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l MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. Denton J. Knight Juee S Ngf /@f 1
D. Eisenhut R. Bernero
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i G. Edison W. Russell
- ff H. Thompson B. Snyder
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F. Miraglia T. Speis
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l G. Lainas G. Holahan l
T. Novak
- 5. Varga D. Crutchfield D. Vassallo J. Zwolinski J. Miller THRU:
John F. Stolz, Chief, Operating Reactors Br' nch #4, a
1 Division of Licensing l
j FROM:
AlberthDe Agazio, Project Manager l
Operating Reactors Branch a4, Division of Licensing i
SUBJECT:
DAILY HIGHLIGHT - DAVIS-BESSE UNIT NO. 1 The following is the secuence of events which occurred at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, coerated by Toledo Edison Company, on June 9,1935.
The information is preliminary and may require clarification or correction i
upon detailed analysis of the event.
The plant was originally at approximately 90! of full power. No surveillance testing was in progress. The plant was in full automatic control except for the #2 Main Feedpump which was in manual.
Tim'e Event 01 35:00 The il Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) tripped on overspeed due to a control failure. Automatic plant runback initiated. Due to the reduced feedwater flow available, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature and pressure increasing. Plant ran back to approximately 807, of full power.
01:35:29 Reactor tripped on hign RCS pressure (2300
\\p' psig).
Turbine trip from reactor trip.
01:35:31 The Steam & Feedwater Rupture Control System
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(SFRCS), Channel 2 spuriously half tripped.
01:35:36 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) #1 closed.
01:35:37 MSIY #2 closed.
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2 01:35 to Normal post trip equipment operation. such as 01:40 the auto transfer of housepower to the startup transformers, etc. The #2 MFP continued to supply normal feedwater until approximately 0140 hours0.00162 days <br />0.0389 hours <br />2.314815e-4 weeks <br />5.327e-5 months <br />, when there was not adequate steam to operate the MFP turbine due to the closure of the MSIV's.
Approx. 01:41 Steam Generator water levels decreased to the SFRCS low level trip setpoint. The SFRCS actu-ated. The Control Room Operator at this time also actuated the SFRCS manually, however, he incorrectly actuated the SFRCS on low steam pressure instead of the desired low steam generator level.
01:41:31 The !1 Auxiliary Feedpump (AFP) tripped on overspeed.
01:41:44 The #2 AFP tripped on overspeed.
01:42 The Operator corrected his error by clearing the manual SFRCS actuation on low steam pressure.
However, since the AFP's were tripped, no feed.
water was supplied by the AFP's.
01:45 Both Steam Generators had steamed down to 1
approximately 12-13 inches of indicated level.
RCS Tave approximately 562'F.
01:45 - 01:51 RCS Tave increasing due to lack of primary to secondary heat transfer. RCS pressure increasing due to decreasing density in RCS water and in-creasing pressurizer level. RCS pressure in-creased to the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) setpoint (2425 psig). PORV cycled a total of three (3) times, relieving pressurizer pressure to the Quench Tank.
Operators placed the Startup Feedpump (SUFP) in 1
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operation to supply the #1 Steam Generator. The l
- 1 Steam Generator pressure had reached a minimum i
of approximately 750 psig. The il Steam Generator repressurized to approximately 900 psig from the startup feedpump.
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/2 AFP returned to operation by opera. tors to supoly the #2 Steam Generator. Maximum RCS temperature had reached approximately 592'F.
i Steam Generator #2 level restored. The #2 Steam Generator had reached a minimum of 920 psig.
l 01:55 fl AFP returned to operation by operators to supply the #1 Steam Generator. Steam Generator il level restored.
i 01:58 Tave restored to normal post trip temperature.
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Additional Notes:
i Adecuate subcooled margin was available throughout the transient.
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The Reactor Coolant Pumps remained ir. operation. The Ouench Tank i
i contained the discharges from the PORV. Makeup /High Pressure injecticn cooling of the RCS was available as a method of core cooling at all i
i times.
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An Incident Investigation Team was sent to the site on 6/11/85.
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Albert De Agaric, Pro,tect Manager i
Operating Reactors Branch 84 l
Division of Licensing l
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I PkiLIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-III. 85-47 Date June 10. 1985 This preliminary notification constitutes CARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or '
public interest significance.
The information is as initially received without veri-d,).
fication or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the staff on this date.
Facility:
Toledo Edison Cornpany Licensee Emergency Classification:
Davis-Besso Nuclear Plant XX Notification of an Unus 1 Event Oak Harbor OH 43449 Alert (Occket Nn. 50-346)
Site Area Emergency General Emergency Not Applicable
Subject:
LOSS OF FEE 0 WATER TO STEAM GENERATORS At 12:33 a.m. (CDT). June 9; 198S, the unit tripped from 90 per cent power (initial conditions) because of feedwater pump problems. One main feedwater punp tripped and the second nain feedwater pump was lost due to an unexplained closure of both the Itain Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). Subsequently both auxiliary feedwater sunos teloped, leaving both steam generators without feedwater ard at low water level for about 11 minutes.
The Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) cycled several times as designed in responding to increased pressure in the primary systen. The Pressurizer Quench Tank rupture disk did not rupture. There were no radioactive releases.
Licensee personnel used the startup feedwater purnp and manually restarted the auxiliary feedwater pumps, restoring feedwater to the steam generators. The unit is presently in cold shutdown.
The Resident inspector was onsite within one hour of cotification of the event.
Region !!! (Chicago) management is closely monitoring the event and the licensee's course uf acticn in detenrining why the #1 main feedwater and auxiliary feedwater puros tripped. Reginn !!! manogement is onsite also. The Unusual Event was terminated at 7:40 a.m. (CDT), June 9, 1985.
The State of Ohio will be notified.
Region !!! was first notified of this event at 1:11 a.m. (CDT), June 9,1985.
This infonnation is current as of 11:00 a.m. (CDT), June 10, 1985 W
/.Shafer CONTACT:
B. Burgess W
rTS 388-5689 FTS 388-5656 OISTRIBUTION:
s,9g. p',';
- h. St.
MNBH Phillips E/W Willste Chairman Falladino ECO
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Comm. Roberts PA
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-m Conr. Bernthal ELO Air Rights MAIL:
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00T: Trans Only CA Applicable Resident Site PDR Regions (
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I ORE:IM!t:A3Y N0llFICATION OF EVENT OR UNU5UAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-III-85-47A Date June 11, 1985 This preliminary notification constitutf:s EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or A3 public interest significance. The infonnation is as initially received without veri-fication or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the staff on this date.
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Facility: Tcledo Edison Company Licensee Emergency Classification:
Davis Besse Nuclear Plant XX Notification of an Unusual Event Oak Harbor. OH 43449 Alert e4 Docket No: 50-346 Site Area Emergency V General Emergency Not Applicable
Subject:
LOSS OF FEEDWATER TO STEAM GEhERATORS (UPDATE)
The unit is in cold shutdown. A special NRC Investigative Team arrived at the Davis Besse site about 9 a.m. (CDT) from Headquarters to review the circumstances surrounding the loss of feedwater to the steam generators on June 9,1985. A Region III team has been on site since June ir evaluating the event.
Region III issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) on June 10, 1985, placing a freeze on electrical and mechanical wurk involving the malfunctioned equipment until such time as the NRC investigative team can evaluate all facets of the event. The CAL also requires the licensee to review, evaluate and implenient corrective actions concerning the unexplained closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves, the inadvertent trip of the main feedwater pumps and the failure of the auxiliary feedwater system.
Tha licensee, under tems of the CAL, cannet restart the unit or exceed 5 per cent power tritnout authorization from the Regional Acministrator.
During the evert, the Power Cperated Relief Valve (PORV) cycled three times. On the third cycle, the Region Ill investigative team preliminarily determined that the valve did not close orcoerly. The licensee had to shut a backup isolation valve, which halted depressurizatten. Furtner, a preliminary evaluation indicates that Auxiliary Feedwater Pump isolation valves, which were supposed to open automatically, did not open as required. The licensee opened the valves manually, starting the pumps and restoring the auxiliary feed:ater system capability to the steam generators.
Ouiing the event, licensee personnel manually started the High Pressure Coolant Injectiort System (HM l.
However, because the Reactor Coolant Pressure was atove the HPI discharge pressure, only 10 gallons was injected before it was manually terminated.
4 PCELIMINAD NOTIFICATION Of EVEh? OR bh0SUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-I!!-64-47A Date June 11, 1985 2-The State of Ohio wil; be notified.
Fredauarters and Region III Public Affairs will issue a news announcement today on the CAL end the NRC investigation.
The licensee issued news annour. cements on June 9 and 10.
Region III is responding tc media inquiries.
inis information is current as of 10:30 a.m. (CDT), June 11, 1985.
b CONTACT:
B. Burgess E. Greenman FTS 388-5689 FTS 388-5518
~~.
DISTRIBUTION:
H. St.
NN88 Phillips E/W Willste Chairman Palladino EGO ~ ~ ~
NRR IE NMSS Comm. Ecberts PA OIA RES Com. Asselstine MPA AE00 Com. Bernthal ELO Air Rights MAIL:
Cur.m. Iech SP
!NPO ADM:DMB SECY NSAC DOT: Trans Only ACRS CA Applicable Resident Site P3R Regions I
, II
, IV
,Y Licensee (Corporate Office)_,
i Rev. 07/06/84
'55 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-I!!-85-47B Date This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without veri-fication or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the staff on this date.
Facility: Toledo Edison Company Licensee Emergency Classification:
Davis Besse Nuclear Plant XX Notification of an Unusual Even Oak Harbor, OH 43449 Alert (Docket No. 50-346)
~ Site Area Emergency General Emergency Not Applicable
Subject:
LOSS OF FEEDWATER TO STEAM GENERATORS (UPDATE)
Th2 unit remains in a stable cold shutdown condition at 100'F and 50 psig.
Th; NRC Fact Finding Team (FFT) and the Region III Team are continuing their reviews. Review teams from INPO and B&W are also onsite conducting their own reviews of the event.
a i
i During reviews of the licensee's sequence of events a potential personnel error was identified. Af ter the plant tripped the procedure directed the operator to initiate Auxiliary Feedwater flow by manually actuating the Steam Feed Rupture Control (SFRCS). The operator actuated the SFRCS; however, he actuated the 4
system in the steam generator low pressure mode rather than the low steam generatcr level mode (the procedure does not specify which mode). The affects of the error on subsequent plant behavior are still under evaluation.
There has been substantial local and national media attention. Congressional inquiries have al so been received.
/W. %"y W CONTACT: )W.u d
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NG B Burgess Sha er FTS 388-5689 FTS 388-5556
. DISTRIBUTION:
H. St.gDD MNes 4.'3 0 Phillips g E/Wy./f WillsteY.T8 Chairrian Palladino EDO NRR IE NKSS i
Com. Roberts PA OIA RES Com. Asselstine MPA AE00 Com. Bernthal ELD Air Rights M MAIL:
Cocrn. Zech SP INPO 5"of ADM:DMB SECY ACRS NSACWiST DOT: Trans Only i
CA Regions 1.510, pplicable Resident Site M A
PDR II5;is, IVM YE:2 Licensee (Corporate Office) #*/f e
r U ff Reportable Event numtcr 01084 Fccility :
DAVIS-EESSE Date Notified : 06/09/85 U
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- 1 Time Notified : 0211 R G e i r. - : 3 Date of Event : 06/09/85 Vsndo- : 85W Time of Event : 01:33 Oparotions Officer :
Don Mar ksber ry Classification : Unusual E ent NEC Notified By :
Catecory 1 : SCRAM Rod Rolente : No Catcoery 2:
Ccusa : IJn k n ow-Catecer i 2 :
Component :
Catco:r y 4 :
EVENT DESCRIPTION :
RX TRIPPED FROM 90% ON THE LOSS OF MAIN FW PUMP #1. AN INADVERTCNT MSIV ISOLATION TRIPPED THE OTHER MAIN FW PUMr. CAUSE UNDER INVESTIGATION. AUX FW SYSTEM WAS MANUALLY INITIATED DUE TO BOTH TUREINE DRIVEN PUMPS EITHER FAILeO TO ACTUATE OR TRIPPED AFTER STARTING. CAUSE UNDER INVESTIGATION. LOCT CONDENSER VACUUM WHEN STEAM HEADER PRESS DROPPED AS Tile AUX FW PUMPS'WER CROUGHT ON LINE. RX STABLE IN HOT STANDEi. AUX FEEDWATER NORMAL. LICENSEL MNAELE TO CLASSIFY EVENT AT THIS TIME.
NOTIFIF. ) RDO (HARR ISON ); EO (EAER ); FEMA ocuPDAYE (O226): DECLARED NOUE DUE TO THE UNUSUAL FAILURE OF THE AUV. FW SYSTEM TO START. AUX FEEDWATER NORMAL.
ocuPDATE DUEING MORNING STATUS CALL (0D15 ): PLANT STABLE. STARTUP FEEDWATER PljMP FEEDING STM GENERATORS, AUX FEED SECURED. ONE AUX FEEDWATER TRAIN PLACED INOFERAELE DUE TO TURBINE GOVERNOR MALFUNCTION. ENTERED INTO A T2 HRS TO HOT S/D LCO ACTION STATEMENT. REACTOR IN HOT STANDEY.
CCUPDATE (0845): TERMINATE NOUE AT 0840. PLAN TO REMAIN IN HOT STANDEY UNTIL PROSLEMS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.
C; portable Event nurnb er 01085.
Fetility :
WOLF CREEL Date Notified : 06/09/p5 Unit : 1 Time Notified : 02:26 Region : 4 Date of Event : 06/09/95 V:nder : WEST Time of Event : 01:15 Opnections Officer :
Don Marksberry Classification : TO CFR 50.72 NRC NotlFled By :
Category 1 : ESF Actuation Rcd R31 ease : No Category 2 :
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Cauco : Mechanical Failure Category 3 :
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1.'. ": FW Pljt
Cates,y 4 :
j EVENT DESCRIPTION :
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cgHILE AT 2% AND FEEDING WITH Aux FEEDWATER. AUX FEEDWATEP ACTUATION i;5*,AL GENERATED DUE TO MAIN FECDWATER PUMP "A" T8IP ON OVERSFEED DURING PU97 STACTUP. EYETEM RESTORED. NOTIFIEC RDO(WEE?EPMANi.
