ML20132B490
| ML20132B490 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Davis Besse |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1983 |
| From: | Thadani A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Parr O Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132B273 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8302090513 | |
| Download: ML20132B490 (7) | |
Text
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Sp.Hb February 4, 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR:
- 0. Parr, Chief Auxiliary Systems Branch Division of Systems Integration FROM:
A. Thadani, Chief I
Reliability and Risk Assessment Branch Division of Safety Technology
SUBJECT:
EVALUATION OF THE RELIABILITY STUDY FOR DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1 UPGRADE 0 AUXILIARY FEE 0 WATER SYSTEM i
1 Enclosed is our evaluation of the reliability study for the Davis-Besse Unit 1 l
auxiliary feedwater system.
This evaluation is based on the review of the licensee's reliability analysis of the upgraded Davis-Besse auxiliary feed-
]
water system performed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL).
The Davis-BesseAFWSisinthelowreliabi}ityraggeanditsunavailability exceeds the numerical criterion of 10 to 10 failure probability per
]
demand presented in the Standard Review Plan (SRP).
The addition of an independent third train will likely improve the AFWS unavailability to the l
acceptable range of the SRP criterion.
Eliminating the common cause and single point failures, as discussed in the enclosure, will likely improve 1
the AFWS unavailability by a factor of 2.
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If you have any cuestions, please contact John Tsao (x27422).
A, Ashok Thadani, Chief I
Reliability and Risk Assesscent Branch Division of Safety Technology j
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Enclosure:
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T. Sceis Ofstribution_
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Evaluation of the Reliability Study Q
Oavis-Besse Unit 1 4
Upgraded Auxiliary Feedwater Systen d
.1 1.0 Introduction J
As a result of the Three Mile Island accident, the NRC issued a letterl dated 1
Ma rch 20,1980, requiring the licensees to perform a reliability stucy on 4
the Auxiliary Feedwater System ( AFWS). The licensee. Toledo Edison Company, resrended by submitting'a reliability study 2 for the Upgraded Davis-Besse
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Unit 1 AFWS in January 1982.
Y Our contractor, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), reviewed the i
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licensee's report and perfort,ed an independent analysis 3.
The review i
addressed the followirg three..ansient conditions, as required in
(
N'JREG-06114 for determining the reliability of the AFWS:
1.
LMFW - Loss of Main Feedwater 2.
LOOP - Loss of Offsite Power / Loss of Main Feedwate.
3.
LOAC - Loss of all AC Power / Loss of Main Feedwater l
Following the guidelines presented in NUREG-0611, the review evaluates nost of AFWS component failures but excludes the high energy pipe breaks and the I
external events e.g., earthquake, fire, and flood.
The system boundary includes the water sources (e.g., condensate storage tanks) and the AFWS l
noz:les on the steam generators but excludes the AFWS ring header inside of the steam generators.
Some support systems such as the Service Water Systen are reviewed qualitatively.
2.0 Discussion The Davis-Besse AFWS has two turbine driven punips.
Both pumps are self-ccoled and take s'ction f rom a carece header whicn is normally supplied by tne condarsate sinrage tank (CST) tnrough no manual valves, a cneck valve 2nd a fine-essh strainer.
The cumps.: ave pressure switches cetecting loss cf suction in which the water supply is autonutically switched from the CST to the Service Water System. The Fire Protection Systen is afsc 3 backup water source for the AFWS; however, this switchover must te done manually.
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8 The licensee analyzed four AFWS configurations:
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1.
" Pre-TMl" configuration: This is the AFWS that existed in March 1979.
2.
" Post-TMI" configuration:
This is the AFWS configuration that contains k
THI-related changes which includes a procedure for providing core cooling using the main feedwater startup pump. reactor coolant system make-up E
pump and the pilot cperated relief valve (startup pump with feed and bleed). This written procedure was planned to be implemented in the l[.
j 1982 refueling cutage.
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3.
" Third Train" configuration:
This configuration uses a larger impeller
's and higher horsepewer motor on. the existing main feedwater startup pump, p
in an altered discharge mode to provide a back-up third train of auxi-g liary feedwater.
l 4
" Analysis Based" configuration:
This configuration includes the written
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procedure for using startup pump with feed and bleed, similar to the
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case 2 above. This configuration also incorporates modifications t'
addressing several dcminant failure contributors identified in the
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3 licensee's study.
