioactive particles depends on complex i interactions between the physical and chemical properties of f
. I 74/ For discussion of interr.a. contamination, see: ,
IAEA, pp. 39-42, 1 NCRP, Report No. 65, pp. 20-29.
G.L. Voelz, "Current Approaches to the Management of ,
Internally Contaminated Persons," in Hubner and Fry, eds.,
pp. 315-316. ,
, i l l l l 1
~ .0 , -,_ __. _ _ _ . _ _ . - - . . , . ,_ _ _ _ _ , _ . --I
O O.
TABI.E 22 yi, Protocol for External Decentanination .
+. -
- 1. Orw . nation site requirements
- 5eparate entrance and isolated air and water systems;
- Dratnage sluicing table;
- Personnel dressed in water. repellent disposable total garb
- ir.duding masks ani gloves;
- Labels br radioactive areas;
- Beta.Jnd gantra Geiger counters, hand held, battery.
E' operated fr/pha very dtfhcult to get and maintain).
- 2. Prxedure on site
- Remove vicum from contaminated area;
- Remove all clothing
- Cotton swab samples of nares, car canals, and mouth to test dose level at lab;
- Rmse out mouth and nose with water;
- Survey with Geiger counter;
- Wash with soap and water-especially on6ces and hair;
- Survey with Geiger counter agatn;
- Repeat wash if necessary and shave all body hair areas if necessary;
- Avoid abrading ska;i-enhances absorphon;
- !!se oedusive dressings (to be removed every sts to twelve hours) for persistent contanunahon (sweanng will flush out.
much of the contamination from super 6cial horny skin 3'
14yers).
n 5
s Source: IAEA !o. .7. 33 42; tiCRP No. 65, 113-115.
4
,m- ~~
~ , - lj: . , p '
3
- 0. LO p; the radioactive: iso' tope and the biologi' cal syste'm'that .
. . i metabolizes it. Alph'a emitters, which'delivef intecse ionization ~in very focal'ireas, ara, in general, most >
~
' y#
. hazardous. g The chief health consequpnces.are exprecse,ds'over g
8
\ -
4'
' years, as inducticn of malignancy in-local affected d(tes. 1A more acute toxic effect on the lung h'as been observed'.with 3:
j 'w a highidose inhalation inlary, especially when.combin'ed with some 3 p: . ,
+
,, _someonent of external.,pontamination and_whole body '
u . .-
I Q?!, 'irradiatipii In this setting,-over a several-month period, a Le @ x. . ,
l"'
patitat- en f.xr;iarience progressive hemorrhagic pulmonary edema (blood and {1uld in.the lungs) and die from hypoxia (low level -
of tissue oxygen) and infection.75/ -
To assess the-amount of radiation a person has absorbed internally requires a battery of tests and a series of
{ _/ .
calculations over time that often challenge the technical capacities of hospitals even when only one or two patients -
are involved in the treatment protocols. In d i sa s t'e r settings, where many people may be it. risk for' internal i
contamination, the assessment task may prove insurmountable.15!
Treatment. Treatment of internal contamination must be delivered as soon as pr 11ble. Procedures or antidotes that are experimental and cumbersome to employ in individual 75/ Rotblat, 1981, p. 38.
76/ IAEA, pp. 4-32.
NCRP, Report No. 65, pp. 125-158.
4 4
1
\
l- - -
? R O O cases, s.uch as chelation, are not recommended on a .
population scale. The administration of potassium iodide is the only antidote currently recommended for widespread use.
If taken as prescribed, potassium iodide will protect
-populations from one of the major contributo.rs to radioactive releases from nuclear power plants--radioactive iodine. Unless' blocked, this radioactive iodine is selectively concentrated by the thyroid gland and c--
inflict high local doses in a short time frame.
Administering potassium iodide saturates the iodine receptors in the thyroid gland and inhibits uptake of the radioactive forms. If administered within one hour of exposure, more than 85 percent of the radioactive dose will be blocked. The recommended dose is 100 milligrams of potassium iodide taken orally within two hours and then daily for 10 days. At this dose, administered to populations, some side effects may be observed. Levels of thyroid stimulating hormone (TSH) may rise slightly, transient and clinically insignificant hypothyroidism may be induced in people with borderline thyroid function, and a percentage of the population may develop a skin reaction.12/
1 l
77/ David V. Becker, "Reactor Accidents: Public Health Strategies and their Medical Implications," Journal of the American Medical Association 258 (1967): 649-654.
Luther J. Carter, "National Protection from Iodine-131 l
Urged," Science 206 (1979): 201-206.
f Frank von Hippel, "Available Thyroid Protection," Science l 204 (1979): 1032.
l i
- _ + - - _ _ -_ .,
O Q .
-Q. What are the long-term health consequences of radiation exposure?
A. (Leaning) Exposure to radiation exerts two principal long-term effects among those who survive the acute effects: induction of cancer and promotion of genetic defects. Both of these consequences appear after a significant latent period. At issue is the dose-response curve, or the relationship between the amount of radiation to which a population is exposed and the subsequent numbers of malignancies or genetic defects that will later develop.
Most of the data on long-term effects derives from populations exposed in the range of 100 rads or more. Since the human data is incomplete at lower levels of exposure, attempts to extrapolate back to effects at lower doses must rely on theoretical concepts of threshold doses and calculated dose-response curves. The scientific argument about this question is explored in detail in the 1980 report of the National Academy of Sciences, submitted by the Biological Committee on the Effects of Ionizing Radiation. .
The BEIR III report examined the literature on long-term effects with a particular focus on an attempt to define a threshold radiation dose above which long-term consequences ,
could be predicted with some certainty. Both the concept of a threshold dose and the shape of the dose-response curve on i
either side of this threshold remain active questions in the literature.1
'] 8/ BEIR III, pp. 21-23.
_ 96 _
_ ___ .~
F U"% O Cancer. In studies of populations exposed to relatively
- high-dose radiation (the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Marshall Islanders, uranium miners, and others),
the carcinogenic effect of radiation--its capacity-to induce cancers--has been repeatedly demonstrated. Only certain cancers are increased in incidence by radiation exposure'and the time of their peak occurrence varies by cell type.
Follow-up on Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors reveals that they have experienced increased incidence of leukemia, cancer of the breast, lung, stomach, 'qd .thyroi-d, and are probably at risk for an increased incidence of multiple myeloma and cancer of the colon and urinary tract. In the case of leukemia, which in the years of peak incidence occurred at a rate 10 times that 'n i the non-exposed population, a dose-response curve can be drawn. That curve is now in dispute since the gamma and neutron dosimetry data for Hiroshima have been revised.11#
79/ Stuart C. Finch, "The Study o. tomic Bomb Survivors in Japan," American Journal,of Medicine 66 (1979): 900.
Hiro Kato.and' William J. Schull, "Studies of the Mortality of A-Bomb Survivors: 7: i :tality, 1950-1978: Part 1.
