ML20135A376

Insp Repts 50-282/85-14 & 50-306/85-11 on 850609-0810. Violation Noted:Annunciator Alarm Response Procedure Incomplete

ML20135A376
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	08/29/1985
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20135A346	List: IR 05000609/2008010 ML20135A344 ML20135A376
References
50-282-85-14, 50-306-85-11, NUDOCS 8509100128
Download: ML20135A376 (8)

See also: IR 05000282/1985014

Text

.- . . . - . . ..

-

.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0fNISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-282/85014(DRP);50-306/85011(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60

Licensee: Northern States Power Company

414 Nicollet Mall

Minneapolis, MN 55401

i

Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant

,

Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN

Inspection Conducted: June 9 through August 10, 1985

Inspectors: J. E. Hard

1

M. M. Moser

J k, h- * *

"

Approved By: I.N.Jackiw,C$ief 8h9!8f

Reactor Projects Section 28 Date

Inspection Sumary

Inspection on June 9 through August 10, 1985 (Reports No. 50-282/85014(DRP);

50-306/85011(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of

previous inspection findings, plant operational safety, maintenance,

surveillance, facility modifications, meetings with corporate management,

Appendix R work, and followup of Licensee Event Reports. In addition, this

,

report documents the closure of a Confirmatory Action Letter pertaining to

operator qualification exaninations. The inspection involved a total of 273

inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors including 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> onsite during

off-shifts.

Results: One violation was identified in the eight areas inspected. The

violation involved an annunciator alarm response procedure which was incom-

plete. In addition two QA audit findings and three plant events directly

related to facility modifications are listed as examples of items of safety

i

concern to the resident inspectors. Close inspector followup in this area

is planned.

.

8509100128 850630

gDR ADOCK O g2

.. .. ,

I

l

'

.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

• E. Watzl, Plant Manager

• D. Mendele, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection

R. Lindsey, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance

• A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer

A. Smith, Senior Scheduling Engineer

M. Balk, Superintendent, Operations

,

D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection

J. Nelson, Superintendent, Maintenance

J. Hoffman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering

K. Beadell, Superintendent, Quality Engineering

M. Klee, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering

R. Conklin, Supervisor, Security and Services

The inspectors interviewed other licensee employees, including members of

the technical and engineering staffs, shift supervisors, reactor and

auxiliary operators, QA personnel, and Shift Technical Advisors.

Corporate personnel who visited the site on July 31, 1985 are listed in

Section 7 below.

• Denotes those present at the exit interview.

'

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Deviation (306/84004-01): Reactor coolant system vents.

Failure to meet requirements of Amendments 63 and 69 of Technical

Specifications. The requirements of the amendments have been met. The

vent system is in operation.

3. Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710)

Operation of both units has been continuous during the report period.

Unit I has been base-loaded at 100% power except for reductions for

-surveillance testing, special maintenance, and weekend load following.

Unit 2 is in the coastdown mode with power at about 75% at the end of

.the report period.

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs,

conducted discussions with control room operators, and observed shift

turnovers. The inspector verified operability of selected emergency

systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper

return to service of affected components. Tours of.the auxiliary

building, turbine building and external areas of the plant were conducted

to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards,

and to verify that maintenance work requests had been initiated for

equipment in need of maintenance.

2 s

<

' h -- + .-

,

_, - _.

-

.

e

,

On June 24, 1985, the inspector noted that the control room alarm response

procedure for annunciator location 47501-0501, Screenhouse General Alarm,

referenced Temporary Memo TM-84-10 which had been deleted August 23, 1984

"

and which was not available in the control room. This alarm response

procedure is contained in plant operating procedure C47.26. Prompt action

was taken to correct the procedure; an approved and updated procedure was

placed in the control room on June 28.

Technical Specification 6.5.A.3 requires, in part, that detailed written

procedures shall be prepared and followed covering actions to be taken to

correct specific and foreseen potential or actual malfunction of systems

'

or components including responses to alarms. Contrary to this requirement,

as noted above, a complete alarm response procedure for annunciator loca-

,

tion 47501-501 was not available in the control room from August 23, 1984

to June 24, 2985. This is a violation of Technical Specification 6.5.A.3

, as delineated in the Appendix (50-282/85014-01(DRP); 50-306/85011-01(DRP)).

i Note that this-is a repeat of a recent violation of technical specifica-

tions involving alarm response procedures. See Inspection Report 50-282/

84-05(DRMSP);50-306/84-05(DRMSP).

