ML20133C063

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Forwards Description of 800419 Event.Probably Caused by Breaker Bumped by Const Workers in Area.Sequence of Events & Summary of Physical Security Insps Encl
ML20133C063
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Davis Besse
Issue date: 04/23/1980
From: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Moseley N
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
Shared Package
ML20132B273 List: ... further results
References
NUDOCS 8510070214
Download: ML20133C063 (10)


Text

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g

REGION lli y

799 ROOSEVELT ROAD g

U GLEN ELLYN,ILLINol5 60137 o

April 23, 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR:

N. C. Moseley, Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, IE FROM:

James G. Keppler, Director SUBJECI:

DAVIS-BESSE EVENT OF APRIL 19, 1980 The attached description of the Davis-Besse event of April 19, 1980, was trans=itted to your staff by facsimile on April 21. We are continuing to evaluate the situation under which this event occurred to determine whether or not changes should be considered to the Technical Specifications. The results of that evaluation will be the subject of separate correspondence.

The team dispatched from the regional office on April 20 has coc:pleted its review and the results will be included in the inspection report.

The cause of the event has not and probably will not be conclusively determined.

Tests by the licensee have not identified anything which would have caused the instantaneous ground fault flag on Breaker HBBF2. The most probable cause is that the breaker was bucped by construction workers who were working in the area.

One problem which surfaced during the event was that it took approximately 35 minutes to get the Regional Incident Response Center patched into the site and Headquarters Incident Response Center.

I'm sure you will agree that such delay is unacceptable.

Somehow we must be able to have our communications systems function in a much more timely mnner. This matter, along with other co=munications difficulties experienced during the event, is being pursued by our Emergency Preparedness Of ficer with the Headquarters Staff.

I would like to congratulate your staff, especially Messrs..M. Wilber and E. Blackwood, on the way it performed during this event. From our perspective, the coordination between the site, Region III, and IE was handled effectively and cooperatively.

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James G. Ke plIr Director

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ encl:

V. Stello, Jr., b1R R. C. DeYoung, DEPUTY DIR Regional Directors 8510070214 850717 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR

DAVIS-BESSE EVENT OF APRIL 19, 1980 STATUS OF DAVIS-BESSE 1 PRIOR TO LOSS OF POWER TO BUSSES E-2 AND F-2:

1.

Refueling mode with RCS temperature at 90 F and level slightly below vessel head flange.

Head detensioned with bolts in place. Manway cover on top of OTSG removed.

Tygon tubing attached to lower vents of RCS hot leg for RCS level indication.

Decay heat loop 2 in service for RCS cooling.

2.

All non-nuclear instrument (NNI) power and Static Voltage Regulator YAR supplied from 13.8 KV Bus B via HBBF2.

13.8 K Bus A energized but not connected.

RPS and SFAS Channels 1 and 3 being supplied from YAR.

3.

Equipment Out of Service a.

Source Range Channel 2 - Surveillance b.

Emergency Diesel Generator 1 - Maintenance.

I c.

Decay Heat Loop 1 - Maintenance.

4.

Breakers for containment spray and HPI pumps racked out.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

~

TIME EVENT CAUSE/ COMMENTS 2:00 p.m.

Loss of power to Ground short on 13.8 KV breaker HBBF2 4

Busses E-2 and F-2 which caused breaker to open.

This (non-essential 480 interrupted power to busses E-2 and F-2 j

VAC) which were supplying all non-nuclear instrument (NNI) power, channels 1 and 3 of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Safety Features Actuation Signal (SFAS),

the computer, and much of the control room indicators.

2:00 p.=.

SFAS Level 5 (recircu-Two out of four logic tripped upon loss lation mode) actua-of Busses E-2 and F-2.

Actuation caused i.

tion.

ECCS pump suction valves from containment sump to open and ECCS pump suction valves from Borated Water Storage Tank to close.

During valve travel times, gravity flow 1

path existed from BWST to containment sump.

2:02 p.m.

Decay Heat (low Operator turned off only operating DH pressure safety in-pump to avoid spillage of RCS water to jection) flow secured containment via the tygon tubing for RCS by operator level indication and open SG manway.

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2:33 p.m.

Partial restoration J

of power Power to Bus E-2 and SFAS channels 1 and 3 restored along with one channel of NNI.

This

)

restored all essential power for ECCS.

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. TIME EVENT CAUSE/ COMMENTS 2:44 p.m.

Attempt to reestab-Started DH pump 1-2 then stopped it when lish DH flow it was determined that air was in suction line.

Pump secured to prevent damage.

3:34 p.m.

Source Range Channel 2 energized.

4:00 p.m.

Restoration of Busses Busses restored sequcetually as efforts to (480 VAC) F-2, F-21, progressed to isolate ground fault.

4:06 p.m.

F-22, and F-23 4:25 p.m.

DH flow restored DH pump 1-2 started after venting.

RCS temperature at 170 F.DH flow bypassing f

1756F.'"*

'C 6*i"8 ****"

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4:46 p.m.

Containment sump Precautionary measure to assure containment pump breakers sump water from Bb'ST remained in gontainment.

opened Incore TC's range from 161 to 164 F.

5:40 p.m.

