ML20127L577
| ML20127L577 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1985 |
| From: | Newman J HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO., NEWMAN & HOLTZINGER, SAN ANTONIO, TX |
| To: | Bechhoefer C, John Lamb, Shon F Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#285-596 OL, NUDOCS 8506280061 | |
| Download: ML20127L577 (336) | |
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A O'f*O (Lvise M. OutTERM AN J AssE I. RT A N K tviN P. G ALLE N DONALD J. SILygaM AN TMOMASA.$cHMuT2 JACOLv4 A. SIMMONS Micnart r. ut Atv sostpHs.sTvens ROctpf I. wee TE ' AC M V A-ROBERT LowCNSTEIN econM AN A. FLA8dlNGAM Charles Bechhoefer, Esq.
Chairman, Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. James C. Lamb, III Administrative Judge 313 Woodhaven Road Chapel Hill, NC 27514 Frederick J. Shon Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: Houston Lighting & Power Co., et al.
South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Dear Members of the Boards Enclosed are copies of the testimony of the following individuals to be presented on behalf of Applicants in Phase II of this proceeding scheduled to begin on July 11, 1985:
(1) Mr. Jerome H. Goldberg, (2) Dr. James R. Sumpter, (3) Mr. Loren Stanley, (4) Mr. Don D. Jordan, (5) Mr. George W. Oprea, Jr.,
(6) Mr. Richard A. Frazar, (7) A panel consisting of Mr. Frank Lopez, Jr. and Dr. Sidney A. Bernsen, (8) Mr. Mark R. Wisenburg, and (9) A panel consisting of Messrs. Thomas J. Jordan, Alfredo Lopez and Walter R. Ferris. 9) 0506200061 050626 PDR T
ADOCK 05000490 PDR \
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S NEWNAN & HOI.TZINGER, P. C.
4 Charles Bechhoefer, Esq.
Dr. James C. Lamb, III Frederick J. Shon Page Two June 26, 1985 Applicants plan to present the witnesses in the order listed above, unless schedule conflicts arise. However, as noted during the telephone conference call on June 21, during the week of July 15, Mr. Don D. Jordan is available only on July 15 (until 3:00 p.m.) and on July 16 (until 2:00 p.m.). Accordingly, regardless of which witness is testifying at the conclusion of the hearing session on Saturday, July 13, Applicants reque,t that Mr. Jordan be allowed to testify (out of turn, if necessary) when limited appearances end on July 15 and to return on July 16, if necessary.
Since the parties will be submitting cross-examination plans to the Board, Applicants would appreciate being in-formed by the Board as to the estimated lengths of cross-exam-ination for each witness or panel. Although Applicants realize that such projections may lack accuracy, they will be useful in at least preliminary planning for the scheduled appearance of witnesses. Recognizing the imprecision of any such estimate, to the extent that the profiled testimony may be indicative of the period required for cross-exam-ination, Applicants suggest the following as a " target" working schedule for the Board's considerations (1) Mr. Goldberg - July 11 plus morning of July 12, (2) Dr. Sumpter - afternoon of July 12, (3) Mr. Stanley - morning of July 13, (4) Mr. Jordan - morning of July 15, (5) Mr. Oprea - afternoon of July 15, (6) Mr. Frazar - morning of July 16, (7) Mr. Lopez and Dr. Bernsen - afternoon of July 16 and morning of July 17, (8) Mr. Wisenburg - afternoon of July 17, and (9) Messrs. Jordan, Lopez and Ferris - morning of July 18.
If the foregoing time estimates are approximately correct, the afternoon of July 18 plus July 19 would be available for contingencies and for oral argument on motions to quash subpoenas, while still permitting Applicants' direct case to be completed prior to the one-week recess.
In addition to the enclosed testimony (including the attachments enclosed therewith), Applicants intend to offer into evidence a number of exhibits. These are identified in the attachment to this letter.
e NawMAN & Hor.rztwoza,P. C.
( Charles Bechhoefer, Esq.
Dr. James C. Lamb, III Frederick J. Shon Page Three June 26, 1985 A copy of proposed exhibit 66 is enclosed. Copies of all other proposed exhibits were served on the Board and the parties either when they were filed with the NRC or when they were produced in response to the Board's order.
Additional copies will be available at the hearing when the exhibits are presented.
Respectfully submitted, N $4 9%
ack R. Newmah Maurice Axelrad Alvin H. Gutterman Steven P. Frantz Donald J. Silverman 1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 Finis E.Cowan 3000 One Shell Plaza Houston, Texas 77002 Dated: June 26, 1985 NEWMAN & HOLTZINGER, P.C. ATTORNEYS FOR HOUSTON LIGHTING 1615 L Street, N.W. & POWER COMPANY, Project Manager Washington, D.C. 20036 of the South Texas Project acting herein on behalf of itself and the other Applicants, THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, acting by and through the City Public Service Board of the City of San Antonio, CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, and CITY OF AUSTIN, TEXAS cca Service List
(
ATTACBMENT Applicants' -
Exhibit No.* Document Date 57 Handwritten notes by J.H. 4/13/81 Goldberg re "Prelminary Re-view" meeting.
58 Memorandum from J.H. Goldberg 4/15/81 to J.R. Sumpter re "Quadrex Review of Brown & Root Engineer-ing Problem Categorization" with handwritten notes by L.
Stanley.
59 Minutes of 4/27/81 STP Manage- 4/30/81 ment Committee Meeting (ex-cerpts).
60 Quadrex Report, " Design Review 5/81 of Brown & Root Engineering for the South Texas Project."
61 Letter from J. H. Goldberg to 5/6/81 E. A. Saltarelli re, inter alia, B&R review of most serious findings from reportability pur-suant to 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e).
62 Letter from E. A. Saltarelli to 5/8/81 J. H. Goldberg enclosing B&R review of most serious findings for reportability pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e).
63 Bechtel Power Corporation Report, 3/82 "An Assessment of the Findings in the Quadrex Corporation Report."
64 Bechtel Power Corporation Final 8/26/82 Work Package Report for Work Package EN-619, " Review of the Quadrex Report."
65 Letter from L. Stanley to J. R. 3/16/81 Sumpter re STP ALARA review.
66 HL&P Procedural No. PLP-02 Revi- 5/21/81 sion 5 re Reporting Design and Construction Deficiencies to NRC.
- The last Applicants' Exhibit in Phase I was #56.
1 Applicants' Exhibit No. Document Date 67 Letter from G. W. Oprea to John 3/23/84 T. Collins re transmittal of response to notice of violation 83-24-02; response attached.
68 Letter from G. W. Oprea to John 5/25/84 ^
T. Collins enclosing summary of programmatic audit of backfill activities; summary attached.
e
, .o I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
l BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 3
4 In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. STN 50-498 OL
) STN 50-499 OL 5 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER )
)
6 )
(South Texas Project, Units 1 )
7 and 2) )
8 9 TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, y ET AL.,
l 10 OF JEROME H. GOLDBERG l 11 12 01 Please state your name and current position.
13 A.1 I am Jerome H. Goldberg, Group Vice President - Nuclear 14 of Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P).
l 15 i
16 02 Have you previously testified in this proceeding?
17 A.2 Yes. I testified in May and June of 1981 and June,
! 18 1982.
19 20 03 Describe your educational and professional 21 qualifications.
22 A.3 My educational and professional qualifications are 23 generally described in my earlier testimony in Phase I 24 of this proceeding.
25 26 27 1 28 l
L
- ' s 1 Q.4 Has your position with'HL&P changed since you last 2 testified in this proceeding.
3 A.4 Yes. On February 1, 1985, I was elected to the 4 position of Group Vice President - Nuclear. As a 5 result of this promotion and the retirement of Mr.
6 Oprea, formerly Executive Vice President-Nuclear, I 7 also assumed his responsibilities. I report directly 8- to Mr. Don D. Jordan, Chairman of the Board and Chief 9 Executive Officer of HL&P.
10 11 0.5 What experience have you had in the interpretation and 12 application of the NRC reporting requirements, particu-13 larly reporting under 10 CFR 5 50.55(e)?
14 A.5 During the 9 years I was with Stone & Webster and in 15 much of my prior experience at the Quincy shipyard, I 16 have been involved in analysis of technical questions 17 very similar to the questions involved in application 18 of 10 CFR S 50.55(e). Such questions generally involve 19 evaluations of alternative designs, the safety of 20 alternative designs and the relative significance of 21 deficiencies in design and construction. While at 22 Stone & Webster, personnel reporting to me were 23 responsible for performing the evaluations of i
24 reportability of deficiencies pursuant to 10 CFR l 25 5 50.55(e) and 10 CFR Part 21 and I reviewed and f 26 supervised their work. After coming to HL&P in October l
27 1980, the licensing personnel for the South Texas l
i 28 l
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i 1 Project reported to me and I personally reviewed and 2 approved HL&P's written reports to the NRC pursuant to 3 10'CFR S 50.55(e).
4 5 06 What is the purpose of'your testimony?
6 A.6 The purpose of my testimony is to describe the
- 7 commissioning and development of the Quadrex Report, 8 HL&P's handling of that Report, including its notifica-9 tion to NRC of the review by the Quadrex Corporation i 10 (Quadrex) and, pursuant to 10 CFR S 50.55(e), of 1
I 11 various Quadrex findings, and the provision of the 12 Report to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board
- 13 or Licensing Board). In addition, my testimony 14 describes my understanding of the Quadrex Report when I ;
15 testified in May and June 1981, as well as my views on 16 the adequacy of B&R's services of Brown & Root, Inc.
17 (B&R) at that time. My testimony shows that HL&P 18 properly reported the appropriate Quadrex findings to .
! 19 the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR S 50.55(e), that HL&P's j 20 delay in providing the Quadrex Report to the Licensing 21 Board was due to a good faith belief that the subject i
22 mattor of the Report and the hearing were not directly
. 23 related, and that I was truthful and candid in my I
24 testimony before the Board. It also explains why HL&P l 25 did not inform the Board prior to September 24, 1981, .
I 26 that it was considering replacing B&R as architect 27 engineer and construction manager. l l 28 f
~_ _ . . _ _ . . _ . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ . . . . _ . _ , _
= s 1 07 Why did HL&P decide to initiate a review of B&R 2 engineering in 1981?
3 A.7 When I assumed my position as HL&P Vice President of 4 Nuclear Engineering and Construction in October 1980, I 5 met with HL&P's key managers for the South Texas 6 Project (STP or Project), and had discussions with 7 various engineers who had been involved in the Project.
8 I was, of course, well aware that B&R had never 9 previously engineered a nuclear power facility. I 10 learned that B&R had recently developed its Systems 11 Design Assurance Group, and that a lot of system design 12 work lay ahead. I also found that there was a general 13 con .n regarding the limited numbers and experience of 14 the B&R engineering personnel. In addition, in discus-15 sions with my engineering staff, they identified a 16 potential weakness in B&R's nuclear analysis capa-17 bility. These observations coupled with my own obser-18 vations of the status of the Project, which was less 19 advanced than I would have expected after seven years, 20 caused me to question the strength of B&R's engineering 21 organization.
22 These impressions about B&R engineering were based 23 largely on discussions with members of my own Project 24 team. Since they had been involved with the Project 25 for some time, there was a potential for bias on their 26 part and I felt it would be desirable to bring in an 27 outside organization that had never previously been 28
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I associeted with the Project to get an objective and i
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2 expeditious third party assessment of B&R's nuclear ' ' Cin 3 engineering and design activities. I expected the .
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4 review to assist me in judging what improvements were h<ij i /f 5 neededtocompletetheProjectsuccessfully,andalso\s - .. s V-6 provide information I would find useful for discussions ,
7 of the status of the Project with HL&P management, the.
8 co-owners of STP and regulatory authorities.
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'th 9 I discussed my desire for a third party independddt'y, 10 assessment of B&R engineering with Mr. Oprea in late ,
11 1980. Mr. Oprea concurred with my judgment that such a 12- review would be appropriate. Mr. Oprea and I also +
13 discussed the matter with Mr. Jordan, and he agreed (7, , ;
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14 with our decision to go ahead with such a review. ."y j ) 3 !
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l l 16 0.8 How did Quadrex come to be selected to perform the 17 review?
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18 A.8 I had three principal criteria. The organization hsd d t, l' 19 to have the necessary skills to perform a competent l
\f 20 evaluation of an architect-engineer. Ithadtohav6k k.
s i suf ficient qualified personnel available to perform ,thc'A i ,%
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,' \ ;Q 22 review on a tight schedule. Finally, I wanted the x
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23 organization to be independent, that is, it could not h
24 have had prior substantial involvement in the Projsctj N
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25 Themajorurchitect-engineerfirmswereclearlyf)
26 competent to do such a review. However, I was aware.' O .
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27 that it was highly unlikely that they would be willingj% g ,
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t i u Ng 1 s te,\ critique the work of another architect-engineer.
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>Amorig.'the consulting firms that appeared to have A * \ \ >
.p 3h N 5 adequate technical qualifications were Management
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Analysis Company, NUS, Quadrex, Torrey Pines, and
< X 5 Teledyne, Each of these firms, with the exception of Vf g p ",7, I i 6 b Quadrex, had significant prior or ongoing involvement e s .,
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i 7 - in the Project. Quadrex had had some prior contact
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8 with the Project but its involvement had been brief and w ,.
'#9' limited to assistance in planning HL&P manpower needs, py
_ j. % y? . !0 \ art effort which did not relate directly to any of the jis
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11 technical issues involved in an engineering review of 1
12 B&R.
13 s g 14 09, What was the assignment given to Quadrex?
3 34 15 A.9- We told Quadrex we were interested in ascertaining 16 B&R's understanding of the significant nuclear engi-i .'
'17 neering technical issues of then current concern in the s
f.y 2. . ,i 18 nuclear industry. In other words, I wanted to gain a x
$ ' ; 19 better feel for whether B&R was in the " main stream" of l
i'., 20 nuclear engineering practice as reflected in the o
21 ,
industry. We also asked Quadrex to review certain s
f .a 22 specific areas in which we had reasons to believe that M) 1
_ 23 B&R might be experiencing difficulty. The assessment
[ g 124 was to assist in benchmarking the status of the Project 25 and identifying opportunities for improvement in the s 26 performance of B&R's engineering work. I was not i4
', a '27 interested in an analysis of B&R's procedures, because
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- 1 I knew that there are many different ways to organize 2 and perform an engineering job successfully. The 3 objective of the review was to see if B&R understood 4 the task before them, and to get some feeling for where 5 they stood in accomplishing that task.
6 7 0.10 How was the Quadrex review carried out?
8 A.10 Based on information provided by HL&P, Quadrex prepared 9 a series of technical questions about the STP design 10 and also identified various design documents to be 11 reviewed. The questions were supplied to B&R and then 12 there was a series of meetings between Quadrex and B&R; 13 first to clarify the questions, and later for B&R to 14 answer them. These meetings were organized generally 15 along discipline lines. In addition to getting answers 16 to their questions, Quadrex asked B&R to identify 17 documentary evidence, such as calculations, drawings 18 and reference documents, that could be examined in 19 support of the answers. As a result of these meetings, 20 Quadrex identified specific documents it desired to 21 review. Dr. James Sumpter, then HL&P's Manager, 22 Nuclear Services, who served as coordinator of the 23 Quadrex review, arranged for these documents to be 24 provided to Quadrex. There was an additional series of 25 meetings between Quadrex and B&R after Quadrex had had 26 an opportunity to review the B&R documents. These 27 meetings all took place during February and March of 28
. o 1 1981. The Quadrex Report was based on Quadrex's review 2 of these documents and the information obtained from 3 B&R.
4 5 0 11 In what ways did HL&P participate in the review?
6 A.ll Our objective was to obtain an independent third party 7 assessment, so we tried to keep HL&P involvement to a 8 minimum, but it was not possible to eliminate HL&P 9 entirely from the process. Dr. Sumpter acted as 10 coordinator, as described in his testimony. Although 11 HL&P provided assistance, Quadrex was in complete 12 control of the review. Quadrex wrote the questions to 13 be answered by B&R, ran the meetings with B&R and had 14 complete editorial control of the report.
15 My personal involvement was essentially limited to 16 discussions with Dr. Sumpter regarding the scope and 17 objectives of the Quadrex review, suggestions regarding 18 the categorization of findings in the Quadrex Report, 19 and participation in the meetings at which Quadrex 20 briefed HL&P on the status of its work. Throughout all 21 of these activities, I refrained from injecting my 22 personal views into the Quadrex Report and I emphasized 23 to HL&P personnel my desire to receive Quadrex's 24 independent views.
25 26 0.12 Did you discuss with NRC your plans for having the 27 Quadrex review performed?
28
1
. o l 1 A.12 When we decided to go ahead with an independent 2 assessment of B&R engineering, I informed the NRC's 3 Project Manager for STP, Mr. Donald Sells of that fact. l 4
5 0.13 Did Quadrex brief you on the results of its review as 6 it progressed?
7 A.13 Yes. There were briefings on March 18, April 13, and ,
l 8 April 30, 1981.
9 10 0 14 Please describe the March 18, 1981, briefing.
11 A.14 The March 18 briefing was a relatively short meeting, 12 perhaps a couple of hours with Dr. Sumpter and Mr.
13 Loren Stanley, Quadrex's Project Manager for this 14 review. Mr. Stanley described some of his impressions 15 of B&R design up to that point. I don't have detailed 16 notes of the meeting, but I have looked at an outline 17 that Mr. Stanley apparently prepared for his presenta-18 tion at the meeting. In view of the brevity of the 19 session, I am fairly sure that he did not cover all of 20 the points in his outline.
21 It was apparent that even at this early stage of i
22 its review Quadrex was convinced that B&R was far 23 behind what most architect-engineers would have 24 accomplished at that stage of the project and that B&R 25 was not performing some aspects of the design in an 26 orderly fashion.
27 0.15 Please describe the April 13 briefing.
28
. . 1 A.15 Mr. Stanley and Mr. Larry Wray, Vice President, 2 Engineering of Quadrex presented their briefing. In 3 addition to myself, I believe that Mr. David Barker, 4 Mr. John Blau, Mr. Joseph Briskin, Dr. Sumpter and Mr.
5 Cloin Robertson were present. As I recall, the meeting 6 took place in the conference room across the hall from 7 my office and the Quadrex personnel spoke from a number 8 of overhead slides, each of which had textual material 9 relating to some of their current findings, grouped by 10 disciplines. The meeting lasted several hours, and I 11 stepped in and out, as other business called me to my 12 office.
13 I have reviewed my notes of the meeting, which 14 apparently listed the topics covered by Quadrex.
15 I do not remember the details of the presentation 16 but it is my recollection that Quadrex summarized a 17 large number of findings on a discipline by discipline 18 basis. Since we had asked Quadrex to focus on areas in 19 which we suspected that B&R was experiencing difficul-20 ties, it was to be expected that some problems would be 21 identified. However, there were a significant number 22 of Quadrex findings. At this meeting Quadrex did not 23 explain the severity or importance of the various 24 findings, but several impressed me as being of a 25 potentially significant nature, depending on the 26 results of the review. One of these was computer code 27 verification. Quadrex stated that while its review was 28
. . 1 continuing there was some indication of problems in 2 this area. HL&P asked Quadrex to look closely at this 3 matter and provide more detail because it could be of 4 great significance to us.
5 In the course of the presentation we asked ques-6 tions from time to time to get a better understanding 7 of the basis for one finding or another. Some of my 8 questions sought the technical bases for Quadrex 9 findings of inadequacies in B&R's design practices 10 which, in some cases, I did not find to be unusual or 11 inconsistent with industry practice as I knew it.
12 13 0.16 Did the Quadrex personnel identify any of their 14 findings as being reportable or potentially reportable 15 to the NRC?
16 A.16 No. The discussion was fairly general, and I expected 17 Quadrex to provide more specific information in its 18 written report. During the meeting, I marked on my 19 notes a number of areas in which it appeared that the 20 Quadrex concerns, if they were accurate and factually 21 supported, could lead to the identification of 22 reportable deficiencies. However, I thought that it 23 was first necessary for Quadrex to complete its review, 24 determine which findings it believed to be accurate and 25 supported by facts, and provide us with specifics that 26 we could evaluate. During the discussion I believe 27 that I suggested, as reflected in my later memorandum 28
i 1 of April 15, 1981 to Dr. Sumpter (Applicants Exhibit 2 58), that Quadrex categorize the findings in its final 3 report in such a manner that anything that might pose a 4 serious threat to plant licensability -- areas where we 5 had not satisfied NRC requirements applicable to STP --
6 would be in a "most serious" category.
7 8 0 17 Please describe the briefing on April 30.
9 A.17 At that meeting Mr. Stanley and Mr. Wray of Quadrex 10 presented the highlights of their findings, with the 11 use of a series of overhead slides. In addition to 12 myself, I believe that Mr. Edward Turner, Mr. Blau, Dr.
13 Sumpter, and Mr. Donald Betterton were present.
14 Quadrex described in broad terms some of their generic 15 findings and the highlights of their discipline 16 findings. Quadrex gave a similar briefing for B&R the 17 following day. The purpose of both briefings was to 18 give HL&P and B&R some advanced information on the 19 results of the review.
20 During the briefing Quadrex described its findings 21 and HL&P personnel asked questions to get at their 22 basis. There were more findings discussed at this 23 briefing than had been discussed ot the prior 24 briefings, but my overall impression was essentially 25 the same. The Quadrex findings suggested that B&R was 26 having difficulty in completing the design; that it 27 lacked experience in the aspects of the design that are 28
1 unique to nuclear plants and that design work in many 2 areas was either in an early stage of development or 3 not yet begun. Quadrex also cited concerns about the 4 adequacy of B&R design work in some areas, such as HVAC 5 design and computer code verification. In addition 6 there were some findings which appeared to constitute 7 Quadrex opinions on the most effecient way to carry out 8 particular aspects of nuclear design work, rather than 9 findings of a failure of B&R to perform in accordance 10 with NRC requirements or generally accepted industry 11 practice.
12 One question which was raised at the briefing was 13 whether Quadrex's generic findings were based on the 14 discipline findings or represented additional indepen-15 dent findings of fact. Quadrex stated that the generic 16 findings were based on the discipline findings.
17 18 0.18 Why did you not consider any of the described findings 19 as potentially reportable to the NRC at that time or 20 immediately initiate a review for reportability?
21 A.18 Although by that time Quadrex personnel had completed 22 their review, we still did not have the benefit of.,
23 their written findings, rationale and support, which 24 were essential to an effective review for report-25 ability. It was clear, however, that there might be 26 some potentially reportable deficiencies identified in 27 the Quadrex Report, and Mr. Robertson and I discussed
(
l l
28 i
. . 1 the steps to be taken to review the document immedi-2 ately upon its receipt. As a result, I wrote a letter 3 on May 6 to B&R (Applicants Exhibit 61) which I discuss 4 further in my testimony below.
5 6 0.19 Can you identify Applicants' Exhibit 57?
7 A.19 Yes. Exhibit 57 is a copy of my notes (referred to in 8 A.15 above) from the Quadrex briefing on April 13, 9 1981.
10 11 0 20 In Applicants' Exhibit 57 a number of the items in the 12 outline format have an asterisk next to them, and there 13 is a note at the bottom of the page next to an asterisk 14 that says "potentially reportable." Did you mean to 15 indicate by your notes that the items that you had 16 marked with an asterisk were then "potentially 17 reportable" within the meaning of the NRC Staff 18 guidance on implementation of 10 CFR S 50.55(e)?
19 A.20 No. As I previously mentioned, at that time the 20 Quadrex views were preliminary and I thought it 21 necessary that Quadrex complete its review before any 22 reportability judgment could be made. My notes only 23 indicate that these particular subjects were general 24 areas in which further Quadrex review might identify 25 reportable deficiencies. In most cases it turned out 26 otherwise.
27 28
1 0 21 When potential deficiencies come to your attention, and 2 you cannot tell whether or not they are reportable, why 3 would you not report them immediately to the NRC as i 4 "potentially reportable"?
5 A.21 The amount of time a licensee may take to evaluate a 6 concern before determining whether it should be 7 reported to the NRC is not specified in NRC 8 regulations. The NRC guidance on conformance with 1 9 Section 50.55(e) encompasses a category of "potentially 10 reportable" with the thought that licensees would make 11 decisions more promptly on whether to report an item if 12 it could be handled informally while an evaluation was 13 under way. But, even before a licensee reports 14 something as "potentially reportable" it must know
- 15 enough to determine whether there really exists a basis 16 for concern. I did not believe that I had that basis 17 until I reviewed the text of the Quadrex Report and the 18 documented bases for its findings.
19 20 0 22 Are you familiar with Applicants' Exhibit 58?
l 21 A.22 Yes. Exhibit 58 is a memorandum I wrote to Dr. Sumpter 22 on April 15, 1981, giving him my suggestions about the 23 categories into which Quadrex should group its 24 findings.
25 This memorandum was written a few days after the 26 April 13 meeting with Quadrex and documented my 27 thoughts on categorization of findings in the Quadrex 28
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1 Report. I wanted Quadrex to group the findings in a 2 way that would simplify the task of identifying items 3 that might be reportable to the NRC and would also 4 assist in setting priorities for corrective action.
S 6 0 23 Was your proposed set of categories used in the Quadrex 7 Report?
8 A.23 Quadrex modified the categories. My memorandum 9 proposed a "most serious" category encompassing 10 failures to meet NRC requirements applicable to the 11 STP. Quadrex apparently believed that my categories 12 were defined too narrowly and would not include all of 13 its findings of consequence to licensing. Thus, they 14 broadened the most serious category to include matters 15 that, in their judgment, had significance for licensing 16 purposes, whether or not NRC requirements were satis-17 fled. The Quadrex Report ended up including many items 18 in the "most serious" category which related not to 19 safety but to potential delay of the licensing process.
20 For example, finding 4.3.2.1(n) related to the selec-21 tion of types of electrical isolation devices. Quadrex 22 noted that B&R was still evaluating alternative devices 23 and recommended that a Technical Reference Document 24 (TRD) be developed to guide designers on the use of i
25 such devices in the design. Such a TRD wouild be based i
26 on the results of the B&R evaluations which were still 27 underway.
28
. . 1 0 24 Please identify Applicants' Exhibit 59.
2 A.24 Exhibit 59 is the portion of the minutes of the April 3 27, 1981, STP management committee meeting in which I 4
4 discussed the Quadrex review and the then anticipated 5 report.
6 7 0 25 Please explain the notation at the second page of 8 exhibit 59 that the Quadrex findings in the "most 9 serious" category would be reportable to the NRC.
10 A.25 I do not recall whether I said those particular words.
11 However, at that time I would have expected the Quadrex 1
12 Report to be based on the system of categorization 13 proposed in my April 15, 1981, memorandum (i.e., that 14 it would identify failures to meet applicable require-15 ments in a "most serious" category). I had reached no 16 judgment on reportability at that time and could not 17 have done so until we had undertaken our own report-18 ability review.
19 20 0 26 Did Quadrex provide another briefing on May 7, 1981?
21 A.26 Yes. The May 7 briefing accompanied delivery by 22 Quadrex of its report.
23 24 Q.27 Please identify Applicants' Exhibit 60.
25 A.27 Exhibit 60 is the " Design Review of Brown & Root 26 Engineering Work for the South Texas Project," which I 27 have generally referred to as the "Quadrex Report."
28
o ,
1 0.28 Please describe the May 7 briefing.
2 A.28 The May 7 briefing was held at HL&P's offices. In 3 addition to myself, Dr. Sumpter and several other HL&P 4 personnel, Mr. Saltarelli, Senior Vice President and 5 Project General Manager of B&R, was present with the i 6 key members of his staff.
7 The purpose of the briefing was to facilitate the 8 reportability review by B&R and HL&P and the Quadrex 9 presentation was limited to the findings in the "most
- 10 serious" category. The discussion began with the j i 11 generic findings. B&R personnel took issue with the 12 broad observations in the discust, ion of the first two 13 generic findings and it was apparent that a discussion i 14 of the generic fin, dings would be lengthy and likely to 15 focus on perceptions rather than facts. I then asked 4
16 Quadrex to confirm my understanding that the generic 17 findings were based on the discipline findings.
18 Quadrex agreed that they were and, at my suggestion, 19 proceeded to discuss only the "most serious" discipline 20 findings.
21 The briefing lasted through the morning. There l 22 were some questions, but after the first portion of the 23 meeting, little argument about the findings.
24 At the end of the meeting B&R asked whether its 25 reportability review should be limited to the most 26 serious discipline findings. Based on Quadrex's 27 statement that the generic findings were based on the 28
. - . - -. ~ . . - _ _ _ _ . _ _ , _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ , _ _ . _ . . . _ _ . - __ ___ . . . _ . . _ , , _ , _ - . , _ . - . , . , _ . , . _
o . - 19 _
l 1 discipline findings, I agreed that only the most 2 serious discipline findings need be reviewed. The B&R 3 personnel then went off to perform their reportability 4 review.
5 i t
6 0.29 What was your reaction to the Quadrex Report?
7 A.29 I received the Report with mixed emotions. The Report 8 was very helpful in providing an independent view of r
, 9 the status of the Project design activities. Quadrex 10 identified a lot of design work that had not yet been 11 done, and this confirmed my initial judgment that the 12 B&R engineering effort was well behind where it should 13 have been at that point in the Project schedule. There 14 were some design deficiencies mentioned by Quadrex, but 15 for the most part these were deficiencies which had 16 previously been identified on the Project and were 17 being resolved.
18 We had asked Quadrex for a limited review of 19 important aspects of the B&R design and wanted to
'20 obtain results promptly. It was not an audit. The 21 Report generated many questions but few answers. With 22 limited exceptions, these questions did not relate to 23 whether B&R design work to date or the B&R design 24 process violated NRC requirements. Rather, Quadrex l
25 identified many areas where the B&R design had not f 26 proceeded on an efficient and well-coordinated basis.
l 27 The concerns resulting from the Quadrex Report were for 28 l
l 1
. , 1 the most part not of a regulatory nature (except to the 2 extent that delays in producing an acceptable final 3 design would inevitably delay licensing, as well as 4 construction), but the findings had to be addressed 5 fully and on a prioritized basis in order to get the 6 design activities in a mode to support a reasonable 7 Project schedule.
8 Some of the findings simply reflected Quadrex's 9 view of the best way of performing certain engineering 10 functions. HL&P did not share Quadrex's view of some 11 of these matters and did not agree, in some instances, 12 that B&R's methods were either inappropriate or 13 deficient. For example, finding 4.3.2.l(b) noted that 14 B&R had not prepared a top level document on separa-15 tions criteria. Use of such a document is a good idea, 16 but it is not an NRC requirement, and I have seen other 17 projects successfully completed without such a docu-18 mont. Other findings referred to B&R designs which 19 were either not yet begun or were in preliminary 20 stages. For example, finding 4.7.3.l(a) noted that B&R 21 had not yet developed criteria for jet impingement 22 protection on unbroken piping systems. Since the 23 criteria would apply to piping design which B&R had not 24 yet done, the finding did not deal with a design error, 25 although it did highlight a serious concern about the 26 progress of B&R design work.
27 28
. . 1 In summary, I regarded the Quadrex Report as a 2 consultant's review containing advisory opinions of the 3 type often reflected in the many technical consultant 4 reports commissioned during the long course of the 5 construction and operation of a nuclear power plant.
6 The Report provided useful confirmation of my concerns 7 about the adequacy of B&R's engineering organization 8 and its lack of experience. While the Report did not 9 suggest that the design of the STP was fundamentally 10 flawed, it did point out that these were important 11 problems in the management of B&R's engineering 12 activities.
13 14 0 30 When you received the Quadrex Report, what did you do 15 to fulfill HL&P's reporting requirements?
16 A.30 Prior to receipt of the Report, I wrote to Mr.
17 Saltarelli, the Project General Manager of B&R, 18 pointing out that the Report would be received on May 7 19 and that HL&P would require B&R to review the Report 20 and advise on the reportability of the Quadrex findings 21 by the following day. The May 7 briefing by Quadrex 22 was the first step in this review. As I have men-23 tioned, at the close of the meeting I directed B&R to 24 focus its review on the most serious discipline 25 findings. Their cognizant engineers then reviewed the 26 Report. They convened a meeting later that afternoon 27 28
1 and evening to review the most serious discipline 2 findings to determine their reportability. Mr.
3 Robertson and Dr. Sumpter attended that meeting.
4 The next day, May 8, I received a letter from Mr.
5 Saltarelli providing advice on the reportability of the 6 Quadrex most serious discipline findings (Applicants 7 Exhibit 62). Upon receipt of that letter, I convened a 8 mieting of Dr. Sumpter, Mr. Robertson, and myself 9 (which I refer to below as the "HL&P review team") to 10 go through the findings, review B&R's advice and make 11 our decisions on reportability.
12 0 31 Please identify Applicants' Exhibit 61.
13 A.31 Exhibit 61 is a copy of my May 6, 1981, letter to Mr.
14 Saltarelli directing B&R to advise HL&P on the report-15 ability of the Quadrex findings and to develop a plan 16 to resolve the Quadrex findings.
17 18 Q.32 Please identify Applicants' Exhibit 62.
19 A.32 Exhibit 62 is a copy of Mr. Saltarelli's May 8, 1981, 20 letter providing B&R's advice on the reportability of 21 the Quadrex findings. Attachment B to the letter is 22 the specific advice regarding each of the "most 23 serious" discipline findings.
24 25 26 27 28
. . ~ 23 -
1 Q.33 Please describe the meeting of the HL&P review team.
2 A.33 I used the attachment to Mr. Saltarelli's letter as a 3 check list. We read each of the findings and B&R's 4 advice, and then we considered whether the finding was 5 reportable. Our review identified three potentially 6 reportable deficiencies. When it became apparent that 7 at least one item would be reportable we called Mr.
8 Michael Powell, the Chairman of the HL&P Incident 9 Review Committee (IRC), and he joined our meeting.
10 After the meeting Mr. Powell phoned the NRC and 11 reported the three items that we had identified as 12 potentially reportable:
13 (1) Concerning the heating, ventilating 14 and air conditioning (HVAC) design f 15 - that certain faulted condition }
16 heat loads may not have been 17 considered in the design of 18 portions of the safety-related HVAC 19 system.
20 (2) Concerning computer program (code) 21 verification - that the verifica-22 tion program lacked visibility to 23 the user as to whether or not the 24 program versions in use had been 25 verified.
26 l
f 27 .
28 t
o o 1 (3) Concerning shielding analysis -
2 that certain shielding calculations ,
3 affecting safety-related design may 4 not have been verified consistent 5 with the requirements for verifica-6 tion of safety-related calcula-7 tions.
. 8 9 0.34 Was it the usual practice at HL&P for Dr. Sumpter, Mr.
4 10 Robertson and yourself to conduct reportability I
< l 11 reviews? !
12 A.34 No. The usual practice at that time was that anyone 13 who identified a concern that should be reviewed for l 14 reportability would notify appropriate supervisory 15 personnel. Such personnel would review the information 16 and determine if it warranted a review for report-17 ability. If such a review was warranted, the matter 18 would then be reviewed for reportability by the HL&P 19 IRC, made up of the Team Leader, Nuclear Licensing; the 20 Project OA supervisor in the Houston office; and the 21 Supervising Project Engineer -- Design Engineering.
22 Mr. Robertson, as Licensing Manager, and I both would 23 have occasion to review decisions on reportability made 24 by the IRC, and we both would review and approve the 4 25 written Section 50.55(e) reports to the NRC. ,
26 27 ,
28
1 . . i l
1 0 35 Why was the usual IRC review not used to determine i
i 2 reportability of the Quadrex findings? .
3 A.35 The Quadrex Report was different from the matters t 4 usually considered by the IRC -- it covered a wide
! 5 scope of design considerations, contained a large 6 number of findings and raised a number of questions 7 that required an in-depth understanding of nuclear i 8 engineering design and design processes. I felt the 9 reportability determinations needed to be made by our i 10 most senior engineers, ones who had the greatest i 11 experience in the nuclear design process. The team I [
12 chose, Dr. Sumpter, Mr. Robertson and myself, repre-13 sented the most experienced HL&P nuclear engineers.
l 14 Dr. Sumpter, who was HL&P's Manager, Nuclear Services, 15 had 11 years of professional experience in nuclear
- 16 engineering and design activities. Mr. Robertson, 17 HL&P's Manager of Nuclear Licensing, had 15 years of 18 nuclear engineering experience. I had 26 years of such !
i 19 experience. Each of us was very familiar with the 20_ requirements of 10 CFR S 50.55(e) and had previously l
21 considered reportability questions on numerous 22 occasions.
i 23 l
24 0 36 What criteria did the HL&P review team use on May 8, ,
25 1981, to determine whether findings on the Quadrex !
26 Report were reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)?
{ 27 .
I 28 t
_ ..-._. ._.~. -- _ , . , . _ , _ _ _ - . - ~ . . , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . _ _ _ _ . _ , _ _ . . . _ . _ _ . _ _ , --
. _ _ _ . ~ , _ _
i
. . l I
1 A.36 Determinations of reportability under 10 CFR 50.55(e) ;
2 require the application of technical and engineering 3 judgment to a series of three criteria lientified in 4 the regulation: These three criteria ares 5
6 First, a deficiency in design or construction must 5
7 be identified.
I 8 (
9 Second, the deficiency must have the potential, if 10 left uncorrected, to affect adversely the safety 1
11 of plant operations.
12 13 Third, the deficiency must represent 14 .
i 15 (i) a significant breakdown in any portion of 16 the quality assurance program under
' t 17 Appendix B to CFR Part 50; or
[
18 (ii) a significant deficiency in final design l
l 19 as approved and released for construction 20 such that the design does not conform to l
21 the criteria and bases stated in the l 22 safety analysis report or construction 23 permits or <
24 (iii) a significant deficiency in construction 25 of or significant damage to a structure, 26 system, or component which will require l 27 extensivo evaluation, extensive redesign !
28
. . 1 1 or extensive repair to meet the criteria 2 and basis stated in the safety analysis 3 report or construction permit or to 4 otherwise establish the adequacy of the
~
5 structure, system, or component to 6 perform its intended safety function; or 7 (iv) a significant deviation from performance i
e specifications which will require 9 extensive evaluation, extensive redesign, 10 or extensive repair to establish the 11 adequacy of a structure, system, or 12 component to meet the criteria and bases
- 13 stated in the safety analysis report or
! 14 construction permit or to otherwise 15 establish the adequacy of the structure, 16 system, or component to perform its 17 intended safety function.
18 Unless all three criteria are satisfied, a finding 19 is not reportable. We applied these criteria to the 20 Quadrex findings. Of course, since the Quadrex Report 21 dealt only with design, parts (iii) and (iv) of the 22 third criterion had no bearing on our decision.
23 24 0 37 In determining whether a finding was reportable as a 25 significant breakdown in the OA program for STP, what 26 weight, if any, did the HL&P Review Tear give to the 27 28
1 fact that the finding did not pertain to an activity 2 that had resulted in a design released for construc-3 tion?
4 A.37 We did not conclude that a finding was not reportable 5 as a significant breakdown in the QA program solely 6 because it did not pertain to an activity that had 7 resulted in a design released for construction. For 8 example, the HL&P review team determined that findings 9 4.2.2.1(a) and 4.8.2.1(d) regarding computer code 10 verification and shielding calculations, respectively, 11 were potentially reportable as significant breakdowns 12 in the QA program without considering whether either 13 finding related to an activity that had resulted in the 14 issuance of a design released for construction.
15 16 0 38 Which of the findings in the Quadrex Report did the 17 HL&P review team review on May 8, 1981, for report-18 ability under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)?
19 A.38 We reviewed the discipline findings in Section 4 of the 20 Quadrex Report which were designated by Quadrex as 21 being the "most serious." The other findings in the 22 Quadrex Report were not specifically reviewed at that 23 time.
24 25 0 39 Why didn't the HL&P review team specifically consider 26 the reportability of other findings?
27 28
. . i i
1 A.39 We wanted to focus our attention on the findings that 2 were most likely to have reportability implications.
3 Quadrex had indicated that if we reviewed the "most 4 serious" findings we would have examined all of those 5 matters with the potential for reportability. In j 6 addition, the other discipline findings in Section 4 of 7 the Quadrox Report were not reviewed by HL&P on May 8, 8 1981, because the characterization of them by Quadrex 9 indicated that they were not reportable. Quadrex 10 classified the discipline findings into five groups:
11 "most serious findings," " serious findings," " note-12 worthy findings," " potential problem findings," and 13 "other findings." The " serious findings" were not 14 reportable because they did not relate to safety but 15 only to "the generatJon of reliable power." (Quadrex 16 Report p. 4-1). The " noteworthy findings" were not 17 reportable because they did not relate to safety but 18 only to " project schedule and/or cost increases." g.
19 The " potential problem findings" were not reportable 20 because they did not identify a deficiency but only l
21 identified a subject warranting "further investi-22 gation." M., p. 4-2. Finally, "other findings" were 23 not reportable because they did not identify a signifi-24 cant deficiency but only identified " minor items or 25 items that are not amenable to corrective action." g.
( 26 l
i 27 28 i
i
. , 1 The generic findings in Section 3 of the Quadrex 2 Report were not specifically reviewed for reportability 3 because the Quadrex Report stated that they were " based 4 on the detailed evaluation of each discipline presented 5 in Section 4 of this report." id., p. 3-1. As 1 6 mentioned previously, Quadrex had in our meeting on May 7 7, confirmed this view. Consequently, by reviewing the 8 "most serious" discipline findings, we were aware of 9 all of Quadrox's findings of fact that might be 10 reportable under 10 CFR 5 50.55(e).
11 Although we did not specifically review each 12 generic finding to determine its reportability on May 13 8, each of us read the generic findings on May 7-8.
14 Consequently, we were sensitive to the concerns 15 expressed in the generic findings when we reviewed the 16 discipline findings for reportability on May 8, 1981.
17 18 0 40 The Bechtel Task Force report, entitled "An Assessment 19 of the Findings in the Quadrex Corporation Report,"
20 March 1982, (Applicants' Exhibit 63), at p. A-5, states 21 that one statement in generic finding 3.1(b), regarding 22 errors in verified calculations, was not the subject of 23 a specific discipline finding. Was the HL&F review 24 team aware of this on May 8, 19817 25 A.40 No. It was our belief on May 8, 1981, based upon the 26 advice of Quadrex, that the generic findings were based 27 upon the discipline findings and we did not review 28
, , i 1 finding 3.1(b). However, we were aware of Quadrox's 2 concern and had it in mind when we reviewed the 3 discipline findings, which included instances of l 4 calculational errors. In any case, as is discussed in 5 the testimony of Sidney A. Bernsen and Frank Lopez, 6 Jr., finding 3.1(b) does not identify a potentially 7 reportable deficiency.
l 8 l q 9 0 41 The Quadrex Report defined the "most serious findings" 1 10 as "those that pose a serious threat to plant licens-11 ability because either (a) the findings would prevent l 12 the obtaining of a license or (b) the finding could 4
13 produce a significant delay in getting a license, or 14 (c) the finding addresses a matter of serious concern i 15 to the NRC at this time." (Quadrex Report, p. 4-1).
16 Why didn't HL&P decide to report all of the "most 1 17 serious" findings under 10 CFR S 50.55(e) based upon 18 this definition alone?
19 A.41 The definition of "most serious findings" did not 20 automatically imply "reportability" under 10 CFR l
21 5 50.55(e). For example, some of the Quadrex "most I 22 serious" findings, such as 4.7.3.1(a) and 4.8.2.1(f),
23 related to an activity which had not been completed by 24 B&R or which was to be performed in the future by B&R. ,
25 The fact that an activity had not yet been completed 26 "could produce a significant delay in getting a 11-
, 27 conse" but would not necessarily identify a " deficiency ,
28
. . 1 in design or construction." Similarly, a finding might l 2 address "a matter of serious concern to the NRC at this 3 time" but that is not necessarily a " deficiency in 4 design or construction." Thus, the fact that a finding 5 fell within Quadrex's definition of "most serious" did 6 not establish that the finding was reportable.
7 1 1
8 Q.42 Please explain why something that has not been 9 commenced or completed would not necessarily be a 10 deficiency in design or quality assurance for design?
11 A.42 Designing a nuclear plant is generally an iterative and 12 evolutionary process. Consequently, some structures 13 and systems are designed and even constructed based 14 upon preliminary but conservative assumptions, and 15 later design activities are undertaken to determine 16 final loads applicable to the structures and systems.
17 Since the original assumptions are usually conserva-7 18 tive, these final calculations are confirmatory in 19 nature and are not expected to result in the need for 20 structural alterations. If a final calculation 21 identified that a preliminary assumption was non-22 conservative, that condition might be reportable.
23 However, the fact that certain design activities may 24 have not yet commenced or been completed generally does 25 not mean there is a deficiency in a design or in 26 quality assurance.
27 28
s?
^
1 A.43 In its reportability review on May 8, 1981 did the HL&P 4 ,(
2 review team rely solely on the information provided in j [
3 the Quadrex "most serious" discipline findings? .
