ML20135A376
| ML20135A376 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1985 |
| From: | Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135A346 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-85-14, 50-306-85-11, NUDOCS 8509100128 | |
| Download: ML20135A376 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000282/1985014
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0fNISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-282/85014(DRP);50-306/85011(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306
Licensee: Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
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Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN
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Inspection Conducted: June 9 through August 10, 1985
Inspectors:
J. E. Hard
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M. M. Moser
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Approved By:
I.N.Jackiw,C$ief
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Reactor Projects Section 28
Date
Inspection Sumary
Inspection on June 9 through August 10, 1985 (Reports No. 50-282/85014(DRP);
50-306/85011(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of
previous inspection findings, plant operational safety, maintenance,
surveillance, facility modifications, meetings with corporate management,
Appendix R work, and followup of Licensee Event Reports.
In addition, this
report documents the closure of a Confirmatory Action Letter pertaining to
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operator qualification exaninations. The inspection involved a total of 273
inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors including 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> onsite during
off-shifts.
Results: One violation was identified in the eight areas inspected. The
violation involved an annunciator alarm response procedure which was incom-
plete. In addition two QA audit findings and three plant events directly
related to facility modifications are listed as examples of items of safety
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concern to the resident inspectors. Close inspector followup in this area
is planned.
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8509100128 850630
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- E. Watzl, Plant Manager
- D. Mendele, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection
R. Lindsey, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance
- A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer
A. Smith, Senior Scheduling Engineer
M. Balk, Superintendent, Operations
D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
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J. Nelson, Superintendent, Maintenance
J. Hoffman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering
K. Beadell, Superintendent, Quality Engineering
M. Klee, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering
R. Conklin, Supervisor, Security and Services
The inspectors interviewed other licensee employees, including members of
the technical and engineering staffs, shift supervisors, reactor and
auxiliary operators, QA personnel, and Shift Technical Advisors.
Corporate personnel who visited the site on July 31, 1985 are listed in
Section 7 below.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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(Closed) Deviation (306/84004-01): Reactor coolant system vents.
Failure to meet requirements of Amendments 63 and 69 of Technical
Specifications. The requirements of the amendments have been met. The
vent system is in operation.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710)
Operation of both units has been continuous during the report period.
Unit I has been base-loaded at 100% power except for reductions for
-surveillance testing, special maintenance, and weekend load following.
Unit 2 is in the coastdown mode with power at about 75% at the end of
.the report period.
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs,
conducted discussions with control room operators, and observed shift
turnovers. The inspector verified operability of selected emergency
systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper
return to service of affected components. Tours of.the auxiliary
building, turbine building and external areas of the plant were conducted
to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards,
and to verify that maintenance work requests had been initiated for
equipment in need of maintenance.
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On June 24, 1985, the inspector noted that the control room alarm response
procedure for annunciator location 47501-0501, Screenhouse General Alarm,
referenced Temporary Memo TM-84-10 which had been deleted August 23, 1984
and which was not available in the control room. This alarm response
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procedure is contained in plant operating procedure C47.26. Prompt action
was taken to correct the procedure; an approved and updated procedure was
placed in the control room on June 28.
Technical Specification 6.5.A.3 requires, in part, that detailed written
procedures shall be prepared and followed covering actions to be taken to
correct specific and foreseen potential or actual malfunction of systems
or components including responses to alarms. Contrary to this requirement,
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as noted above, a complete alarm response procedure for annunciator loca-
tion 47501-501 was not available in the control room from August 23, 1984
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to June 24, 2985. This is a violation of Technical Specification 6.5.A.3
as delineated in the Appendix (50-282/85014-01(DRP); 50-306/85011-01(DRP)).
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Note that this-is a repeat of a recent violation of technical specifica-
tions involving alarm response procedures. See Inspection Report 50-282/
84-05(DRMSP);50-306/84-05(DRMSP).
On July 2, 1985 a packing leak on the Unit I reactor coolant system power
operated relief valve block valve 32195-increased to approximately two
gallons per minute. An entry was made to the pressurizer vault to
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investigate the cause, which proved to be a leaking valve stem packing.
