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WATERFORD 3 STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 4
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1983 Full-scale Emergency Exercise I
Section II of Exercise Package I
- OBJECTIVES -
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r LOUISIANA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD 3 STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 1983 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
- 2. OBJECTIVES AND GUIDELINES As a result of discussions between Louisiana Power and Light Company (LP&L), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region IV (NRC), the Federal Emergency Management Agency - Region VI (FEMA), the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED), Louisiana Of fice of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP), St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes, general objectives and guidelines have been developed for the 1983 Energency Preparedness at Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station, which is scheduled to be conducted on April 13, 1983.
A.
Exercise Obiectives 1.
For the LP&L (Licensee) Emergency Responsa Organizations a.
Demonstrate proficiency in classifying the emergency condition.
b.
Demonstrate prompt notifications.
I c.
Demonstrate the ability of the LP&L Emergency Response Organization to establish command and control and maintain continuity of command and control throughout the exercise.
g.
f d.
Demonstrate adequate and effective use of emergency communications equipment, and communications procedures and methods.
e.
Demonstrate the capability to develop and disseminate timely and accurate public information releases.
f.
Demonstrate the ability to obtain appropriate medical care for simulated injured or contaminated personnel.
g.
Demonstrate the ability to perform radiological monitoring and assessments, and off-site dose assessment projections necessary to provide advance s
warning to Parish, State and Federal agencies.
h.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the LP&L emergency response facilities for personnel to perform their designated functions'.
1.
Demonstrate recovery techniques in the ability of the LP&L Emergency Response Organisation to de-escalate (deactivate) corporate and site emergency response activities, j.
Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response organisation to disseminate information to other participating emergency response organisations (Parishes, State and Federal).
k.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct a post-exercise critique to determine areas requiring additional capability improvements.
t 2.
For the various off-site emergency response organiza-tions (Parish, State, Federal and private).
a.' Demonstrate that participating organizations can alert, notify and activate emergency response personnel in a timely and effective fashion, b.
Demonstrate State and Parish capability for alert / notification of the public, institutions and industry within the plume exposure pathyway (EPZ).
c.
Test and evaluate the activation and adequacy of external communications systems and procedures bet-ween facility, State and Parish.
d.
Test and evaluate the activaItion and adequacy of communications between the various emergency response organizations and their respective field operations.
e.
Demonstrate the activation of amergency operations centers and the effectiveness of security, internal procedures, displays and information systems.
f.
Evaluate the adequacy, capabilities and personnel of emergency operations center staffing.
g.
Evaluate state and Parish effectiveness in the direction and control of emergency operations.
h.
Demonstrate LNED's capability for accident assessment and protective action recommendation.
i.
Demonstrate that timely and coordinated protective response decisions can be made for both plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZ's.
e j.
Test and evaluate capability of State and Parish emergency staffs to carry out radiation exposure control measures.
k.
Test and evaluate State and Parish capability for implementing accese control and traffic control procedures.
1.
Demonstrate State and Parish capability for dissemi-nating instructions and emergency information to the public.
m.
Test and evaluate utility, 'Stara and Parish capability for coordinating the release of informa-tion to the media and the general public.
n.
Demonstrate the capability of special facilities within the pluma exposure pathway F.PE to implement protective measures.
o.
Demonstrate the capabilities to provide support to risk Parish from designated local and State agencies.
p'.
Test and evaluate the implementation of representa-tive reception center and shelter operations in select support Parishes.
q.
Demonstrate capability for implementation of recovery operation.
WATERFORD 3 STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 1983 Full-scale Emergency Exercise Section IV of Exercise Package
- Narrative Susuary -
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I Section IV 1983 LP&L/LA i
Emerg. Exercise I
Section IV - Narrative Summary l
This exercise is provided only to test the integrated response
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capability of the organisations established to protect the public i
should an " actual" event occur.
As such, the plant sequence of f
events in this exercise is not evidence of the possibility for i
i such an actual event.
It is contrived on worst case or extremely i
i unrealistic assumptions necessary to force degradation of support 1
j systems that would place the plant into an unstable condition.
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In order to achieve a sequence of events that will lead to a significant plant problem, the exercise scenario must contain an i
l incredible plant situation, an unlikely series of equipment
,1 failures, or an improbable operator error combined with equipment
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failures, such as is the basis for this exercise.
Thus, of f-site I
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personnel (e.g., the public) should not be misled into believing
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l that an event of this nature could occur based on the 1
assumptions used to generate the events in this scenario.
The f
j following is a summary of these events:
1 The plant is operating at 1004 power with a.1 gpa primary to
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l secondary leak in the No. 1 Steam Generator.
A 4.16 KV bus r
(3A3-s) is out of service due to an electrical fault.
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j Section IV 1983 LP&L/LA Emerg. Exercise I
i The NOS-SS receives a call from an Equipment Operator stating l
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that a Maintenance individual has been injured in a fall and r
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is in a contaminated area of the plant.
An announcement for l
immediate first aid team and health physic response is then T
made over the plant public address system and off-site j
notifications are made for medical assistance.
Following f
pick-up of the injured individual by an off-site ambulance
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f service an Unusual Event is declared (the time is now l
approximately 7:00 a.m.).
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A notification of Unusual Event simultaniously will go to State and local emergency preparedness organisation via the i
j Operational notline.
Additional emergency personnel will be notified as per standard operating procedure.
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Following the medical emergency, a sudden main steam rupture j
causes pressure in Steam Generator No.1 to drop below the i
i isolation safety actuation, and the reactor trip, set points.
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The associated hain Steam Isolation Valve fails to close.
An Alert is declared with associated off-site notifications (the time is now approximately 8:30 a.m.).
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The Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center l
are activated and the 30-minute responders are called in.
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Section IV 1983 LP&L/LA Emerg. Exercise Upon receiving Alert notification, appropriate State and local emergency organizations will be activated.
Further notification will be made to appropriate response personnel.
The Station Security computer f ails requiring additional Security backup to maintain access control to the site and vital areas in the plant.
Plant parameters have changed drastically with No. 1 Steam Generator level low, Pressurizer level off-scale low, High Pressure Safety Injection, and primary plant pressures and temperatures dropping rapidly.