Computer returned to Incore TC's range from 158 to 160 F.

se rvice.

6:24 p.m.

DH flow directed RCS cooldown established at 1 css ghan 25 F through cooler per hour.

RCS temperature at 150 F. Incore TC's range from 151 to 1580F.

9:50 p.m.

Power completely RCS temperature at approximately 115 F.

restored STATUS OF DAVIS-BESSE 1 AFTER RECOVERY FROM LOSS OF POWER TO BUSSES E-2 AND F-2:

1.

Refueling mode with RCS temperature at 115 F and level slightly below vessel head flange.

Head detensioned with bolts in place. Manway cover on top of OTSG removed. Tygon tubing attached to lower vents of RCS hot leg for RCS level indication.

Decay heat loop 2 in service for RCS cooling.

2.

Bus E-2 being supplied from 13.8 KV Bus A via breaker RAAE2 and Bus F-2 being supplied from 13.8 KV Bus B via breaker HBBF2.

3.

Decay heat loop filled, all tags clear.

Maintenance work restricted so restoration of system will be less than two hours.

4.

ECCS pump suction valves (DH-9A and DH-9B) from containment sump closed and breakers racked out.

This will prevent the suction of air into the decay

1 1

heat loop during a level 5 actuation (recirculation mode) when there is no water in the sump.

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5.

Equipment Out of Service:

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i Emergency Diesel Generator 1 - maintenance I

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6.

Breakers for containment spray and HPI pumps racked out.

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Tl20 DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR P0'JER STATION

SUMMARY

OF PHYSICAL SECURITY INSPECTIONS JANUARY 1980 - PRESENT i

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2.

1980 INSPECTION DATES RESULTS INSPECTOR HOURS 1/14-18/80 3 - INFRACTIONS 133.5 i

6 - DEFICIENCIES 1

4/30-5/2/80 -

4 - INFRACTIONS 66.0 IAL - ISSUED 1 - DEFICIENCY 7

84 ACTION POINTS (JAN.-JUNE) 1979 INSPECTION DATES RESULTS INSPECTOR HOURS i

1 5/7-11/79 3 - INFRACTIONS 127.0 IAL - ISSUED 2 - DEFICIENCIES 7/12-13/79 2 - DEFICIENCIES 21.0 34 TOTAL ACTION POINTS l

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OBSERVATIONS OF SECURITY PROGRAM j

1.

A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SECURITY RELATED ITEMS OF NONCOMPLIANCE HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN 1980 DURING Ik'0 INSPECTIONS.

2.

THERE IS AN APPARENT INABILITY TO PROPERLY IMPLEMENT SECURITY REQUIRE >ENTS AS COMMITTED TO IN THE APPROVED SECURITY PLAN.

3.

THERE IS AN APPARENT INABILITY TO MAINT.iIN SECURITY-RELATED EQUIPMENT IN AN OPERABLE AND EFFECTW E CCNDITION.

4.

SECURITY SUPERVISION NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED TO MEET INCREASING RESPONSIBILITIES.

5.

THE LICENSEE'S ACTIONS, PLANNED OR TAKEN, TO IMPLEMENT THE REQUIRED SECURITY PROGRAM, ARE OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST TO US.

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i INSPECTION: JANUARY 14-18, 1980 p

)

RESULTS:

THE LICENSEE WAS FOUND TO BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH NRC REQUIRFlfENTS

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WITHIN THE 20 AREAS EXAMINED DURING THIS INSPECTION, EXCFPT FOR THE FOLLOW-ING 9 ITEMS:

4 1.

ACCESS CONTROL (VITAL AREAS) - FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY AND EFFECTIVELY CONTROL ACCESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY PLAN REQUIREMENTS.

(INFRACTION) 2.

ALARM STATIONS - FAILURE OF THE ALARM STATIONS TO HAVE ADEQUATE ALARM

.(

MONITORING CAPABILITIES.

(INFRACTION) i 3.

DETECTION AIDS - A PORTION OF THE ACTIVE INTRUSION DETECTION ALARM SYSTEM IS NOT TAMPER-INDICATING.

(INFRACTION) 4.

TESTING AND MAINTENANCE - THE LICENSEE FAILED TO CONDUCT PROPER TESTS

~

OF SPECIAL PURPOSE DETECTORS.

(DEFICIENCY)

I 5.

ALARM STATIONS - FAILURE TO PROVIDE AN ALARM SUBSYSTEM IN ACCORDANCE i

WITH A SECURITY PLAN COMMITMENT.

(DEFICIENCY)

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6.

COMMUNICATIONS - SEVERAL REDUNDANT SECURITY COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS WERE i

NOT PROPERLY SECURED.

(DEFICIENCY) 1 7.

DETECTION AIDS - AN INSPECTOR WAS ABLE TO CIRCUMVENT INTRUSION DETECTION SENSORS IN CERTAIN AREAS.

(DEFICIENCY) l 8.

ACCESS CONTROL (IDENTIFICATION, AUTHORIZATION, AND BADGING) THE

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j LICENSEE FAILED TO LOG THE ENTRY OF CERTAIN PERSONNEL ACCORDING TO PROCEDURE.

(DEFICIENCY) 4 9.

