ML20134M300
| ML20134M300 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1985 |
| From: | Carpenter D, Constable G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134M292 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-85-03, 50-498-85-3, 50-499-85-03, 50-499-85-3, NUDOCS 8509040074 | |
| Download: ML20134M300 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000301/2004030
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APPENDIX
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b.'S'.NUCLEARREGdLATORYCOMMISSION
REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-498/85-03
Construction Permit: 'CPPR-128 and
50-499/85-03
CPPR-129
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Docket:
50-498 and 50-499
Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
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P. O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas 77001
Facility Name:
South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2
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Inspection At:
South Texas Project, Matagorda County, Texas
Inspection Conducted: March 1-April 30, 1985
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Inspecte :
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D~. R. Carpenter, Resident Inspector
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Approved:
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G. L. Constable, Chief
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Project Section C, Reactor Projects Branch
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted March 1-April 30, 1985 (Report 50-498/85-03;
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50-499/85-03)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection included:
(1) Site Tours;
(2) Survey of Licensee's Response to Selected Safety Issues; (3) Nuclear
Operator Training; (4) Review of Draft Properational. Procedure 1-DJ-P-01,
"125V DC Battery System (Channel 1)"; and (5) Review of Generic Prerequisite
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Test Procedure SG-E-04, " Batteries and Battery Chargers." The inspection
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involved 255 inspector-hours onsite by the NRC inspector.
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Results: Within the scope of this inspection, no violations or deviations-
were identified.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Employees
R. Balcom, Reactor Operations Supervisor
- G. Parkey, Technical Support Superintendent
J. Hughes, Construction Superintendent
D. Cody, Training Manager
- R. Daly, Startup Manager
- S. Dew, Deputy Project Manager
L. Fotter, Startup Training Supervisor
- J. Goldberg, Vice President,-Nuclear
- J. Green, Operations QA Manager
G. Jarvela, Health / Safety Service Manager
T. Jordan, Site QA Manager.
- W. Kinsey, Plant Manager
M. Ludwig, Maintenance Manager
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- M. McBurnett, Licensing Supervisor
A..Peterson, Startup Engineer Special Projects
- J. Westermeier, Project Manager
- F. White,' Site Licensing
- J. Williams, Site Manager
- B.-Franta, Manager, Staff Training
Other Personnel
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- J. Downs, D?puty Manager of Construction
- L. Hurst, Project'QA Manager
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A. Priest, Site Manager
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Ebasco' Services, Inc.'(Ebasco)
- C. Hawn, Quality Program Site Manager
Westinghouse Electric Company (Westinghouse)
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- A. Hograth,'_ Site Manager
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The NRC inspector also interviewed additional licensee personnel,
Bechtel personnel, and other contractor personnel during this
inspection.
- Denotes those individuals attending one or more exit meetings
during the inspection period.
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2.
Site Tours
During this reporting period, routine tours of the site were conducted
by the NRC inspector to observe ongoing work activities.
The general plant cleanliness was acceptable.
Areas of concern were noted
to the licensee.
Plant cleanliness at South Texas Project (STP) appears
to be cyclic in nature as opposed to steady, consistent.
Continued
attention needs to be paid to areas off the beaten path.
The NRC inspector observed construction and material handling
activities at the essential cooling pond pumphouse to be orderly and
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acceptable.
Equipment and material movement and storage was observed
at the warehouse and laydown complex.
All activities were being
conducted in a safe, effective manner.
The NRC inspector toured various warehouses and laydown areas and found
that material was being stored in accordance with site procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Survey of Licensee's Response to Selected Safety Issues
The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's actions _and commitments to
selected safety issues.
Specifically, IE Information Notices (IN) 83-75
and 84-06 dealing with steam binding of auxiliary. feed pumps and misposi-
tioned control rods.
Since STP is approximately 20 months from scheduled
fuel load, no actual hardware or_ approved procedure changes have been made.
Steam binding of auxiliary feed pumps - The complete train
separation feature and separate auxiliarj feedwater (AFW) line to
the steam generators.(separate from main feedwater) provide added
protection for STP beyond~the interconnected (H. B. Robinson, IN 84-06) design, so that the likelihood of a' common mode failure, as
described in IN 84-06 should be much less. .Also, STP hot
water / steam would have to leak through two containment isolation
valves and one autocirculation valve.
Despite the above STP, with
Westinghouse support, decided to issue a design! change approval
request (DCAR) to install a dual element temperature sensor (TE)
immediately upstream of each AFW system isolation valve.