Increasing radiation levels in No. 1 Main Steam Line are also indicated.
The Operators respond using the plant Emergency Operating Procedures as required and the on-shif t Chemist draws a primary sample.
Personnel are dispatched to determine the cause of the loss of steam pressure and the reason for the open indication on the No. 1 Main Steam Line Isolation Valve.
Plant conditions continue to change as Operations and Technical Support Center personnel assess and evaluate them.
Off-site agencies are periodically updated.
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l 1983 LP&L/LA Section IV Emerg. Exercise Results are received from the primary coolant sample which indicate an iodine spike had occurred at about the same time the Control Element Assemblies were tripped.
Due to the unisolated steam line break and associated Steam Generator tube leak, a radiation release to the environment is evident.
Available field monitoring personnel are dispatched and dose assessment efforts are initiated.
Following the staffing of the on-site emergency response centers and the local Emergency Operations Centers, additional field monitoring teams are dispatched to determine the off-site consequences of the radiation release.
Mechanical failure causes the 3B-S Diesel Generator to trip and fail to restart.
This creates a serious electrical distribution problem.
The Emergency Operations Pacility is activated at this time to provide additional engineering support.
Appropriate off-site updates are made by the Technical Support Center staff.
(The time is now approximately 9:45 a.m.)
Main Steam Line radiation levels increase, instituting a Protected Area evacuation and personnel accountability effort.
Non-essential personnel assemble in the plant parking lots.
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i Section IV 1983 LP&L/LA Emerg. Exercise Through dose assessment and field monitoring efforts, it is determined that doses one mile from the plant in a southwesterly direction are above Protective Action Guide values.
The Emergency Coordinator declares a Site Emergency (the time is now approximstely 11:00 a.m.).
Non-essential
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j personnel are evacuated to an off-site assembly area, 1
Monsanto Park.
The LP&L Information Center is activated.
The State Office of Emergency Preparedness Emergency Operations Center and Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division's operations Center are fully activated at this time to respond
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as conditions necessitate.
Upon receiving site emergency notification, appropriate State and local emergency organizations will mobilize their emergency workers and take other appropriate actions to prepare for assisting with possible protective actions if i
recommended.
j Initial off-site protective action recommendations are made to shelter within the two mile radium of Waterford 3.
The early warning system sirens and Emergency Broadcast System are used to notify residents near the site.
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Section IV 1983 LP&L/LA Emerg. Exercise l
At this time traffic control points will be set up and manned and access will be limited to the affected area.
Prepara-i tions for possible escalation of emergency status will be undertaken should the situation degrade.
Meteorological conditions change and the wind shif ts to a l
northwesterly direction.
Press briefings and news releases are conducted to update the public on conditions and activities associated with the event.
i The radiation release continues and field monitoring readings indicate increased radiation levels that require declaration i
of a General Emergency (the time is now approximately 1:30 p.m.)
Additional off-site protective actions are recommended.
1 Parish and State agencies will review and update information and take appropriate actions as warrented by the situation.
Increased communications and news releases ensure that the public and key responsn agencies are aware of event i
developments.
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e Section IV 1983 LP&L/LA Energ. Exercise Through accident assessment and emergency repair activities, plant conditions gradually improve.
Failure of the Main Steam Isolation Valve was found to be due to a mechanical failure of the MSIV activator.
This problem is corrected and the release terminated.
A while later, electrical repairs are completed to the 33-8 Diesel Generator returning it to an operable status (the time is now approximately 4:00 p.m.).
Plant conditions continue to stabilise and improve due to the efforts of the LP&L emergency response organisations and the Emergency operations Facility Director eventually declassifies the event and initiates necessary recovery actions.
Decontamination and reparative restoration activities of the recovery program are subsequently completed and the plant is returned to a pre-emergency status capable of power operations.
Parish and State agencies will initiate recovery operations necessary to ensure the health and safety of the public prior to their return to affected areas.
The esercise is then terminated (time is now approximately 5:00 p.m.).
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WATERFORD 3 STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT EfAlMC isas manu:, macecr ranumess xxracIst l
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O TABLE I-l Abbreviations KWeric Dtmip Valve ADV Cbrporate Ccausmd Center CI Contairunant Isolation Systm CIS CEPADAS - 0:npaterized Biergency Planning and Data Acquisition System Exclusion Area Boundary INI Baargency Action Invel
!!AL Buergency Coordinator IC Buargency Censumd Cantar Er Bnargency Core Cooling System liCCS B ergency Feedwater Actuation Signal 1lFAS Emargency Operations Centar ECC Ehergency Operations Facility EEP Federal Beargency knagement Agency FDA Fixed Facility Response Team FFRT liigh Pressure Safety Injection HPSI Imisiana Itaclear !!hergy Division IJalD Imisiana Office of Baargency Preparedness IGP Imisiana Power & Light Ocupany IE6L IPSI Im Pressure Safety Injoction min Stamm Isolation Signal MiIS min Stamm Isolation Valve MiIV Nuclear Auxillary Operator imo Itaclear Operations Stpervisor - Shift Suppvisor N06-SS Nuclear Regulatory Cannission WC J
Abbreviations (Cont'd)
Operations Support Center CSC Radiation Monitoring System aMs S/G Steam Generator Safety Injection Actuation signal SIAs Safety Injection System SIS Shift Techni a l Advisor SM Technical S W Center TBC 4
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S ction IV 1983 LP&L/LA Emarg. Exorcios j
Section IV - Narrative Summary This exercise is provided to test the integrated response i
j capability of the organizations established to protect the public i
should an " actual" event occur.
As such, the plant sequence of events in this exercise is not evidence of the possibility of 6
l such an actual event.
It is conceived on worst case or extremely unrealistic assumptions necessary to force degradation of support systems that would place the plant into an unstable condition.
In order to achieve a sequence of events that will lead to a l
significant plant problem, the exercise scenario must contain an j
incredible ~ plant situation, an unlikely series of equipment i
failures, or an improbable operator error combined with equipment 1
i failures, and is the basis for this exercise.
Thus, off-site i
l personnel (e.g.,
the public) should not be misled into believing 3
that an event of this nature could occur based on the assumptions l
used to generate the events in this scenario.