ACCESS CONTROL (SEARCH)

THE LICENSEE FAILED TO CONDUCT ADEQUATE SEARCHES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY PLAN COMMITMENTS.

(DEFICIENCY) 4 1

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INSPECTION:

APRIL 28-MAY 2, 1980 RESULTS:

THE LICENSEE WAS FOUND TO BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH NRC REQUIRE-MENTS WITHIN THE SEVEN AREAS EXAMINED DURING THIS INSPECTION EXCEPT FOR THE FOLLOWING FIVE ITEMS:

1.

ACCESS CONTROL (IDENTIFICATION, AUTHORIZATION, AND BADGING) - THE LICENSEE DID NOT CONDUCT PROPER PERSONNEL SCREENING IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY PLAN COMMITMENTS. (INFRACTION) 2.

ACCESS CONTROL (VITAL AREAS) - A VITAL AREA DOOR WAS FOUND UNSECURED AND UNATTENDED AND SEVERAL WATCHMEN WERE NOT PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE COMMUNICATION.

(INFRACTION) 3.

ACCESS CONTROL (SEARCH) - THE LICENSEE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY SEARCH SOME INDIVIDUALS PRIOR TO THEIR ENTRY INTO THE PROTECTED AREA.

(INFRACTION) 4.

ACCESS CONTROL (ESCORTING) - THIS LICENSEE FAILED TO PROPERLY ESCORT SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS.

(INFRACTION) 5.

TESTING AND MAINTENANCE - THE LICENSEE FAILED TO PERFORM A REQUIRED TEST ON AN ALARM SYSTEM. (DEFICIENCY)

AS A RESULT OF ITEMS 1, 2 AND 3 NOTED ABOVE, AN IMMEDIATE ACTION LETTER WAS ISSUED TO THE LICENSEE ON MAY 2, 1980.

CONCLUSIONS 1.

THE LICENSEE MUST TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE OF THE EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF NONCOMPLIANCE. MOST ITEMS COULD HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND CORRECTED BY THE LICENSEE IF SUPERVISION WAS MORE EFFECTIVE.

2.

A DEFINITE EFFORT MUST BE UNDERTAKEN TO TRANSFORM THE SUPERVISORY i

FORCE INTO A VIABLE ELEMENT OF THE SECURITY PROGRAM. (GENERAL /

SECURITY SUPERVISORY TRAINING) 3.

CLOSE AND CONTINUING COOPERATION BETWEEN SITE AND CORPORATE SECURITY I

MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL MUST BE MAINTAINED.

4.

CORPORATE MANAGEMENT MUST BE AWARE OF AND TAKE DECISIVE ACTION CONCERNING SITE SECURITY PROBLEMS.

a.

SECURITY EQUIPMENT MUST BE REPAIRED PROPERLY AND PROMPTLY.

b.

AN ADEQUATE NUFBER OF PERSONNEL MUST BE AVAILABLE TO MAINTAIN SECURITY EQUIPMENT.

5.

MORALE OF THE SECURITY ORGANIZATION IS DISINTEGRATING.

a.

EXTENDED WORK SCHEDULES.

b.

INCONSISTENT SUPERVISORY DECISIONS.

c.

SECURITY SUPPORT PERSONNEL ARE NOT AVAILABLE (WATCHMEN) 6.

CORPORATE SECURITY REPRESENTATIVES NEED TO TAKE A GREATER ROLE IN THE SECURITY AUDIT FUNCTION.

7.

SITE SECURITY MANAGEMENT / SUPERVISION SHOULD BE LOCATED WITHIN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE SECURITY ORGANIZATION.

8.

IF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE NOT INSTITUTED IN THE LICENSEE'S SECURITY PROGRAM TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE, ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION WILL BE CONSIDERED.

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UNITED STATES y

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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a

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itay 13, 1980 i

Docket No. 50-346 t

Mr. Lowell E. Roe Vice President, Facilities ~

j Development Toledo Edison Cospany Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue l

Toledo, Ohio 43652 j

Dear Mr. Roe:

Enclosed for your information are the NUREG documents listed below:

r...EG-0645 - Vol. I and Vol. II j

Report of the Bulletins and Orders Task Force j

s' NUREG-0565 Generic Evaluation of Small Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident Behavior in Babcock & Wilcox Designed 177-FA Operating Plants.

1 i

Sincerely, A

Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 g

Division of Licensing j

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/o enclosures:

See next page l

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00HTED STATES 8'

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E

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I nEason m 790 fecos4Wf LT ltOAD

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GL E N E LLYN, lLL18eOls 00137 WAT2T W 0

P Docket No. 50-346 V

Toledo Edises Company ATTN: Mr. Richard P. Crouse i

Vice President Nuclear 4

Edison Plaza f

300 Esdison Avenue i

Toledo, OH 43652 Jj Gentlenes:

A l

This confirms arrangements made for a meeting to be held between represent-stives of the Toledo Edison Company and the Nuclear Regulatory commission I

at the Regios III Office, Glen Ellyn, Illinois ou June 4, 1980 at 9:30a.m.,

1 inspecties findings, 2) inspection findings en the AprilThe agenda _fo (CDT).

j 30, 1980 over i

espesare,'what additiemal steps Toledo Edison Campany may be taking to control and plas estage activities, and 3) schedules, milestones and 1

accomplishmenta of your program to improve and promote better management

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We appreciate the opportaalty to discuss these matters with you.