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R:perteble Event numbe- 0105t Fa-ility WC'_F CREEr Date Notified : 0:'09/P5 Unit : 1 Time Nctified : 02:26 Rac i er. : 4 Date of Event : 06/09/05
.Vcncor : WCC Time of Event 02:0/
Ocaratient Of ' car :
Don Mar ksber ry Classification : 10 CFR 50.72 NRC Nct i f ied E-Catccory 1 : ESF Actuation Red R31 ease : No Cateocry 2 :
Cmase :
Catecory 3 :
ab Ccmponent :
Catecory 4:
m EVEr.
DESCRIPTION :
_zs WHILE AT,2% AND FEEDIN3 WI AUX FEEDWATER, MAI, FEEDWATER ISOLATED AND AUX FEEDWATEF. SIGNAL GENERATED 4 HIHI STM GENERAT,dR LEVEL CAUSED EY NORMAL' MAIN FEED PEGULATION VALVE L EAKAG WHEN THE "A" MATN FW PUMP WAS PLACED IN
. SERVICE. FLANT RECOVERED. NOTI IED RDO (WESTERMAN) 1 Q por table Event number 01087
/
Fccility : DAVIS-EESSE Dat Notified 06/09/95 Unit : 1 T i ene otified : 14:15 l hcosen : 3
/
Date et Event 06/09/B5
- V0nder : EEW
/
f Time ofMvent : 01:34 Oparotions Of f icer : - '
David Powell Classifibation : INFORMATION NRC Notified Ey :
/
Ca teQor y 1 :
Red Rolease : No Catecory 2 Ccuco :
Categor y 3 :
6 C;mponent :
Ca tecor y 4 :
/
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EVENT DESCRIPTION :
l A COMM 51UNERS ASSISSTANT BRIEFING WAS HELD CONCERNING THE OK33 EDT EVENT AT DAVIS ESSE. THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL WERE INVOLVED IN THE ERIE ING:
G.
MAZ AU, S. CHESNUT, K.
- COHEN, J. MONTGOMERY, G.
HOLAHAN, E.
R SI, R.
- EAER, R. NEWLIN.
E. GREENMAN FROM RF.GION 3 PRESENTED THE INFORMATION.
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DNa 70-8833 Truck Acci ont (F-4 cvl tador heele was involved an en accident et Winfield. West Virol le with e ertwate autenebile. The delver of the automobile died of inJurse e suffered.
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truck tretter but the cab was ineeerable. A surwer for radioactsvity b.
local fire derertment personnel r eveeled ne t e, lease of me ter 8el, a
The West Viretale. Putnam County. Emeroency terwice has been inwo:ved tr the rewtem of survev date and e s ses sment of **emese s.
Plans are to continue the ehtement of the treller with its contents to the final g
destinetten in P8heten. Ohle.
The State of liest Viretate has been informed. A PN 28539 was issued 
.
O O
f O
e eCORRECTED COPYe DAILY REPORT RIII oCORRECTED COP %e O
DATEe 04/1t/95 FACILITY / LICENSEE NOTIFICATION ITEM OR EVENT REOIONAL ACTION OFFICE OF TNE REGIONAL AOMINISTRATOR OEERAL PWt. BRUCE A. SERSON IS IN te TO ATTEle TE REGIONAR.
19 FORMATION COtDeSELS COtDtTERPART IEETINO.
O DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS S
CLINTOss sat AT NOON OM 6/10/05 220 LADONERS. 70 BOILERMRKERS AseO RESIDENT INSPECTORS SEWRAt. OTDER CAAFT PERSONNEL WENT HOME SICK.
TE ARE FOLLOWINO eda 4. STOUT WAS APFARENTLY IN PROTEST OVER AN INCIDENT ON O
6/3/95 694EN A QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTOR STRUCtC A LA90RER IN TE p(AD WITH A ROLL OF DLtK PRINid.
TE INSPECTOR WA3 SLt3 PENDED FOR 4 DAYS WITHOUT PAY.
O THE INDIVIIAAALS WHO LEFT TE PLAsef SITE FELT TMY WouLD HavE SEEN TERMINATED FOR A SIMILAR INCIDENT.
T E UNIONS HAVE A NO OTRIKE CLAUSE IN TMIR CONTRACT.
O IKstkERS stJST RETURN IN 48 HOURS OR FACE A COURT INJUNCTION.
ILLINOIS PCWER FEELS THAT THE WORKERS WILL RETURet TO WORIC SY 6/18/85. TERE HAS DEEN W
SOME LOCAL MEDIA INTEREST.
DAVIS-DESSE TELEEON FROM SRI f.W (UP34TEI TDC este FACT FINDIN)
W SECTION CHIEF ONSI TE TK REACTOR IS IN COLD S,.UTDOWN WITN PRIMARY TE AM FOR THE DAVIS-TEMPERATW E AT 100 DE6REES F AND PRIMARY PRFSSURE AT DESSE EVENT Of 4/9/C 50 PSI.
teOTH S/O'S ARE IN ET LAYUP.
AND THE RIII teart A9E W
A CONFIRr4ATORY ACTION LETTER (cat t WAS ISSteED DV Rit!
(*rilTE EVALUATING TT 008 6/10/0S FtACING A FREEZE 004 EQUIPMENT THAT mat.-
LICENSEE'S ACTIutr3.
FUNCTIONED DURING T4 LCriS OF FEEDWATER EVENT.
THE W
CAL ALSO REOUIRLS THE LICENSEE TO hEVIEW. E'.ALUATE AND IrftEMENT CCARECT!VE ACTIO*e frEGARDINO TedE fMADVERTt NT d
CLOGURE OF DOTH NAIN
- teart ISta.AT IOpe VALVES E NSIV 'S t.
4 Y
THE TRIP OF T K e l P94
- M F EF D f' UMP (MrP3 AND TK F AILle<C YO, START OF,1**; Aus it.I ARY FE E teJATL R, SMTEM_f,AFE D.
e sw. e u eae.;e s ses s e tt t.As.FuEUUIREO THE PIII fit.OIONAL I
AletI2TSTRATOR'O APPROVAL.
l itE SMCIAL "NRC FACT FINDING TEAM FOR THE DnVI3-SESSE l
ECT W c/7/65* ARRIW3 ONSITE CT CeOO API Ore C/II/65 T3 DATE. THE GIII teart NAS IDENTIFIES Asa;MAI. ES WITH I
YtC THIRD ACitMTION W THE POWE3 OPEAATED RE. IEF VALVE IFT)RV) RELATED TO'THE CLO3URE OF THE VALVE AtD HAS A
IDENTIFIED THAT OPJRATOR ACTION WAS REQUIRED TO OPEN THE AFW DISCHAROE ISOLATION VALVES DURINO THL EVENT.
FURYtE R INVESTIGATION OF TE SE PRELIMINARY FlNDINGS 4
IS IN PROrdeESS.
ftE LICENSEE HAS IIKNTIFIED THAT AN LDEEPt AINE D SWITCHOVER ftE AFW PUMP SUCTION FROrt itE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANKS TO itE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Sb ALSO OCCLmRED.
THE LICEEEE HAS ISSUED A PRf SS RELEASC.
341LY REPORT-4tIII 06/II/85 O
/ACILITV/ LICENSEE NOTIFICATION ITEM OR [WNT REGIONAL ACTION (t
JIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS ICONTINtKD) sASALE I TELECON FROM SRI ON 6/8/95. A ft>St SUIVICE WATER PLPF WRS DISCOVERED TO RESIDENT INSPECTORS J
te4VE A DROKEN SEAI. COOLING MATER LI8E.
THIS " LACED ARE ONSITE FOLLOWING LMIT I IN A 30 OAV LCO.
DURING k TESTING O' LICENME'S ACTIONS EQUIPTENT REQUIRED DV itE LCO. IT WAS DISCOVt dED THAT THE TOnUS SPRAY VdtLVE WOULD NOT OPEN.
SINCE THE REQUIREMENTS OF ftC LCO COULD NOT BE SET. AN UNUSUAL EVENT WAS DECLARED AT 20I5 AND A SHUTDOWN OF UNIT I 4"1 MAS INITIATED. AT 8235 TtE RHR SERVICE WATER PUMP WAS RESTORED TO SERVICE AND AT 2240 TtE UNUSUAL EVENT WAS TERMIN4tED. TtE LICENSEE NOTIFIED TFE O
NRC VIA THE ENS.
t ASALLE I RI LMIT I WAS DEIMO STARTED LP ICRITICAI. AT 12:30 PM FOLLOWUP PER MC 2585 O
ICDil DN e/IO/85) FOLLOWING ENTENSIVE MPAIRS SUBSEQUENT TO FLOOD!pe itE LAKE SCREEN HOUSE ON 3/38/e5. TIE CAUSE Or itE EWNT WAS IETERMINED TO v
DE A FAILED OPERATOR ON TtE IS CIRCULATINO WA.ER Pure DISCHAROE VALVE.
VIDRATION HAO APPARENTLY I
LOOSENED TDE DOLTS CAUSINO EVENTUAI. FATIOLE FAILtDIE w
OF THE OPERATOR WHICH ALL0tED TFE VALVE TO CLuSE.
TtE RES&A. TANT WATER HAMPER IILEW OUT THE RUSSE 4 EEPANSION JOltfT SETEEN itE PtAP Ape DISCHARGE Vet.W.
REPAIRS INCLUDED VAIVE OPERATOR IEPECTION AND REPAIR ANO EXTENSIVE REPAIR TO ALL FLOODED ELECTRICAL CCff0ENTS.
u LASALLE 2 RI/HQsDO AT IIs25 AM ICDT) ON &#I0/05. TIE LICENSEE DE ALRED FOLLOWLP PER MC 2585 TFE DIVISION I EMEROENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS EECCSI w
IMOPERAKE UPON FIMOINO A RECENTLY REPLACED L6W LEVEL ACTUATION SWITCtl PIPED DACkWARDS.
TFE UNIT 64AS IsEEN IN COLD SteJTDOnad SINCE FElsRUARY. DIVISION II A8ep III gy ERE OUT OF SERVICE AT YtE TIME FOR PeAINTENAEE. SO THE UNIT WAS WITHOUT ECCS CAPASILITY SINCE APrROIIMAT[tV 4s00 Art ON 6/5/85 6eEN DIVISION II WAS TAAEN edVT OF w
SERVICE.
IN ADDITION. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFIC /*TIOP0 ACTION STATENENT FOR IMOPERASLE ECCS SYSTEMS bEQUIRES THE LICEttJEE TO HAVE T ECONDARY CONTAINPENT. LINCE W
UNIT I WAS ALSO IN COLD SHUTDOWN ATH STAND 9V JAS
,sgg TREAire[NT TRAINS WERE TAkEN OUT OF SERVIEE AY 3:45 ppt I
ON 6/5/05 IFOR WORet ON THE FIRE PROTECTION DE sUGE W
VALVES 9 TFE REACTOH IMf!LDING VENTILATION SYSit 1 WAS g l ALSO OUT tdF SERVICE.
I4)TH SE6 T AND itC REACT. 4 BLDG.
VENTILATItW SYSTEM TRAlgi WERE RETURNED TO SEs VICE ON sp 6/3/05.
TUCL WAS NOT Inf 8Nu HANDLED NteR WLRC (CERATILW l
IN Ffv0GRES". WITH A POIENTI AL f M LRAININt.s THE eEACTOf.t SML.
e e.
.a.....-
a m h _2 g
g
- c....
e.,.. -
-9
,p.
4NE F*4L The Reesonal Adelnistrater and meet *ers of the staf f are meet tne with the Vice President of N sclear Eneineer Ine and Licens tne.
EP&L. and a menter of has staff t. f t scus s Dr unswicti's Enver ennental uweltitcettens.
selectedR.et.5:
Yme E.. rect.c. Dt.t.t.. of Reacter P. sects and.thee I steis er. in H.ed werters for e m.eetne n.two.n roere.entettwee of Tee.nessee Valles Au t hor i t y and P6Wt r e per d e ne We t t s See issues.
en The Re=tenal Cownset is in Head *wer*ers to attend a meettne between OELD and Oeerste Power Comeeny atterneve reeerdine the Veette esceltts.
o The Dir ector of tho' Divisten of Red.eleetce! Health. Tennessee Health Deeertment is meettne toder with ment,ers of the Restenet staff to descuss operetsens et the NFJ escality.
e o
DAILY REPORT RIII p
DATEe 06/12/95 e
e FACILITY / LICENSEE NOTIFICATION ITEM OR EVENT rEGIONAI. ACTION e
DIVISION OF REACTOR I M CCT3 OAVIS-PCSSE TELECON WITH RIII (tJPDATE D FACT FINDINO TEAM e
teart ter3ITE TK REACTOR REMAINS IN COLD $84JTD0188 WITH PRIMARY AND T K RIII TEAM ARE PLANT AT 100 DEOREES F AND PRIMARY FRESSURE AT 50 PSI.
ONSITE REVIEWING TK THE NRC FACT FINDINO TEAM IS ONSITE AND HAS COMPLETED EVENT AND INTER-p FRELIMINARY BRIEFINOS WITN T K LICE EEE AND THE RIII VIEWING LICENSEE TEAM.
PER$(edNEL.
PRLLIMINARY FINDINOS TO DATE HAVE REVEAt.ED THE FOLLC4fINO:
i e I.
AURILI ARY FEEleaATER PUMPS ( AFW) ISP-FA DISCHArv0C VALVE WOLA.D NOT OFEN ALLOWING 084.Y OK STEAM OEPERATOR 90 FED DURINO THE EVENT.
e 2.