Manual backseating of the valve reduced the' leakage rate to a few tenths
of a gallon per minute. The valve is to be repacked during the next
outage. The NRC resident inspector considers these actions acceptable.
D-1 diesel generator was declared inoperable at 1630 on July 29, 1985
because of water. observed dripping from the exhaust system.
Investiga-
tion revealed a leaking 0-ring seal on the cooling jacket for No.12
cylinder. Hydro testing showed an additional small leak on No. 11
cylinder. Both cylinders were replaced, as were three damaged bearings.
D-1 was again operable en August 3. .(D-2 had undergone cooling jacket
hydrotesting during a preventive maintenance inspection in March, 1985.
No such leaks were found.)
At 10:30 a.m. on August 1,1985, breaker 228 was tripped accidentally and
was reclosed manually at 10:56 a.m.
Construction work was in progress in
the immediate area of breaker 228 at the time of the trip and the workers
involved may have accidentally caused the trip. From 10:30 a.m. to 10:56
a.m., Operations personnel were preparing to shut down both Unit 1 and
Unit 2 since D-1 diesel generator was inoperable (see above) and since
breaker 228 provided power to other safeguards equipment required to be
operable by technical specifications. However, the unit shatdowns were
not begun since power was promptly restored to the safeguards equipment
from an independent source.
The inspector performed a walkdown of the diesel-generator system
including breaker alignment of the safeguards buses and the auxiliary
systems supporting the generators. No deficiencies were identified.
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4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components
listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted
in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry
codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
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The following items were considered during this review: the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were
performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality
control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by
qualified personnel, radiological controls were implemented, and fire
prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and
to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment mainte-
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nance which may affect system performance.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed
during the inspection period:
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Repair of D-1 diesel-generator.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance (61726)~
The inspector witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety-
related systems and components. The inspection included verifying that
the tests were scheduled and performed within Technical Specification
requirements, observing that procedures were being followed by qualified
operators,- that Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were not vio-
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' lated, thatisystem and equipment restoration was completed, and that
test results were acceptable to test'and Technical Specification
requirements.
Portions of the following surveillances were observed / reviewed during the
inspection period:
SP 1028 Radiation Monitoring System Test
SP 2093 Diesel Generator Function Test
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Facility Modifications (37700)
A review was conducted of the facility modification control process and
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- of recent events involving facility modifications. These items are as
follows:
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a.
NSP Corporate QA Audit No. AG 85-16-Outage resulted in a Finding
(No. FG-85-5) that Commonwealth Electric Co., a contractor to NSP at
Prairie Island, had conducted work activities which were ineffective
in complying with NSP QA program requirements as delineated in Cor-
parate Administrative Work Instruction N1AWI 5.1.15, Revision 0.
This instruction specifies in Sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.3, among other
things, that an Engineering Change Request (ECR) is to be released
for implementation only after resolution of the ECR. Specifically,
the Corporate QA Auditor found that conduit support hangers and
other electrical components were installed without prior engineering
approval and not in accordance with existing design documents.
In-plant corrective actions have included review of the existing
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installations of conduit support hangers. To date, two safety
related electrical cable supports have been found which will require
special seismic analysis. This analysis is to be completed by
August 30, 1985.
Corrective actions by the construction forces have included management
review of the Finding, review and updating of construction standards,
personnel additions to the NSP Nuclear Engineering and Construction
field staff, and personnel changes in Commonwealth Electric Company.
b.
NSP Corporate.QA Audit No. AG 85-17-Outage resulted in Findings that
the Prairie Island plant staff, the Nuclear Technical Services staff,
and the Nuclear Engineering and Construction staff all failed to
properly implement the NSP uniform modification processes described
in Corporate Nuclear Administrative Work Instruction N1AWI 5.0,
Modification and Maintenance, Revision 1. which contains an overall
description and general instructions for the use of the process. The
Corporate QA Auditor found in his report for the period January 14 -
March 18, 1985 that the Prairie Island plant staff, the Nuclear
Technical Services staff, and _the Nuclear Engineering and Construc-
tion staff all failed to properly implement the uniform modification
process. These failures were in the areas of planning and coordina-
tion, design, logging / tracking, document control, project control,
and turnover.