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hamesG.Esppler

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p Director 8

Mr. 7. D. $neray, station cc:

Superistendent-Central Files 4. i sion Unit NRC 20b M

i Iocal FDR NSIC TIC Esrold W. Eohn, Power Siting Commission Nelen W. Evana, State l

of Ohio j

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9,* %%o UNITED STATES 9

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION 111 o, i[D 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD 8

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,o GLEN ELLYN. lLLINOls 6o137 May 27, 1980 NOTICE OF SIGNIFICANT LICENSEE MEETING Name of Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Name of Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Docket No. 50-346 Date and Time of Meeting:

June 4, 1980, 9:30 a.m. CDT Location of Meeting:

Region III Office, Glen Ellyn, IL Purpose of Meeting: Operational Management Meeting and Security and Radiation Protection Enforcement Conference F

ttendees:

R. F. Hershman, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Supp>rt Branch T. N. Tambling, Acting Chief, Project Section 2-2 L. A. Reyes, Senior Resident Inspector J. F. Donahue, Chief, Security Section W. L. Fisher, Chief, Fuel Facility Projects and Radiation Support Section Licensee Attendees:

W. A. Johnson, President and Chief, Operating Office R. P. Crouse, Vice President, Nuclear L. C. Philips, Vice President, Administrative Services T. D. Murray, Station Superintendent D. W. Briden, Chemist and Health Physicist Note: Attendance by NRC personnel at this IE/ licensee meeting should be made known by close of business, June 2, 1980 via telephone call to T. N. Tambling FTS 384-2542.

Distribution:

N. C. Moseley, Director, DROI J. H. Sniezek, Director, DEF & MSI S. E. Bryan, Executive Office for Operations Support, IE D. Thompson, Officer for Operations Support, IE:HQ T. M. Novak, A. D. for Operating Reactors, DOL R. W. Reid, ORB #4, DOL J. P. Murray, Director, Rulemaking and Enforcement Division, ELD J. G. Keppler, Director, RIII R. F. Heishman, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch, RIII

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UNITED STATES j

g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION c,

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I REGION lli g

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799 ROOSEVELT ROAD 4-j

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GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137 i

i NRC, RIII - Toledo Edison Company j

Management Meeting i

June 4, 1980

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9:30 a.m.

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A RECAPITULATION - J. G. KEPPLER i

- Regional Concerns

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- Connission Concerns - M I

- Statements To The Commissions - M

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- Non-Compliances ----

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- Events During Current Outage

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- LER'S l

- FCR'S i

II.

STATUS AND CHANGES TO PROGRAM TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT CONTROLS AND OPERATION OF DAVIS-BESSE STATION - TECO

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- Staffing

- Management Controls

- Procedures

- Training

- LER'S

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- Maintenance

- Surveillance Testing

- FCR'S

- Communications

- Nuclear Services i

III. A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY INSPECTION FINDINGS - J. F. DONAllUE i

IV.

ENFORCEMENT ACTION ON OVEREXPOSURE - W. L. FISHER j

V.

GENERAL DISCUSSION j

VI.

SUMMARY

- J. G. KEPPLER I

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I Decket Ms. 50-346 EA-80-37 1

Tolede Edison Ceapa q ATTII: per. Richard P. Creuse Vice President 8tuclear Edison Plaze 300 feedison.hvenue

q Tolede, OM 43652 Sent1 aeon

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The fladings of a recent inspection of the redietfen protection progree at the

)5 Davis-tesse Ihsleer.Pomer Stetten.perticolerly with to the everezposure l

t o e seM e et a s weri est e e s u rr e d m e e r. Ireasetriseelle.ase1 11 30, 19ee, inst-YEd cete that eetfittent:stteattenig';st i

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"V hf$ redtetfen etees The?~~

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,youristoff et thin:cen@cluef uere'dfesingsed ~with esebers of.

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30e'JuneM390D;;the Director.

of;eer-hesten III Offles' th T.te s' the!.efrehuessages' surrounding

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i and regsfreitDeihe( e(23esi types;ef: hip renge servey entry fataleshed ht$;tedtattenterees islecceptablethPlease em. esters for eure, however, j.

that these thenges and"

. ether 1 changes ' ecessary to control exposure in the n

reester.ceeity,and' ether.

'ereas are preeptly and fully toplemented.

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tse eensider the April 30 '1900Teverexposure to be very" serious not only hecesse the actual dose of 4.76 ress eaceeded the regulatory limit, but also hacesse of the potential for an extremely large radiatten exposure. We are particolarly concerned that to seen extent this overeapesure resulted free of!FitD Mall stECEPT Rf00f5TED (6c4.1.3 z yr f

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l Toledo Edison Company <

J your failure to act upon a high. priority facility change request written in i

June 1978 to install pereenent horricades at reactor cavity access points and i

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the April,19g0 request to relocate'the; temporary barrier to the proper loca-tien. Consequ6ntly, we, propose % fopese civilepenalties in the cumulative l

assent of Thirteen Thesease Del 400ST.for these noncompliancas.