4 A.43 No. In addition to the findings we had other informa-5 tion in the Report such as the Questions, Answers and i s
6 Assessments as well as our knowledge of the Project, t 7 and other information available to us, including tha .
7 8 results of B&R's review (Applicants' Exhibit 62.) We i, y 9 also had the benefit of Dr. Sumpter's insight gained <( ^[ "
. t:
10 through his contacts with Quadrex, as well as the ,
11 information gained by Dr. Sumpter and Mr. Robertson f .I 12 while attending the B&R meeting in the late afternoon ,
13 and evening of May 7, 1981. In addition, we brought to~
14 the May 8 meeting our considerable background and
,1
(
15 experience as nuclear engineers.
16 ,
17 0.44 What consideration did you give to the possibility that 18 findings may not have been reportable individually but s
19 that, as a group of two or more, they might be report-20 able as a significant breakdown'in the OA progrem for, l 21 STP?
22 A.44 We were aware that Quadrex had identified what it 23 considered to be generic findings that encompassed 24 findings from more than one discipline. During our 3 25 review we were alert to the possibility that several 26 findings might identify deficiencies that collectively 27 could have constituted a significant breakdown in the 28
+
~.
i L
~
(.
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~
+l' ?
l' OA program for STP. However, we did not discern from
-- Qi t 2 the discipline findings any pattern of deficiencies in 3 the design OA program for STP or any systematic failure 4, $ to implement the OA program other than the matters we
~, 5 - , reported to'the NRC. <
k
[# - Y' 0.45 Please identify the items which the HL&P review team 8 determined to be potentially reportable on May 8, 1981, q 9 and explain why they were determined to be potentially
[ ' ., f 10 reportable, n
11 A! 4 5' As I mentioned before, we found three items to be
~
12 potentially reportable. First, as reflected primarily 4 13 in findings 4.4.2.1(a) and (b), faulted condition heat 14 loads were not considered in the design of portions of 15
- the HVAC system. B&R, in its May 8, 1981, assessment 16 (Applicants' Exhibit 62), had identified findings 17 4.4.2.l(a) and (b) as being potentially reportable.
19 18 s HLLP agreed that this item was potentially reportable s
I,7 3 19 because it identified a deficiency in the design of the f
20/ '
, HVAC syst.em, some design drawings for the HVAC system i
, 21 had been released for construction, and the failure of
., "l 22 the HVAC design to account for certain faulted heat I23' (loads might, if left uncorrected, have adversely
' s, 24 .
affected the ability of plant operations personnel
' ^
25 and/or equipment to perform safety functions during an 4
g 26 accident.
27 ,
a 28 's ,
' ~
O.,i
- s ,
.5,
- . 1 Second, as reflected in finding 4.2.2.1(a), the l l
2 methods for identifying whether the computer code i 3 version in use had been verified lacked adequate 4 visibility to the users of those codes. B&R, in its 5 May 8, 1981, assessment (Applicants' Exhibit 62),
6 identified finding 4.2.2.l(a) as not reportable because 7 its preliminary assessment of this matter found 8 procedural problems only. Nevertheless, HL&P 9 approached this findir.g conservatively and determined 10 that it was potentially reportable. The finding 11 identified a deficiency in the process of design which 12 represented possible breakdown in the QA program for 13 STP (i.e., inadequate controls on the use of unverified 14 codes) that might have resulted in the use of unveri-15 fied computer codes in safety-related design activi-16 ties. Until a detailed assessment could be made, it 17 could not be determined whether there were design 18 deficiencies that could adversely affect the safety of 19 operation.
20 Finally, as reflected in finding 4.8.2.l(d), B&R 21 did not treat shielding calculations as being safety-l 22 related and therefore may not have verified the 23 calculations in accordance with its practice for 24 safety-related calculations. B&R, in its May 8, 1981, 25 assessment (Applicants' Exhibit 62), indicated that 26 some shielding calculations might be safety-related but 27 stated that finding 4.8.2.l(d) was not reportable 28
. . I because it would not impact the safe operation of the 2- plant or the public health or safety. Nevertheless, we 3 decided to treat it as potentially reportable, because i 4 it appeared to identify a deficiency in the design i
5 process which represented a significant breakdown in 6 part of the OA program for STP (i.e., a systematic 7 failure to perform verifications). Without further 8 review it could not be determined whether this 9 deficiency might have created significant flaws in the 10 design which could adversely affect the safety of 11 operations. Where it is not possible to determine 12 promptly whether a deficiency could adversely affect 13 the safety of operations, it is HL&P's practice to 14 inform the NRC of its existence as a potentially 15 reportable item if the deficiency otherwise satisfies 16 the reporting criteria. After the NRC has been 17 notified, HL&P determines whether or not the deficiency 18 is, in fact, reportable. This practice is consistent 19 with the NRC's " Guidance-10 CFR 50.55(e), Construction 20 Deficiency Reporting" dated 4/1/80, pages 6-7. After 21 ~the NRC was notified that this finding was potentially 22 reportable, HL&P determined that shielding calculations 23 are generally considered in the industry not to be 24 safety-related and therefore that any failure to verify 25 these calculations was not a deficiency in the OA 26 program for STP.
27 28
1 0 46 Did HL&P notify the NRC after May 8, 1981, that any 2 other findings in the Quadrex Report were potentially 3 reportable?
4 A.46 Yes. On March 15, 1982, HL&P notified the NRC that one 5 additional matter was potentially reportable. This 6 matter, as reflected in findings 4.3.2.l(a) and 7 4.8.2.l(a), related to a common instrument air line in 8 the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) HVAC system which 9 Quadrex identified as violating the single failure 10 criterion. B&R, in its May 8, 1981, assessment 11 (Applicants' Exhibit 62), identified findings 12 4.3.2.l(a) and 4.8.2.l(a) as not reportable because the 13 design for this system was incomplete and had not been 14 released for construction. For the same reason, HL&P 15 determined on May 8, 1981, that these findings were not 16 reportable. However, when the Bechtel Task Force 17 issued its assessment of the Quadrex findings in March 18 of 1982 (Applicants' Exhibit 63), it identified these 19 findings as being potentially reportable. Accordingly, 20 since this was a specific recommendation of the Task 21 Force, HL&P notified the NRC that the FHB HVAC common 22 instrument air line design constituted a potentially 23 reportable deficiency. Subsequently, Bechtel confirmed 24 that the design of the FHB HVAC common instrument air i
25 line had not been released for construction. Conse-26
( 27 i
28 i
38 -
1 quently, HL&P informed the NRC on April 8, 1982, that 2 this item did not meet the criteria for reportability 3 under 10 CFR S 50.55(e).
4 5 0 47 With respect to each finding that the HL&P review team 6 determined not to be reportable, do you remember 7 precisely the basis for that determination?
8 A.47 After more than four years it is difficult to recall 9 the precise reason why a finding was determined not to 10 be reportable on May 8, 1981, particularly since, as I 11 have previously described, there could be several 12 reasons why any item would not be reportable. However, 13 with respect to each finding discussed in the following 14 portion of my testimony, I have described at least one 15 reason why such finding was not reportable at that 16 time.
17 18 0 48 What does finding 4.1.2.1(b) state?
19 A.48 Finding 4.1.2.l(b) states as follow:
20 There was no evidence of Civil / Structural evaluation of l
the reasonableness of postulated internal missiles or 21 that the criteria for internal missiles presented in TRD IN209RQ013-A had been implemented in the design 22 (see Question C-9).
l 23 0 49 Please explain why finding 4.1.2.1(b) was not poten-24 tially reportable.
25 A.49 In May, 1981 the design activities associated with 26 protection against internal missiles had not yet j l
27 commenced. Finding 4.1.2.l(b) was not potentially 28 l
. . 1 reportable because it did not identify a deficiency in 2 a design or in quality assurance for design but rather 3 an activity to be performed in the future by B&R as 4 part of its remaining design work.
5 6 0 50 What does finding 4.3.2.l(a) state?
t 7 A.50 Finding 4.3.2.1(a) states as follows:
8 The common instrument air line, as depicted in FSAR drawing 9.4.2-2 attached to Question R-6, does not meet 9 the single failure criterion required by IEEE 279-1971 and 10 CFR 50 (see Question E-15). The occurrence of 10 this design error in the late 1970's in concert with the B&R response to other single failure criterion 11 questions suggests that B&R is not sufficiently experienced in the performance of a Failure Mode and(5) 12 Effects Analysis that crosses discipline boundaries.
In most organizations, the I&C discipline would detect 13 and immediately correct this type of design error by performing a rigorous examination of the separation 14 provided between redundant divisions in the safety-related portions of the plant for all involved disci-15 plines.
16 17 (5) Instrument line blockage was identified as a potential concern for single failure analyses in the l 18 1970 period when an early B&W plant had three instru-ments connected to two piping taps. Technicians 19 repeatedly replaced the instrument connected to one tap because it read differently than the other two instru-20 ments connected in common to the other tap; only later l
l did they discover that a blocked instrument line was l
21 causing the two common instruments to read erroneously.
22 0 51 Please explain why finding 4.3.2.l(a) was not poten-23 tially reportable.
24 A.51 As discussed above in connection with HL&P's 1982 25 notification to NRC, the design of the common instru-l 26 ment air line had not been released for construction.
j l 27 The finding did not identify a significant breakdown in i
28 l
l
. . 1 the quality assurance program for design because it 2 addressed only a limited aspect of design and did not 3 suggest the existence of a systemic deficiency.
4 5 0 52 What does finding 4.3.2.1(d) state?
6 A.52 Finding 4.3.2.l(d) states as follows:
7 No formal methodology or documentation exists to verify adequate separation or the single failure criterion 8 (see Questions E-1, E-8, and E-19.)
9 0 53 Why was finding 4.3.2.l(d) not potentially reportable?
10 A.53 We knew that B&R had a formal design verification 11 procedure in place. With respect to the documentation 12 Quadrex war looking for, " formal" documentation is l
l 13 neither universally used nor required by the NRC and in 14 my experience many nuclear projects have been success-l 15 fully completed without formal documentation of the I
l 16 type noted by Quadrex. Since finding 4.3.2.l(d) did 17 not identify a deficiency in a design or in quality l 18 assurance for design it was not potentially reportable.
19 20 A.54 What does finding 4.3.2.l(n) state?
21 A.54 Finding 4.3.2.1(n) states as follows:
22 It is planned that various types of isolation devices will be used. Actual devices are still under evalua-23 tion and qualification. There is no existing document i that provides guidance to the designers on the circuit 24 application of these various types (e.g., optical couplers vs. fuses vs. relays, etc.). It is our 25 opinion that lack of such a document (TRD) could result in design errors and licensing problems (see Question 26 E-14).
27 28
, , 1 0 55 Why was finding 4.3.2.1(n) not potentially reportable?
2 A.55 This Quadrex finding was identifying that isolation 3 devices were still under evaluation by B&R and that 4 the design had not yet been developed. A TRD of the 5 type mentioned by Quadrex could be a useful tool, but 6 until B&R began to select isolation devices there would 7 be no need for such a document.
8 9 0 56 What does finding 4.5.2.1(b) state?
10 A.56 Finding 4.5.2.1(b) states as follows:
11 EDS did not perform a design review or design verifica-tion of preliminary loads transmitted to B&R; these 12 loads have, however, been used as a basis for plant design (see Questions C-4 and M-8).
13 14 15 0.57 Why did the HL&P review team determine that finding 16 4.5.2.l(b) not potentially reportable?
- 17 A.57 Preliminary designs are often used as a basis for l 18 design and construction activities, subject to later 19 verification. This is true not only at STP, but at 20 every other nuclear project with which I am familiar.
21 Where preliminary data is used, it is industry practice 22 to include an extra margin of safety to minimize the 23 likelihood that the final design will require changes.
i 24 Since these preliminary data are carefully controlled 25 to assure they are later finalized and verified, their 1
I 26 preliminary use does not represent a deficiency.
27 28
1 0 58 What does finding 4.6.2.1( n) state?
2 A.58 Finding 4.6.2.1(n) states as follows:
3 Assumptions regarding the availability of various heat sinks under varying plant conditions should be re-4 examined (see Question N-17).
5 Question N-17 provides further details, stating that 6 B&R should have analyzed the temperature of the water 7 in the Essential Cooling Pond (ECP) under conditions of
- , 8 normal shutdown of two units as well as the condition 9 actually analyzed by B&R (normal shutdown of one unit 10 and a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) in the other 11 unit).
12 13 0.59 Why was finding 4.6.2. l( n) not potentially reportable?
14 A.59 B&R had performed an analysis of the ultimate heat sink 15 (Essential Cooling Pond or ECP) that did consider the 16 combinations of plant conditions identified in the NRC 17 guidance. This analysis was described in FSAR section 18 9.2.5. B&R had subcontracted with NUS for a reanalysis 19 of the heat loads to the ECP and that reanalysis was 20 underway at the time of the Quadrex Review. Thus, the 21 re-examination Quadrex was recommending was already in 22 prog ress . The finding did not identify either a design 23 deficiency or a breakdown in quality assurance.
24 25 26 27 28
. . 1 0 60 What does finding 4.7.3.1(a) state?
2 A.60 Finding 4.7.3.l(a) states as follows:
3 B&R has not yet developed a criteria for jet impinge-ment protection on unbroken piping systems (see 4 Question P-20). A future TRD is planned.
5 0.61 Why was finding 4.7.3.l(a) not potentially reportable?
6 A.61 The analysis of the effects of postulated pipe breaks 7 had not yet been performed and the " criteria" referred 8 to by Quadrex would be necessary only when such 9 analyses were commenced. Finding 4.7.3.l(a) did not 10 identify a deficiency in a design or in quality 11 assurance for design.
12 13 0 62 What does finding 4.7.3.1(b) state?
14 A.62 Finding 4.7.3.l(b) states as follows:
15 Approximately 50% of the reviewed SDDs do not yet contain system operating temperatures (see Question P-16 1).
17 Question P-1 provides further d> tails in support of 18 this finding. Question P-1 states that, of the sixteen 19 SDDs which were reviewed by Quadrex, eight f.dentified 20 system design temperatures, seven did not identify a 21 design temperature directly but did provide a reference 22 for enabling the designer to determine the temperature, 23 and one did not identify either a system design 24 temperature or a reference for obtaining the tempera-25 ture. These temperatures were used in performing 26 preliminary stress analyses.
27 28
. o 1 0 63 Why was finding 4.7.3.l(b) not potentially reportable?
2 A.63 All but one of the SDDs contained system design 3 temperatures or referenced a document that did. The 4 single SDD in which a temperature had not been identi-5 fied was for a system that had not been designed or 6 released for construction. This isolated example in 7 which one SDD did not contain a design temperature did 8 not constitute a significant breakdown in a portion of 9 the quality assurance program for STP.
10 11 A.64 What does finding 4.7.3.l(k) state?
12 A.64 Finding 4.7.3.l(k) states as follows:
13 B&R assumptions for seismic to nonseismic boundary anchors are probably unconservative and difficult to 14 technically justify as adequate (see Question P-29).
15 0 65 Why was finding 4.7.3.l(k) not potentially reportable?
16 A.65 Finding 4.7.3.l(k) was not potentially reportable as a 17 design deficiency because the design for the boundary 18 anchors was not released for construction. It was not 19 potentially reportable as a significant breakdown in OA 20 because the TRD on which it was based was in draft 21 status and still undergoing review.
22 23 0.66 What does finding 4.8.2.1(a) state?
24 A.66 Finding 4.8.2.l(a) states as follows:
25 The instrument air piping, between the valves actuated by redundant radiation monitors and the valves that 26 divert air flow through safety-related filter trains in the FHB HVAC exhaust subsystem, does not meet the 27 single failure criterion (see Question R-6).
28
T
. , 1 0.67 Why was finding 4.8.2.1(a) not potentially reportable?
2 3 A.67 This finding is already addressed in response to the 4 questions regarding finding 4.3.2.l(a). As discussed 5 there, the design of the common instrument air line had 6 not been released for construction and the finding did 7 not identify a significant breakdown in any portion of 8 the QA program for STP.
9 10 0 68 What does finding 4.8.2.1(b) state?
11 A.68 Finding 4.8.2.l(b) states as follow:
12 No procedures exist that define the minimum qualifica-tion requirements for ALARA reviewers. Some design 13 drawings have been reviewed and signed off for ALARA.
There is limited evidence that proper follow-up has 14 occurred to verify incorporation of ALARA specified designs (see Question R-1).
15 16 0 69 Why was finding 4.8.2.1(b) not potentially reportable?
17 A.69 Finding 4.8.2.l(b) does not identify a deficiency in a 18 design that was released for construction or a signifi-19 cant breakdown in any portion of the OA program. As 20 with other engineering personnel, ALARA reviewers were 21 selected by the B&R Engineering Project Manager, who 22 was responsible to assure that they were qualified to 23 perform their assigned functions. Additionally, B&R's 24 procedure required that the ALARA reviewer sign all 25 relevant design drawings to verify that the cognizant 26 engineer had incorporated, as appropriate, the comments 27 of the ALARA reviewer. Although this procedure could 28
. ... 1 have been improved as suggested by Quadrex in its 2 assessment of B&R's response to Question R-1, it was 3 adequate to ensure that the ALARA review process was 4 properly controlled and performed by qualified 5 individuals. We agree with the emphasis which Quadrex 6 placed on ALARA and believe our program was, and is, 7 consistent with that view. HL&P had instituted an 8 ALARA program that was one of the most comprehensive in 1
9 the industry. In addition to requiring the designers 10 to address ALARA considerations in design, HL&P was 11 requiring a separate design review for ALARA 12 considerations.
1 13 14 0 70 What does finding 4.8.2.1(c) st. ate?
! 15 A.70 Finding 4.8.2.1(c) states as follows:
16 Modification of the MAB HVAC system to eliminate filter
- i. media needs to be re-examined (see Questions R-5 and 17 R-29).
18 0 71 Why was finding 4.8.2.l(c) not potentially reportable?
19 A.71 Finding 4.8.2.l(c) did not identify any deficiency in a 20 design or in quality assurance for design. These i
21 filters were eliminated in the course of the construc-22 tion permit-review and the Construction Permits were
( 23 issued based on an analysis that showed the plant would 24 meet Appendix I without such filters. Reexamination of 25 the decision to eliminate the filters was appropriate 26 because source term assumptions were changing as a l
l 27 i
L 28 i
l i
,, . . 1 result of the TMI-2 accident. Bechtel has since 2 confirmed that the addition of such filters to the MAB 3 exhaust is unnecessary.
4 5 0 72 What does finding 4.8.2.1(e) state?
6 A.72 Finding 4.8.2.1(e) states as follows:
7 B&R has not correlated radiation zones to the shielding design and shielding design has not adequately 8 considered ISI requirements or the potential locations for temporary shielding (see Question R-10).
9 10 0.73 Why was finding 4.8.2.l(e) not potentially reportable?
11 A.73 The plant design was based on B&R's original shielding 12 analysis. As the plant design evolved B&R was doing 13 confirmatory analyses. This aspect of the design 14 (ALARA) is dynamic, changing with the development of 15 plant design and was an ongoing activity. This is 16 consistent with industry practice. The finding 17 identified a requirement for future work and not a 18 deficiency in the design.
19 20 0 74 What does finding 4.8.2.l(f) state?
21 A.74 Finding 4.8.2.l(f) states as follows:
1 22 Radiation zone drawings based on accident conditions have not been prepared (see Question R-30).
'23 24 0 75 Why was finding 4.8.2.l(f) not potentially reportable?
25 A.75 The requirement for radiation zone drawings based upon 26 accident conditions was a post-TMI requirement that B&R
. 27 had not yet addressed in its design. work. The finding 28 was not potentially reportable because it did not
1 identify a deficiency in a design or in quality 2 assurance for design but rather an activity to be 3 performed in the future by B&R as part of its remaining 4 design work.
5 6 0.76 What does finding 4.8.2.l(g) state?
7 A.76 Finding 4.8.2.1(g) states as follows:
8 A design basis governing removable concrete block walls was not evident (see Question R-ll).
9 f 10 0 77 Why was finding 4.8.2.l(g) not potentially reportable?
11 A.77 The design basis for removable concrete walls was still 12 in the process of development. Accordingly, the 13 finding was not potentially reportable because it did 14 not identify a deficiency in design or in quality 15 assurance for design but a concern for an activity to 16 be performed in the future by B&R as part of its 17 remaining design work.
18 l 19 0.78 Did you give any consideration to submitting the entire l
20 Quadrex Report to the NRC Staff under 10 CFR 21 S 50.55(e)(1)(i)?
22 A.78 Yes, I did. Given the nature of the findings in the 23 Quadrex Report and the fact that only three of the 24 findings were determined by the HL&P review team to be 25 potentially reportable, the Report as a whole did not, 26 in my judgment, identify any widespread breakdown in 27 quality assurance or suggest that a significant amount 28 i l
.. o 1 of the safety-related design was flawed. Consequently, 2 I did not believe it would be appropriate to submit the 3 entire report under 10 CPR S 50.55(e).
4 5 0 79 When did you first inform the NRC of the existence of 6 the Quadrex Report?
7 A.79 As I mentioned before, after we decided to perform an 8 independent third party assessment of B&R engineering, 9 I mentioned that fact to Mr. Donald Sells, the NRC i
10 Project Manager for STP. In April 1981, when receipt 11 of the Quadrex Report appeared to be imminent, I called 12 Mr. Sells again and told him that the report was due 13 soon and that some Section 50.55(e) reports might 14 result. I offered to give Mr. Sells and Nuclear 15 Reactor Regulation (NRR) a briefing on the Report as 16 soon as it became available. When he asked whether we 17 planned to file the Report with the NRC I told him that 18 we would not, but that the NRC could review it at HL&P 19 at its convenience.
20 Since both Mr. Sells and I were going to be in Bay 21 City the first week of the Phase I hearings, which was 22 the week after receipt of the Report, that appeared to 23 be the best, earliest opportunity to meet with him. We i 24 met during the course of the week of May 11, 1981. The j 25 meeting lasted about twenty minutes. I told Mr. Sells 26 about the three potentially reportable items that had j l
27 been reported to NRC Region IV and that one of those f
l 28 E
, , 1 items had been identified as potentially reportable by 2 B&R, while the other two had been identified by HL&P in 3 its review of the Report. I explained that there was a 4 large number of findings and I briefed him regarding 5 the general areas of concern. I told Mr. Sells that 6 HL&P intended to take an in-depth look at the issues 4
7 identified in the Report and that we would take all 8 necessary corrective actions. I also told him again 9 that the Report would be available for NRC review at 10 the Project site.
11 12 0 80 Why did you discuss the Quadrex Report with Mr. Sells 13 instead of with NRC Region IV?
14 A.80 I believed NRR was the appropriate arm of the NRC to 15 inform regarding the Quadrex Report in view of the fact 16 that, generally, the NRC's technical and engineering 17 expertise was, at that time, concentrated in NRR. I 18 would have gone to Bethesda to brief NRR staff had it 19 not been for the earlier opportunity presented by the 20 ASLB hearings in Bay City. I understood the Region's 21 area of interest to be in the identification of 22 particular deficiencies representing departures from 23 regulatory requirements rather than the general 24 efficiency of the design process. I believed that in 25 advising the Region of the potentially reportable 26 deficiencies as required by 10 CFR S 50.55(e), and in 27 28
- . 1 advising NRR by my discussions with Mr. Sells, I was 2 being completely candid in my dealings with the NRC 3 Staff.
4 5 0.81 Did you brief Mr. Jordan and Mr. Oprea on the Quadrex 6 findings?
7 A.81 Yes. I discussed the status of the review with Mr.
8 Oprea from time to time in separate conversations and 9 called him about the Report on May 7 and 8. Once the 10 HL&P review team decided that three items were 11 potentially reportable, I promptly informed Mr. Oprea.
12 On May 11, I met with Messrs. Jordan and Oprea and 13 provided them a briefing on the Quadrex findings. I 14 told them of the large number of findings in the Report 15 and described their significance. This included both 16 the identified weaknesses in the B&R engineering 17 organization and the large amount of design work yet to 18 be perfonned, especially the lack of analyses to 19 confirm the preliminary design. I described the three 20 items which had been reported to the NRC and explained 21 the potentially serious nature of the computer code 22 verification issue. I also mentioned that a number of 23 the findings were based on incomplete information or 24 premised on views of engineering practice that I 25 believed to be not supported by industry practice.
26 27 28
i i
. . 1 0 82 Prior to submitting the Quadrex Report to the Licensing 2 Board in September 1981, did HL&P keep the Quadrex 3 Report secret?
4 A.82 No. The Quadrex Report was treated like numerous other 5 reports and studies on the Project. It was distributed 6 to individuals who would have a reason to want the 7 information contained in it. There were no instruc-8 tions that it be kept secret.
9 I did consider whether it should be sent to the 10 NRC, particularly in light of Mr. Sells' original 11 inquiry during our April telephone call. There was no 12 regulatory requirement that it be submitted to the NRC, 13 and I decided not to do so. I knew that if the Report 14 were transmitted to the NRC, it would be sent, in the 15 ordinary course of business, to the Public Document 16 Room. It had been written rather hurriedly and, in 17 some cases, on the basis of incomplete information. I 18 knew that it reflected some judgments about acceptable 19 engineering practice which I did not share. I believed 20 that there was a high likelihood that the Report could 21 be misread or quoted out of context if it were made 22 publicly available without extensive explanatory 23 materials -- a situation which, as it turns out, has 24 occurred. I had, of course, made clear to the NRC that 25 the Report would be available for its review.
26 0 83 Did you participate in a meeting regarding the Quadrex 27 Report with NRC Region IV on September 8, 19817 28
. . 1 A.83 Yes. In August of 1981 Mr. Oprea suggested that Region 2 IV would be interested in hearing about the Quadrex 3 Report. He arranged for a meeting with Region IV 4 personnel, and he and I participated in a meeting on 5 September 8 with a large group of NRC personnel. We 6 described the Quadrex review and its results, including 7 the areas reviewed, the number and significance of the 8 findings and HL&P's plans for resolving the findings.
9 The Region emphasized the importance of disposition of 10 all of the findings and we agreed that we would do so.
11 12 0 84 Was there a discussion at that meeting regarding HL&P's 13 reporting obligations as they related to the Quadrex 14 Report?
15 A.84 Yes. Mr. Seyfrit asked whether there were any addi-16 tional potentially reportable findings beyond the three 17 that had been identified in May. He also asked if we j 18 had considered whether the Report as a whole might be 19 reportable. We assured him that if we identified any 20 additional potentially reportable findings, we would 21 promptly report them. Either at that meeting, or 22 later, we also advised him that we could see no basis l
l 23 for reporting the entire Quadrex Report.
! 24 l
l 25 0 85 At pages 20-21 of its Memorandum and Order of February
! 26 26, 1985, the Licensing Board discussses the obligation l 27 of parties "to keep licensing or appeal boards informed l
28 i
.- . 1 of newly developing information bearing on issues 2 pending before such boards," i.e., the so-called 3 "McGuire doctrine." Were you aware of such obligation 4 in 1981?
5 A.85 Yes. I may not have been familiar with the term 6 "McGuire doctrine", but I was aware of HL&P's obliga-7 tion to advise the Licensing Board of new information l
8 that could affect its decision regarding matters under 9 its review.
10 11 0 86 When you received the Quadrex Report did you consider 12 whether HL&P was obligated to provide it to the 13 Licensing Board?
14 A.86 Yes, I did. However, I understood that the hearing was 15 aimed primarily at construction and construction-16 related QA problems -- not design questions. My 17 testimony described HL&P's Project organization, 18 including the HL&P engineering organization and its 19 responsibilities, but I did not view this description 20 as being a focus of the hearing. The Quadrex Report l 21 did not raise any question with respect to the manner l
22 in which construction was performed or the adequacy of l
l 23 construction OA. Because, in my view, the Quadrex 24 Report did not relate to the issues in the licensing l
L 25 hearing, I did not believe the Report should be 26 furnished to the Licensing Board until September 1981.
l 27 I did not discuss with HL&P's licensing counsel whether 28
. 0 1 the Report should be provided to the Board. At that 2 time HL&P's counsel advised me that counsel to the NRC 3 Staff had taken the position that the Licensing Board 4 should be given the Report. I agreed to do so.
5 6 0 87 Did you view the Quadrex Report as a report on OA?
7 A.87 No. There were quality concerns addressed in the 8 Report, such as the three items that HL&P identified as 9 potentially reportable, but I viewed this report as 10 being primarily focused on the efficiency of B&R's 11 engineering activities, not its OA program. The 12 important message of the Quadrex Report was not that 13 the quality of the engineering products or processes 14 was deficient (although there were a few such concerns) 15 but rather that the B&R engineering organization was 16 weak and unlikely to support the Project without 17 substantial, additional improvement. I did not, and do 18 not, view the Quadrex Report as identifying weaknesses l 19 in OA (either as administered by the OA department or 20 within the engineering organization) but rather as 21 pointing up problems in engineering itself -- problems 22 of a type not likely to be identified by the OA 23 function.
24 25 26 27 28
1 0.88 In view of the reporting obligation under the McGuire 2 doctrine, please explain why HL&P did not inform the 3 Board prior to September 24, 1981, that it was 4 considering replacing B&R as architect-engineer and 5 construction manager?
6 A.88 When I testified in June of 1982, I explained the 7 sequence of events that lead to the replacement of B&R 8 as architect-engineer and construction manager. As I 9 explained then, the Licensing Board was promptly 10 notified when an agreement in principle was reached 11 with Bechtel to replace B&R. Until that took place 12 there was no meaningful information to convey to the 13 Board.
14 Although early in 1981 I had suggested to Mr.
15 Jordan that it might be advisable to determine whether 16 there were options in the event that B&R could not 17 complete the job on a reasonable schedule, it was not 18 until June 29, 1981, that HL&P decided to seriously 19 investigate whether there were qualified contractors 20 that would be willing to replace B&R as architect-21 engineer and construction manager. Once that decision 22 was made Mr. Oprea and I contacted a number of 23 qualified firms to determine their interest. I then 24 prepared a Request-for-Proposals, received and 25 evaluated proposals and interviewed each of the 26 candidate companies. It was only after the completion 27 of this evaluation process that we were in a position 28 I
I to recommend to the STP Management Committee, the HL&P I
2 Board of Directors and the Chief Executive Officers of l l
3 the Project owners that HL&P enter into negotiations 4 with Bechtel. The dates at which these approvals were 5~ received were September 12, 14, and 15, respectively.
6 At that point it was still uncertain whether Bechtel 7 would agree to acceptable contract terms; in fact, 8 important basic contractual matters remained to be 9 resolved during the following week. When the negotia-10 tions with Bechtel reached a point at which it was 11 apparent that there were terms that would be acceptable 12 to both companies the Licensing Board was promptly 13 informed of the transfer of responsibilities. The 14 actual preliminary agreement with Bechtel was not fully 15 executed until October 3, 1981.
16 Until HL&P had determined that a qualified company 17 would be willing to replace B&R on acceptable terms, 18 HL&P could not be certain that any change would occur.
19 Moreover, I did not see any reason why the Board should 20 be informed prior to that time because the 21 determination to seek a replacement for B&R was based 22 on cost and schedule concerns, not OA or nuclear safety 23 related considerations that might be of interest to the 24 Board.
25 It would have been irresponsible of HL&P to 26 announce the replacement of B&R before it was certain 27 to occur. A premature announcement would have had a 28
. . 1 significant adverse effect on Project activities. Many 2 people would have immediately begun to seek other 3 employment and it would have become more difficult to 4 recruit new employees. Morale of B&R employees who 5 remained on the job would have been adversely affected 6 and attention to detail would have suffered. It was 7 thus essential to be certain of the decision before 8 making the announcement that B&R might be replaced.
9 10 0 89 Have you reviewed your May and June 1981 testimony in 11 this proceeding in preparation for this hearing?
12 A.89 Yes. I have reviewed the portions of my 1981 testimony 13 that mentioned B&R's performance of engineering.
14 15 0 90 At the time you testified in 1981, what was your view 16 of the adequacy of B&R's services?
17 A.90 When I joined HL&P in October, 1980, I had questions 18 about the adequacy of B&R's services on STP generally.
19 I was aware of the limited nature of B&R's prior
- :2'O nuclear experience, the Show Cause Order and the less 21 than-adequate progress of the Project. Progress on the
- 22 Project during the early part of 1981 was below B&R's 23 earlier projections and it was clear that construction 24 was being delayed by the failure of B&R to complete the l
l 25 design on schedule. I began suggesting to HL&P I
l 26 management in early 1981 that, to keep its options 27 i
l 28 l
l A
. . 1 open, HL&P should explore whether an experienced 2 architect-engineer would be available to complete the 3 project, if that became necessary.
4 As I testified in 1982, there was a meeting of .
5 executives of the Project owners and B&R on April 10, 6 1981, at which time we discussed the need to attract 7 more experienced personnel to B&R. I expressed my view 8 that B&R needed to make a number of improvements to its 9 engineering department, involving the addition of 10 experienced personnel in key technical positions, 11 Additionally, B&R needed to acquire a senior executive 12 with nuclear experience to take complete charge of 13 their STP activities.
14 After the April 10 meeting I met with B&R execu-15 tives and we were successful in achieving some needed 16 improvements, including reorganization of engineering 17 to improve lines of authority and a recruitment program 18 which included hiring bonuses and improved compensation 19 for relocation expenses. There was also consideration 20 of employing some experienced subcontractors for 21 specific design tasks. These were positive steps that 22 I found encouraging. On the other hand, B&R had 23 resisted my suggestion that it hire a senior nuclear 24 executive who would report directly to the President of 25 B&R. This step, in my judgment, was absolutely 26 essential and Mr. Jordan had undertaken to pursue this 27 question with higher levels of B&R management. In view 28
. o 1 of B&R's position, I urged even more strongly that HL&P 2 ascertain whether an alternative was available.
3 Recognizing, however, the enormously complex nature of 4 employing another architect-engineer, I could under-5 stand that HL&P management had to explore, and perhaps 6 exhaust, every possibility of improving B&R's perfor-7 mance before formally soliciting the interest of the 8 industry in taking over the job.
9 So, at the time I testified I was not satisfied 10 with B&R's engineering and management resources. The
! 11 Quadrex Report had confirmed my concern about the 12 adequacy of B&R's engineering resources. However, 13 meaningful steps had been taken to attract more i
14 experienced engineers and subcontract part of the 15 design effort, and HL&P was still discussing with B&R 16 the need for an experienced senior nuclear executive.
17 18 0.91 Do you now believe that you should have mentioned 19 either the Quadrex Report or your concerns regarding 20 B&R's engineering services in response to the questions 21 at the portions of your testimony cited in the Board's l 22 February 26, 1985, Memorandum and Order?
l 23 A.91 No. Although it was not the purpose of my testimony to 24 address the engineering capabilities of B&R, when asked 25 about these issues I did mention my concerns. I 26 discussed the fact that B&R had never before designed a l 27 nuclear plant and that it was experiencing problems of l 28 l
l
i l i
1 a type that were commonplace in the industry in the 2 early 1970's (Tr. 1158), and that B&R was taking steps
)
3 to acquire additional resources to cope with its task. -
4 I also mentioned that HL&P had identified to B&R "a '
a 5 number of areas that . . . [were] in need of strength-s ~
6 ening, both in terms of talent, as well as in terms of 7 depth of talent." Tr. 2386. I mentioned a need to I' 8 bolster B&R engineering in the areas of cable tray .
9 supports, design of seismic pipe supports, technical L 10 management and acquisition of a more senior technical '
11 leader to provide over-all technical direction. I,also ; ,
12 discussed the need for "other changes relative to the }
13 way they are structured in order to bring more focus of-14 management attention to the needs of the South Texas ,'
15 Project." Tr. 2387. And finally, I stated, that I was 16 not satisfied with the B&R engineering organization and 17 I hoped that B&R management was not satisfied because 18 there were " substantial improvements that can yet be <
19 made." Tr. 2404.
20 1
21 0 92 Specifically, please explain why you did not mention 22 these subjects at Tr. 1095-96.
23 A.92 At those pages Mr. William Jordan, representing CEU, i.s 5> .
24 referred to a statement on page 5 of my direct testi- f 25 mony which stated that HL&P administered the contracts ; ,
26 with B&R and Westinghouse, and asked me to identify i 4 27 other major contractors. I answered that they were the 28 4
e i'
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two major contractors. Mr. Jordan then asked if any of
-i I j ~2 S t the other contractors had responsibility for QA and QC.
q '3 I answered that by pointing out that a number of
- 0) ...
, 4 contractors were under subcontract to B&R.
"5 ' It would not have been appropriate to mention 6 . Quadrex in response to these questions because Quadrex 7 was neither-a major contractor, nor did it have OA or 8 OC responsibilities for STP. Neither did the questions 9 call for an' assessment of B&R's performance of design 10 'we.rk.
11 12 0 93 Why did you not mention these subjects at Tr. 1143-527 13 A.93 At these pages Mr. Jordan and the Licensing Board asked 14 questions regarding the types of B&R design documents 15 routinely reviewed by HL&P and how such reviews were l
! 16 performed. Since these questions dealt with the normal
.g
'I,k7 HL&P process of reviewing B&R design by HL&P's engi-A % 't i 51 8 neers nothing in the discussion suggested to me that it
~
19 would have been appropriate to mention the Quadrex 20 9 Report. The Quadrex Report did not address the subject g
i
( ' 21
/
6 of what type of design documents HL&P did or should l-l 22 have reviewed. Neither did it focus on problems in the 23 relationship between the HL&P and B&R engineering
- s,/
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. . 1 0 94 Why did you not mention these subjects at Tr. 1158-59?
2 A.94 At these pages Mr. Hager asked me how I perceived the 3 problems facing me at the time I accepted the position 4 of Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Construc-5 tion, of HL&P. My answer to this broad question was 6 very general. I mentioned that many of the problems at 7 STP were ones that were common-place in the nuclear 8 industry in the early seventies and that the newer 9 requirements made the tasks involved in designing a 10 nuclear plant more difficult. I suggested that B&R may 11 have been caught off guard by these new requirements, 12 but that it was " recognizing the magnitude of the task 13 and [was] acquiring additional resources of quality and 14 experience nature to cope with those tasks." I then 15 went on to say that HL&P was also increasing its 16 experience base.
17 I believe my answer addressed the question appro-18 priately. I described my perception of the problems, 19 which included a recognition of difficulties in 20 addressing the newer requirements, and a general need 21 for more experienced personnel. It did not enter my 22 mind to single out the Quadrex Report for mention, 23 because it was only one source of my perception of the 24 Project problems, and in any event, did not contribute 25 to my perception of the problems at the time I accepted 26 27 28
64 -
1 the job. I believe my answer clearly stated that there 1
2 was a need for improvement of B&R's resources on the 3 Project.
4 5 0 95 Why did you not mention these subjects at Tr. 2404-06?
6 A.95 At these pages Mr. Reis, counsel to the NRC staff, 7 asked me about the adequacy of B&R's management of 8 design. My answers recognized that there had been 9 substantial improvements, but that I was still not 10 satisfied and hoped that B&R management was not 11 satisfied either. .I then stated that where B&R was not 12 meeting minimum requirements these matters were being 13 brought to the attention of B&R management and would be 14 corrected. I emphasized our determination "to 15 encourage B&R to acquire the resources to improve the 16 quality of their effort."
17 Mr. Reis then inquired about the " principal problem 18 areas" in which B&R's design activities had been found
- 19 " lacking." I discussed a number of problem areas we 20 were then addressing, HVAC, shielding analyses and 21 consideration of faulted condition loads. These were l
22 all matters addressed in the Quadrex Report. The first 23 two of these had, a few days earlier, been the subject 24 of " potential reportability" notifications to Region 25 IV. While I cannot remember it with certainty, from my 26 review of the transcript I suspect that I was about to 27 mention the computer code verification concern as well, 28
. . 1 but Mr. Reis interrupted to clarify a point. After the 2 . clarification he shifted immediately back to questions 3 about the adequacy of construction. My omission of the 4 computer code area was due to the interruption.
5 The question did not call for any mention of the l
6 Quadrex Report. My answer mentioned several of the 1
7 specific deficiencies identified in the Quadrex Report, 8 and knowledge of the Report, itself, was not necessary 9 to understand my answer. I believe my answers in these 10 pages and elsewhere did convey my view that B&R needed 11 to improve its design capabilities.
12 l
13 0.96 In the CCANP Motion to Reopen the Phase I Record, CCANP l
14 accuses Mr. Oprea of giving "what appears to be 15 misleading testimony to the ASLB in June of 16 1981 . . . . In support of that accusation, CCANP 17 cites an excerpt from your testimony before the Public j 18 Utility Commission of Texas. (CCANP Exhibit "A" to the l
19 foregoing Motion to Reopen, Tr. 1378-80). In that 20 excerpt, and in the immediately preceding pages you 21 testified before the Texas PUC regarding your sugges-22 tions to Mr. Jordan and Mr. Oprea prior to June 29, 23 1981 that HL&P explore the availability of alternatives l 24 to completing the Project without B&R as A-E. Have you 25 previously testified on this subject before the 26 Licensing Board?
27 28 l
. . 1 A.96 Yes. In my testimony on June 15, 1982, (Tr. 10518-20),
2 I explained that starting in January of 1981 I 3 suggested to HL&P management on several occasions that 4 HL&P explore the marketplace to determine the 5 availability of alternatives for completing the Project 6 without B&R as A-E. I also mentioned that I made this 7 same suggestion not long after the April 10, 1981, 8 meeting when B&R made clear that it would not be 9 receptive to my urging that it acquire a senior nuclear 10 executive to assume overall direction of the Project.
11 (Tr. 10,417).
12 13 0.97 Did you consider your discussions with Mr. Jordan or 14 Mr. Oprea regarding your suggestions of exploring 15 alternatives to be discussions regarding removal of 16 B&R?
17 A.97 No. I think this is reflected in my June 1982 18 testimony before this Board. After describing the 19 discussions that took place regarding the exploration 20 of alternatives, in response to a question from Judge 21 Hill I specifically stated that" . . . there was 22 absolutely no conversation or decision that I am aware 23 of prior to June 29 along the lines of seriously 24 considering replacement of Brown & Root . . . . Tr.
25 10519.
26 27 28
. . 1 0 98 Exhibit "A" to the CCANP Motion to Reopen cites Mr.
2 Oprea as responding "No, I have not," to the question 3 "Have you had any discussions with any of your staff or 4 other individuals after the show cause order regarding 5 removal of Brown & Root?" Do you consider that answer 6 as inconsistent with your testimony or as misleading?
7 A.98 No. 1 do not think it was unreasonable for Mr. Oprea 8 to have understood that question to ask about serious 9 discussions focused on the removal of B&R rather than 10 our discussions about the need to explore alternatives.
11 When, in answer to a question about Mr. Oprea's 12 testimony before the Texas PUC (Tr. 1378), I suggested 13 that Mr. Oprea's recollection was different than mine, 14 I really did not have in mind anything other than our 15 discussions about the advisability of exploring other 16 alternatives and I immediately pointed out (TR. 1379),
17 as I did before this Board in 1982, that there were no 18 serious discussions regarding removal of B&R before 19 June 29, 1981. I think Mr. Oprea took our conversa-20 tions as part of discussions we had from time to time 21 about the desirability of exploring our options and not 22 a discussion about "the removal of Brown & Root" and he 23 was right.
24 25 26 27 28 1
J
1 0 99 In your review of other portions of your testimony, did 2 you find any answers that you now believe would have 3 called for you to mention the Quadrex Report or your 4 views at that time concerning B&R's engineering 5 services?
6 A.99 No. My answers were responsive to the questions and 7 there was no instance in which mentioning the Quadrex 8 Report would have contributed to the substance of my 9 answer. I did mention my views concerning B&R's 10 engineering services in response to the few questions 11 that dealt with that subject. I believe that all of my 12 testimony was truthful and candid and that I responded 13 properly to the questions that I was asked.
14 15 0 100 What is your opinion regarding how HL&P's commissioning 16 and handling of the Quadrex Report reflects on HL&P's 17 character and competence?
18 A.100 I believe that HL&P demonstrated both competence and 19 good character in the commissioning and handling of the 20 Quadrex Report. In the current regulatory environment 21 independent design reviews have become a standard 22 technique, but in 1980-81, when HL&P decided to 23 commission the Quadrex review there was little or no 24 precedent for such reviews. In the circumstances then 25 confronting HL&P and myself, I believed such a review
~
26 would contribute measurably to our understanding of the i
27 Project. We kept the Quadrex review independent of 28 HL&P to obtain unbiased results, and imposed very tight
r-
, . 1 deadlines so that we would get timely information. As 2 a result, the Report was written under great time 3 pressures and HL&P did not get the opportunity to 4 provide Quadrex with comments that would have helped 5 put the findings in a clearer perspective. Neverthe-6 less, the Report provided valuable insights into the 7 engineering problems which were constraining progress 8 on the Project.