Cancer Mortality," Radiation Research 90 (1982): 395-432.
Eliot Marshall, "New A-Bomb Studies Alter Radiation Estimar.es," Science 212 (1981): 900-903.
Warren K. Sinclair and Patricia Failla, "Dosimetry of the Atomic Bomb Survivors: A Symposium," Radiation Research 88 (1981): 437-447.
O O
~
The, International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRp) -has published standard estimates of cancer risks, based on' extrapolations from a broad range of data, employing a_ linear dose-response curve. Although the linear hypothesis is controversial, the ICRP estimates presented in Table 23 serve as gross-indicators of risk.
According to the ICRP formula, the total risk of death-from all cancers for both sexes comes to 12.5 x 10-3 per 100 remr., meaning that if 10,000 people were exposed to 100 rems, 125 would subsequently die of cancer who would otherwise not incur this disease. The number of non-lethal cancers induced by this radiation exposure might be double this figure.
Genetic effects. Ionizing radiation can damage chromosomes, containing many genes, or s.lter the structure of just one gene. Genetic or chromosomal alterations in germ cells may be transmitted to the offspring of the exposeo person. These defects may take several generations to reveal themselves in populations.
Since it is assumed that radiation-induced gentic defects will be similar to the significant spontaneous mutations that currently occur at the rate of 10 percent of all live births, scientists employ the concept of doubling dose, or the radiation dose required to double the normal background incidence of significance mutation from all causes. The doubling dose concept atsumes that the dose response curve is linear.
m <
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TABLE 2 3 Risk Factors for Cancer Deaths Cancer Type" Death Rate per 100 Rems Leukemia 2.0 x 10 -3 Breast cancer 2.5 x 10 - 3 Lung cancer 2.0 = 10 - 3 Bone cancer 0.5 x 10 - 3 Thyroid 0.5 x 10 - 3 Other (s'omach, 5.0,x 10 - 3 colon, liver.
salivary glands)
Total 12.5 x 10 - 3 a No a3owance rnade for age o'r sen of pmon esposed, smcv beeest cancer occurs almost eadusivery m fernales the ruk for them ts double what is given here as an average for both senes Source: ICRP No. 26, cited in Rotblat, 1981, 47, i
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- The doubling dose in humans has been estimated to range between 50 and 250 rads.ES/ Translating this range to
- population effects, the BEIR III Committee has suggested that exposing a population to i rem willfinduce in the first generation thereafter 5-65 significant genetic mutations per million live births.E1/
Q. Could you describe the task fac'ing an emergency 4
physician asked to respond and provide triage and treatment
. to people possibly exposed to a release of radioactivity-from Seabrook?
A. (Leaning) The response to this question can be approached by defining the problem, describing the resources available, outlining the established procedure to be followed, and evaluating the potential results.
The problem:
It is. assumed tnat the release of radioactivity has been significant, resulting in the likelihood that many of the people on the beach have received a potentially lethal dose.
Notification of the disaster has occurred, and the evacuation of the beach population is in progress. The time frame for this discussion is within the first four to eight hours from the time of the accident.
80/ BEIR III, p. 84.
81/ Jbid., p. 85.
a t ' e- q *e r-- *. , ,, k + s , -,r-.,
O~ O At one of the local community hospitals within a 10 mile radius of the Seabrook plant, one might anticipate the arrival of at least 100 patients per hour, experiencing a range of symptoms from anxiety to intense vomiting.
The Resources:
(a) PL j cal Plant The appropriate treatment of radiation victims requires space, equipment, ventilation, and waste disoosal systems that are separate from the general treatment area and from the external environment. In most hospitals that have paid attention to the risk of radiation accidents and have organized a response system, the physical plant is usually arranged for multi-purpose use, so that in the actual event of a radiation emergency, necessary modifications in routine space must be made at very short notice.82/
82/ For discussion on necessary resources and recommended procedures, see:
J. Geiger, op cit.
Harold A. Goldstein, "Radiation Accidents and Injuries,"
Emergency Medicine, September 15, 194-215.
R.E. Linnemann, op. cit.
Fred A. Mettler, "Emergency Management of Radiation Accidents," Journal of the American College of Emergency Physicians," 7:8 (1978); 302-305.
Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Radiation Accident Management: ' Syllabus, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, November, 1980.
LL. Richter, et al., "A Systems Approach to the Management of Radiation Accidents," Annals of Emergency Medicine, 9:6 (1980): 303-309. '
Frances Shepherd, "Treatment for patients with Radioactive Contamination," Dimensions in Health Service, June (1990): 19-20.
- 100 -
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(b) Personnel
- The' local disaster plan would be activated. For a-community hospitalLresponding to a radiation alert, at most 20-30 physicians and nurses could be expected to assemble.
(c) Coordination
.In this context, the organization and coorCination of personnel is more crucial than the actaal numbe s deployed. This priority always prevails, regardless of the kind of disaster under discussion; in the care of radiation accident, the various procedures that need to be performed are discrete, serial, often counter-intuitive, and carry an element of fear. Consequently, even in small-scale radiation disasters, a higher premium is placed on leadership, training, and appropriate task assignment than what might otherwise be needed in a disaster response employing procedures the physicians and nurse are more accustomed to perform in the course of their regular work.
And, as with any disaster, even seasoned responders can find their efforts overwhelmed if the numbers of people in need outstrip the physical and human resources available.
s
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Procedure A) Standard Procedure:'
Standard procedure for evaluating and treating one patient with possible. exposure to external contamination and the potential for internal contamination-has been outlined in preceding sections.
The process of assessing for life-threatening cinjury, taking patient history, screening for radiation contamination, and implementing decontamination procedures would take two experienced people approximately 15 to 30 minutes for each patient.
The task of triage requires estimating radiation received. This estimate would be based on patient history, on evidence of prodromal symptoms (anorexia, nausea, vomiting, fatigue), and on results of Geiger counter survey for external contamination. Such an estimate will often be hard to arrive at with any certainty or precision. In making this triage decision, a protocol will have to be in place or arrived at soon into the event as to where and how to send patients who are deemed at risk for lethal exposures. The destination should be a hospital environment equipped for the management of severely exposed individuals. In the example described here, preparations should be made to transport the patient by ambulance to teact.ing hospitals in the Greater Boston area.
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- 3) General triace cuidelines: .
- Send to tertiary hospital anyone with presumed exposures of 200 rems or more;
- Send to community hospital all patients with exposures estimated to be between 50 and 200 rems, where, pending results of blood samples, admission will provide surveillance for further symptom development;
- Send home, with information allowing-for immediate re-call, any patient whose exposure is judged to be 50 rems or less.
Procedure for Mass Casualty Response Available space, equipment and personnel, even in the most advanced and prepared radiation sites, would be stressed to capacity after receiving 100. patients an hour'. An orderly, comprehensive response would be disrupted. The area around and outside the hosptal emergency room would be crowded with patients. Crowd supervision would be a matter of great priority. If not handled well (and crowd management requires sufficient numbers of trainea peo'ple) the situation could degenerate to hysteria and mass panic. The management of large numbers of children would especially complicate matters.
