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UNITED STATES g
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f f-L j
WASMNGTON, D C. 20555 k
f June 19, 1985 MSORANDUMT0:
James Keppler, Regional Administrator Region III R. Minogue, Director, Office of Research'*
James Taylor, Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement C. J. Heltemes, Jr., Director, Office for Analysis cnd Evaluation of Operational Data Guy H. Cunningham, Executive Legal Director, OELD James P. Knight, Acting Director, Division of Engineering Robert Bernero, Director, Division of Systems Integration Themis Speis, Director, Division of Safety Technology FROM:
Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director, Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES CONCERNING THE DAVIS BESSE INCIDENT is a June 17, 1985 letter from Congressman Markey which requires a direct response from the staff on short notice. You are requested to provide answers to your assigned questions by close of business Friday, June 21, 1985. A breakdown of responsibility for each question is indicated in the margin of enclosure 1. provides the fomat to be followed in your response.
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John Thoma (x28213) will assemble all responses into a final package. If possible, please transfer your responset via 5520 by having your secretaries contact Caryn Faircloth or Carol Reed (x28960). Your cooperation in this I
accelerated effort is appreciated.
Y D
Hugh L. Tho6ps/tito,J
, Director Di sion of Li ensi '
Enclosures:
As Stated s
cc w/ enclosures:
See next page CONTACT:
J. Thoma (X28213)
VA 854wn app
2 cc:
H. Denton D. Ruberstein W. Houston D. Crutchfield G. Lainas G. Holahan A. DeAgazio e
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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES g{h""2 suecoM MITrti t
CONSERVATION g- -
ee nes COMMnTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE WAsMNGTON. DC 20515 June 17, 1985 The Bonorable Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 E Street, NW Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The June 9,1985 incident at the Davis-Besse reactor near Toledo, Ohio is one of the most serious since the 1979 accident at Three Mils Island.
The large number of failures and the siallarity to the accident at Three Mile Island raise significant concerns.
I am i
particularly troubled by the fact that NRC had previously recommended improvements to the auxiliary feedwater system and had previously identified serious management deficiencies at Davis-Besse.
Bence, it appears that there may have been opportunities to prevent such a close call.
The Commission must devote the same degree of scrutiny to itself as it does to the licensee.
It is important to determine the extent to which NRC is responsible for allowing Davis-Besse to suffer a major degradation of essential safety related equipment.
I would like to request that the Subcommittee be briefed i
on the Davis-nesse incident and other related matters on Friday, June 21,1985 at 5:30 a.m. by the NRC Staff.
In addition to a representative of the Task Force investigating the incident, I would also request that william Dircks, Barold Denton and James Reppler be in attendence to brief Members of the subcommittee.
As the briefing will be open to the pq>1ic, the Commission is certainly welcome to attend, although this is not required.
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The Bonorable Nunsic J. Palladino June 17,1985 Page 2 Additionally, I request your response to the attached 4
questions within ten working days.
Some of these questions may arise at the briefing on Friday.
While I understand that your analysis of the incident is continuing, and that some of your answers may necessarily be subject to change, your preliminary response should be provided by June 28, 1985 at the latest.
A complete response should be provided to the subcosaittee prior to any restart of Davis-sesse.
Thank you for your attention to this important matter.
Sincerely,
{gk WYh'1 l
sdward J. Markey Chairman EJManw
- Attachment i
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.3 H 'O *M *N TG:90 G9/6T 4
Questions for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
- MOD [1.
List each failure that occurred during the Da.is-Besse u/EEI incident including:
(a) the cause(a) of each failurer and (b) the intended function of the system or component that l
failed.
2.
Based on probabalistic risk analyses and precursor data prior
, ggg/pg7 to the Davis-Besse incident what was the estimated probability of the followings i
j a.
loss of main feedwater; b.
loss of main feedwater and loss of auxiliary feedwater; c.
failure of 70RV to close; d.
each other failure that occurred during the incident the acabination of all the failures that occurred during a.
1 the incident.
i Bad the' electric driven startup pump not manually started 3.
ggg/ggg/4yg during the Davis-Besse incident, and had the auxiliary feedwater system not been restored, would there have been a severe sore damage accident taken before fuel damage occ?
If yes, how long would it have urred?
4.
According to preliminary information provided by the NRC VER/DSI/4J8 staff, the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCs) at navis-nesse is unable to function properly when the primary cooling system is pressurised in excess of 1,600 pounds per
- ^Y the sccs duri(ng the Davis-Besse incident and why did theysqua If this is true, why did the operators initiate i
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terminate ECCs?
have Eigh Pressu)re Injection pumps whose shutof f head iswhat oth below the set point of the code safety valves?
