IR 05000293/1985019

Insp Rept 50-293/85-19 on 850904-06.No Violation Noted.Major Areas inspected:850905 Annual Full Participation Exercise. Concerns Identified Re Evaluation of Radiation Exposure to Reentry Teams

ML20138C956
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	10/11/1985
From:	Harpster T, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138C944	List: IR 05000293/1985019 ML20138C938
References
50-293-85-19, NUDOCS 8510230113
Download: ML20138C956 (5)

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'k U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /85-19

Docket N License N DpR-35 Priority -

Category C Licensee: Boston Edison M/C Nuclear 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199

, Facility Name: Pilgrim Generating Station Inspection At: Plymouth, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted: September 4-6, 1985 Inspectors: W /d f 45'

W. fa;4rus[Jenior Emergency Preparedness date Specialist T. Harpster,- Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section L. Tripp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A M. McBride, Resident Inspector, Pilgrim ,

G. Wiliman, Battelle, PNL L. Smith, Battelle, PNL '

J. Lynch, Battelle, L

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Approved by: b - 30 B6 T. HarpstTer', C ef, Emergency Preparedness Section pte/

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Inspection Summary: Inspe on on September 4-6, 1985 (Report No. 50-293/85-19)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection to observe the licensee's~ annual full participation emergency exercise performed on September 5, 1985. The inspection involved 147 inspector hours by a team of 7 NRC and NRC contractor personne Results: No violations were identified. The licensee's emergency response [

actions for this exercise scenario were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public. Two significant concerns were identi-

. fied: 1) Radiation exposure to're entry teams was not adequately evaluated, and 2) No plans or procedures are in effect.to-implement a relocation to the i Alternate EO '

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l 8510230113 851018 PDR ADOCK 05000293 G PDR ,

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1. Persons Contacted

• C. Mathis, Nuclear Operations Manager P. Mastrangelo, Chief Operating Engineer

• A. Oxsen, Vice President, Nuclear Operations J. Seery, Technical Section Head

• T. Sowdon, Radiological Section Head P. Smith, Chief Technical Engineer-

• Denotes those present at the exit meetin . Emergency Exercise The Pilgrim Generating Station full participation exercise was conducted on September 5, 198 Pre-Exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives had telephone discussions and met with licensee representatives to review the scope and content of the exercise scenario. As a result of these discussions, revisions were made to the scenario and supporting data sheet The NRC observers and licensee observers and controllers attended a scenario briefing on September 4, 1985. The emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario were discusse The scenario included the following events:

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High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) pump steam line break with worker contaminated and injure Loss of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System (RBCCWS)

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Reactor trip

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Reactor feedwater fails to trip, causing loss of vessel level control

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Relief valves manually operated to control reactor pressure

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Release of radioactivity from HPCI steam line break

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Reactor Building evacuation

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Fuel shipping cask falls, damaging the spent fuel pool with a resultant uncovering of spent fuel I

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Partial melting of spent fuel with resultant release of radioactivity The above events caused activation of the licensee's emergency facilities and also permitted state and local governments to exercise their Emergency Plan Activities Observed D'uring the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made -

1 detailed observations of the activation :nd :t;-antation of the emergency organization; activation of emergency response facilities; and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:

• Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario i events; l2

Direction and coordination of the emergency response;

Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertiner.t information;

Assessment and projection of radiological (dose) data and

!_ consideration of protective actions;

• Provisions for in plant radiation protection;

Performance of offsite, onsite, and in plant radiological surveys;

Maintenance of site security and access control;

Performance of technical support;

-Performance of repair and corrective actions; j'

Communications /information flow, and record keeping; and

• Management of Recovery Operation The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation i of the emergency organization; activation of the emergency response

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facilities; and actions and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing l procedures. The team also noted the following actions of the

, licensee emergency response organization that were indicative of

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their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:

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Emergency response personnel appeared generally knowledgeable

in performing their duties and maintained an active role in i demonstrating assigned functions in accordance with emergency procedures.

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Control room personnel demonstrated teamwork and effectively used the established Emergency Action Levels for classification

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of the events.

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• The Emergency Director made prompt conservative decisions when declaring Site Area and General Emergencies. State personnel

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in EOF were well briefed on the status of the simulated emergency and projections for potential worst case protective action recommendations to expec *

Good correlation was noted between dose assessment calculations with information collected by field sample team The following areas were identified which degraded overall response

\ and require evaluation and corrective action by the licensee:

• Inadequateconsiderationwasgiveni$oradiationexposures received by personnel on re-entry team Personnel were allowed to re-enter the spent fuel pool area with general levels of 800 R/hr. One individual on the team approached the edge of the spent fuel pool where direct radiation from the uncovered fuel would be estimated at greater than 100,000 R/h There are no procedures in place which define how such situa-tions would be evaluated and controlled to maintain radiation exposures at a reasonable leve In the cases observed, severe overexposures would likely have resulted, with very limited gain in mitigation of the accident. The licensee agreed to review this area, establish appropriate controls, and train personnel involved to 'mprove performance in this area. When controls are in effect and personnel trained, the licensee has committed to inform NRC Region I and perform a drill.which demonstrates performance in this area. This item is unresolved (50-293/85-19-01).

The present EOF is unshielded with n'o ventilation protectio Similar scenarios could be expected to necessitate relocation to the Alternate EOF several miles away. There are presently no procedures in effect describing how/when relocation would be accomplished. The licensee is drafting appropriate procedures to cover relocation. This item is unresolved and will be reviewed ia a subsequent inspection (50-293/85-19-02).

During the site evacuation, accountability wasn't completed until 48 minutes after the evacuation was announced. NUREG-0654 guideline for this fur >ction is 30 minutes. Contributing factors were 1) difficulty in paintaining accountability in the TSC and OSC areas. and 2) performance of a manual check of ID card racks instead of performing a check with the security computer. The licensee is evaluating various means to improve accountability of onsite personnel (50-293/85-19-03).

Communications between the Control Room, TSC, and EOF used -

regular telephone speaker phones, which in several instances resulted in unintelligible or lost information and in general degraded the flow of information (50-293/85-19-04).

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The Emergency Director did not provide guidance to the TSC Coordinator. Coordination with the Control Room and Recovery Center and the TSC was much better (50-293/85-19-05).

Too much raw data concerning the situation was provided to state personnel in the EOF. Much was too technical and should have been discussed and reduced to essential information before passing on to the state (50-293/85-19-06).

• Important information was not displayed or treno d in the EOF for the use of decision makers. Time had to be used searching phone logs for information regarding times of important events (50-293/85-19-07).

There is no access control established for the E0F. The Emergency Director could be distracted from his principal duties by being forced to interface with many different levels of state response teams (50-293/85-19-08).

3. Exit Meeting The inspectors attended the licensee's critique on September 6,198 following the critique, the NRC team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise as detailed in this report (See detail 1 for attendees).

At no time during the inspection was any written material provided to the licensee by the inspectors.