', - 103 - .
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One of two different consequences could result. The personnel on site could think clearly and de-escalate their
-response protocols to a minimum level of intervention aimed at identifying the mostly severely exposed and delaying until.
later the assessment and treatment of those less seriously exposed.
. The key problem with this decision process in the context of radiation injury is the degree of uncertainty that is inexorably attached to the assessment of individual cases--a degree of uncertainty, given our medical knowledge, that is greater than the uncertainty with which a skilled physician approaches someone with a traumatic chest injury. The stress of this process lead to a deterioration in medical judgment over time.
I5 the on-site personnel become confused and anxious, they might resort to a serial treatment pattern (taking care of each patient as he or she arrives). Serial intervention results in a situation where many potentially seriously ill patients queue up, unevaluated, and untreated. Ultimate morbidity and mortality of victims would, in this mode, be increased.
Summary j The short-termr'esponse to a significant radiation accident l
l at Seabrook, involving exposures of over 200 rems to a population in excess of 500 people, could be expected to overwhelm a methodical standard approach to the assessment and decontamination of radiation victims. Instead, an accelerated and truncated treatment process would develop, and, in the best j case, those most seriously exposed would be identified, i
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ss decontaminated, and sent to more definitive treatment sites with'little delay. In the worst case, medical organization would crumble, resulting in delay in treating those wno should be treated at once. A greater incidence of morbidity and mortality could be expected.
Q. In conclusion could.you describe what might be the reactions of the beach population during ,the first few minutes to one hour after expcsure to 2 potentially lethal radiation release?
A. (Leaning) Radiation- is invisible and leaves no smell or taste. The first signs of the release would be the ons,et of nausea and vomiting in that section of the population whose sensitivity to radiation was highest and who were in the path of the release of radioactivity. This population would include a preponderance of children and whatever elderly adults were present on the beach. Initially, other family members, friends, and bystanders would not pay particular attention to isolated instances of nausea or vomiting occurring up and down the beach area. However, this kind of news, recounting un'toward and unexpected symptoms, travels very rapidly. Within minutes of onset of symptoms in a few people, word of a strange epidemic would spread throughout the several miles of oopulated beach region.
At that point, regardless of official communications and advice, mass turmoil could be expected. Any exodus would be
- 105 -
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complicatec by the fact that an increasing n; ter of people would begin to fall ill. This expanding number'would include paren,ts anc crivers of vehicles. .The nausea that afflicts people is intense and sudden, of ten persisitn; f or several hours. .This nausea will reduce energy levels, impair clarity of thought, and contricute to emotional instacility. Inese acverse effects would be felt more by that segment of the population that-immeciately becomes nauseated and soon af ter
^
exposure begins to vomit. The vomiting of the raciation prcarome sincreme can come on sudcenly, and ray continue relentlessly for several hours. Again, people with this concition may well be unable to manage, with any dispatch or efficiency, the task of assemoling-family anc celongings, getting to vehicles, anc negotiating the journey out of the affecteo area.
In the scenarios cescribec in the testimer'. vf Pro'fessor Beyea, on any given summer day there might cs .e many as 10,000 to 23,000 people who coulc be exposeo. .Accc r:ing t o statistical probablity, basec on study of prev;ous population experience, even at levels of radiation bele. 100 rems one could preciet that approximately 30% of the ;;;ulation woulc '
begin to feel loss of appetite anc general ce:11ne in wellbeing, another 10% woulc become nauseatec, ano 101 woula begin to vomit. A few people might experience abrupt onset of ciarrhea, with or without .other symptoms.
- 106 -
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l Translated'into numbers, within minutes of exposure to a radioactive release, 1,000 people or more on the beach would become acutely. nauseated, and another 1,000 people would begin active vomiting. It should be noted that these-percentages were. derived for an adult population. Higher percentages for illness in each category should be employed for populations containing many children. Evacuation procedures ~in this setting would take longer and involve more comple>:ities than the evacuation of people who are not ill.
Q. :Does this complete your testimony?
A. (Leaning) Yes. It does.
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O O TABLE A TO TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY SURRY DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES. WASH-14QQ The WASH 1400 analysis of Surry Unit 1 identified twsNe accident sequences which dominated the estimated median core melt frequency of 5 x 10 5 per reactor year.
If These twelve accident sequences, their designations, and their estimated frequencies are described below. 2/
- Sequence TMLB' - This sequence is a station blacka,it sequence (a loss of offsite power fo!!cwed by the failure of onsite AC power and the failure to recover AC power within about three hours). WASH 1400 estmated the frequency of sequence TMLB' at 3 x 104 per reactor year. 2/ f/
! If It we be ruxed that If the of these tweNo sequences are summed mWt frequency is 1.24 x 10 per reactor year. WASH 1400 obtaned theper 5 reactor x 10'pyear resultatt cere by a Monte Carlo sampling technique, the particders of which are not aarh8y dear. The latter value has been caed widely, and is therefore used here for reference purposes.
2/ Recersty, a new rtsk assessment for Surry Unit 1 was i.Mw,Tre for the draft NRC report NUREG.
1150. Reacw R/sk Reference Docuvern. The h.d results of the new Surry 1 PMA are documented in Robert C. Bertucao, et si., Annws d Core Damace Frecuency Fstwn Internal Events. Suny Umr 1 Sandia Nedonal Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nudear Reguetory Commasax:n.
NUREG/CR-4650, SANOeS 2064, Vp 3, November 1908. This study esdmeted the mean frequency of core melt at 2.8 x 10 per reacter year from 'interrui wants' accidents (i.e., not indutSng 'estamel events' such as earthquskes, Soods, Mres, etc.). E page 14. WASH 1400 sequences TXQ, TMMQ, and $2 C were found not to need to core melt. Other WASH 1400 sequences ter Suny were iderened as among the dernners cere maa sequences in the new study, alon0 8415 several newlyidettined accident sequences. A tabie trem NUREG/CR-4550 which N he resiAs of the newer study is prcmded as an addendum to Exhibit 3 for compartsen pta'pcess.
l 3/ N.C. Rasmussen, et al., Renew Saferv Stt& An Hue"mort & Accident Risks in U S l Commere/a/ Nuclear Power Plants. U.S. Nudear Regulacry Corrrruesson, WASH 1400, NUREG-75/014. October 1975, ' Maid Report,' page 82.