The following is a summary of these events:
I The plant is operating at 1004 power with a.1 gpa primary to i
secondary leak in the No.1 Steam Generator.
A 4.16 KV bus i
l (3A3-s) is out of service due to an electrical fault.
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1 Rev 1 i-I
S cticn IV 1983 LP&L/LA Emsrg. Exarcica The NOS-SS receives a call from an Equipment Operator stating that a Maintenance individual has been injured in a fall and is in a contaminated area of the plant.
An announcement for an immediate first aid team and health physics response is then made over the plant public address system and off-site notifications are made for medical assistance.
Following the i
pick-up of the injured individual by an off-site ambulance service, an Unusual Event is declared (the time is now approximately 7:00 a.m.).
A notification of Unusual Event will simultaneously go to State and local emergency preparedness organizations via the Operational Hotline.
Additional emergency personnel will be notified as per standard operating procedures.
Following the medical emergency, the Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) responds to an increase on the No. 1 S/G main steam line monitor.
The subsequent evaluation indicates a signifi-cant increase in the primary to secondary leak rate in No. 1 S/G.
Operators determine via their indications, that the primary system to secondary system leak rate of 60 gpa exists.
Based on EP-1-001 " Recognition and Classification",
TAB "B"
" Loss of RCS Inventory", the NOS-SS classifies the event as an " Alert" and assumes the role of Emergency Coordinator (EC).
The Emergency Coordinator directs the Control Room staff to take action to mitigate the effects of the loss of RCS inventory.
The Emergency Coordinator directs 2
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l S0ction IV 1983 LP&L/LA Emerg. Exorcica his appointed Emergency Communicator to begin making the required notification to plant management, and state and i
federal agencies.
The Emergency Communicator activates the 4
emergency pager system to call in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Center (OSC) staffs.
The NPO, under the direction of the NOS-CRS, commences a s
controlled plant shutdown to minimize the stress on the already damaged No.1 S/G.
Chemistry samples are taken to support the Control Room indications and to determin,e the i
amount of contamination in the No. 1 S/G.
The TSC and OSC staff begin arriving and staffing their respective facilities (the time now is about 9 an).
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Baergency communicators transmit additional information to the parish, state and federal agencies as it becomes available.
l The Station Security computer fails, requiring additional Security backup to maintain access control to the site and vital areas in the plant.
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-SOction IV 1983 LP&L/LA Emerg Exercise The evaluation of available plant parameters by the technical assessment staff indicates that the primary system to secondary system leak rate has stabilized at approximately 60 gpm.
At this time there is no radiation release occuring off-site.
Plant shut down continues in a controlled manner (the time now is about 10 am).
At 10:30 am, the pressurizer level rapidly decreases, pressurizer heaters trip, primary pressure decreases, the reactor trips, CIAS and SIAS actuate and HPSI and LPSI auto-matically start to limit the effect of the loss of RCS inventory and pressure.
The Control Room staff reacts to the reactor trip and the loss of RCS pressure.
The technical assessment staff evaluates the changing parameters.
The leak rate of primary coolant into No. 1 S/G has increased to approximately 200 gpa.
The Esergency Management Staff evaluates the event and reclassifies the event to a " Site Emergency".
amargency Communicator begins notifing parish, state and federal agencies of the changing plant status and the degrading plant conditions.
The Emergency Coordinator con-tacts the EOF Director and requests that the EOF be staffed to support the on-site emergency organization (the time now is about 11:00 am).
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Secti@n IV 1983 LP&L/LA Emerg. Exercise The Protected Area is evacuated of all non-essential personnel.
The non-essential personnel assemble in the parking lots and await further instructions.
The plant security force performs accountability.
Due to the construc-tion force present, this will be limited to a select group of administrative staff members who work within the Administra-tion Building.
At this time, traffic control points will be set up and I
manned and access will be limited to the affected area.
Preparations for possible escalation of emergency status will be undertaken should the situation degrade.
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i Meteorological conditions change and the wind shif ts to a northwesterly direction.
Press briefings and news releases are conducted to update the public on conditions and activities associated with the event.
Parish and State agencies will review and update information and take appropriate actions as warrented by the situation.
Increased communications and naws releases ensure that the public and key response agencies are aware of event develop-ment.
Plant conditions continue to change as Operations and Technical Support Center personnel assess and evaluate them.
Off-Site agencies are periodically updated.
5 Rev 1 l
Ssetion IV
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1983 LP&L/LA Emerg. Exarcice Results are received from the primary coolant sample which indicates an iodine spike has occurred at about the time the Control Element Assemblies *were tripped.
Due to the unisolated S/G, radiation is released, via the turbine gland leakage and various plant steam leaks, to the environment.
Field Monitoring Teams are dispatched and dose assessment efforts are initiated.
Plant Operators commence a plant cooldown and when pressure becomes less than the lowest No. 1 S/G safety valve setting, No. 1 S/G MSIV is shut.
Iodine levels in the turbine building begin to drop.
The State Office of Emergency Preparedness - Emergency Operations Center and Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division's Operations Center are fully activated at this time to respond as conditions necessitate.
Upon receiving Site Emergency notification, appropriate State and local emergency organizations will mobilise their emergency workers and take other appropriate action to prepare for assisting with possible protective actions if recommended.
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Siction IV
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1983 LP&L/LA Emerg. Exarcice The EOF is staffed and the TSC begins transferring appropriate responsbilities from the TSC to the EOF (the time i
now is approximately 12:00).
About 12:30 pm, No. 2 S/G MSIV shuts on MSIS.
Pressure and level in No. 1 S/G begin to decrease.
A NPO is sent to investigate the apparent steam rupture.
The NAO reports that there is a large steam leak in the area surrounding No. 1 S/G Atmospheric Dump Valve (ADV).
A large scale release has casumanced.
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Dose A.=sessment activities increase.
The community of
- l Killona and the Waterford 1 & 2 Steam Electric Station lie i
l within the plume pathway.
Protective action recommendations i'
are communicated to the parish and state, evaluations are l
made, sirens are sounded and actions are taken to protect the affected personnel.
All non-essential personnel are i
evacuated from the site to the down-river assembly area (the
'l time now is about 1:30 pm).