5 According to preliminary information provided by the NRC g8 pg/gg
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staff, Davis-Besse is not capable of cooling the reactor using the " feed and bleed' process.
what is the technical basis for not requiring Davls-Besse to be capable of cooling the reactor using this process?
Identif feed and bleed has been demonstrated y all PWR's for which using safety evaluations performed in accordance with establish NRC requirements -- to be an adequate method of core oo,oling.
6.
! ygg/pg/gr3 raise questions about the adequacy of testing dDoes the failure one in accordance with the TMI Action Plan?
Additionally please ehrf / -
provide the following informations (a) was the spe,cific 70RV j}go,n(c) model used at Davis-Besse tasted as part of the TMI Action Plans (b) how many other plants have the same model 70RV; and t
te0 MO 'CN iS H '3 *&f *N TE:90 E8/6T 43
2 (c) how many 70RV failures have occurred durin operation or testing since the accident at Three Nile Islan 7 7.
Does the auxiliary feedwater system at Davis-Resee provide yge/gp/Ag greater, equal or smaller margin of safety than the auxiliary feedwater system at other pressurised water reacters?
8.
Provide a history of any previously noted difficulties I
- ff y observed with the main or auxiliary feedwater systems at Davis-Besse since 1979 and any actions taken in response.
9.
What are the generic implications and lessons learned from Apop the Davis-Besse incident?
10.
In light of the Davis-Besse incident, is there any hd information of which the commission is aware that would lead uf(/BSI it to reconsider any of the positions taken by the NRC Staff, or in any of its own decisions, in the TMI restart proceeding 7 For example, in the TNI restart proceeding, the ERC Staf f contended that a total loss of feedwater was beyond the design basis and therefore, capability to accomplish feed and bleed was not required.
11.
1.ist those TNI Action Plan items directly relevant to the N64 g g Davis-Desse incident and provide the current status of compliance.
Specifically included in your response should be
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a detailed explanation of what actions were taken and when in response to those TNI Action Plan items concerning the auxiliary feedwater system and pilot operated relief valve.
Your response should clearly identify those relevant Action Plan items that have not been fully implemented and explain when each item was originally scheduled to have been i
completed and the reason it remains outstanding.
12.
In NUREG-0647, Transient Response of Babcock &
Wilcox-Designed Reactors (May 1980) the NRC specifically ypa/oc/0Edy recommended that Davis-nesse improve, safety by installing a diverse drive auxiliary feedwater pump.
Acccording to preliminary information provided by the NRC staff, this recommendation was suspended and is now pending for the next refueling outage in 1986 of all actions taken in response to this recommendation andPlease provide all actions since 1979 taken concerning the auxiliar!y feedwater sustaa at Davis-Besse.
Your response shou,4 include a lasting of all meetings, copies of all correspondence between NRC and the licensee and all documents concerning the auxiliary feedwater system since 1979.
13.
In terms of configuration, reliability, diversity and
/#4[O/[kS6 capacity how, if at all, does the auxiliary feed water system vis-nesse differ from the system in place on March 28,
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teSlDTIlMB According to preliminary information provided by the NRC l
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3 Staff, the licensee has resisted NRC recommendations to improve the reliability and capacity of the auxiliary i
feedwater system at Davis-Besse.
Is this true and if so, why did NRC not require that improvements be made?
i 15.
The Commission was provided with a preliminary sequence of 1
gy pA events which occured at Davis-Besse in a ' June 12, 1965 i
memorandum from william J. Dircks, Executive Director for
[252I Operations that appears not to include several important j,/Ng details of the incident.
For example, the preliminary chronology fails to note that the PORV stuck open, that ECCS was initiated and turned off, and that one of the auxilary feedwater pumps could not be returned to operation from the control room, when did the Commission first become aware of this information and why was it not transmitted to the Commission in the June 12, 1985 memorandum?
16.
According to a June 13, 1985 memorandum from william J.
Dircks, trecutive Director for operations, to the Commission h8" the licensee failed to provide accurate information to the NRC about the Davis-Besse incident.
The memorandum statast "It became clear the the initial written description of the event was incomplete and that a number of potentially important details were not included."