9 HL&P was candid about this report with the NRC.
10 When the review was commissioned, I told the NRR 11 Project Manager about it, and when the Report was 12 received I described the findings to him. Our review 13 for potentially reportable findings was undertaken 14 promptly on receipt of the Report. Although B&R advised 15 that only one item was reportable, HL&P performed its 16 own independent review and reported two additional 17 items that appeared to be potentially reportable.
18 Application of 10 CFR S 50.55(e) requires 19 engineering judgment based on the specific facts.
20 Although I am confident that our judgments were 21 correct, I recognize that others may reach differing 22 conclusions with respect to one or another of the 23 findings. Such differing professional opinions would 24 not, in my view, in any way negate the fact that HL&P 25 made a good faith review of the findings and made 26 responsible judgments on reportability.
27 28
7.
1 On our compliance with the "McGuire doctrine," I 2 would'not propose to quarrel with any judgment the
-3 Board may make. However, our course of action was based l
l 4 on our understanding of the issues before the Board and i 5 our very different perception about the basic thrust of 6 the Quadrex Report. But even if the Board feels 7 otherwise, I would hope that our failure to furnish the 8 Report to the Board would not diminish the credit which 9 belongs to HL&P for commissioning the Report, and for 10 dealing fairly with the NRC Staff in advising them of
-11 that fact and, subsequently, offering to share with 12 them the information in the Report.
13 In terms of the relationship of the Report to the
~14 ultimate decision to seek alternatives to continuing 15 with B&R, we were aware of many of the basic problems 16 in B&R's engineering organization before we received 17 the Report. The Report helped to confirm my judgment, 18 but it was not a major factor in our decision to l
l 19 seriously explore the possibility of replacing B&R in i
i 20 the summer of 1981. To the extent it had an impact, it 21 underscored not deficiencies in B&R's QA/QC program but 22 rather the basic question of whether B&R could be 23 relied on to finish the Project on a reasonable 24 schedule. The Project would not have moved forward if
[
l 25 there had been a fundamental flaw in the design or a 26 serious question about B&R's ability to control the 27 design process to assure its quality. B&R was not, 28 l
r.
= ,. I however, terminated for these reasons. The decision 2 was a complex business judgment based largely on cost, 3 schedule and contract feasibility. Speaking for 4 myself, I did not regard these matters as being within 5 the Board's interest. But even if I am wrong, we were 6 just beginning to wrestle with that preblem in June of 7 1981. Practical considerations required care against 8 premature public disclosure of our investigation into 9 the feasibility of replacing B&R. The Board was 10 informed as soon as that judgment was reached.
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 i
20 21 22 23 24 l
l 25 l
26 27 f
28 i
L
l 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 3 l 4 In the Matter of ) j
) !
5 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER ) Docket Nos. STN 50-498 OL COMPANY, ET AL.
) STN 50-499 OL 6 )
(South Texas Project, Units 1 )
7 'and 2) )
8 9 TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,
10 OF JAMES R. SUMPTER 11 12 01 Please state your name and current position.
13 A.1 My name is Dr. James Robert Sumpter and I am currently 14 Manager-Litigation Technical Support for Houston 15 Lighting & Power Company (HL&P).
16 17 02 Please describe your educational background and 18 professional experience.
l l 19 A.2 I received my B.S. in Engineering Science from 20 Pennsylvania State University in 1965, my M.S. in 21 Nuclear Engineering from the University of Michigan in 22 1967, and my Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from Texas 23 A&M University in 1970. From October, 1970 until 24 August, 1972 I was employed as a Nuclear Analyst for 25 Sargent & Lundy Engineers. During that time I was 26 responsible for radiological systems design for several 27 nuclear power plants, including radioactive waste 28
1 treatment and disposal systems, area and process 2 radiation monitoring systems, and hydrogen control and I
3 charcoal filtration systems. My responsibility 4 included the development of design criteria, drawings, 5 plant equipment layout, specifications, testing 6 requirements, radiation transport and release 7 calculations and purchase of equipment.
8 In August, 1972, I joined HL&P and served as a 9 Nuclear Engineer until March, 1973. During that time, 10 I participated in the evaluation of bids of nuclear 11 suppliers for the South Texas Project (STP) and the 12 Allens Creek Project. From March, 1973 until February, 13 1975, I was Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Safeguards 14 and Licensing for HL&P. In that capacity, I directed 15 HL&P's nuclear licensing efforts for both the STP and 16 the Allens Creek Project. I was promoted to Manager, 17 Nuclear Services Department in February, 1975, with 18 responsibility, at various times, for Nuclear Fuel, 19 Nuclear Engineering, Nuclear Licensing, Health Physics 20 and Nuclear Security for both projects. I was 21 appointed to my current position in December, 1984. In 22 that capacity, I coordinated HL&P technical support for 23 the lawsuit brought against Brown & Root, Inc., (B&R) 24 in Matagorda County, Texas. I am a registered 25 Professional Engineer in the State of Texas, and have 26 27 28
a 1 been appointed by the Governor to the Texas Radiation 2 Advisory Board. A copy of my resume is attached to 3 this testimony.
4 5 0.3 Please describe your professional experience in 6 evaluating matters for reportability to the NRC 7 pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e).
8 A.3 As Manager of HL&P's Nuclear Services Department, I 9 have had considerable experience with 10 C.F.R.
10 S 50.55(e), including managerial responsibility for 11 HL&P's reporting of design deficiencies from February, 12 1975 until March, 1981. As part of my responsibility 13 for STP licensing activities, I supervised the 14 development of HL&P and B&R reporting procedures, 15 sponsored training seminars for HL&P personnel on their 16 reporting responsibilities both before and after 17 issuance of the STP construction permits, and 18 participated in the evaluation of design matters for 19 reportability.
20 i 21 0.4 In May, 1981, were you familiar with the B&R design and l 22 design process at STP?
23 A.4 Yes. I had been involved in the development of the STP 24 design and with B&R's design effort since the inception 25 of the Project and was generally familiar with the 26 Project design and the B&R design process. My respon-27 sibilities as head of Nuclear Services included review
! 28 of B&R System Design Descriptions (SDDs),
_4_ i 1 specifications, and selected drawings against 2 applicable requirements, industry code provisions and .
3 operational needs, and review of selected B&R 4 engineering procedures, including ALARA review 5 procedures.
6 7 05 What is the purpose of your testimony?
8 A.5 The purpose of my testimony is to describe my ,
9 involvement in the initiation and conduct of the review 10 of B&R engineering undertaken by Quadrex Corporation 11 (Quadrex), and in the review of the " Design Review of 12 Brown & Root Engineering Work for the South Texas 13 Project" (Quadrex Report or Report) for reportability 14 pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e).
15 16 06 Please describe your first involvement with the Quadrex 17 review.
18 A.6 My first involvement was in early December, 1980, when 19 Mr. Jerome H. Goldberg, who was then HLSP's new Vice-20 President, Nuclear Engineering and Colstruction, told 21 me that he desired an independent evaluation of STP 22 engineering. Over the next several weeks, I discussed l
1 23 with Mr. Goldberg various areas he wished to be l 24 included in the evaluation.
l 25 26 27
- 28 f
0 1 0.7 How was Quadrex selected?
2 A.7 Mr. Golc59rg and I discussed the criteria to be used to 3 select a contractor to perform the review. After 4 consideration of a number of potential contractors, it 5 was decided that Quadrex was the most appropriate 6 contractor to perform the review. Accordingly, Mr.
7 Goldberg instructed me to contact Quadrex and request a 8 proposal.
9 10 08 once it was determined that a proposal would be 11 solicited from Quadrex what did you do?
12 A.8 I contacted Mr. Loren Stanley, Group Manager, 13 Consulting Engineering Department, Quadrex corporation, 14 and requested a proposal for an engineering review. I 15 indicated that we anticipated a brief two to three week 16 review of various disciplines.
17 Quadrex promptly submitted a proposal calling for a 18 review to begin in early February and to cover the 19 technical disciplines which I had identified. I met .
20 with Mr. Stanley and other Quadrex personnel to discuss 21 the specific methodology to be utilized for the review, 22 and in late January, authorized them to proceed.
23 24 09 What additional guidance did you provide to Quadrex?
25 A.9 I elaborated on the key technical areas which HL&P 26 desired Quadrex to examine within each technical 27 discipline and some of the unique nuclear criteria to 28
1 be reviewed such as single failure criterion, 2 separation of safety-related components, ASME code and 3 pipe stress analysis. It was decided that a series of 4 ' technical questions would be prepared by Quadrex for 5 presentation to B&R engineering personnel and that 6 B&R's responses would be used as one of the bases for 7 reviewing its technical engineering effort, along with 8 Quadrex's review of various engineering " products" such 9 as drawings and calculations. Quadrex subsequently 10 developed draft questions and transmitted them to HL&P 11 for comment.
12 13 0.10 What input did HL&P have in formulating the specific 14 questions to be posed to B&R?
15 A.10 On January 29-30, I met with Quadrex personnel to 16 discuss the draft questions they had developed and to 17 provide comments I had received from Mr. Goldberg and 18 HL&P discipline engineers. Mr. Goldberg had commented 19 that the questions were more detailed than he had 20 anticipated, but he did not request Quadrex to modify 21 them. HL&P discipline engineers provided additional 22 information regarding appropriate areas of inquiry. I 23 continued to work with Quadrex until mid-February to 24 refine the questions to be asked B&R. My principal 25 objective was to assure that the areas which we had 26 agreed that Quadrex would cover were adequately 27 reflected in the questions.
28
1 0 11 Was anything else discussed at the January 30, 1981 2 meeting? -
3 A.ll Yes. Mr. Arnold Granger, HL&P's Project Engineering j 4 Manager, participated in that meeting. He explained, 5 in general terms, B&R's engineering process and some of 6 their key design documents (such as SDDs, technical 7 reference documents (TRDs), etc.), in order to 8 familiarize the Quadrex reviewers with B&R's basic 1
9 engineering approach. We also discussed some specific l 10 areas where we believed B&R may have been having some ,
l 11 difficulties, such as HVAC design and computer code 12 verification.
13 14 0.12 When was your next involvement with the Quadrex review?
15 A.12 I attended a number of meetings in February between 16 Quadrex and B&R in which the Quadrex questions were 17 further discussed and clarified.
18 19 0.13 How was the review conducted?
20 A.13 Quadrex conducted "on-site" reviews and meetings with 21 B&R personnel in March, 1981 at B&R's offices in l
22 Houston. During these meetings, answers to the 23 questions were discussed and B&R engineering personnel 24 led the Quadrex reviewers through the relevant design 25 documents.
26 27 28
i O 1 0.14 Did you take part in these meetings between Quadrex and 2 B&R?
3 A.14 Yes. I attended almost all of the review meetings and l 4 served as HL&P's coordinator for the review effort. I 5 coorainated schedules and assisted in obtaining 6 necessary information. Where I had specific knowledge i
! 7 of aspects of the STP design, or felt that certain l
8 areas required additional exploration by Quadrex, I 9 participated in the review sessions.
10 11 0.15 During its review, did Quadrex keep HL&P management 12 informed regarding the status of its review and its I
13 preliminary findings?
i 14 A.15 Yes. As indicated in Mr. Goldberg's testimony, Quadrex 15 met with HL&P several times during the course of its 16 review in order to keep HL&P apprised of its efforts.
17 18 0 16 Did you meet with Quadrex to review drafts of the 19 Report?
20 A.16 Between April 8-10, 1981, I visited Quadrex's offices l
21 and reviewed draft copies of volumes II and III of the 22 Report, containing the Quadrex questions, B&R answers 23 and Quadrex " assessments."
24 25 0 17 What was the purpose of your review of the drafts of l
l 26 volumes II and III?
27 28
_9_
1 A.17 I wanted to ascertain the bases for the Quadrex assess-2 ments, and to assure that the facts were based on the ,
3 information available to Quadrex and that the Quadrex 4 reviewers' thoughts had been clearly stated.
5 Upon returning from Quadrex's offices, I furnished 6 the draft questions, answers and assessments to HL&P 7 lead discipline engineers for their review.
8 Subsequently, I received marked-up copies of volumes II 9 and III containing the HL&P engineers' comments and 10 forwarded them to Mr. Stanley. Although I wanted to be 11 sure that Quadrex was working with accurate 12 information, I did not want to influence their 13 judgments. Accordingly, I told Mr. Stanley that HL&P 14 was simply furnishing comments and that Quadrex did not 15 owe HL&P an answer with respect to any of the comments.
16 I returned to Quadrex's offices on April 15-16 in 17 order to review the latest drafts of volumes II and 18 III. I also discussed with Quadrex Mr. Goldberg's
! 19 suggestion for defining the categorization of the 20 Quadrex findings.
21 22 0.18 What was Mr. Goldberg's suggestion?
l 23 A.18 Mr. Goldberg's suggestion was set forth in his April l
l 24 15, 1981 memorandum to me (Applicants' Exhibit 58) and I
i 25 is aescribed more fully in his testimony. It i
( 26 I
l 27 28 1
L
_ 10 _
1 recommended, among other things, that a category of 2 "most serious" findings be established containing 3 matters which might violate NRC requirements.
4 5 0 19 What was Quadrex's reaction to Mr. Goldberg's
- 6 suggestion?
I
! 7 A.19 Mr. Stanley felt that there would be a number ot 8 findings that would not fall within any of the 9 categories suggested by Mr. Goldberg. As a result, he 10 indicated that the categories would be broadened and 11 that, for example, Quadrex would include in the "most 12 serious" category, those matters that might cause 13 delays in licensing reviews, regardless of whether 14 those matters violated NRC requirements.
15 16 0 20 What was the outcome of these discussions?
17 A.20 The definition of the categories to be utilized was 18 refined by Quadrex. As reflected in the Quadrex 19 Report, Quadrex expanded the "most serious" category to i
l 20 include items which could entail significant licensing 21 problems, especially items which could affect timely 22 review of the license application.
23 24 0 21 At any time prior to receiving the final Quadrex Report i 25 were there matters which you felt should be reported to i
26 the NRC?
l 27 28 l
1 A.21 No. While I had indications that there were areas 2 which would require close scrutiny for possible .
3 reporting to the NRC, I do not believe that, prior to i
4 actual receipt of the final report, I had been 5 presented with sufficient information to knowledgeably 6 undertake an evaluation of any matters for potential 7 reportability. That was the first time I saw Quadrex's 8 actual findings in conjunction with all of the 9 supporting information. Until I received the Report, I 10 had only, in essence, preliminary opinions and 11 information regarding the B&R design. This preliminary 12 information did not-provide an appropriate basis for 13 making a reportability determination. Thus, it was 14 necessary to await the final Report rather than 15 engaging in a piecemeal review based upon partial and 16 preliminary information.
17 18 0.22 When did you receive the final Quadrex Report?
i 19 A.22 On May 7, 1981, I received copies of the final Report -
20 (Volumes I-III) from Mr. Stanley and arranged for its 21 reproduction for use by HL&P and B&R personnel. I had i
22 received volumes II and III on April 29 but did not 23 review or distribute those volumes at that time.
24 25 26 27 28
-n- - - - - - -
1 0 23 How was the Report reviewed for reportability?
2 A.23 In a letter to B&R on May 6, 1981, Mr. Goldberg 3 instructed B&R to review the "most serious" findings 4 and report to HL&P by noon on May 8 regarding the 5 reportability of those findings under 10 C.F.R.
6 S 50.55(e). After the meeting on the morning of May 7, 7 B&R assigned the "most serious" discipline findings to 8 its appropriate lead engineering personnel for review.
9 A one page form had been prepared for the reviewers to 10 record their reportability determination and their 11 rationale for each of the findings. A meeting was then 12 convened in B&R's offices at about 5:00 p.m. during 13 which the B&R discipline engineers presented their 14 results to various B&R personnel. Mr. Cloin Robertson 15 and I attended the meeting.
16 The results of B&R's review were presented in 17 writing to HL&P on the morning of May 8, 1981.
18 (Applicants' Exhibit 62). Attachment B was a set of 19 the forms on which B&R's reportability determinations 20 had been documented. B&R had concluded that no l 21 findings were reportable except an item associated with 22 HVAC design, which it identified as reportable under 10 23 C.F.R. S 50.55(e) and 10 C.F.R. Part 21.
24 25 26 27 28
\
1 0 24 What did HL&P do with this input from BER? l 2 A.24 At about 12:30 p.m. on May 8, I met with Messrs.
3 Goldberg and Robertson to review each of the "most l 1
4 serious" discipline findings for reportability. While 5 we took into account B&R's input, we made our own 6 independent judgments as to the reportability of the 7 individual findings.
8 9 0 25 What did you conclude as to reportability?
10 A.25 We concluded that, in addition to the HVAC design 11 deficiency identified by B&R, the NRC should be 12 notified of potential deficiencies related to computer 13 code verification and classification of shielding 14 analyses.
15 16 0 26 After May 8, did you have any other occasion to review 17 the Quadrex findings for reportability?
18 A.26 Yes. I subsequently reviewed each of the Quadrex 19 findings with Mr. Robertson to provide him with the 20 benefit of my knowledge of the findings and to consider 21 again whether any items which should have been reported l
22 had been missed in our prior reviews. We identified no 23 additional reportable items.
24 25 0 27 Are you aware of any discussion by HL&P regarding with-26 holding the Report from the NRC Staff?
27 28 l
1 A.27 No. While prior to the receipt of the Report Mr.
2 Goldberg indicated to me that a copy would not be .
3 transmitted to the NRC Staff, there was no discussion 4 of any intention to prevent the Staff from reviewing '
5 the Report. On the contrary, Mr. Goldberg informed me 6 that he intended to brief Mr. Sells, NRC Project 7 Manager for STP, on the Report. During the hearing 8 session in Bay City during the week of May 11, 1981, 9 Mr. Goldberg told me that he had briefed Mr. Sells on 10 the Report and had told him that a copy would be 11 available for his review.
12 13 0 28 Was the Quadrex Report maintained as a confidential 14 document within HL&P?
15 A.28 No. Numerous copies were available at both HL&P and 16 B&R, and I am aware of no instructions being given 17 which would have limited access to the Report.
18 19 0 29 Do you think HL&P met its obligations under 10 C.F.R.
20 S 50.55(e) in its review and reporting of the Quadrex 21 Report?
i 22 A.29 Yes. A timely review of the Quadrex Report was 23 undertaken by HL&P's most experienced management 24 personnel aided by prompt review and advice, at HL&P's 25 direction, from B&R, the organization most familiar 26 with the details of the design. Despite the large 27 number of matters to be evaluated in a short time, all 28
i 1 potentially reportable matters were identified and 2 reported to the NRC. Therefore, I believe that HL&P 3 carried out its responsibilities under 10 C.F.R.
4 S 50.55(e) in an expeditious and effective manner.
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 4
23 24 25 26 27 28
RESUME OF ,
JAMES R. SUMPTER Employment History: Sargent & Lundy Engineers Nuclear Analyst, October, 1970-August, 1972 Houston Lighting & Power Nuclear Enaineer, August, 1972-March, 1973 Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Safeguards and Licensing, March, 1973-February, 1975 Manager, Nuclear Services Department, February, 1975-December, 1984.
Manager-Litigation Technical Support, December, 1984-Present Education: B.S., Penn State University, Engineering Science, 6/65 M.S., University of Michigan, Nuclear Engineering, 12/67 Ph.D., Texas A&M University, Nuclear Engineering, 12/70 Professional Affiliations: Member, Electric Power Research Institute, Safety Technology Task Force, 1984 - present Lecturer, University of Houston, Department of Curriculum and i Instruction, Energy Course, 1982 -
present; Member, Texas Radiation Advisory Board, 1980 - present; Member, Low Level Waste, Uranium Mining, and Fees Committees, 1981 - 1984; Member, l Sunset Commission Committee, 1983 -
- present l
American Nuclear Society - South Texas Section, Program Co-Chairman, 1977; Treasurer, 1978 - 1980; Vice-Chairman, 1981; Chairman, 1982; Executive Committee, 1983; National i Society, Joint Subcommittee on Teacher Communications, 1983 -
present
,n n . - . . . _ -
l I
Registered Professional Engineer, State of Texas, 1979 - present ,
Member, Advisory Committee on Nuclear Energy, Texas Energy & Natural Resources Advisory Council (TENRAC), 1980-1983; Member, Nuclear Operations Subcommittee, 1980 - 1983 Lecturer, Institute of Energy, Economics l and the Environment, University of Houston, Clear Lake City, 1979 -
1982 Member, Edison Electric Institute, Nuclear Operations Subcommittee, 1979 - 1982 Member, Utility Occupational Radiation Standards Group, 1978 - 1981 Member, Industrial Representatives Committee, Doctor of Engineering Program, Texas A&M University, 1977 - 1981 Member, Technical Program Committee, ANS Reactor Operating Experience Conference, 1979 Member, Gas Cooled Reactor Associates Direct Cycle Technical Advisory Committee, 1977 - 1980 Chairman, Technical Session on New Developments in Radwaste Management, ASME Joint Power Generation Conference, 1978 Lecturer for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Power Projects Course, Argonne National l
Laboratory, 1976, 1977 American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Steering Committee on i Nuclear Power Plant Fire
! Protection, 1976 - 1978
[ Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) Steering l Committee on Reactor Licensing &
Safety, 1975 - 1978 Secretary, American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard on Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning
( Units & Components, N509, 1972 -
l 1975 I
l l
7 .,
. . 1 Awards, Honors: Honorary Societies: Sigma Pi Sigma .
(Physics), Psi Chi '
(Psychology)
Fellowships: Graduate Fellowship, National Science [
Foundation, 1967 - 1969' Graduate Fellowship, .
Atomic Energy Commission, 1970 - 1972 Publications: "BWR Liquid Radwaste System Optimization Studies" 't 1975 Winter Meeting of Americanf ,'
Nuclear Society, t "ANS Transactions," 22 542 (1975),\
" Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection' Status", AIF Conference on Reactdr Licensing & Safety, February, 1977
" Impact of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations on Fire Protection for Nuclear Plants"-American Power Conference, March, 1977
" Proceedings of the American Power Conference," 39, 127 (1977)
" Working for Energy Literacy Through the Public Schools" - 1983 Winter Meeting of the American Nuclear Society, "ANS Transactions," 45, 584 (1983) t l
g.E s ,
i 4 t I
r
-t 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
~.
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 3 ,-
s 4 .
,/' 4 In the Matter of )
)
( ,
Docket Nos. STN 50-498 OL 5 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER )
', COMPANY, ET AL. i, ) STN 50-499 OL
/ 6 )
(South Tex:ss Project, Units 1 )
7 and 2) ~
)
f, g ,*
9 TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, 1 / ET AL.,
10 5' OF LOREN STANLEY g j t' J
11 ,
12 0.1 What is your name?
13 A.1 My name is Loren Stanley.
14 15 02 Please identify your present employment.
16 A.2 I am President of Zytor, Inc., located in San Jose, 17 California. Zytor, Inc., provides engineering and 18 consulting services related to nuclear power 19 generation and other areas.
20 ,
21 03 Please describe your professional qualifications.
's 22 A.3 My professional qualifications are described in the 23 Statement of Professional Qualifications of Loren 24 Stanley, which is attached hereto and incorporated by 25 reference.
26 [! j -
27
, 28 R
l
1 04 What is the purpose of your testimony?
2 A.4 The purpose of my testimony is to describe the purpose .
3 and nature of the " Design Review of Brown and Root 4 Engineering Work for the South Texas Project" 5 (Quadrex Report) (May 1981).
6 7 0.5 What was your role in preparing the Quadrex Report?
8 A.5 At the time the Quadrex Report was prepared, I was 9 employed by the Quadrex Corporation (Quadrex) and was 10 assigned as the project manager in charge of the 11 review of Brown & Root (B&R) engineering. The Quadrex 12 Report was prepared under my supervision and control, 13 and it describes the results of the review of B&R 14 engineering.
15 16 06 Is Applicants' Exhibit 60 a true and correct copy of 17 the Quadrex Report?
18 A.6 Yes.
19 20 07 Have you read the " Testimony on Behalf of Houston 21 Lighting & Power Company, et al., of Jerome H.
l 22 Goldberg" and " Testimony on Behalf of Houston Lighting 23 & Power Company et al., of Dr. James R. Sumpter?"
24 A.7 Yes.
25 26 27 s 28
1 0.8 Do you agree with Mr. Goldberg's and Dr. Sumpter's 2 description of the role of Houston Lighting & Power 3 Company (HL&P) in the performance of the Quadrex 4 review of B&R engineering and their description of the 5 meetings involving HL&P and Quadrex?
6 A.8 Yes.
7 8 0.9 What was the purpose of the Quadrex review of B&R 9 engineering?
10 A.9 The purpose of the Quadrex review of B&R engineering 11 was to evaluate B&R's engineering activities as they 12 might reflect on B&R's ability to complete the plant 13 in an efficient and orderly way. Quadrex was asked to 14 make this evaluation by reviewing selected aspects of 15 B&R's engineering response to issues that were known 16 to present difficulties to the nuclear industry as 17 well as those areas in which HL&P believed that B&R 18 was experiencing problems. Based on this information, 19 Quadrex found indications of potentially weak areas 20 and identified these to HL&P so that they could 21 inquire further into the specific details and .
22 characterizations regarding each issue.
l 23 24 0.10 What were the major results of its review that Quadrex 25 intended to convey to HL&P in its Report?
! 26 l
27 l
28 l
_4-1 A.10 Our review of B&R engineering primarily indicated that 2 B&R was not as far advanced in the design of STP as we .
3 would have expected for a plant which had been under 4 design for at least seven years. In many areas, such 5 as mechanical, electrical, instrumentation, and 6 piping, B&R had not yet performed much of the work 7 needed to complete the design, including the 8 development of basic design documents. In a few 9 instances, we also observed some deficiencies in the 10 design work that had been performed; these instances 11 are identified in the Report.
12 13 0 11 Was it the purpose of the Quadrex review to identify 14 failures of B&R to conform to the requirements of 15 Appendix B to 10 CPR Part 50 in the design process for 16 STP?
17 A.ll No, this was not our assigned task. We did not review 18 B&R's design procedures or quality assurance (QA) 19 program for design activities, nor did we assess B&R's 20 compliance with such procedures and program.
21 22 0.12 Did you separately identify specific findings which 23 might have licensing implications?
24 A.12 Yes. These findings were placed in a "most serious" l
25 category.
26 27 28
E 0 0 1 0 13 At the time Quadrex performed its review, were you 2 aware of 10 CFR S 50.55(e)? -
3 A.13 Yes, we were aware of it. However, the only similar 4 reporting requirement applicable to Quadrex was 10 CFR S Part 21.
6 j 7 0.14 Did you identify findings which were reportable to NRC 8 under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)?
9 A.14 No. HL&P had asked us to try to identify any findings 10 which might be potentially reportable under 10 CFR S 11 50.55(e). However, we could not make this determina-12 tion because we felt we did not have sufficient 13 information to make such a judgment. Instead, we put l
14 everything with possible licensing implications into 15 the "most serious" category. We believed this 16 category would encompass anything that might be 17 possibly reportable. Additionally, this category 18 included findings which clearly were not reportable.
I 19 20 0.15 Why did Quadrex include generic findings in its 21 report?
22 A.15 The Quadrex review of B&R engineering was not intended 23 to be a detailed review of the B&R design work. HL&P l 24 desired to have a quick review of the status of B&R's 25 engineering work. Consequently, Quadrex devised a l
26 program to sample a limited segment of B&R's work in 27 selected areas. The specific results of this sample 1
28
o are presented in Volumes II and III of the Quadrex 1
2 Report and are summarized in the discipline findings .
3 in Section 4.0 of volume I of the Report.
4 5 In the generic findings in Section 3.0 of Volume I 6 of the Quadrex Report, we attempted to identify some 7 common threads which appeared in the discipline 8 findings. The generic findings were intended to 9
assist HL&P in identifying areas where HL&P could 10 inquire to determine whether improvements were 11 desirable; they do not represent conclusions regarding 12 the existence of any deficiencies in design.
13 14 0.16 Do you recall discussing with HL&P whether the generic 15 findings were based on the discipline findings?
16 A.16 Yes. Our report plainly stated that the generic 17 findings were based on the discipline findings.
18 Additionally, I confirmed that point with HL&P.
l 19 i
l 20 0 17 Could a determination of whether the most serious l
21 generic findings in the Quadrex Report were reportable 22 be made based upon a review of the most serious 23 discipline findings?
24 A.17 Yes. Since the generic findings did not have indepen-25 dent factual bases, they did not have to be reviewed 26 separately for reportability. A careful examination 27 of the most serious discipline findings by experienced 28 l
_7_
1 engineers alert to the potential that several most 2 serious discipline findings could, as a group, repre- ,,
-3 sent a systematic deficiency would have captured 4 anything reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). If the 5 HL&P reviewers were sensitive to this consideration, 6 the foregoing approach was reasonable.
7 8 0.18 Please describe Applicants' Exhibit 65.
9 A.18 Applicants' Exhibit 65 is a copy of a letter dated 10 March 16, 1981, from me to Dr. J. R. Sumpter, then 11 Manager of HL&P's Nuclear Services Department. This 12 letter states my conclusions that B&R's method of 13 conducting ALARA reviews was inadequate to meet HL&P's 14 needs.
15 16 0.19 Was it your intent in this letter to identify a 17 significant breakdown in the OA program for STP with 18 respect to ALARA or to identify violations of the 19 ALARA principle?
20 A.19 No. B&R's ALARA review program was similar to 21 industry practice at that time. However, it was I
22 HL&P's goal to establish an ALARA program which far 23 exceeded industry practice. The purpose of my letter 24 was to alert HL&P to the fact that B&R's ALARA program 25 did not satisfy HL&P's goals.
26 27 28
e .
1 0 20 Does this conclude your testimony?
2 A.20 Yes. ,
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
l
- STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF LOREN STANLEY Experience Highlights Twenty-nine years in engineering design, systems evaluation, and consulting service with nuclear plant systems and aerospace instrumentation. Thirteen years experience in I
Quality List development and implementation, and seventeen l years experience in systems design review on BWR, PWR, and HTGR plants.
Thirteen years managing technical groups performing design, licensing, and consulting activities. Provided FSAR licensing; response to USNRC questions; failure mode and effects reliability analyses; safety-related component determinations; instrumentation design and analysis, and design review of engineering work.
Professional Experience 2/83-Present President, Zytor, Inc., San Jose, CA.
Performed the Instrumentation and Control (I&C) portion of Integrated Design Inspections at two BWR and three PWR plants, and participated in an audit of electrical construction at a PWR plant.
Performed accident monitoring instrumentation conformance analyses relative to USNRC R.G. 1.97 rev. 3 and provided recommendations for analog transmitter implementation at an operating BWR .
plant. Provided ASLB testimony regarding a BWR l
plant Component Classification Program involving i safety-related and important-to-safety aspects.
3/74-2/83 Quadrex Corporation, Campbell, CA.
! Group Manager, Licensing and Systems Analysis Department.
Supervised consulting activities in licensing, design review, safety classification of plant components, and probabilistic risk assessment.
Directed a technical review of Brown & Root South l
' Texas Project engineering work.
l Deputy Director, Engineering Services. Prepared technical proposals and performed technical design l
l reviews of engineering output for client projects.
l l
l
r l
c l l
Director, Project Services.
l supervised consulting activities in Licensing and I
Safety, Quality Assurance, Environmental Services, i
Reliability and Risk Assessment, and '.
L Records Management. Participated in a MFTF fusion reactor. reliability improvement program, a TNS fusion reactor licensing criteria evaluation, and an EPRI study of PWR feedwater steam generator
! level trips.
l
! Manager, Licensing, Safety, and Reliability.
Supervised FSAR reformat with added technical content for six BWR plants. Developed and implemented 0-List methodology to identify and classify safety-related components and spare parts for BWR and PWR plants. Supervised an accident
! monitoring instrumentation study of a typical Westinghouse PWR and a pressure sensor response time verification program for EPRI. Prepared FMEAs for TMI 1/2 ECCS, BWR 5/6 ECCS, HTGR Steam Dump System, ATR Plant Protection System Upgrade, j
and LMFBR secondary control rod system and test facility. Performed hazard analysis and MTBF estimates for the ATR PPS Upgrade program.
t 4/63-3/74 General Electric Company, San Jose, CA.
Manager, Nuclear Instrumentation and Protection Systems.
Supervised initial conversion of the BWR safety systems to a solid-state design, and design of l
!' safety-related control systems. Prepared I technical system descriptions, compliance analyses, and technical responses to USNRC licensing questions.
Technical Leader, Control and Electrical Systems.
Performed design improvements for BWR control rod l
drive and reactor protection systems. Designed l
instrumentation for the process computer system, rod worth minimizer, and a prototype RWM system at Dresden 1. Participated in the development and testing of intermediate range neutron monitoring i
system equipment.
6/56-4/63 General Electric Company, Utica, NY.
Lead Electrical Engineer, Polaris Guidance l
Electrics and Orbiting Astrological Observatory l
Electronics. Assisted in the initial design of the Apollo guidance computer, and Polaris guidance and fire control computers.
- u. -
o .
Field Service and Senior Field Service Engineer.
Provided technical training and maintenance supervision for Polaris guidance electronics equipment and airborne ARR-39A data link electronics equipment.
Education M.B.A. University of Santa Clara, Santa Clara, CA, 1970.
B.S.E.E. Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh, PA.,
1956.
Professional Registration Professional Engineer, California, Electrical Engineering, 1975.
Professional Affiliations Senior Member, IEEE Member, IEEE/ PES Nuclear Power Engineering Committee, 1971-Present Chairman, IEEE/ PES /NPEC SC6, Safety-Related Systems, 1972-1975.
Member, American Nuclear Society Chairman, ANS 4.5 Writing Group, Criteria for Accident Monitoring Functions in LWRs, 1979-1980.
Member, ANS Nuclear Power Plant Standards Committee, 1981-1983.
Member, IAEA Work Group on Safety System Safety Guide SG-D3, Vienna, 1976.
r i
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I t'
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2 -
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 3
4 In the Matter of )
)
5 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER ) Docket Nos. STN 50-498 OL COMPANY, ET AL.
-~
) STN 50-499 OL 6 )
(South Texas Project, Units 1 )
7 and 2) )
8 9 TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,
10 OF DON D. JORDAN 11 12 0.1 Please state your name and occupation.
13 A.1 I am Don D. Jordan, Chairman of the Board of Directors 14 and Chief Executive Officer of Houston Lighting &
15 Power Company (HL&P).
16 17 02 Have you previously testified in this proceeding?
18 A.2 Yes, I testified on May 14, 1981.
19 20 03 Has your position at HL&P changed since you testified 21 in 1981?
22 A.3 Yes, on May 12, 1982 I was elected Chairman of the 23 Board and relinquished my position as President. I 24 have continued as Chief Executive Officer.
25 26 04 Does the HL&P officer responsible for the South Texas 27 Project (STP) still report directly to you?
28
1 A.4 Yes. Mr. George W. Oprea, Jr., Executive Vice 2 President-Nuclear, reported directly to me until he -
3 retired on February 1, 1985. Since that date, Mr.
4 Jerome H. Goldberg, Group Vice President - Nuclear, 5 has reported directly to me.
6 7 05 What is the purpose of your testimony?
8 A.5 The purpose of my testimony is (1) to describe my .
9 knowledge of the Quadrex Report when I testified on 10 May 14, 1981, as well as my views on the adequacy of 11 B&R's services at that time, and (2) to show that I 12 was truthful and candid in my testimony before the 13 Board and that there was no occasion for me to mention h- 14 either the Quadrex Report or the review of B&R's 15 design engineering services.
l 16 17 06 What was your involvement in the decision to initiate L 18 the Quadrex review of B&R engineering at STP?
l 19 A.6 In late 1980, I had been informed of, and concurred 20 in, the decision by Messrs. Oprea and Goldberg to l 21 undertake a third-party assessment of BER engineering.
l 22 23 0.7 Did you receive any information concerning the Quadrex 24 review during its conduct or after the Quadrex Report 25 was received?
26 l
27 28 l
. - _ . . - _ . . . . , _ _ . . . - . . - , _ . _ . - . _ - . _ . . - _ . . ~ - _ . - - - . - , - - -
1 A.7 During the conduct of the review by Quadrex, I 2 occasionally received information concerning the .
3 progress of the review. After the Quadrex Report was 4 received, Mr. Goldberg briefed me on its results on 5 May 11, 1981. He mentioned a number of engineering 6 problems and some general observations that had been 7 raised by Quadrex. He indicated that some of the 8 Quadrex findings were unsupported or did not take into 9 account complete information, since the review had 10 been limited in time and scope. However, Mr. Goldberg 11 said that some engineering problems would require 12 significant attention and that Quadrex confirmed the 13 lack of progress in many important aspects of B&R 14 engineering. He concluded that this lack of progress l 15 meant that engineering was insufficient to support the 1
l 16 construction schedule, and, if not corrected, the 17 completion of STP might be substantially delayed. Mr.
j 18 Goldberg also mentioned the three potential defi-19 ciencies that had been reported to the NRC on May 8, 20 and noted that the computer code verification problem 21 could be a pervasive concern.
22 i
! 23 08 When you testified on May 14, 1981, what was your 24 understanding of the import of the Quadrex Report?
i 25 A.8 Mr. Goldberg did not convey to me that the STP design 26 was deficient or did not meet regulatory requirements 27 (except for a few items reported to the NRC) but 28 l . - - -
_4_
r .
1 rather that the Report confirmed that B&R had not 2 performed its engineering functions in a timely and -
3 efficient fashion and that the present B&R engineering 4 organization was weak and unlikely to support the 5 Project without substantial, additional improvements.
6 In other words, it was not my understanding that the 7 Quadrex Report dealt with compliance with quality 8 assurance requirements at STP, but rather that it 9 primarily identified problems in the efficiency and 10 timeliness of the performance of engineering 11 functions.
12 13 09 At the time of your testimony, what was your opinion 14 concerning B&R's services at STP?
15 A.9 The progress of the Project had been disappointing to 16 me for a number of years, and that disappointment 17 related to a significant degree to B&R's performance.
18 When I testified in May 1981, my opinion of B&R 19 differed with respect to the distinct categories of 20 services they were performing at STP.
21 22 One category of services provided by B&R was as 23 constructor of the STP. A number of serious problems 24 relating to the construction of STP, including 25 significant GA problems, had been identified in I&E 26 Inspection Report No. 79-19 and the related Notice of 27 Violation and Show Cause Order in early 1980. But, by 28
1 the time I testified, those problems had been 2 vigorously and effectively addressed to the satis- -
3 faction of both HL&P and, we believed, the NRC Staff.
4 Thus, I expected that B&R could satisfactorily perform 5 the remaining construction at STP.
6 7 My opinion concerning B&R's ability to perform 8 construction management and engineering services was 9 not as positive. My concerns stemmed from the fact 10 that, since the inception of the Project, significant 11 delays and changes in scope of the Project had 12 occurred, only some of which could be attributed 13 either to regulatory changes or to the construction 14 problems associated with 79-19 and the Show Cause 15 Order. We were concerned that engineering was not 16 sufficient to support the construction schedule, 17 although the magnitude of the impact on schedule was 18 unknown. As I previously testified (Tr. 1376), B&R 19 was preparing a reforecast of cost and schedule which l 20 was to be issued in August or September of 1981.
21 22 When the independent third-party assessment was 23 performed by Quadrex in 1981 it confirmed our con-24 cerns, and indicated that the lack of progress in 25 engineering would have more of an impact than we had
! 26 expected.
27 28
1 At the time of my testimony, we were taking steps to 2 enhance B&R's capability to perform engineering in a -
3 manner that would support the construction schedule.
4 Representatives of the owners of STP met with B&R in 5 Corpus Christi on April 10, 1981, to discuss Project 6 problems and corrective measures that might be taken 7 to remedy them. Some discussion centered on the 8 availability of human resources and lack of sufficient 9 experienced B&R nuclear personnel, principally in the 10 area of engineeri g and basic project management. We 11 considered various incentives to enhance B&R's ability 12 to attract qualified personnel, as well as subcon-13 tracting portions of the engineering effort. We also 14 considered the possibility of reorganization of the 15 B&R project team, with new senior nuclear experienced 16 executive management at B&R to supervise the STP 17 effort.
18 l
l 19 I met personally with B&R officials to discuss a 20 reorganization plan in attempting to reach a mutually 21 satisfactory solution. When B&R resisted the sugges-22 tion that it acquire a senior nuclear executive who 23 would report directly to B&R's president, Mr. Goldberg l
24 believed this was a serious setback. However, as of 25 May 14, 1981, my discussions with B&R on reorgani-26 27
-28
1 zation were continuing, and I was not yet convinced 2 that some combination of sufficient corrective actions' 3 was not achievable.
4 5 Thus, when I previously testified before this Board, 6 we were concerned about B&R's engineering performance 7 and we were in the midst of taking actions to enhance 8 such performance.
9 10 0 10 When you testified were you actively considering 11 removing B&R7 12 A.10 No. In June of 1980, Mr. Oprea and I questioned l
13 whether an experienced A-E alternative to B&R would be 14 available if that became necessary. In discussions 15 that I had with management of Bechtel and Ebasco,
! 16 however, they indicated that they were not interested l
17 and that it would not be in the best interest of the l'
18 Project to change contractors. I was also well aware 19 that such an action would have been unprecedented --
l 20 never in the history of the United States nuclear 21 power program had an architect-engineer been dismissed 22 after issuance of a construction permit -- and could 23 have entailed an extended cessation of Project 24 activities. Accordingly, I did not pursue the subject 25 any further-at that time.
26 27 28
1 Shortly after Mr. Goldberg joined HL&P - probably in 2 January, 1981 - he suggested that it would be prudent -
3 to establish whether it would be feasible to replace 4 B&R with another engineering organization, if that 5 became necessary. This would keep open HL&P's options 6 if it were determined that B&R could not complete the 7 engineering work in a timely and efficient manner. He 8 thought such a contingency should be explored while we 9 sought to improve B&R's performance. We discussed the 10 matter again after the meeting in Corpus Christi on.
11 April 10, 1981.
12 13 My own view was that our efforts should be devoted 14 primarily to steps aimed at improving B&R's perfor-15 mance, such as enhancing B&R's ability to attract 16 experienced nuclear personnel, subcontracting as 17 appropriate, and restructuring of B&R's engineering 18 organization. In the latter connection, when B&R 19 resisted the suggestion that it acquire a senior 20 nuclear executive who would report directly to B&R's 21 president, Mr. Goldberg increasingly urged us to 22 determine whether there were available alternatives to 23 retaining B&R. However, I was not prepared to do so 24 until we were in a position to evaluate the potential 25 effectiveness of the steps being taken by B&R.
26 27 28
1 In short, when I testified before this Board, replace-2 ~ ment of B&R was a course of last resort, not to be -
[
3 explored'until the results of the steps being taken to
, 4 improve B&R's engineering performance could be 5 assessed. Replacement of B&R was not under active 6 consideration, and there was some question whether it l
7 would be feasible to retain a more experienced 8 architect-engineer.
9 10 0.11 When did you begin consideration of replacement of 11 B&R?
12 A.ll As Mr. Goldberg has described in his previous testi-13 mony (Tr. 10,468-69), it was not until the meeting of 14 the owners of STP with B&R at San Antonio on June 26, i
15 1981, that we became convinced that the prospects for 16 sufficient improvement by B&R were poor. It was then 17 apparent that B&R, having spent substantial sums and 18 effort to develop a new construction schedule, would i
19 be unable to support that schedule because of 20 engineering problems that were continuing to plague 21 the Project's ability to move forward in a reasonable 22 and effective way. Immediately thereafter, on June 23 29, 1981 I met with Messrs. Oprea, Goldberg and 24 Barker, and it was agreed that the situation was j 25 sufficiently ominous that we had to find out if there
{ -26 1
27 i 28 t.
i i
I were feasible alternatives to B&R available in the .
2 industry. It was from that point on that discussions .
3 were held concerning replacing B&R.
4 l 5 0.12 Have you reviewed your May 14, 1981, testimony in this 6 proceeding in preparation for this hearing?
7 A.12 Yes. I have reviewed the portions of my testimony 8 that mentioned B&R engineering services.
9 10 0 13 Do you now believe that you should have mentioned 11 either the Quadrex Report or your concerns regarding 12 B&R's engineering services in response to the 13 questions at the portions of your testimony cited in 14 the Board's Memorandum and Order of February 26, 1985?
15 A.13 No, I do not believe so. After a lapse of more than i
16 four years, it is, of course, difficult for me to l
17 recall exactly how I understood a question in the I 18 middle of cross-examination and why I did or did not 19 refer to matters beyond those contained in my replies.
20 However, it is my personal view that I could not 21 reasonably have thought that the Quadrex Report or my l 22 views concerning the adequacy of B&R's engineering 13 services would be relevant to my response to the l 24 particular questions that were asked.
4 25 26 27 l
28 l
L
1 I should emphasize that when I appeared on May 14, 2 1981, I was focusing almost entirely on the impact of -
i
- 3. 79-19 and the Show Cause Order on HL&P and the steps 4 being taken to prevent a recurrence of those events.