Jt BNL analyzed a AFWS system that is comparable to the " Analysis Based" config-
..r uration, without considering the main feedwater startup train and feed and
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biced operation as proposed by the licensee. The reason is that the startup c
pumo has about 300 GPM capacity which is less than the required 800 GPM for r
decay heat renoval and the feed and bleed cperation is not allowed by the l
NUREG-0611 methodology. Therefore, the BNL results should be compared to S.
the licensee's " post-TMI" results.
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3.0 Results 1
Table 1 belcw compares the results of the AFWS unavailability for the three b
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transient cases based on the BNL and applicant analysis.
Table 1: Davis-Gesse AFWS Unavailability for Three Transient Cases
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}q, BNL Estinate Licensee Estimate for the Four Configurations I,h Per Gemand Per Oemand j-Third Analysis-k,..
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Pre-TMI Post-TMI Train based p
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LMFW 1.6x10-3 3.3x10-2 6.5x10'#
4.5x10-5 3.3x10-5 j
2.
LOOP 2.8x10-3 4.1x10 5.5x10-3 1.4x10'4 9.3x10-5 j
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LCAC 3.4x10-2 8.8x10-2 1.9x10-2 1.9x10-2 1.1x10~2 f
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3.1 Dominant Failure Contribution Loss of Main Feedwater (LMFW) Case I
1.
Failure of both turbine driven pumps to start.
l Maintenance error of valve MS730 2.
3.
Actuation logic f ailure including independent pressure switch l
failures, spurious AFWS isolation, etc.
4 Failure of steam admission valves to open.
Loss of Offsite Pcwer (LOOP) Case i
1.
All the dominant failure contributors in the LMFW case.
2.
Failure of diesel generator 1, which supplies pcwer to the steam admission valves MS106A, MS107, and MS107A.
Loss of All AC Power (LOAC) Case All dominant failure contributors in LMFW and LOOP cases.
1.
2.
The TOP-2 train is unavailable because steam acmission valves l
MS106A, MS107, and MS107A which depend on AC power, fail to I
open during a LOAC event.
3.2 Corinon Cause/Sincie Point Failures Because lack of diversity in the AFW pumps, the Davis-Besse AFWS is particularly susceptible to potential corrnon cause failures.
The following failures were obtained from LERs:
1.
Dirt January 1979 - steam admissica s'!ves M5106 and MS106A for pump AFWP-1 failed to operate becatie of dirt accumulation.
The potential cocunon fail "e is that dirt may also affect pump AFWP-2 and cause bo'h pumps to '
.e.
2.
Isoiatinn v bes closed Novemoer 1977 - motor operated control valves AF599 and AF608 were found to be closed and, thus, isolated both steam ger.eratnes frcm the AFW flow patn. Valve AF599 controls AFW ficw to steart gererator i no valve AF608 to steam generator 2.
The reason of the failure is due to omission in the test and maintenance procedures, which failed to alert the operator to reset the valve log u for these valves.
3.
Pressure switch failures May 21, 1979 - common cause failure of six AFW purp suction pressure switches due to setpoint drift and/or malfuncticr. of corponents.
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these switches fail high, pumps will not be able to autcmatically switch over to alternative water sources in the event of a loss of suction.
If switches fail Icw, it will inhibit steam admission to the pump turbines and will f&il the entire AFWS.
4 Strainers One fine mesh strainer is located on the suction side of each AFW There are no LERs reported on strainer blocking the flow pump.
path in Davis-Besse but this failure has occurred in other plants.
5.
Loss of steam suoply
~
One potential ccmmon cause failure is loss of steam to both turbines because of steam generator depressurization which could stem from two relief valves failing to close, or operator error in cpening the dump valve.
6.
Imprcper alignment of suction l
October 20, 1977 - it was discovered that both AFW pump suctions were f
aligned to the deaerator storage tanks which was not an alternative i
The tank's water temperature is greater than 200*F water source.
which could damage the turbine bearings in both AFW pumps. An oper-ator improperly aligned both AFW pumps to deaerator tanks through valve FW85 instead of FW32. The Service Water System should be the alternative water source. Since this incident, valve FW35 has been lock-closed and added to the valve verification list.