TK el AFW Pts 1P COULD NOT BE CONTROLLED IN AUTOMATIC OR reANUAL CONTROL FROrt THE CONTROL ROOrt.
THE Ft*1P laAS CONTROLLED LOCALLY FROM TK AFW PUMP ROON.
e 3.
THE #2 AFW FUMP COULD OPG.Y DE CONTROLLED IN MADRJ44. FROrt THE CONTROt. ROON.
4.
THE e2 AFW PUMP HAS A POS NOOEL OOVERNOR RECENTLY INSTALLED DURING TK LATEST OUTAOE.
FYRRY LICE EEE ON 6/II/85. PER TNE REQUIREMENTS OF IOCFRSO.55(E) ON FOLLO64P PER HC25I2 e
THE CLERLAND ELECTRIC ILLurtINATINO COMPANY REFT /<TED A FOTENTIAL CONS 1RUCTION DEFICIENCY AT THEIR PERfsy SITE.
DURING A REVIEW OF AS BUILT SEISrtIC SUPPORF e e CPACINO CRITERI A FOR IMTRUNLNT AND CONTROL PIPItes
\\ '
ftC ARC &lITEC T ENGINEER NOTED THAT GPACINO CRITElt!4 IaAD NOT ALWAYS FCLN PROPERLY INTERFhETED BY THE IMTALLATIOrf *
- CONTRACTOR. GIETY-FUUR NONEONFORMANCE REFORTS HAVE f(LN WRITTEN AND WILL DE HLVIEWED AND DISF10SITI(#JLD s tit SI TE FT<OCL18URES.
A 'Je) DAY REPORT WILL FOLLOW Fts;TICl4
{s INVCSTIGAIIOrd DV TIC LTILITY.
1
+
FWA l k I E A *.t AND rut.,eAMES 0. 0 Ef ft.LR AND NEMITRS OF TK RIII STAf f INFeN;t1AT ION WILL MLET WITH NANAGEME NT REPRESENT AT IVES OF
- 4JR T&E.HN SIAIES #4MLR f<LOAhDIt}G IHE 84.SULTS OF RECENT OFtRATOH LICLNSIPS3 EI Arts AT FT1AINIL ! $L ANL*.
t FTt;.
bt"Wlh ge ve go.
- aTU LILENJE NUTIF ICAIION ITEM OR EVENT
(/I3/r T I 1
.VITION C7 RfACTOR PROR CTS REGIONAL ACTION DAVli -IE SSE NOTIFICATION FROM IUPDATED THE REACTOR IS IN COLD SHUTDOWN WITH ftC OrtJITE HEGluN III TI. AN PRINARY PLANT PRESSURE AT 50 PSI.
RIII TEAM AND F ACT DURINO REVIEW OF llE LICENSEE'S SEQtCNCE OF EVENTS. A PERSONNI.L FINDING TEAN ARE ERROR WAS INDICATED I4MINO OPERATION OF ON5tTL REVIEWING ftC STE Art AND FEEDWATER RUPTURE CONTROL SYSTEN ISFRCS)
C t hCurtS T ANCES g
IsY A SURROUNDINO THIS CONTROL ROOrt OPERATOR.
AFTER THE PLANT TRIP ON HIOH PRESSURE. Yte. TRIP PROCEDURE DIRECTED AN EVENT OPERATOR TO NANUALLY INITI ATE AutILIARY FEEDWATER o
FLOW BY ACTUATION OF THE SFRCS STEArt GENERATOR LOW LEVEL TRIPS HOWEVER. YtE OPERATOR ACTUATED SOTH CHANNELS OF THE STRCS LOW STEAN PRESSORE TRIP.
o THE RESULT WAS A EOP(LICTING SET OF SIGNALS SENT TO THE AUXILI ARY FEET 4 DATER I AFWI PtwS DISCHARGE VALVES f 0 PEN AND CLOSE R WHICat NAV HAVE CAUSED THE AFW PUNPS TO TRIP.
LASALLE 1 & 2 HQ DO ON 6/12/95 AT 163I CDT TM SAPPLE TAPE FOR DE *9*
s TRA'N ANNONIA DCTECTOR FOR CONTROL ROOrt VENTILATION RESIDENT IS FOLLOWINO INTAftE DROkE.
THIS CAUSED THE CHARCOAL 000REATER LICENSEE ACTIONS TO AUTOMATICALLY SWITCH TO THE RECIRCULATION NODE o
AND THE OUTSIDE INTAE DANPERS TO CLOSE TO MININUN POSITION.
- A* TRAIN WAS IN SERVICE AT THE TINE.
16E T APE WAS REPAIRED AND THE SYSTEMS WERC RETURNED o
TO NORNAL OPERATIONS.
MONTICELLO TELECON VIA ENS AT 0010 CST ON 06/12/85. WHILE OPERATING AT 1001 t
TO DO & SRI POWER. A REACTOR TRIP OCCLRRED.
THE CAUSE Es TK FOLLOWUP PER NC ISI5 TRIP WAS PERSOpmEL ERROR WHICH OCCURRED DURING o
YtE PERFORMANCE OF A GROUP I ISOLATION SURVEILLANCE TEST.
TRAIN *B* HAD IsEEN TRIPPED DL#tlNO THE TESTING AND BEFORE TRAIN "9" WAS RESET.
THE TECHNICIAN BEGAN TESTING ON TRAIN *A* RESta. TING IN A OROUP o
I ISOLATION AND A REACTOR SCRAM.
ALL SYSTEMS RESPONDED AS REQUIRED IN RESPONSE TO TK TRIP.
YlE RESIDENT t
INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.
O OUAD CITIES I TELECON FROM SRI ON 06]IAL SERVICE IMS FROrt RESI2/95 AT 1000. lA4ILE TRANSFERRING ESSENT SRI FOLLOWING e
ERVE FEED TO NORMAL LICENSEE ACTIONS FEED. THE SPGTS AUTO STARTED. THE START SIONAL CAME FROrt THE IB REACTOR isu!LDINO VENT RAD NOMITOR.
THE SIONAL WAS SPURIOUS.
THE SOURCE OF itE SIGNAL g
COULD NOT DE TETERMINED IA SPIKE IN TFE MONITOR OR A SPI AE ASSOCIATED WITH SWITCHINO FEEDSI.
s e
DAILY REPORT'RIII 06/I3/05 FACILI TY /LICEPe1EE NOTIFIC ATION ITEN OR EVENT e
DIVISIsA OF RADI ATION SAFETY AND SAFEOUARDS REOlONAL ACTION s
NPI/ SYNC +WI
~
NR. NC CLINTOCK. NP( AND REPRESENTATIVES FROrt O
l SVNCOR WILL NEET WIWf NESGRS. AIELOWN AND ADAP1 INFORMATION P
TO DISCtras THE PROPO'ED NPI/SYPEOR NERGER AND THE COrtBINATION OF TIC TWO CHICAGO BASED PHARNACIES.
s
e ce notetet roles ear underwelttee footc. The LSD sclustseA a r.c le fsd inteestsee of the *%*
trete ecgw%ccr. the %* smer ges.c r datee t serwr et er f ED08 cao loodano of the 34 4teuV seereescv bes este the EOG.
Pee other ESF tveteos estveted. The
- O* EDO wa s st.ut down e t is0S r.m.
e r.d i t.e JR 4 8 4,0V
)
bus restored to,noteel.
Reuttne Fellowwe.
~
Veen. 3&2 Telecen by Potential 50.55(e P f eastrwctlen Def ec tency neeert - M19 - Seteesc M
ters 50-424 Licensee. 6/83 Owettiscorsen F Claes6 IE Electescal Conductor Seal Assee6sses ([CSA*el.
So-4.5 Durino a reuttne rewtow of electescal phwsecal levout drawines. Ipechtet determined that decweentatten d84 set estet der the sessetc quelsfacetten 3
of coe68ned ESCA's and electrical bem essentites. The ECSA's were
(~
eevnted on Jwctlen benes. hiph enerer 14ne break bones, and ewl1 6 emes.
Each seeeenent wee individweity setselcelly guellited het no evidence 8%
esists thev esere qualified as combined essentlies. It connet new be O
dos.enettsted that these cestined essentlies will Perform their intended j
eately functione ductne a seleesc event.
Ipechtel to new conductino en n
ewelwetten of ti.e coe68aed essemelles to worify that the qual 8ficetten
~
Iovels envetere thsee orteinelly predicted for the combined instelletten.
Resten it util followwe.
n l
p&
n DAILY MPORT RIII BATES 06/84/05 o
("I FACI.8 iV/ LICENSEE NoTiFICAT8ON ITEM OR EVENT MGl0BetL ACT10N O
DIVlatoM OF RAD SAFETV & SAFEGUAADS O
SRAg wnnn:
TELECOM FROM LICEseSEE TDE t.lCENSEE REPORTED THAT A88 30eIVIDuAL ECONTItACTOR TK LICENSEE HAS
. U ON R & 6/83/93 EMPt.OVEE S HAS SEEN IDENTIFIED AS A SanPECT IN YtE INCitEASED ACCESS 4.,,,
VANDALISM te43CH HAS KEN OCCURRIle0 ONSITE. TE CONistoLS 70 T6E Ite0IVIDuAL teas CCeFRONTED WITH TDE FACTS Ofr TpE CONSTRUCT 8000 $8TE ts VANDALISM SITUATION Asso WAS TOLD THAT DE WAS M8800 AND HAS ORMRED TDE v
SARRED ACCESS TO ALL Cofft0NEALTH EDISome pears FAR SECtNITY FORCE TO CALL SITES.
THE lacDIVIDUAL DID NOT ADMIT TO T E TK SM RIFF'S OFFICE e.,
VANDALISM. ND PRCALEMS EME E8eCOLDITERED Ape TDE Seejuto TW INDIViouAL INDIVIDUAL LEFT TE SITE WIT 6eAJT ItsCIDENT.
DE FOLJMD ONSITE AseD HAW TDE PERSost w
ARfsESTED FOR TRESPASS.
w DIVISI0st OF REACTCdt Ph(LECTS f w i
FERrt. 2 A MEETIsso IS SEIsso MLD TODAY 808 TIE MOION III 18 FORMATION OFFICE WITH tee LICEasSEE TO DISCUSS DETROIT
! w EDISgse*S PLAmeED PtANAK8ENT M(dtGANIIATION AT TIE w
FERMs PLApef. FOLLOWIND TPE KEilteG A ROUTI9E 9I-MEscLY PLAssT STATUS FEET 18e0 IS ALSO SCMDLA.ED.
w OunD CITIES 2 TELECOss FRort SRI LDelf 2 WILL 00 OFFLIE SATURDAY tU/058 Afde flE RESID[NT Ise5PEDTOR
~
M7telm IN HOT SHUTDOMM WHILE TDE FOLLOWI8so taste PLACE: IS FOLLOwlse) TK j w 8 3 MPAIR TO CIV eS. 23 MPAIR SEVERAL LEAS (S Its EHC LICENSEE ACTIosts.
SYSTEM. 39 MPAIR A PtAIN CONMasSOft ItEVERSE FLOW VALVE.
AND 4 3 REPACat A LEAst!NG VALVE.
TDE MPAIRS AhE EEPECTED w
TO M COMPLETED. AND 1DE LDdIT SACK ONLIIE SATLatDAY EVENI943.
j e
DAVIb-Kb5E SITE teart (UPDATE e TIE FtALOWies0 AteE TW MSta.TS OF TDE SECONDAAY IDF0fettAfl0N Ost.V tur e SITE -RApIOLOGICAR. AmeALYSES (GAMrth SffCTh0SCdPVs l
~
PEhFleertEta Es[FhhE. (AJRING AND AF TER THE EVEprT *0F 6/ip/85.
N TIC SArePLES WEs<E OSTAINED FRort iK CON 0L9tGATE PUPP O[LCHAhti, j
sp
.Jube: 3 & F.
Ifr0S - 0 UCl/It j
.AJNC 9.
3903 = 0 UCI/Pe.
==
- AseC 10. t905 - 0.UCI/.r.e e
.e 3(r
.J k.
rhe f6 N
ll.
4 I
1
CENERAL 9
e Cometsets,ner tech end his T;chnical Amelitant, acceepented by the Reglose 11 Frsjects Section Cht:f and the North Anne Reeldent inspectore, are touring the North Anna Nuclear Stat toe.
~
DAILY REPORT Rill DATE: 06/IF/s3 FACILITT/ LICENSEE NOTlFICATION ITEM OE EVENT BFA10NAL ACTION OFFICE OF THE REC 10NAL ADMINISTRATOR CENERAL MR. CORDELL REED VICE PRESIDENT. 00ste0NWEALTN INFORMATI&A EDIS0se COMPANT WILL BRIEF MR. JAMES C. REPPLER AND MEMBERS OF IIIS STAFF ON TNE ACTIVITIES OF TWE NUCLEAR UTILITT MANAGEMENT AND NUMAN RESOURCES C0e9etTTEE (NUMARC).
DITISION OF REACTGR PROJECTS BRAIDWOOD TELECON FROM SRI ON JUNE I4. 1991 AT APPRORIMATELT 1I000 P.M. A INFORMATION QHISTRUCTION WORRER DIED OF NATURAL CAUSES (NEART ATTACE). THE IDCAL AUTHORITIES WERE NOTIFIED BY CECO.
DRESDEN 2 FOLIAWileC A SNORT CUTACE FOR SNURSER INSPECTIONS fur 00 MAT 10N AND MISCElJANEOUS MAINTENANCE ITEMS. THE UNIT WAS PUT BACE ON LINE AT 10:35 A.M. Det 06/I4/85 (BEFEREleCE REPORT OF 06/10/85). THE OUTACE. UNICM SECAN ON 06/09/05 WAS SLICNTLY thesCER TNAN ANTICIPATED DUE TO FR0eLEMS WITN TNE ID MAIN STEAM LINE (MSL) 1501JT1088 TALVE LINIT SWITOIES AND SNUBBER INSTRUMENTATI0st.