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l The Plant Operator's continue to cooldown and de-pressurize j
the plant.
i' The OSC Emergency Repair Teams investigate the steam leakage from No. 1 S/G ADV.
Attempts to shut the No. 1 S/G ADV isolation valve are impaired by blowing steam from the failed l
body to bonnet seal on the ADV.
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Srction IV 1983 LP&L/LA Emarg. Exercise The release continues, dose assessment efforts continue, and efforts to terminate the release are ongoing.
The plant updates the parish and state as plant parameters change.
At about 4,pm, primary and secondary system pressure has been reduced to a point adequate to allow repair teams to shut the No. 1 S/G ADV isolation valve.
Field Monitor teams begin'to send reports back of decreasing off-site radiation.
The emergency management team evaluates the changing plant situation and declassifies the event.
Recovery actions are initiated.
Plant conditions continue to stabilize and improve due to the efforts of the LPEL emergency response organisations.
The Emergency Operations Facility Director eventually de-classi-fies the event and initiates necessary recovery actions.
Decontamination and reparative restoration activities of the recovery program are subsequently completed and the plant is returned to a pre-emergency status capable of power operation.
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Scction IV 1983 LPfL/LA Emerg. Exercise Parish and State agencies will initiate recovery operations necessary to ensure the health and safety of the public prior to their return to affected areas.
The exercise is then terminated (time is now approximately 5:00 pm).
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CONFIDENTIAL 1983 LP&L/LA emergency Exercico SECTION V - ON-SITE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS INITIAL CONDITIONS The Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station is presently still under construction, however, to demonstrate that response personnel can readily adapt to operating plant conditions, it is assumed that the plant has received its operating license, gone through fuel load, and is now operating with the following conditions:
The plant has been operating at 100% power for the last four months.
A.1 gpm primary to secondary leak exists in the No.1 Steam Generator.
The 4.16 Kv bus (3A3-S) is out of service due to an electrical fault.
The Security condition is green.
Two electrical meintenance personnel and a Health Physics Technician have been called in early and are now working to restore the 3A3-S bus.
Approx.
Planned Time of Exercise Day Time - Minutes On-Site Scenario Cue Cards 6:00 a.m.
T-0:00 The Plant is simulated to CC-1 have been operating at 1004 power.
Operations personnel are aware of a.1 gpm primary to secondary leek in the No. 1 Steam Generator.
NOTE:
The actual Operations Shift personnel may not participate in the exercise due to plant operation safety concerns.
In this event, additional Operations personnel will be present to respond to the simulated plant conditions and will be briefed on the initial conditions at this time.
'983 LP&L/LA Smergency Exercise Approx.
Planned Time of Exercise Day Time - Minutes On-Site Scenario Cue Cards 6:05 T-0:05 An electrical maintenance CC-2 individual falls and severely injures himself in a contaminated area of the plant.
An Equipment Operator working with him i
reports the incident to the
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Control Room.
6:07 T-0:07 A public address system I
announcement is made at the plant and the First Aid Team responds to the injured victim.
Off-site notifica-tions are made requesting medical asistance.
NOTE:
An actual announce-ment and off-site notifica-tion should be made, how-ever, they should be pre-faced and concluded with, "THIS IS A DRILL".
6:10 T-0:10 The First Aid Team evalu-CC-3 ates the condition of the injured victim and prepares him for transport out of the plant.
6:15 T-0:15 Information concerning the victim's injuries is re-layed to the receiving hospital.
6:30 T-0:30 The First Aid Team moves the victim to an area outside of the plant for pick-up by the ambulance service.
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'983 LP&L/LA dmargency Exarciso Approx.
Planned Time of Exercise Dav Time - Minutes On-Site Scenario Cue Cards 6:45*
T-0:45 An ambulance service arrives and is aided by Security to obtain access to the loca-tion of the victim.
NOTE:
Due to the contami-nation on the victim, health physics support should be provided to both the ambu-lance and hospital by LP&L.
7:00 T-1:00 Because of the transport of a contaminated injured vic-tim to an off-site medical facility, an Unusual Event is declared by the Nuclear Operations Supervisor-Shift Supervisor (NOS-SS) per EP-1-001 " Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions".
An announce-ment is made over the public address system by a control room operator in accordance with EP-1-010 " Unusual Event".
Initial notifica-tions are made to off-site agencies and the NRC by an auxiliary operator.
NOTE:
Callout of the 30-minute responders is not ne-cessary at this time.
7:15 T-1:15 The First Aid Team is secured from their activi-ties and restoration of first aid equipment occurs.
7:35 T-1:35 The ambulance service arrives at the hospital with the injured victim.
Medical treatment is provided by the hospital staff.
- Exact time may vary dependent on whether an ambulance or heli-copter aircare service is used.
183 LP&L/LA mergancy Exarcisa Approx.
Planned Time of Exercise Dav Time - Minutes On-Site Scenario Cue Cards 7:40 T-1:40 The plant involvement in the CC-4 medical emergency has ended, thus the NOS-SS secures from the Unusual Event.
Off-site notifications are made to close out the emergency.
8:10 T-2:10 RCS equilibrium mismatch CC-5 between charging flow and total letdown flow indicates 60 gpm.
An Alert is declared based on Loss of RCS inventory EAL. No. 1 S/G Main Steam Line Monitor is noted trending upward.
8:12 T-2:12 The NOS-SS classifies the event per EP-1-001, assumes the role of Emergency coordinator and declares an Alert, implements EP-1-020.
He contacts the Plant Manager to advise him on the current situation.
The Station Alarm is sounded and an announcement is made to the facility.
8:14 T-2:14 The NAO who has been appointed Emergency Commun-cator by the Emergency coordinator begins the noti-fication process as per EP-2-010 " Notification and Com-munication".
The on-site emergency organization pager system is activated.
NOTE:
Since the event occurs during normal working hours the on-site organiza-tion should quickly man their facilities.
8:15 T-2:15 The control Room requests a secondary sample of No. 1 S/G to verify their indica-tions.
A primary coolant sample should also be requested at this time.
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.983 LP6L/LA Emergency Exercise
- Apprcx, Planned Time of Exercise j
Dav Time - Minutes On-Site Scenario Cue Cards 8:20 T-2:20 The Control Room staff, based on present indications contacts Pine Bluff Dispat-cher and commences a control-led shutdown of the plant.