What information was incomplete and what details were not included in the 4
licensee's initial report to NRC7 What is the reason for i
this' failure and what, if any, reporting requirements were violated?
l 17.
what accions will NRC require prior to restart of W"
Davis-Besse.
b Specifically, will NRC require that the January 1985 license condition committing to an additional auxiliary feedwater pump be fulfilled prior to restart.
In not, please explain why.
I cay / 18.
List all pending requirements and licensing actions relating bu[OE0 to a stems and components involved in the Davis-Besse l
inci ent.
' 19.
According to a June 13, 1985 memorandum from william a.
sphedes Dircks, Executive Director for Operations, to the Commission, the NRC Task Force investigating the incident has allowed a
' Au[/,
u lawyer representing the licensee to be present during
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interviews with workers at the plant.
This practice was used a
/p.or,yop during the investigation of the accident at Three Mile Island where some believe it resulted in less than candid testizony from workers and enabled the company to coordinate testicony.
Practices such as this were also harshly criticized by the Department of Justice in a March 25, 1903 letter."
Why is this practice beir.g allowed at Davis-Besse when the NHC has already noted that information originally provided was less than complete?
What, if any, plicy does NRC have on third party attendence during investigations?
5 4
20.
Please provida the following information for each year since 1980:
IF/AEoo a.
the number 10 CFR 50.72 reports; I
b.
the total number of Licensee 8 vent Reports, specifying the number attribstable to personnel error, equipment failures, and design or fabrication errors; c.
the number of unusual events, alerts and abnormal occurrences; d.
the number and cause of reactor trips; and the number of all enforcement actions including a brief e.
description of the issue, the severity classification and any fine levied.
21 NRC's most recent Systematic Assessment of Licensee E
Performance report on Davis-Besse noted that improvment was.
needed in 5 of 11 areas.
The report concluded that " strong steps are needed to raise the performance level at the Davis-Besse facility."
specifically what actions has NRC taken?
22.' What are the root causes of management problema noted by NRC at Davis-Besse? What steps should be taken to correct these M
problems?
Provide any documents including internal memoranda that relate to NRC concerns about Davis-Sesse's regulatory performance.
23.
Please provide all documents including internal NRC staff
'VEA/bi[08/memorandawhichrelatetotheDavis-Besseincident.
Your f
4 response should provide all documents generated by the NRC h[g l
AEoD Task Force investigating this matter including transcripts of,
interviews with employees of Toledo Edison.
24.
At the subcommittee's April 17, 1945 budget authorisation MR/ DST hearing, the commission testified that some plants dominate the probability of a severe accident as reported in the w/mudy Commission's 45 percent estimate of a core meltdown at a U.S.
(
/ EES' resctor in the next 20 years.
Is Davis-sesse one of those plants? What factors are important in identifying those plants most likely to have a severe accident?
What facilities has the Commission identified as most likely to have a severe accident and what actions has the Compiasion taken at each?
see peO *ON 15 H *3*hf*N r5:90 E8 '6I '90
(CUEsTicu insTRucTlo'es AnD FORMAT)
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QUESTION 6, (B)
WHAT ARE THE PROCEDURES FOR PREPARING AND TRANSMlTTING RESPONSES TO RM OR THE APPROPRIATE OFFICE?
- ANSWER, WHEN A QUESTION IS ASSIGNED TO MORE THAN ONE OFFICE -- FOR P:STAMCE, NRR/RES/NMSS -- THE FIRST OFFICE LISTED IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUBMITTING A REPLY THAT HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE OTHER 0FFICES.
THE SECONDARY OFFICES SHOULD SEND THEIR INPUT TO THE ANSWER TO THE PRIMARY OFFICE.
THE PRIMARY OFFICE ASSIGNED WILL THEN TRANSMIT VIA DATA PHONE THE FINAL COORDINATED STAFF RESPONSE TO THE APPROPRIATE RM OR OTHER OFFICE WORD PROCESSING CONTACT.
WHEN THE PRIMARY OFFICE ASSIGNED DOES NOT HAVE WORD PROCESSING EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE TO THEM, PROVIDE THE ORIGINAL (EVEN IF IT IS CUT-AND-PASTE) AND ONE COPY (EACH WITH ANY ATTACHMENTS) TO RM OR THE APPROPRIATE OFFICE.
WHERE MAG CARDS HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS ARE NOT AVAILABLE, PROVIDE THE ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY AND THE MAG CARDS (APPROPRIATELY INDEXED) TO RM OR THE APPROPRIATE OFFICE.
SIMPSON/EDO
[DATE]..
Revised 02/24/84 V-5
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