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4.0 Conclusions The Davis-Besse AFWS ur. availability i'. estimated to be in the low reliability range and outside of th' occeptable numerical criterion of the SRP. The addition of an independen' third AFW trair will likely imprnve the AFWS unavailability to the acceptable range of the SRP criterion.
Eliminating the cocinen cause and single point f ailures will likely improve the AFWS unavailability by a factor of 2.
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TABLE __2 l
^
Dominant Failure Contributors to AFWS Unavailability i
A Turbine-driven cump train 1, failures per demand i
BNL Licensee Estimate Estimate Description of Components j
5x10-4 Human error in aligning motor operated valves: AF608, AF3870 AF360, ICS388 l
1x10-#
1.5x10-2 Hardware failure of moter operated valves:
AF608, AF3870, AF360 1x10-4 Hardware failure of check valves:
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'I AF39, AF72 1x 10~,-
3.6x10-2 TDP-1 fails to start 7x10-3 Actuation logic failure, including independent pressure switch failures, spurious isolation etc.
5.8x10-3 5.81x10-3 Pump unavailable due to maintenance a
1 2.1x10-3 Valve maintenance: AF360, AF3870, AF3869 3x10-#
1.94x10-3 Pump unavailable due to test 3
Failure of steam admission: 3x10-3 1x10-4 (valv? It,106 failur2); x 3.9x10-2 i
(M5106A failure or diesel generator j
1 failure) 3.6:10~2 Failure of diesel genertor, which supplies AC power to steam admission valves of pump AFWP-1
.j fiOTE5 We cannot find this failure rate in the licensee's report.
Comment -
A. Contributors to Train 2 are similar to those of Train 1.
- However, i
Train 2 is unavailable in the LOAC event because the steam admission valves that allows stean to the pump turbine AFWP-2 depend on the AC power.
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5.0 References i
" Actions required from Operating License Applications of Nuclear l'
.-]
1.
Steam Supply Systems designated by Westinghouse and Combustion
-5' Engineering resulting frcm the NRC Bulletins and other task fcrce review regarding the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Accident," from i
D. Ross to all pending operating license applications, dated March 10, 1980.
Holderness, J.
H., " Davis-Besse Unit No.1 Auxiliary Feedwater 2.
System Reliability Analysis Final Report," prepared by EDS Nuclear i
Inc., for Toledo Edison Company, Report tio. 02-1040-0R95,
-j December 1981.
il Youngblood, R. and Papazoglou " Review of tne Davis-Besse Unit 3.
No. 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System Reliability Analysis," Brookhaven i
p National Laboratory, November 1982.
4.
" Generic Evaluation of Feedwater Transient and Small Break Loss-of-1
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Coolant Accidents in Westinghouse-Designed Operating Plants,"
- J NUREG-061), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, January 1980.
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- u...m o c... w Docket No. 50-346
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License No. NPF-3 i
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Sorial No. 742 i
September le, 1981 I
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Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
.r. John F. Stolz M
Attention:
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 g
y Division of Operating Reac. ors I, J-
'?nited States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2.-
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'Jashington, D.C.
20555 Dear.r.
Stol--
M is in response to your letter dated July 28, 1981 (Log No. 769) i 4
This relating to the Auxiliary Feedwater System Automatic Initiation and Flow Indication for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1. to
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Attach-your letter listed five items requiring Toledo Edison response.
1 snd 2 to this letter summarize our response to these items.
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ments U
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Very truly yours, 00/
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Docket No. 50-346
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b-License No. NPF-3 h
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Scptember 16, 1981 i
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'q Attachment I to Toledo Edison letter to the NRC on Auxiliary Feedwater ( AFV) Automatic Initiation b.
and Flow Indication l-(,
j Provide full size up-to-date electrical schematic / elementary Itca 1 i.. +
l diagrams for:
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AFV sjstem initiation circuits (from the logic to the ly l'
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final actuation signal) -
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AFV system annunciation circuits
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AFV pu=p control circuits 6\\
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AFV valve control circuits Five sets of the following drawings are enclosed to provide lE t
Response
information as requested in item 1.