NOTE:
Drill Monitor shall limit plant load reduction to 15% per hour.
8:30 T-2:30 Additional Chemistry Techni-clans are requested to sup-port additional primary and secondary samples needed to determine radioactive con-centrations in the affected systems.
9:05 T-3:05 The radiation level on No. 1 CC-6 S/G Main Steam Line Monitor continues to increase to the high alarm set point.
9:15 T-3:15 The On-Site Emergency Organ-ization should be fully activated by this time and the Plant Manager should have relieved the NOS-SS of the Emergency Coordinator responsibilities.
TSC Communicators should be handling all off-site communications.
9:20 T-3:20 Chemistry Technician reports CC-7 the results of the initial secondary sample.
No. 1 S/G gross activity, Iodine consentration and boron have increased.
9:35 T-3:35 As the plant shutdown con-CC-8 tinues, the primary to secondary leak rate appears to have stablilized at approximately 60 gpm.
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983 LP&L/LA dmarg8n y Exarcice
' Approx.
Planned Time of Exercise Day Time - Minutes On-Site Scenario Cue Cards 10:05 T-4:05 No. 1 S/G Main Steam Line CC-9 Monitor High-High alarm actuates.
10:10 T-4:10 Health Physics personnel are CC-10 dispatched to monitor areas surrounding the main steam line to determine local radiation levels.
10:30 T-4:30 Pressurizer level rapidly CC-ll decreases.
NOTE:
The Control Room Operator may, based on plant indications, elects to manually trip the reactor plant to prevent the automatically trip.
NOTE:
The plant is now at 70% reactor power and the pressuriser level is 52%.
10:40 T-4:40 The following plant condi-CC-12 tions occur as the pressur-izer level decreases.
- low pressurizer level alarms at about 484
- low-low pressurizer level alarms
- par heaters off at 284
- primary pressure drops
- DNBR trip point is exceed and the reactor plant trips
- at 1889 psia SIAS and CIAS occurs
- EPSI and LPSI actuates
- reactor coolant pumps are tripped by the operator
- the plant is setup for natural circulation
- additional secondary chemistry samples are re-quired
'983 LP&L/LA emergrney Exorcico Approx.
Planned Time of Exercise Day Time - Minutes On-Site Scenario Cue Cards l
NOTE:
SIAS causes isolation l
of S/G blowdown lines at this time.
When operations attempts to re-open the No.
1 S/G blowdown containment isolation valves, the S/G #1 blowdown valve air solenoid fails, preventing it from being re-opened for the duration of the exercise.
10:45 T-4:45 S/G low level trip at 27%
CC-13 (narrow range indication) actuates emergency feedwater.
NOTE:
The Nuclear Plant i
Operator (NPO) may have elected to isolate the Steam Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump from #1 S/G early.
If not, it should be isolated at this time.
A release will occur if the turbine drive pump is started and i
is not isolated from #1 S/G.
10:50 T-4:50 The Emergency Event is l
reclassified per EP-1-001 1
and a Site Emergency is l
declared as per EP-1-030
" Site Emergency".
Notifica-tions are conducted as per EP-2-010 to update parish and state agencies.
i 10:52 T-4:52 An announcement is made to CC-14 4
i the facility personnel per EP-1-030.
A limited evacuation is conducted of designated administration building staff as per EP 070 " Protected Area Evacuation".
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~ 983 LPsL/LA Approx.
Planned Time of Exercise Day Time - Minutes On-Site Scenario Cue Cards NOTE:
The EP-1-030 announcement will be modified to delete the words
" Protected Area Evacuation" to prevent impacting the ongoing contruc, tion effort.
NOTE:
The leak rate has in-creased to approximately 200 gpm.
However, due to the transient that exists on the primary system during this time frame, it will be almost impossible to deter-mine the magnitude of the i
leak.
10:53 T-4:53 The affect of HPSI will stablilize at about 1350 psia with primary system Tc 530 deg F.,
Tave 550 deg F.
and Th 570 deg F.
10:55 T-4:55 Radiation levels along the CC-15 main steam piping increase due to the primary system
]
leakaqs into the No. 1 S/G.
10:56 T-4:56 The Vice President of Operations - Nuclear is notified of the plant problem.
On completion of his update, the Near-Site i
organization is activated.
NOTE:
When the plant stabilizes from the effects of safety injection
- LPSI should be secured
- Natural circulation actuated
- Plant cooldown will be limited to a miximum of 30 deg F. per hour maximum.
NOTE:
When RCS pressure reach 1070 psig (set point of lowest set S/G safety I
valve) No. 1 S/G will be isolated.
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'983 LP&L/LA dmorgancy Exarcica Approx.
Planned Time of Exercise Day Time - Minutes On-Site Scenario Cue Cards 12:15 T-6:15 The Near-Site Emergency Organization should be man-ned to a level adequate to support full EOF activities.
12:30 T-6:30 The No. 2 S/G MSIV closes CC-16 due to MSIS.
- No. 1 S/G pressure is dropping rapidly
- No. 1 S/G level is slowly decreasing
- No. 2 S/G pressure is about 500 psia and temperature 465 deg. F and decreasing due to the plant cooldown
- No. 2 S/G level is decreasing slowly due to cooldown NOTE:
RCS temperatures Tc 470 deg F and decreasing, Tava 495 dog F and decreasing, Th 520 deg F and decreasing.
NOTE:
Cooldown from the steam leak is about 20 deg F per hour.
12:35 T-6:35 A NAO is dispatched to CC-17 investigate the rapid drop in No. 1 S/G pressure and level.
12:40 T-6:40 The NAO reports that No. 1 CC-18 S/G has steam coming from the wing area in the vicinity of the atmospheric dump valve.
NOTE:
The NAO should be surveyed to ensure that he has not become contaianated.
t
' 983 LP&L/LA dmergency Exercise Approx.
Planned Time of Exercise Dav Time - Minutes On-Site Scenario Cue Cards 12:42 T-6:42 A General Emergency is declared per EP-1-001 and announcements are made per EP-1-040.
NOTE:
The EP-1-040 announcement will be modified to delete the words 1
" Site Evacuation" to prevent impacting the ongoing construction effort.