The~TEs
will be monitored and alarm on the ERFDADs system in the control
room.
Procedure changes required ~before issuing the-approved
procedures are being tracked ~on the STP commitment tracking and
control report with assigned responsibility and due' dates.
All the
above information and documentation was reviewed by the NRC inspector
and found acceptable.
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'Mispositioned control rods - IN 83-75 were reviewed by the licensee
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and actions were assigned and monitored under the STP-commitment
tracking and control report with assigned responsibility and due
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dates for procedure review.~ STP plans on addressing the misposi-
tioning of control rods by. strict adherence to procedures.
The NRC
. inspector has reviewed the above document for inclusion of commit-
ments.
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The NRC inspector also reviewed STP Interdepartmental Procedure
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IP-2.2Q, Rev. 1, " Operating Experience Review," under which various
information sources are reviewed for application or impact on STP.
The
system appears to be effective and acceptable.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Nuclear Operator Training
The NRC inspector attended several sessions of cold license training
for nuclear operators.
The sessions attended were randomly selected in
such areas'as plant electrical (IE and non-IE), instrument air, various
chemical control systems, main circulating water, and.various theory
classes. The sessions attended were well controlled with good
instructor-student communcation.
All questions asked were answered or
the information was looked up for the-following session.
Training aids
(audio-visual) were acceptable.
The lesson plans and handouts are
still a little rough; however, the training manual will be published in
4 to 6 months and all trainees will be provided with a copy.
The inspector observed, on several occasions,' groups of trainees in the
plant tracing out systems and locating equipment.
In conversations-
with the students, the consensus was that they were receiving adequate
instructions, both in quality and quantity.
The NRC inspector reviewed the STP nuclear training program and determined
that there was no requirement presently in the program for previously
licensed operators to complete the short simulator training session.
Due
to unique designs of the STP facility, HL&P determined that the previously
qualified operators should go through, as a minimum, the 2-week short
course simulator training in normal and off normal commercial power plant
operation.
HL&P intends to include this commitment in the next FSAR
ammendment submitted for Chapter'13.2.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Draft Preoperational Procedure 1-DJ-P-01, "11'5V DC Battery
System (Channel. 1)"
The draft'Preoperation Test Procedure 1-DJ-P-01, "125V DC Battery System
(Channel 1)," a safety system,.was transmitted to the NRC inspector for
review at the same time it was sent to the joint test group (JTG) for
review and approval. .This procedure was the first draft safety system
test procedure to be issued.
The following NRC inspectors' comments were
provided verbally to the electrical startup supervisor.
- 1.1
This test is composed of parts of the tests described in test
summaries 20 and 21 in Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR),
Section 14.2.12.2.
Since this test is a combination of parts
of the two test summaries, the objectives should be clearly-
stated.
- 2.0
Same comment as Section 1.1.
Additionally, the licensee should
be sensitive as to when the rest of the requirements of test
summaries 20 and 21 will be performed.
- 2.1.1
Incomplete.
Test summary 21.b.4) also requires a cell
temperature limit not be exceeded.
- 2.1.2
Mislabeled.
The test calls it "Section 2.2.2."
- 2.2.2
Test summary 20.b.1) requires " . . . that each battery
charger . . ." while this section states " . . . both battery
chargers together . . ."
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The battery technical manual referenced is incorrect.
It is
for a 1200 AH battery, not the 1800 AH battery installed.
- 3.1.6
The. technical manual referenced would be for Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel, not Power Conversion.
Note:
the only two
technical manuals referencedzin this procedure are both
incorrect.
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It is not clear how revisions are going'to be handled.
Is
one startup engineer going to be able to review this
with'no other concurrences?
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Sugge'st including a , list in ,the test package of outstanding
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titems on~the startup master completion list for this system
at the start of the test.
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- Suggest'listingthhprerequisitetest'thatwasreviewed.
This stepi oes not belong under 4.4.
Should be labeled 4.5.
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- 4.4.11 LAdd " corrected for electrolyte level."
- 4.5.
Normal' battery room ventilation will not be available so
temporary' ventilation will be required.
If temporary
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ventilation is used, the battery room should be periodically
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checked during charge and discharge periods to ensure H2
concentration remains less than 2%.
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e5.1
Need to add an electrolyte-level tester.
- 5.1.1
Other range scales are used during the test. What are their
range accuracy requirements? (See 7.4.12 for example.)