On July 2, 1985 a packing leak on the Unit I reactor coolant system power

operated relief valve block valve 32195-increased to approximately two

gallons per minute. An entry was made to the pressurizer vault to

'.

investigate the cause, which proved to be a leaking valve stem packing.

Manual backseating of the valve reduced the' leakage rate to a few tenths

of a gallon per minute. The valve is to be repacked during the next

outage. The NRC resident inspector considers these actions acceptable.

D-1 diesel generator was declared inoperable at 1630 on July 29, 1985

because of water. observed dripping from the exhaust system. Investiga-

tion revealed a leaking 0-ring seal on the cooling jacket for No.12

cylinder. Hydro testing showed an additional small leak on No. 11

cylinder. Both cylinders were replaced, as were three damaged bearings.

D-1 was again operable en August 3. .(D-2 had undergone cooling jacket

hydrotesting during a preventive maintenance inspection in March, 1985.

No such leaks were found.)

At 10:30 a.m. on August 1,1985, breaker 228 was tripped accidentally and

was reclosed manually at 10:56 a.m. Construction work was in progress in

the immediate area of breaker 228 at the time of the trip and the workers

involved may have accidentally caused the trip. From 10:30 a.m. to 10:56

a.m., Operations personnel were preparing to shut down both Unit 1 and

Unit 2 since D-1 diesel generator was inoperable (see above) and since

breaker 228 provided power to other safeguards equipment required to be

operable by technical specifications. However, the unit shatdowns were

not begun since power was promptly restored to the safeguards equipment

from an independent source.

The inspector performed a walkdown of the diesel-generator system

including breaker alignment of the safeguards buses and the auxiliary

systems supporting the generators. No deficiencies were identified.

1

k

,.

> 3

- _

.- ._ .

-

.

4. Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components

listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted

in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry

codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.

'

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting

conditions for operation were met while components or systems were

removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the

work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were

inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were

performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality

control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by

qualified personnel, radiological controls were implemented, and fire

prevention controls were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and

, to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment mainte-

nance which may affect system performance.

Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed

during the inspection period:

.

Repair of D-1 diesel-generator.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Surveillance (61726)~

The inspector witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety-

related systems and components. The inspection included verifying that

the tests were scheduled and performed within Technical Specification

requirements, observing that procedures were being followed by qualified

operators,- that Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were not vio-

'.

' lated, thatisystem and equipment restoration was completed, and that

test results were acceptable to test'and Technical Specification

requirements.

Portions of the following surveillances were observed / reviewed during the

inspection period:

SP 1028 Radiation Monitoring System Test

SP 2093 Diesel Generator Function Test

, No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Facility Modifications (37700)

A review was conducted of the facility modification control process and '

of recent events involving facility modifications. These items are as

follows:

4

- , - , , . .

_. .- , -, .-- .

.

.

a. NSP Corporate QA Audit No. AG 85-16-Outage resulted in a Finding

(No. FG-85-5) that Commonwealth Electric Co., a contractor to NSP at

Prairie Island, had conducted work activities which were ineffective

in complying with NSP QA program requirements as delineated in Cor-

parate Administrative Work Instruction N1AWI 5.1.15, Revision 0.

This instruction specifies in Sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.3, among other

things, that an Engineering Change Request (ECR) is to be released

for implementation only after resolution of the ECR. Specifically,

the Corporate QA Auditor found that conduit support hangers and

other electrical components were installed without prior engineering

approval and not in accordance with existing design documents.

In-plant corrective actions have included review of the existing

-

installations of conduit support hangers. To date, two safety

related electrical cable supports have been found which will require

special seismic analysis. This analysis is to be completed by

August 30, 1985.

Corrective actions by the construction forces have included management

review of the Finding, review and updating of construction standards,

personnel additions to the NSP Nuclear Engineering and Construction

field staff, and personnel changes in Commonwealth Electric Company.

b. NSP Corporate.QA Audit No. AG 85-17-Outage resulted in Findings that

the Prairie Island plant staff, the Nuclear Technical Services staff,

and the Nuclear Engineering and Construction staff all failed to

properly implement the NSP uniform modification processes described

in Corporate Nuclear Administrative Work Instruction N1AWI 5.0,

Modification and Maintenance, Revision 1. which contains an overall

description and general instructions for the use of the process. The

Corporate QA Auditor found in his report for the period January 14 -

March 18, 1985 that the Prairie Island plant staff, the Nuclear

Technical Services staff, and _the Nuclear Engineering and Construc-

tion staff all failed to properly implement the uniform modification

process. These failures were in the areas of planning and coordina-

tion, design, logging / tracking, document control, project control,

and turnover.