NOTE:
Cooldown will be allowed to increase to a maximum rate of 60 deg F per hour.
NOTE:
From those selected Administrative Building Staff personnel, a sample group will be directed to evacuate to the appropriate assembly area.
NOTE:
OSC repair teams, and health physic personnels effort to close the il S/G ADV isolation valve are hampered by blowing contaminated steam.
Efforts to increase the torque on i
the body to bonnet flange also produce no noticable effect.
12:45 T-6:45 The Emergency Director is requested to activate the Corporate command Center.
12:50 T-6:50 Field Monitor Teams are CC-19 1
dispatched to track the plume.
1:45 T-7:45 Jessica Savage of the CC-20 National News network calls l
the EOF and requests an up-date on activities and what LP&L plans to do.
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'983 LP&L/LA dmergsncy Ex3rcica
, Approx.
Planned Time of Exercise Dav Time - Minutes On-Site Scenario Cue Cards NOTE:
The EOF should not provide information to her, but instead politely refer her to the LP&L Information Center.
1:50 T-7:50 The OSC reports that repair CC-21 parts are necessary to cor-rect the problem with the No. 1 Main Steam Atmospheric Dump Valve body to bonnet seal.
The EOF staff attempts to locate the ne-cessary parts and equipment.
l 1:55 T-7:55 Off-site authorities and agencies are updated on the plant conditions by the EOF.
2:00 T-8:00 Release radiation levels CC-22 decrease slightly due to the plant cooldown.
- However, the release has still not been terminated.
NOTE:
Plant parameters now as follows:
Tc 400 deg F Tave 435 deg F Th 470 deg F No. 1 S/G pressure 250 psig No. 2 S/G, pressure 250 psig No. 1 S/G 1evel 20 percent wide range indication No. 2 S/G 1evel 70% narrow range indication 2:35 T-8:35 Off-site authorities and agencies are updated on the plant conditions by the EOF.
2:50 T-8:50 Security apprehends two in-CC-23 dividuals attempting to gain access illegally to the site.
f 983 LP&L/LA anergoney Exarcies
. Approx.
Planned Time of Exercise Day Time - Minutes On-Site Scenario Cue Cards 3:00 T-9:00 Parts to repair the No. 1 CC-24 Main Steam Atmospheric Dump i
Valve are found in the local area and are dispatched to the site.
3:05 T-9:05 '
off-site authorities and agencies are updated on the plant conditions by the EOF.
3:15 T-9:15 Release radiation levels CC-25 continue to decrease.
i NOTE:
Plant parameters now are as follows:
Tc 340 deg F i
Tave 380 deg F Th 420 deg F No. 1 S/G pressure 120 psig No. 2 S/G pressure 120 psig
~
No. 1 S/G 1evel 5 percent 3
wide range indication No. 2 S/G 1evel 70 percent narrow range indication i
3:20 T-9:20 The parts are received on-CC-26 site to repair No. 1 Main Steam Atmospheric Dump Valve.
i NOTE:
Operations should be making preparations to go into shutdown cooling 3:30 T-9:30 off-site authorities and
, agencies are updated on the plant conditions by the EOF.
3:40 T-9:40 Repair team personnel com-CC-27 4
plate actions to close the No. 1 Main Steam Atmospheric Dump isolation valve.
The release is terminated.
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'*983 LP&L/LA amargsney Exarcico Time of Exercise Day Time - Minutes On-Site Scenario Cue Cards 3:55 T-9:55 Field monitoring teams CC-28 report that radiation levels off-site are returning to normal background.
The EOF Director declassifies the amergency to the Site Emergency level.
NOTE:
Plant should be on CC-29 shutdown cooling at this time and RCS temperature of about 300 deg F.
4:00 T-10:00 Off-site authorities and agencies are updated on the plant conditions by the EOF.
4:20 T-10:20 All field monitoring teams report background radiation levels.
4:25 T-10:25 Repairs are completed to the CC-30 3A3-S buss and a normal electrical line-up is set up by the plant operators.
4:30 T-10:30 Plant conditions continue to CC-31 stabilize and improve due to the efforts of the LP&L emergency response organi-zations and the EOF Director eventually declassifies the event and initiates neces-sary recovery actions per EP-2-170.
Off-site authorities and agencies are updated.
5:00 T-ll:00 Decontamination and repara-tive restoration activities of the recovery programs are subsequently completed and the plant is returned to normal operation.
.- -.. - - --.~. - ma.n-
,mv.oe s4 seis7 re,n aceton e ocnt m 3 p.az ggi A Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VI. Tederal Center. 800 North Ioop 288 Denton. Texas 76201 3698 May 8,1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: P.0BERT S. WILKERSON CHIEF State and Local Programs and Support Natural and Technological Hazards Division ATTENTION:
Gloria Joyner Project Officer State and Local Programs and Support Nat ral and Technological Hazards Division FROM: /
. Dell Greer. Chief f
Natural and Technological Hazards Division
SUBJECT:
FEMA Supplemental Findings. Waterford !!!
The following infonnation supplements Region VI Interim Findings and addresses the four offsite planning issues requiring resolution prior to issuance of a full-power operating license as specified in the ASLB partial Initial Decision of November 3.1982, as amended by its memorandum and Order dated December 12, 1982.
All issues have been resolved with the exception of issue 2 and this l
t.111 be resolved in the near future with the receipt of letters of agreerent after all of them have been obtained.
i Issue 1: The Parish plans shall designate by title the LP&L offtetal at the EOF who will have the authority or responsibility to provide protective g
action reconmendations to off-site authorities.
Resolution: The St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parish Plans have i
been revised to read as follows:
Chapter 4, !!. 0 "D.
Depending on the lead time available. the State or the Waterford 3 smargen:y coordinator is responsible for providi response recomendations based on an assessment of the accident.
fMOTE' L.ths, W1.thg.),
the Waterford 3 Emerftency Doerations Fec1' ity E L.1g. activated.
1 response reconiendat' ons.frgn,, Waterford 3,,,'wi'1_ !come. ten rosoonsibility 1f 23, EOF DirecF,or. D The Parish reserves'Be r'ght to 'up'enent Viose actions wnten in the. judgment of responsible officia1s are appropriate to the situation."