4/ The NUMEG-1150 analysis of Suny idenoned four separate stadon bieckoujaquences. These four sequences have an aggreg&ta core rnett frequency sedmeted at 9.5 x 10 per reactor year. Sti Robert C. Bertucho, et al., AnsMis d Core Damece frecuency From Intemal Ems. Sancs l
[_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
O O 4-2 Sequence TML - This sequence is a transient either resulting from er fc(Iowed by a loss of main feedwater, with a failure of auxiliary feedws:er. WASH 1400 es the frequency of sequence TML at 6 x 10 4 per reacter-year. 5/ g/
Secuence V - The V sequence represents an 'intersystem LOCA* resulting the failure of the low pressure injection system check valves. This results in the of the low pressure injection system piping outside of the containment; the r release from this core mett accident also bypasses the containment- WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of sequence V at 4 x 104 per reactor-year Z/ g/
Secuence S2C - Sequence Sp represents a small LOCA in which the containment spray inject >on system fails. This results in a lack of containment heat removal.
! The contaanment fails due to steam overpressure, following which the emergency core cooling systems fail due to insufficient net postuvo suction head (NPSH and/or damage due to containment depressunzation. This results in core meft s&tt Nabonal L.atsscries, prepared for the U.S. Nudeer Regulatory M NUREG/CR-4550, SAND 86-2064, Vd. 3 November 1986, pages V 5 and V4.
1)
N.C. ~ Rasmuason, et al., Renew Safarv Stu& An Assensi-i d Acektent Risks in 'i s.
Commercial Nue/ ear Pcur P/ ants. U.S. Nudent Regulatory Corrmasjon, WASH 1400. NUAEG.
75/014. October 1975, 'Maln Aaporr,' page a2; 1/ The NUREG 1150 anatyeis esdmetad the frequency d this type of anddent sequence at 1.1 4 x 10 per reactor year. Age, Robert C, Bertucio, et at, AnaAsis d care Damace Frecuenev From Intemal Emers Sandia National Laboratories, prepared for me U.S. Nudear Regulatory Commlealon, NUREG/CR 4660, SAN 006 2o84, Vd. 3, Neember 1988, page V-5.
Z/ N.C. Reemuseen, et aL, Menew saferv sit & An Assn **mert d Accident Risks in U S.
I Commemht Wi ' - "cur Pfanrr U.S. Nudear Reguatory Corrmssaon, WASH 1400, NuREG.
75/014. Osteher 1975, ' Main Aaporf,' page 81.
' h/
y' 10 per reacter year. Sag, R.L Rltzmarn, et al., Sunv Source Ter Science Appincadons irrematJonal Corpontkm, prepared for the Sectrt: Powr Research Institute.
page 2-0. The NUREG 1150 analysis
' EPRI Report No. NP 4096, Finsi Repoct, June endmated the frequency of the V sequence at 9.0 x 10' -
196p,perreacto gg, Robert C. Bertuem.
et al., AnaAsis d Core Damace Frecuer.cv From Imsmal Emn Sandia Nabonel Laboratones.
prepared for the U.S. Nudear Reguatory Commessaon, NUREG/CM 4650, SAND 86 2084 Vd. 3.
November 1986, page V 5.
t O O 4-3 containment fadure. WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of sequence S2 C at 2 x 10 6 per reactor year. 9/IQ/
Sequence S2p - Sequence S2D represents a small LOCA in which the emergency coolant injection system fails. WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of sequence S2D at 9 x 104 per reactor year.11/
Sequence S2H - Sequence S2H represents a small LOCA in which the emergency coolant recirculation system fails. WASH-1400 estmated the frequency of sequence S2H at 6 x 104 per reactor year. J.2/
g) N.C. Rasmussen, et al., Meactor Saferv Studv An Assensmont d Accident R sks in u s Commercial Nuclear Fower Planfs. U.S. Nudear Reguatory Commassen. WASH 1400, NUREG-75/014, October 1975, ' Main Aaporr,' page 90.
1.Q/ Both Science Applications International Corporation and the NURIG-1150 analyses conclude that this is a non-core melt sequence. g,As, R.L Ritzman, et al., Sarw Sowen Term and Consecuence Anetvsis.
Sdence Applications Irtemedonal Corporadon, prepared for the Eleccic Fmwor Rosestch Insttute.
EPRI Report No. NP 4096. Fhel Report. June 1986, page 210 t and Robert C. Bertuoo. et al.,
Analvsis & Core Damnoe Frecuencv from inremal Encts. Sandia Nadonal t.aboratcries, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissaon, NUREG/CR-4550, SAND 66 2064, Vc4 3. November 1986, page V 70. The NUREG-1150 analysis identified similar sequences with medium and large I4cAs, loss of offsite power transients, and loss of reedwater transients as initiating events. These sequences wer frequency of about 1.1 x 10~9 estimated per reactor-year. to have an3.g3, aggregate Robert C.
Bertucso, et al., Anales d Core cameos Freouseey From Intemal Emnes. Sandle National Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nudeer Regdatory Comm6 amen, NUREG/CR 4550. SAND 66-2064 Vd. 3, November 1986, pages V-69 to V-71. The large reduction in frequency arises from analyses which suggest that containment failure results in ECCS failure only 2% of the time, rather than 100% of the time as assumed in WSH-1400.
! 1.1/ The NLAWb 1180 anstysle andmated the frequency of tNe sequence a 7.'1 x 10*7 per reactor year.
l The ansfysis also endmetad a simaar sequence ( from reacscr coolers pump seed LOCAs whicts were not considered M WASH 1400) at 2.6 x 10 per reacterieer. Sag, Robert C. Sem)cao.
L et al., Anahen d Core Damece Frecuenev From infomal Evern Sandia Nanonal Laboratones, propered for the U.S. Nudeer Regulatory Comrmssaca, NUREG/CR 4550, SANDes 2004, Vol. 3.
November 1986, pages V 5 to V 6.
12/ The NUREG 1150 analyse andmated the frequency of this sequence at 1.2 x 104 per reactor yser (sequences $2 Hg and S ).133, Robert C. Bertudo, et al., Anahls d Core Damace Frecuecey l From Intemal Everfs. la Nanonal Labcratories, prepared for the U.S. Nudest Requiatory
) Commissaon. NUREG/CR 4550. SANC86-2064, Vd. 3, NcNomber 1986, pages V-5 to V-6.
l l
- ---,n- - - - - - . - - - -c--. . , - - - , , _ _ _ _ . , , , , , _ . . - , , , ,- _ - - . . . , . - . , - . . . . - . - . - . - . ---._
O O 44 Secuence S1D - Sequence S D $ re# resents a medium LOCA in which the emergency coolant injection system fails.
WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of sequence S$ D at 3 x 104 per reactor-year. W W l
Secuence S1H - Sequence S H 1 represents a medium LOCA in which the emergency coolant recirculation system fails. WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of i sequence S$H st 3 x 10 4 per reactor year,15/16/
Sequence AD - Sequence AD represents a large LOCA in which the emergency coolant injection system fails. WASH 1400 estfmt.ted the frequency of sequence AD at 2 x 10 4 per reactor year.12/18/
4 W N.C. Raarmanen, e: al., Raeew Safetv % An Ass &&rs^t & Accdont Risks in U s.
Commercial Noelaar Pc= Pfans. U.S. Nudeer RegtAatory Comrrassion, WASH 1400. NUREG-75/014, October 1975, 'Ma/n Aapcyr,' page 80.