Appensix a of*t a m y g g ggy

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s thtDataseds,the; sf5 Dresition of Civil Penalties. 2.Yee are' required tairesp fand in preparing your e'

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in addition to. $"an%D,4f! MMS $3#2D flifM', 54$O

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~ Uf 7 dequate.prepepaitten _and a on hl I

between the senter citan'and' red' tester'and his ~superviser, preoccupation with m

some other assigned.rediattss~pyiteetisin'reisp'ensittlities, and a sense of "Sd urgency to get the jeKeempletedikefore'aiplanned' electrical outage all appear 3

to have centributed.te the:incienetrats' responding to the noncespliance items in Appeneiz'A,'yes should specif14e11 ' address.your plans for strengthening 3

your controis.related:te{the! ~

      • peed eenagement of work in high'

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.n, Your written ' reply;te'.th g

our continuing inspections of,your, activities will be-eensidered in determining 1

I whether further enforcement actfenFoustf aisledditional' civil penalties or

-lj er6eestosuspeed..sedify,yer,reeche.theii1.conse,."P9py.44 y;

may-he required to assure p

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In accordance with Sectio;n 2.790 of the IRC's

  • Rules of Prectice, Part 2 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations "a

'of this-letter and the enclosures

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will he placed in the NAC's Felic Document M.,

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.v ;,Siacerely.

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~.r Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Enclosures:

1.

Appendix A Motice of Violation 2.

Appendim 5, Motice of Proposed Iaposition of Civil Ptnalties cc w/ enc 1:

(see next page)

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'-c REGION lil 4..... ((

793 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN,ILLINols 60137

'JUL 10 G80 Docket No. 50-346 Toledo Edison Company ATTN:

Mr. W. A. Johnson President and Chief Operating Officer Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652

Dear Mr. Johnson:

This refers to the meeting conducted by me, and others of this office on June 4, 1980, at NRC Region III offices with you and others of your staff.

The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies the areas discussed during the meeting.

As summarized at the conclusion of the meeting, the current problems in the implementation of the station's security plc.a and the personnel overexposure has detracted from the apparent improvement and progress in other problem areas.

Implementation of your security plan must be brought into compliance with the requirements. Vs have pro-vided you a summary of what we believe are the problem arer Our inspec-tion effort will continue in this area.

Future items of n r mpliance with the requirements of your security plan could lead to m alated enforcement action.

No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were idenufied during the course of this meeting.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter, the enclosures, and your response to this letter will be placed in the h3C's Public Document Room, except as follows.

If the enclosures contain information that you or your contractors believe to be proprietary, you

rmst apply in writing to this office, within twenty days of your receipt of this letter, to withhold such information from public disclosure. The application must include a full statement of the reasons for which the information is considered proprietary, and should be prepared so that proprietary information identified in the application is contained in an enclosure to the application.

Y 4 ween zy

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t pjijt,.1 0 1980' Toledo Edison Company

  • Thank you for your cooperation with us.

If you have any questions re-garding the enclosed report please feel free to call me.

Sincerely, James G. Keppler Director

Enclosure:

IE Inspection Report No. 50-346/80-17 cc w/ enc 1:

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Mr. T. Murray, Ftation Superintendent Central Files Reproduction Unit NRC 20b PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC Howard W. Kohn, Ohio Power Siting Conunission Helen W. Evans, State of Ohio i

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION III Report No.

50-346/80-17 Docket No.

50-346 License No. NPF-3 t

Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Management Meeting and Enforcement Conference At: Region III Office 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 T, a.TML i

Prepared By:

T. N. Tambling 7.i \\ N

.. o eis hief Approved By:

Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Meeting and Conference Summary Meeting and Conference on June 4, 1980 (Report No. 50-346/80-17)

Scope of Meeting and Conference: A special, announced meeting and enforce-ment conference was held with corporate and site management to discuss 1) schedules and accomplishments on planned actions to address specific RIII concerns expressed in previous meetings on April 18, May 31, July 17, September 19, 1979 and February 29, 1980; 2) RIII assessments of security inspections findings, and 3) the enforcement actions being taken on the April 30, 1980 personnel overexposure. The meeting lasted approximately 4

five hours and ten RIII personnel attended.

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Results: The licensee reported on the status of their program to improve management controls and the operations of Davis-Besse station. This report indicated that significant progress had been made in many areas with several areas still needing additional work, namely, the area of facility change requests. The licensee was informed that 1) unless significant improvement is made in the implementation of their security program, escalated enforcement actions would be taken and 2) the items of noncompliance associated with the April 30, 1980 exposure had been esca-j lated to the Civil Penalty level. No items of noncompliance or devia-tions were identified within the scope of this meeting.

2 I

DETAILS 1.

Attendees Toledo Edison Company W. A. Johnson, President and Chief Operating Officer R. P. Crouse, Vice President, Nuclear L. C. Philips, Vice President, Administrative Services T. D. Murray, Station Superintendent NRC J. G. Keppler, Director, RIII R. F. Heishman, Chief, RO&NS Branch A. B. Davis, Chief, FF&MS Branch J. A. Hind, Chief, Safeguards Branch T. N. Tambling, Acting Chief, Projects Section 2-2 L. A. Reyes, Senior Resident Inspector J. F. Donahue, Chief, Security Section T. J. Madeda, Security Inspector W. L. Fisher, Chief, FFP&RS Section L. J. Hueter, Radiation Protection Inspector

===2.