Issue 2: Letters of agreement with the support parishes for vehicles and drivers necessary to implement the evacuation plans shall be completed i
I and submitted to the NRC staff.
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P.03 r%Y.03 *B4 19:30 FD S REGION VI CC RON 1 2
Rebart S. Wilkerson. Chief Proposed Resolution: The bus shortfall for the evacuation of schools, hospitals, nursing homes, jails and the general public without automobiles for the Waterford 3 ten mile EPZ is calculated at 270. LP&L and the State of Louisiana are in the process of obtaining contracts or letters of agreement for the use of 419 buses and drivers from sources in Jefferson Parish, Plaquemines Parish. Lafourche Parish. Tangipahoa Parish. Ascension Parish and East Baton Rouge Parish. Additions to this total are expected in the near future. These Letters of agreement will be fomarded to NRC and FDR in the near future.
Due to tne evacuation concept employed for the area around Waterford 3 no van shcrtfall is specifically identified. LP&L and the State of Louisiana have obtained letters of agreement or contracts for the use of six vans and ten mini buses to. assist with the evacuation of the infirmed or handicapped should their use become necessary.
As stated in testimony presented before the ASLB in May of 1985, there are available more than 80 ambulances in neighboring Parishes to assist with the evacuation of the medically infim. This neber exceeds the asculances that would be necessary to support a worst case evacuation scenario. Under an agreement sponsored by the Southeast Louisiana Emergency Medical Services Council. both St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes through their Sheriff's dispatcher can request ambulance service on an as needed basis. LP&L therugh the Emergency Medical Services Council is sponsoring ongoing training on the requirements for Waterford 3 emergency response for ambulance drivers, emergency medical technicians, medical first responders and ambulance dispatchers in the Parishes of East Baton Rouge. Ascension. Assmption. St. John. St. James. St. Charles.
St. Tamany. Terrebonne. Lafourche. Jefferson Orleans. St. Bernard and Plaquemines.
t Issue 3: The Parish plans shall be amended to specify the vehicles allotted to evacuate prisoners. These vehicles shall have a costined capacity to evacuate the prison population. The plans shall also specify i
the personnel commitment for drivers and guards. Furthemore, the plans shall clearly indicate that the personnel designated as drivers or l
guards will have no other emergency function until after prisoner evacuation l
is accomplished.
Resolution: The St. Charles and,St. John the Baptist Parish Plans have been revised to include the following infomation:
"In the event of an accident at Waterford 3 requiring the evacuation of jail to reception detention center (s)y will be provided from the Parish prisoners, transportation and securit
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O mY.08 '8419:39 fem REGgm v5 CGTm &
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t Robert 5. Wilkerson. Chief 3
1.
A bus without another emergency function and with sufficient capacity to simultaneously evacuate the prison population is assigned for this purpose.
2.
An adequate number of Parish SheMff's Department personnel. without other emergency duties, are assigned to operate the bus and provide secuMty during prisoner evacuation."
The St. Charles Parish and St. John the Septist PaMsh Implementing Procedures detail specific arrangements for the evacuation of Parish jail prisoners. St. Charles Parish will receive transportation assistance from the PaMsh School Board in the fem of a bus which will be dedicated to prisoner transportation in an emergency. This bus has the ability to transport more than the maxima capacity of the Parish jail in one trip.
A dHver and eight guards have been assigned to pMsoner transportation should it become necessary. ' Relocation arrangements have been made for the St. Charles Parish jail prisoners with correction centers in Jefferson Parish. Orleans Parish. Lafourche Parish and Terrebonne Parish.
St Charles Parish tested the loading of prisoners during the sxercise held on February 8.1984.
The St. John Parish jail will receive transportation support from St.
James Parish in the fom of a bus with the ability to transport more than the maximum capacity of the PaMsh jail in one tMp. The entire Parish jail staff has been eensitted to assist with transportation responsibilities until prisoner relocation has been completed. The St.
i James Parish Correctional Center will serve as the primary relocation center for St. John Parish jail prisoners.
s Issue 4: Pick-up point infomation shall be included in the EBS evacuation messages.
Resolution: Infomation on the location of pick-up points has been included in the emergency broadcast messages which appear in the Public Alert / Notification Implementing Procedures for both 5t. Charles and St.
John the Baptist PaMahes.
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ft/nA 6' g Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VI, Federal Center, 800 North Loop 288
%* F Denton, Texas 76201-3698 June 22, 1984 NEMORANDUM FOR: ROBERT S. WILRERSON, CHIEF, TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS DIVISION OFFICE OF NATURAL AND TECHN01DCICAL HAZARDS - SL-NT ATTENTION
- Cloria Joyner, Project Officer Tiald Operations Branch FROM
. Dell Greer, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division SUBJECT
- FEMA Supplemental Findings - Waterford III Reference Region VI memorandum to you, same subject, dated May 8, 1984.
The only issue that was yet to be resolved in our May 8,1984, memorandum was Issue 2, which required letters of agreements with the support parishes for vehicles and drivers necessary to implement the evacuation plans.
FEMA Region VI has now received these letters of agreement from Louisiana, and this should resolve the last issue as specified in the ASLB partial initial decision of November.3, 1982, as amended by memorandum and order, dated December 12, 1982.
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LOUISIANA u2 eEameNeE smo P O W E R & L 1 G H T! P c ecx 6000. NEW CA EANS LCU'SIANA 7C'74 L
- (504) 356 2345 UMN E5YEb May 28. 1984 W3P84-1471 3-A1.01.04 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. G.W. Knighton Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com=ission Washington, D.C.
20555
SUBJECT:
Louisiana Power & Light Company Waterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 SER Section 13.3.2.7
REFERENCE:
Louisiana Power & Light Company Letter W3F84-0068 of May 17, 1984 to E.H. Johnson from K.W. Cook
Dear Sir:
A public information program as described in SER Section 13.3.2.7 has been implemented. A Public Information Brochure addressing the specific items in Section 13.3.2.7 has been distributed to the public on May 9, 1984.
This was confirmed by NRC Region IV inspectors during inspection 50-382 8423. Distribution of posters in public areas will be completed by July 17, 1984. A list of areas for distribution, is contained in the referenced letter. This information addresses transient population information in the Waterford 3 10-mile EPZ.