Appropriate drawing change notices where applicable and so indicated are also if;;
g, enclosed.
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t LT Drawing Change 57
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Notice No.
Drawing No.
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l E 19B-1 Rev. 6 E 19B-2 Rev. 4 E 198-1
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E 193-3 Rev. 2
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E 18 Rev. 11 E 18-3 E 42B-53 Rev. 5 E 423-13 4
E 443-4A Rev. 6 E 44B-50 E 44B-4B Rev. 7 E 44B-49 E 44B-4C Rev. 8 E 44B-36 E 443-4D Rev. 10 E 44B-3, c
E 448-5 Rev. 6 E 44B-59 N
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- E 448-45 E 44B-9 Rev. 7 E 44B-10 Rev 9 E 44B-39, E 44B-43 E. ;
E 443-11A Rev. 7 fi l
E 44B-118 Rev. 8 E 443-30 c.
E 44B-14A Rev. 7
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E 443-14B Rev. 8 l'.
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Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF 3 I
Ssrial No. 742 k..
S:ptember 16, 1981 h
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Drawing Change Notice No.
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E 448-31 E 44B-15 Rev. 8 6
E 44B-55, E 44B-53 E 448-19A Rev. 1 E 448-54 E 44B-19B Rev. 1 p
E 448-Se E 448-20 Rev. 1
$7 E 44B-21A Rev. OC E
E 448-21B Rev. OA E 44B-21C Rev. 0A (t:
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E 458-11A Rev. 9 E 458-118 Rev. 11 va E 453-11C Rev. 3 E 458-26 E 45B-17 Rev. 4 E 46B-1A Rev. 9 d'
E 463-1B Rev. 9 i
E 462-1C Rev. 5 E 46B-1D Rev. 9 i
E 46B-1E Rev. 5
}fl E 468-IF Rev. 0A E 468-88, E 46B-79 4 -j E 46B-4A Nov. 12 r:
E 468-89. E 468-80
@ j E 458-4B Rev. 11 E 46B-81
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h{l E 465-46A Rev. 6 E 46B-82 E 46B-4eB Rev. 5 E 468-49 R..
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E 46B-50 Rev. 3 f
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M00 Rev. 12 E-M 051-4, M 051-3 M 051 Rev. 15 W'l
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r-Provide a detailed full size up-to-date piping and instrumen-1 ATWS (including jij J, tem _2 cation diagrse (Ph1D) of the Davis-Besse Unit steam supply lines for the turbine driven AW pump (s)).
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following drawings and drawing change notices f.]
Ra,ponse Five sets of the o,' the above item.
are provided in response f"t I
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Scrial No. 742 S;pto ber 16, 1981 C.
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j Drawing Change 9
Notice No-Drawing No.
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M 003-21 g
M Ot3 Rev. 31 O
M 006A Rev. 27 M 0063-12, M 006B-13, M 006-16 g
M 006B Rev. 35 v.
M 007 Rev. 34 0
M 041 Rev. 33 N
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'I Itca 3 Provide up-to-date AW system initiation logic diagrams.
Q-1 Rzeponse The informction requested in this item is included as part of j
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response to item 1.
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' r For each steam generator level channel at Davis-Besse 1l cit 1, P
the specific source f r w. which that channel is powered.
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Itc,4 list RSsponse See Attachment 2.
fem 5 By letter dated March 21, 1980, it is stated that " Toledo 7' '
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for each Edison will provide one safety grade flow instrument auxiliary feedwster train at DB-1.
This will be a differential h
across an orifice located in each auxiliary
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g pressure device set feedwater line."
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.t f ' 'j Thi., does not comply with Section II.E.1.2 Part 2 of NUREG-j.
cy 0737 (Clarification of TM1 Action Plan Requirements) which states that two AW flowrate indicators for each stea.a generator r
1 should be provided.