14/ The NUREG 1150 analysis estimated the frequency of tNo sequence at 7.1 x 10*7 per reactor year.
Egg, Rcoort C. Bertudo, en al., kemis d Core Damace frecuency from Intemal Enm. Sandia Natienal Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nudear Reguatory Commessaan, NUREG/CR4550.
SAND 8e 2064, Vol. 3, Nowmber 1986, pages V 5 to V a.
15/ N.C. Rasmussen, et al., Raeenv Saferv srte An A=nTst & Accident Risks in U S Commercial Noelaar ?ca Pfans. U.S. Nudear Reguatery Commasaon, WASH 1400, NUREG-75/014. October 1975, 'Ma#s Aaporr,' page 80.
13/ The NLNG 1150 anafysis estimated the frequency of this sequence at 7.7 x 10*7 per reedor. year.
133, Rchem C. Bertucio, et al., Ana/vsts d Core Dameos frecuency from Infomal Esm. Sand 4 National Labssuscries, prepared for the U.S. Nudear RegtJatory Commassaon, NUREG/CA 4550.
SN Vol. 3, Nommber 1986, pages V 5 to V4 12/ N.C. Raamunaan, et al., Manew Saferv stuchn An Ansessment d Accident Risks in U S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Plans. U.S. Nudear Reguatory Commasaort WASH 1400, NUREG-75/014, Octocer 1975, ' Main Aaporr,' page 80.
11/ The NUREG 1150 analysis sedmated the frequency of this sequence at 3.9 x 10'7 per rencor yst' Ltt, Robert C. Bertuclo, et al., Annws d Core Damece Frecuency from infomal Events. Sanca Nanonal Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nudear Regulatory Commtssaon, NUREG/CA-4550.
SANO46 20e4, Vd. 3, November 1986, pages V 5 to V4
O O 4-5 Secuence AM - Sequence AH represents a large LOCA in which the emergency coolant recirculation system fails. WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of sequence AH at 1 x 104 per reactor year.19/ 20/
Secuence TKO - Sequence TKO represents a transient followed by failure of the reactor protection system and a failure of at least one pressunzer safety / relief vane to reclose. WASH 1400 estimate the frequency of sequence TKO at 3 x 104 per reactor-year. 21/ 22/
Sequence TKMO - Sequence TKO represents a loss of feedwater transient followed by failure of the reactor protection system and failure of at least one pressurizer safety / relief vaNo to reclose. WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of sequence TKMO at 1 x 104 per reactor-year. 23/ 21/
1
- 19) N.C. Raamunnert et al., Manerne Saferv %& An A~== ment d AccMeer Risks in U S l
Cc,-,,T_,clal Nuclear Power Pfams. U.S. Nudent Regidatory Corrmesson, WASW1400, NUREG.
l 75/014. October 1975, 'Maki Reporr,' page 80. .
I 22/ The NUREG 1150 anetysis sedmeted the frequency of this sequence et 3.9 x 10*7 per reactor.y.
133, Robert C. Bertucio, et at, AneAmis d Core Dameos Fremancy From Inremal Fers. Sandia Nabonel Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nudeer Regidetcry Commesson, NUREG/CR 4550.
SANO86 2004, Vol 3, Naomber 1986, pe0es V 6 to Y 6.
21/ N.C. Rasmuseen, et aL, Mn- Saferv %& An A^^ ^ ^^ r,a d AccMent Risks in U S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Pfems. U.S. Nudeer Reguietcry Comnessiert WASS1400 NUREG.
75/014 October 1975, ' Main Aaporf,' page 90.
12/ The NLNWb 1150 enelysis estimated the frequency of a simler sequence (TXRD4) at 1.1 x 104 per reeN h Robert C. Bertucio, et al, Anahis d Core Dammoe Frecuency From Infomal Sam, Santhe National Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nudmar Regulatory Commason.
NUREG/04,4860, S#C06 2064 Vol 3, Neember 1986, page V-69.
22] N.C. Reemuseen, et eL, Meector Saferv %& An A~** ment d AccMent Risks In U S.
Commerelal Nuclear Power plants. U.S Nudeer RegtAatory Comrfuesson, WASH 1400. NUREG.
75/014 October 1975, ' Man Aeporr,' page 90. -
Zi/ The NUMEG.1150 anetysis er1 meted the frequency of a simier sequmes (TKRZ) et 4.8 x 10 7 per reactor. year 133, Robert C. Bertucso, et aL, AnaAsis d Core Demsoe Frecuency Frem Inrema!
L:Ad!I, Sandia Nabonel Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nudeer Regulatory Commasen.
NUREG/CR 4SSO, SANOe6 2064, Vol. 3, No, ember 1986, page V-69.
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O O TABLE a TO TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C, SHOLLY SURRY RELEASE CATEGORIES. WASH 1400 This exhibit provides a description of the WASH-1400 rekase categories fo Unit 1, as weH as a table which gives the release charactenstics (frequency, release magnitudes, etc.). Inferrnation for this Exhibit is taker 1 from WASH 1400.1/
l t
i 1
1/ The release category fram and cha actertsdes are taken ircrn N.C. Rasmussen, et al..
Reacmr Safarv M An A a *= = =-r,nt d Acciden Risks in U S. Cc r.:mL' Huclear Pca;" Plans.
U.S. Nudeer Reguatory Cc . ie WASH 1400. NUREG.75/014 Octetser 1975, ' Main Reocyt.'
page 97; the descripoons of the release categernes are taken frorn RC. Rasmussen, et al , Redery Safetv M An Ammew & AccMen Risks in US. Cc.r.,ane: Nudser Pc = P!ans. U.S.
Nudent Repdatory Commeeen, WASH 1400, NUREG.75/014. Octecer 1975, Appendk W
'Calcthdon of Reector Accdont Consecuences,' pegoe 21 to 2 3.
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- talp taa rester understanc t.e postdate:
- release resentscategorf.
traaf desc::pta=ns of us varacus ;nyeLeal containees: re. eases, uis sett;:n
- esses tr.at det;ne ea ?.
ue tec a& ques omployed := comeute ce ract:act:ye releasesFor more detuled ar. : i teamer
.r. as referree to Appendices :. VI:. anc VI:* . to u s at.csor. ore. ue esau release category are discassed an catat1 an sect an 4.6ant *he 23:1r. event ::eex sersan::
of Appenc: .
7 sn ; .