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- 5.4
Does this mean that.the test doesn't start till section 7.0
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isistarted? If so, how far in advance can you perform Steps
1-6?
- 6.0
There should be a precaution on-use of= metal l tools.
- 6.2-
What constitutes " appropriate protective clothing?" Why not
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state what the technical manual required: rubber apron,
gloves, safety goggles or face shield?
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Add:" insure H concentration level less than 2%."
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- 6.6
All-specific gravities should be corrected for electrolyte
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level.
Incorrecy.[Shouldbe"QIR-onMCCEIA1."
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+7.1. 5
Incorrect.
Should be "A2L on MCCE1A2."
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- 7.2.2
Which local'and remote meters?
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- 7.2.4
lShould be EIA1, not E1A2'.
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- 7.2.9
Inconsistent in format.
- 7.2.11
Inconsistent in format.
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- 7.3.4-
What is the meaning of AC in "AC battery charger DC output
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breaker?"-
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- 7.4
Throughout this procedure;there is'no connection to specific
gravity for electrolyte ^1evel.
This is contrary to IEEE 450.
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Std.' .1980.
Revise all areas'throughout the procedure to
account for variations in electrolyte levels.
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- 7.'4. 7
Breaker already.open in' step 7.2.14.
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- 7.4.9
Typo "416 KV" should be "4.16 KV."
- 7.4.12
Typo." slowing" should be " slowly."
- 7.4.12
Scale not listed in Section 5.1.1.
- 7.4.17
Electrolyte levels?
Note:
lhe review of the remainder of the test procedure was termi-
nated after 7.4.17.
Figure 1 is poor figure.
No points are labeled.
How is test
recorder set up?
Data sheet 1 typo - acceptance criteria "X85MV" should be less than
"85MV."
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Data sheet 2 - Acceptance should also include a rejection of all
cell specific gravities greater than plus/minus 0.010 of average
(IEEE 450, Std. 1980). 'Also, any and all' cells.with an ICV 10.040
VDC from average should be listed.
Although this is a draft. procedure, it was transmitted to the NRC inspector
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at the same time it was sent to the JTG for review and approval.
The JTG
is the management level review and the procedure,Lat time of submittal,
should be technically adequate.
This procedure, as reviewed, was viewed
as unacceptable for performance of this safety test. ~It appeared to have
had no technical or supervisory review.
Since'this was a draft test
procedure, no violations have occurred; however, the NRC inspector con-
siders the test procedure generation process to be a matter of conern.
This is an open item (50-498/499/8503-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Review of Generic Prerequisite Test Procedure SG ~.-04
The_NRC inspector reviewed Generic Prerequisite Test Procedure SG-E-04,
" Batteries and Battery Chargers," Rev. O, in support of Preoperational
Test Procedure 1-DJ-P-01, "125V DC 1E Battery System (Channel 1),"
Rev. O.
While prerequisite tests are, in actuality, component tests
and are not classified as safety-related tests at STP, this test would
test functions of the safety-related battery charger that will not be
checked as part of the safety-related preoperational test of the 1E
battery system.
Therefore, the NRC inspector considers this a
safety-related test.
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Generic Prerequisite Test Procedure SG-E-04, as most generic prerequisite
test procedures reviewed by'the NRC inspector, is not like a normal how-to
procedure, but rather is more like a basic guide.
The attached data
sheets, when filled out by the startup engineer, documents the results of
the test. The responsible startup engineer determines the appropriate
references, acceptance criteria, test equipment, etc.
Then he performs
the test with no other review or approval until the completed test results
are reviewed and approved.
Total reliance is made on the ability of
the startup engineer to use the vendor technical manual to perform the
steps.
The data sheets for this particular procedure, SG-E-04, are incomplete
in that no values are recorded on the data sheets for various " test and
adjust" requirements, only "yes" or "no" boxes.
The NRC inspector raised this concern to the licensee.
The licensee
responded by rewriting the battery charger preoperational test to
incorporate testing of all safety-related functions and will review the
inspector's concern on using component test results for other safety-
related components. The NRC inspector will continue to follow this
matter.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Open Items
One new open item was identified in this report in paragraph 5.
8503-01
Preoperational Test Procedure Generation.
8.
Exit Interviews
Exit interviews were held periodically with the licensee management
personnel during the course of this inspection.
Those attending one or
more of the meetings are denoted in paragraph 1.
At these meetings,
the scope and findings of the inspection were presented.
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