DIvtStolt OF RADIAftoet SAFETT AND SAFECUARDS DAftS-sESSE setAusLICENsth ON 06/13/83 AN Alt OPERATED SORIC ACID DISCNARCE SRI CONTINUINC TEIACON Ost 06/16/0$
TALVE WAS FOUND WITN THE AIR SUPPLY 10 THE OPERATOR TO MONITOR ONSITE ISOLATED DURIleC A SURVEILLANCE TEST. MAD TWE AND RECIONAL j
TALVE (MU-23) SEEli CALLED UP0e1 TO OPEN. IT WotfLD SAFECUARDS STAFF 1807 ItAVE FUleCTIONEDI IIDWEVER. THE STATUS WOULD ARE ALSO MONITORIIeC NAVE BECOME ENOWN TO THE CONTROL BOOM teceEDI ATELT.
AD0lfl0NALLY THIS TALVE COULD MAVE BEEN SfrASSED TO ALLETIATE THE ANOMALT IF NEEDED. IT IIAS APPARENTLY BEEN OPERATED T:15 PREvt005 DAT. Telt CAUSE FOR THE ISOLATION IS NOT RNOWN. THE LICENSEE IS INVESTICATING AND THE lAT WAS NOTIFIED.
h N
MORNINC REPORT - RECION IV DATE:
.fUNE IF. 1985
4 13
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9 MORNING REMHtT - REGION 11 DATE: JUNE 19, 1985 CENERAL THE DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTICATION COORDINATION STAFF AND A MEMBER OF HIS STAFF ARE IN HEADQUARTERS TO ATTEND THE ENFORCEMENT C00RDINATOR'S QUARTERLY MEETING.
DAILT REPORT RIII DATE: 06/19/85 FACILITY / LICENSEE NOTIFICATION ITEM OR EVENT RECIONAL ACTION DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS ZION I SRI UNIT I WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE FOLIAWING A 138 DAY INFORMATION ONLT REFUELING AND MAINTENANCE OUTAGE. THE UNIT WENT CRITICAL AT 8:25 A.M. ON J9NE 14,1985 AND WAS TIED TO THE CRID AT 4:47 P.M. ON JUNE 18,1985. MAJOR JOBS DURING THE OUTAGE INCLUDED REACTOR COOLANT PUMP (RCP)
ROTOR REPAIR FOR THE BC AND ID RCP'S, I A St PUMP REPIACEMIFT, SC EDDY CURRENT TESTING AND TURE PLUCCING, REPLACFJ8ENT OF ALL NORMALLY ENERCIZED 8?D REACTOR PROTECTION RELAYS, FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS TO INSTALL ISOLATION BETWEEN CONTROL Ro0M AND REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANELS, EQ MOV AND SOLEN 0lO VALVE INSPECTION, AND CONTROL ROD DRIVE SHAFT BENT THERMAL SLEEVE REPAIR.
DAVIS BESSE Rill SITE TEAM (UPDATE) THE LICENSEE MAS SURMITTED, FOR REVIEd, INFORMATION ONLY TWO ADDITIONAL ACTION PtANS ONE FOR THE TURBINE SYPASS VALVE AND THE OTHER FOR THE SOURCE RANCE MONITORING SYSTEM. IN ADDITION, THE FFT HAS REVIEWED THE I.lCENSEE'S ACTION PLAN ON THE MAIN FEED PUMP CONTROL SYSTEM; THE LICENSEE PLANS TO START WORR ON THE MAIN FEED PUMP TURRINE CONTROLS THIS AFTERNOON (6/19/85).
AT THE PRESENT TIME, RIII INSPECTORS ARE ON-SITE FOLIAWINC THE LICENSEE'S ACTIVITIES ON AUXILIARY FEEDWATER VALVE 608 AND WILL FOLIAW THE ACTIVITIES ASSOCI ATED WITH THE MAIN FEED PUMP CONTROLS.
E!ESDEN UNIT 2 TELECON FROM ON JUNE 17,89$5, AT 2:40 A.M. (CDT) THE UNIT EXPERIENCED FOUAWUP PER MC 2585 A REACTOR SCRAM FROM HI HI SCRAM DISCHARCE VOLUME LEVEL.
< U'.
THE UNIT FUNCTIONED NORMALLY AND NO ECCS WERE RF. QUIRED.
THE CAUSE OF THE SDV LEVEL INCRF.ASE WAS A 1. EARING CRDM SCRAM OUTLET VALVE. REPAIRS ARE REING PERORNED.
F01. LAWING REPAIRS, THE UNIT WILL RE RESTARTED.
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% l6 CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER d4 f f]
June 10,1985 Docket No. 50-346 Toledo Edison company ATTN: Mr. Richard P. Crouse Vice President Nuc1 ear Edisen Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toleco, OH 43652 Gentlemen:
This letter confirms the conversations on June 10, 1985, between you and Charles E. Norelius of my staff related to the reactor trip at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant on June 9,1985.
While operating initially at 90% power, a reactor trip and other subsequent problems with the main and auxiliary feedwater systems resulted in a situation where no feedwater-flow was available for 10-12 minutes causing low level in the steam generators.
With regard to the matters discussed, we understand you have taken or will take the following actions:
1.
Hold in abeyance any work in progress (electrical or mechanical) and/or any work planned on equipment that malfunctioned during the incident, such as dismantling or disturbing existing evidence, until the NRC Investigative Team has had an opportunity to evaluate this event and concur on your proposed corrective action (s).
3.
Review main steam isolation valve actuation.
Establish the cause(s) of the unexplained closure of both MSIVs.
a.
b.
Determine and implement the corrective action (s) necessary to prevent recurrence.
Perfom additional testing to ensure the MSIVs operate as required.
c.
3.
Review the auxiliary feed system actuation.
Establish the cause(s) of the inadvertent trip of both auxiliary
~
a.
feedwater pumps (AFP).
b.
Determine and implement the corrective action (s) necessary to prevent recurrence.
l CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER l
1 e
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CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER
~
.i
' Toledo Edison Company 2
June 20, 1985 4.
Review the main feed system operation.
a.
Establish the cause(s) of the inadvertent trip of the No. I main feed pump (MFP).
j i
b.
Detemine and implement corrective action (s) to prevent recurrence for both main feed pumps.
5.
Complete and submit to NRC Region III the results of your investigation of this ever.t including your safety evaluation, an evaluation of thereal shock considerations for both Steam Generators (SG), the maximum S/G shell differential temperature, and possible general mechanical damage to any affected system (s).
Also report your basis for event classification and the adequacy of information as, originally reported to the NRC on June 9, 1985.
5.
Complete the actions required by items 1-5 and obtain verbal concurrence from the NRC Region III Regional Administrator or his designee prior to authorizing restart (Mode 2) of the reactor.
7.
Main and Auxiliary Feed System Testing.
Perform testing which can be performed below 5% power, of the MFP's a.
to demonstrate all pumps operate as required.
b.
Perform testing of the AFP's to assure all pumps operate as required.
c.
Appropriate test results, your conclusions, and a summary of corrective sctions taken will be provided to the NRC resident i
office upon completion.
8.
Af ter all actions required above are completed obtain verbal concurrence I
from the NRC Region III Regional Administrator or his designes prior to exceeding 5% reactor power.
6 1
l CONFIP(ATORY ACTION LETTER
I-c._ n CONFIRMATORY
- ACTION LETTER RIII-CAL-85-06 Toledo Edison Company 3
June 10, 1985 Please let us know immediately if your understanding differs from that set forth above.
$1ncerely.
Cric!nel stened by
.?:'. ' : G. K,.:sr James G. Keppler Regional Administrator cc w/ enclosure:
S. Quennez. Station Superintendent-DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIOS)
Resident Inspector, RIII Harold W. Kohn, Ohio EPA James W. Harris, State of Ohio Acbert H. Qui 11in, Ohio Department of Health
~
6 CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER RIII.
RIII RII RI RIII f0',
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Feyney/kr Gree n
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U.S. 30 CLEAR REGULATORY CDMNISSION 3
RECION III~
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DAVIS-BESSE - LOSS OF ALL MAIN FEEDWATER AND AUXILLARY FEEDWATER JUNE 9. 1985 (A, DEAGAZIO, NRR)
LOSS OF ONE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP AT 90% POWER.
REACTOR TRIP AT 78% POWER ON HIGH PRESSURE.
BOTH MSIVS CLOSE SPURIOUSLY TRIPPING REMAINING MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP.
STEAM GENERATOR LOW LEVEL STARTS BOTH AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS BUT BOTH TRIP ON OVERSPEED.
NO FEEDWATER AVAILABLE FOR ABOUT EIGHT MINUTES AND STEAM GENERATOR LEVELS FELL TO ABOUT EIGHT INCHES.
PORV CYCLES THREE TIMES - DID NOT RESEAT ON THIRD CYCLE, OPERATORS CLOSE BLOCK VALVE, STARTUP FEEDWATER PUMP USED TO FEED ONE STEAM GENERATOR.
~
OPERATORS RESTART AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS AND RESTORE NORMAL POST-TRIP CONDITIONS.
NO INDICATION THAT SUBC00 LING MARGIN WAS LOST OR THAT REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITY WAS ABNORMAL.
PLANT NOW IN COLD SHUTDOWN.
NRC INVESTIGATION TEAM ONSITE.
REGION III ISSUED CAL REGARDING PLANT SHUTDOWN UNTIL EVENT REVIEW AND EQUIPMENT RESTORATION IS COMPLETE.
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'In the inatter of:
MEETING BETWEEN THE NRC STAFF AND TOLEDO-EDISON COMPANY CONCERNING AFW SYSTEMS a
Docket No.
Location: Bethesda, Maryland Date: Monday, June 17, 1985 Pages:
1 - 50
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ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES-I.
Court Reporters 15 7 5 T. St. - N.W.
Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
$Wb L1 5?{f
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I 4
1 0
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 MEETING BETWEEN THE NRC STAFF AND TOLEDO-5 EDISON COMPANY CONCERNING AFW SYSTEMS 6
7 8
Room P-110 g
phillips Building 10 7920 Norfolk Avenue M
11 Bethesda, Maryland
. L 12 Monday, June 17, 1986 13 14 The meeting in the above-entitled matter convened, 15 pursuant to notice, at 10:30 o' clock, a.m.,
Mr. Harold Denton, 16 presiding.
e 17 NRC ATTENDEES:
18 H.
Denton NRR
-l 19 B.
Sheron DSI 20 C.
Parr DSI 21 W.
Houston DSI 22 J.
Stolz NRR 23 F.
Rowsome OST 24 A.
DeAgazio NRR 25 D.
Eisenhut NRR l
. ~-
l C
2 1
NRC ATTENDEES (continued) 2 A.
Thadani Safety Technology 3
D.
Wessman Division of Licensing 4
A.
El-Bassioni PRAB 5
B.
Newlin Public Affairs 6
G.
Lasnas NRR 7
F.
Miraglia NRR 8
9 LICENSEE ATTENDEES:
10 J.
Silberg, Esquire 11 8.
Fink 1
8 12 R.
Gradomski 13 8.
Peters 14 T.
Myers 15 S.
Jain E
16 M.
O'Reilly i
g7 IS ALSO PRESENT:
19 L.
Conner Doc-Search Associates 20 R.
Borsum Babcock & Wilcox 21 J.
Nurmi Engineering planning & Mgmt 22 M.
Ryan Nucleonics Week 24 san 25
t l
3 1
p ROC EED 1 N GS g
(10:30 a.m.)
3 MR, DENTON:
Good morning.
My name is Harold 4
Denton.
I want to thank you for coming in on such short 5
notice.
6 The purpose of this meeting as to develop a 7
chronology of actions that have been taken on the feedwater 8
system at Davis-Besse and the studies which have been done 9
leading to those actions.
10 1 rea l ize I didn't give you enuch lead time to 11 prepare for this meeting, and all this information was not yet
- ("*q
(!
12 available.
But I have had the Staff go through our files on 13 what has transpired between us with the steamline accident, 14 and I wanted to be sure we had a complete chronology developed
~
15 on that point.
16 I think there have been some questions asked since 17 the incident at Davis-Besse as to what the status of 16 operations is and when at would be completed a rid this mort of 19 thing, and I would like to get a clear understanding of what 20 you have done, what studies you've done, and we'll chip in 21 with our knowledge of the process where we can.
Ec Beforo we begin, 6 think at might be useful to go munst t53
.-e->'.
.a n 't a-h n u t :m a i don t : fif 1 h r.. s.: ' er r ed
- F ::
24 responsibilities for the record.
25 Why don't we start. Al, with you.
a
)
4 1
I am Al DeAgazio. Davis-Besse 2
Project Manager in the Division of Licensing.
3 MR, STOLZ:
I'm John Stolz, Branch Chief of the 4
branch to which Davis-Besse is assigned, g
5 MR. RDWSDME:
I'm Frank Rowsome. Division of Safety
~
i 6
Technology.
7 MR. EISENHUT:
Darrell Eisenhut, Deputy Director of t
B NRR.
A 9
MR. DENTON:
Harold Denton, Director of NRR.
10 MR. SHERON:
I'm Brian Sharon, Chief of Reactor 11 Systems Branch, DSI.
C 1-l 12 MR. PARR:
Clan Parr, Chief. Auxiliary Systems.
e
,j 13 Branch.
14 MR. HOUSTON:
Wayne Houston, Assistant Director for DSI 15 Reactor Safety and today Acting Division Director,
~
e 16 MR. THADANI Ashok Thadani, Chief, Reliability And 17 Assessment Branch.
i
?9 MR WESSMAN:
I'm Dick Wessman, representing the 19 Branch Chief of the Division of Licensing.
20 MR. FINK:
Bob Fink, MPR Associates, consultant to 21 Toledo Edison.
22 MR. ORADOMOKI Rich Gradem@8, Engineer.
Mn AF.TERS:
Onb Aeters, l.icensing Manager 24 MR. SILBERG:
Jay Silberg, Shaw. Pittman, Potts &
1 25 Trowbridge, Attorneys.