5 Those NRC actions stemmed from construction and
- 6 construction QA problems and I understood that this 7 NRC proceeding dealt basically with those problems and 8 their solution. Moreover, even had I thought that f
9 this proceeding dealt with engineering aspects of the 10 STP, I understood that the NRC was interested in 11 safety-related matters and not whether B&R was capable 12 of completing the job in a timely and cost-effective 13 way. It was not my perception that the Quadrex Report 14 or the factors weighing on our minds about the 15 adequacy of the B&R engineering effort were QA/QC
[
i l 16 matters. I had certainly received no such suggestion 17 from Mr. Goldberg.
18 19 For both of those reasons, neither the Quadrex Report 20 nor our concerns about B&R's ability to complete L 21 engineering came to mind when I was testifying.
l 22 1
0.14 Specifically, please explain why you did not mention 23 24 those subjects at Tr. 1269-70.
25 A.14 The questions and answers at Tr. 1269-70 were plainly 26 ' focused on improvements made in response to 79-19 and 27 the Show Cause Order, i.e., improvements in the 28 l
l
I construction program (e.g., see question at Tr. 1268, 2 lines 2-7) and in the quality assurance program. I do .
3 not see that those questions related to the effective- i 4 ness of B&R engineering services or the cost and 5 schedule of the Project, and thus they would not have 6 called to mind either the Quadrex Report or my 7 concerns as to B&R's engineering services.
8 9 0 15 Please explain why you did not mention those subjects 10 at Tr. 1294.
11 A.15 My testimony at Tr. 1294 was in direct response to 12 questions concerning actions taken as a result of the 13 Show Cause Order (see, e.2., question at Tr. 1293, 14 lines 14-18). At that point I was reflecting my view 15 concerning improvements in OA/0C performance made as a 16 result of problems identified by the NRC and the 17 responsibility for those problems. On the basis of 18 the corrective measures taken, I felt that from the 19 standpoint of OA the Project was in " good order."
20 That discussion did not trigger in my mind mentioning 21 the Quadrex Report or concerns with the effectiveness 22 of B&R engineering services.
23 24 0 16 Please explain why you did not mention those subjects 25 at Tr. 1337.
26 27 28
I l l
1 A.16 My remarks at Tr. 1337 were in response to questions i
2 concerning whether, prior to the Show Cause Order, I ,
3 came to any conclusion as to the need for extra l t
4 quality assurance measures by HL&P in light of B&R's !
l 5 limited experience in constructing nuclear power i
- 6. plants (see questions at Tr. 1336, line 19 to Tr.
These 7 1337, line 1 and Tr. 1337, lines 10-12).
8 questions dealt with a time frame well before the 9 Quadrex Report and my testimony. Moreover, in the 10 context of my testimony, I believed that the questions 11 pertained to B&R's limited experience in nuclear 12 construction, not nuclear engineering, and my answers i
13 dealt with whether additional HL&P OA measures were 14 needed. For_ reasons I have previously described, I 15 did not relate the Quadrex Report nor our concerns 16 with the effectiveness of B&R engineering to any need 17 for additional HL&P OA measures.
18 19 0.17 Finally, please explain why you did not mention those 20 subjects-at Tr. 1402-05.
21 A.17 At Tr. 1402-05, I discussed improvements in OA-QC 22 operations and the possible need for additional 23 modifications. It is apparent that I had in mind the 24 -
QA improvements resulting from the Show Cause Order 25 and additional changes relating to activities at the 26 site (see, e.g., Tr. 1404, lines 1-2). Those 27 . questions did not bring to my mind the Quadrex Report 28
I i
1 or concerns regarding B&R engineering. Moreover, one 2 question's reference to " major problem areas" that I -
3 had previously mentioned (see Tr. 1402, lines 11-13),
4 apparently referred to an earlier discussion of QA-QC 5 problems at Tr. 1276-77.
6 7 0 18 In your review of other portions of your testimony, 8 did you find any answers that you now believe would 9 have called for you to mention the Quadrex Report or 10 your views at that time concerning B&R's engineering 11 services?
12 A.18 No. In no instance do I believe that it would have 13 been reasonable to expect me to mention the Quadrex 14 Report or my views concerning B&R's engineering 15 services. I believe that all of my testimony was 16 truthful and candid and that I responded properly to 17 the questions I was asked.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 L
1
^ ,o 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD J 3
4 , In the Matter of )
4 )
5 ; HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER ) Docket Nos. STN 50-498 OL COMPANY, ET
-~
(South Texas Project, Units 1 )
7 . and 2) )
ii 8
9 TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF HOCJTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,
10 OF GEORGE W. OPREA, JR.
11 ,i
!i 12 h Q.1 Please state your name.
13 :l A.1 I am George W. Oprea, Jr. .
N 14 15 02 Please state your present occupation.
1;
- 16 A.2 I retired from my position as Executive Vice l 17 ' President-Nuclear of Houston Lighting & Power Company H
(HL&P) on February 1, 1985. I presently serve as a 18 !l I ,
! 19 consultant to HL&P.
20 21 0.3 Have you previously testified in this proceeding?
22 A.3 Yes, I testified in May and June of 1981.
h i
23 ,
l 24 i
,, 0.4 What is the purpose of your testimony?
! H I 25 A.4 My testimony will explain why HL&P did not furnish to 26 the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Licensing Board l
27 or Board) ti.e report prepared by Quadrex Corporation
[
28 g.
1 (Quadrex) entitled " Design Review of Brown & Root i'
2 Engineering Work for the South Texas Project" (the ,
3 Quadrex Report) and why HL&P did not advise the Board 4 of the potential replacement of Brown & Root, Inc.
5 (B&R) before the decision was announced publicly.
6 7 In addition, in response to the Board's request at 8 page 19 of its Memorandum and Order of February 26, 9 1985, my testimony will describe my knowledge of the 10 Quadrex Report when I testified, as well as my views 11 on the adequacy of B&R's services at that time. It 12 will also show that I was truthful and candid in my 13 testimony before the Board and that there was no 14 occasion for me to mention either the Quadrex Report 15 or the review of B&R's design engineering services.
16 17 -05 What was your involvement in the decision to initiate A
18 the Quadrex review of B&R engineering on STP?
19 A.5 After Mr. Jerome H. Goldberg joined HL&P as Vice 20 President-Nuclear Engineering and Construction in the 21 fall of 1980, he recommended that there be an 22 independent third party assessment of the engineering 23 services of B&R. I agreed that such a review be 24- undertaken, because I thought it important to assure
! 25 that engineering was coordinated and properly 26 sequenced to support the construction schedule in an 27 orderly fashion. I 6ad considered such a review in 28 l
v
f
/ t 1
mid-1980, but initiation of the activity was delayed 2 because of the pressure of other, more immediate j ,
.i 3 activities associated with responding to I&E >
t 4
InspectionReportNo.79-19andtheShowCause,brder.
5 6 06 Were you briefed on the progress of the Quadrex 7 review?
8 A.6 Several times during March and April I obtained 9 information as to the progress of the review, either l
l l 10 in conversations with Mr. Goldberg or at meetingEJof; 11 the STP Management Committee. It was apparent that t
12 Quadrex was finding weaknesses in the B&R engineering 13 Program which, in some cases, tended to confirm an t 14 underlying concern we had regarding its ability to 15 Perform the work necessary to support the construction I 16 schedule. Mr. Goldberg also indicated the 17 Possibilities of some deficiencies that would be ;
18 reportable to the NRC under 10 CPR S 50.55(e). I did i
19 not attend any meetings with Quadrex or briefings by 20 Quadrex.
21 ,
22 0.7 Were you braefeu on the Quadrex findings after ,e 23 completion of the review?
24 A.7 Yes. I was aware that the Quadrex Report would he 25 received on May 7. At about that time Mr. Goldberg
~
26 informed me that B&R would do an immediate review to .
27 determine the reportability of any Quadrex findings to 28
+
I the NRC, and th,at an HL&P review team (Mr. Goldberg, 2 Mr. Cloin G. Robertson, and Dr. James E. Sumpter) .
' 3 would do an additional review and would decide if any 4 ' items were reportable.
5 ,
,1 _,
7 3 6'^ In the ate afternoon of May 8, Mr. Goldberg told me 1
7 that B&R had recommended reporting one Quadrex item to n
8 the NRC and that the HL&P review team had decided to 9 report two additional items. He also informed me
.10 ,
generally as to the results of the Quadrex review. A 1 {.j coaple of days later, on May 11, Mr. Goldberg briefed
'. 1:
'.12 both Mr. Jordan and myself.
13 14 08 When you testified what was your understanding of the
/
15 jsubstance and import of the Quadrex Report?
-16 A.8 On the basis of the briefings I had received, it was
.1
, 17 my underst,anding that the Quadrex Report contained a 18 large number of specific findings and general i 19 observations. Mr. Goldberg explained that some of the 4
20 , , findings and observations were unsupported or based on incomplete information, at least in part because the l ;*'
s
_ $1/
22 Quadrex review had been performed in a short time
.I >
) 23 period. I recognized the potentially serious 24 I- implications of some of the deficiencies which had 25 been reported to the NRC, particularly the one dealing n' r '
! 26 with computer code verification. Apart from the items i
27 that had been reported to the NRC, I understood that a
28 s
l
i l
1 Quadrex had reported a number of areas in which 2 engineering was even further behind than we expected, ,
.3 and that the schedular impact on Project completion 1
4 could be significant. These types of concerns 5 underscored the importance of actions which we were .
i 6 then taking to improve the B&R engineering 7 organization with additional experienced personnel, as 8 well as other related measures such as subcontracting 9 specific portions of the engineering work.
10 11 I was also aware that Mr. Goldberg had tasked B&R with 12 developing an action plan to disposition the Quadrex 13- findings. Thus I was confident that any substantive 14 engineering questions raised by the Quadrex Report 15 would be properly taken into account in completing the 16 design of STP.
17 18 09 Do you know how the NRC Staff was informed of the 1
19 Quadrex Report?
20 A.9 I was aware that Mr. Goldberg had informed Mr. Donald 21 Sells, the NRC Project Manager for STP, of the conduct 22 of the review by Quadrex and that he briefed him on 23 the Quadrex Report in Bay City during the week of May 24 11, 1981. It was logical to contact Mr. Sells because 25 the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) is 26 involved in the design and technical areas for NRC.
27 28
i 9
I Both Mr. Goldberg and I believed that Mr. Sells was 2 the appropriate contact with the NRC concerning the - ,
3 Quadrex review, and there was no apparent reason to 4 discuss the subject with Region IV in addition to NRR, 5 except to the extent that our review of the Report 6 disclosed the existence of reportable deficiencies.
7 8
0 10 Were you involved in August 1981 when personnel from 9 Region IV asked to see the Quadrex Report?
10 A.10 Yes. I received a call from Mr. Richard Frazar. I 11 made clear that the Report should be made available to 12 the Region IV personnel for review. It was our view, 13 however, that the Report would not be filed with the 14 NRC since it could be misunderstood and misinterpreted 15 if it were made publicly available.
16' 17 0.11 Did you subsequently discuss the Report with officials 10 of Region IV?
19 A.11 Yes. When I realized that Region IV might not be 1
20 aware of our contacts with Mr. Sells regarding the 21 Report, or, if they were aware, might be concerned as 22 to why we had not provided them with a similar 23 briefing, I called Mr. Karl Seyfrit, the Director of 24 Region IV, in late August, 1981, and offered to discuss the Report with him and his staff. Such a 26 meeting was held on September 8, 1981, and Mr.
27 28
_7_
1 Goldberg and I briefed Region IV on the contents of 2 the Report and the actions being taken by HL&P and ,
3 B&R.
4 5 At that time, I believe that Mr. Seyfrit asked whether 6 HL&P planned to file any additional reports under 7 S 50.55(e) or whether HL&P considered the entire 8 Quadrex Report to be reportable under S 50.55(e).
9 Although I do not recall whether we responded at the 10 meeting or in subsequent telephone conversations, our
. 11 position was that only three distinct matters were 12 reportable under S 50.55(e) and we did not see any
.13 basis for reportability of the entire Report. Since 14 HL&P and B&R were implementing a corrective action 15 . plan for the Quadrex findings we would, of course, 16 file additional S 50.55(e) reports if any additional 17 reportable matters were found.
18 19 In the course of the meeting, Mr. Goldberg had 20 mentioned 10 priority matters being addressed by B&R 21 under the corrective action plan. Region IV stressed 22 that all of the Quadrex findings would have to be 23 dispositioned, and we agreed to do so.
24 25 0.12 At the time of your testimony, what was your opinion 26 concerning B&R's services as constructor at STP?
27 28
t l
1
-A.12 As my testimony in 1981 indicated, I believed that 2
both HL&P and B&R had taken effective actions to -
1 3
correct the problems concerning the performance of 4
construction of the STP, including the OA problems 5
that had been identified in I&E Inspection Report No.
0 79-19 and the related Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order. Accordingly, I had no doubts regarding 0
B&R's ability to perform construction services at STP.
9 10 0 13 At that time, what was your opinion concerning B&R's 11 engineering and construction management services?
2 A.13 The situation was not as clear with respect to B&R's 13 performance of those services at STP.
14 15 A baseline estimate for cost and schedule had been 16 prepared in 1979, and a reforecast was being developed 17 by B&R to'be issued by August or September 1981. (See 18 my testimony at Tr. 3469-70.) The Project was 19 significantly behind the previous schedule. Only part 20 of B&R's difficulties in construction management could 21 be attributed either to changes in NRC regulatory 22 requirements after the Three Mile Island or to the 23 effects of 79-19 and the show Cause Order. As I have 24 previously indicated, I had considered conducting an 25 assessment of the status of engineering in mid-1980.
26 It was apparent that the B&R engineering organization 27 needed to be strengthened to be able to support the 28
l 1 construction schedule. B&R had brought in Mr.
2 Saltarelli from NUS to strengthen the engineering ,
3 -organization but improvements in this area were not 4 given the same priority as resolving the construction 5 problems.
6 7 As Mr. Jordan mentions in his testimony, we thought it 8 would be useful in 1980 to ascertain whether an 9 experienced alternative to B&R would be available.
10 However, his contacts with Bechtel and Ebasco 11 indicated a lack of interest and strong suggestions 12 that the better course for the Project would be to 13 improve B&R's performance.
14 15 After Mr. Goldberg joined HL&P in the fall of 1980, 16 the efforts to improve B&R engineering continued with 17 additional vigor. At a meeting of the STP owners with 18 B&R in Corpus Christi on April 10, 1981 we discussed 19 the types of actions that could be taken to enhance 20 B&R's ability to attract experienced nuclear 21 personnel, the possibility of subcontracting various 22 specific engineering tasks and restructuring of the 23 B&R engineering organization.
24 25 These potential improvements were actively pursued in 26 the succeeding couple of months. Mr. Goldberg was in 27 continuous contact with B&R and received weekly 28
_ 10 - :
1 progress reports. Mr. Goldberg and I prepared a 2 proposed new B&R organizational chart for Mr. Jordan .
3 to discuss with Mr. Feehan, President and Chairman of 4 the Board of B&R. These organizational changes -- as 5 well as enhanced recruiting and subcontracting -- were 6 still being actively pursued with some degree of 7 success when I testified in 1981. We were attempting 8 to attract about thirty engineers and discussions were 9 moving along looking toward subcontracting parts of 10 the work to such organizations as Westinghouse, Gibbs 11 & Hill, and others.
12 13 In sum, at that time I had serious concerns with 14 respect to B&R's ability to successfully complete the 15 engineering effort, but I had not yet reached a 16 judgment on the likely effectiveness of steps being 17 taken by B&R at our urging, to turn things around.
18 19 0 14 When and how was the decision to replace B&R made and 20 implemented?
21 A.14 In essence when the owners of STP met with B&R on June 22 26, 1981, it became apparent that all the steps taken 23 and contemplated by B&R still would not likely enable 24 B&R to perform engineering services in a fashion that 25 would support the construction schedule. It would 26 take an extensive period before engineering could 27 achieve the desired productivity, if at all.
28
)
i 1 At a subsequent meeting held on June 29 by Mr. Jordan 2 with Messrs. Goldberg and Barker and myself, we all .
3 expressed doubts as to the ability of B&R to complete 4 the engineering in an orderly, timely and cost 5 effective manner. Thus, it became essential to 6 ascertain whether any alternative was available.
7 8 In early July, 1981, Mr. Goldberg and I contacted four 9 prospective contractors and ascertained that each 10 would be interested in undertaking to complete the 11 Project. Invitations to submit proposals were sent to 12 them in late July, and the proposals were evaluated 13 during August and early September. Bechtel's proposal 14 was accepted as a basis for negotiation and an 15 agreement in principle was reached by September 24, 16 1981.
17 18 0 15 At pages 20-21 of its Memorandum and Order of February 19 26, 1985, the Board discusses the obligation of 20 parties "to keep licensing or appeal boards informed 21 of newly developing information bearing on issues 22 pending before such boards," i.e., the so-called 23 "McGuire doctrine." Were you aware of such obligation 24 in 1981?
25 26 27 28
~~
i
]
1 A.15 I was not aware of the McGuire doctrine by name. I 2 fully understood, however, that HL&P had to report to .
'3 the Board any new information that might affect issues 4 under consideration in this proceeding.
5 6 0 16 In its Memorandum and Order of February 26, 1985, the 7 Board has determined that under the McGuire doctrine, 8 the Quadrex Report should have been turned over to the 9 Board shortly after its receipt by HL&P (pages 21-23).
10 Please explain why you did not furnish the Report to 11 the Board at that time.
12 A.16 I, quite candidly, did not associate the Report with 13 the issues under consideration in this proceeding. I 14 knew that the matters being considered by the Board 15 were issues arising from 79-19 and the Show Cause 16 Order and certain contentions raised by the 17 intervenors. In my mind all of these matters related 18 either to construction or construction OA, neither of 19 which were addressed directly or indirectly by the 20 Quadrex Report.
21 22 The Quadrex Report seemed so remote from the matters 23 at issue in this proceeding that I can recall no 24 discussions about providing the Report to the Board 25 prior to late September 1981, when counsel for the NRC 26 Staff suggested that we do so.
27 28 l
1 As I understand it, the Board's determination is that 2 the Report should have been provided to the Board -
3 because its subject is design OA and "[clonstruction 4 and design OA are not so disparate as to be considered 5 unrelated subjects." (Memorandum and Order of February 6 26, 1985, at page 22).
7 8 I do not intend to take issue with the Board's 9 determination, but I can only explain that my 10 perception of the Quadrex Report was significantly 11 different from the Board's. In my view the Quadrex 12 Report dealt with the effectiveness of B&R's 13 engineering effort and did not (with limited 14 exceptions) deal with compliance with OA requirements.
15 The main import of the Quadrex Report was what it told 16 us concerning the limited progress of the design of 17 the Project -- a productivity concern, not a OA 18 concern.
I 19 20 In sum, I believe that our action in not furnishing 21 the Report to the Board was reasonable under the 22 circumstances. I can assure the Board that the 23 failure to furnish the Report -- or to even consider 24 doing so - did not occur because of any willful or 25 careless disregard of obligations under the McGuire 26 doctrine.
27 28
_ 14 _ !
1 0 17 In view of the reporting obligation under the McGuire 2 doctrine, please explain why HL&P did not inform the -
t J I
3 Board, after June 29, 1981, that it was considering '
4 replacing B&R as architect-engineer and construction t
5 manager.
6 A.17 We did not inform the Board before September 24, 1981, 7 because we did not believe that we had any meaningful 8 information to provide to the Board until we had 9 reached an agreement in principle with an experienced 10 architect-engineer who was willing to replace B&R on 11 acceptable terms and conditions. Until that time the
, 12 replacement of B&R was only a possibility - one which 13 might never occur. Informing the Board that the 14 process of seeking a replacement was taking place 15 would not have conveyed useful information to the I 16 Board and, for obvious reasons, could have had an 17 unnecessary and devastating effect on B&R personnel 18 carrying out Project ectivities.
I 19 20 The Board's question may be whether the concerns that 21 led HL&P to seek a replacement for B&R should have l
l 22 been disclosed to the Board after the June 29, 1981 '.
23 meeting. However, as I have explained, those concerns 24 related to B&R's inability to perform engineering 25 services in a manner which would support the 26 27 t
l 28
1 construction schedule. Such productivity considera-2 tions did not seem to me to be germane to.the matters ,
3 under consideration by the Board.
4 l 5 I should emphasize that there was no new information I 6 that related to B&R's ability to perform the 7 construction services, including construction related ,
QA, that was the focus of this proceeding. In fact, 8
9 as the Board will recall from the initial notification 10 to the Board on September 24, 1981, HL&P expected to 11 retain B&R as constructor and had confidence in B&R's 12 ability to perform such services under Bechtel's 13 direction. All of the previous information provided ,
14 to the Board concerning actions to remedy the problems 15 identified in 79-19 and the Show Cause Order remained 16 fully accurate.
i 17 l 18 Since the decision to ascertain the availability of an 19 acceptable alternative to B&R was not based on any 20 deficiencies in the B&R OA program -- either relating 21 to construction or design -- or on any nuclear safety 22 concerns, we simply did not perceive any obligation to inform the Board earlier. No discussion concerning 23 24 notifying the Board took place until a decision 25 regarding replacement of B&R was imminent in September 26 1981. At that time counsel urged an early decision 27 and prompt notification of the Board.
28
1 Again, the fact that HL&P did not inform the Board 2 earlier was not based upon any willful or careless , ,
3 disregard of our reporting obligations under the 4 McGuire doctrine.
5 6- 0 18 Have you reviewed your testimony in this proceeding in 7 preparation for this hearing?
8 A.18 Yes. To prepare myself to testify today, I have 9 reviewed portions of my testimony that mentioned B&R 10 engineering services.
11 12 0.19 Do you now believe that you should have mentioned 13 either the Quadrex Report or your concerns regarding 14 B&R's engineering services in response to the 15 questions at the portions of your testimony cited in 16 the Board's Memorandum and Order of February 26, 19857 17 A.19 No. I have reviewed those responses in the context of 18 the overall cross-examination then taking place, as 19- well as my prefiled testimony, since I wanted to 20 recollect to the best of my ability how I understood 21 the particular questions that were being asked. Even 22 in retrospect, I do not believe that those questions 23 reasonably called for me to mention either the Quadrex 24 Report or my concerns as to the adequacy of B&R's 25 engineering services.
26 27 28
_ 17 _
1 My review of my prefiled testimony confirmed that 2 (aside from a'few brief references to engineering) it .
3 was clearly aimed at the identification and correction 4 of matters of the type addressed in 79-19 and the Show 5 Cause order, and in particular deficiencies in the 6 construction OA program and their resolution.
7 Therefore, in responding-to questions, I had in mind 8 construction or construction OA overtones. Unless the 9 questions were very direct, they would not have 10 brought to my mind the Quadrex Report or concerns 11 regarding engineering, which, as I have previously 12 explained, did not seem to me to be within the focus 13 of this proceeding.
14 15 0 20 Specifically, please explain why you did not mention 16 those subjpcts at Tr. 3486.
17 A.20 At Tr. 3486, I was responding to the last of a series 18 of questions beginning at Tr. 3482 pertaining to 19 whether B&R's lack of experience as an architect-20 engineer for a nuclear project contributed to 21 construction delays at STP. As is evident from my 22 answer at Tr. 3483, I understood the first question to 23 elicit information germane to the hearing on 24 construction matters, and I referred to the concern 25 previously identified by HL&P that B&R's inexperience 26 as an architect-engineer may have led it to prepare 27 excessively complex construction procedures (one of 28
=~
?
1 the " root causes" of the OA/OC problems identified by 2- HL&P). A question was then asked as to my-personal .
3 responsibility for assuring that such lack of 4 experience "did not show up in construction" (Tr.
5 3483-84), which reinforced in my mind the relationship 6 of the line of questioning to the focus of the hearing 7 on construction matters. My answer referred to 8
difficulties in recruiting qualified personnel in all 9 areas, but that steps were being taken to upgrade 10 B&R's capabilities. (Tr. 3484-85). Finally, I was 11 asked whether I should have set up a system "which 12 reviewed Brown & Root's architect engineering with any 13 greater scrutiny." (Tr. 3485). My answer (at Tr.
14 3486) acknowledged that HL&P might have conducted more 15 engineering reviews. I was reflecting the thought 16 that reviews of that type might possibly have 17 prevented the types of root causes of some of the 18 construction problems I had been discussing all along.
, 19 In view of my understanding of the focus of the 20 hearing and in the context of the cross-examination, 21 .the question did not suggest to me that I refer to the 22 Quadrex Report or the pending review of B&R engineer-23 ing services. I did not consciously decide not to 24 refer to those subjects; they just were not brought to 25 ,
mind by the question.
26 27 28 L _.
1
_ 19 _
1 0 21 Please explain why you did not mention those subjects 2 at Tr. 3527. .
3 A.21 I am not sure that I understand the Board's reference 4 to Tr. 3527. At that point I was answering a question 5 pertaining to whether the problem with OA/Oc was in 6 implementation of the program. Obviously both the 7 question and the answer were in the context of the 8 problems that had been identified in 79-19 and the 9 Show Cause Order. I do not see how either the Quadrex 10 Report or the review of B&R engineering services would 11 have been pertinent.
12 13 0 22 Please explain why you did not mention those subjects 14 at Tr. 5458-74.
15 A.22 Similarly, the excerpt at Tr. 5458-74 seems fairly
.16 well limited to the concerns raised by 79-19 and the 17 Show Cause Order.- Tr. 5458-62 is a philosophical 18 discussion of OA/0C relationships between a utility and its contractors in the context of a question from 19 20 Dr. Lamb, seeking from me a retrospective insight 21 about whether too much responsibility had been left 22 with B&R before the Show Cause Order (the " abdication" aspect of the issues in this proceeding). Tr. 5462-68 23 24 deals with the justification for the Show Cause Order and its beneficial impact. Finally, Tr. 5468-74 deals 25 26 with an allegation concerning construction at STP 27 which was the subject of an I&E investigation, and 28
i 1 HL&P's efforts to achieve open communication with site ;
2 personnel. I do not see how any of those questions ,
3 could have brought to mind either the Quadrex Report 4 or the pending review of B&R engineering. ,
5 6 0.23 Please explain why you did not mention those subjects 7 at Tr. 3469-73.
8 A.23 From Tr. 3469 to the top of Tr. 3473, I was answering 9 questions pertaining to studies performed by MAC in 10 1978 and 1979 and some internal discussions of the 11 removal of B&R from the Project prior to 'he Show 12 Cause Order. Obviously, such questions would not have 13 suggested that I refer to the Quadrex Report or to my ,
14 views in 1981 concerning B&R engineering services.
15 16 The only question in that excerpt that could relate to 17 then current circumstances appears at Tr. 3473, where 18 I answer negatively a question concerning whether I 19 had any discussions concerning the " removal of Brown &
20 Root" after the Show Cause Order. Even though such 21 discussions did not take place, the Board may be 22 suggesting that it would have been appropriate for me 23 to mention that the Quadrex Report confirmed that B&R 24 engineering was not sufficiently supporting 25 construction and that steps were being taken to 26 enhance B&R's engineering capability. l l
27 )
l 28 I
. ]
1 However, having reviewed not only Tr. 3469-73 but many 2 Pages of transcript before that (Tr. 3447-69), I note .
3 that the entire line of questioning for those pages 4 arose from lines 16 to 20 of page 6 of my prefiled ,
5 testimony, which dealt with HL&P staffing at the 6 beginning of the Project. Immediately after the 7 single question at Tr. 3473 concerning post-Show Cause 8 Order consideration of removal of B&R, the questioning 9 continued as to lines 20-27 of page 6 of my testimony 10 (dealing with staffing at early stages of the 11 Project). Accordingly, I can only say that when -- in 12 the midst of much historical questioning -- I was 13 asked a single question concerning post-Show Cause 14 Order circumstances, it did not bring to mind other 15 aspects of our then current relationship with B&R. I 16 answered the question put to me, and I answered it 17 truthfully and candidly. I might add that the 18 decision to replace B&R was not a direct outgrowth of i
19 the Quadrex Report. Quadrex confirmed, in part, the 20 conclusion we reached about the ability of B&R's 21 engineering to support the construction schedule but l
l 22 it was not, in itself, an influential factor in the
. 23 decision.
24 25 0 24 In the CCANP Motion to Reopen Phase I Record of April 26 15, 1985 (at page 4), CCANP accuses you of giving 27 "what appears to ba misleading testimony to the ASLB 28 l l 1
i 1 in June of 1981 . .. . In support of that accusation, 2- CCANP cites an excerpt from Mr. Goldberg's testimony 3 before the Public Utility Commission of Texas. -(CCANP 4 Exhibit "A" to foregoing Motion to Reopen, at Tr.
5 1378-80). In that excerpt, Mr. Goldberg is questioned 6 concerning your response to the question at Tr. 3473 7 which you discuss in A.23 above. Do you now believe 8 that your response to that question at Tr. 3473 was 9 " misleading"?
10 A.24 No. As I explained above, I believe that my response 11 was truthful and candid.
12 13 It appears that CCANP views my testimony as 14 inconsistent with that given by Mr. Goldberg before 15 the Texas PUC, but I do not see any inconsistency. As 16 Mr. Goldberg testified before the Texas PUC, as he 17 testified before this Licensing Board in June 1982, 18 and as both he and I are testifying in our present 19 testimony concerning events in early 1981, almost from 20 the time Mr. Goldberg joined HL&P he advocated that 21 HL&P ascertain whether there was an available alterna-22 tive to B&R. When B&R resisted the suggestion that it 23 appoint an experienced nuclear executive reporting 24 directly to the president, he advocated that course 25 even more strongly. I did not then -- and still do 26 not -- view that as a discussion "regarding removal of 27 Brown & Root." Mr. Goldberg testified similarly in 28 i
+ . .
6 1 June 1982. (Tr. 10519) In my mind, discussions 2 regarding the removal of B&R did not begin until June .
3 29, 1981. I can appreciate that others might read the 4 words " discussion . . . regarding removal" more 5 broadly than I understood them, but I believe that my 6 understanding of the question was reasonable.
7 Certainly it was a fair understanding on my part in 8 the course of a lengthy cross-examination on matters 9 unrelated to this subject.
10 11 Similarly, Mr. Goldberg's testimony before the Texas 12 PUC mentions that other personnel at the Project might 13 have made remarks such as, "Well, we ought to get rid 14 of those fellows." Remarks of this type were 15 undoubtedly made, both before and after the Show Cause 16 Order. However, in my opinion, these do not rise to 17 the level of a " discussion . . . regarding removal,"
18 and they did not come to mind when I responded to the 19 question at Tr. 3473.
20 21 Finally, in reviewing that particular answer, I asked 22 myself whether I should have mentioned my discussions 23 with Mr. Jordan in June 1980 when he explored with 24 Bechtel and Ebasco the basic feasibility of an 25 alternative to B&R. Those discussions did not come to 26 mind when I answered the question on June 2, 1981.
27 Even if they had, I do not believe that the question 28
i 1 called for any mention of such discussions. At that ,
2 time, our focus was on trying to ascertain whether an 3 alternative was available if we had to pursue it. In 4 my view, those discussions could not be fairly l 5 characterized as "regarding removal of Brown & Root."
t 6
7 In sum, I believe that my response to the question at 8 Tr. 3473 was accurate and, notwithstanding CCANP's 9 allegation, did not mislead the Board in any way.
10 11 0 25 In your review of other portions of your testimony, 12 did you find any answers that you now believe were 13 incorrect or misleading or that would have called for 14 you to mention the Quadrex Report or your views at 15 that time concerning B&R's engineering services?
16 A.25 No. I believe that my testimony was truthful and 17 candid, that I responded properly to the questions 18 that I was asked, and that I could not reasonably have 19 been expected to mention the Quadrex Report or my 20 views concerning B&R's engineering services in the 21 context of that testimony and the questions addressed 22 to me at the hearing.
23 24 0 26 Do you believe that the failure to provide the Quadrex 25 Report to the Board when received, to inform the Board 26 of the seeking of alternatives to B&R prior to 27 September 24, 1981 or to mention the Quadrex Report or 28
1 the pending review of B&R's engineering services in 2 HL&P's testimony in May and June of 1981 reflects .
3 adversely on HL&P's character or competence or its 4 ability to manage the construction and operation of 5 the STP?
6 A.26 No. I believe that the commissioning of the Quadrex 7 review reflects favorably on HL&P's character and 8 competence. For all of the reasons set forth in my 9 testimony, I believe that HL&P acted reasonably with 10 respect to disseminating the Quadrex Report and not 11 disclosing publicly that it was seeking an alternative 12 to B&R. The fact that HL&P did not inform the Board 13 of these subjects was the result of a different view 14 as to the scope of the issues in this proceeding and 15 of the substance and import of the Quadrex Report, and 16 did not involve any willful or careless disregard of 17 HL&P's obligation under the McGuire doctrine.
18 Accordingly, none of HL&P's actions regarding such 19 matters reflects adversely on its character or 20 competence or its ability to manage the construction 21 and operation of the STP.
22 23 24 25 26 27 28
i w_
.r 4
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,
2 .
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD I
3 i
I 4 In the Matter of )
)
5 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER ) Docket Nos. STN 50-498 OL COMPANY, ET AL. ) STN 50-499 OL ,
6 )
(South Texas Project, Units 1 )
7 and 2) )
8 9 TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,
10 OF RICHARD A. FRAZAR ,
11 12 01 Please state your name and occupation.
13 A.1 I am Richard A. Frazar, Manager of the Engineering 14 Assurance Department of Houston Lighting & Power Company 15 (HL&P).
16 17 02 Have you previously testified in this proceeding?
18 A.2 Yes, I testified in May and June 1981 and in February 19 1982.
20 21 03 Please describe your educational and professional 22 qualifications.
23 A.3 My educational and professional qualifications are 24 generally described in my earlier testimony in Phase I of 25 this proceeding.
26 27 28 I
t I
l 1 l
4 1 0.4 Has your position at HL&P changed since you last 2 testified?
3 A.4 No. l l
4 l
What is the purpose of your testimony? i 5 05 6 A.5 In response to the request of the Atomic Safety and 7 Licensing Board (Licensing Board or Board) at page 19 of 8 its Memorandum and Order of February 26, 1985, the 9 purposes of my testimony are (1) to describe my knowledge 10 when I testified in 1981 of the report prepared by 11 Quadrex Corporation (Quadrex) entitled " Design Review of 12 Brown & Root Engineering Work for the South Texas 13 Project" (Quadrex Report), as well as my view on the 14 adequacy of Brown & Root (B&R) services at that time, and 15 (2) to show that I was truthful and candid in my 16 testimony before the Board at that time and that there 17 was no occasion for me to mention either the Quadrex 18 Report or the pendency of a far-reaching review of B&R 19 design engineering services.
20 21 0.6 Did you have any involvement in the initiation or perfor-22 mance of the review of B&R engineering by Quadrex in 23 early 1981 or in HL&P's review of the Quadrex Report for 24 reportability on May 8, 1981?
25 A.6 No. During that period and until June 22, 1981, I was 26 stationed at the STP site performing the functions of 27 Project 0A Manager. I was aware that the Quadrex review 28
6 I was being conducted because it was referred to in 2 occasional discussions with Mr. Goldberg or other HL&P 3 personnel or at meetings of HL&P staff. However, the 4 Quadrex review of B&R engineering was being performed as 5 an independent assessment for HL&P executive management 6 and was not part of any of the required programmatic 7 reviews or QA functions, and there was no need for any 8 involvement by the HL&P OA Department. I did not attend 9 any briefings by Quadrex concerning the Report.
10 11 0.7 Have you reviewed the Quadrex Report?
12 A.7 No. I probably received a copy at the STP site after it 13 was provided to HL&P on May 7, 1981, since my successor 14 as HL&P Project OA Manager found one in the site office.
15 However, I did not review it at that time or later.
16 Until I left the site in June 1981, my attention was 17 principally focused on the corrective actions being taken 18 as a result of the problems identified in I&E Inspection 19 Report No. 79-19 and the related Notice of Violation and 20 Show Cause Order.
21 22 08 Were you involved when personnel of NRC Region IV asked 23 to see the Quadrex Report in August 1981?
24 A.8 Yes. I had left the STP site after June 22, 1981, and 25 was stationed at HL&P's Baybrook offices near Houston. I 26 recall that Mr. Richard Herr and Mr. Shannon Phillips 27 asked to see a copy of the Quadrex Report. Since I did 28
1 not have a copy, I tried to reach Mr. Goldberg, who was 2 not available that day. My recollection is not precise 3 as to whom I reached, but I believe that I spoke to Mr.
4 Oprea who assured me that the Report should be made 5 available to the NRC. A copy of the Report was made j 6 available to them.
7 8 0.9 Was it your understanding that the Quadrex Report was to 9 be withheld from the NRC Staff?
10 A.9 No. I knew that copies of the Quadrex Report were 11 available within HL&P and B&R, and I was aware of no 12 restrictions on making it available to the NRC Staff.
13 ,
14 0.10 When you testified in 1981, what was your understanding 15 of the import of the Quadrex Report?
16 A.10 Since I had not received any briefings on the Report and ,,
17 had not read it, I nad no knowledge of the substance of 18 the Report. From conversations with HL&P staff, I knew 19 that the NRC had been notified of three potentially 20 reportable items under 10 CFR S 50.55(e), and there was 21 no indication that the Report reflected generally on 22 B&R's compliance with OA requirements.
23 24 0.11 At that time, what was your opinion concerning B&R's 25 services at STP?
26 27 28
. t
," 1 A.11 I had worked very closely with B&R in the development and ,
t 2 implementation of the improved OA program that applied to l
F 3 construction activities at the site. I had confidence 4 that B&R would implement that program properly and could 5 complete construction in accordance with applicable 6 requirements. I was less familiar with B&R's engineering 7 activities, but those activities had been audited by HL&P 8 OA and inspected by the NRC for many years and I believed 9 that applicable OA requirements were being generally 10 observed. Thus, I had no significant concerns regarding 11 B&R's performance of the engineering-related portions of 7
12 the OA program either generally or based on the Quadrex 13 Report. l 14 15 0 12 Between issuance of the Show cause order and your 16 testimony in 1981, did you have any discussions with Mr.
17 Oprea or Mr. Goldberg regarding removal of B&R or seeking 18 alternatives to B&R?
19 A.12 No.
20 21 0 13 Have you reviewed your 1981 testimony in this proceeding i 22 in preparation for this hearing?
23 A.13 Yes. To prepare myself to testify today, I have reviewed 24 portions of my testimony that mentioned B&R engineering 25 services.
26 9
27 28 5
4 1 0.14 Do you now believe that you should have mentioned either 2 the Quadrex Report or any concerns regarding B&R's 3 engineering services in response to questions at the ,
4 portions of your testimony cited in the Board's ;
5 Memorandum and Order of February 26, 19857 l 6 A.14 No. I had not read the Quadrex Report. Moreover, from 7 my understanding of the Quadrex Report it had no ,
8 relevance to the construction and construction OA matters 9 that were the focus of my testimony. Apart from the 10 matters already reported, as I montioned previously, I -
11 had no significant concerns regarding the engineering-12 related portions of the B&R OA program, either generally 13 or based on the Quadrex Report.
14 15 0 15 Specifically, please explain why you did not mention 16 those subjects at Tr. 3249-50?
17 A.15 At that point my testimony focused on the organizational 18 structure for the STP OA function and related 19 improvements made in response to 79-19 and the Show Cause 20 Order. This is apparent both from that testimony itself 21 and the line of questioning that it followed. (See, 22 e.g., Tr. 3248). The Quadrex Report and engineering OA >j 23 had no relationship to such matters. Moreover, even if I 24 had thought that the questions encompassed engineering 25 OA, I had no concerns to mention on those subjects.
26 27 28 ,,
i a 1 0 16 Please explain why you did not mention those subjects at 2 Tr. 3527-28.
j 3 h,16 At Tr. 3527-28 I volunteered some information regarding - 1 4 ihplementation of the OA-0C program in the course of 5 questioning addressed to Mr. Oprea which had begun on Tr.
t 6 3525 regarding a provision in the B&R contract entitled 7 f " Implementation of Site Quality Assurance Program."
8 Although, at Tr. 3526, the questioning continued without 9 reference to the contract, in context it is apparent that II/ we were still addressing the site OA program. My own 11 '
answer, of course, focused on problems of implementation 12 identified in 79-19. Even if I had thought the questian 13 was broaded, however, I would not have mentioned the f' 14 Quadrex Report since, to my knowledge, it did not involve s u f .(,
,f 15 significant problems in OA implementation beyond those 16 that had been reported.
'17 18 s, 0 17 Please explain why you did not mention those subjects at 19 .Tr. 5419-22.
20 A.17 I am not sure that I understand the Board's reference to 21 Tr. 5419-22. At that point, I was questioned concerning 22 'my concerns in 1978 regarding B&R's OA performance and 23 how the improvements I perceived in early 1978 related to 3
24 -
the problem,s found in late 1979. There were no 25 /hngineeringOAconcernsat that time which were ignored 26 either in Applicants' Exhibits Nos. 44 and 45 (upon which 27 ,
28 l '
r_.
e 6 I the questioning was based) or in my response to 2 questions. I do not see how the questioning could have 3 called for any mention of the Quadrex Report.
4 5 0.18 In your review of other portions of your testimony, did 6 you find any answers that you now believe would have 7 called for you to mention the Quadrex Report or your 8 views at that time concerning B&R's engineering services?
9 A.18 No. In no instance do I believe that it would have been 10 reasonable to expect me to mention the Quadrex Report, 11 and I had no concerns regarding engineering OA which 12 would have been responsive to any question. I believe 13 that all of my testimony was truthful and candid and that 14 I responded properly to the questions that I was asked.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27~
28
re p 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 3
4 In the Matter of )
5 ) .
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER ) Docket Nos. STN 50-498 OL 6 COMPANY, -ET _AL. ) STN 50-499 OL
)
7 (South Texas Project, Units 1 )
and 2) 8 9 TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, ET AL., ,
10 OF SIDNEY A. BERNSEN AND FRANK LOPEZ, JR.
11 12 0.1 Dr. Bernsen, please state your name.
13 A.1 My name is Sidney A. Bernsen.
14 15 0.2 Mr. Lopez, please state your name.
16 A.2 My name is Frank Lopez, Jr.
17 18 03 Dr. Bernsen, please identify your present employment.
19 A.3 I am employed by Bechtel Power Corporation as the 20 Corporate Manager of Quality Assurance.
21 1
22 23 24 25
~*/ Dr. Bernsen is sponsoring the answers in A.1, A.3, A.5, 26 A.8, A.10, and A.ll. Mr. Lopez is sponsoring the answers in A.2, A.4, A.6, A.9, A.12, and A.13. Both Dr. Bernsen 27 and Mr. Lopez are sponsoring all of the remaining answers.
28
l i
l 1 04 Mr. Lopez, please identify your present employment. l 2 A.4 I am employed by Bechtel Energy Corporation (Bechtel) as 3 an Assistant Project Engineer assigned to the South 4 Texas Project (STP).
5 6 05 Dr. Bernsen, please describe your professional 7 qualifications.
8 A.5 My professional qualifications are described in the 9 Statement of Professional Qualifications of Sidney A.
10 Bernsen, which is attached hereto and incorporated by 11 reference.
12 13 06 Mr. Lopez, please describe your professional 14 qualifications.
15 A.6 My professional qualifications are described in the 16 Statement of Professional Qualifications of Frank Lopez, 17 Jr., which is attached hereto and incorporated by 18 reference.
19 0.7 What is the purpose of your testimony?
20 A.7 The purpose of our testimony is to address Citizens 21 Concerned About Nuclear Power (CCANP) Contention 9, as 22 set forth at page 24 of the Licensing Board's Memorandum 23 and Order of February 26, 1985, which states:
24 The Applicants' failure to notify the NRC (Region IV) of the Quadrex Report, and of 25 many findings beyond those actually reported, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from the time 26 HL&P became aware of the findings or prospective findings of the Report 27 (including drafts), violates 10 C.F.R.
S 50.55(e)(2) and reflects adversely on 28
, > 1 the character and competence of the Applicants and on cheir ability to manage 2 the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant.
3 More specifically, our testimony discusnes whether the 4
findings in the " Design Review of Brown and Root 5
Engineering Work for the South Texas Project" (Quadrex 6
Report) (May 1981), as identified by the Licensing Board 7
in its Memorandum and Order of February 26, 1985, its 8
Sixth Prehearing Conference Order of May 17, 1985, and 9
its Memorandum and Order of May 24, 1985, represent a 10 significant breakdown in any portion of the quality 11 assurance {0A) program within the meaning of 10 CPR 12 S 50.55(e)(1)(i).
13 14 08 Dr. Bernsen, please describe any experience you may have 15 in applying or interpreting 10 CFR S 50.55(e) and in 16 applying or interpreting 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B.