Corrective actions implemented by the licensee have included retrain-
ing of the users of the modification process.
In addition, further
audits of the use of the process are to be conducted by Corporate QA
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during the Unit 210-year outage scheduled to begin in September 1985.
The resident inspector will review the results of these audits.
c.
During thc conduct of and in the location of Appendix R work in the
Auxiliary Building on May 8,1985, the two-inch instrument air supply
line for Unit 1 failed. One result of this failure was a trip of
Unit 1.
(SeeInspectionReport 50-282/85010(DRP);50-306/85008(DRP)).
-Possible causes of the break include accidental bumping of the line
and relocation of the line to accommodate Appendix R work.
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Corrective actions have included inspection.of the line and reinforce-
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ment of leaking solder joints. The licensee's final Investigative
Report will be. reviewed by the Resident inspector.
d.
On July 26, 1985, a temporary cable splice in the power supply
to MCC 1TA1 failed by shorting to ground. This fault disabled
many of the D-1 diesel generator auxiliaries. The fault
occurred in a location where Appendix R work had been done and
might be related to that activity.
An investigation by the licensee is underway.
e.
On August 1,1985, breaker 228 tripped, thus disabling certain
safeguards equipment momentarily.
(See also Section 3, above).
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The tripping might accidentally have been caused by construc-
tion activity near the breaker.
Subsequent electrical testing
of the breaker showed no fault conditions in the breaker itself.
An investigation by the licensee is underway.
The items discussed above, though not-specifically identified as being
violations, are of safety concern since they pertain to either serious
audit findings related to facility modifications or to serious events
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which occurred as a result of modifications being made to the facility.
Further infonnation is needed to assure that'these safety concerns are
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properly ' addressed. This is considered an unresolved item
(50-282/85014-02(DRP);.50-306/85011-02(DRP)) pending review by our
resident inspector of the completed corrective actions.
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7.
Meeting with Corporate Management (30702)
On July 31, 1985, the inspectors met with the following NSP people in
corporate headquarters:
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D. McCarthy - Chairman of the Board
D. Gilberts - Sr. Vice President, Power Supply
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C. Larson - Vice President, Nuclear Generation
F. Tierney - General Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction
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. K. Albrecht - Director, Power Supply Quality Assurance
- P. Kannan - Superintendent, Nuclear Operations QA
P. Suleski - Superintendent, Nuclear Projects QA
-D. 'Musolf - Manager, Nuclear Support Services
D. Rautmann - Superintendent, Safety Analysis
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M. Moser was introduced as the new resident inspector at Prairie Island.
Discussions were held on the subjects of.the NRC inspection program and
operation of the plant.
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Appendix R Modifications (37701)
Plant modifications required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, were completed on
June 14.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine
that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective
action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had
been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications:
(Closed) 282/84018-01
One Component Heat Exchanger in Each Unit Mad
(PRE-1-85-3)
(Closed) 282/85001-02
One Containment Isolation Valve Failed its LLRT
(PRE-1-85-5)
10. Confirmatory Action Letter
A licensed operator annual requalification examination was administered
the week of March 26, 1985. Three of the four sections of each examina-
tion were provided by the NRC. After grading, it was determined that six
Senior Reactor Operators and two of the Operators had not met the 80%
overall or 70% in each section, minimum scores specified in the licensee
requalification program. After notification by the NRC on April 26, 1985
(the date of the Confimatory Action Letter) the licensee removed the
operators from performing licensed duties and placed them in an acceler-
ated training program. The NRC reviewed and approved the June 14 and
July 1 examinations prior to administration by the facility. The licensee
complied with the commitments made during the April 26, 1985 conference
call.
On' July 23, 1985, further review of the examination grading resulted
in passing grades for all the individuals and NSP was informed of our
agreement with their grading in a telephone call on July 23, 1985.
All actions required by the licensee are considered completed.
11. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspector met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at
the conclusion of the inspection on August 12 -1985. The inspector
discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.
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The inspector also discussed the likely . informational content of the
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inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the
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inspector during the inspection. The: licensee did not identify any
documents / processes as proprietary.
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