Corrective actions implemented by the licensee have included retrain-

ing of the users of the modification process. In addition, further

audits of the use of the process are to be conducted by Corporate QA

-

during the Unit 210-year outage scheduled to begin in September 1985.

The resident inspector will review the results of these audits.

c. During thc conduct of and in the location of Appendix R work in the

Auxiliary Building on May 8,1985, the two-inch instrument air supply

line for Unit 1 failed. One result of this failure was a trip of

Unit 1. (SeeInspectionReport 50-282/85010(DRP);50-306/85008(DRP)).

-Possible causes of the break include accidental bumping of the line

and relocation of the line to accommodate Appendix R work.

5

.- - - . .- _. -.

.

'

Corrective actions have included inspection.of the line and reinforce-

ment of leaking solder joints. The licensee's final Investigative

Report will be. reviewed by the Resident inspector.

d. On July 26, 1985, a temporary cable splice in the power supply

to MCC 1TA1 failed by shorting to ground. This fault disabled

many of the D-1 diesel generator auxiliaries. The fault

occurred in a location where Appendix R work had been done and

might be related to that activity.

An investigation by the licensee is underway.

e. On August 1,1985, breaker 228 tripped, thus disabling certain

safeguards equipment momentarily. (See also Section 3, above).

l The tripping might accidentally have been caused by construc-

tion activity near the breaker. Subsequent electrical testing

of the breaker showed no fault conditions in the breaker itself.

An investigation by the licensee is underway.

The items discussed above, though not-specifically identified as being

violations, are of safety concern since they pertain to either serious

, audit findings related to facility modifications or to serious events  !

which occurred as a result of modifications being made to the facility.

Further infonnation is needed to assure that'these safety concerns are ,

properly ' addressed. This is considered an unresolved item

(50-282/85014-02(DRP);.50-306/85011-02(DRP)) pending review by our

,

resident inspector of the completed corrective actions.  ;

I

7. Meeting with Corporate Management (30702)

On July 31, 1985, the inspectors met with the following NSP people in

'

corporate headquarters: ,

D. McCarthy - Chairman of the Board

D. Gilberts - Sr. Vice President, Power Supply

-

C. Larson - Vice President, Nuclear Generation

'

F. Tierney - General Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction

. K. Albrecht - Director, Power Supply Quality Assurance

- P. Kannan - Superintendent, Nuclear Operations QA

P. Suleski - Superintendent, Nuclear Projects QA

-D. 'Musolf - Manager, Nuclear Support Services

, D. Rautmann - Superintendent, Safety Analysis

M. Moser was introduced as the new resident inspector at Prairie Island.

Discussions were held on the subjects of.the NRC inspection program and

operation of the plant.

.

4

6

. - . -.. , -. . . - - - .. --

. ..

8. - Appendix R Modifications (37701)

Plant modifications required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, were completed on

June 14.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and

review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine

that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective

action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had

been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications:

(Closed) 282/84018-01 One Component Heat Exchanger in Each Unit Mad

(PRE-1-85-3) Inoperable

(Closed) 282/85001-02 One Containment Isolation Valve Failed its LLRT

(PRE-1-85-5)

10. Confirmatory Action Letter

A licensed operator annual requalification examination was administered

the week of March 26, 1985. Three of the four sections of each examina-

tion were provided by the NRC. After grading, it was determined that six

Senior Reactor Operators and two of the Operators had not met the 80%

overall or 70% in each section, minimum scores specified in the licensee

requalification program. After notification by the NRC on April 26, 1985

(the date of the Confimatory Action Letter) the licensee removed the

operators from performing licensed duties and placed them in an acceler-

ated training program. The NRC reviewed and approved the June 14 and

July 1 examinations prior to administration by the facility. The licensee

complied with the commitments made during the April 26, 1985 conference

call.

On' July 23, 1985, further review of the examination grading resulted

in passing grades for all the individuals and NSP was informed of our

agreement with their grading in a telephone call on July 23, 1985.

All actions required by the licensee are considered completed.

11. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspector met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at

the conclusion of the inspection on August 12 -1985. The inspector

discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.

7

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ - _

-

.

.,. .:..

!

t

I

t

,

The inspector also discussed the likely . informational content of the

! inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the

! inspector during the inspection. The: licensee did not identify any

documents / processes as proprietary.

l

!

,

I

l

!

I

,

-

l

'

l

8

L ..