5 1
MR. JAIN:
Sushil Jain, I'm with Tole,do Edison.
2 MR. MYERS:
Director, Core Safety and Licensing, 3
Toledo Edison.
4 MS. BRYAN:
Margaret Bryan with " Nucleonics Week."
5 MS. NURMI Joy Nurmi with Engineering planning &
6 Management.
7 MR. NEWLIN Bob Newlin, public Affairs. NRC.
8 MS. O'REILLY:
Mary O'Rel!Iy, Toledo Edison.
9 MR. DENTON:
We have t wo more seats for anyone w>:o 10 would like to move forward.
11 MR. BORSUM:
Babcock & Wilcox.
12 MS. CONNOR:
Lynn Connor. Doc-Search Associates.
13 MR. MIRAGLIA:
Frank Miraglia, Deputy Director of 14 Licensing, NRR.
~
15 MR. LAINAS:
Gus Lainas, Assistant Director.
16 Operating Reactors, Division of Licensing.
17 MR. EL-BASSIONI-Adel El-Bassioni 1*m with pRAB.
13 MR DENTON For the benofit of ti.e pueple whc ;w=t 19 arrived, what we're doing today is developing a chronology of 20 actions that have been taken at Davis-Besse regarding the 21 feedwater system and the auxiliary feedwater system since the 22 TMi accident Ww do not intend to get into any discussions of M
vhat happened re:cr+!y
- Osv!. M e _. c.
- ut th.; is ic gu b46 24 to some of the earliest actions that were taken in the sumer 25 of '79 and to bring those forward.
And I would like to go
6 i
1 forward right up until your plans for late this, year regarding 2
completing the operating of the auxiliary feedwater' system, 3
including the larger pump associated with the electric drive 4
system for the auxiliary feedwater.
5 So at this point. AI, unless there are some other 6
preliminaries to get into, I propose that we let Toledo Edison 7
have the floor and give us your understanding of the actions 8
that have transpired.
A g
MR. DeAGAZIO:
I think we can probably do that.
10 MR. MYERS:
I am here on behalf of Dick Crouse, who og 11 apologizes for not being able to come down here.
We have 12 brought several of our key individuals from the engineering i
13 and licensing area, who have been involved with the auxiliary 14 feedwater system over the years.
It was our intent to 15 exchange information today at your request from Saturday, 4
e 16 much as we could, and if anything was left unvalidated or 17 preliminary, like much of our information is that we developed i
18 yesterday and thin morning, we would ver ify that in time to 19 support any further use of that information that we've been 20 involved with that perhaps people have not been aware of over 21 the years.
22 MR. DENTON:
I think what might be useful would be
?
f o,-
u:s !s g,: j e'. 4 par i ve;.Si t i,n..
tc.avicw tho 1e 4.. w. pt 24 and then provide any additional clarifying material that you 25 think might be appropelate.
l l
7 1
MR. MYERS:
We appreciate that 2
The intention we have this morning w--
to provide a 3
short description of our auxiliary feedwater system.
4 recognizing several people may be new to it or have not been 5
involved recently in it to bring the system back into focus.
6 I think most of the indaviduals or many of you here have b e e r.
7 involved over the years since TMI with Davis-Berse. but I will 8
give you a short review of its operation and its basic design a
9 and then go into both the procedural and the modification 10 activity that we've been involved with since TMI.
M 11 Again, much of that has been exchanged with you.
12 Some of that has not specifically been identified to you.
The 13 intent today is to come up with a complete list.
Hopefully, 14 that would give you both of those packages.
15 As I said, we have some of our people here, but some 16 of our key people are also back supporting the fact-finding e
17 team.
So if we need to validate any information or if there 19 are burning questions, wa c ar. p r c b a r, :, St.!! d r.
that teday by 19 phone.
But to at least give you an overview of what those 20 changes have been, we should be able to supply that here.
21 We are working again back at Toledo to actually R?
3dentify sctual Installatten and modefication datoc f or-you te 1
1 23 qive you an accurate chronology of exactly when these 24 modifications were in place.
We can give you estemates today, 25 to the best of our knowledge and what we were able to come up
(
l l
5 0
1 with yesterday.
But we will be validating, ane you should 2
recognize this is preliminary information, so we can append 3
the transcript, possibly, with any changes that we would find 4
in the interim to validate that information for you.
5 I would like to introduce now Mr. Jain, who will be 6
describing in general the system function.
I had expected a 7
sma l l,er meeting, so unfortunately our overhead doesn't seem to e
focus large enough.
9 We have a system layout drawing that we will pass 10 around that will help in the discussion.
11 MR. DENTON:
Do you have sufficient copies?
If not, 12 we would make some.
13 MR. MYERS:
I think we do, hopefully.
14 e
This is a simplified drawing and is not the actual, 15 exact detalI~that's in the field.
Any differences will be 16 pointed out as we go through, but I think it will offer a 17 basis for discussion.
16 MR. JAIN:
Davis-Besse right now has two 19 independent, redundant trains of auxiliary feedwater systems.
20 The mode of power provided right now is a steam turbine, and 21 each train, which drives one full hundred percent capacity aux 22 feedwater pump, normally is taking suction from the condensate st.vege tank Thu. -e. am e r.
8 Sunplee< and t%c
<J fo'y grad
- 24 supplies the service water system, for which we have an 25 automatic switchover from the condensate to the service water
i 9
1 in the event of a LOCA condition from the condensate storage 2
- tank, 3
On the discharge side, we have each aux feed pump 4
discharging to its respective steam generator with provisions 5
for crosstles, so that each aux feed pump can feed either 6
steam generator at a given time.
We have similar crossties on 7
the steam inlet side on the aux feed pump turbine.
Normally O
the No.
1 steam generator would be providing steam to the 9
No.
1 aux feed pump turbine, and the No. 2 steam generator 10 would be doing that for the No. 2 aux feed pump turbine.
We 11 have similar crossovers where any steam generator can provide C'
12 steam to either aux feed pump turbine.
13 The initiating system for the aux feedwater system 14 is what we call a steam and feedwater rupture control system.
15 The SFRCS, as we call it, is actuated on four different 16 parameters ranging from steam at low-level for 17 loss-of-feedwater condition, a loss at the coolant pumps to 18 promote natural circulation, and then a steamline break, which 19 is a low steam pressure condition.
20 The alignment of valves on the discharge of the 21 pumps, as well as the steam inlet to the turbines, is 22 dependen* men wk.ich s t oain genera;ce is good, meanirig whoch I
?*
has <;.ad crac<ura ft a n t o.* - g e r. n - s t e r %si g in a p
- 6 24 considered to be a bad generator, and auxiliary feedwater is 25 isolated from that generator, and so is the steam coming from i
10 1
that steam generator.
2 The system that we have right now is essentially all 3
safety grade components, both on the steam inlet as well as on 4
the discharge side, with all the motor-operated valves 5
supplied from either the diesel, in the case of loss of 6
offsite power, or from the DC power supply from one train of 7
the aux feedwater system.
.~
8 Tgat is the basic overview of the system, very 9
briefly.
10 MR. DENTON:
What is the function of the system
.g 11 labeled " steam generator wet layup generation and x,
- !?
12 recirculation pumps?"
13 MR. JAIN:
This drawing includes two systems.
The 14 basic intent here is to look at the aux feed pumps.
The
.5 recirc pumps are used when you have flooded the steam e
16 generator during a shutdown condition, and you have the steam 17 generators in a wet layup condition, and then you want to 18 insert to maintain chemistry, and you have steam generators 19 flooded up to the top nozzle.
20 MR. DENTDN:
So thdt's merely a recirculation 21 system?
22 MR.
JAIN:
Correct.
That is merely relevant to what
.s e ', e 4:
.g N.
+w 16y 24 MR. DENTDN:
Let's stop and see if the Staff has any 25 questions about this system.
i
11 1
MR. STOLZ:
Were you also going to discuss the 2
startup pump and its relationship to supporting the aux feed 3
system that you show here?
4 MR. MYERS:
Verbally describe that.
5 MR. EISENHUT:
Before you do, though, if we could 6
maybe on the aux feed system, with what you were just 7
desccJbing, the normal mode, then, on any event such as a low B
steam generator level would be that both aux feed pumps get a 9
signal to turn on?
10 MR. JAIN:
Correct.
11 MR. EISENHUTt And they actually get a signal to i
12 turn on, and are there any valves that have to open?
Where 13 would the normal water supply be coming from in such an 14 event?
Could you just describe the scenario of what would 15 have to happen to turn on the auxiliary feedwater?
16 MR. JAIN:
For a steam generator low-level 17 condition, there is one valve that has to open to supply steam 18 to the aux feed pump turbine, and those are s h own on the left 19 top of this drawing.
But for just a low-level condition, the 20 respective valve from the No.
I generator would open the 21 No.
1 aux feed pump turbine.
With respect to the valve for 22 the No. 2 generator, it would open the No. 2 aux feed pump ds turbsne.
24 MR. EISENHUT:
Could you tell me which those are on 25 this diagram?
l I
l
12 1
MR. JAIN:
100 and 107 is for the No.,2 aux feed 2
pump turbine.
3 On the discharge side, I will tell you what the 4
configuration is today, because we have changed it over the 5
last few years.
In the configuration today, there will be one 6
discharge valve that would have to open on a low-level signal, 7
and that would be 3070 and 3872 for the other generator.
~.
8 MR EISENHUT:
So given an event of a low-level or 3
9 dry generator, for whatever reason, upon the loss of -- or 10 low-level upon the loss of the main feed system, those four
_g
,11 valves would open, and that would normally turn on the aux f
12 feed system, and it would deliver flow to the steam generator?
13 MR. JAIN:
Correct.
The normal water supply in this 14 case would be the condensate storage tank.
15 16 17 10 19 20 21 22 24 25
13 0
1 MR. ROWSOME:
Would not HF-3GO also have to open?
2 MR. JAIN:
This is an older drawing.
AF'960 and 3
388, which were also on the discharge of the pump, they used 4
to be speed control valves.
It used to open on an rpm of 5
2800.
We have since deleted that interlock in order to 6
impr ove the reliability, it's one of the changes l'Il be 7
talking about later as to what has transpired.
8 MR. ROUSOME:
Okay.
They're normally open, then?
A g
MR. JAIN:
Yes.
10 MR. DENTON:
Could you start your description of the M
11 changes, beginning about the time of the TMl accident?
A-i
- 12 MR. MYERS:
Excuse me.
We had one other question 18 that John wanted, having to do with the current use of the 14 startup feed pump and how that would be utilized.
We can do 15 that before we get into.that.
16 MR. JAIN:
The startup feed pump, as it is e
17 configured right now, delivers water to the main feedwater 10 no22:en int > the etwam ger or a t or s.
It takw..wction or it 19 could also take suction from the condensate storage tank.
20 That's the normal alignment for the startup feed pump.
We 21 could go into detail as to what actions are required for it to 22 ha put in service, given a complete loss of feedwater -- mair.
23 and auxiliary feedwater.
24 MR. DENTON:
What is its normal function?
25 MR. JAIN:
The startup feed pump is basically there
i 14 1
to support low-power operation and for feedwater cleanup for 2
the steam generator chemistry again.
3 MR. DENTON:
And the capacity of that system again?
4 MR. JAIN:
It's 300 gpm.
-i t 's not enough to remove 5
decay heat by itself.
6 MR. LAINHS:
Was that about half the capacity?
7 MR. JAIN:
Yes.
8 MR. MYERS:
Any other questions as far as the basic 9
operation currently?
10 MR. THADANI That startup pump, what is the mode of 11 power for the pump and the assoclated valves?
12 MR. JAIN:
It's supplied from a nonessential 4100 13 bus, but we have provisions for it to be back'it from an 14 essential 4160 bus.
15 MR. MYERS:
Those are also discussed.
That activity 16 is also discussed in the changes we've provided over the I
17 years.
18 Anything else?
19 Okay, we have Mr. Jain will also continue, then, 20 if you want to talk about the equipment and associated 21 procedural changes.
Again, some of these -- the exact times 22 when they're implemented, we're in the process of validating.
l s.% vc
.,, e., i.....s.:
t...
2., r...I
.3
...,, 1 24 but we would jockey their positions, based en the actual times l
25 we would hopefully get back to you today or tomorrow or in the
e
'e 15 1
transcript here.
2 MR. JAIN:
Originally the Davis-Besse a u m' i t i a r y 3
feedwater system motor-operated valves were all AC power 4
operated.
We made changes so that the No.
I train over the 5
auxiliary feedwater system has valves which are all DC power 6
operated, so one train of valves is entirely independent of HC 7
power.
This change, we think, was done sometime in 1980 in 8
order to reduce the probability of human errors on manual 9
valve mispositioning in the flow path of both the aux 10 feedwater system as well as the startup feedwater system.
So 11 we have put padlocks on the local handwheels.
We have also s
12 put padlocks on local handwheels, as well as the pushbutton 13 stations for vital motor-operated valves in the field.
So 14 nobody in the field could inadvertently misposition those 15 valves.
[
16 There is an administrative procedure in place wh'ich 17 is a control on the positioning of both the manual valves, as 18 well as the motor-operated valves.
19 We have made provisions for the startup feedwater 20 control valve and the feedwater block valve to be controlled 21 from the control room by the operator.
These are the two 20 valves that get i sc la ted on a steam and feedwater rupture 1
2*
content system, which in the lentiating Sy s t eci ter
- he 1
24 auxiliary feedwater system.
So for a loss-of-feedwater l
25 condition, these valves will get isolated.
However, t h e'/ will
i 16 1
have to be reopened to provide startup feedwater to the steam 2
generators for a complete loss-of-feedwater condition.
3 We have provided the capability, so that the SFRCS 4
signal to these valves can be blocked from the control room, 5
and these valves can be reopened in order to expeditiously 6
provide feedwater to the steam generator and the startup feed 7
pump.
8 Mg. EISENHUT:
Can you point out where they are on 9
this?