!?.as release ex:i=st:n categorf can te enaracterised ay a c=re a.:f:ren f=11:ves4 ::y
- n c=ntas: a
- na :=nsatrsent spray of 41:en and neat fusi vttr. tr.e residua
- smoval syster.s are a.a sa:s; a tr.e teact:: ress e s.
u n r e f o re . tr.e :ca s sar.se r.t could me at a pre s s ure amoveassu=ed :s 7. ave fu's:,e..
a:s t ent at 12: .
steam explostca. It as assumed .aat .no steam exploste: sne uma f tr.a
- ortica of ce reactor vessel asd bresca .se contatames
- vould rupture tr.e u;;e:
sarr:er, vitt. ue resu.:
mas
. a suastaattai amount of radioactivt:y a puff over a pet:od of secut 10 minutes. signs '
= e released fr:s tr.e e:n:s
..=e..:
renerates Oua :n us sweeping acta:n =f gases sould ::ntuduring us atc:starr. ment-vessel =alttarcugn a relatively *ow ste cereafter. =e reeease of radicaetave .a::::2;.
a;;r:zarately 7Cl of ce andar.as and 40% of .ta 41.4411 *te ::tal :sinase .cu.4 ::r.:nn a: ne :::e of release. -
gases at ste time of f ulure ,3ecause tr.e contair. mans vould :: stats hottasals ;;esent u ne :
pressura:e:
f::a ce =cataar. ment =culd he associated wit.s snas cataecrf.a relatavely P.ign :si ar.:;unes certata potennal ace: dent "nis catagerf also sequences tant would anvolve tr.e occer:ss e ofr. : re =eltane anc. a steam explestoa af ter ::ntatamaat ::; are due :n over;resst:s
.r.ase seguances, relatavely naga. taa rate of energy relcase vould to hver, altr.cugs st l1 .
sn :
!?as catevery 2e.ung ::ncurrer.tis associated vt . vita ce f ailure :f c:re-teelis; systess sad ::re tr.e f ailure of cantain= ant spray an Ta bre :f tae ::ntau:aat marrter vould occar cc:ugs :ver;d e. eat-removal ;e s s ure . =ausu; systas.s.
a sa :staattal fracta:n of un containmen at=es;
- ened of aaout 2 3
- .t r.ut e s . Due to he sweepu g ac::::
ere to me released u a puff :ver
- r.tatamen 1: t vessel seistarcugn, tre release of radioactive ater a1 vould :::cf gases generates tunt
- ) relatively icw rate tr.ereafter. The total :elease ec 6 2 n r.u s
- s.aase. :f tr.e ::daras and !3% cf tae 41.kali setals ;;ese-- - - a :::: stun ap;;:x:: ate.'l
- e at te :=
- r. n a:an As ;n 7v1 release :stegory 1, the .ug :enpers:::e ar.a ;; essure n a :: -
- s.ssse rate cf sensadle energy ft:s ce c:ntussent. :ssG: LA & :eiatively rain at tr.e ::=a of :entatszer.: fulure vould In :
!?as : ster:rf avolves an overytessure failure af .as ecstaan= ant
- n:nnsar.:
cf :::e :e.:eng. . test resevel. Cantun=ent fulure voCd :=rar ;n=r :=fue .r.eto::==es:ers.:
f athre :f C:re saltang tr.::ugs a r:ptured :entaassent karrier. A .aen voeld cause radicactare natorials :: :e reinare:
4..:411 =atala present la ce core as .r.e ::pprox:sately *:) af tr.e a:dizes as: ::t :t :ne ass syners.
- . set of Ae release vould ccrar :a ever f release a pen:2vend :f se release- *- -e amout ;.! .:u:3.
- .sase =f radiaseta*.1 satorial fr:s :catus= ant vould :s :4ased my Ae swee;;.r.-In s 4:::.:n cf fames gemarated av tas :eactaen of me :alten f:e. saty. ::n c re t s . ! .r. : s
.ase gasse seald he 1. At 111y .eated :y ::ntact vita tr.a =a;:. c e este :t se..s. .e ener:y release to t e atmosynere .ouad me _ccerately ?.ign. ,
In .
Tras tr. esta=n:steisef :nvolves avstes after 4f ailurs :t .r.e cere-::aling syste= ar.d tr.e ::ntaarssa s ;: 1.*
!ai.; e f it.e c '.o s s -o f -:: s t ar.t see dant, t:; suer vtse, a ::r.curts.:
.:nt.= ant system is ptsperly solate. :::s vould result en ce re.eato
- =e :f release. af 7% of ce Loair.es anc 4% of tse alkali :stals ;;esent La tr.e :::e as ce
- 1 ?.etes. tocause Most of tr.e release vould
- ccur rents::cus.y over a per;:d if
- ne 4:ntunnent rectr.Jiata:n spray tae. neat-remove 6, sys:::J
.oa.1 operate to :esave heat !::s :ne catarnment at=ss pr. ore durans este ze6 nt e.
4 ts.an n : si: r/ . vely ; w rate of raisase :f sonst:Le eteri? vou.d :e associated vita 3 gn .o . . ..*
\
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4 .
Pwn s release category 4, exceptSta category lavolves f atture of tae core coolin that spray nin tame and is samalar to PWR suppress contatamentto furtaar reduce the guantity of atraorne raditae contatament a large leaxage rate due to a concurrenttemperature and pressure. oact. ave ma)tartal and to tattiallyeettoa s Laoiste, a period and of most of several taa radioactive material heure. f ailure Os contaAnannt of the costalament ba.rrier would have
] metais present Approximately in the core would be" released. Jn of the todiaes and 0.3% alkali of thewou i containannt Pwn 6 heat-removal systems, the energy release rate wBecause of tae operatten ould me low.
31scontaartment Se category involves a core meltdown due spraye wonid not operate. but to failure in the cor e coollag sys ter.s .
tta integrity base sat. until the melten core proceeded to melt tartae contaanannt narrter would reta.ta leasage to the atassphere occurring upward tArouga theser.a
, with Direct leakage to groundDe the atmosynere would aise occur at a low rate prter to co .
Aost of tse release would occur coatiaucualy over a pertedntatament-vessel melttarscqn.
present ta the core at the time of release.ne release of asent 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
would include approx tae atmospaare weeld be low and gases escaptag tarougn ceBecause leazage from
. to con *=imet by contact with tse soil, fSJ energy rolesse rate wouldground Pwn 7 be very would be cooled ow. l would opera te to reduce tae conm =ntDis category is almilar to FWR release c amount of tarmorne radioactivity. tamperature and pressure as well as thecentsiament sprare and 0.001% of tse alkali metala presentme release would involve 0.002% of the iodises of ce release would occur over a period la of the 10 heurea core at tas time of release. Most cae energy release rate weald be very low. As 1.a pWR relsase category 6, Pvt 8 Stst category appresta.ates a PWR design basis accidaat taa exc e ,s t saf eguarts are assumed to function properly,the contaanannt . would f ati to me otAer engtaaered would Post tavolve appromaa.ately 0.01% of the todiras and 0 05% of cne core would not molt. Se r pressure would be above ameient.of t.se release would occur a alkali la tsemetals.