17 A.8 As Menager of Nuclear Standards and Quality Assurance 18 for the Power Industrial Division of Bechtel Corporation 19 during 1969-72 and Manager of Quality Assurance for the 20 Thermal Power Organizaiton of Bechtel Power Corporation, l
21 I coordinated the corporate review of proposed 10 CFR l 22 S 50.55(e) and developed Bechtel Power Corporation's 23 initial procedures for implementing 10 CFR S 50.55(e).
24 Subsequently, I provided guidance to various divisions 25 of Bechtel Power Corporation and their projects on 26 specific reportability questions. Furthermore, as the 27 28
, 25 1 Project Licensing Manager and Assistant Project 2 Manager-Systems for STP during 1982-83, I served as the 3 Bechtel project management representative for 4 determining the reportability of a number of Bechtel-5 identified design deficiencies.
6 I have also served for more than 14 of the last 16 7 years as Chairman or a member of the Nuclear Quality 8 Assurance Standards Committees that produced various 9 ANSI OA standards adopted in the NRC regulatory guides.
10 Furthermore, I was responsible for developing Bechtel 11 Power Corporation division and corporate OA programs 12 which implement NRC requirements. Additional relevant 13 OA experience is described in my statement of 14 professional qualifications.
15 16 09 Mr. Lopez, please describe any experience you may have 17 in applying or interpreting 10 CFR S 50.55(e) and in 18 applying or interpreting 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
19 A.9 For the past eleven years, I have worked in various 20 assignments on nuclear power plant projects. These 21 include three domestic nuclear projects and two foreign 22 projects. All of these projects were committed to the 23 application of these U.S. federal regulations to the I 24 conduct of activities with which I was involved 25 (although the foreign projects had no formal requirement 26 to report deficiencies to the NRC). As a member or i
27 supervisor of the Nuclear Engineering discipline on 28 e
i'
, b ~1 these projects, I was trained in the process of 2 identifying, evaluating and dispositioning reportable 3 deficiencies in accordance with 10 CFR S 50.55(e). In 4 addition, each of these projects worked under the 5 Procedures established in its quality assurance program 6 to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, 7 and I was often called upon to assist in the 8 determination of acceptable compliance with this 9 regulation. In particular, on the South Texas Project, 10 my duties have included supervision of the Quality 11 Engineering discipline which is responsible for the 12 development, monitoring and maintenance of all 13 Engineering Department procedures related to meeting the 14 project's OA commitments. This supervisory 15 responsibility also included acting as the primary 16 reprasentative of the Bechtel Project Engineering 17 Manager (PEM) in interfacing with other departments l 18 relative to quality matters, including the Bechtel and 19 HL&P Ouality Assurance Departments. With respect to 20 reportability determinations under 10 CFR S 50.55(e),
21 the Bechtel PEM designated me to act as his primary 22 representative in reviewing, evaluating and 23 dispositioning all Deficiency Evaluation Reports 24 generated by the Project in order to assure complete and 25_ consistent application of the Project's procedures on 26 27 28
, . b 1 reportability. I held this responsibility from the 2 beginning of the Bechtel involvement on the Project 3 until approximately one year ago.
4 5 0.10 Dr. Bernsen, in addition to the work you have done to 6 prepare this testimony, have you conducted any reviews 7 of the findings in the Quadrex Report?
8 A.10 Yes. In 1982, the Bechtel Power Corporation Task Force 9 conducted an assessment of the findings in the Quadrex 10 Report in order to recommend management and design 11 actions to resolve the findings in a timely manner. The 12 results of this assessment were presented in "An 13 Assessment of the Findings in the Quadrex Corporation 14 Report" (March 1982) (Applicants' Exhibit 63). Among 15 other things, this report identified the discipline 16 findings in the Quadrex Report which the Bechtel Power 17 Corporation Task Force thought may be potentially 18 reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e). I participated in a 19 Bechtel Power Corporation management review of the draft 20 report prepared by the Bechtel Power Corporation Task 21 Force to confirm the accuracy and reasonableness of the 22 conclusions presented in the draft. I also served as a 23 member of the Bechtel STP Project management team with 24 overview responsibility for EN-619, the " Review of the 25 Quadrex Report" (Applicants' Exhibit 64).
26 27 28 I
l
, t _7_
1 0 11 Dr. Bernsen, was the Bechtel Power Corporation Task 2 Force report (Applicants' Exhibit 63) true and correct 3 to the best of your knowledge, information and belief 4 when the report was issued?
5 A.ll Yes. It may be noted that Bechtel has learned of 6 additional information since the issuance of the Bechtel 7 Power Corporation Task Force Report which has led 8 Bechtel to a different conclusion with respect to 9 findings 4.3.2.1(a) and 4.8.2.1(a) than is stated in the 10 Report, as we discuss below.
11 12 0.12 Mr. Lopez, in addition to the work you have done to 13 prepare this testimony, have you conducted any reviews 14 of the findings in the Quadrex Report?
15 A.12 Yes. In 1982, I was employed by Bechtel as the Nuclear 16 Engineering Group Supervisor at STP. My .
17 responsibilities in this position included direction and 18 supervision of preparation of various work packages 19 associated with the transition from Brown & Root (B&R) 20 as architect-engineer / constructor to Bechtel as 21 architect-engineer / construction manager and Ebasco as i
22 constructor. Among those work packages was EN-619, 23 entitled " Review of the Quadrex Report" (Applicants' 24 Exhibit 64).
25 The purpose of EN-619 was to establish a program for 26 the evaluation and disposition of the findings in the 27 Quadrex Report. The primary purpose of EN-619 was not 28
, .* 1 to review the Quadrex findings to determine their 2 reportability. However, Bechtel, in its overall design 3 review, was alert to identify any reportable deficiency 4 arising from the Quadrcx Report (and in fact, EN-619 5 identifies relevant Deficiency Evaluation Reports).
6 EN-619 did not focus upon Quadrex's comments on the 7 practices, policies, and procedures of B&R because they 8 were not applicable or germane to Bechtel's activities.
9 10 In some cases, the practices identified in the 11 Quadrex Report were adopted by Bechtel. However, in 12 other cases, EN-619 shows that Bechtel has not adopted 13 the types of design practices apparently suggested by 14 Ouadrex but instead utilizes reasonable alternatives.
15 Thus, EN-619 helps to indicate that a number of the 16 findings in the Quadrex Report essentially state 17 Quadrex's opinion as to good practice in accomplishing 18 an efficient engineering process but do not identify 19 practices which are required under Appendix B to 10 CFR 20 Part 50.
I 21 22 0 13 Mr. Lopez, was EN-619 (Applicants' Exhibit 64) true and 23 correct to the best of your knowledge, information and 24 belief when it was issued?
25 A.13 Yes. However, it should be noted that, among other 26 things, EN-619 describes substantive activities to be l 27 undertaken by Bechtel to correct, prevent or address the
! 28 l
l h
, = _9_
1 matters identified in the Quadrex Report. In a few 2 cases, as the design has evolved, Bechtel's design 3 activities and technical resolutions addressing matters 4 raised in the Quadrex Report have been different than 5 those projected in EN-619. None of these differences 6 has any significance with respect to the reportability 7 of the findings in the Quadrex Report.
8 9 0.14 Please identify the Quadrex Report findings as to which 10 you will be testifying.
11 A.14 The Quadrex Report findings on which we will be testi-12 fying may be divided into two groups. The first group 13 consists of certain generic findings which the Licensing 14 Board accepted for litigation at pages 12-13 of its 15 Memorandum and Order of February 26, 1985, page 10 of 16 its sixth Prehearing Conference Order of May 17, 1985, 17 and pages 1-2 of its Memorandum and Order of May 24, 18 1985. These findings are numbered 3.l(a) through 19 3.1(j). The second group consists of certain discipline 20 findings identified in the Quadrex Report as "most 21 serious" which the Licensing Board accepted for 22 litigation at pages 13 and 16 of its Memorandum and 23 Order of February 26, 1985, page 12 of the Sixth 24 Prehearing Conference Order of May 17, 1985, and pages 1 25 and 2 of its Memorandum and Order of May 24, 1985.
26 These findings are numbered 4.1.2.l(b), 4.3.2.l(a),
27 28 e
.'
- i i
1 4.3.2.1(d), 4.3.2.1(n), 4.5.2.l(b), 4.6.2.l(n), ;
2 4.7.3.l(a), 4.7.3.1(b), 4.7.3.1(k), and 4.8.2.1(a) 3 through 4.8.2.l(g).
4 5 0.15 In performing your review for reportability under 10 CFR 6 S 50.55(e), what information did you rely upon?
7 A.15 In a number of cases, we were able to determine that the 8 findings, on their face, were not reportable under 10 9 CFR 550.55(e)(1)(i). In some cases, we also took into 10 account the material in the Quadrex Report in 11 determining whether the findings were reportable under 12 10 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i). Finally, in a few cases, we 13 are aware of information, which Quadrex may not have 14 possessed when it performed its review, which would 15 indicate that Quadrex's findings were not reportable 16 under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i).
17 18 0 16 What criteria did you utilize to determine whether the 19 findings identified by the Licensing Board were 20 reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i)?
21 A.16 A matter is reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i) 22- only if it satisfies each of the following three 23 criteria:
24 (1) a deficiency in design or construction must be 25 identified, 26 27 28
. 1 (2) the deficiency must have the potential, if 2 left uncorrected, to affect adversely the 3 safety of plant operations; and 4 (3) the deficiency must represent a significant 5 breakdown in any portion of the quality 6 assurance program conducted in accordance with 7 the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 8 50.
9 In response to the Licensing Board's request to 10 determine whether the findings identified by the Board 11 identify a significant breakdown in any portion of the 12 OA program for STP, we have focused primarily upon the 13 third criterion listed above and have determined that 14 none of the findings (except those actually reported to 15 the NRC) identified by the Board satisfies this 16 criterion. Consequently, we have concluded that no 17 additional findings would be reportable under 10 CFR 18 S 50.55(e)(1)(i). Finally, it may be noted that there i
l 19 may be reasons in addition to those discussed in this l
20 testimony why a particular finding is not reportable f 21 under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i).
22 In determining whether a finding indicates the 23 existence of a significant breakdown in any portion of 24 the OA program for STP which may be reportable under 10 L 25 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i), it is important to keep the l
26 following consideration in mind. Appendix B to 10 CFR 27 Part 50 sets forth general criteria governing quality
- 28
4
. > 1 assurance for design, construction, and operation of 2 structures, systems, and components which perform 3 safety-related functions. Thus, while Appendix B 4 identifies measures which must be established and 5 implemented, it allows a licensee to exercise discretion 6 in deciding which specific practices are most 7 appropriate for its project. Accordingly, as long as a 8 licensee has acceptable controls in place, the fact that 9 a licensee does not utilize a particular procedure, 10 document, or other specific method for controlling 11 design activities does not indicate a significant 12 breakdown in the quality assurance program.
13 It is also noted that the determination of whether a 14 significant breakdown exists in any portion of the 15 quality assurance program that could lead to a report to 16 the Commission under 10 CFR 1 50.55(e)(1)(i) is not a 17 straight-forward process, since there are no firm i 18 criteria available for making this determination. It is 19 particularly difficult to make this determination with 20 respect to deficiencies related to design, because of 21 the iterative nature of the design process, the need to 22 rely on preliminary assumptions or judgment that 23 occasionally may be found nonconservative, the changing 24 standards of performance, and the evolution of 25 analytical techniques and documentation that have 26 occurred over the past decade or more. If conditions 27 are found where an explicit requirement of 10 CFR Part 28
i 1
l l
1 50, Appendix B or an applicant's quality assurance 2 program are clearly and significantly not implemented ,
3 or where required verification or checking processes are 4 repeatedly ignored, the determination can be rather 5 obvious. In other areas, such as questions regarding 6 the adequacy of preliminary assumptions, the level of 7 detail in criteria, the timeliness or degree of 8 sophistication in analysis, or the relative 9 effectiveness of organizational relationships, the 10 determination is much more complex. We would recommend 11 reporting questionable cases involving any deficiencies 12 in the process of design that could adversely affect the 13 safety of operations as measured by sound engineering 14 judgment, whether or not the design had been released 15 for construction. We believe this has been and 16 continues to be the general philosophy applied on the 17 South Texas Project and has formed the basis for our 18 testimony.
19 0.17 Please describe the format you will use in addressing 20 each generic finding.
21 A.17 First, we will identify the primary concerns contal.
22 in the finding. Next, we will discuss whether these l
23 concerns indicate the existence of a significant 24 breakdown in the OA program for STP. Finally, we will 25 address the statements of CCANP with respect to the 26 finding.
27-28
. 3 1 0.18 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.l(a)?
2 A.18 Finding 3.l(a) primarily expresses two concerns of 3 Quadrex. First, Quadrex was concerned that an effective 4 systems integration and overview function and systems 5 engineering function may not exist at the STP. Second, 6 Quadrex was concerned about the absence of 7 multidisciplinary design guidance at STP for separation 8 and the single failure criterion and that each 9 discipline was providing its own interpretation and 10 acceptance criteria.
11 12 0 19 What are a systems integration and overview function and 13 a systems engineering function?
14 A.19 A systems integration and overview function generally 15 refers to the responsibility for assering that factors 16 such as system interactions, the impi. cts which one 17 system may have upon another system, and the 18 compatibility of one system with an interfacing system 19 are accounted for. For example, one systems integration 20 function which nuclear projects address by one method or 21 another is an analysis of the potential interactions 22 which might exist between non-safety related systems and 23 safety-related-systems. In such an analysis, one might 24 evaluate the safety impact of the failure of non-25 seismically supported components as a result of i 26 postulated earthquakes. In order to perform this 27 evaluation, the analyst would need to become familiar 28
.- ) I with the design and relative locations of both safety-2 related and non-safety-related systems and components.
u 3 Such an evaluation necessarily goes beyond the level of ,
4 understanding needed to design an individual system or i I
5 component.
6 Another example of a systems integration function 7 which is common in power plant design is the 8 interdisciplinary coordination which is needed to 9 identify, design and verify the relationship between 10 primary process systems and their support systems, such 11 as HVAC, lighting, power supply and other services. In 12 the initial phases of design activity, the required 13 support services are identified and, in normal practice, 14 assumptions are made about interface requirements such as 15 heat loads, service conditions, and power requirements.
16 As design of both the primary and support systems 17 progresses, the need increases to confirm the validity of 18 the assumptions made in the preliminary stages of design.
19 That need is fulfilled by some method of 20 interdisciplinary coordination, often referred to as a 21 systems integration or systems engineering function.
22 Common between these two examples are the multi-23 disciplinary aspects of the design activity, and the 24 iterative nature of the approach which involves some set 25 of preliminary interfacing assumptions coupled with 26 activities in the latter stages of design or construction 27 to confirm the validity of the assumptions.
28
N 1 A systems engineering function generally refers to 2 the responsibility for determining multidisciplinary 3 design requirements applicable to a particular system, 4 For example, individuals performing a systems 5 engineering function w ald have responsibility for 6 ensuring specific t".on of the functional requirements 7 applicable to a system, such as the operating 8 temperatures, head requirements, and instrumentation 9 requirements for a fluid system.
10 11 0.20 Did B&R have a systems integration and overview 12 function?
13 A.20 Yes. Among other things, we understand that B&R 14 established a Systems Design Assuranco Group at STP in 15 February of 1980 to provide a systems integration and 16 overview function. As indicated by Quadrex to the 17 Bechtel Power Corporation Task Force, the Quadrex Report 18 did not include a review of the activities of this 19 group. The activities performed by the group may not 20 have been evident to Quadrex because we understand that 21 most of the reviews performed by the group had not yet 22 been factored into revisions of the design documents 23 .being reviewed by Quadrex.
24 0 21 Does the fact that B&R did not establish the Systems 25 Design Assurance Group until 1980 indicate a significant 26 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
27 28
a
.
- 1 A.21 No. Such a group is not a necessary element of a design 2 control process. Other measures to assure adequate 3 systems integration are often used. The need for a 4 systems integration and overview function becomes more 5 important as the design of a plant progresses. During 6 the early stages of design, systems interactions are not 7 well-defined due to the preliminary nature of the 8 design. Consequently, at this stage of design, systems 9 integration does not play a significant role, and the 10 measures that we understand were employed by B&R (e.g.,
11 use of System Design Description (SDDs), Technical 12 Reference Documents (TRDs), and multidisciplinary review 13 and comment) provide appropriate methods of integration 14 controls. As the design evolves and systems 15 interactions can be determined with greater precision, 16 the need for controls for systems integration becomes
! 17 more acute since this function plays a greater role in l
! 18 design. B&R recognized this, and its approach to 19 handling this need was the establishment of the Systems 20 Design Assurance Group in 1980. The fact that this 21 group was not established before that time does not 22 indicate a significant breakdown in any portion of the 23 OA program for STP, but simply reflects the iterative 24 nature of the design process.
25 26 27 28 l l
l l
. .' 1 0 22 Did B&R have a systems engineering function?
2 A.22 Yes. We understand that B&R did have a systems
-3 engineering function at STP. This consisted of such 4 measures as designating engineers within various 5 disciplines to coordinate the development of system 6 descriptions, including System Design Descriptions 7 (SDDs), Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P& ids), and 8 other documents which specified multidisciplinary i
9 requirements applicable to a system. These documents 10 provide evidence of the existence of that function.
11 Furthermore, B&R enhanced the systems engineering 12 function through multidisciplinary review of and comment 13 on design documents. These measures are typical of 14 those used by the industry at that time.
15 In recent years, some architect-engineering 16 companies have begun to establish systems engineering 17 groups to significantly augment the systems engineering 18 function. The Systems Design Assurance Group 19 established by B&R in 1980 was in accord with this 20 movement. However, Quadrex did not review the 21 activities of this group.
22 23 0 23 Does the Quadrex Report identify significant 24 deficiencies in design related to B&R's systems 25 integration and overview function and systems 26 engineering function?
27-28
T .
, > 1 A.23 Yes, but the deficiencies were limited those reported to 2 the NRC. We have reviewed the information in the 3 Quadrex Report to determine whether Quadrex identified 4 any other deficiencies in design related to systems 5 integration and systems engineering. Quadrex did not 6 identify any significant deficiencies in design with the 7 exception of those which were reported to the NRC.
8 Consequently, we conclude that the Quadrex Report does 9 not identify a significant breakdown in B&R's systems 10 integration and systems engineering beyond the 11 deficiencies which were reported.
12 13 0 24 In general, did B&R have multidisciplinary design 14 guidance for STP?
15 A.24 Yes. We understand that, in general, B&R did have a 16 program to provide multidisciplinary design guidance.
17 In addition to its System Design Descriptions (SDDs),
- 18. which pertained to individual systems, BeR also utilized 19 Technical Reference Documents (TRDs), most of which 20 applied across systems and disciplines. Additionally, 21 B&R procedure STP-SD-005-B required the Systems Design 22 Assurance Group to perform reviews encompassing several 23 systems and disciplines in order to assure the compati-24 bility of the design work performed by the various 25 disciplines.
26 27 28
i 1 0 25 Please explain whether Quadrex's concern about the 2' absence of multidisciplinary design guidance for 3 separation and single failure criterion indicates a l
4 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program I 5 for STP.
6 A.25 Criterion III of Appendix B requires that measures "be 7 established to assure that applicable regulatory 8 requirements and the design basis... are correctly 9 translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, 10 and instructions." There are many acceptable methods of 11 satisfying this requirement, including the use of 12 multidisciplinary design guidance or the use of guidance 13 applicable to a specific discipline. However, Appendix 14 B does not require the use of multidisciplinary design 15 guidance, nor does it require that each discipline 16 utilize the same design criteria for its work as are 17 being used by other disciplines on their work. As long 18 as the criteria being utilized by each discipline are 19 appropriately conservative for the work it is doing, and 20 as long as the final designs of the systems are 21 compatible, as confirmed during verification activities, 22 the lack of multidisciplinary design guidance would not 23 be indicative of a significant breakdown in any portion 24 of the OA program.
25 We have reviewed the information in the Quadrex 26 Report to determine whether Quadrex identified any 27 deficiencies in design related to separation or the 28 i
1 single failure criterion. Quadrex did not identify any 2 concerns in this regard with the exception of 3 questioning the design of the common instrument air line 4 in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) HVAC system.
5 Similarly, the Bechtel review of the B&R design during 6 the transition period did not identify any significant 7 Problems related to separation or the single failure 8 criterion. Consequently, we conclude that there was no 9 significant breakdown concerning the design guidance 10 Provided by B&R related to separation or the single 11 failure criterion.
12 13 0 26 " Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power Motion To File 14 Additional Contentions Based On New Information And To 15 Establish A Discovery And Hearing Schedule With Respect 16 To New Contentions" (November 21, 1981) (CCANP's 17 Motion), pp. 16 and 41, quotes three sentences from 18 finding 3.l(a) as identifying a violation of Criterion 19 III of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50. These sentences 20 are as follows:
21 "There is no indication that an effective systems integration and overview function 22 exists within the B&R design process."
23 "HL&P has indicated that their organizational structure is closely 24 aligned with that of B&R, and that no systems engineering function exists 25 within the utility either."
26 "A working interface relationship among the disciplines is not routine 27 Particularly regarding follow-through at the discipline input-output interface."
28
t 1 In particular, CCANP states that these sentences 2 identify a violation of the requirement in Criterion 3 III, which states that "[m]easures shall be established 4 f r the identification and control of design interfaces 5 and for coordination among participating design 6 rganizations." See CCANP's Motion, p. 16. Did B&R 7 have measures for controlling design interfaces?
8 A.26 Yes. For example, B&R had several procedures intended 9
t control the interfaces that exist between various 10 rganizations. These included STP-SD-004, Engineering 11 Procedure for Design Reviews, STP-SD-005, System Design 12 Assurance Reviews, and STP-DC-014, Document Review 13 Comment Procedure. In combination, these procedures 14 established formal requirements for conducting 15 interfacing activities, including a review and comment 16 pr cess for design and vendor documents and a process 17 for conducting design review meetings. A separate 18 process for performing design assurance reviews designed 19 to assure that system design requirements and interfaces 20 were properly identified and implemented was a part of 21 this interface control. Each of these processes 22 included requirements for documentation of the 23 activities undertaken.
24 25 0.27 Please explain whether the first two sentences quoted by 26 CCANP indicate a significant breakdown in the interface 27 controls for STP?
28
.. 1 A.27 Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 requires 2 that design interfaces be controlled. However, with the 3 exception of requiring " procedures among participating 4 design organizations for the review, approval, telease, 5 distribution, and revision of documents involving design 6 interfaces," Criterion III does not specify how design 7 interfaces shall be controlled. Thus, the means by 8 which design interfaces are controlled is left to the 9 discretion of the licensee and its contractors.
10 Design interfaces may be controlled by various 11 methods, such as assigning discrete responsibilities to 12 various individuals and organizations, establishing 13 lines of communication which identify responsibilities 14 for decision-making and resolution of problems, and 15 establishing procedures to control the flow and review 16 of design information. Thus, a systems integration 17 function and a systems engineering function in the form 18 of discrete functional groups are not necessary means of 19 controlling design interfaces.
20 As we have discussed above, B&R did have appropriate 21 procedures to control design interfaces. Furthermore, 22 B&R did have a systems integration function and a 23 systems engineering function, and it had taken action to 24 strengthen these functions by establishing the Systems 25 Design Assurance Group (the activities of which Quadrex 26 did not review). With the exception of the reported 27 deficiencies, Quadrex did not identify any significant 28
I deficiencies in design attributable to B&R's process for 2 design interface control. Consequently, the two 3 sentences quoted by Quadrex do not indicate a 4 s'ignificant breakdown in the control of design 5 interfaces for STP beyond the deficiencies actually 6 reported.
7 8 0.28 What is the basis for the sentence which states that 9 "[a] working interface relationship among the 10 disciplinesisnotroutineparticularlyregardikg 11 follow-through at the discipline input-output 12' interface"?
13 A.28 This sentencc is part of a paragraph which pertains to 14 systems engineering. It appears that Quadrex was 15 seeking greater informal communication among disciplines 16 designing a system so that each discipline knew what the 17 other disciplines were doing. In particular,'Ouadrex 18 observed that a discipline supplying data to another 19 discipline was not checking to see that the data were 20 being properly used.
21 22 0 29 Does this indicate a significant breakdown in the design 23 interface controls for STP?
24 A.29 No. As we discussed previously, B&R had appropriate '
25 procedures to control interfaces and had a systemb<
26 engineering function, including the Systems Design 27 Assurance _ Group which Quadrex did not reviewl There are 28
. _ = _ - _
)
< l 1 benefits in terms of efficiency in routine informal 2 communication among disciplines. However, the OA 3 program contained-appropriate measures (such as design 4 review meetings, document review and comment, reviews 5 .provided by the Systems Design Assurance Group, and 6 design verification) designed to provide assurance that 7 the multidisciplinary aspects of a system were properly 8 accounted for and coordinated. In particular, it is not 4
Ir 9 normal practice for a discipline supplying input data to 10 ensure that the recipient of the data uses it correctly, 11 although the discipline which supplies data may review 12 the other disciplines' design output documents as part 13 of the coordination process.
14 15 0 30 CCANP's Motion, p. 42, quotes the following sentence 16 from finding 3.1(a) as identifying a violation of 17 Criterion VI of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50:
18 "A major concern is with the achievement 1 of internal consistency among various 19 design documents and the maintenance of that consistency over time with personnel
[ 20 turnover."
21 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure 22 "to adequately control the issuance of documents, such 23 as instructions, procedures, and drawings, including 1
24- changes thereto." Id. What was the nature of the 25 concern expressed in this sentence?
26
, r, 27 28 '
~. ,
1 A.30 As is apparent from the context in which it arises, this 2 sentence relates to system integration. Additionally, 3 this sentence appears to relate to Quadrex's concern 4 that there was not a single set of multidisciplinary
+
5 design criteria applicable to all disciplines, and that 6 each discipline was establishing design criteria 7 applicable to the work it was doing.
8
' ~ ' '
9 0.31 Do these concerns indicate the existence of a 10 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program 11 for STP?
12 A.31 No. It appears to have been Quadrex's concern that 13 future design activities might not be as performed as 14 efficiently or as consistently as they might be with a 15 more effective systems integration and overview function. As we discussed previously, Quadrex's concern
$S 16 17 in this area did not indicate a significant breakdown in 18 any portion of the OA program for STP.
19 Similarly, as we explained previously, use of 20 multidisciplinary design guidance is not required by 21 Appendix B. Furthermore, Criterion VI of Appendix B is 22 not relevant to this concern, since Criterion VI only 23 applies to the control of issuance and distribution of 24 documents which prescribe activities affecting quality.
25 Criterion VI does not require the issuance of a 26 27 l
28
d,
.y 1 Particular type of design criteria, nor does it require 2 that each design discipline use the same design 3 criteria.
A 5 0 32 CCANP's Motion p. 40, quotes the following sentences 6 from finding 3.1(a) as identifying a violation of h' 't 7 Criteria II and XVII of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50:
1
}/ d "There is no indication that an effective 7,
~
systems integration and overview function 9- exists within the B&R design j process . .. . A major concern is with
- 10 the achievement of internal consistency among various design documents and the 11 maintenance'of that consistency over time with personnel turnover."
12
^
13 CCANP states that these sentences demonstrate a failure 14 "to ' assure adequate documentation in an identifiable and 15 retrievable manner of the safety-related design and
'16 angineering work" at STP. Id. What relevance, if any, 17- do these sentences have to Criterion XVII?
18- A.32 These sentences do not relate to the maintenance of J
19 quality assurance records, which is the subject of 20 Criterion XVII. In particular, these sentences do not 21 indicate that B&R failed to maintain records for 22 activities affecting quality. Consequently, these 23 sentences do not establish that any violation of 24, Criterion XVII occurred.
25 26 27 28
/
t '~ . _ _ _=
1 0 33 Do these sentences indicate a significant breakdown in 2 any portion of the quality assurance program for STP 3 under Criterion II of Appendix B?
4 A.33 No. B&R had various procedures designed to provide a 5 system integration function, including its newly 6 established System Design Assurance Group. However,
! 7 most of the activities of this group had not yet been 8 factored into the design documents reviewed by Quadrex.
9 As we discussed previously, this fact does not identify 10 a significant breakdown in any portion of the quality 11 assurance program for STP but only indicates that B&R
- 12 had not yet completed this activity.
13 Similarly;. when read in context, the statement 14 regarding consistency among design documents also 15 reflects a concern about the lack of multidisciplinary 16 design guidance. As we discussed previously, none of 17 the criteria of Appendix B (including Criterion II) 18 specifically requires the use of multidisciplinary 19 design guidance, provided that other appropriate 20 measures exist to ensure that applicable requirements
, 21 and design bases are correctly translated into l 22 specifications, procedures, and instructions.
23 24 0 34 Does finding 3.l(a) identify a significant breakdown in i
25 any portion of the OA program for STP?
26 i 27 28
1 A.34 No. As we have discussed previously, finding 3.1(a) 2 does not identify a significant breakdown in any portion 3 of the OA program for STP.
4 5 0 35 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.l(b)?
6 A.35 Finding 3.l(b) primarily expresses four concerns.
7 First, Quadrex was concerned that calculations 8 containing errors were being verified as correct with a 9 higher frequency than should be encountered. Second, 10 Quadrex was concerned that design input was not being 11 consistently reviewed for reasonableness by the 12 recipient and that the use of design output was not 13 being co,nsistently checked by the group providing it.
14 Third, Quadrex was concerned that B&R was not providing 15 adequate guidance to vendors relative to acceptable 16 analysis and testing methods, required data, and report 17 format. Finally, Quadrex was concerned that B&R was not 18 verifying work performed by subcontractors and vendors, 19 was not reviewing and approving the analysis methods 20 used by subcontractors and vendors, and did not have 21 documented criteria governing the evaluation process for 22 vendor reports.
23 24 25 26 27 28
3 l
1 0 36 Please explain whether Quadrex's finding that 2 calculations containing errors were being verified as 3 correct with a higher frequency than should be 4 encountered indicates a significant breakdown in any 5 Portion of the OA program for STP.
6 A.36 In order to determine the extent of this Quadrex 7 concern, we have reviewed the information cited by 8 Quadrex as support for its statement that calculations 9 containing errors were being verified as correct with a 10 higher frequency than should be encountered. The 11 Quadrex Report cites Questions C-16, H-15, N-1, and N-12 17:
13 o Quadrex's assessment in C-16 states that B&R's 14 design verification procedures " appeared to be ,
15 adequate or above industry standards on paper."
16 Nevertheless, Quadrex noted that it was " unable 17 to evaluate the effectiveness of their 18 Procedure" and that there was " evidence" that a 19 "significant number of mistakes" passed through 20 the verification process.
- 21. o Quadrex's assessment in H-15 states that the 22 reactor cavity cooling system pressure drop 23 calculation "does not take into account the 24 effects of restrictions to air flow within the-25 reactor cavity."
26 27 28
1 o Quadrex's assessment in N-1 is critical of B&R 2 for accepting an analysis of a main steam line 3 break (MSLB) which it knew had a large 4 conservative error. With this exception, 5 Quadrex found that the " verification sheets 6 showed proper verification procedures."
7 o Quadrex's assessment in N-17 states that 8 "[t]here appears to be either an error in the 9 calculation of ECP [ essential cooling pond]
10 initial temperature or an inconsistency with 11 Heavy Civil calculations."
12 H-15 identifies only one error; however, this error had 13 been identified prior to the Quadrex review and in fact 14 was in part the subject of an earlier 50.55(e) report 15 (see letter from G.W. Oprea to Karl Seyfrit (November j-16 11, 1980)). N-1 also identifies only one error, but it 17 was previously identified and was accepted because it i
l 18 was conservative. Quadrex was not able to determine in 19 N-17 whether any error existad in a calculation (in 20 fact, N-17 did not involve an error but only the use of 21 different but conservative assumptions by different 22 disciplines). C-16 does state that there was evidence 23 of a "significant number" of mistakes, but Quadrex does 2.4 not identify these mistakes, their number or the number 25 of verified calculations it reviewed, nor does it
, 26 describe the nature or significance of the mistakes it 27 discovered. Furthermore, in C-16, Quadrex states that 28
1 1 it was unable to evaluate the effectiveness of B&R's ;
2 verification procedure. Thus, the information provided 3 by Quadrex in the C-16, H-15, N-1, and N-17 is not 4 sufficient to support an independent determination that 5 a significant breakdown occurred in verification of 6 design at STP.
7 In this regard, it should be noted that, during the 8 course of design and construction of any project as 9 extensive and complex as a nuclear power plant, some 10 calculational errors will inevitably occur. Quality 11 assurance programs are designed to catch, minimize, and 12 control calculational errors in design through such 13 measures as checking, verification, inspections, tests, 14 and audits. However, it is unreasonable to expect a OA 15 program to preclude all calculational errors.
16 Consequently, the fact that a few calculational errors 17 are identified does not necessarily establish that there 18 was a significant breakdown in any portion of the 19 quality assurance program.
20 Furthermore, we have reviewed the Quadrex Report to 21 identify whether other information in the report might 22 indicate a significant breakdown in the process of 23 performing or verifying calculations at STP. With the 24 exception of the deficiencies which were reported to the 25 NRC, no design errors with adverse safety implications 26 were identified by Quadrex.
27 28
l 1 Finally, with respect to calculations in the civil 2 area addressed in Question C-16, the civil / structural 3 aspects of design and construction were the most 4 advanced at the time of the transition from B&R to 5 Bechtel. As a result, Bechtel civil / structural 6 engineering personnel reviewed the existing B&R 7 calculations to determine their technical adequacy to 8 support the design of structures. These personnel 9 generally observed that, although the analytical methods 10 utilized by B&R were not the same as normal Bechtel
-11 practice, the relatively high degree of conservatism 12 used in the B&R analyses produced an end product in the 13 design which was technically acceptable without redesign 14 or reanalysis.
15 16 0 37 Does Quadrex's concern that a recipient does not 17 consistently review the reasonableness of input data 18 provided to it or that the provider of output data does 19 not consistently check the use of that data indicate a 20 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program 21 for STP?
22 A.37 No. The adequacy of data provided across design 23 interfaces is assured through such measures as 24 interdisciplinary document reviews and through design 25 verification. As we discussed previously, B&R did have 26 appropriate procedures for conducting these activities, 27 28
1 and Quadrex did not identify any significant 2 deficiencies related to interfaces controls which were 3 not reported to the NRC.
4 It is not normal industry practice to require a 5 supplier of data to perform a formal review of the use 6 of that data by the recipient, although the discipline 7 which supplies data may review the other disciplines' 8 design output _ documents as part of the coordination 9 process. Although it is good practice to have the 10 recipient of data perform an informal review of the 11 reasonableness of input data, in many cases the 12 recipient does not have either the knowledge or 13 experience necessary to conduce such reviews.
14 Accordingly, such reviews of input data are generally 15 not part of a licensee's OA program.
16-17 0 38 Does the absence of guidance to vendors relative to 18 acceptable analysis and testing methods, required data,
.19 and report format indicate a significant breakdown in 20 any portion of the OA program for STP?
21 A.38 No. Criterion IV of Appendix B requires that procure-22 ment documents include or reference " applicable 23 regulatory requirements, design bases, and other 24 requirements which are necessary to assure adequate 25 quality." In general, the "other requirements" may 26 include reference to specific drawings, specifications, 27 codes, or test, inspection, and acceptance requirements.
28
. l l
1 Detailed guidance on " analysis and testing methods, 2 required data, and report format," may be, but are not 3 required under Criterion IV to be, included in 4 procurement documents. Such details may be left to the 5 discretion of the vendors since the vendors are often in 6 the best position to know which types of methods or 7 reports best satisfy the quality requirements of the 8 purchaser. In other words, procurement documents 9 generally specify the criteria which a product must 10 meet, and the vendor usually has discretion to determine 11 how to satisfy those criteria.
12 Specifically, B&R procedure STP-DC-005, Preparation 13 and Control of Specifications, provided guidance to 14 personnel responsible for developing the design 15 documents which are issued for the purpose of 16 identifying the technical requirements to be met by 17 vendors and subcontractors. This procedure describes 18 the types of information requirements which B&R 19 engineers should provide to the vendor / subcontractor and 20 the types of documents which are to be required from the 21 vendor / subcontractor. The procedure provides the 22 following the specific guidance with respect to special 23 or unusual interface requirements or conditions for 24 subcontracted engineering services: "Unless the 25 requirement is essential to the performance of that 26 task, the requirement should not be included." ( Emphasis 27 in Original) In our experience, the type of practice 28
1 embodied in this procedure has proven a generally 2 satisfactory means of obtaining appropriate products in 3 a cost-effective manner.
4 It may be noted that, in addition to the 5 requirements specified in the procurement documents, for 6 some types of procurements purchasers often provide l 7 guidance to vendors identifying one or more acceptable 8 means by which the requirements in the procurement 9 documents may be satisfied. Although such guidance is 10 not required, it helps avoid a situation in which a 11 vendor may satisfy all of the quality requirements in 12 the procurement documents and yet not provide a product 13 or service in a form that is useful to the purchaser.
14 15 0 39 Does.Quadrex's concern that B&R was not verifying work 16 performed by subcontractors and vendors, was not 17 reviewing and approving the analysis methods used by 18 subcontractors and vendors, and did not have documented 19 criteria gover. ting the evaluation process for vendor 20 reports indicate a significant breakdown in the OA 21 program for STP?
22 A.39 No. It appears that Quadrex was concerned with the 23 extent to which B&R was performing these functions 24 rather than their total absence. Review of work 25 performed by vendors and contractors is encompassed 26 within the scope of Criterion VII of Appendix B.
27 Criterion VII requires that measures be established to 28
. 1 assure that purchased services conform to procurement
.2 documents. Other than stating that "[t]hese measures 3 shall include provisions, as appropriate, for source 4 evaluation and selection, objective evidence of quality 5 furnished by the contractor or subcontractor, inspection 6 at the contractor or subcontractor source, and 7 examination of products upon delivery," Criterion VII 8 does not identify which measures must be used to assure 9 that purchased services conform to procurement 10 documents, but instead allows the purchaser to select 11 the measures it deems appropriate.
12 Typically, purchasers confirm the adequacy of the 13 activities of their suppliers by conducting reviews of 14 selected procedures, audits, surveillances, and reviews 15 at vendor shops and inspections of products upon 16 delivery. Suppliers of safety-related services are 17 required to provide an approved quality assurance 18 program to the extent necessary for their activities 19 which affect quality. In general, review and monitoring 20 of a supplier's OA program provides confidence in the 21 quality of the work of the supplier.
22 Criterion VII does not require a purchaser to verify 23 (in the sense of a detailed check or design review) work 24 performed by subcontractors and vendors. Verification 25 by the purchaser could be used as one means of 26 satisfying Criterion VII. However, in many cases, it 27 would not be possible for a purchaser to verify the work 28
1- performed by a subcontractor or vendor. Subcontractors 2 or vendors often possess specialized knowledge and 3 abilities which are necessary for verification but are 4 lacked by the purchaser (which may be the very reason 5 why the purchaser did not perform the design activities 6 itself). In such cases, the subcontractor or vendor 7 typically would verify its own work in accordance with 8 its own OA program, and the purchaser would rely upon 9 other measures to assure that the work satisfies the
+
10 requirements in the procurement documents. In short, a 11 purchaser is only required to assure that purchased 12 services conform to procurement documents; the purchaser 13 is not required to perform design verification of the 14 work performed by subcontractors and vendors and in most 15 cases it would be impracticable to do so.
16 Similarly, neither Criterion VII nor Appendix B in 17 general requires that a purchaser review and appcove the 7
18 analysis methods used by subcontractors and vendors. As 19 explained previously, purchasers are not required to 20 specify analysis methods in procurement documents, and 21 in many cases purchasers (including B&R) do not do so.
22 Furthermore, although a purchaser may rely upon a review 23 of a supplier's analysis methods as a means of assuring 24 that purchased services conform with procurement 25 documents, there are other acceptable alternatives for 26 providing this assurance. These measures include the 27 use of audits and surveillances and review of objective 28
1 evidence of conformance with the procurement document 2 requirements, such as certificiations by appropriate 3 registered engineers.
4 Finally, it may be noted that B&R did have 5 documented procedures governing the reviews of vendor 6 reports. B&R procedure STP-DC-004 required that 7 vendor reports be reviewed in accordance with 8 procedure STP-DC-014. Additionally, among other 9 things, STP-DC-004 required that such reviews include 10 a determination of whether the vendor has met the 11 requirements of the procurement documents. Tnis 12 procedure is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 13 Appendix B. Also, it may be noted that the Quadrex 14 Report did not identify significant safety 15 deficiencies in the work performed by subcontractors 16 and vendors. However, we would agree with Quadrex 17 that it is good practice to provide additional 18 guidance for the review of vendor reports.
19 20 0 40 CCANP's Motion, p. 39, quotes the following sentence 21 from finding 3.l(b) as identifying a violation of 22 Criteria I and XVIII of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 23 50:
24 " Input data to a technical group does not appear to be consistently reviewed 25 by that group for its reasonableness prior to use."
26 27 28
1 e
1 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure 2 "to adequately verify safety-related design and 3 engineering work" at STP. Id. What relevance, if 4 any, does this sentence, or design verification in 5 general, have to criteria I and XVIII?.
6 A 40 This sentence, and design verification in general, are 7 not relevant to Criteria I and XVIII. Criterion I 8 requires the responsibilities of organizations 9 performing activities affecting quality to be 10 established in writing, and it sets forth certain 11 requirements with respect to those responsibilities.
12 Criterion I does not specify which organization shall 13 verify or review design input. Similarly, Criterion 14 XVIII recuires that a comprehensive system of planned '
15 and periodic audits be carried out to verify 16 compliance with and the effectiveness of the quality 17 assurance program. Criterion XVIII does not impose 18 any requirements with respect to verification or 19 review of design input. To the extent any question 20 about verification of design can be inferred from this 21 sentence quoted by CCANP, it would be encompassed 22 generally within Criterion III, not criterion I or 23 XVIII.
24 25 As is discussed above, the sentence quoted by 26 CCANP does not indicate a significant breakdown in any 27 portion of the OA program for STP. While Criterion 28 1
i 1 III requires that measures shall be established for 2 virifying or checking the adequacy of design, it does 3 not prescribe who shall perform the verification or 4 check. Thus, under Criterion III, the organization 5 which provides the design input may, and often does, 6 verify the adequacy of the input without additional 7 verification by the recipient organization.
8 P
9 0 41 CCANP's Motion, p. 41, quotes the following sentence 10 from finding 3.1(b) as identifying a violation of 11 Criterion IV of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50:
12 " Brown and Root does not provide adequate guidance to vendors stipulating 13 acceptable analysis and testing methods, required data, and report format."
14 15 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure 16 "to assure that applicable regulatory requirements, 17 design bases, and other requirements for design and 18 engineering of the South Texas Project were included 19 or referenced" in procurement documents. Id. Does 20 the sentence quoted by CCANP indicate that B&R f ailed 21 to specify applicable regulatory requirements, design 22 bases, and other requirements in the procurement 23 documents?
24 A.41 No. The sentence quoted by CCANP only provides 25 Ouadrex's view regarding guidance given to vendors.
26 As we discussed previously, this sentence does not 27 28
~ 42 -
1 identify any f ailure to specify applicable regulatory 2 requirements, design bases, and other requirements in 3 procurement documents.
4 5 0 42 CCANP's Motion, p. 43, quotes the following sentences 6 from finding 3.l(b) as identifying a violation of 7 Criterion X of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50:
8 "No documented criteria exists governing the evaluation process for vendor 9 reports."
10 " Brown and Root continues to pursue a policy that work performed by major 11 _
subcontractors or suppliers, such as EDS Nuclear and Westinghouse, is design 12 verified by these firms and can therefore be assumed to be correct."
13' 14 ~ CCANP states that these sentences demonstrate a 15 failure "to establish and execute effectively a 16 program for inspection of safety-related design and 17 engineering work." Id. Please explain whether these 18 sentences indicate a significant breakdown in 19 inspection of design work under Criterion X.
20 A.42 Inspection refers to examinations, observations, 21 measurements, or tests to determine whether the 22 physical characteristics of a material, structure, 23 component, system, or process comply with applicable 24 requirements. Consequently, Criterion X is generally 25 understood to identify requirements pertaining to 26 inspections of fabrication and construction activities 27 and not to design activities.
28
, 1 The criteria of Appendix B which are most 2 applicable to the statement by CCANP are Criteria III 3 and VII. The conformance of a design with applicable 4 criteria is determined by means of verification under 5 Criterion III and review of vendor-furnished 6 information under Criterion VII. As we previously 7 explained, the sentences quoted by CCANP do not 8 identify a significant breakdown in the OA program for 9 STP under Criterion III and VII.
10 11 0 43 Does finding 3.1( b) identify a significant breakdown 12 in any portion of the OA program for STP?