Background===

This meeting was the sixth of a series of management meetings re-quested by Region III. This sixth meeting served two purposes:

1) to discuss schedules and accomplishments on planned actions to improve management controls and operations of the Davis-Besse Sta-tion and 2) to discuss enforcement action associated with security inspection and the overexposure of a station employee that occurred April 30, 1980. The previous meetings were held April 18, May 31, July 17, September 19, 1979 and February 29, 1980 (Inspection Re-ports 50-346/79-08, 79-12, 79-20, 79-26 and 80-06) 3.

A Recapitulation of Past and Present Concerns The RIII Director reviewed and summarized pertinent areas related to previous meetings, ev'ents that occurred during the current pl:nt outage, current history of noncompliance, licensee event reports, and that for some previously identified problem areas such as faci-lity changes, the improvement has not been as fast as desired.

It was noted that there has been apparent improvement in many areas, -

but that the current problems in the implementation of the security plan and the April 30, 1980 overexposure have detracted from these improvements.

4.

Status and Changes to Program to Improve Management Controls and Operation of Davis-Besse i

The licensee detailed the progress and changes they have made to improve their level of management controls, staffing, training, plant operations and to reduce equipment problems, a.

Staffing q

Original Goals:

. Initial effort i

To fill 12 positions in Power Engineering To fill 22 positions at the Plant

. Future and continuing effort In house review on future manning requirements and organi-zation structures.

Status:

There has been a net increase of 59 people in the nuclear program since last August.

Sixteen more people have accepted job offers.

The original 22 positions to be filled at the plant have been filled.

Of the original 12 positions in Power Engineering 4 are still open.

Salaries and benefits have been restructured.

i Recruiting methods and techniques have been upgraded with an emphasis placed on recruiting people with previous experience.

Experiened licensed operators have been transferred into the Training Department, Nuclear Service Group and Power Engineer.

The company has been working with Terra Technical College to promote programs to meet industrial needs.,

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i The Instrument and Control Group is being staffed with additional people.

J A new I&C Engineer has been hired.

Future goals include the formation of a sixth operating shift, establishment of a permanent shift technical advi-sor group, providing administrative assistants for each operating shift, additions to Nuclear Services and addi-tions of maintenance personnel.

b.

Management Controls Original Goals:

Immediate: Promotion of Mr. Crouse to concentrate his efforts on

'the nuclear side of the house.

Mr. Johnson to hold meetings with all plant personnel to discuss current problem areas.

Current and Future Goals:

Continue to interface with other nuclear generating stations to l

review their organization and controls.

Reevaluation of personnel policies including selections and evaluation of new personnel, a development program for manager and promotion practices.

Status Company organization restructured December 1, 1979. All nuclear station activities placed under one vice presi-dent.

Interfacing with other nuclear stations has been a contin-uing effort.

Promotion and job progressive policies have been changed.

A computer program has been established to track and control commitments.

A consultant completed a comprehensive review of station management, operation and maintenance procedures, engin-eering support and training in May, 1980.

Final report is due June, 1980.

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9 Another consultant conducted a review of possible methods to improve plant reliability.

Phase I was completed March, 1980.

Phase II will cover the causes.

c.

Procedures Original Goals:

At plant level establish a group to centralize prepara-tion and maintenance of procedures.

Engage a consultant to review plant procedures to estab-lish uniformity and general upgrading of procedures.

Status:

The original goals to establish a group to centralize pre-paration and maintenance of procedure has been dropped.

The administrative procedures for preparation and control of procedures has been revised and streamlined. Coordina-tion of procedure review and revision has been assigned to the Technical Section.

Also one man in each section has been assigned responsibility for coordinating procedure review and revision within the section.

The streamlining of the original method of procedure review has maintained the specialized expertise of each section and has resulted a factor of 4 to 5 increase in the number of procedures reviewed on time.

The consultant's review of operating and maintenance pro-cedures was discussed under management controls. Final report is due June, 1980.

d.

Training Original Goals:

Implementation of a broad training program for all plant staff directed toward improving job related skills.

5-

in Evaluate the need for a plant simulator for operator training.

Status:

Broad training program training being implemented. Further i

implementation is expected by end of 1980.

l GOT I and II has been updated Size of Training Department has been increased.

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New facilities have been provided 2

Simulator plans are on " hold" pending possible changes to j

reactor control room to improve human engineering.

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LER'S i

i Original Goals:

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4 Set up a special investigation group to review LER's j

with special emphasis on personnel errors and repetitive r

l equipment problems, i

Hold monthly meetings with plant staff to discuss signifi-cant LER's.

Status:

l Special investigation groups established to review LER's 3

and reviews being implemented.

J Monthly reports are being issued.

Station corrective action on all LER's being reviewed by a l

separate review group.

There has been a noted reduction in personnel errors and procedure error.

Repetitive equipment problems are still a major source of LER's.