10 MR. JAIN:
1*m afraid this startup feed pump is not dt
, t 1,1 on this drawing.
12 MR. EISENHUT:
But the valves also, they're not 13 on here, obviously.
Okay, thank you.
14 MR. JAIN:
Okay.
After the TMl accident, we were to 15 demonstrate that the aux feed pump turbine could be driven on 16 a dry steam generator.
We actually conducted a test where we w
l 17 ran the steam generators dry and started the aux feed pump t
l 18 turbine with a dry steam generator.
The test was successful.
l 19 The SFRCS --
l 20 MR. DENTON:
Let's stop there.
Can you describe a 21 bit more about the test?
Is that because when it's dry, it's 22 not really dry?
po Me
,an N st'=
dry
'a the n.'a<e F.-
hi-t*'me f
l 24 up steam in it with all the isolation on the feedwater as well
)
25 as the steam side.
j 17 1
MR. DENTON:
When you can the test, do you recall 2
what the pressure was?
3 MR. JAIN:
I don't recall personally.
We would have 4
to look at the test results.
5 MR. EISENHUT:
But the reason you can the test was 6
the concern that the pumps would not have any inlet flows --
7 sufficient inlet flows so that they would overstrip and 8
9 MR. JAIN:
The reason to do that test was to 10 d emon s t ra t e that you had enough power, if you will, in the 11 steam generator that could initially roll the turbine, and 12 once the turbine was rolled, you had enough water going into 13 the steam generater to start the cycle, the production of 14 steam, and then running the turbine again.
15 MR. EISENHUT:
But yet enough to actually start the 16 turbine flow?
17 MR. MYERS:
There was a question the question 18 we're trying to answer was, in all the lines and everything, 19 once the system was bottled up, would we lose the motor force 20 prior to getting water backflashing to raise pressure to 21 recover the motor force.
22 MH. TH404Ni-Can you tell me two things?
Number
~m
- e. v. sc..
-eq j6n
~,.
e..v t s..
t-s
- r o 24 Number two, is there any implication in terms of 25 controls?
Steam inlet valves, for example, and so on.
The
l 18 the speed of the turbine, what happens?
1 speed of the pump 2
MR. JAIN:
l*m afraid I cannot answer that. right 3
now.
I don't have firsthand knowledge of that.
4 MR. MYERS:
The test engineer is not here.
We can 5
get that information in the detailed test.
As a matter of 6
fact, I believe that was even submitted.
We can dig those 7
details up.
8 MR. DENTON:
Do you recall if this is one that we a
9 asked you to perform, or you performed it on your own 10 initiative?
-5 11 MR. MYERS:
I'm pretty sure the details were 12 provided.
I don't know whether it was one that was asked for 13 or was part of our program anyway.
I'd have to -- we changed 14 Project Managers and a lot of people since then.
I'm not sure 15 that we can dig that up,*too.
16 MR. DENTCN:
I think we've had a turnover of i
e l
l 17 personnel also in the intervening five or six years, and it's i
I 18 difficult for us to reconstruct all the details.
19 Let me ask just about dryout.
When you use the term 20 "dryout," what do you really mean with regard to the water j
21 level in the steam generator?
What does B&W normally mean
(
l 22 when they talk about dryout conditions?
Is that no liquid 23 remaining or --
l 24 MR. JAIN:
Well, the procedure that the operators l
f 25 are told to use is again, you have to realize what's l
l
I
{
19 1
happening to the level instrumentation, because the level 2
instrumentation doesn't read the actual level it'gives you 3
the indicated level, based on the conditions it was calibrated 4
to and so on.
5 The procedure they have been given is eight inches G
in the steam generator indicated, eight inches indicated -- it 7
could be anything actual, depending on what the steam 9
generator pressure is.
A 9
MR. DENTON:
I was asking in connection.with that 10 test you performed, whether there was water still in the M
11 bottom of the steam generator, or whether it,was
~1 12 MR. JAIN:
I think the assumption was that there was 13 no water, but we will have to dig further into that.
14 MR. EISENHUT:
A correlated followup question, if 15 you could look at it at the same time.
The B&W eight inches 16 left in the bottom of the vessel, is that the definition of a 17
" dry generator?"
What's the instrument error?
18 I think eight inches is B&W --
19 MR. MYERS:
It's a determination by the ATOG 20 guidelines, which utilizes an either/or level, eight inches or 21 b e l cw, or pressure below, and I believe that's 900 pounds.
22 Whather there is water or not, you should assume that that 23 generator is dry 1
24 MR. DENTON:
Why don't you go ahead, then, with your 25 chronology?
i l
(
20 1
MR. JAIN:
The steam and feedwater rupture control 2
system, as well as the auxiliary feedwater system,* utilizes 3
several pressure switches, either for actuation or for 4
protection of the pump or the steamlines.
Initially, for a 5
few years after we started up, we had recurring problems with 6
the p r e< <isc e swit hes They were f a i f i r.g at a very fast rate 7
because of corrosion problems in the diaphragm.
~~
8 We have since gone to a modified design for the 9
pressure switches, and since then, the failure rates of these 10 pressure switches have gone down considerably, which 11 essentially improves the reliability, because it eliminates 12 the potential failure mechanism for valves going inadvertently 13 closed or so on.
14 As part of the NUREG-0737 requirements, we installed 15 a control-grade flow 1.ndicator in each train of the auxiliary 16 feedwater system, and we also Installed a safety-grade flow a
17 indicator on each train.
These indicators have since been 18 tech spec'ed 19 MR. MYERS:
Those were part of the 0737 20 requirements.
Specifically the control-grade, I believe, was 21 part of the original startup after TMI, and 0737 required a 22 s a # e t y-gr ade = #,Sgr a de 23 MR. STOLZ:
Ted, as you go along, can you indicate 24 the dates when these were implemented?
25 MR. MYERS:
We're going to try to do that wherever
1 21 1
we can s however, the concern is that the best d,ates that we 2
have right now are off the top of a couple of engineers' 3
heads.
We will get those dates specifically down, so we can 4
have a chronology.
Where we have them, we'll provide them.
5 The control grade was prior to restart after TMI, 6
and the safety-grade was sometime en 1982, I think it was, 7
1982.
8 MR. JAIN:
We have also modified the control room 9
annunciator in order for the operator to be better able to 10 diagnose what has caused an aux feedwater pump or, train 11 inoperability, given that the pump has been dalled upon to 12 actuate during an accident or a transient.
13 Using that revised annunciator window and the
~
14 computer printout, we can tell what exactly has gone wrong 15 with the aux feedwater train and take remedial action to 16 correct it.
17 MR. LAINUS:
These are additional annunciators?
18 MR. J41N:
This was an additional annunciator, for 19 which we revised the logic, so it's for him to tell exactly 20 what went wrong.
1 21 As I mentioned earlier while describing the system, 22 we deleted the speed switch interlock from the auxiliary Po f e s t.1 t e r wmp c4 I g e:h e q n
..Iv.-
.t net rg*
a i-e ; a va.,-
~3 i!v 24 open with the local handwheel and the pushbutton stations l
25 locked to minimize the number of valves that had to open on
22 1
the discharge side.
2 in terms of the analyses we have done a f t.er TMI, the S
startup and makeup pump pORU analysis, which talked about 4
using the startup feed pump, if you lost both trains of 5
auxiliary feedwater, there was a l so a B&W reliability analysis 6
done as part of NUREG-0737 requirements, which was done on the 7
auxiliary feedwater system, and then in December '81 we 8
submI'tted a detailed PRA analysis of the Davis-Besse aux k
9 feedwater system and the several improvements that could be 10 made to it to improve the reliability overall
-4 11 MR. DENTON:
la that the one that was done by EDS7 n-C) 12 MR. JAIN:
Correct.
13 MR. DENTON:
Was there also a Bechtel study?
Was 14 there a Bechtel study of the aux feedwater system reliability.
15 in addition to the EDS report?
16 MR. JAIN:
I don't think there ever was a Bechtel e
17 reliability.
Thore was a B&W au>.
feedwater reliability 18 analysis done and submitted to the NRC.
19 MR. DENTON:
Just to be sure I understand, you have 20 mentioned so f ar three reports:
the original report done in 21 response to bulletins and orders, and then what was the second 22 report that you mentioned, the one done by B&W7 1
23 MR. JAIN:
Right.
I 24 MR. DENTON:
That was the reliability analysis of 1
25 the auxiliary feedwater system.
And then the third report was I
c r
23 1
the reliability analysis of the auxiliary feedwater system 2
also, but done by EDS?
3 MR. JAIN:
Correct.
To a different scope and to a 4
different detail 5
MR. EISENHUT:
Let's see, in fact, the last one that 6
EDS did was really the report submitted under NUREG-0757 of 7
the pRA study?
8 MR. JAIN:
No.
We never claimed that.
The B&W 9
analysis was part of the NUR EG-0737 requirements.
The EDS was 10 submitted basically to assess what we in the company could do 11 to improve the overall reliability of the aux feedwater
)
12 system, what options.
13 MR. EISENHUT:
Was it the study that concludes that 14 a third train of aux feedwater is not required?
15 MR. JAIN:
Correct.
16 MR. MYERS:
The conclusion was that there was equal e
17 improvement in reliabilities that could be made in utilizing 13 an installed pump and vther prww.Jures activities as the tnis d 19 pump, part of that third capacity full pump.
20 21 22 23 24 25
24 1
MR. JAIN:
There have been some procedural changes 2
excuse me.
I'm sorry.
We have also undertaken a 3
comprehensive government governor improvement program, 4
and Rick Gradomski is going to talk about that.
5 MR. DENTON:
We could also probably use an overall 6
government improvement program, too.
7 Claughter]
MR. SRADOMSKI
.I am Rick Gradomski from Toledo 8
9
- Edison, in dpeaking to the governors that are installed on 10 the Terry Turbine / Byron Jackson pump auxillary feedwater pump 11 turbine system, the Woodward governors that were originally
-5
)
. ~12 installed on this system were Woodward PGPL pneumatic type 13 governors that were modified with the addition of 'a Bodle 14 motor attached to the hand control knob to accept electric 15 pulse signals from the steam generator level control 16 There are two major points to this program other 17 than the fact that we continue to try to adjust and make 18 repairs as necessary to the modified pGPL system.
l l
19 MR. DENTON:
When did this system go into operation?
20 MR. GRADCMSKI This was September 1977 or July 1977 l
l 21 when we started it up.
22 MR. MYERS:
It was the original operational system.
23 MR. GRHDOMSKI.
From roughly startup until May of M. !'
au s: s:. ir u l *.
..'t'-
a*:*
'; s ' ' e pe r 1
'i>>
M8 25 system until it became apparent to us in roughly late 1901,
25 1
early 1982 that some sersous work and evaluation had to be 2
done on this in order to improve the reliability of..this 3
system in general 4
in May of 1982 the Woodward Governor Company began 5
conducting an evaluation of the Woodward governors supplied by 6
the Terry Turbine Company and modified by the Terry Turbine 7
Company for Davis Besse.
8 In approximately September of 1983, we had completed A
9 a major modification to eliminate speed setting problems 10 associated with adaptation of the electric motor drive to the M
11 manual hand control knob.
At that point in time there was a em a-(,,
12 1983 refueling outage, and we made changes to both the 13 installed governors and the spare governor that we had, so all 14 three of them were now modified as a result of the exhaustive 15 testing program that both Woodward and Toledo Edison had 16 conducted in order to solve a lot of the recurring mechani* cal e
l 17 problems that we were seeing.
18 In October of 1983, we began a program for the 19 qualification and installation of a replacement governer.
The 20 fixes that we had instituted in September of 1983 were at best 21 considered short term.
We knew that at this point in time we 22 couldn't continue to operate with the system as it was.
We 23 felt confident that the changes we had made had drastically I
f 24 improved the reliability of the governors and that had been 25 proved out in testing, that the recurring problems that we had
l 1
1 E
26 1
seen had, in fact, been solved.
2 Since that time, I don't recall any of the recurring 3
probiems wIth either j arron i ng on the high and low speed atops i
4 nor the problems of the slip clutch recurring since that point 5
in time.
6 MR. MYERS:
I thank en response to one of the early 7
bulletins and orders, we went back through the failures and 8
described those that had happened over the period of time.
9 Many of those were associated with valve operation as well as 10 governor speed settings.
This is the main thrust, that the 11 failures 'had been in that area.
We didn't mention that.
I h
12 just wanted to bring that in.
18 So go ahead.
14 MR. GRADOMSKl All right.
15 Again, in October 1983, we began a program for 16 qualification and installation to improve the reliability of i
17 the aux feedwater pump speed control.
As a result of that, in ha November 1984 during our last refueling outage, we i ris t a. l ud a 19 Woodward model pGG governor on auxiliary feedwater pump No.
2, 20 and we plan to install at the 1986 refueling outage, depending 21 upon the continued evaluation of the performance of the new 22 model PGG governor, we intend to install a new model pGG
?9 novernce on tha Mc
' a'rt ! l ' ary f e r -' v 4 t u pimp 24 MR. PETERS:
I'm Bob peters.
1*m going to discuss 25 the procedure generation and modification that we went through l
,-,.,,-,r--
m-
,an--r
,--,y
27 1
to support the use of the electric-driven startup feed pump.
2 prior to our restart from the TMI accident approximately May 3
1979, we generated a procedure that allowed the operators to 4
utilize the electric-driven startup feed pump to feed one 5
steam generator at a time.
Although we are not sure of the 6
emact dates, early on we provided the capability of powering 7
the electric-driven startup feed pump f r ees one emergency 8
diese'l generator, and subsequently we modified the plant to 9
allow the startup feed pump to be powered from either 10 emergency diesel generator.
11 As Mr. Jaim mentioned earlier, in September of 1980,'
)
12 we modified the procedure again to reflect the plant 13 modification that allowed the reset of the SFRCS trip on the 14 main feedwater block valves from the main control rocc.