13 A.43 No. As we have discussed previously, finding 3.l(b) 14 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 15 portion of the Quality assurance program for STP.
16 17 0 44 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.l(c)?
18 A.44 Finding 3.1( c) primarily expresses three concerns of 19 Ouadrex. First Quadrex was concerned about the lack 20 of consistent treatment of plant operating modes and 21 environmental conditions and noted the absence of 22 written design bases to guide designers in what '
23 combination of events and plant modes must be 24 considered. Second, Quadrex was concerned that the 25 design criteria for STP appeared to reflect industry 26 issues in tne 1973-75 time frame but not more recent 27 28 i
- 44 _
1 issues. Finally, Quadrex was concerned that analyses 2 of certain systems did not reflect appropriate plant 3 operating modes and environmental conditions.
4 5 0 45 What is the source of Ouadrex's first concern?
6 A.45 Although the Quadrex Report-does not specify the 7 source of this concern, it appears to be predicated 8 upon finding 4.3.2.1(i), which states that "there is 9 no project-wide documented basis for [ plant operating 10 and environmental] conditions and their use."
11 12 0.46 Would the absence of a project-wide documented basis 13 for plant operating and environmental conditions 14 violate the requirements of Appendix B?
15 A.46 No. There is no requirement in Appendix B that plant 16 operating and environmental conditions be specified in 17 a project-wide document. At STP, the design bases 18 were provided for individual systems or disciplines by 19 System Design Descriptions (SDDs) and Technical 20 Reference Documents (TRDs). In fact, B&R procedure 21 STP-SD-002-B required SDDs to address of f-normal and 22 post-accident operating conditions and to list the 23 casualty events considered in the design of systems.
24 This practice is sufficient to satisfy the 25 requirements of Appendix B. In this regard, it should 26 be noted that B&R had established the Systems Design 27 Assurance Group to assure, among other things, that 28
1 plant operating modes and environmental conditions 2 were being properly accounted for from system to 3 system.
.4 5 0 47 Does Quadrex's concern that the design criteria for 6 STP appeared to reflect industry issues in the 1973-75 7 time frame but not more recent issues identify a 8 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program 9- for STP? .
10 A.47 No. Based upon our review of the Quadrex Report and 11 Bechtel's review of B&R design work during the 12 transition period, we have determined that B&R was 13 reviewing regulatory and industry developments since 14 1975, but that in some cases B&R had not yet performed 15 the work necessary to revise its design criteria.
-16 Thus, Quadrex's observation that the design criteria 17 did not account for more recent developments does not 18 indicate that the controls provided by the OA program 19 were not being properly implemented but instead 20 indicated that B&R had not yet updated its design 21 criteria -- which at most could be considered a 22 productivity and scheduling concern. This is 23 particularly true since Ouadrex did not identify 24 significant deficiencies in design output traceable to 25 out-of-date criteria.
26 27 28
I 1 0.48 What is the basis for Quadrex's concern that the 2 analyses of certain systems did not reflect 3 appropriate plant operating modes and environmental 4 conditions?
5 A.48 Ouadrex relied upon three examples in support of its 6 conclusion. First, Quadrex pointed to deficiencies in 7 the design basis for the HVAC system. These 8 deficiencies were reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 9 CFR S 50.55(e). The other examples involved a 10 purported failure to consider the worst case 11 conditions (i.e. , simultaneous shutdown of two units) 12 in the assumptions used in the design of the Essential 13 Cooling Pond (ECP) and the absence of postulated line 14 cracks and breaks outside of containment. However, 15 the design of the ECP did in fact consider two units 16 shutdown as reflected in FSAR Section 9.2.5., and we 17 understand that B&R had not yet begun design 18 activities associated with line cracks and breaks 19 outside of containment.
20 21 0 49 With the exception of the HVAC system design 22 deficiency which was reported to the NRC, do these 23 examples indicate a significant breakdown in the OA 24 program for STP?
25 A.49 No. The questions about the ECP and the pipe break 26 analysis were of a different nature than the 27 deficiency in the HVAC system and do not suggest any 28
1 systematic deficiency in the controls provided by the 2 OA program or in the implementation of those controls.
3 Thus, these examples do not indicate the existence of 4 a significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 5 program for STP.
6 7 0 50 CCANP's Motion, p. 42, quotes the following sentences 8 from finding 3.l(c) as identifying a violation of 9 Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 C.P.R. Part 50:
10 "No written design bases are provided to guide the designer in what combinations of events and plant 11 modes must be considered."
12 " Consideration of degraded equipment performance was also not evident."
13 14 CCANP states that these sentences demonstrate a 15 , failure "to adequately prescribe by documented 16 instructions, procedures, or drawings the safety-17 related design and engineering activities at the South 18 Texas Project." Id. Please explain whether these 19 sentences quoted by CCANP identify a significant 20 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP.
21 A.50 Procedure STP-SD-002-B required that SDDs provide 22 design bases for of f-normal and post-accident 23 conditions and list casualty events to be considered 24 in the design of systems. As explained previously, 25 Quadrex was apparently seeking a project-wide document 26 which provided design bases for plant operating modes 27 and environmental conditions. Neither Criterion III 28
- }
i 1 nor Criterion V requires that a project-wide document j 2 specify the design basis for all systems or I
3 disciplines; both criteria permit the design basis to t
4 be identified on a system or discipline level.
5 Additionally, the degraded equipment performance 6 identified by Quadrex refers to matters that had not 7 yet been the subject of design activities at STP.
8 Thus, the sentences quoted by Quadrex do not identify 9 a significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 10 program for STP.
11 12 0 51 CCANP's Motion, p. 42, quotes the following sentence 13 from finding 3.1(c) as identifying a violation of 14 Criterion VI of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50: ;
15 " Design criteria provided in issued
[ System] Design Descriptions (SDDs) and 16 Technical Reference Documents (TRDs) . . . do not adequately address 17 more recent developments," particularly developments in the post-1975 period.
19 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure 20 "to adequately control the issuance of documents, such 21 as instructions, procedures, and drawings, and changes 22 thereto, which prescribed safety-related design and 23 engineering." Id. Does the sentence quoted by CCANP 24 identify a violation of Criterion VI?
25 A.51 No. Criterion VI pertains to document issuance to 26 assure that when design documents and any revisions 27 are updated, the revision process be appropriately 28
i I controlled by assuring that the revisions "are 2 reviewed for adequacy and approved for release by
- 3 authorized personnel and are distributed to and used 4 at the location where the prescribed activity is 5 pe r fo rmed . " The sentence quoted by CCANP relates to 6 the engineering design process of updating design 7 documents relative to changing regulatory 8 requirements, not the control process of issuing 9 documents. Quadrex was expressing its view of the 10 efficiency of B&R's design process in implementing new 11 requirements.
12 13 0 52 Does finding 3.1(c) identify a significant breakdown 14 in any portion of the OA program for STP?
15 A.52 No. As we have discussed previously, finding 3.1(c) 16 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 17 portion of the quality assurance program for STP.
18 19 0 53 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.1(d)?
20 A.53 Finding 3.l(d) primarily questions whether some design 21 activities that were classified as non-safety-related 22 should have been classified as safety-related, and it 23 identifies seven examples in support of this 24 conclusion.
25 26 0 54 What were the seven examples identified in finding 27 3.1(d)?
28
1 A.54 The first example was stated as being "a lack of 2 awareness of high energy piping in the MAB [ Mechanical 3 Auxiliary Building] (see Ouestions M-3, N-3, N-15, and 4 R-5)." A review of the cited questions indicates that 5 Quadrex was concerned that B&R had not analyzed 6 postulated breaks in high energy lines in the MAB.
7 This example does not involve an improper 8 classification of a safety-related system but rather 9 an activity which had not yet been performed by B&R.
10 The second example referred to shielding 11 calculations that were not classified as safety-12 related. The NRC was notified that this was a 13 potentially reportable deficiency under 10 CFR S 14 50.55(e). However, HL&P later determined that this 15 was not reportable because the shielding calculations 16 were not generally classified as safety-related in the 17 industry and, more importantly, the shielding 18 calculations were internally processed by B&R in the 19 same manner as a safety-related calculation with 20 respect to checking and verification of adequacy.
21 The third example involved "HVAC system 22 requirements for off-normal conditions." Quadrex was 23 concerned that B&R had not provided safety-related 24 HVAC systems to account for off-normal conditions.
25 This was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR S 26 50.55(e).
27 28 l
l l
1 The fourth example involved "[c}omputer code CPVR 2 status." -Quadrex was concerned that users of computer [
3 codes could not determine whether the codes were 4 safety-related or non-safety-related because some 5 computer program verification reports (CPVR) were not 6 in place. This was also reported to the NRC pursuant 7 to 10 CFR S 50.55(e).
8 The fifth example involved " support systems (see 9 Ouestions E-3, E-15, H-4, H-13, M-5, M-25, N-10, N-17, 10 and R-6)." A review of the cited questions does not
-11 indicato any problem with safety-related 12 classifications (with the exception of the HVAC 13 problem mentioned previously), but instead generally 14 indicates that Quadrex was concerned about various .
J5 types of analyses which had not yet been completed or 16 with analyses which Quadrex believed may have 17 contained errors.
18 The sixth example involved "[o]perations performed 19 at remote panels (see Questions E-13 and R-10)." A 20 review of the cited guestions does not indicate any 21 problem with safety-related classifications of 22 operations at remote panels but only a concern that 23 environmental conditions ( temperature, humidity, and 24 radiation) at the remote panels may not have been 25 properly accounted for. This example is related to 26 1
27 28 e
1 the reported deficiency in the HVAC systems, and 2 pertained to activities which we understand had not 3 yet been completed by B&R.
4 The final example involved "[slystems interaction 5 (see Ouestions H-18, H-23, M-3, M-10, M-50, P-20, and 6 R-12)." A review of the cited questions indicates 7 that, with one exception (H-23), the questions do not 8 involve improper safety-related classifications but 9 instead analyses which we understand had not yet been 10 completed or concerns by Quadrex regarding the 11 adequacy of certain analyses. In Question H-23, 12 Quadrex was questioning whether the le,ak detection 13 instrumentation and sump pumps in the essential 14 cooling water pump rooms should be classified as 15 safety-related. Bechtel's review of this question 16 revealed that level instrumentation was not the sole 17 means of identifying leakage in the ECW system and as
, 18 such did not have to be classified as safety-related.
19 Furthermore, the operation of the sump pumps is not 20 relied upon to mitigate against the consequences of 21 postulated ECW system line breaks in.nuch a way as to 22 require their classification as a safety-related 23 component.
24 25 0 55 Do these seven examples indicate a significant 26 breakdown in the safety-related classification system 27 for STP? -
28
1 A.55 No. Of the seven examples, only the one related to 2 the HVAC system clearly involved a safety-related 3 design activity that was improperly classified as 4 non-safety-related. The other examples included 5 analyses which we understand had not yet been i
ed 6 completed and concerns about the adequacy of certain 7 analyses. The isolated example involving the 8 classification of portions of the HVAC system does not 9 'ndicate a significant breakdown in the safety-related i
classification system for STP, and this example was in 10 11 fact reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR S 12 50.55(e).
13 14 0 56 CCANP's Motion, pp. 39 and 41, quotes the following 15 two passages from finding 3.1(d) as a basis for its 16 contention that finding 3.l(d) violates Criteria I and 17 II:
)[:
- r' 18 "It was observed on many occasions that B&R uses a very sharp distinction between 19 S/R and non-S/R categorizations for both equipment and calculations. A non-S/R 20 designation results in the design outputs not being subjected to design 21 verification. In several instances, design activities that affected plant 22 safety were designated as non-S/R."
21 "It was frequently stated during the design review that only NRC requirements 24 .
must be met whether or not those requirements are accurate, reasonable, or 25 [ even meet the intent of the regulations."
( Emphasis as in the Quadrex Report) .
26 27 ,
28 5 Y f
1 CCANP states that these passages demonstrate a failure 2 "to establish and effectively execute an acceptable 3 quality assurance program" and a failure "to properly 4 identify safety-related versus non-safety-related 5 aspects of the design." Id. Do you have any comments
'i 6 regarding this contention?
7 A.56 Yes. Initially, it should be noted that drawing a 8 sharp distinction between safety-related and non- -
9 safety-related classifications and failing to verify 10 non-safety-related designs do not indicate any 11 violation of Appendix B because Appendix B only 12 applies to activities affecting the safety-related 13 functions of structures, systems, and components. i 14 Furthermore, Criterion I of Appendix B is inapplicable 15 to the quoted passages, since Criterion I only sets 16 forth quality-related requirements for the organiza-17 tions of a licensee and its contractors and does not ,
18 specify any requirements regarding safety-related 19 classifications. The criterion most directly i
20 applicable to the quoted passages is Criterion II, 21 which requires among other things, that the " applicant 22 shall identify the structures, systems and components 23 to be covered by the quality assurance program. . . .
24 l
l 25 0 57 Do the passages cited by CCANP indicate a significant l
26 breakdown in quality assurance under Criterion II?
27 L 28 l
l' _ 55 -
+
1 A.57 No. -As previously explained, since Ouadrex identified 2 only one example of an improper designation of f
3 : safety-related activities which was in fact reported 4[ to the NRC under 10 CFR S 50.55(e) , there was no 5 '. reasonable basis for notifying the NRC of a 6 ,
significant breakdown in any portion of the quality y '7 assurance program for STP.
8
~9 0 58 Does finding 3.1(d) identify a significant breakdown
'10 in any portion of the OA program for STP beyond the 11 reported deficiency in the HVAC system?
12 A.58 No. "As we'have discussed previously, finding 3.1(d) 13 does not indicate a significant breakdown in any 14 portion of the quality assurance program for STP 15.
3 beyond the reported deficiency in the HVAC system.
k 16 17 0 59 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.1(e)?
18 A.59 Finding 3.1(e) primarily expresses Quadrex's concern 19 ,that written guidelines do not exist for the conduct 20 of failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) and that I
21 there is no documented evidence of satisfaction of the 22 single failure criterion. Additionally, finding l
- ^y 23; 3.1(e) identifies one case, involving the common
) gi24 instrument' air line, which Ouadrex indicated as a
- l. 25 violation of the single failure criterion.
- > 26 27 y 28 l
L ._
4 1 0 60 Does this finding indicate a significant breakdown in 2 any portion of the quality assurance program for STP?
3 A.60 No. First, it should be noted that, as we understand 4 it, B&R had not begun to perform FMEAs for key systems 5 (except for preparation of tables on single failures 6 in the FSAR). Consequently, documented guidance for 7 performance of FMEAs was not yet necessary, and 8 therefore the absence of such guidance would not 9 indicate a significant breakdown in any portion of the 10 quality assurance program for STP.
11 It appears to have been Quadrex's opinion that a 12 project-wide document should exist to provide guidance 13 for the conduct of failure mode and effect analyses.
14 See finding 4.3.2.1(i).
As we explained previously 15 with respect to finding 3.](c), a project-wide 16 document is not necessary as long as each discipline 17 or group uses appropriate guidance for its specific 18 type of work. Similarly, it is not necessary to have 19 documented evidence solely for the purpose of demon-20 strating satisfaction of the single failure criterion 21 provided that satisfaction can be determined from 1
22 other documentation.
23 Finally, with respect to the single failure 24 criterion violation reported by Quadrex in the common 25 instrument air line, nothing in the Quadrex Report 26 indicated that the situation involving the common 27 instrument air line was attributable or related to a 28
1 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program 2 for STP. This matter is also the subject of findings 3 4.3.2.1(a) and 4,8.2.1( a) , which are discussed below.
4 5 0 61 CCANP's Motion, p. 42, quotes the following sentence 6 as the basis for its contention that finding 3.1(e) 7 identifies a violation of Criterion V of Appendix B to 8 10 C.F.R. Part 50:
9 "No guidelines exist on what types of failures should be considered for 10 various types of equipment."
11 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure 12 "to adequately prescribe by documented instructions, 13 procedures, or drawings the safety-related design and 14 engineering activities at the South Texas Project."
15 Id. Does the sentence quoted by CCANP identify a 16 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program 17 under Criterion V?
18 A.61 No. As explained previously, Quadrex apparently was 19 seeking a project-wide document which provided 20 guidance for conducting FMEAs. Such a project-wide 21 document is not required under Criterion V or under 22 Criterion III. In any case, B&R had not yet begun to 23 perform FMEAs for key systems. Consequently, guidance 24 for this effort was not yet required to be in place.
25 26 0.62 Does finding 3.1(e) identify a significant breakdown 27 in any portion of the OA program for STP?
28
i 1 A.62' No. As we have discussed previously, finding 3.1(e) 2 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 3 portion of the quality ' assurance program for STP.
4 5 0 63 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.1( f)? .
6 A.63 Finding 3.1(f) primarily expresses three concerns by 7 Quadrex. First, Quadrex was concerned that there was
! 8 no documented evidence for assuring that commitments 9 in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) were being 10 systematically implemented. Second, Quadrex was j 11 concerned that there were inconsistencies between the 12 FSAR and design documents. Finally, Quadrex was 13 concerned that there did not appear to be any method 14 to assure the timely updating of the FSAR.
15 16 0 64 Did B&R heve a method designed to assure that FSAR 17 commitments were implemented?
18 A.64 Yes. We understand that coordination of 19 implementation of the FSAR commitments was the 20 responsibility of the B&R Licensing Group (the 21 activities of which Quadrex did not review), and 22 implementation of the commitments was the 23 responsibility of the individual design disciplines.
24 Additionally, we understand thct the B&R Design 25 Assurance Group had responsibility for reviewing the I
26 27
'28
1 ' design to assure that FSAR commitments were met. This 1
2' is a reasonable method for assuring implementation of
. 3 FSAR commitments.
4 B&R.had two' measures designed to assure that FSAR 5' commitments were implemented. First, in accordance
- 6 with the review and comment process described earlier, 7 B&R issued design documents such as SDDs that 8 reflected those regulatory and code requicements which 9 the design organizations were to meet. Secondly, B&R 10 committed to a formal design assurance process in 11 accordance with procedure STP-SD-005 which, among 12 other things, was intended to assure that 1
13 regulatory / licensing commitments were fully
, 14 implemented as reflected in the FSAR upon design 15- completion.
16 In addition, B&R procedure STP-DC-015 required :
17 design verifiers to confirm that the designs being 18 verified conformed with FSAR requirements and to 19 initiate FSAR change notices - for designs which did not 20 conform. This procedure provided an additional method 21 for assuring that the design conformed with the FSAR.
22 23- 0 65' what was the basis for Quadrex's concern that B&R did 24 not have a method for assuring that FSAR commitments 25 were systematically implemented?
26 27 28 i
t f
..n.,_--- , . , . e n - , -- --~n a r
1 A.65 Ouadrex's concern in finding 3.l(f) is essentially the 2 same as the concern in finding 4.3.2.1.(g), which 3 states that a " systematic method to assure that FSAR 4 commitments are implemented in the design does not 5 appear to exist...." In turn, finding 4.3.2.l(g) 6 cites four questions, none of which provides adequate 7 information to support the conclusion that there was 8 no documented method for assuring that FSAR 9 commitments were being systematically implemented.
l 10 l 11 0 66 Please explain whether Quadrex's concern that there 12 were inconsistencies between the design and the FSAR 13 indicates a significant breakdown in any portion of 14 the OA program for STP.
15 A.66 In many projects, such as STP, the FSAR is not used to l 16 control design activities but instead is used to 17 summarize pertinent information in the design 18 documents which do govern the design activities.
l .19 During construction, the design of a project evolves, l 20 as reflected by revisions to the controlled design 21 documents, and the FSAR is of ten amended to 22 incorporate these revisions. Since there is 23 inevitably some delay between the time that the design l 24 is changed and the FSAR is amended to reflect that 25 change, it is not unusual for some inconsistencies 26 between the design and the FSAR to exist. As long as 27 the differences between the FSAR and the design are 28
1 identified and controlled, and as long as design 2 activities are being controlled by the appropriate 3 design documents, inconsistencies with the FSAR do not 4 Pose a significant quality problem.
5 In the case of STP, B&R did have a procedure 6 (STP-DC-012) for controlling changes to designs which 7 necessitated amendments to the FSAR. Among other 8 things, this procedure required that any changes in 9 design which dif fered from the FSAR be documented on a 10 change notice describing the change and identifying 11 affected pages of the FSAR, and it required that a 12 control log be maintained for these change notices.
13 This is an appropriate procedure to control 14 inconsistencies between the FSAR and design documents.
15 16 0 67 Please explain whether Quadrex's concern that there 17 was no method to assure the timely updating of the 18 FSAR indicates a significant breakdown in any portion 19 of the OA program for STP.
.20 A.67 Failure to update the FSAR in a timely manner may 21 result in some temporary inconsistencies between the 22 FSAR and the design documents governing the design 23 activities. As we explained in response to the 24 previous question, such inconsistencies do not pose a 25 significant quality problem as long as the entire 26 Process is controlled. However, timely updating of 27 the FSAR is important in order to provide the NRC 28
-l
1 Staff with proper information for the conduct of its 2 functions. In this regard , B&R had a procedure (STP- '
3 DC-012) for control and processing of changes to the 4 FSAR.
5 6 0 68 Is there any other reason why Quadrex's concerns 7 regarding inconsistencies between the FSAR and various 8 design documents and regarding the need to update the 9 FSAR would not be reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)?
10 A.68 Yes. We have reviewed the Quadrex Report to identify 11 examples related to Quadrex's concerns. The examples 12 we identified generally involvcd a design or design 13 practice which was technically adequate but which was 14 either inconsistent with the FSAR or not reflected in 15 the FSAR. In fact, in many cases, the Quadrex Report 16 states that the design or design practice in question 17 was acceptable or consistent with industry practice 18 and NRC guidance. Consequently, Quadrex's concern 19 also would not be reportable because it does not 20 identify a condition which, if left uncorrected, could 21 have adversely affected the safety of operations.
22 23 0.69 CCANP's Motion, pp. 42-43, quotes the following 24 sentences from finding 3.1( f) as a basis for its 25 contention that finding 3.l(f) identifies a violation 26 of Criterion VI:
27 28
1 "There [were] many inconsistencies noted between the FSAR and other design and 2 procurement-documents."
3 "There did not appear to be any method to assure that timely updating of the 4 FSAR was being accomplished."
5 "In a number of areas, the PSAR is now out-of-date."
6 7 CCANP states that these sentences demonstrate a 8 failure "to adequately control the issuance of 9 documents, such as instructions, procedures, and 10 drawings, including changes thereto, which prescribed 11 safety-related design and engineering." Id. Do these 12 sentences identify a violation of Criterion VI of 13 Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50?
14 A.69 No. As previously explained, Criterion VI requires 15 that, if a document is issued or revised, it be 16 accomplished in a controlled manner. Criterion VI 17 does not require that any particular document, 18 including the FSAR, be updated, nor does it prohibit 19 inconsistencies between the FSAR and other types of 20 documents as long as those inconsistencies are 21 controlled. Furthermore, as we explained previously, 22 the matters raised in these sentences do not indicate 23 a significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 24 program for STP.
25 26 27 28
1 0.70 CCANP's Motion, p. 43, quotes the following sentence 2 from finding 3.l(f) as a basis for its contention that 3 finding 3.l( f) identifies a violation of Criterion X 4 of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50:
5 "These were numerous differences between EDS practices and FSAR promises."
7 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure 8 "to establish and execute ef fectively a program for 9 inspection of safety-related design and engineering 10 work." Id. Please explain whether this sentence 11 quoted by CCANP indicates a significant breakdown in 12 inspection of design work under Criterion X.
13 A.70 As we explain previously, Criterion X is generally 14 understood to apply to inspection of fabrication and 15 construction activities rather than design or 16 engineering work. Thus, the sentences quoted by CCANP 17 would not indicate a significant breakdown in the QA 18 program for STP under Criterion X.
19 Furthermore, as part of its subcontract 20 responsibilities, EDS was directed by B&R to conform 21 its design activities to the same Technical Reference 22 Documents which were being used by B&R personnel in 23 the performance of their duties with regard to piping 24 stress analysis and pipe support design. These TRD's 25 represent the primary method used by B&R to implement 26 licensing commitments with respect to analytical 27 methods.
28
1 Finally, it may be noted that while Quadrex 2 identified differences between some of EDS's design 3 activities and the then-current revision of the FSAR, 4 Ouadrex confirmed that these activities were 5 technically adequate. See Quadrex's assessment of 6 EDS's responses to Questions P-7, P-9, and P-24.
7 Thus, the existence of these difference would not have 8 adversely affected the safety of operations.
9 10 0 71 Does finding 3.l(f) identify a significant breakdown 11 in any portion of the OA program for STP?
12 A.71 No. As we have previously discussed, finding 3.l(f) 13 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 14 portion of the OA program for STP.
15 16 0.72 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.l(g)?
17 A.72 Finding 3.1(g) primarily expresses Quadrex's concern 18 that there was very little evidence of a well-19 thought-out and consistent basis for design, that much 20 of the plant design basis was solely rooted in 21 engineering judgment, and that the rationale for this 22 judgment was not documented in a retrievable manner.
23 Quadrex provided several observations in support of 24 its concern. Some of these observations were also the 25 subject of findings we have discussed previously.
26 Others included observations that much of the design 27 was based upon unverified preliminary data; that a 28
1 1 number of key front-end criteria documents had not yet 2 been prepared; that work performed by one contractor 3 was not being reviewed by other contractors; that B&R 4 did not have a consistent requirement for design 5 margins and allowed individual engineers to make this 6 determination; and that B&R did not require the use of 7 either design manuals that provide guidance on 8 acceptable practices or individual engineer log-books.
9 10 0 73 Please discuss whether the concern expressed by 11 Ouadrex in finding 3.1(g) identifies a significant 12 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP.
13 A.76 When read in context, it appears to have been 14 Quadrex's concern that each discipline was 15 establishing its own design basis, that much of the 16 design bases were rooted solely in engineering I 17 judgment, and that because the rationale for this 18 judgment was not documented, new project personnel 19 were not familiar with the reasons why their 20 predecessors had selected certain design bases.
21 However, as we explained previously with respect to 22 findings 3.1(a), 3.1(b) and 3.1(c), it is acceptable l 23 for each discipline to develop its own design basis 1
24 rather than relying upon a project-wide document or i
25 multidisciplinary guidance. Furthermore, use of 26 engineering judgment in development of the design 27 basis is appropriate, and the rationale for that 28
I judgment need not be documented as long as the design 2 basis itself is documented. Although we agree that it
.3 would have been beneficial if new project personnel 4 were familiar with the rationale for the design basis 5 established by their predecessors, the absence of such 6 familiarity does not present a problem as long as the 7 design basis is documented. In any case, Bechtel's 8 own review of B&R's design basis indicated that the 9 design basis was primarily rooted in the Safety 10 Analysis Reports, regulatory guides, industry codes, 11 and other standard sources for design bases.
12 Consequently, Quadrex's concern does not indicate a 13 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program 14 for STP.
15 The examples provided by Quadrex in finding 3.1(g) 16 also do not identify a significant breakdown in any 17 portion of the OA program for STP. Basing the design 18 upon unverified preliminary data is generally 19 necessary at the start of design and does not identify 20 any quality assurance problems. Quadrex's concern in 21 this area generally pertained to the over-conservatism 22 incorporated in this data. Similarly, while it may 23 have been desirable for B&R to have produced the key 24 front-end criteria documents mentioned by Quadrex, 25 many of these documents were not yet needed at that 26 time given the status of design. More generally, many 27 plants have been successfully completed without using 28
4 I these types of documents in the design process.
2 Additionally, as we have explained previously, 3 Appendix B does not require .that design assumptions 4 -(including the design margins) be consistent from 5 discipline to discipline, nor does it require that one ,
6 contractor review the work of other contractors, 7 provided there is review to assure conformance with 8 the procurement documents and compatibility at inter-9 faces. Finally, there is no requirement that design 10 manuals be prepared to provide uniform guidance to 11 disciplines or designers or that designers use 12 " individual engineer log-books," provided that other 13 acceptable means of identifying the design input and 14 assumptions are used in preparing a design. It may be 15 noted that B&R in fact treated its collection of SDDs 16 and TRDs as a design manual and had a procedure (STP-17 S D-001 ) to this effect.
l 18 l
19 0 74 CCANP's Motion, pp. 39-40 quotes the following two 20 sentences from finding 3.l(g) as identifying a 21 violation of Criteria I and XVIII of Appendix B to 10 22 CFR Part 50:
23 "Significant quality variations were also observed in the design review 24 comments provided for internal documents prior to their initial issue or their 25 subsequent revision."
26 The current design includes design details "obtained from other PWR plants 27 and used without confirming their" appropriateness for this application.
28
1 CCANP states that these sentences demonstrate a 2 failure "to adequately verify safety-related design 3 and engineering work at the South Texas Nuclear 4 Project." Id. What relevance, if any, do these 5 sentences, or ' design verification in general, have to 6 Criteria I and XVIII?
7 A.74 These sentences, and design verification in general, 8 are not relevant to Criteria I and XVIII. Criterion I 9 requires that the responsibilities of organizations 10 performing activities affecting quality be established 11 in writing, and it sets forth certain requirements 12 with respect to those responsibilities. Criterion I 13 does not specify any requirements for reviewing, 14 verifying, or commenting upon design documents or 15 design details. Similarly, Criterion XVIII requires 16 that a comprehensive system of planned and periodic 17 aud!ts be carried out to verify compliance with and 18 the ef fectiveness of the quality assurance program.
19 Criterion XVIII does not impose any requirements with 20 respect to comments on or verification or review of 21 design. Design verification is encompassed within 22 Criterion III, not Criteria I or XVIII.
l 23
! 24 0 75 Does the first sentence quoted by CCANP identify a 25 violation of the verification requirements of l 26 Criterion III?
27 l
28
1 A.75 No. Providing comments on internal documents prior to 2 their issuance is not encompassed within design 3 verification as that term is used in Criterion III.
4 Moreover, finding 3.l(g) only states that " quality 5 variations" were observed in the comments. We assume 6 this means that some comments were not as thoughtful 7 as others and that the finding was not intended to 8 identify a deficiency in the comments or in any 9 quality assurance control measures required by 10 Appendix B.
11 12 0 76 What is the, basis for the second sentence quoted by 13 CCANP?
14 A.76 The statement that design details from other plants 15 were used without confirming their applicability at 16 STP appears to be based upon Quadrex's assessment of 17 B&R response to Questions P-2 and M-28. Quadrex's 18 assessment in P-2 explicitly states that reliance upon 19 information provided by Westinghouse is "probably 20 satisfactory" but that B&R "should be more involved in 21 understanding similar plant operating experiences" to 22 assure that components have adequate duty cycle life.
l 23 Similarly, in its assessment of B&R's response to 24 Ouestion M-28, Quadrex observed that B&R had directly 25 used Westinghouse plant design events without review 26 for plant availability or economic considerations.
27 28
1 0.77 Did these Questions indicate a significant breakdown 2 in the verification process for STP?
3 A.77 No. Quadrex's concern in this area does not appear to 4 be safety-related but instead related to matters of 5 plant availability. ,
6 7 0 78 CCANP's Motion, p. 40, quotes the following two 8 passages from finding 3.l(g) as identifying a 9 violation of Criteria II and XVII of Appendix B to 10 1
10 C.F.R. Part 50: i i
11 "Much of the plant design basis is rooted solely in engineering judgment and the 12 rationale for this judgment, has not been documented in a retrievable manner."
13 "B&R does not require use of . . .
14 individual engineer log-books to record key bases, assumptions or 15 decisions. . . . Consequently, fundamental background information 16 regarding the STP design is difficult to retrieve since many current B&R engineers 17 are not suf ficiently f amiliar with the STP design or its bases."
18 19 CCANP states that these passages demonstrate a failure 20 "to assure adequate documentation in an identifiable 21 and retrievable manner of the safety-related design 22 and engineering work at the South Texas Nuclear 23 Project." Id. Is Criterion II relevant to these 24 passages?
25 26 27 28
1 A.78 No. Criterion II requires that licensees establish 2 and implement a written quality assurance program.
3 Criterion II does not identify any specific 4 requirements applicable to the maintenance of records 5 or documents.
6 7 0.79 Do these passages identify a violation of Criterion 8 XVII?
9 A.79 No. Criterion XVII establishes requirements for the 10 preparation and maintenance of records that " furnish 11 evidence of activities affecting quality." Criterion 12 XVII also identifies various types of records which 13 must be maintained. Engineer log-books and 14 documentation of the rationale for engineering 15 judgment are not explicitly identified as types of 16 records which must be maintained under Criterion XVII.
17 Furthermore, lack of documentation of the rationale 18 for judgment in the selection of the design basis (as 19 distinct from documentation of the design basis 20 itself) is not inconsistent with the provisions of 21 Criterion XVII. Finally, although engineer log-books 22 may be one method by which the requirements of 23 Criterion XVII can be satisfied, there are acceptable 24 alternatives to the use of engineer log-books for 25 recording design bases, assumptions and decisions, 26 such as preparing a separate document for each 27 calculation or design activity. For example, B&R 28
1 issued SDDs and TRDs and documented calculations on 2 separate documents. Consequently, the absence of 3 engineer log-books does not identify a violation of I 1
4 Criterion XVII.
5 6 0 80 CCANP's Motion, pp. 41-42, quotes the following 7 sentences from finding 3.1(g) as identifying a 8 violation of Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R.
9 Part 50:
10 "There was little evidence of a well-thought-out and consistent basis for 11 des ig n . "
12 "A number of key front-end criteria documents are missing [for] STP."
13 "A plan to identify and develop these 14 TRDs on the project was not evident."
15 CCANP states that these sentences demonstrate a 16 failure "to adequately prescribe by documented 17 instructions, procedures, or drawings the safety-18 related design and engineering activities at the South 19 Texas Nuclear Project." Id. Please explain whether 20 these sentences quoted by CCANP identify a significant 21 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP.
22 A.80 As we explained previously, the first sentence quoted 23 by CCANP does not indicate a significant breakdown in 24 any portion of the OA program for STP. Furthermore, 25 with respect to the other sentences quoted by CCANP, 26 we have previously explained that Appendix B does not 27 require the type of project-wide document sought by 28 ,
i i
1 Quadrex. Although such documents may be used to ,
2 provide guidance to designers, there are other >
3 .
acceptable methods of communicating such guidance.
4 Thus, for the reasons previously discussed, these 5 sentences quoted by Quadrex do not indicate a 6 violation of either Criterion V or Criterion III.
7 8 0 81 CCANP's Motion, p. 43, quotes the following sentence 9 from finding 3.1(g) as identifying a violation of 10 Criterion VII:
11 "It was noted that the Materials Group does not review subcontractor material 12 selection [s] . "
13 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure 14 "to adequately establish measures to assure that 15 purchased safety-related engineering and design 16 services conformed to procurement documents." Id.
17 What is the nature of the concern expressed by Quadrex 18 by this sentence?
~ 19 A.81 This sentence in finding 3.1.(g) appears to be based 20 upon Quadrex's assessment of B&R's response to 21 Question C-39, which states that " Brown & Root 22 Materials Group does not review material selections by 23 [ design] contractors prior to vendor release for 24 manufacture." In other words, B&R would hire a 25 subcontractor, such as EDS, to perform design work and 26 to select the material type, and the vendor would be 27 28
1 authorized to commence manufacture of the item using 2 that material type without any provision for prior 3 review by the B&R Materials Group.
4 5 0 82 Does such a practice identify a violation of Criterion !
6 VII?
7 A.82 No. Criterion VII requires that measures "be esta-8 blished to assure that purchased material, equipment, 9 and services, whether purchased directly or through 10 contractors and subcontractors, conform to the 11 procurement documents." A review by B&R of the 12 material selections of its subcontractors was not the 13 only acceptable means to assure that the 14 subcontractors' design work satisfies the procurement 15 documents between B&R and the subcontractors.
16 It should be noted that the absence of a review of 17 the materials selections of its subcontractors by the 18 B&R Materials Group does not mean that the materials 19 selections were going unreviewed. Criterion III 20 requires that these selections be reviewed and 21 verified. Review and verification by the subcon-22 tractors satisfies the requirements of Appendix B and 23 assures that the materials selection is appropriate.
24 Our discussion with respect to finding 3.l(b) provides 25 additional information regarding the controls for 26 assuring conformance with procurement documents.
27 28
N 1 In fact, the procedures for reviewing pipe support 2 subcontractor documents did not require review by the 3 Materials Group. It is our understanding that 4 material selections (even those made by B&R S disciplines) were not, as a normal practice, required 6 to be reviewed by the Materials Group. This group was j 7 utilized by B&R as a specialized technical support 8 staff whose primary function was to assist the design 9 disciplines in establishing general material 10 requirements and in resolving specific material 11 problems. The group did not function as a reviewer of 12 all material selections, but rather only of those 13 material questions directed to it.
14 15 0 83 Does finding 3.l(g) identify a significant breakdown 16 in any portion of the OA program for STP?
17 A.83 No. As we have discussed previously, finding 3.l(g) 18 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 19 portion of the OA program for STP.
~
20 21 0.84 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.l(h)?
22 A.84 Finding 3.l( h) primarily expresses Quadrex's concern 23 that reliability requirements had not been established 24 for equipment.
25 26 0 85 Does this concern indicate a quality assurance 27 problem?
28
1 A.85 No. There is no explicit requirement in Appendix B to 2 10 CFR Part 50 that the procurement documents for 3 equipment include specific reliability requirements.
4 Furthermore, it is not general industry practice for 5 procurement documents to include specific reliability 6 requirements for all equipment. B&R's program for 7 obtaining satisfactory performance of most equipment 8 consisted of such measures as specification of a 9 quality level consistent with the intended function of 10 the equipment, reliance on historical data and 11 experience, and qualification tests or analysis. This 12 is consistent with industry practice. Additionally, 13 for certain components, such as the ESP sequencer, 14 requirements for performance of reliability analyses 15 or demonstration tests may also be specified (which is 16 what B&R had done for the ESF sequencer) .
17 18 0 86 CCANP's Motion, pp. 15-16, 39, and 40-41, quotes the 19 following sentence as identifying a violation.of 20 Criteria I and II:
21 "The absence of specific reliability requirements in both mechanical and 22 electrical equipment specifications, and the inability to produce a standard 23 checklist of postulated failures to be considered casts doubt on the rigor of 24 the safety-related evaluation process."
25 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure 26 "to establish and effectively execute an acceptable 27 quality assurance program" and a failure "to properly l
28
1 identify safety-related versus non-safety-related 2 aspects of the design." Id. Does this sentence 3 identify a violation of Criteria I or II?
4 A.86 No. Criteria I and II are obviously inapplicable 5 since they only set forth quality-related requirements 6 for the establishment of a OA program and for the 7 organizations of the licensee and its contractors.
8 Neither specifies reliability requirements or 9 requirements for the use of standard checklists of 10 postulated failures. Furthermore, as we have 11 explained previously, it is not necessary that i 12 reliability requirements be explicitly specified.
13 Although a standard checklist of postulated failures 14 can be useful in the safety-related evaluation 15 process, this process can be successfully completed 16 without such a checklist.
17 18 0 87 Does finding 3.1(h) identify a significant breakdown 19 in any portion of the OA program for STP?
l 20 A.87 No. As we have discussed previously, finding 3.1(h) 21 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 22 portion of the OA program for STP.
I 23 24 0 88 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.1(i)?
25 .A.88 Finding 3.1(i) (which mistakenly is designated as
! 26 3.1(j) in the Quadrex Report) primarily expresses two 27 concerns by Quadrex. First, Quadrex was concerned 28
1 about the fact that certain nuclear-related analyses 2 had not yet been completed, about the technical 3 adequacy of the nuclear-related analysis methods and 4 assumptions, and about the high error rate in these 5 calculations. Second, Quadrex was concerned that a 6 large amount of nuclear-related analysis was 7 subcontracted and that the technical guidance provided 8 to the subcontractors and the review of the 9 subcontracted analyses by B&R did not appear to be 10 adequate.
11 12 0.89 Does the first concern indicate a significant 13 . breakdown in any portion of the quality assurance 14 program for STP?
15 A.89 No. The thrust of Quadrex's concern regarding 16 analyses which had not yet been completed was to 17 indicate a productivity or scheduling problem and not 18 a significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 19 program.
20 The concerns raised by Ouadrex regarding 21 inadequate analysis methods or high error rates could 22 relate to quality assurance matters. We have reviewed 23 the discipline findings cited by Quadrex as support 24 for its finding that B&R nuclear-related analysis 25 methods were inadequate and contained a high error 26 rate. The discipline findings do not identify a large 27 number of inadequate calculations and, with the 28
. . 1 exception of the deficiencies which were reported to 2 the NRC, the findings do not identify any safety-3 significant deficiencies. Consequently, Quadrex's -
4 finding does not support a conclusion that there was a 5 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program 6 for STP.
7 Some of the " errors" related to calculations which 8 were not inadequate, but needed to be updated. For 9 example, Quadrex cited as an inadequacy in the methods 10 used by B&R's Nuclear Analysis Group the use of a ,
11 computer code, RELAP3, which at the time of the 12 Quadrex review was being replaced in general usage by 13 the NRC and the industry with later, more realistic 14 (i.e., less conservative) modelling methods. Quadrex 15 indicated that B&R and its subcontractor, NUS, were 16 using these modern methods, but cited as an inadequacy 17 the use of RELAP3 in older calculations.
18 In general, Quadrex's concerns regarding Nuclear 19 Analysis calculations appear to be largely based, not 20 on specific errors, but on the impression that Nuclear 21 Analysis personnel were not as knowledgeable of 22 certain design assumptions or factors as Quadrex 23 believed they should have been. In fact, Quadrex 24 assessments of the B&R responses in the Nuclear 25 Analysis area often explicitly pointed out that no 26 errors had been found, although they did indicate a ,
27 concern about the relative lack of understanding by 28 i
I some B&R personnel of the factors affecting these
- /
2 analyses. Where specific errors or inconsistencies in ,
3 calculations were noted by 0uadrex, a complete reading 4 of the Quadrex assessment and an understanding of the 5' related circumstances reveals that Quadrex was mostly 6 concerned with the timeliness of certain analyses the 7 changing regulatory acceptance of certain analytical 8 methods or the overconservatisms to be found in some 9 older calculations.
10 The dis.ciplines mentioned in this finding other 11 than Nuclear Analysis were HVAC, Piping and Supports 12 and Special Stress. The significant deficiencies in 13 the HVAC area were covered by HL&P's 50.55(e) report.
14 In the pipe support analysis area, Quadrex appears 15 to have been primarily concerned about what they
- 16. believed were inappropriate methods. For the most
. 17 part, the " inappropriate methods" consisted of t
18 differences between methods used by B&R and its 19 subcontractors, differences between the methods being 20 used and those described in the FSAR, and differences
/
21 between the methods being used and those currently
,. 22 being recommended by the NRC Staff. In general, the 23 " inappropriate methods" did not involve actual errors 24 in calculations. In the area of pipe rupture 25 analysis, Quadrex expressed similar concerns regarding 26 the analytical methods being used and identified
- 27. analyses which had not yet been completed, but in
, 28
1 1 general it did not identify actual errors in 2 calculations. In fact as to the Piping and Supports '
3 and Special Stress areas, Quadrex found that the EDS 4 design analysis appeared to be " technically adequate,"
5 that a " limited amount of actual STP piping design and .
6 analysis work" had been accomplished by BSR, and that 7 "[m]any of the design practices and analytical methods 8 examined were . . . consistent with industry 9 practice." See Quadrex Report ( Applicants' Exhibit 10 60), pp. 4-74 and 4-77. Since the few errors 11 identified by Quadrex were either of limited scope 12 (i.e. HVAC) or did not represent safety significant 13 design errors, this concern does not represent a 14 significant breakdown in any portion of the quality 15 assurance program for STP.
16 17 0 90 Please explain whether the second concern indicates a 18 significant breakdown in any portion of the quality 19 assurance program for STP?
20 A.90' Initially, it should be noted that Appendix B to 10 21 CFR Part 50 does not prohibit a licensee from 22 contracting or subcontracting for design work. In 23 fact, Criterion I of Appendix B explicitly authorizes 24 the delegation of the work of establishing and 25 excuting the OA program as long as the licensee 26 retains responsibility. Thus, Quadrex's finding that 27 28
1 B&R had subcontracted a large amount of nuclear-2 related analysis does not identify a significant 3 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP. ,
4 We have already addressed Quadrex's concern about 1
5 the technical guidance provided by B&R to 6 subcontractors and vendors and the review of their 7 analyses by B&R with respect to finding 3.1(b) . For 8 the reasons which we previously stated, this concern 9 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 10 Portion of the OA program for STP.
11 12 0.91 CCANP's Motion, p. 39, quotes the following sentence 13 from finding 3.1(i) as identifying a violation of Ik' Criteria I and II of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50:
15 An " abnormally high error rate was observed" in Brown & Root calculations 16 for the nuclear, as opposed to the conventional, aspects of the engineering 17 work.