Special efffort is being put in trying to reduce

these, l

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Maintenance I

Original Goals:

Develop a computer program to track maintenance and preventative maintenance.

Status:

A goal was to have the computer tracking program opera-tional by May, 1980. A contractor was hired to provide the program but he has not been able to deliver (see discuss-ion under Surveillance Testing).

1 A contract was let to an experienced outside contractor to provide onsite management and skilled crafts to supplement the maintneance and facility modification activities. The i

contractor moved onsite in December,1979. For the current refueling outage the contractor has approximately 130 l

staff and 500 craft personnel onsite. They expect to j

complete approximately 80 FCR's plus other preventative l

maintenance activities.

l Other contractors are also supplying personnel during the current outage to work with plant personnel.

g.

Surveillance Testing Original Goals:

Implement a specialized computer program to assist opera-

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tors in identifying and tracking Technical Specification surveillance requirements.

1 Target date: April, 1980.

l Status:

Contractor hired to develop and provide several programs; maintenance management, surveillance testing and technical j

specification tracking. The contractor scoped programs but has not provided the design or functional programs.

In order to keep development of the programs going, TECo in January of 1980 got directly involved in the analysis review and documentation of the programs.

Final review of the development is expected June 9, 1980.

Pending their review; TEco will be directly involved in i

making the programs functional.,

The new target dates are: maintenance management and sur-veillance testing, January 1981; Technical Specification track-ing July, 1980.

a h.

FCR's Original Goals:

Initiate a review system to improve tracking, preplanning of procurement and scheduling of work.

Status:

Currently there are three tracking systems in use.

Bechtel has one to track design work delegated to them.

TECo has an outage FCR tracking system and system for all outstanding work items including all FCR's, maintenance (WR's and MWO's) surviellance testing and nonconformances.

See Maintenance regarding use of an onsite contractor to implement FCR's.

Although Lessons Learned, Fire Protection, Bulletins, etc.

j have placed a heavy demand on the system, management goal is to continue working on improvement.

f i.

Communications f

Original Goals Consultant to evaluate the lines of communications and methods of personnel motivations.

Status:

4 The consultant completed their survey and study. Approx-imately 33 findings and/or recommendations were made involving communications and human relationships at the site.

Several of the recommendations have been implemented.

The station superintendent has held 16 sessions with various sections of the plant staff to pass on the find-ings of the report. _

1 j

Nuclear Service Group Original Goals:

Establish a nuclear service group to report directly to the Vice President to handle support activities at the plant.

Status:

Position of Nuclear Service Group Director filled September 1,1979.

Training and reliability groups transferred from plant to Nuclear Service Group.

The group has a total of 22 people in it now.

f There are plans to increase the total staff to 32 by December 1980.

There are future plans to combine all sections of the group at the site.

k.

Conclusions The Region III staff concludes that the licensee has made significant progress in most of the designated areas to the point that their status need not be specifically addressed in future management meetings. Region III, however, will continue to inspect in these areas to insure that there is continued progress and that any unusual developments or future problems will be appropriately addressed.

In the areas of Facility Changes and repetative equipment problems, the licensee corrective actions has not made a signi-ficant impact yet. Progress reports in these two areas shall be subjects in future management meetings.

5.

Review and Assessment of Security Inspection Findings Because of an increased number of noncompliances discovered during i

two inspections in 1980 (Inspection Reports 50-346/80-02 and 80-13),

RIII expressed concerns that there appeared to be major break down in the management and implementation of the security plan. The licensee was notified that if appropriate corrective actions are not instituted in the licensee's security program to assure compliance, escalated enforcement action will be considered.

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s The following specific areas were addressed by RIII as needing corrective attention by the licensee.

The licensee must take positive action to prevent recurrence of a.

the excessive amount of noncompliance. Most items could have been identified and corrected by the licensee if supervision was more effective.

b.

A definite effort must be undertaken to transform the super-visory force into a viable element of the security program.

(General / Security supervisory training).

c.

Close and continuing cooperation between site and corporate security management personnel must be maintained.

d.

Corporate management must be aware of and take decisive action concerning site security problems.

1.

Security equipment must be repaired properly and promptly.

2.

An adequate number of knowledgeable personnel must be available to maintain security equipment.

Morale of the security organization appears to be deteriora-e.

ting.

1.

Extended work schedules.

2.

Inconsistent supervisory decisions.

3.

Security support personnel are not always available (watchmen).

f.

Corporate security representatives need to take a greater role in the security audit function.

g.

Site security management / supervision should be located within close proximity to the security organization.

The licensee representatives acknowledged RIII concerns and stated that they were taking additional steps to correct the prob-lems.

Such corrective actions, as stated, included:

Increased site time of the Director, Industrial Security until the problems are resolved. (Up to 80 to 90% of his time, if required).

Their immediate effort would be directed towards equipment problems, morale, and training. This would include replacing some of the existing equipment, additional training of per-sonnel, and dedicating people to maintenance and testing of equipment.

1. _.._

f3 6.

Enforcement Action on Overexposure The representatives'of the licensee were informed that due to the seriousness of the radiation overexposure that occurred April 30, 1980 that escalated enforcement action was being taken by RIII.

7.