We believe this program satisfies the commitments in SER Section 13.3.2.7.
Very truly yours, K. W. Cook Nuclear Support & Licensing Manager KWC/PNB/ch cc:
E.L. Blake, W.M. Stevenson, J.T. Collins, D.M. Crutchfield, B. Churchill, J. Wilson, G.L. Constable f0ff e hO*$
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POWER & LIGHT / New ca.aaNs Leuw voivaecoe
. (so43se.-=34s M: DLE SOUTH UTiuT1ES SYSTEM November 8, 1984 W3P84-3149 I'-l % [b 3-A1.01.04 A4.05 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. C. W. Fnighton, Chief
- .icensing Branch No. 3 Ti~
Divisien of Licensing
~ - - -
U.S. Nuclear Regulatorv Cc==ission
~
"ashington, D.C. 20555' NOV - 91984 h
Dear Mr. Knighton:
Subject:
Waterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 Emergenev Plan I=elementing Procedures Enclosed are ceptes of the latest issues of some of the Waterford 3 Emergency Plan I=plementing Procedures. This trasmittal consists of five revised procedures. The procedures contain personal infor=ation which is not to be disclosed to the public. Therefore, tve attach =ents for the enclosures are provided. Attachment 1 includes the copies for NRC use which contain the personal _infor=ation; Attach =ent 2 copies are provided for public disclosure and these are duplicates of the Attachment I copies except for the blanked out personal information.
- p. 1..
this submittal are the following procedures:
d
/1.
EP-2-010..
ification and Communication, Revision 7 2.
EP-2-050, Off Site Dose Assessment (Manual), Revision 5 3.
EP-2-060. Radi logical Field Monitoring, Revision 5 4.
EP-2-100. Techtical Support Center Activation. Operation and Deactivation.
l Revi ion 6 l
l 5.
EP-2-102 En gency Operations Facility Activation Operation and Deactivation
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vision 6
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Mr. O. W. Knighten W3P84-3149 Page :
1 Also included is the October 25, 1984 issue of the Record of Revision for the l
subject procedures.
Please update the Emergency Plan Implementing Document by i
replacing the revision listing at the end of the Table of Contents with the enclosed page.
i I
Very truly yours.
W. Cook Nuclear Support & Licensing Manager L'C:GEW: sms t
1 cc: (w/o enclosure) - E.L. Blake. W.M. Stevenson. D.M. Crutchfield. J.H. Wilson, G.L. Constable. T.A. Flippo. D. Perrotti. C.A. Hackney, S.E. Turk. G. Groesch 4
i ec:
J.T. Collins (2 copies of enclosures) i 4
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3 I O U I SI A N A /,.e e.- o~os emes-m c.e.oes POWER & LIGHT / New cA.ANs Lc.rs=
7e*v4wscos e :ssaisa w sas w:: OLE SOL'TM ur:: mEi SYSTEY October 31, 1984 W3PS4-2974 3-A1.01.04 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. G. W. Knighton, Chief w
1.icensing Branch No. 3 N
Division of Licensing
'D j, ejp",9 p L'.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co==isson E '
Washington, D.C. 20555 NOV - l SM
Dear Mr. Knighten:
Subject:
'uterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 E erge.cy Plan I= ele entine Procedures Itclosed are copies of the latest issues of the Waterford 3 E=ergency Plan 1=;:lementing Procedures. This transmittal consists of ten revised procedures and one changed procedure. The procedures contain personal information which is not to be disclosed to the public. Therefore, two attach =ents for the enclosures are provided. Attachment 1 includes the copies for NRC use which contain the personal infor=ation; Attachment 2 copies are provided for public disclosure and these are duplicates of the Attachment 1 copies except for the blanked out personal infor=ation.
Included in this submittal are the following procedures:
1.
EP-1-001. Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions.
Revision 5.
2.
EP-1-010. Unusual Event. Revision 6.
3.
EP-1-020. Alert. Revision 6.
4.
EP-1-030. Site Area Emergency. Rev!* ion 6.
5.
EP-1-040. Generai imergency. Revision 6.
6.
EP-2-030. Emergency Radiation Exposure Guidelines and Control.
Revision 4.
7.
EP-2-052. Protective Action Guidelines Revision 4 8.
EP-2-071. Site Protective Measures. Revision 6.
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9.
IP-2-101. Cmerations.1 Support Center Activation. Operation and Deactivation. Levision 6.
- 10. EP-3-020. Emergency Prepareness Drills and Exercises. Revision 3 Change 1.
4
- 11. EP-3-040. F. merge =:y Equipment Inventory. Revision 5.
t 1
'1 Very truly yours.
1 K.W. Cook Nuclear Support & Licensing Manager
)
R*C:3WC:Grs: sus
}
(w/o enclosure) - E.L. Blake. V.M. Stevenson D.M. Crutchfield. J.H. Wilson, i
cc:
j C.L. Constable. T.A. Flippo. D. Perrotti, C.A. Rackney, i
S.E. Turk. G. Groesch l
j cet J.T. Collins (C copies of enclosures) l 4
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LOUISI AN A ida eranc~os s meer POWE R & LiG H T! P O 801 6000
- NEW CALC ANS LCutSi.U.A 70* 74. (504) 366-2345 weete seu -
uTurits systm March 24, 1983 e v uAumn vee PresMent Nuceer Operef@S W3P83-0887 3-A45 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulatica Attention: Mr. G. Knighton Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Con: mission Washington, D.C.
20555 SU3 JECT: Waterford 3 Emergency Planning Exercise for NRC/TEMA Evaluation
Dear Sir:
This letter is to advise you that after conaultation with Mr. C. Hackney
- NRC Region IV, Mr. A. Lookabaugh - FEMA Region VI State and Local govern-ment organizations, we have re-scheduled the subject exercise from April 13, 1983 to May 25, 1983.
If there are any questions, please advise.
Yours very truly, du L. V. Maurin LVM/RCA/ssd cc:
E. Blake, M. Stevenson, J. Wilson, D. Perrotti S. Turk, L. Constable.
W A. Lookabaugh, G. Groesch, J. T. Collins 1
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