Provide a schedule for implementation of E
a second flow channel for each steam generator and describe i
how these flow channels comply with the criteria listed in NUREG-0737 Section II.E.1.2 Part 2.
g 1
As part of our ef fort to continuously review and upgrade the h
i Rqsponse Auxiliary Feedwater System (AWS) for reliability and perf ormar.ce, p
we have completed an extensive reliability analysis of the
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Davis-Besse AWS, Results of this analysis, performed by EDS
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.j Nuclear Inc., will be made available to the NRC in the near j'
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'The analysis provides a useful framework for evaluating future.
the impact of AWS flow indicators on overall plant safety.
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Results of the Davis 0 esse AW S reliability analysis indicate that the AWS flow indicators do not contribute substantially y.
to AWS reliability. The reasons for this are as follws:
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Docket No. 50-346 I
License No. NPF-3 i
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Serial No. 742
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The actuation of the two trains of AWS le accomplished automatically t
t The automatic action includes switching 1.
to a safety-grade backup water supply (service water supply) should f,
through safety-grade signals.
fail.
g the primary AWS water supply (condensate storage tanks) is a.
Operator action based on control room indication of AWS flow, h
4 therefore not required.
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Emergency procedures exist to guide operator actions for mitigating
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j The AWS flew i
2.
f aults should one or both trains of the AWS f all.
j indicators provide only one of several measures of AWS performance.
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The primary indicator of syster performance however.
generator secondary side water level which is monitored and indicated t[
In inside the control room by safety grace instrumentation.
level indicators are also addition, separate redundant safety grade Other parameters available to the available in the cabinet roce.
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plant operators for diagnosis of faults and identification of tank level, AW pump corrective actions include condensate storagw 3-speed, AW pump discharge pressure (all non saf ety grade) and 1
i safety grade steam generator pressure.
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Eg j The steam generator level instrumentation which provides the primary P'.]-
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indication of availability of secondary side kf and most important heat sink s powered from a safety grade power supply redundant b.2 from the one supplying the flow instrumentation. Thus, it is f1 highly improbable to lose both the level and existing flow indication
{j caused by a loss of channel power.
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Other plant design and procedures meditications have been implementad 4
at Davis-Besse subsaquent to the TMI-2 evant.
These mocift:1tiens have addressed the most significant contributions to AWS ut,availa-
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bility and have reduced the system unavailability by over an crder y
of magnitude. These modificattons include:
electric power sources (DC-power supplies) foc motor L;;
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- diverse operated valves in one train of the AWS.
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f4 redundant at.d seismically qualified turbino exhsusts.
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administrative procedures to lock in position all manual p
valves and local control stations and handwheels for motor pH operated valves in the AWS.
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automatic steam generator dual level setpoint control.
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Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3
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g Serial No. 742
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September 16, 1981 I
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an emergency procedure to supply water to the steam generator
~g through the main feedwater startup titap should both c: ains of the AFiS fail.
These modifications have greatly reduced the proba'.iility for hilure 7
to achieve the AFiS safety function, and have thereby diminisheo I
the relative significance of the' ADiS flow indication.
f ne inclusion of one AFiS flow indicator per train h.s little J
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impact on the reliability analysis results. The inclusion of a second flow indicator per train has even less impac.t.
The only f
application for the flow indicator in the reliability analysis is
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I the operator in recovering from a faulted system condition.
y to assist Generally, the ability to recover is dominated by human f actors, not by instrumentation performance.
A second flow indicator would
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address the more dominant human factors, and would therefore significantly improve system reliability.
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not not t.
6.
The f ailure of a flow indicator, in itself, will not lead to adverse L,
consequences.
It should be noted that the steam generator level
{j and pressure indications provide adequate information for operator
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to casure availability of adequate secondary heat sink.
Even in p r,j the eve..' of a steam line break when the two AF4 pumps are f ee ling
[.g the unaf fected steam generator, the availability of (unaf fected) g,1, for pq steam generator has been previously shown to be acceptable b
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dacay heat removal purposes. There are no credible occurrences in which autcmatic or manual actions sould be taken to terminate AFi
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flow basad on a faulty indication of that flow.
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4 The insensitivity of the overall AFiS reliability to a second AFiS flow
(.1 indicator and the inclusion of truly diverse indication of the primary W.i pe-formance parameter (steam generator level) make unnecessary a second kl flow indicator in each train.
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