I 18 CCANP Ldates that this sentence demonstrates a failure l 19 "to establish and effectively execute an acceptable i 6 20 quality assurance program." Id. Does this sentence 21 identify a significant breakdown in any portion of the 22 OA program for STP?
23 A.91 No. As we have previously discussed, the 24 calculational errors or inconsistencies identified by si 25 Quadrex do not represent a significant breakdown in 26 any portion of the OA program for STP.
27 i
28
4 O C l
1 0.92 CCANP's Motion, p. 43, quotes the following passage 2 from finding 3.1(i) as identifying a violation of 3 Criterion VII of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50: I 4 "The amount of nuclear-related analysis that is subcontracted by B&R is higher 5 than a typical A/Es practice. The i technical guidance provided by some of 6 these Groups for subcontracted consultants, such as EDS and NUS, does 7 not appear to be adequate."
8 CCANP states that this passage demonstrates a failure 9 "to adequately establish measures to assure that 10 purchased safety-related engineering and design 11 services conformed to the procurement documents." Id.
12 Does this passage quoted by CCANP identify a violation 13 of Criterion VII? i 14 A.92 No. What " technical guidance" must be provided to 15 suppliers is not the subject of Criterion VII, which 16 pertains to the purchaser's measures to verify 17 conformance of supplied material, equipment, and 18 services with procurement documents. The criterion of 19 Appendix B which is most relevant to this passage is 20 Criterion IV, which pertains to procu ement document 21 control. As we previously explained with respect to 22 finding 3.1(b), Criterion IV does not require that 23 procurement documents include the type of detailed 24 guidance suggested by Quadrex, especially for 25 experienced contractors such as EDS and NUS.
26 27 28
. o ?
1 0.93 Is finding 3.1(i) reportable under.10 CFR 2 S 50.55(e)(1)(i)? '
3 A.93 No. As we have expressed, finding 3.1(i) would not be 4 reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i) because it 5 does not identify a significant breakdown in any i 6 portion of the OA program for STP. I 7
8 0 94 What is the subject of finding 3.1(j)?
9 A.94 Finding 3.1(j) primarily expresses four concerns of 10 Quadrex regarding the design verification process.
11 First, Quadrex was concerned that B&R's design 12 verification process permitted the use of preliminary 13 data up to the point of fuel loading. Second, Quadrex 14 was concerned that there were no documented standards 15 regarding the minimum qualifications for a design 16 verifier. Third, Quadrex was concerned that the only 17 evidence of a completed design verification was a 18 sig na ture . Finally, Quadrex was concerned that errors 19 were not detected by design verifiers.
20 21 0.95 Does the fact that B&R permitted use of preliminary 22 data up to the point of fuel loading indicate a 23 quality or safety concern?
24 A.95 No. Initially, it should be noted that, while B&R did 25 not plan to perform final verification of a design 26 until final input was available and design was nearing 27 completion, B& R's procedure ( STP-DC-015) required a 28 I
l l
1 check of preliminary designs prior to release for l
2 construction or procurement. This check was intended 3 to confirm that the preliminary designs were 4 acceptable based upon the preliminary input then 5 available.
6 Design verification is encompassed within the 7 scope of Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 8 50. Criterion III does not include specific 9 requirements regarding the timing of verification 10 activities. Nevertheless, when possible, it is good 11 practice to verify a design prior to release for 12 construction or procurement.
13 It is not uncommon to defer final verification of 14 some types of structures, systems, and components 15 until after construction is well-underway or in some 16 cases completed. For example, plant structures are 17 often built in accordance with a preliminary design 18 which is based upon conservative estimates of expected 19 loads. As design and construction of the structure 20 are completed, it becomes possible to determine the 21 actual loads on the structure, and the design of the 22 structure is then verified using these loads. By 23 using a conservative preliminary design subject to 24 later verification, the possibility for design changes 25 to account for final loads is minimized, construction 26 can proceed in a timely manner, and the design is 27 confirmed to be acceptable.
28
i
}
1 0 96 Does the absence of documented standards for the 2 qualifications of design verifiers indicate a 3 algnificant breakdown in any portion of the OA program 4 for STP?
5 A.96 No. Criterion III only states that design 6 verifiestion "shall be performed by individuals or 7 groups other than those who performed the original 8 design, but who may be from the same organization."
9 As long as the verification is performed by 10 individuals who are competent, appropriately trained, 11 and qualified, Criterion III and Appendix B in general 12 do not require that the specific qualifications of a 13 verifier be spelled out in a document. Quadrex itself 14 acknowledged this fact in finding 3.l(j) and stated 15 that B&R's approach (as embodied in procedure STP-DC-16 015) of having the Discipline Project Engineer select 17 the design verifier from within the discipline "does 18 not violate NRC requirements." In fact, this approach l
19 was consistent with industry practice.
20 21 0 97 Does Quadrex's concern that the only evidence of a 22 completed verification was a signature and that B&R 23 did not require the use of a design verification 24 checklist indicate a significant breakdown in any 25 portion of the OA program for STP?
26 1
27 28 1
1 A.97 No. There are many acceptable methods for satisfying 2 the requirements in Criterion III for suitable design 3 controls governing verifications. One method includes-4 the use of design verification checklists; other
- 5 acceptable methods include the use of procedures to 6 prescribe how the verification shall be conducted and 7 what elements should be addressed (which was the 8 method discussed in B& R procedure STP-DC-015) or the 9 use of individually-prepared documents which record 10 how the verification was conducted. Consequently, use 11 of design verification checklists is a permissible, 12 but not a required, means of providing an auditable
! 13 record of design verifications. Furthe rmore , B& R ' s 14 procedure for design verification does identify 15 documentation requirements (i.e., comment forms and 1 .
I 16 input list) in addition to the verifier's signature on 17 the design document.
18 19 0.98 What was the basis for Quadrex's concern that errors 20 were not detected by design verifiers?
21 A.98 Quadrex cites its assessment of B&R's response to 22 Question C-16 as a basis for its conclusion that L 23 errors were not detected by design verifiers.
24 Although this assessment does state that a 25 "significant number of mistakes" passed through the 26 verification process, it does not identify the l
27 significance or the number of those mistakes or the I
28 l
i l .__ . _ .
1 number of calculations reviewed by Ouadrex.
2 Furthermore, the assessment states that Quadrex was 3 " unable to evaluate the effectiveness" of the B&R 4 design verification procedure, which Quadrex found to 5 be adequate on paper.
6 7 0 99 Does this indicate a significant breakdown in the OA 8 program for STP?
9 A.99 As we discussed prevously with respect to finding 10 3.1( b) , the information provided by Quadrex in C-16 is 11 not sufficient to support an independent determination 12 that a significant breakdown occurred in the 13 verification process at STP.
14 15 0.100 CCANP's Motion, pp. 39-40, quotes the following 16 passages from finding 3.1(j) as identifying a 17 violation of Criteria I and XVIII of Appendix B to 10 18 CPR Part 50:
19 "There [are] no documented standards regarding the minimum qualifications 20 required for a design verifier."
21 "The only evidence of a completed design verification is a signature, since B&R 22 does not require either the use or completion of design verification 23 checklists. Consequently, there is evidence that the key design verification 24 questions are not being adequately
[ considered]."
25 26 27 28
i I
l 1 CCANP states that these passages demonstrate a 2 failure "to adeguately verify safety-related design
+
3 and engineering work at the South Texas Nuclear 4 Project." Id. Do these quoted passages, or design 5 verification in general, have any relevance to 6 Criteria I and XVIII?
7 A.100 No. Criteria I and XVIII do not specify requirements 8 that directly relate to these passages or design 9 ver'ification in general. Criterion I requires that 10 the responsibilities of organizations performing 11 activities affecting quality be established in 12 writing, and it sets forth certain requirements with 13 respect to those responsibilities. Criterion I does 14 not contain any requirements regarding design verifi-15 cation. Similarly, Criterion XVIII requires that a 16 comprehensive system of planned and periodic audits 17 be carried out to verify compliance with the 18 effectiveness of the quality assurance program.
19 Criterion XVIII does not impose any requirements with 20 respect to verification or review of design. Design 21 verification is encompassed within Criterion III, not i
i 22 Criteria I or XVIII.
23 24 0 101 Please explain whether these passages identify a 25 violation of Criterion III?
l
- 26 27 28 i
1 .A.101 Quadrex does not provide support for its conclusion 2 that key design verification questions were not being 3 adequately considered. We have previously explained 4 that the remainder of these passages do not identify 5 any violation of Criteria II and III.
6 7 0 102 Does finding 3.l(j) identify a significant breakdown 8 in any poriton of the OA program for STP?
9 A.102 No. As we have previously discussed, finding 3.1(j) 10 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 11 portion of the OA program for STP.
12 13 0 103 What does finding 4.1.2.l(b) state?
14 A.103 Finding 4.1.2.l(b) states as follows:
15 There was no evidence of Civil / Structural evaluation of the reasonableness of 16 postulated internal missiles or that the criteria for internal missiles presented 17 in TRD IN209R0013-A had been implemented in the design ( see Question C-9) .
18 19 0.104 Does finding 4.1.2.l(b) identify a significant 20 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
21 A.104 No. This finding does not identify a significant 22 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP.
23 Evaluation of internal missiles is generally deferred 24 until late in the design process af ter the design is 25 largely complete. Thus, the fact that B&R had not 26 yet evaluated the criteria for internal missiles or 27 implemented the criteria into the design was 28
l l
I consistent with industry practice. Additionally, it 2
should be noted that Quadrex found in its assessment 3 of the B&R response to Question C-9 that 4 Civil / Structural "was handling the missile 5 penetration problem in accordance with industry 6 practice and the state-of-the-art." In short, 7 finding 4.1.2.1(b) does not identify any problem or 8 deficiency in the work being performed by B&R or a 9 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 10 program for STP.
I i
11 12 0 105 Does finding 4.1.2.1(b) identify a significant 13 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
14 A.105 No. As we have discussed above, finding 4.1.2.1(b) 15 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 16 portion of the OA program for STP.
17 18 0 106 What does finding 4. 3.2.1( a) state?
19 A.106 Finding 4.3.2.1(a) states as follows:
l 20 The common instrument air line, as
! depicted in FSAR drawing 9.4.2-2 l 21 attached to Question R-6, does not meet the single failure criterion required 22 by IEEE 279-1971 and 10 CFR 50 (see Question E-15). The occurrence of this l
23 design error in the late 1970's in concert with the B&R response to other 24 single failure criterion questions L suggests that B&R is not sufficiently l
25 experienced in the performance of a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis that 26 crosses discipline boundaries. (5) In most organizations, the I&C discipline 27 would detect and immediately correct l this type of design error by performing l 28 l
l
s 1 a rigorous examination of the separation provided between redundant 2 divisions in the safety-related portions of the plant for all involved 3 disciplines.
4 5 (5) Instrument line blockage was identified as a potential concern for 6 single failure analyses in the 1970 period when an early B&W plant had 7 three instruments connected to two piping taps. Technicians repeatedly 8 replaced the instrument connected to one tap because it read differently 9 than the other two instruments connected in common to the other tap; 10 only later did they discover that a blocked instrument line was causing the 11 two common instruments to read erroneously.
12 13 0.107 Does this finding indicate a significant breakdown in 14 any portion of the OA program for STP?
15 A.107 No. Although this finding does identify a design 16 feature as a violation of technical requirements 17 applicable to the common instrument air line, there 18 is no indication in the finding itself or in the 19 questions which it cites that the selection of this 20 design feature was related to or caused by a 21 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 22 program for STP.
23 It should be noted that, after Bechtel reviewed 24 the Quadrex Report in 1982, the NRC was notified that 25 the subject of this finding was potentially 26 reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e) as a deficiency in 27 design. It was later determined that failure of the I
28 l
- 94 _
1 air line would not result in a safety hazard and that 2 the design of the common instrument air line had not !
3 been released for construction. Accordingly, the NRC 4 was informed that this was not a reportable 5 deficiency.
6 As a result of the evaluation of this finding, a '
7 review was conducted by Bechtel of all safety-related 8 piping and instrumentation diagrams (P& ids) for 9 application of the single failure criterion to 10 instrument air lines. Based upon the results of this 11 review, Bechtel determined that finding 4.3.2.1(a) 12 did not reflect a generic condition or a significant 13 safety issue.
14 15 0 108 Does this finding identify a significant breakdown in 16 any portion of the OA program for STP.
17 A.108 No. As we have discussed above, finding 4.3.2.l(a) 18 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 19 portion of the OA program for STP.
20 21 0 109 What does finding 4.3.2.l(d) state?
22 A.109 Finding 4.3.2.l(d) sta.tes as follows:
23 No formal methodology or documentation exists to verify adequate separation or 24 the single failure criterion (see Questions E-1, E-8, and E-19).
25 26 27 28
i 1 0 110 Did B&R have a formal methodology for performing and 2 documenting verification of separation requirements 3 and the single failure criterion? '
4 A.110 Yes. B&R had a procedure for design verification 5 (STP-DC-015) which required that designs be verified .
6 for failure analysis and separation and that this 7 verification be documented. This procedure satisfied 8 the requirements of Criterion III for design 9 verification.
10 11 0 111 Did B&R have a formal methodology for demonstrating 12 how design documents incorporated separation 13 requirements and the single failure criterion?
14 A.111 No. However, it may be noted that many projects have 15 been successfully completed without this type of 16 methodology (although Bechtel does have such a formal
, 17 methodology for STP). Instead, it is common practice
! 18 for each designer or design group to determine how to l
19 document incorporation of the separation requirements 20 and the single failure criterion in its design 21 documents. This practice is acceptable.
22 Furthermore, a uniform methodology or approach for 23 demonstrating satisfaction of separation requirements 24 or the single failure criterion is not required even l 25 though it may be desirable. '
26 27 28 l
I l
1
i 1 0 112 Does find ing 4. 3. 2. l( d) identify a significant 2 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
3 A.112 No. As we have discussed above, finding 4.3.2.1(d) ,
4 does not -identify a significant breakdown in any 5 portion of the OA program for STP.
6 7 0 113 What does finding 4.3.2.1(n) state?
8 A.113 Finding 4.3.2.1(n) states as follows:
9 It is planned that various types of isolation devices will be used. Actual 10 devices are still under evaluation and qualification. There is no existing 11 document that provides guidance to the designers on the circuit application of 12 these various types (e.g., optical couplers vs. fuses vs. relays, etc.).
13 It is our opinion that lack of such a document (TRD) could result in design 14 errors and licensing problems (see Question E-14).
15 16 0 114 Does finding 4.3.2.1(n) identify a significant 17 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
18 A.ll4 No. As this finding explicitly states, the use of 19 isolation devices was still under evaluation when 20 Quadrex conducted its review, and isolation devices 21 had not yet been designed, purchased, or installed.
j 22 Consequently, the type of document identified by
, 23 Quadrex was not needed at that time. Such a document 24 could be useful when selection of the isolation 25 devices was actually being made.
l 26 27 28
s -
!1 0 115 What does finding 4.5.2.1(b) state?
2 A.ll5 Finding 4.5.2.l(b) states as follows:
3 EDS did not perform a design review or design verification of preliminary 4 loads transmitted to B&R; these loads have, however, been used as a basis for 5 plant design ( see Questions C-4 and M-8).
6 7 0.116 Does finding 4.5.2.l(b) identify a significant 8 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
9 A.ll6' No. As we explained previously with respect to 10 finding 3.l(j), use of preliminary loads is 11 acceptable and not uncommon. Furthermore, it may be 12 noted that, in the questions cited in finding 13 4.5.2.l(b), Quadrex itself stated that the 14 preliminary loads transmitted by EDS were 15 conservative. In fact, a " major concern" of Quadrex 16 was the " potential overconservatism in the design" of 17 EDS. See Quadrex Report ( Applicants' Exhibit 60),
18 p. 4-38.
19 20 0.117 What does finding 4.6.2.l(n) state?
21 A.ll7 Find ing 4. 6. 2. l( n) states as follows:
22 Assumptions regarding the availability of various heat sinks under varying 23 plant conditions should be re-examined (see Question N-17).
24 Question N-17 provides further details, stating that 25 B&R should have analyzed the temperature of the water 26 in the Essential Cooling Pond (ECP) under conditions 27 of normal shutdown of two units as well as the 28
l L
1 condition which Quadrex believes was the only one 2 analyzed by B&R (normal shutdown of one unit and a 3-loss of. coolant accident (LOCA) in the other unit).
4 F
5 0 118 Does finding 4.6.2.l(n) identify a significant 6 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
7 A.118 No. Finding 4.6.2.l(n) does not identify a 8 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 9 program for STP. In fact, an analysis of the ECP had 10 been conducted under conditions of normal shutdown of 11 two units. This analysis was reflected in FSAR 12 Section 9.2.5. Consequently, finding 4.6. 2.1( n) does 13 not identify a deficiency.
14 15 0.119 What does finding 4.7.3.l(a) state?
16 A.119 Finding 4.7.3.1(a) states as follows:
17 B&R has not yet developed a criteria for jet impingement protection on 18 unbroken piping systems ( see Question
! P-20). A future TRD is planned.
0 120 Does finding 4.7.3.1(a) identify a significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
A.120 No. B&R had not yet begun design analysis of jet impingement on unbroken piping systems. Since this analysis had not begun, there was no need for B&R to have in place criteria to govern this analysis.
26 27 28
, _ _ , -, - - - - ~
E ! )
l
- 1. O.121 What does finding 4.7.3.1(b) state?
2 A.121 Finding 4.7.3.1(b) states as follows: l 3 Approximately 50% of the reviewed SDDs !
do not yet contain system operating 4 temperatures (see Question P-1).
5 Question P-1 provides further details in support of 6 this finding. Question P-1 states that, of the 7 sixteen SDDs which were reviewed by Quadrex, eight ,
8 identified system design temperatures, seven did not 9 identify a design temperature directly but did
-10 provide a cross-reference for enabling the designer 11 to determine the temperature, and one did not 12 identify either a system design temperature or a 13 cross-reference for obtaining the temperature. These 14 temperatures were used in performing preliminary 15 stress analyses.
16 17 0 122 Does finding 4.7.3.1( b) indicate a significant 18 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
19 A.122 No. As Ouestion P-1 states, all but one of the 20 sixteen SDDs reviewed by Quadrex either identified a 21 design temperature or identified a cross-reference 22 for obtaining the temperature. Either approach is an 23 acceptable means of providing guidance to designers 24 for the performance of preliminary stress analyses.
25 Consequently, finding 4.7.3.1(b) and Question P-1 do 26 not identify any pattern of deficient SDDs, but 27 instead identify only an isolated case where an SDD 28
- - - + - - -c, , , - - , . e , - , .--s, -m - -
- 100 -
1 did not yet provide guidance regarding design 2 temperatures. Furthermore, this SDD was still in 3 draft form and had not yet been issued for control of 4 design activities.
5 6 0 123 What does finding 4.7.3.1( k) state?
7 A.123 Finaing 4.7.3.1(k) states as follows:
8 , B&R assumptions for seismic to nonseismic boundary anchors are 9 probably unconservative and difficult to technically justify as adequate (see 10 Ouestion P-29).
11 0 124 Does finding 4.7.3.1( k) identify a significant 12 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
13 A.124 No. Bechtel agrees that the boundary anchor design 14 should be analyzed with a different approach than 15 that taken by B&R. However, it is common when one 16 engineer reviews the work of another, that 17 differences in approach will occasionally arise.
18 Such differences, while generally requiring 19 resolution particularly with respect to degrees of 20 conservatism of the analytical methods, do not 21 indicate the existence of a significant breakdown in 22- any portion of the OA program.
23 24- 0.125 What does finding 4.8.2.1(a) state?
25 A.125 Finding 4.8.2.1(a) states as follows:
26 The instrument air piping, between the valves actuated by redundant radiation 27 monitors and the valves that divert air flow through safety-related filter 28
- 101 -
I trains in the FHB HVAC exhaust subsystem, does not meet the single 2 failure criterion ( see Question R-6) .
3 0.126 Does this finding indicate a significant breakdown in 4 any portion of the OA program for STP?
5 A.126 No. Finding 4.8.2.1(a) is the same as finding 6 4. 3. 2. l( a) . As we have previously discussed with 7 respect to finding 4.3.2.1(a), finding 4.8.2.l(a) 8 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 9 portion of the OA program for STP and therefore would 10 not be reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i) .
11 12 0 127 What does finding 4.8. 2. l( b) state?
13 A.127 Finding 4. 8. 2.1( b) states as follows:
14 No procedures exist that define the minimum qualification requirements for 15 ALARA reviewers. Some design drawings have been reviewed and signed off for 16 ALARA. There is limited evidence that proper follow-up has occurred to verify 17 incorporation of ALARA specified designs ( see Question R-1) .
18 19 0 128 Does the absence of a document defining minimum 20 qualifications for ALARA reviewers indicate a 21 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 22 program for STP?
23 A.128 No. Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 only applies to 24 activities affecting the safety-related functions of 25 structures, systems and components. A safety-related 26 activity is an activity which assures the integrity 27 of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the 28
- 102 -
I capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it 2
in a safe shutdown condition, or the capability to 3 prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents 4
which could result in potential offsite exposures 5 comparable to those specified in 10 CFR Part 100.
6 ALARA activities are obviously not activities which 7 affect these safety-related functions. Consequently, 8
ALARA activities are not encompassed within Appendix 9 B, and therefore failure to apply the OA program 10 under Appendix B to ALARA would not be reportable 11 under 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e)(1)(i). However, for the' 12 purpose of this testimony, the findings were analyzed 13 the same as if Appendix B was applicable to ALARA.
14 Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 does not require 15 documer.tation of specific requirements for reviewers.
16 However, it should be noted that B&R did have a 17 procedure (STP-DC-016) which required the Engineering 18 project Manager to designate a qualified individual 19 to perform ALARA reviews. This provision would be 20 sufficient under Appendix B.
21 22 0 129 Does the f act that design drawings were reviewed and 23 signed off for ALARA with limited evidence of 24 follow-up to verify incorporation of ALARA specified 25 designs indicate a significant breakdown in any 26 portion of the OA program for STP?
27 28
- 103 -
1 A.129 No. Apparently, Quadrex was concerned that, with the 2 exception of a drawing sign-of f, there was an absence 3 of documented evidence that the comments of the ALARA 4 reviewers were in fact incorporated into the 5 applicable design drawings. Although such 6 documentation is one means of satisfying the 7 requirements of Criterion III for assuring that l 8 regulatory requirements and design bases are 9 correctly translated into specifications, drawings, 10 instructions, and procedures, there are other means 11 of satisfying this requirement. For example, B&R 12 identified requirements of the ALARA review in a 13' procedure (STP-DC-016) which required the ALARA 14 reviewer to provide comments to the cognizant 15 engineer and then sign-off on the relevant drawings 16 verifying compliance with the procedure. This is a 17 reasonable measure for documenting acceptable 18 incorporation of the ALARA reviewer's comments.
19 20 0.130 Does finding 4.8.2.1(b) identify a significant 21 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
22 A.130 No. As we have discussed above, finding 4.8.2.1(b) 23 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 24 portion of the OA program for STP.
25 26 27 l
28
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l 1 0 131 What does finding 4.8.2.1(c) state?
l 2 A.131 Finding 4.8.2.1(c) states as follows: l 3 Modification of the MAB HVAC system to '
eliminate filter media need to be re-4- examined (see Questions R-5 and R-29).
5 0 132 Does finding 4.8.2.l(c) identify any deficiency?
6 A.132 No. With the exception of the Radiochemistry Lab and 7 the Sample Room, exhaust filter media were not 8 provided in the HVAC design for the Mechanical 9 Auxiliary Building ( MAB) . Finding 4.8.2.l(c) simply 10 expresses Quadrex's recommendation that this design 11 be re-examined. However, the design complied with 12 the requirements of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.
13 Consecuently, there was no deficiency in the design, 14 and finding 4.8.2.l(c) does not indicate anything to 15 the contrary.
16 17 0.133 Does finding 4.8.2.1(c) identify a significant 18 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
19 A.133 No. As we have discussed above, finding 4.8.2.1(c) j 20 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 21 portion of the OA program for STP.
22
! 23 0.134 What does finding 4.8.2.l(d) states?
24 A.134 Finding 4.8.2.1(d) states as follow:
25 B&R's position that shielding calculations are not-safety-related 26 needs to be re-examined (see Question R-7). Several shielding analyses were 27 performed by NUS; however, there is no indication that B&R has verified this 28 I
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i 1 work. Standard models and codes have been used in analyses performed by BhR, .
2 yet B&R exhibited a lack of f amiliarity l with and understanding of the codes. A 3 re-review of plant shielding is !
necessary to ensure that analysis '
4 results are properly reflected in design ( see Questions R-ll, R-12, and 5 R-14). 8 i
6 0.135 Was the NRC notified that finding 4.8.2.1(d) was 7 potentially reportable?
8 A.135 Yes. On May 8, 1981, the NRC was notified that the-9 substance of finding 4.8.2.1(d) was potentially 10 reportable. Subsequently, this finding was 11 determined not to be reportable for the reasons 12 discussed with respect to finding 3.l(d).
13 14 0.136 What does finding 4.8. 2. l( e) state?
15 A.136 Finding 4.8.2.1(e) states as follows:
16 B&R has not correlated radiation zones to the shielding design and shielding 17 design has not adequately considered ISI requirements or the potential 18 locations for temporary shielding (see Ouestion R-10).
19 20 0 137 Does finding 4.8.2.i(e) identify a significant 21 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
22 A.137 No. It should be noted that the shielding design was 23 subject to ongoing reviews by B&R and that in-service 24 inspection (ISI) requirements were still being 25 developed at the time Quadrex conducted its review.
26 Thus, this finding simply identifies an activity 27 28
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I which had not yet been performed by B&R and not a 2 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 3 program for STP.
4 5 0.138 What does finding 4.8.2.l( f) state?
6 A.138 Finding 4.8.2.l( f) states as follows:
7 Radiation zone drawings based on accident conditions have not been 8 prepared (see Question R-30).
9 0.139 Does finding 4.8. 2.1( f) identify a significant 10 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
11 A.139 No. The need for radiation zone drawings based on 12 accident conditions is an outgrowth of the NRC's 13 position in Item II.B.2 of NUREG-0737, " Clarification 14 of TMI Action Plan Requirements" (November 1980).
15 B&R had not yet prepared these drawings at the time 16 Quadrex conducted its review. Thus, finding 17 4.8. 2. l( f) does not identify a significant breakdown 18 in any portion of the OA program for STP but only a 19 matter which needed to be completed.
20 21 0.140 What does finding 4.8.2.1(g) state?
22 A.140 Find ing 4. 8. 2.1( g) states as follows:
23 A design basis governing removable concrete block walls was not evident 24 (see Question R-ll).
25 0.141 Does finding 4.8. 2. l( g) identify a significant 26 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?
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I 1 A.141 No. At the time Quadrex conducted its review, the 2 design basis for removable concrete block walls was 3 still being developed by B&R. Thus, finding 4 4.8.2.1(g) does not identify a significant breakdown 5 in any portion of the OA program for STP but only a 6 matter which needed to be completed.
7 8 0.142 Please explain whether the Quadrex Report as a whole 9 would be reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)?
10 A.142 The Report itself is not an analysis of the adequacy 11 of the design OA program for STP nor does it conclude 12 that there is a widespread breakdown in the design OA 13 prog r am. Although the Report is critical of B&R's 14 engineering practices and includes suggestions for 15 their improvement, Quadrex identified relatively few 16 significant deficiencies in the design product or 17 significant failures of the design process to meet 18 NRC requirements. Our review of the findings has not 19 identified a significant breakdown in any portion of 20 the OA program for STP, except to the extent 21 previously reported to the NRC. Having reviewed the l 22 report as a whole, as well as its individual l
23 findings, we do not regard the Report itself as 24 " reportable" under 10 CFR S 50.55(e).
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STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF SIDNEY A. BERNSEN POSITION Corporate Manager of Quality Assurance, Bechtel Power Corporation /Bechtel Construction, Incorporated Manager, Division Quality Assurance Eastern Power Division, Bechtel Power Corporation EDUCATION BSME, Purdue University MSME, Purdue University.PhD, Purdue University
SUMMARY
7 Years Quality assurance management 3 Years Project management 11 Years Engineering management q 4 Years Chief engineer, nuclear and other i disciplines i 5 Years Engineering supervision , '
{ 3 Years Nuclear and mechanical engineering EXPERIENCE Dr. Bernsen has been' employed by Bechtel for 23 years. He is currently the corporate manager of quality assurance, Bechtel Power Corporation and -
Bechtel Construction, Incorporated. He also holds the position of manager of division quality ,
assurance for the Eastern Power-Division. He is responsible for overall Bechtel Power Corporation quality program policy and management of Eastern -
Power Division quality assurance. Activities under his cognizance include quality assurance functions associated with design, construction and operation
, support services.
. Dr. Bernsen previously served as assistant project manager for quality activities on the Midland Project and manager of quality on the Zimmer Project. The Zimmer Project assignment included responsibility for all Bechtel quality assurance, quality control, quality engineering and supplier quality functions associated with the verification and' construction completion programs. Earlier, Dr.
i Bernsen served as assistant project manager-technical, for the South Texas Project. In this capacity, he had management oversight over the
licensing, systems design, project procedures and coordination with the project quality assurance group.
As a member of the Bechtel power management group, Dr. Bernsen held a number of assignments including manager of nuclear engineering, chief nuclear engineer and manager of quality assurance. Earlier, Dr. Bernsen served as an engineering manager and manager of quality assurance in the San Francisco Power Division of Bechtel Power Corporation and held a number of project management, engineering manage-ment and chief engineering assignments in the Scientific Development Department. In addition, he has had experience in quality assurance, nuclear power plant design and construction, plant siting and engineering on a variety of power, aerospace and other advanced technology projects.
Prior to joining Bechtel Power Corporation Dr.
Bernsen participated in and managed analysis, design and experimentation associated with boiling, pressurized and gas cooled reactors while at the Advanced Technology Laboratory of American Standard, General Atomic and Argonne National Laboratory.
Dr. Bernsen has actively participated in codes and standards activities serving as the initial chairman of: American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
N45 Working Group 7, in preparing the initial version of ANSI N45.2 pertaining to quality assur-ance requirements for nuclear facilities; N45 l Subcommittee 2, the committee responsible for N45.2 and the daughter QA standards; and the ASME Nuclear Quality Assurance Committee. He served as the vice chairman of ANSI Committee N45 on reactor plants and
, their maintenance and is currently chairman of the l
Nuclear Technical Advisory Group reporting to the American National Standards Institute Nuclear Standards Board. He participated on the Inter-national Standard Organization's Committee TC-85, i Subcommittee 3, Working Group 8, in preparation of l
IS06215, " Nuclear Power Plants - Quality Assurnce" and the special task group formed under ANS 3 for l the preparation of the revision of the N18.7 l Standard to incorporate quality assurance provisions for operation. He was the U.S. technical expert in the drafting of the International Atomic Energy ,
Agency (IAEA) Safety Guide on OA for operation.
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l Dr. Bernsen has participated in a number of industry activities. He served as a member of the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) Committee on Reactor Licensing and Safety, organized and served as the initial chairman of the Subcommittee on Cost Impact, and as chairman of the Subcommittee on Load Combinations. He is the Bechtel Power Corporation member of the IDCOR Policy Committee and served as a member of the IDCOR Steering Committee.
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS American Society of Mechanical Er.gineers American Nuclear Society - Past member of the Board of Directors American Society for Quality control REGISTRATION Registered Nuclear Engineer, California PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS Dr. Bernsen has published or presented a number of pertinent papers on a variety of subjects. The following lists some of these in the area of quality assurance:
" Nuclear Codes, Standards, and Quality Assurance in the United States," paper published in British Nuclear International, August 1971
" Nuclear Power Plant Quality Assurance Standards -
the Status and Application of ANSI N45.2 Standards,"
a special report published by Nuclear Standards News, January 1973
" Quality Assurance in the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants," paper published in Nuclear Safety, March-April 1975
" Quality Assurance Education Requirements in the l
Engineer / Constructor Organization," presented at i 21st Annual Meeting, American Nuclear Society, New Orleans, L.A., June 8-13, 1975
" Nuclear QA Standards: A Coordinated Effort,"
article published in Nuclear News, March 1976
" Quality Assurance Experience and Viewpoint From the U.S. Industry," presentation to Norwegian Petroleum Society, Oslo, Norway, April 1978
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"The Consolidated U.S. Nuclear Quality Assurance Standard - Present Status and Application," prepared for presentation at Europeon Nuclear Conference, April 1979 l
STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF FRANK LOPEZ , JR.
Education B.A., Mathematics and B.S., Physics, Texas A & M University M.S., Nuclear Engineering, Texas A & M University Graduate Studies: Industrial Engineering Management, University of Houston M.B.A., Program and Management and Financial Management, West Coast University Employer Mr. Lopez has been employed by Bechtel Power Corporation or Bechtel Energy Corporation since graduation from college.
Summary Present: Project Engineer, Material & Configuration Management 3 Years: Project Engineer, Systems / Licensing 5 Years: Engineering Supervisor in analysis, design, licensing, and evaluation of nuclear power stations, international and domestic 3 Years: Engineer, Nuclear Analysis Employment Experience In his current assignment on the South Texas Project, Mr.
Lopez is responsible for project coordination of the Configuration Management Program including interface between the Engineering Department and other entities with respect to design freeze activities leading to systems and area completion, configuration control of design document releases, and startup interfaces. In addition, he is responsible for the Engineering Department scope of services for material management including material delivery require-ments in support of system and area completion activities in the field. As an additional duty, he supervises design office Engineering personnel responsible for ASME Code activities.
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Mr. Lopez previously served as the Assistant Project Engineer, Systems / Licensing on the South Texas Project. His duties have involved direct managment of design, licensing and quality activities for the project, including the transition of responsibilities from the previous architect / engineer. He has directly supervised the Mechanical, Nuclear, Architectural, Quality Engineering and Codes and Standards disciplines on the project, and been directly responsible for the development of the FSAR and project Design Criteria Manual.
Mr. Lopez was previously assigned as the Nuclear Engineering Group Supervisor on the Korea Nuclear Units 5 and 6 project being designed by Bechtel Power Corporation for the Korea Electric Company. His duties included the planning and administration of all nuclear-related design and procurement support activities within the Bechtel Power Corporation scope of services for the project, as well as the coordina-tion of all project licensing activities. In this position, he supervised assigned Bechtel Power Corporation nuclear engineering personnel as well as assigned Korean trainees participating in a technology transfer program.
Mr. Lopez was previously assigned as the Deputy Nuclear Group Supervisor on the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station project. This project consisted of three nuclear units under construction by Bechtel Power Corporation for the Arizona Nuclear Power Project, a group of participating utilities. In this assignment, Mr. Lopez had the primary responsibility for the development of the Final Safety Analysis Report, which was submitted to the NRC.
Mr. Lopez was previously assigned as the Nuclear Analysis Group Supervisor for the Los Angeles Power Division. His responsibilities included supervision of a technical staff of engineers and specialists in nuclear and environmental assessment. Further, he was responsible to the Chief Nuclear / Environmental Engineer for the technical adequacy of nuclear analysis tasks performed on all nuclear projects in the LAPD scope, representing twelve domestic and foreign projects.
Mr. Lopez was previously assigned as an Engineer responsible for shielding and dose assessment analysis on both foreign and domestic nuclear power projects. These included the Maanshan Nuclear Power Station project for the Taiwan Power Company and the Blue Hills Station for Gulf States Utilities. He also had responsibilities with respect to the preparation of pertinent portions of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Reports (PSAR), and for numerous environmental analysis performed for inclusion in Environmental Reports (ER).
4 Professional Affiliations Registered Professional Engineer, Texas 4
Member, American Nuclear Society
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2 :
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 3
4 In the Matter of )
)
5 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER ) Docket Nos. STN 50-498 OL COMPANY, ET AL. ) STN 50-499 OL 6 )
(South Texas Project, Units 1 )
7 and 2) )
8 9 TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,
10 OF MARK h.~ NISENBURG 11 12 0.1 Mr. Wisenburg, please state your full name and current
. 13 position.
14 A.1 My name is Mark R. Wisenburg and I am currently 15 Manager, Nuclear Licensing for Houston Lighting & Power 16 Company (HL&P).
17 18 0.2 Please describe your educational background and 19 professional experience.
20 A.2 I received my B.S. degree from the United States Naval 21 Academy in 1964 and completed the United States Naval 22 Nuclear Propulsion Training Program in 1965. After i 23 serving eleven years in the United States Navy on l 24 active nuclear submarine duty, including one year as i
25 Executive Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Naval 26 Operations (Submarine Warfare), I joined the Tennessee 27 28 I
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e 1 valley Authority (TVA) as Principal Licensing Engineer 2 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in 1975. I served ,
3 in that capacity until 1976 when I was promoted to 4 Supervisor, PWR Projects Section, Regulatory Staff, 5 responsible for licensing activities for the Sequoyah, 6 Watts Bar, Bellefonte and Yellow Creek Nuclear Plants.
7 I became Staff Nuclear Engineer in 1979, and acted as 8 asnistant licensing manager for TVA from that time 9 until 1982. In May 1982, I joined HL&P as Special 10 Assistant to the Manager, Nuclear Licensing and was 11 promoted to my current position in September, 1982.
12 13 0.3 During your professional career what involvement have 14 you had with 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e)?
15 A.3 I have had considerable experience with the 16 requirements of that regulation. Throughout my 17 employment at TVA, I was involved in evaluating 18 numerous matters for reportability, and prepared or 19 supervised the preparation of written reports required l
20 by 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e) for the Yellow Creek, l
21 Bellefonte, Watts Bar and Sequoyah nuclear plants.
l In my current position, I review all reportability i
l 22 23 determinations under 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e) by the South 24 Texas Project (STP) Incident Review Committee (IRC) and 25 often participate in the technical reviews of 26 individual matters. I prepared Revision 1 of the 27 28 t
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I current HL&P reporting procedure which, among other 2 things, established the Deficiency Evaluation Form ,
3 (DEF), and supervised the preparation of subsequent 4 revisions. I have also participated in the training of 5 HL&P Engineering and Quality Assurance (QA) personnel 6 in the applicable procedures and regulatory 7 requirements.
8 9 04 What is the purpose of your testimony?
10 A.4 The purpose of my testimony is to describe HL&P's 11 current program for the evaluation and reporting of 12 deficiencies pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e), changes 13 in that program since 1981, and, in particular, the 14 method by which conditions are evaluated in order to 15 determine whether they represent significant breakdowns 16 in the STP OA program which may be reportable under 10 17 C.F.R. S 50.55(e)(1)(i).
18 19 05 What is the current STP procedure governing the conduct 20 of reportability reviews under 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e)?
21 A.5 Project Licensing Procedure (PLP)-02, originally issued l
22 on May 18, 1982 and updated through Revision 5 on May 23 21, 1985, specifies the process by which HL&P 24 identifies and evaluates conditions which may be 25 reportable pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e). PLP-02 26 l
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I also governs the review for reportability of conditions 2 under 10 C.F.R. Part 21. Applicants' Exhibit 66 is a ,. 4 3 copy of the current procedure. While HL&P is 4 responsible for evaluating and reporting conditions 5 pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e), procedures are also 6 in place defining the responsibility of Bechtel Energy 7 Corporation (Bechtel), Ebasco Services Inc., and Ebasco 8 Constructors Inc., (Ebasco) under the regulation.
9 10 06 How are conditions which need to be evaluated for 11 reportability under 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e) identified at 12 STP?
13 A.6 Any HL&P employee becoming aware of a condition which 14 he believes may constitute a significant deficiency is 15 required to promptly prepare a DEF describing the 16 condition. Once the DEF is prepared, it is evaluated
! 17 by HL&P Engineering. If Engineering determines that a 18 significant deficiency exists, the DEF is promptly
! 19 provided to the IRC for evaluation for reportability 20 under 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e). If HL&P Engineering 21 determines that no significant deficiency exists, the 22 basis for that determination is documented and the DEF 23 is, nevertheless, transmitted to the IRC Chairman.
24 A similar process is in place for Bechtel employees 25 which provides for the initiation of a Deficiency 26 Evaluation Report (DER) whenever a significant 27 28
. deficiency is identified, and notification of HL&P, 1
2 regardless of whether Bechtel's evaluation finds that .
3 such a deficiency exists. Finally, Ebasco employees 4 are responsible for bringing conditions which may 5_ represent significant deficiencies to Bechtel's 6 attention and Bechtel, as appropriate, may generate a 7 DER.
8 Whether or not a particular condition is determined 9 to be a significant deficiency within the meaning of 10 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e), deficient conditions are, of course, 11 dispositioned and corrected using appropriate Project 12 procedures.
13 07 Who serves on the IRC?
The IRC is chaired by Mr. Michael Powell, P.E., HL&P's 14 A.7 15 Supervising Engineer-STP Licensing. Mr. Paul W.
16 Ratter, HL&P's Project OA Supervisor, also sits on the 17 Committee. In addition, the IRC includes an 18 Engineering representative cognizant in the discipline
! 19 affected by the particular condition being evaluated, 20 and other individuals, designated by the IRC Chairman l 21 on a case-by-case basis, who are familiar with the 22 matters to be evaluated. Both the Chairman and the l 23 Project QA Supervisor may designate others to sit on 24 the Committee in their stead when they are not 1
25 available during the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period within which the 26 IRC must make its determination and notify the NRC.
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1 Q.8 May HL&P executive management also convene a committee 2 to evaluate an item for reportability? ,.
3 A.8 Yes. The Group Vice President Nuclear may also 4 convene a committee to perform an evaluation under 10 5 C.F.R. S 50.55(e).
6 7' O.9 Please describe Mr. Powell's background and 8 qualifications?
9 A.9 Mr. Powell has a Bachelor of Engineering in Electrical 10 Engineering from the State University of New York at 11 Stony Brook, and a M.S. in Nuclear Engineering from 12 Georgia Institute of Technology. He was employed by 13 Sargent & Lundy Engineers as an engineer in the Nuclear 14 Safety and Licensing Division from 1978 until 1979, and 15 joined HL&P in 1980 as an Associate Engineer in the 16 Nuclear Safety and Licensing Section. He was promoted 17 to Engineer and Team Leader of the STP licensing group 18 in that same year. Mr. Powell was promoted to Lead 19 Engineer, Licensing for STP in 1981 and to his current 20 position in 1984. In that capacity, he is responsible 21 for planning and-directing the work of the STP 22 licensing section. Mr. Powell has served as IRC p 23 Chairman since 1980. He is a Registered Professional 24 -
Engineer in Texas and a Member of the American Nuclear 25 Society, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 26 Engineers, and the Health Physics Society.
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t 1 0 10 Please describe Mr. Ratter's background and 2 qualifications. ,
3 A.10 Mr. Ratter has 14 years of commercial nuclear QA/QC 4 experience, including work for J.A. Jones Construction 5 ' Company /Livsey Company, United Engineers and 6 Constructors, Bechtel-Power Corporation, and 7 Gilbert / Commonwealth Associates. He joined HL&P in 8 1979 as a Lead QA Specialist - Audits, and was promoted 9 to Supervisor, Technical Services and Vendor 10 surveillance in 1981. He was appointed to his present 11 position in March 1984, in which he is responsible for 12 the supervision of audits and surveillance, and quality 13 program development for design and procurement activi-14 ties. From March, 1982 until September, 1982, Mr.
15 Ratter was on loan to the Institute of Nuclear Power 16 Operations (INPO) as a utility representative partici-17 pating in the development of INPO's Performance 18 Objectives and Criteria for Construction Project 19 Evaluations. Mr. Ratter has obtained certificates as 20 an ANSI Level III Inspector in Procurement, a Lead 21 Auditor, a Quality Specialist - Mechanical and as a 22 Level II Inspector for a number of non-destructive 23 examination techniques.
24 25 0 11 Once the IRC is notified of a significant deficiency is 26 an IRC meeting initiated?
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1 1 A.ll Yes. The IRC is required to conduct an initial 2 evaluation to determine whether or not the condition is ,
3 reportable or potentially reportable pursuant to 10 4 C.F.R. S 50.55(e), and if so, to report it to the NRC 5 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of such notification. The IRC Chairman 6 is responsible for promptly notifying Mr. Goldberg, 7 HL&P's Group Vice President-Nuclear, myself and the 8 NRC.
9 10 0.12 Once the NRC is notified of a reportable or potentially 11 reportable condition, what does the IRC do?
12 A.12 The Chairman will initiate a technical evaluation in 13 order to confirm the determination as to the 14 reportability of the condition. That technical
, 15 evaluation is performed by a group with the expertise 16 to perform the evaluation, designated on a case by case 17 basis by the Chairman. During both the initial and 18 technical evaluations, the IRC Chairman completes an
. 19 IRC evaluation checklist, documenting its determi-l 20- nations with respect to the specific criteria of 10 21 C.F.R. S 50.55(e).
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23 0.13 What happens if the technical evaluation confirms that 24 the condition is reportable?