0.3-nour period celtang would not Because contaisanat occur, taa energy release rate would also be low. sprays weald operata and care Pvn 9 hts categor oniv us ac y approximatas a pWR desig".s basis accadaat (large ytpe break) , la vna:a claading as would be released Late tse contatsanat.Avaty tattially contained witAia the gda s umed tAat to remove neatthe alaimas required engtanered safegua.rds . a core would would not molt.
function satisf It acis t
- 0. 3eour period during from the sees wetics theand containmaat, contas amant ne release would occur over ce :rtly Approximately 9.444414 ei the indiaes and pressure would be above amatant.
released.
I' 1 As La pWR release category0.00006% 8, the enerfy of tae release alkali metals ratewouldwouldtebe cv. very A 21 egi release son La category is repressatative of a core melt followed by a steam qu anst e reactor esel.
approm of rad active na tal toSethe. ster would cause taosynere. De the release f s substaattal _
cf contal.telyat40% f the 10d es and alka tal release old contais fal. re. Most f tae relea metals present the core a the St e 3ecause of he ener genera ted a the ste would occur ove a 2-hour per d.
caaractorate by a re stvely hi rate of enexplosion, category also cas rgy release to tegory would cludes rtata a atmosyners. v ts cantatament pra aces that volve overpress uos e seesences , to tAe occurrence f core nel s
e rate f energy eyease woul g and a steam sWlosion.e failureInof ty i 4Lacassed a.oove, altacugn i vould att11 be relattsomewnas ly hagn. smallerA taan for tacse l
l
=
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. . 4 O O k 7;ss c TO TEST 1 MONY OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY FIGURES l 11 TO I 18. NUREG-0396_
This exhibit consists of reproduced pages from NUREG 0396 Figures 111 through I 16. These figures are reproduced on the follow l
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- i. . 1 10 100 1000 DLS TANCE (MILIII Figurs 111. Cordeoned Prohebility of Exceeding Whole 8ody Dose Versus Distana. Probabilities are Candidonal on a Core Mett Acendent ($ x 1(PS).
Whole body does calculated includes: external does to the whole body due to the pasung cloud, exposure to radionuclides on ground, and me does to the whole body from inhaled radionuclides.
- Does calculations mumed no protectrw n,etmans akon, aM straight line plume trajectory.
t i
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Conditwnsi os a Core Melt Accident (5 a 10 5),Condt!
l Lung dose calculated includes:
exposure to redsonudidos on ground, and the dose to the kng I
rodeonuclides wrthn 1 year.
Does calculetaons amourned no protectrre actions taken, and streig ,
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DISTAMCI adtL131 Figure 1 13. Condiconel Probability of Exoseding Thyroid Dooms Versus Distenes. Probabilities are Coruficonal on a Core Melt Acadent ($ x 178).
Thyroid does soleisted inchules: exwnel dow to the thyroid due to the passes cloud, exposure to redsonudidos on preund, and the does so tha thyroid from 5 inholesi radionucMas.
Does esseulations assumed no protectm actions taken, eruf straigert IW tretectory.
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Figure I 14. Condttanol Probability of Exceeding Thyroid Does to en Infant versus Distance. -
l ProbeenWties are Condrtional on a Core Melt Acadent (5 x 10 8).
Thyroid done calculeted is due solely to radionuclide ingssoon through the milk ',
consurr.ptdgibthersy. ;
Done calcutstions sawmed no protective estions taken, and straght line trajectory e
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6 l e
O O TARLE D _ TO TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY F10URE 8.1 FROM MARCH 1987 MNL REPORT Ms Exhibit consists of Figure 6.1 from W.T. Pratt &.C. Hofmayer, et al.,
Technical Evaluation of the EPZ SensitMtv Studv fev SanM Brookha Laboratory, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear R*0'JM Commission, March 19
- 19. This figure can be compared with Fgure h11 from NUREGM (seg, Erhlbit 5.
attached to this testimony).
I O
I i
~
O O 62 1 -,
,' *y is IA = PWalA 18 = NR18 2 = N R2
\ 3 = NR3 4 = NR4 a
' 5 = PW5 S = Sunnary 3 \ (6.7 = 0. Risk) a 0 .1 . l \
i ' % s H
b 0 s
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i t a \
\
01 \ b
g : '\ i, g-3 \,
' i
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.001 . , , ,,,,,1 , , ,, ,,,
1 10 100 l Miles Figure 6.1 Cauconeets of NUREG-0396 curve as com-puted by 8Nt. using CAAC2. Tbe sumary curve is normalized to 6:10-2 core relt proba bili ty. TM result f.iffers from NU4!G-01M .
1 I
(~')
G (~']
REFERENCES TO TESTIMONY OF GORDON THOMPSON (Kouts, 1987)
H. Kouts, Review of Research on Uncertainties in Estimates of Scarce Terms from Severe Accidents in Nuclear Power Plants,-
3rookhaven National Laboratory, NUREG/CR-4883, April 1987 (NRC, 1975)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, October 1975.
(NRC, 1987a)
U.S. Nuclear Kegulatory Commission, Reactor Risk Reference Document, NUREG-1150 (3 vols.), Draft, February 1987 (NRC, 1987b)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Uncertainty Papers on severe Accident Source Terms, NUREG-1265, May 1987.
(PLG, 1983)
- 8. John Garrick (Study Director) et al., Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Pickard, Lowe and Garrick Inc., prepared for Public Service Company of New Hampshire and Yankee Atomic Electric Company, 6 volumes, December 1983.
(Sholly and Thompson, 1986)
Steven Sholly and Gordon Thompson, The Source Term Debate: A Report by the Union of Concerned Scientists, Union of Concerned Scientists, January 1986.
- 108 -
A
.u p ..
U: \,J
- l -
.. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-Before Administrative Judges:
Ivan W. Smith, Chairperson' Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr. .
Dr. Jerry Harbour
)
)
In the Matter of )
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket Nos. 7 50-443-444-OL HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. )
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) (Off-site EP)
) November 17, 1987 - :
) -
ERRATA TO TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY, DR. JAN BEYEA, DR. GORDON THOMPSON, ,
2 AND DR. JENNIFER LEANING, ON BEHALF OF JAMES M. SHANNON, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE :
COMMONWELTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, CONCERNING VARIOUS MATTERS RAISED IN THE "ETE" AND "SHELTERING" CONTENTIONS ,
t ;
The following changes have been made to the Testimony and n Attachments filed on September 14, 1987:
t PAGE: LINE: ERRATA:
3 '6 change 0--247-SP" to "50-247-SP" I t
8 18 change "filered" to "filtered" 9 24 change "he" to "the" !
9 14 insert "testimony" after "this" cnd I before period .
. i 12 4 insert "any number of" between "of" and "the" 14 14 change "Reactor" to "reactor" b
n n
\,_/ \
i 15 16 change "a nuclear power plant accident" to "nuclear power plant accidents" 16 fn. 1 insert a comma after "et al."