This 15 allowed the control room operator to regain control of the i
16 main feedwater block valve to utilize the startup feed pump e
17 feed the selected steam generator.
i 16 Then in July of 1981, we again modified the 19 procedure to reflect the modification to the plant to allow l
l l
l 20 use of the startup feedwater valve l*m sorry. Regain l
21 control of the startup feedwater valve from the control 22 room. That, again, would be to reset the steam rupture control 23 system trip from the control room.
i 24 And then finally in January of this year, January 25 1985, this procedure was incorporated into our abnormal l
28 1
transient operating guidelines, the symptom-based operating 2
procedures that we have utilized that were developed as a 3
result of the TMl accident.
And that's it.
4 MR. MYERS:
That brings you up to current changes.
5 There are several additional changes that are being planned 6
that-are down in the areas of lower contributors but are still 7
in our plans in addition to the mode of the startup feed pump.
8 Sushul, would you like to cover those?
Mk. DENTON:
9 I would like for you to be sure and 10 cover the status of the latest amendment.
I guess It was
~
11 Amendment 83 that requires installation of a new startup 12 feedwater pump prior to starting cycle No.
6.
13 MR. JAIN:
As a result of the pRA study that we 14 submitted in 1981, we had iduntified there that one of the 15 most dominant contributdra to the aux feedwater unreliability 16 was the failure of the motor-operated valves.
To that end we e
17 designed and engineered several changes so as to reduce the 18 number of valves that have to open on demand for the aux 19 feedwater systen.
20 We ar e planning to leave the discharge valve on this 21 drawing 3870 and 72, leaving them normally open and locked 22 open, so that there wouldn't be any valve in the discharge of i
23 the pump which will need to be opened to provide water to the i
24 steam generator.
25 The other change that we are planning to make is the
29 1
change to the logic of the steam and feedwater rupture control 2
system, as I had mentioned earlier.
On low level or loss of 3
feedwater condition, the respective steam generator provides 4
steam to the corresponding aux feed pump turbine through its 5
normal path, MS-106 or 107 in this path.
6 The logic is to be changed such that when steam 7
generator can provide steam to both aux feed compartments 8
in o't'h e r w o r d s, two valves will open, providing two paths, two 9
redundant paths for a given aux feed pump turbine, so if one 10 path or one valve fails to open, the other path can still 11 provide steam to the aux f eed pump turbine.
12 So essentially, each aux feed pump turbine has got 13 two paths of steam for it to be run.
14 We are proceeding on designing changes to improve 15 the operation of the steam inlet valves.
The steam inlet 16 valves have several interlocks.
One interlock is the one'that e
17 closes these valves if you had a break in the steam inlet line 18 to the turbine itself We have proposed a tech spec change to 19 the NRC to delete that interlock so that the closure of the f
l 20 valve is eliminated and thereby eliminating a potential 21 failure by that valve.
1 I
22 These valves are also interlocked with the decay 23 heat drop line valves, and the interlock has been there 24 because once you go to the decay heat mode, you trip all your 25 reactor coolant pumps, and tripping all four reactor coolant
{
30 1
pumps starts the auxiliary feedwater system at pavis Besse, so 2
the interlock was provided to prevent inadvertent start when 3
you are going to the decay heat mode.
4 We are proceeding to delete that interlock and 5
taking manual action to de-energize the valve, which we 6
already have been doing for the last six or seven years anyway 7
to remove power from those valves so they don't come on open
.~
8 to start the aux feed pump turbine.
9 These two modifications essentially reduce all the 10 control systems or the Interlock failures that could 11 potentially contribute for these valves to fall to come up.
1t As part of the control room design review, we have 13 Identified several changes to the steam generator system, as 14 well as the SFRCS.
We are going to be providing a redundant 15 steam geneerator level and pressure indication in the control 16 room so the operator has better knowledge of the steam 17 generator status as far as what the level is and what the la pressure
- s. as far as its unabesity f or sua feedwater sy tem.
19 We are also going to be relocating some of the SFRCS 20 manual trip switches to enhance human engineering.
21 The normal suction supply from the condensate 22 storage tank has a valve that is normally open to provide PS s u r. t i ce. t v-the vex fead,c"mn + str b ' no, wf that,; - r i c f.,stret on 24 a low suction pressure to transfer to service water, which is 25 a seismic suction for the pump.
31 1
One potential failure mechanism would be that the 2
valve in the suction from the CST could spuriously.go closed, 3
thereby robbing the aux feed pump of water for a few seconds 4
before it is called upon to actuate, and then it transfers to 5
We are proposing to delete or remove power 6
from that valve so that particular failure mechanism is again 7
eliminated.
8 And finally, we are putting in a new startup feed a
9 pump which is of a higher capacity, which has a capability of to feeding water into the steam generator, both in the main
~*s 11 feedwater nozzles as well as the aux feedwater n ozz l e s.
We 4
12 were planning to implement that in the next refueling outage.
13 MR. DENTON:
What would the capacity of that pump 14 be?
15 MR. JAIN:
As I recall. 600 gpm, but we could 16 provide the exact number.
I e
17 MR. DENTON:
So that would be an estimate of the 10 equivalent capacity i
19 MR. JAIN!
It is equivalent to 100 percent capacity 1
20 decay heat removal aux feedwater pump.
I i
21 MR. DENTON:
Have you had any studles done of 22 reliability of this system since that one that you mentioned 23 done by EDS?
24 MR. JAIN:
What we have is we have internalized most l
25 of the risk assessment work. We have fault trees and other
32 1
models made up fer the system, but we are unable to support at 2
the present time any numbers in order to compare what the 3
numbers were when we submitted the EDS PRA study.
4 MR. DENTON:
Could you summarize what the EDS study 5
stated?
6 MR. JAIN-The promise of the EDS study was
- e 7
evaluate what we should be doing as far as spending our money 8
on installing either a third aux feed pump or otherwise a
9 improving the existing aux feedwater system to include the 10 reliability, and the analysis-based configuration in that M
11 report was the one that was aimed at addressing each of the 12 most dominant contributors to the unreliability and making 13 changes to the system to eliminate those dominant 14 contributors.
15 There was a third change analyzed in the report, 16 which analyzed a third aux f eed pump, if you will, and the e
17 analysis showed that you have a bigger improvement in 18 reliability for the analysis-based centiqorm+8em fe-a fe<4*r 19 expenditure, and you had lesser improvement in reliability for EC the third aux feed pump with a much greater expenditure.
Et MR. MYERS:
I think the third the moving of the 22 st ar tup feed pump was initiated and actually has several other 23 functions in addit 6en to providing 100 percent auxiliary 24 feedwater backup to our concept it eliminates some of our 25 operational concerns about limited startup flow. It gives us
33 1
improved operability in the normal function of the system, and
)
2 also helps separate some of our fire hazards as under the 3
Appendix R activities for control circuits and shutdown panels 4
and that sort of thing.
5 So there are quite a few issues that moving the i
6 startup feed pump into a different area and increasing its J
7 size actually addresses.
.~
8 MR. DENTDN:
If your configuration on the auxillary 9
feed pump system is different than ot,her S&W plants, as i 10 recall, do you happen to remember wha t the decision process It was leading to that decialon?
C's) 12 MR. MYERS:
Maybe there is some here that can la help. In reconstructing and that's as good as I can do.
14 trying to put it together I think if we r ememb e r
~
15 timeframe-wise, Davis Besse was late in the licensing period 16 to where safety-grade auxiliary feedwater systems were being e
17 discussed as requirements, and Davis Besse perhaps was the 10 first to actually entor de :. l g a.
a requ; red safaty ge*ade cf. tem, 19 safety-grade initial operation and control of the BalJ un i t s,
20 the 177 B&W units.
21 At that time the I'm not sure exactly how this 22 particular configuratien came out, but it was driven a lot on 23 this feedwater rupture control system, and the ded6cated 24 discharge -- you notice that is fairly unique pump to 25 generator rather than two pumps to header arrangement One
C 34 i
1 pump to one generator, and if you need cross-connectors, you 2
dedicate cross-connect, so that original thought process in 3
the instrumentation and in the original system seems to have 4
been generated in those days of converting from a normal 5
control grade for older p l a:St 's aux feedwater system into a 6
fully safety-grade aux feedwater seismic qualified 7
control-started system.
8 MR. DENTON:
la that normally under the jurisdiction b
9 of the vendor or the architect engineer?
10 MR. MYERS:
Architect engineer. The basic M
11 requirements for steam generator cooling are provided by the e
.L k
12 vendor s however, the particular design is architect engineer 13 specific, and safety-grade systems being now, probably was 14 fairly unique, I would imagine, during that timeframe.
I'm 15 not sure If maybe someone here can help alluminate. who was in 16 a position at the time who could help.
This was the '74 17 through '76 timeframe.
18 MR. DENTON:
Well, I had heard at least I had a
~~
19 memory, a recall that you had a study done, a Bechtel study 20 done, but you are saying you don't think Bechtel was ever 21 involved.
l 22 MR. MYERS:
in the original design?
l 23 MR. DENTON:
I'm not sure.
I thought there was 24 Bechtel involvement.
25 MR. MYERS:
Absolutely.
I'm sure there was Bechtel
35 1
in the original design of the system, and Consolidated 2
Controls was our vendor for the steam and feedwater. rupture 3
control system. So in the original design, that definitely was 4
the case.
5 MR. JAIN:
The effort that you may be thinking about 6
would be maybe a study that we had Bechtel do trying to define 7
different options for a third aux feed pump, and they did a 8
cost.' analysis as to which alternative was going to cos't how 9
much, and that's the one we were quoting when we met here four 10 or five years ago with the NRC would cost $6 million or $7 11 million.
That's the only involvement that I can think of in 12 those timeframes.
18 MR. DENTON:
That's probably the one i remember, 14 MR. ROWSOME:
I can clarify the record a little 15 bit.
There was a system reliability analysis done at Bechtel 16 by me.
I was at Bechtel at the time.
e 17 CLaughter.3 l
1e i
19 20 I
21 l
22 23 24 25 1
l l
l
36 in the 1974-75 period.
It was not at the request of 1
2 Toledo Edison.
It was submitted to the project desJgn team 3
and I presume passed on to you all.
But it was not at your 4
request.
5 It did not result, to my knowledge, in any design 6
changes.
7 MR. MYERS:
Do you re all in this t imef ra.no of the 8
original design, where you were, off project?
9 MR. ROW 50ME:
I was off project.
It was supported 10 under overhead as an exercise in developing Bechtel's i
11 capability in using fault tree analysis and system reliability 12 techniques, and it was not requested by the project.
13 MR. MYERS:
So you weren't really disowning the 14 actual design?
15 MR. ROWSOME:
No, it wasn't part of the design 16 effort.
e 17 MR. MYERS:
Good timeframe, though.
18 MR. DENTON:
Well, does that complete your 19 presentation?
20 MR. MYERS:
That completes our presentation.
- But, 1
21 if there are any questions, again as I said, we are in the 22 process now, still now, trying to actually get dates for 23 chronologies here.
i 24 Any discussion or questions concerning either the 25 studies or
a 37 1
MR. DENTON :
What I wanted was to be sure that we 2
had as complete a record of the studies and the physical 3
changes to the plant that we could amass.
4 Are there other studies you have now underway in the 5
system, or is there anything more you are doing with it, or do 6
you see the completion of the effort just described as 7
providing a satisfactory feedwater system absent some further 8
problems?
3 9
MR. MYERS:
Let me cover the philosophy which to wasn't, obviously, in the discussion of the individual items.
M 11 in our early review of the system it was felt that 4
C.
1 12 having the installed system being somewhat unique and somewhat 13 Inflexible to change, particularly without having a common 14 header on the discharge like many of the newer designs, would 15 have to allow options of dropping pumps onto the header and 16 that sort of thing, that we work on the major contributors to
~
17 unreliability of the installed septic rate aux feedwater 13 system.
Decause, aa we saw then, they were quite edunt6(tablo 19 and quite attackable.
The governor valve systems and 20 elimination of potential for new signals coming into isolate.
21 In addition we would provide procedurally a backup 22 to the cond6tien of loss of all main feed and auxiliary feed, and provids that te the opera *er.
.s e d algm enn*8a'sily imp" SUS 24 that for rallability.
So, just bringing an additional power 25 supply capability to it, and then from either side of the
~. -. _.. _ - -
38 1
plant, as we saw the opportunity to actually move the startup 2
feed pump to not only increase the size, but also increase the 3
capability to deliver directly into the feedwater nozzles, 4
which is highly desirable on the B&W generic design.
We 5
certainly did not let that opportunity go by at all 6
The intention is to continue to improve the 7
as-installed system while we are providing an upgrade also in E
the startup date of system supports, a
9 MR. DENTON:
Will this new system you are describing 10 actually replace the previous system?
M 11 Or, will you keep it in addition to the system you C-)
12 are talking about, talking about the upgraded pump and motor?
13 MR. MYERS:
The upgraded pump and motor will be 14 normally use to replace the startup feed pump.
It is in place 15 now.
16 MR. DENTON:
It will go in the same place in t h e' e
17 plant?
19 MC MYF9' Ch, no No We are me,;ng t te a r.
19 entirely different location in the plant.
The size and piping i
20 limitations are one of the reasons for moving it The 21 piping energy line break considerations, and also fire 22 considerations for moving it out of fire areas to give us 23 additional support so it will be moved into a different l
24 por*lon of the plant, the turbine area where there is more 23 room, a capability for a different pump activity and cross
39 1
connects for water supply and discharge lines.
2 MR. EISENHUT:
When is Cycle 6 scheduled?.
3 MR. MYERS:
It was scheduled for spring of 1986.
4 The long lead time components, as I believe Dick Crouse had 5
mentioned to you, they are already on order.
6 Again, we are trying to get the details of wher, they 7
were put on order to provide to you.
But that design process 8
is well underway and procurement is underway for that.
9 MR. EISENHUT:
How much time is programmed on your 10 schedule in Cycle 6 to actually do the installation, do you 11 know?
Is it a three month job, six month job?
12 MR. MYERS:
18 88 have to find that out.
Actually 1 13 can give you the philosophy also of the location.