Summary The Director, RIII summarized the results of this meeting with the following points:

RIII acknowledged the significant progress made in the ten areas to improve the management controls and the operation of Davis-Besse. However, the region feels that additional pro-gress in the implementation of FCR's is still required.

The problems in the implementation of the security program and the overexposure has seriously detracted from apparent impro-vement in other areas. It was reemphasized that the licensee should be identifying and correcting the problems in security themselves and that appropriate corrective action must be taken to bring the program into compliance.

The Director also informed the licensee representatives that their letter of March 28, 1980 addressing their commitment to sections of draft ANS 3.1 for the training of licensed and nonlicensed operator was found to be satisfactory with one point of clarification. We plan to communicate this in a separate letter.

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SUMMARY

OF CONCERNS a

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The Preoperational Test Program was conducted inadequately.

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items added as condition of License also are indicative of unresolved i

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There are serious questions about conformance with several Gener.it Design Criteria.

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many repeat concerne. These concerna are not being adequately

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A significant number of safety related FCR's (Facility Change r

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of accidents at the facility.

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WhitTED STATES 8

7 NUC1. EAR REGutATORY COMMISSION j

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Eaclosed are three Performance Appraisal Branch (PA8) inspection reports and a copy of the PAS Nenagenest Evaluation Tree with a User's Guide.

n The three reports are those most recently completed by PAB. We are

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,j dissentaating these reports to provide you the opportunity to compare Q

your program to those already reviewed by PAR and adjust your progras y*

as appropriate. We latand to provide you a copy of all future PAB management appraisal reports.'

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l The Management twelmaties Tree and User's Guide is the basic program used by PAR daries the monstement sypraisal inspections. This document 21 i

v has been made public and is being disseminated for your information.

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FAS !aspecties Reports (3)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ill

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OLEN ELLys, stunOis soiar November 26, 1980 Docket No. 50-346

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Toledo Edison Company ATTN: Mr. Richard P. Crouse Vice President Nuclear Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Gentlemen:

This letter is to confirm the schedule arranged by Messrs. L. A. Reyes and T. D. Murray for a meeting with you and members of your staff at 11:00 a.m. on December 5,1980, at your corporate office in Toledo.

The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the evaluation of your regulatory performance relative to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this meeting Sincerely, Wib g

James G. Kepp e Director Mr. T. D. Murray, cc:

Station Superintendent Central Files Reproduction Unit NRC 20b AEOD Resident Inspector RIII PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC Harold W. Kohn, Power Siting Commission Helen W. Evans, State of Ohio g__2.:eQ-h-7d O

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i Mr. VI. tor Stelle, ir.,

oirector atttre of Inspection.ind Enforcement I.

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Nucle.sr Regulatory Commi..lon Wa.hington, D.

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Dear Mr. Stello :

5 The opportunity to sha re your views of foledo E d ia.o n i npanv's nuc l e.i r

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actisities as expressed hv the performance Apprais.nl. an i..s p p ret ia ed.

y Your person.nl views expressed in our meeting follo.ing the Perfor.ince

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l A irais.a1 Te am e xit interview were.il.o. appreciated.

Attion ha. already l

s heen ini t la t eil in several. areas to address issues which were b rou,:h t to e

our.ittentson.

'S trinediate corrective action has been taken where t he proper. set inn is

,3 admin! trattve in nature (such as procedure enodiftratfor.3).

In some "2;

areas (i.e.,

response to Quality Assurance Audits) my personal.at tent ion will.nssure.appropri.ite respon e.

In other areas, corrective actions d

will requi*e a more system.at ic. approach.

Interin storage f acilit ten are being upgraded while permanent storage solutions are identified.

Develop-rwnt of appropriate training programs for Quality A'4surance, procurecent

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and 9.41ntenance ; wrwonnel, and upgrading of cocunit tee act ivit ies are areas where action must be more precise.

I w. ant to ensure root causes. ire e

corrected.

Jh11e activities in many of these areas are underway as a 1?

result of our recent reorganization, your input will reielve careful

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con.ideration in the execution of our plans.

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All the i t eria idenettled by vour Per:ornance Appr.iisal le. arm are beine studied.and tracked a's our resolut ion of them provres*es, l'tn n receipt of the formal report, you w!!! receive our prompt re;1..

In the interim, should vi.u have any questiens or tt 6 tan a..ist vou please call.

sincerely,

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Docket No.50-34h

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Toledo Edicon Coepany AITN:

P.r. Richard P. Crouse Vice President Nuclear Edison Pla:s 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OIT 43652 Gentlemen:

This letter is to confir= the schedule arranged by P.essrs. L. A. P. cyes and T. D. Murray for a meeting with you and members of your staff.it 11:00 a.m. on December 5,1980, at your corpor. ate office in Tole.to.

The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the evaluation cf your rer.ulatory performance relative to the Davis-Besse !!uclear Power Station.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this meeting.

Sincerely, James C. Keppler Director cc:

Mr. T. D. Ikstray, Station Superintendent

./ Central Files Reproduction Unit !Ctc 20b AECD Resident Inspector RIII FDR

!.acal PDE N::IC TIC liarold W. Kohn, Power 1

Siting Cossaission

!!elen W. Evans State of j

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