17 8 change "NUREG-1500" to "NUREG-ll50" 17 fn. 2, 1. 4 change "Refernce" to "Reference" 17 fn. 2, 1. 7 add a period after parenthesis 17 fn. 2, 1. 13 change "Exhibit" to "Attachment" and delete comma and "attached" after "3" 18 17 add comma after closed parenthesis 18 fn. 3 insert a space between "Response" and "Plans" 22 18, 20 change "10-5" to "10-5a 22 fn. 11 change period to a comma 24 6 change "does" to "dose" 24 23 g, change "Ation" to "Action" 25 15 change "does" to "doses" 27 27 change "readiological" to "radiological" 28 20 change "for" to "forth" 29 1 change heading to read "RADIATION RELEASES FROM ACCIDENTS WITHIN THE PLANNING SPECTRUM" 30 12 add a period after "(see figure I)"
34 fn. 29, 2nd 1 delete "FI" 34 6 add "may" before "lead" 35 fn. 30 change "Ruthenium" to "ruthenium" 35 fh. 31 change "consequences" to "Consequence" 35 fn. 32 change "Hippe" to "Hippel" 35 fn. 32 change "Atmospherre" to "Atmosphere" 36 16 insert footnote No. 34, "34/", after "Health."
2-
9 9
36 fn. 32 change "consequences" to "Consequences" 37 fn. 35.. add "See footnote 39." after "class."
39 19 change "significant" to "sufficient" 40 fn..38 change "penisula" to "Peninsula" :
44 2 insert "(4t p.76 infra)" after "Thompson"
.45 11 change "What Special Characteristics Around Seabrook Affect The Consequences Of a Release There?" to "What special characteristics around Seabrook affect the consequences of a release there?"
47 5 change "county" to "state and local" 47
- 14 change "43" to "plus" 47 19 . change period to a comma 47 fn. 42 Insert a period at end of sentence ,
49 19 delete "As indicated in the testimony ~
of Jennifer Leaning,"
50 1 change "with" to "and" I 50 10 change "between" to "from" ;
51 15 insert period after "1.0-1.3." ,
52 18 change "PRW-2" to "PWR-2" 54 4 delete comma after "population" 55 2 change "would" to "should" 55 15 insert "yphen between "1" and "day" 56 13 change .ading to read "RADIATION DOSES
- FROM ACCIDENTS WITHIN THE PLANNING SPECTRUM" 56 18 change "0.59-0.78" to "0.53-0.78" 57 3 change "0.58-0.72" to "0.53-0.78" 57 fn, 47 change "effact" to "effects"
r
+
.O lO 57 fn.=48 replace "(Ref. 22)" with "See footnotes 26 and 60."
57 fn. 49 replace "(Ref. 22)" with "See footnotes 26 and 60."
59 15 change "simp 1'ificatilon" to "simplification" 61 21 change "travelled" to "traveled" 64 17 change "population-especially" to "population -- especially"-
66 fn. 58 change "Assuming" to "This assumes" 71 fn. 60 change "INc." to "Inc."
72 21 change "he" to "the" 75 10 delete "being" 77 13 change "pressur" to "pressure" 77 19 change' heading to read: "HEALTH EFFECTS FROM RADIATION DOSES FROM ACCIDENTS WITHIN THE PLANNING SPECTRUM" 77 20-24 change from single space to double space 78 13 add "s" to end of "level" to read "levels" 80 1 add "O" to read "BRAVO" 80 12 delete "ed" and add "ion" to read "collection" 84 5 delete "n" to read "fractionation"
, 86 16 3rd entry, Andrews, add "of" to read "Mantgement of Accidental" o
! 86 21 4th entry, Fanger, delete "Ancient" and l substitute "Accident" to read "Criticality Accident..."
86 22 4th entry, Fanger, delete "e" to read "Archives" 86 29 7th entry, check reference in rough draft: is it really "Excursion" rather I that "Explosion". or "Excursion"
- i. 4-5
- ,__a. -- ....- . , . . , -
e~ .
b n o 87 Table 20 should follow p.87, not as is now the case, p.88
~
. 88 ,2 delete "e" and add "t" to read "worst
~ declines" 88 5 ' change "for" to "from" 88' 14 change "Neurvascular" to -
"Neutrovascular" 89 14 add "to" after "exposures" "y"
91 9 add to read."recovery" 92 13 delete "with" 92 ~ 20 insert space before "micrometers" 94 15 insert space between "over" and "time" to read "over time" 95 2 change "potassilum" to. "potassium" 96 14 delete "r" and add "t" to read "at" 98 8 change "10-3" to read "10-3" 99 2 change "81" to "80" 101 2-6 move from "Serial..." to
... increased." from 101 to 104, 1.17 102 3 . add "evaluating and treating" after "for" to read "... procedure for evaluation and treating one patient..."
102 5 change "have" to "has" 102 5 change "proceding" to "preceding" 102 7. add "for" after "assessing" 101 8 delete "and decontaminating" and add "for radiation contamination, and implementing decontamination procedures" to read "... screening for radiation contamination, and implementing decontamination procedures would take..."
102 9 delete "months" and substitute "minutes" to read "15 to 30 minutes" i
b ,
(v) ()
v 102 13 delete "e" and substitute "o" to read "prodromal" 102 14 add "Geiger counter" after "of" to read
...of Geiger counter survey..."
103 revise second paragraph to read: "Send to community hospital all patients with estimated exposures to be between 50 and 200 rems, where, pending results of blood samples, admission will provide surveillance for further symptom development;"
103 revise third paragraph to read: "Send -
home, with information allowing for immediate re-call, any patient whose exposure is judged to be 50 rems or less."
103 15 add comma between "sites" and "would" to read "... sites, would be..."
103 22 change "mangement" to "management" 104 2 delete "u" and add "a", to read "de-escalate" 104 13 change "deterication" to "deterioration" 104 17 revise third paragraph to read "If the on-site personnel become confused and anxious, they might resort to a serial treatment pattern (taking care of each patient as he or she arrives). Serial intervention results in a situation where many potentially seriously ill pacients queue up, unevaluated, and untreated. Ultimate morbidity and mortality of victims would, in this mode, be increased.
106 6 change "constribute" to "contribute" 106 7 delete comma to read "... effects would..."
106 8 change "immedately" to "immediately" 106 8 delete comma to read "... nauseated and..."
106 12 change "manange" to "manage"
e - - - - - - - - - -
c .
- /
[
d V 106 24 change "expereince" to "experience" 107 4 .. change "vomitting" to "vomiting" ,
107 6 change "populatins" to "populations" 108 add the following reference: "Inc.,
prepared for Public Service Company of New Hampshire and Yankee Atomic Electric Company, 6 volumes, December 1983." to testimony of Gordon Thompson after "Garrick" 108 add the following reference: "(Sholly and Thompson, 1986) Steven Sholly and Gordon Thompson, The Source Term Debate: a Report by the Union of Concerned Scientists, Union of Concerned Scientists, January 1986."
t 9
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