It is 14 relatively free of activity currently.
I don't want to say it 15 is a dead spot in the plant where the square footage is doing
~
16 nothing.
But, a lot of the work was planned to do pre-outtage 17 so that we would not impact in working around the area with 16 more impe r t an t pumps whifc
- u aru
._v ee r a t i.g. but we
.v!d bo 19 able to do a lot of that construction independent of our 20 operation, it would not hamper that.
21 I can certainly find out what the construction 22 module says now for actual outage time.
That is a dedicated 23 olet in our planning.
24 MR. DENTON:
Any other questions?
25 MR. THADANI Do you have procedures today,
C 40 1
recognizing the low capacity of the start-up feed pump, in the 2
event of extended loss of main and aux feed?
Can the 3
operators perform combinations of actions, the start-up feed 4
pump as well as the other mechanisms for removing decay heat?
5 Do you have procedures in place 6
First of all, is it feasible?
7 Second, if it is feasible, do you have procedures
.=
.~
G today in place to be able to remove decay heat by a multiple A
9 source of actions?
The start-up feed pumps, maybe open up the to DORV, try to get the pressure downs that kind of stuff?
M 11 MR. MYERS:
Yes.
The procawure that Bob peters 12 mentioned earlier, the one that we originally developed was 13 called an abnormal procedure, total loss of main and auxiliary 14 feedwater, and specifically did give instructions to utilize
~
15 and make up the high head capability of the makeup system 16 utilizing the pilot operated relief valve and the start-up e
17 feed pump to provide full decay heat capability, and that's 18 our pr; edu.af.. t. o r.
and ba. beer, in place since th tt 19 procedure was initially approved.
20 Since then, this last cycle, we converted to the j
21 ATOG, the symptom-oriented guidelines and incorporated that 22 whole thing into our current program, current procedoret 23 program and that, along with, of course, the recovery of i
24 auxiliary feedwater, is stressed in the procedure and actually 25 was the procedure we followed, the process we followed, last
41 1
summer and it is a result within. I believe, two minutes of 2
when we lined up the feed pump and the auxiliary pumps were 3
recovered also.
4 So, yes, that is proceduralized and is an integral 5
part of our ATOG program.
6 MR. THADANI in ref erer co to some analysis that was 7
done by you and supported this procedure, I assume?
.~
8 MR MYERS:
We have done analysis to support it.
I 9
don't know what the ATOG references are.
We can find those 10 out.
They are probably in Volume 1 of the book, of the ATOG 11 guidelines for Davls-Besse.
We can dig out exactly what
.. ~
12 the actual emergency procedure in 'the plant probably does not 13 have that as "this references such and such a" 14 MR. THADANI:
No, I understand that, but the 15 procedures were developed on the basis of whatever analyses 16 were done.
17 CMr. Myers nodding.3 j
l 18 Mh. Hous0ME Twv L = ci... s v a l que s t i ve..
o ri what 19 Mr. Jain told us.
I didn't quite follow what you said about 20 dropping the auto start on the trip of the reactor coolant 21 pumps.
How is that being implemented?
I 22 MR. JAIN-These valves get an open signal fren, the l
R?
eteem end fendwater rupture enntrol 2/ stem whee we he%r
'ot*
i l
24 all four reactor coolant pumps.
I 25 Now we are proposing to and we have been do6ng this
l 4
42 1
ever since we started up, is when we go into the decay heat 2
mode, we take the power off of the steam Inlet valve so the 3
interlock really never has been used, per se.
4 So we are deleting that interlock so that you are in 5
mode 1 operation, nothing can go wrong in the Interlock to 6
cause the valve to go closed, you know, a spurious failure.
7 MR. ROUSOME:
Instead of manually depowering the 8
valves, you are going to change the logic so that they are g
automatically cut out of the logic when you are in mode 57 10 MR. JAIN:
We will be depoweeing it still, but we 11 don't need the interlock any more.
I guess we never needed C1 12 the interlock, but it was put in there for that purpose, so 13 that you don't start the aux feed pump turbine.
14 Maybe 1 am not very clear.
~
15 MR. ROWBOME:
I don't quite follow, but I am 16 reassured.
We will find out in due time.
17 You are saying that you would lock open the W
d i s wl..a r go v a !'. w. 3370 and 90727 19 MR. J4tN:
- Yes, 20 MR. ROWSOME:
I think that gives you trouble w6th 21 Isolating a main steamilne break, does it not?
Do you depend 22 on manual action to isolate the affected steam generator 9 Pn Mn J et l N -
Thim
- e s wete apnea *~'
'**t'se
.%
- A 24 lecking it open in the field, the hand wheel and the local 25 pt sh button station doesn't disable the control f r ece steam and
43 1
feedwater rupture control system.
2 MR. ROtJECME :
Oh, it's just the local control and 3
hand wheel All right.
4 MR. JAIN:
So most os your SFRCS actuations are on 5
the low level.
6 MR ROWSOME:
So it will still be ncrmally closed, 7
it will just be that the 8
M$ MYERS:
An operator in the plant could not 9
misposition the valve because it's locked.
He would have to 10 have there's a rigorous control for him to change the og 11 position of that valve.
12 MR. ROWSOME:
But it remains normally closed?
13 MR. JAIN:
Open.
We are proposing it to be open.
14 MR. EISENHUT:
Open, and the logic would close it.
15 MR. ROWECME:
- And you are counting on check valves 16 to constitute the pressure boundary?
17 MR. JAIN:
Right te MR DCNTON Let me ask aL. et the m4.n food punp2.
19 Once the main steam line isolation valve closes, are you able 20 to bring them back to service again following a reactor trip 9 21 What prohibits those from being used as " auxiliary" feedwater?
22 MR MYERS-The steam supply essentially would not 29 be ausilshla to rum the" bedause tha-a are 's g*
- test n a "' "
24 1 understand, like in Combustion Engineering plants, they talk 25 about condensate booster pumps and things like that.
We have
44 1
not pursued the evaluation of that type of add i,t 6 ona l backup 2
to date.
We felt much more reliable feed pump pressurewese 3
and availability and power supply-wise 4
MR. DENTON:
Well, then, a normal unplanned trip 5
what role does the main feed pump play?
6 MR. MYERS.
In just a normal plant trip without a 7
steam and feedwater rupture control signal?
9 MR. DENTDH:
Whatever woisld normally happen, a
9 assum6ng no equipment failures.
10 MR. JAIN:
Steam and feedwater control system, the m
11 ICS will take the integrated control system will take the 3
12 plant to a steam generator low level condition where the main 13 feed pumps will be used to maintain level at 85 inches in the 14 steam generators and removing decay heat thereby.
15 Once the pressure in the steam lines has gone d cwn
[
16 significantly, you can either go on the auxillary boiler t'o 17 run your main feed pump turbines or you can go to the decay 10 heet mode T f. 9 ' '.9 the long e.c'6Jown p r o c t.... w i t h.' u t t64 19 MR. DENTON.
What's the sumillary boiler?
20 MR. JAIN:
It's an oil-fired boiler that we use for 21 station heating, for example, when the plant is not running, 22 or we also use it for initial warming up of the plant's i
??
chieles eteam fn-the tiarh I nq 8*
.'ot down +eing re. **st 24 operation.
25 MR. DENTON:
If you had a loss of all feedwater, is l
I l
i l
45 1
that the system that you try to bring into operation?
2 MR. JAIN:
We normally don't 3
MR. MYERS:
I believe that the start-up time on the 4
auxiliary boiler is quite significant and 1*m not sure if we 5
actually consider it able to be brought on 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day.
6 It's able to be started, but I believe it takes a while to get 7
that system going, and it would actually be I don't want to 8
say a detraction from the main recovery mode, but it would be 9
much less reliable and swift to recover feedwater than the 10 start-up pumps or recovering the aux turbines.
11 MR. DENTON:
Do you happen to remember the
\\.
12 conclusion of the reliability of the aux. feed system that EDS 13 reached?
14 MR. JAIN:
As to what we should be doing?
15 MR. DENTON:
No, how reliable, say, the system was I
16 likely to be, either in this state or upgraded.
'l 17 MR. JAIN:
As far as the numbers?
/eA 19 MR. JAIN:
I don't remember it, but the report has 20 the numbers in there.
I don't r em emb er it right now.
21 MR. MYERS:
That was submitted.
22 MR DENTON:
I'll leek at that later.
Let's 500 if
- 7 there are any other qua<tlong from the itiff or etbar i
l l
24 parties.
And if not, I propose we take a caucus for the sta((
25 and mu l l over what we have heard and see if we have some more
E 46 1
questions.
But before we break, we'll see if anyone has any 2
further questions.
3 is there any other information you want to tell us 4
about the system that you've got or actually plan to take?
5 MR. WESSMAN:
One quick question.
Maybe it's i
6 outside the scope of what you-all wanted, but can you 7
summarize some of the changes that are going on with the main G
feed system 9
.h 9
1 understand you have had some difficulty with 10 governors on main feed pump turbines.
M 11 MR. MYERS:
We can probably give you 30 seconds.
We
.s t
12 converted the complete main feedwater pump control system in 13 this last outage.
It's a General Electric system 14 modification.
We have had some problems, as a matter of fact, 15 prior to last Sunday's event.
We even did special 16 instrumentation of this system specifically to try to na l l
~
17 down if any centrol failures occurred, and that's hopefully 18 when we get intu weth the fact-finding team, into the 19 machinery, that instrumentration is going to give us qu6to a 20 bit of input.
But it's a complete change-out.
Our main 21 feedwater pump control guru is right now working with our 22 team, the fact-finding team, back there.
We can respond to
.n 9 ! c.
(,a i.2 e
e,,-
- s'
- y. s, hew s p a c ; f ;... e re sa,e t e...ri t
we ycy 24 can probably get specific answers today for you on that But i
25 the staff here that information is not available, i
47 1
MR. DENTON:
Okay.
Why don't we break untei say a 2
quarter after 12:00.
That will give us time to see if there 3
is other Information er questions we might have on what you 4
have told us.
5 ERecess.3 6
7 S
9 10 11 12 13 14 3
I e
15 16 17 1 &,
i t
19 20 h
21 22 i
24 25
48 1
MR. DENTON:
Let's resume the meeting.
We don't 2
have any additional questions to ask.
What you told us this 3
morning has been very useful to help us reconstruct events and 4
actions that you have taken.
5 What we will do is coordinate with our team at the 6
site to be sure that any follow-up questions that we ask of 7
you are coordinated with them.
I think some of the types of e
ques [lons that come naturally to mind are whether the EDS 9
study that was done for you sometime ago used what I would 10 call generic failure rates as opposed to plant-specific 11 failure rates, and whether if you were using plant-specific 12 performance data over the past couple of years or you had 13 gotten a different result, and the question of whether it is 14 safe to resume operation with the type of failure rates that 15 we are experiencing is t,h e type of question that leaps to 16 mind.
e 17 But i don't have any specific requests to make for 18 additional information of you at this time What I will do is 19 coordinate with Mr. Rossi and others to be sure that we're not 20 having two different arms of the NRC asking for information, 21 so l'
I just mention these items as one that I think followed 22 from the discussion we had, namely, you had a reliability 23 study done.
It looks like the system was getting upgraded, 24 you thought it was being upgraded, you worked on the valves 25 and control systems and those kind of things.
And then we had
49 1
both systems that didn*t work, and that naturally leads to the 2
question of why the difference between what you had expected 3
from a previous pRA analysis and real life, and that's a 4
scenario that we will be looking into back here and with 5
Mr. Rossi 6
MA. MYERS:
Har v i d, I would like to make one comment 7
that I think you can feed back to your staff now, and if the 8
report doesn{t stress it we should note that in the EDS pRR 9
that was done, plant-specific failure rates were used, as a 10 matter of fact, and because of that we did see specific M
11 differences between generic and industry, and that started 12 some of our follow-on work with Limotorque operators and some 13 other consultants to actually -- in that comparison of our own 14 failure rates individually to industry's.
And we took some 15 action there, o
16 So I believe that maybe doesn*t stand out in the 17 report but it should be in there somewhere, the specifics.
14 Mn DENTCH Do you ba.c a feel ( c.,r wnethei y v., e 19 plant-specific experience up to a few weeks age would give the 20 same estimate that was used in the EDS report, whether 21 patterns of changes in the reliability of 22 MR MYERS?
I think the patterns that changed we saw 23 were improvements Like i said, the main centelhoters wera 24 quite well defined and, in our corrective actions, were 25 noticeably turned, both in valve operation and in governor l
t' 50 1
performance, which were the main contributors to system 2
unavailability.
3
'I n those particular areas I think we can say that in 4
going back and revisiting the data now, I'm sure we will see 5
past performance had reflected that.
Of course, the exact 6
cause of the two turbines being unavailable is a major focus 7
of ouf investigation, and with the factfinding team activity
~
8 at the site,sboth of us are anxious to get in there and 9
validate our findings.
And I think hopefully, that will shed 10 a lot of light back on the analysis to reflect whether it was
-5
, _11 something that should have been foreseen or something outside 12 the procedures of PRA.
13 MR. DENTON:
That is something we'll have to await 1A for respective efforts to be completed.
15 All right.
If there are no more questions or 16 comments, I appreciate your caming in on such short notice.
17 Thank you.
18 CUher muson, at 12 40 p.m.,
thu meeting wa= ad;wurneu.J i
19 l
l 20 21 22 24 25
O e
9 1
CERTIFICATE OF QFFIClHL REPORTER 2
3 4
4 5
This is to certify that the attached proceedings 6
before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the 7
matter of:
8 9
Name of proceeding: Meeting Between the NRC Staff and Toledo-Edison Company Concerning AFW Systems 10 11 Docket No.
()
12 place:
Bethesda, Maryland I?
cate:
Monday, June 17, 1985 14 15 were held as herein appears and that this is the original 16 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuc, tear e
17 Regulatory Commission.
l 1s
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(Signature)
., p, g
(Typed Name of Reporter)
And Riley 20 21 I
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