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1 A.13 A written report is prepared, to be forwarded to the 2 NRC within 30 days of the initial notification to the .
3 NRC. It contains all of the information required by 10
<4 C.F.R. S 50.55(e), including a description of the 5 deficiency, an analysis of the safety implications and 6 the corrective actions taken, and sufficient 7 information to permit analysis and evaluation of the 8 deficiency and the corrective action by the NRC. I am 9 responsible for reviewing the IRC's completed 10 evaluations and the written reports prior to their sub-11 mission to the NRC, and Mr. Goldberg reviews and signs 12 the written reports to the NRC.
13 14 0.14 What happens if the technical evaluation discloses that 15 the condition is not reportable?
I 16 A.14 The finding of non-reportability is confirmed by the
, 17 IRC. The determination of the IRC, including the 18 justification for concluding that the condition is not 19 reportable, is documented and the NRC is verbally 20 notified within 30 days. A written report is 1
21 subsequently prepared informing the NRC of the results 22 of the evaluation.
, 23 24 0 15 What happens if the technical evaluation cannot be l
25 completed within the 30 days required for submission of 26 the written report to the NRC?
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1 1 A.15 The condition is considered to be reportable and an l 2 interim report is prepared for submission to the NRC. , .
3 4 0 16 Is there any mechanism to verify that those matters 5 which were determined not to require IRC review, do 6 not, in fact, represent reportable deficiencies?
7 A.16 Yes. As indicated above, all DEFs are forwarded to the l l
8 IRC Chairman, regardless of whether IRC review is 9 recommended. Periodically, the Chairman convenes the 10 IRC to review those DEFs previously determined not to 11 warrant IRC review in order to provide additional 12 assurance that all significant items have been 13 adequately considered for reportability. Additionally, 14 Bechtel DERs determined not to identify significant 15 deficiencies are informally reviewed by HL&P Licensing 16 and Engineering.
17 18 0 17 How does HL&P's current procedure for evaluating 19 conditions for reportability compare to the procedure 20 in effect on May 8, 1981?
21 A.17 Although in May, 1981, there was no requirement for the 22 preparation of a DEF, both procedures require any 23 individual becoming aware of a condition which may 24 require evaluation for reportability to promptly bring 25 that information to the attention of appropriate 26 27 28
1 supervisory personnel who initiate the IRC review 2 process as appropriate. Both procedures provide for an 3 IRC determination to be made when it is informed of a matter that may be reportable. IRC review, and initial '
4 5 and written notifications to the NRC must be performed 6 in accordance with the time limits provided in 10 7 C.F.R. S 50.55(e). Differences include the designated
-8 individuals responsible for reviews, and a provision in 9 the former procedure for notification of the Resident i
10 Reactor Inspector (RRI), in addition to the Region IV 11 office. HL&P, however, continues to keep the RRI 12 informed regarding reportable items.
13 14 0 18 Were there any significant modifications of the 15 applicable reporting procedure between May 8, 1981 and 16 May 21, 1985, when the current revision of the 17 procedure was issued?
I i 18 A.18 Yes. PLP-02 Revision 1 enhanced the evaluation process 19 by, among other things, adding the requirement for the l 20 preparation of a DEF, clarifying the responsibility of 21 individuals identifying conditions warranting 22 evaluation, providing for periodic IRC review of all 23 DEFs, adding the requirement that IRC evaluation 24 checklists be completed and providing for the 25 concurrence of the Manager, Nuclear Licensing in all 26 reportability determinations.
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4 1 0.19 Did the procedure in effect in May, 1981 provide a 2 satisfactory mechanism for identifying and reporting ,.
3 deficiencies pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e)?
4 A.19 Yes. The procedure required individuals identifying 5 conditions warranting review for reportability to 6 promptly call such matters to the attention of 7 management, and pla'ced responsibility on appropriate 8 personnel to make a determination of reportability in a 9 time frame consistent with the requirements of 10 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e).
11 12 0.20 In reviewing DEPs and DERs, does the IRC routinely 13 determine whether conditions represent a significant 14 breakdown in the STP OA program which may be reportable 15 under 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e)(1)(i)?
16 A.20 Yes. The evaluation checklist used by the IRC requires 17 that it determine whether matters before it may 18 represent a significant breakdown in the STP QA 19 program, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e)(1)(i),
20 regardless of whether the other criteria for 21 reportability have been satisfied. Thus, all 22 conditions presented for IRC review are evaluated in 23 light of their implications on the STP QA program, even 24 if no deficiency in design or construction has been 25 found.
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. 1 0.21 How is the evaluation under 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e)(1)(i) 2 performed?
. i 3 A.21 It is important to recognize that there are no 4 objective standards for determining whether a specific 5 condition represents a'significent GA breakdown. The 6 determination that a particular matter represents such 7 a breakdown is a subjective determination that must be 8
made on the basis of sound judgment by knowledgeable 9 persons.
10 It is difficult, if not impossible, to provide a 11 hard and fast rule as to what represents a significant 12 breakdown of the OA program. While the mere existence 13 of a deviation from the QA program (such as an 14 inadequate, incomplete or erroneous inspection record) 15 may not rise to the level of a significant GA 16 breakdown, the nature, extent and ramifications of the f
17 specific condition being evaluated must be considered.
18 19 0 22 Please provide an example of how the current 10 C.F.R.
-20 S 50.55(e) reporting procedure has been applied under f 21 circumstances in which a condition with OA implications I 22 has been evaluated by the IRC.
I 23 A.22 The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in its May 17, 24 .
1985 Sixth Prehearing Conference Order at 8, has 25 identified an item related to NRC I&E Unresolved Item 26 83-12-01 which can serve as an example.
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1 0 23 What was the nature of the condition which was 2 evaluated for reportability? .
3 A.23 The condition which was evaluated was identified in two 4 HL&P audits of Bechtel Engineering, and was documented 5' in two HL&P Corrective Action Reports (CAR) issued 6 against Bechtel, in October 1982 and June 1983, for the 7 omission of references to specific OA standards 8 (certain ANSI and other industry standards) in three 9 procurement specifications.
10 11 0 24 Please describe, more specifically, the conditions 12 addr'essed in the two CARS.
13 A.24 CAR G-165, issued in October, 1982, indicated, among 14 other things, that HL&P OA's review of two procurement L 15 specifications during an audit found that " seemingly 16 applicable" ANSI N45.2 daughter standards had not been 17 invoked in the specifications, and that Bechtel's 18 technical and QA reviews for quality content had not 19 identified the apparent deficiencies. The second CAR,
- 20 G-278, was issued in June, 1983 and indicated, among l 21 other things, that, apparently contrary to Project l
22 requirements, certain industry standards had not been 23 referenced in a procurement specification. It also l_
24 indicated that Bechtel OA's review of the specification l
25 had not identified the absence of the standards.
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.- I 1 0 25 How was this matter brought to the attention of the 2 IRC?
3 A.25 When the NRC Inspactor, during the course of Inspection 4 83-12, noted that the apparent omission of the QA 5 standards in the procurement specifications may have 6 been indicative of a reportable breakdown in the STP QA 7 program, HL&P's Project QA Manager prepared a DEF 8 citing the results of the two HL&P audits which had 9 identified the omission of the QA standards. After the 10 DEF was reviewed by HL&P Engineering, it was forwarded 11 to the IRC for review.
12 0 26 Did the IRC conclude that the matter represented a 13 significant breakdown in the STP QA program?
14 A.26 No. The IRC determined that the two CARS did not 15 represent a significant breakdown in the STP QA program 16 and did not meet the criteria for reportability of 10 17 C.F.R. S 50.55(e).
18 19 0 27 Please describe how the IRC determined that the 20 condition did not represent a significant QA breakdown.
21 A.27 After consultation with the appropriate Bechtel 22 Engineering and QA personnel in order to review 23 Bechtel's actions in response to the CARS, the IRC 24 determined that, in both cases, Bechtel had, in fact, 25 evaluated the specifications in question in order to 26 determine which QA standards ought to be imposed on the 27 28
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i 1 vendors. Although HL&P's standard practice was 2 somewhat different than Bechtel's practice and would -
I 3 have resulted in the selection of a somewhat different 4 set of standards, Bechtel had followed its NRC approved 5 OA program, and the IRC determined that there had been 6 no OA breakdown.
7 8 0 28 What action was taken in response to the CARS?
9 A.28 After discussion between Bechtel Engineering and HL&P 10 OA, it was determined that the appropriate OA standards 11 had, in fact, been referenced in the specifications.
12 However, because the scope of work under one of the 13 specifications had subsequently changed, that 14 specification was modified to reference the additional, 15 applicable standards.
16 17 18 0.29 While a specific condition may be determined not to 19 represent a significant GA breakdown, is there any 20 effort to determine whether a number of such 21 conditions, taken together, represent such a breakdown?
22 A.29 Yes. HL&P's trending program provides for the review 23 of all deficiency documents generated on the Project l 24 (including all DEPs and DERs) against the criteria of 25 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e), in order to determine if a number 26 of such conditions, taken together, may be reportable.
27 28 l
1 Under that program, all deficiency documents generated 2 by HL&P, Bechtel and Ebasco are collected, coded and .
3 analyzed in order to determine whether any of the 4 conditions reported in such documents, taken together, 5 constitute a trend. Whenever a trend is identified, i
6 the condition is evaluated for reportability pursuant l 7 to 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e) by HL&P OA. If there appears 8 to be a reportable condition, a DEF is initiated and 9 transmitted to the IRC for evaluation.
10 In order to determine if a trend exists, deficiency 11 documents are coded by company, organization, 12 discipline or group, activity (such as soils, receiving 13 or Cadwelding) and deficiency type (such as drafting 14 deficiencies, fabrication errors or interferences).
15 Deficiencies are normalized against criteria such as 16 manhours, quantity installed and hours of inspection, 17 and analyzed to determine if any immediate carrective 18 action or further review is warranted.
19 A summary of new trends identified and actions 20 taken on previously identified trends is included in 21 monthly reports and a formal, detailed Trend Report is l 22 prepared quarterly and distributed to, among others, 23 the Group Vice President-Nuclear, QA Manager, Project 24 OA Manager, Bechtel Project QA Manager and Ebasco l 25 26 27 t . 28 i
l l
1 Quality Program Site Manager. Quarterly Trend Reports 2 and other documentation of trends are maintained and ,
3 controlled as formal OA records. .
4 5 0.30 Does HL&P's current program provide a satisfactory 6 mechanism for the identification and reporting of 7 deficiencies under 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e) and, in 8 particular, for the identification and reporting of 9 reportable OA deficiencies under 10 C.F.R.
10 S 50.55(e)(1)(i)?
11 A.30 The program in effect at STP requires that Project 12 employees promptly call matters warranting review for 13 reportability to the attention of appropriate 14 management personnel, provides for prompt evaluation by 15 appropriate individuals of conditions which may be 16 reportable, and includes a mechanism to assure that 17 matters determined not to require IRC review have 18 received adequate consideration. In each case in which 19 the IRC evaluates a condition for reportability, a 20 determination is made as to whether the condition may 21 represent a significant QA breakdown, regardless of 22 whether the other criteria for reportability have been j
23 satisfied. Finally, HL&P's trending program provides 24 additional assurance that conditions which may be i 25 insignificant standing alone, but which, taken
- 26 together, may represent a significant OA breakdown, are
- 27 l
l 28 l
l l
l
C
_ 19 _
1 evaluated for reportability. Accordingly, HL&P's 2 current reporting program is more than satisfactory and 3 provides assurance that HL&P will continue to meet.its 4 cbligations under 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e).
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
, HOUSTCN UGHTING & PcWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT PROCEDURE MANUAL T
SUMMARY
OF REVISIONS
( PR OC. NO.
~
SUBJECT REPORTING DE5IGN AND CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES TO NRC
~
~cyV'5'
, ,* Ouality Related - Yes REVISION DESCRIPTION 0 Changed procedure number from PEP-4.01 to PLP-02. In addition, changed the lead responsiblity for initial notification of all deficiencies solely to the Team Leader, Nuclear Licensing; removed distinction between site and home office handling of deficiencies and clarified engineering's role in the evaluations.
1 Complete revision to procedure.
2 Change to Section 5.6 changing Project Manager to Manager, South Texas Project. Editorial changes to Attachment 9.3.
Revision to Attachment 9.5.
3 Changed " incident" to deficiency. Added new sections 4.2.10, 5.4, 6.5, 6.6 and re-renumbered existing Sections. Added new Attachments 9.8 and 9.9. Attachments 9.5 and 9.7 were revised.
4 Changed Manager, STP Site to Deputy Project Manager in Attachment 9.8 on Page 23. Added Deputy Project Manager Attachment 9.9, page 24.
5 Changed Executive Vice President, Nuclear to Group Vice President, Nuclear in Sections 4.2.9, 4.3.4 and 5.8. Deleted reference to Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Construction in Section 5.8 since this position no longer exists. Added the word boundary to attachment 9.5, item B.1 to identify "the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary." These changes are editorial in nature.
l l
REVISION AUTMORIZ ATION REVISION O 1 2 3 4 5 NUMBER DATE 05-18-82 08-04-82 01-27-83 08-03-83 07-01-84 05-21-85 ISS UE D PREPARED M.E. Powell L.J.Klement M.E. Powell M.E. Powell M.E. Powell M. E. pPowell g'aov'D L.J.Klement L.J.Klement L.J.Klement L.J.Klement '/[Powell I
APP R O V E D tv STP 60 (540) 1
STP$9A (1 831
- P R OC. NO. MEV.NO.
HOUSTON UGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT PROCEDURE MANUAL PLP-02 5
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REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 05-21-85 DEFICIENCIES TO NRC 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 To establish the procedure for identifying and evaluating conditions which could potentially affect the safety functions of STP and for reporting deficiencies, defects and noncompliance to NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21.
2.0 SCOPE t
2.1 This procedure applies to conditions identified during the design,
! engineering, and construction phases of each unit of the STP, prior to l
the issuance of the operating license for each respective unit.
2.2 This procedure also applies to conditions reported to STP by its architect-engineers, constructors, suppliers and any other contractors or consultants.
3.0 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 3.1 NRC I&E Information Notices 80-28, " Prompt Reporting of Information in
- Accordance with 50.55(e)." 79-30, " Reporting of Defects and l Noncompliance, 10 CFR Part 21."
3.2 10 CFR 50.55(e) - Attachment 9.1 3.3 10 CFR 21
- 3.4 NRC I&E Inspection Manual, " Guidance - 10 CFR 50.55(e) Construction i Deficiency Reporting", 4-01-80.
3.5 Corporate Procedure Handling of Conditions Potentially Reportable under 10CFR21
! 3.6 Reporting of Safety-Related Defects and Non-Compliancies -
Attachment 9.2 4.0 DEFINITIONS 4.1 10 CFR 50.55(e) Definitions - As used in this procedure 4.1.1 Significant - Having an effect or likely to have an effect on, or influence, the safe operation of the facility in an adverse manner.
4.1.2 Extensive - Expenditure of resources (time, manpower, or money) to a degree disproportionate with the original design, test or construction expenditure.
4.1.3 Final Design - Denotes those drawings, specifications, or other engineering documents that have been reviewed, approved and released for fabrication, installation or construction.
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REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 05-21-85 _
DEFICIENCIES TO NRC 4.1.4 Potentially Reportable Deficiency - A deficiency in design or construction which could be significant but for which additional time is required (in excess of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) to determine if the criteria for a reportable deficiency have been met. ,
4.1.5 Reportable Deficiency - A deficiency in design or construction, which, were it to have remained uncorrected, could have adversely affected the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant at anytime throughout the expected lifetime of the plant, and which represents at least one of the following criteria:
(i) A significant breakdown in any portion of the Quality Assurance Program conducted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
(ii) A signtficant deficiency in final design as approved and released for construction such that the design does nut conform to the criteria and bases stated in the Safety T t
Analysis Report (SAR) or construction permit. 1 (iii) A significant deficiency in construction of or signifi-cant damage to a structure, system, or component which will require extensive evaluation, extensive redesign, or extensive repair to meet the criteria and bases stated in the Safety Analysis Report or construction permit or to otherwise establish the adequacy of the structure, system, or component to perform its intended safety function.
(iv) A significant deviation from performance specifications which will require extensive evaluation, extensive redesign, or extensive repair to establish the adequacy of the structure, system, or component to meet the criteria and bases stated in the Safety Analysis Report or construction pennit or to othemise establish the adequacy of the structure system or component to perform its intended safety function.
4.2 10 CFR 21 Definitions - As used in this procedure 4.2.1 Basic Component - A nuclear power plant structure, system, component, or part thereof, necessary to assure:
(1) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; or .,
(2) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or W2/F002/a
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(3) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to those referred to in 10 CFR 100.11.
In all cases, the term " basic component" includes design, inspection, testing, or consulting services, important to safety, that are associated witn the component hardware, whether these services are pc ' formed by the component supplier or others.
Those plant structures, systems, or components, or parts thereof, at a minimum, which are identified as either Safety Class I, 2, or 3 or Seismic Category I, are basic components.
4.2.2 Commercial Grade Item - An item that is (1) not subject to design or specification requirements that are unique to facilities or activities licensed by NRC, and (2) used in applications other than facilities or activities licensed by NRC, and (3) able to be ordered from a manufacturer / supplier on the basis of specifications set forth in his published product description (e.g., a catalog).
A comercial grade item becomes a basic component after receipt when it is dedicated (designated for use as a basic component) by the recipient.
4.2.3 Deviation - A departure from the technical requirements of a j procurement document for a basic component.
i 4.2.4 Procurement Document - A contract which defines the requirements which the facility or basic component must meet in l order to be considered acceptable by the purchaser. This L
includes specifications, purchase orders and other documents i that establish the requirements for purchaser acceptance and l
includes code requirements, drawings and procedures that are referenced as part of the procurement document.
4.2.5 Delivery - Transfer of control of a basic component. Delivery occurs upon acceptance of a basic component made subsequent to a test or inspection which takes place within a reasonable time after receipt. If no test or inspection is performed within a reasonable time, the basic component will be deemed to have been delivered. If a component is rejected on the basis of a deviation identified during a receipt test or inspection, delivery has not occurred.
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4.2.6 Substantial Safety Hazard - A loss of safety function to the extent that there is a major reduction in the dyree of protec-tion provided to public health and safety (including employee health and safety). Criteria which are appropriate for the determination of the creation of a substantial safety hazard include:
- Moderate exposure to, or release of, radioactive effluents or materials; t
Major degradation of essential safety-related equipment;
- Major deficiencies in design, construction, use of, or management controls for licensed facilities or material.
i 4.2.7 Defect -
(1) A deviation in a basic component delivered to a purchaser for use in a facility or activity subject to 10 CFR 21, s
(
if, on the basis of an evaluation, the deviation could
)
create a substantial safety hazard; g -
(2) The instailation, use, or operation of a basic component containing a defect as defined in (1) above; or (3) A deviation in a portion of a facility subject to the con-struction permit requirements of 10 CFR 50, provided the deviation could, on the basis of an evaluation, create a substantial safety hazard and the portion of the facility containing the deviation has been offered to the purchaser for acceptance; E (4) A condition or circumstance involving a basic component that could contribute to the exceeding (4 a safety limit, as defined in the technical specifications of a license for operation issued pursuant to 10CFR Part 50.
4.2.8 Noncompliance - The failure of a basic component activity, or facility to comply with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or any applicable rule, regulation, order or license of the NRC relating to substantial safety hazard.
- 4.2.9 Responsible Officer - The Group Vice-President, Nuclear a is that individual in HL&P who is vested with executive authority ever the activities subject to 10 CFR 21. 3 4.2.10 Responsible Individual - Those individuals within HL&P who may become cognizant of 10CFR21 reports made by STP architect-engineers, constructors, suppliers and any other W2/F002/a
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contractors or consultants. See Attachment 9.8 for a listing of STP responsible individuals.
4.2.11 Constructing or Construction - The design, manufacture, fabrication, placement, erection, installation, ri.odification, l inspection, or testing of a facility or activity, and consult-ing services related to the facility or activity that are im-portant to safety.
4.3 Procedure Definitions 4.3.1 Significant Deficiency - An event or condition which has an effect or is likely to have an effect on, or influence, the safe operation of the facility in an adverse manner.
1 4.3.2 Initial Evaluation - Evaluation of a significant deficiency to determine if it is a reportable or potentially reportable deficiency under 10 CFR 50.55(e) or if there is a need to consider 1t further under 10 CFR Part 21.
- 4.3.3 Technical Evaluation - The technical, including safety, evalua-tion of a significant incident to determine if the criteria for reportable deficiency under 10 CFR 50.55(e) or a defect or non-compliance under 10 CFR 21 are met. The technical evaluation is performed subsequent to the initial evaluation.
4.3.4 Incident Review Committee.{IRC) - The project committee respons-ible for conducting the initial evaluation and subsequent tech-nical evaluation of significant deficiencies. Unless an incident review is conducted by a committee under the direction and supervision of the Group Vice President, Nuclear as a minimum, the IRC shall consist of the following members or their designees:
- 1. ProjectLicensingEngineer(Chairman)
- 2. Project QA Supervisor
- 3. Cognizant Supervising Project Engineer, Houston Engineering
- 4. Other cognizant individual (s) as designated by the Chairman.
4.3.5 Notification - A telephone, telegraphic or verbal report.
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DEFICIENCIES TO NRC 5.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 5.1 Originator 5.1.1 Any HL&P employee, except those individuals carrying out their responsibility as required by Section 5.4, who becomes aware of a condition which he or she believes constitutes a substantial safety hazard or a significant deficiency has the responsi-bility to prepare a Deficiency Evaluation Form (DEF) in accordance with this procedure. A DEF must be prepared even under circumstances where the information is known to be covered by a NCR.
i 5.1.2 The originator has the responsibility to provide accurate and sufficient data or information to the extent known.
5.2 ResponsibleSupervisingProjectEngineer(SPE) 5.2.1 The SPE is responsible for reviewing deficiencies documented by i~ '
a DEF and making recommendations relative to their significance to the Manager, Engineering. }
5.3 Manager, Engineering 5.3.1 The Manager, Engineering is responsible for performing prelim-inary screening of documented deficiencies to determine if they are significant deficiencies.
L 5.3.2 The Manager, Engineering is responsible for notifying the IRC Chairman of significant deficiencies.
l 5.3.3 The Manager, Engineering is responsible for technical interface with the major contractors regarding technical support in evaluation of 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21 items.
5.4 Responsible Individuals 5.4.1 Those designated responsible individuals (see attachment 9.8) are responsible for imediately informing the IRC Chairman once they become aware that any STP supplier, contractor or consultant has notified the NRC of a 10CFR21 item that may be applicable to the STP.
5.4.2 Those individuals responsible for the interface with the STP l
architect-engineer and/or NSSS supplier are responsible for
! 1mmediately informing the IRC Chairman once they become aware ',
that the STP architect-engineer and/or NSSS supplier has notified the NRC, or HL&P of potentially reportable deficiencies. See attachment 9.9.
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5.5 Incident Review Connittee (IRC) 5.5.1 The IRC is responsible for conducting the initial evaluation of significant deficiencies and, if applicable, for initiating and reviewing the technical evaluation.
5.5.2 The IRC Chairman is responsible for drafting the written reports to NRC.
5.5.3 The IRC Chairman is responsible for publishing minutes of each IRC meeting. Minutes shall include, as a minimum, identification of participants, listing of deficiencies considered, and an explanation of findings, as applicable'.
5.5.4 The IRC 'Chaiman is responsible for notifying the NRC of i potentially reportable deficiencies and reportable deficiencies. The initial notification (if appropriate) shall be made within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the time that the IRC Chaiman is informed that there exists a significant deficiency.
5.5.5 The IRC Chairman is responsible for maintaining files pertaining to 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21 evaluations.
5.5.6 The IRC Chairman is responsible for notifying the originator of the disposition of those items referred to the IRC. This may be accomplished by sending the originator a copy of the IRC meeting minutes.
5.6 Manager, Nuclear Licensing 5.6.1 The Manager, Nuclear Licensing is responsible for reviewing the IRC's completed evaluations and the written reports before i
submission to the NRC.
5.7 Manager, South Texas Project 5.7.1 The Manager, South Texas Project ensures that appropriate resources are made available to assure that evaluations and
- reports are completed in a timely manner.
i 5.8 Group Vice-President, Nuclear 5.8.1 The Group Vice-President, Nuclear is responsible for submitting the written reports to the NRC.
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- * '** ATEissisEO I REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES TO NRC 05-21 6.0 PROCEDURE 6.1 Any HL&P Employee who identifies an event or condition that may be a significant deficiency, or who obtains infomation of such an event or condition, shall prepare a Deficiency Evaluation Form (DEF)
(Attachment 9.3) and forward it directly to the responsible Supervising Project Engineer (SPE) in Engineering. If the originator is unsure who the responsible SPE is, he shall forward it directly to the Manager, Engineering for distribution. The DEF should be prepared in as short a time frame as possible, and should include sufficient information to facilitate preliminary assessment.
6.2 The responsible SPE shall log in the DEF and confirm that the DEF is accurate and contains sufficient information to facilitate preliminary assessment. He shall then review the DEF expeditiously to determine if it should be recommended for IRC review. If the SPE determines that a reported condition or event does not constitute a significant deficiency he shall document the basis for that determination on the DEF.
6.2.1 If recommended for review by the IRC, it is so noted on the DEF
}
and forwarded (hand-carried) to the Manager, Engineering.
6.2.2 If not recomended, it is so noted on the form and copies sent to:
- 1) Originator
- 2) Manager, Engineering
- 3) IRC Chaiman 6.2.3 In either case, DEF's should be processed expeditiously and without delay to reach the Manager, Engineering as soon as possible.
6.3 If the Manager, Engineering is not available, the responsible SPE shall act for the Manager to accomplish the activities described in 6.4.
6.4 For a DEF which the SPE has recomended for IRC review, the Manager.
Engineering shall immediately evaluate the DEF to determine if the condition or event reported constitutes a significant deficiency. If he detemines that a significant deficiency exists he shall send the DEF to the IRC for review.
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i 6.4.1 If the DEF is to be reviewed by IRC, it is so noted on the DEF and imediately forwarded (hand-carried) to the IRC Chairman.
6.4.2 If the DEF is not to be reviewed by IRC, it is so noted on the form along with an appropriate explanation and copies sent to:
l 1) Originator
- 2) IRC Chairman
- 3) Responsible SPE l 6.5 In the event that a responsible individual (see attachment 9.8)
- becomes aware that any STP supplier, contractor or consultant has notified the NRC of a 10CFR21 item that may be applicable to STP, he shall imediately so inform the IRC Chairman.
6.6 In the event that any of those individuals responsible for the l
interface with the STP architect-engineer and/or NSSS supplier becomes aware that the STP architect-engineer and/or NSSS supplier has notified the NRC, or HL&P, of a potentially reportable deficiency, he shall imediately so inform the IRC Chairman.
- t. ,
6.7 The IRC Chairman, upon notification by the Manager, Engineering, of a significant deficiency; or by a responsible individual becoming aware of a 10CFR21 item reported by a vendor (per Section 6.5); or after l being informed of a potentially reportable deficiency as required by Section 6.6; shall initiate an IRC meeting.
6.7.1 The IRC shall conduct an initial evaluation to determine if the significant deficiency is a potentially reportable deficiency, a reportable deficiency, or not reportable, under provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e) and to determine if there is a need to further consider the deficiency under the provisions of 10 CFR 21.
6.7.2 The detennination of the IRC shall be documented on an IRC Evaluation Form (Attachment 9.4). Minutes of the IRC meeting f : hall be available as soon as practicable. A copy of the IRC Evaluation Form shall be sent to ths originator.
6.7.3 If the IRC determines that a reportable or potentially reportable deficiency exists the IRC Chairman shall notify the NRC. The initial evaluation and notification to NRC shall be accomplished within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from the time that the IRC Chairman was informed that a significant deficiency exists.
The notification to NRC must be documented in telephone minutes.
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REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES TO NRC 05-21-85, 6.8 If the NRC is notified of a potentially reportable deficiency or the IRC has determined that 10 CFR 21 might be applicable, the IRC Chairman shall initiate a technical evaluation.
6.8.1 The technical evaluation will be conducted to make a final determination of reportability under 10 CFR 50.55(e) and to determine reportability under 10 CFR 21.
6.8.2 The IRC Chairman shall assign a cognizant group with expertise related to the. incident to perform the technical evaluation.
6.8.3 If the technical evaluation as reviewed by the IRC indicates the matter is reportable, the IRC Chairman will prepare a written report per Section 7.0 for submittal to the NRC.
6.8.4 The written report shall contain, as a minimum, the known information required by 10 CFR 50.55(e). If the determination is made that the incident is reportable under 10 CFR 21, the information required by 10 CFR 21.21 shall also be included.
2 .' 6.8.5 If the technical evaluation indicates the matter is not report-able, the IRC Chainnan will convene the IRC to verify the find-ing of non-reportability. Meeting minutes shall be available as soon as practical, and shall document the determination with justification.
6.8.6 If the NRC was notified of a potentially reportable deficiency, but the technical evaluation determines that the deficiency is not reportable, the technical evaluation will document such determination with justification. Once the IRC has concurred that the item is not reportable, the IRC Chairman shall notify the NRC, document the notification on the IRC Evaluation Form and prepare a written report to inform the NRC of the results of the evaluation.
6.8.7 Normally, if the technical evaluation cannot be completed on a schedule consistent with the preparation of the written report, the deficiency is considered reportable and an interim report
~
shall be submitted to NRC per Section 7.0. An item can be maintained as potentially reportable after the 30 day report, if the technical evaluation is ongoing and is expected to be routinely completed soon after the 30 day period. In such a case, a followup report will be submitted to the NRC upon completion of the technical evaluation.
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,- REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 05-21-85 DEFICIENCIES TO NRC 6.9 For reportable or potentially reportable deficiencies that are also determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 21, NRC shall be notified by including the appropriate information in the report described in Sec-tion 7.0. However, the Notification process and other subsequent requirements of this procedure shall be invoked as if the defect or noncompliance were a reportable deficiency under 10 CFR 50.55(e). For deficiencies determined reportable under 10 CFR 21 but not otherwise reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e), the NRC shall be notified in accordance with 10 CFR 21. 10 CFR 21 requires initial notification within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of completion of IRC's determination that 10 CFR 21 applies.
6.10 The IRC shall also be convened from time to time by the IRC Chaiman to review those DEF's that Engineering determined were not significant. The purpose of this review is to provide added assurance that all significant items are being considered by the IRC. Meeting minutes should include a listing of those DEF's considered and conclusions reached.
7.0 REPORTS TO NRC 7.1 For those deficiencies determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e) the written report will be submitted to NRC within 30 calendar days of the initial notification to NRC. This report shall l
contain the pertinent elements identified in Attachment 9.6. For those items called into the NRC as potentially reportable but subsequently determined not to be reportable, verbal notification must be made to the NRC within 30 calendar days followed by written confirmation.
7.2 For those deficiencies determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 21 but not under 10 CFR 50.55(e), the written report shall be submitted to NRC within 5 days of the completion of IRC's determination that 10 CFR 21 applies.
8.0 MAINTENANCE OF RECORDS 8.1 In addition to any other files maintained by applicable procedures, a file of each deficiency evaluated by an IRC subsequent to the effective date of this procedure shall be maintained under the cognizance of the IRC Chairman.
8.2 Each file shall contain the documentation associated with the deficiency including the IRC Evaluation Form with all supporting documentation, copies of minutes of IRC meetings, and all copies of written reports to NRC.
8.3 A copy of those items described in 8.2 shall be forwarded to Recordt Management.
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9.0 ATTACHMENTS 9.1 10 CFR 50.55(e) 9.2 Reporting of Safety-Related Defects and Non-Compliance t
9.3 Deficiency Evaluation Form 9.4 IRC Evaluation Form 9.5 10 CFR 21 Evaluation Form 9.6 Contents of Written Report 9.7 Procedure Flow Chart 9.8 List of Responsible Individuals 9.9 List of Individuals responsible for the architect-engineer /NSSS supplier interface
)
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f .
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- * * ^ 'ssuE O REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 05-21-85 DEFICIENCIES TO NRC ATTACHMENT 9.1 - 10 CFR 50.55(e) Pace 1 of 1 te) (1) If the permit is for construc- (2) The holder of a ' construction tion of a nuclear power plant. the permit shall within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> notify holder of the permit shall notify the the appropriate NucTear Regulatory Commission of each deffetency found Commlaston Inspection and Enforce-in design and construction, which. ment Regional Office of each rep rta-were it to have remained uncorrected, ble deficiency.
~
_,, m, .
could have affected adversely the (3) The holder of a construction safety of operations of the nuclear permit shall also submit a written power plant at any time throughout report on a reportable deficiency the expected lifetime of the plant. and within thirty (30) days to the appro-which represents: priate NRC Regional Office shown in (1) A sign!!! cant breakdown in any Appendix D of Part 20 of this chapter, portion of the quality assurance pro. Copies of such report shall be sent to gram conducted in accordance with **the Director of Inspection and En.
the requirements of Appendix B to forcement. UE. Nuclear Regulatory this part; or
(!!) A significant deficiency in final Commission. Washington. D.C. 20555-design as approved and released for The report shall include a description of the deficiency, an analysis of the construction such that the design does safety implications and the corrective not conform to the criteria and bases action taken, and sufficient informa-stated in the safety analysis report or constructfon pernut; or tion to permit analysis and evaluation (11D A signi!! cant defielency in con- of the deficiency and of the corrective struction of or significant damage to a action. If sufficient information is not structure. system, or component which available for a definitive report to be will require extensive evaluation, ex- submitted within 30 days, an intenm tensive redesign, or extensive repair to report containing all available infor-mation shall be filed. together with a meet the criteria and bases stated in statement as to when a complete the safety analysis report or construc-tion permit or to otherwise establish report will be filed. ,.
the adequacy of the structure, system. (4) Remedial action may be taken or component to perform its intended both prior to and after notification of i
safety function:or the Divulon of Inspection and En-l (iv) A significant deviation from per* forcement subject to the risk of subse-formance specifications which wi!I re- quent disapproval of such action by quire extensive evaluation, extensive the Commission, redesign, or extensive repair to estab-lish the adequacy of a structure, systern, or component to meet the erl.
' teria and bases stated in the safety analysis report or construction perTnit or to otherwise establish the adequacy of the structure, system, or component to perform Ita ,latended safety func-tion. ,
W2/F002/a
PR OC. NO. MEV.NO.
HOUSTON UGHTING S POWER CtMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT PROCEDURE MANUAL PLP-02 5 TIT LE PAGE OF
. PROJECT LICENSING PROCEDURE 14 24 ,
)
'"' REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
- ^rEissuEO 05-21-85 DEFICIENCIES TO NRC ATTACHMENT 9.2 - 10 CFR 21 Page 1 of 2 10 CFR 21 " Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances
See the following page for a statement of the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21.
f C
me M2/F002/a
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CCMPANY PitOC. NO. fiE V. N O.
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT PROCEDURE MANUAL PLP-02 5 TITLE PAGE OF PROJECT LICENSING PROCEDURE 15 24 SU BJE CT OATEISSUED REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES TO NRC 05-21-84 -
- Reporting of Safety Related Defects and Non Cornpliances Attachment 9.2 o m o ur.ac.csa.o**"
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- solu.11p eleistes or senses to se *(l) ene caseeests of tee constee tietete meteet ress#e esasisers.
ente. e,e,. e*, see er eletten, stea eroe of tais tes.se ast, s.y *(f) see sesentitty se emet-easa tasee. nee *, se est iteemme se.stste, see feettf er ese mentata 13 to
.e>*ca setectee etelettaa seets esse sweetts.
sesettee, erse He e este seet-essa e.asitte.
se stref tteat teniensat of e neste eveat er causae=t of sure a foretets saisit.
usea saaet
- (3)estemte tae aseettists see seasse to r.entes of et me,ation, of estteents seita acele tasatoart.see a. eject feeteearn e fees er of etetetten, or to tesetteus*t cesett ette estesse to en eme.temme matities of eH.
et fissies ones.of rts as esteeltaa.
to to een e. tetten scope ise.e s peers.
ee a etelettaa er tot *. If een. es er tar Cesstaa.
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- _- ._ . . _ . . . . . _ . _ ~ _ _ . . . ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . . _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _ _
STP 59 A f1833 HOUSTON LIGHTING G POWER COMPANY PROC. NO. REV.NO.
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT PROCEDURE MANUAL PLP-02 5
=
TITLE PAGE OF PROJECT LICENSING PROCEDURE 16 24 -
('
'" AreissuEo REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES TO NRC 05-21 .
ATTACHMENT 9.3 Page I of 2 OtFICtfNCY EVALUATION FORM
}
The purpene of the Form a se prende a mechanam for HLAP ausseyees Teite in by Supernmag Prosest Enynner se edenefy to Eng neenns cand.uoni senesstad to be seniidered as Devicaensies, pursuant to PLP-02. The instaators should eve as sempeeu a densnpuan -
a poistwe. Une addebonal sheru as nessuary DATE RECElvED Artenen Uness Safety Class of Component Searns Category of Campenent, I Gesuming Dnipi Desuneu er System in Ount.on syirsen er Structure in Quswan Unet 1 SC-1 C Cat I SDD C Unit 2 C IC-2 C Non-Cat i SPEC-Sotn Unru SC-3 CTHER C IE hN5 Recurremenu of Component, Sysum e Suusnat as Raated to the Consem:
J Dnsnecon of Condauan:
l
, Ho. D,,co e,.d.
DEF Inst.atar Dau
$PE (Valuation-
] Rehr toIRC Referr4 so IRC emedwed not nessenary Olmasman SPE Deu i WAN ACf m thCINgt niNG Refse se IRC Referral so IRC sere,dered not massinary. Diesuomen OsANAG(R Des co-eies .n at:
- , , - - m - -, , , . . , _ _ - , ,. ., _-,---w. r . -- _ _ . - - - - ~ , ,_ y ----. . . _ . - , , - _ _ _ , _ _ . _ m - , , , , - , , , . , . . ~ . _ , ,,_w...-y,
$h 8 P "Jw d4 t i #J t
, HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY PRCC.NO. f:E V. NO.
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT PROCEDURE MANUAL PLP-02 5 TITLE PAGE OF PROJECT LICENSING PROCEDURE 17 24
'"'"'*' ^'88
REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES TO NRC 05-21-85 ,
ATTACHMENT 9.3 Page 2 of 2 INSTRUCTION FOR COMPLETING A DEFICIENCY EVALUATION FORM LINE NO. INSTRUCTION .
1 The responsible SPE should assign and record form and revision number; enter date report received.
2 Record the unit number (s) affected. Record the safety class l and seismic category of the system structure, or component.
e
( 3 Give a brief description of how the deficiency wcs discovered.
Reference any deficiency related documents.
l 4 Record the title of the governing documents.
l 5 Record the requirement stated in the governing documents.
l 6 Describe the deviation and hazard as accurately and completely
(,' as possible.
7 Signature of the initiator and the date the fonn was prepared.
8 The SPE marks the appropriate "yes" or "no" block, signs and dates the DEF. Provide a short discussion of the basis for the determination. Distribution is made in accordance with Section 6.2.
9 The Manager Engineering, marks the appropriate "yes" or "no" block, signs and dates the DEF. Provide a short discussion of the basis for the determination. The Manager, Engineering may simply concur with the reason provided by the SPE.
Distribution is made in accordance with Section 6.4.
- Steps 2 through 7 apply to DEF originator.
W2/F002/a
HOUSTON UGHTING O POWER COMPANY FROC.NO. HEV.NO.
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT PROCEDURE MANUAL PLP-02 5 TITLE PAGE OF PROJECT LICENSING PROCEDURE 18 24
^ '5 5 "'
REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES TO NRC 05-21-85 ATTACHMENT 9.4 Page 1 of 2 IRC EVALUATION FORM IRC EVA'UAff0N F0aN IRC CHAIRMAN DATE .
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT: .
IN5UFFICIENT 1 hit!AL REPontABILITY DETERM!hAff 0N (10CF850.55fe)): YES No. Ihr0R".ATION There entsts a deficiency in design or construction N/A ME Deficiency represents a significant F (f) Breakdown in any portion of the QA Progran
' (per 10CFR50, Accendfx B) .
OR (11) Deffefency in fiiIal design as approved and mieased for construction (does not confom to SAR or CP) .
OR (111) Deffefency in ciFstruction or construction damage wfiich requires extensive evaluation, recesign or repair .
OR (tv) Deviation fran perfomence specifications which requires extensive evaluation, redesign or npair .
AND
' Were it to remain uncorreIfid could have adversely affected the safety of operations .
T>e incident is:
Not reportable under 10CFR$0.55(e)
Reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) (Reportability c-f teria are met)
Potentf ally reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) (Futther evaluation is necessary to detemine if reportability criteria are met) l Tels incident:
Must be further evaluated with respect to 10CFR21 (Use Attachment 9.5) becd not be further evaluated with respect to 20CFR21 ARs Ghairman
)
evuu20UN LiuMIING G PQWLH COMPANY PMUC. NO. RE V. NO.
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l .
PROCEDURE MANUAL PLP-02 5 TlTLE PAGE OF PROJECT LICENSING PROCEDURE 19 24
~
REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
^*'
DEFICIENCIES TO NRC 05-21-85 ATTACHMENT 9.4 Page 2 of 2 l
i htC N0TfFICATION Date .
71se Indiviewat nottried at niis .
Notified by .
of Miga FINAL REPORTABILITY CETEPMMATION (10CFD50.55fe)): TES NO -
There entsts a deficiency in design or construction U .
Deficiency represents a significant (1) Breakdown in any portion of the CA Program (Per 10tFR50 Accendia B) .
(
(ii) Deficiency ~In final design as approved and released for construction OR (does not conform to SAR or CP) .
(iii) Deficiency ~in construction or constrvction damage eAich required entensive evaluation, redesign or repair OR (iv) Deviation Trom perfomance specifications which requires entensive evaluation, redesign or repair AN3 idere it to remain unciirrected could have adversely affected the safety of operations There esists a reportable deficiency:
- Attach all necessary supporting documentation -
Comrents:
NRC notification (if required by step 6.6.6)
Date Time Individual notified at NRC Notified by .
4ML Lnagrman Date Reviewed Renager, nuclear Licensing pate e
. STP 59 A (183)
HOUSTCN UGHTING & PCWER CEMPANY FROC. NO. 5;E V. NO.
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT PROCEDURE MANUAL PLP-02 5 TIT LE PAGE OF PROJECT LICENSING PROCEDURE 20 24
'" ,)
REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES TO NRC
'[*5 21-85 ' 1 1
l l
I 1
l ATTACHMENT 9.5 Pace 1 of I l l
10treft featwatica lorrert areas'af fLITY St' Tom +sation- g g A. Sees the prelles f avelve:
- 3. A fattere of a testa temesaent se attfetty ta esquely """* -
eith the Atoott taerty Act of 1954, as asenese. er eay apelicante es rule, regulattaa ereer se license. )
Esante: The fattere ta tamely etth letrato.llf sl regaretag Asnt ceae casettomats se a fatte re te me,e i a suestter to have a GA program per IKrale Appeasts '
8 reevernments.
KI If "'el' 6e To g e r uc esue,e vi ta v.
- 8. Is the itse e tests causeneat enten te necessaey to ensorer
- 1. The fategrety of tSe reacter toelant p*essere beenesey """ ""'"
- 2. N cassettity te samt sowa the reactee one esinuta et ta a safe snutseen tenettten .
""" ~
3.
conseeveaces of acc'teratsThe espettitty te p event se ottigets tse K:6. aan.or su a esestieas. 3r a u me a . tne ites is not reportasis, en To E and chee
- ec' . le e*, 'v et 's'. Se to C.
C. Bees the proelse tavelver *
- 8. A eviattaa to a teste - . t deliveeve te a _ _ ,
persnaser fee ese ta tae 577 taaele: A treet to the toey of a safety class selee.
E The testalletten ese er operetten of a teste esameneet
- 2. _ _
containtag a eeviatten.
Esasele: A safety stats peso ehtch is fasad to be efecttee ewetag startup teattsg.
- 3. A erstattoa de a sortben of a facility sveject to tee Carstructtaa permit 11teastag reevereseats saith has teen ' offeree to the purchasee e re acteetance'. The
! factitty to te constructas shall to ces.
1 portten of theee to tne surthoser fee acceptance
- enly sterree 'offe
, efter et has toen gtven final constructten sign off.
I tassete: A motetten to a sitas tersee over to it&P fee ese emetag testtag ee operetten.
- 4. A remettten er strcumstance favoletag a taste esasenent _ _
that centettetes to the exceestag of a safety Itatt as afinee se tocantcal spectf trattens.
faaetet A tenetsten that emid tese to tan escoesteg of
, a safety iteit es eef taea in asse=ets A. Section 2.0 of
, tae tecnntsal Sanctftsattens for the plaat.
K7 Ir eil me's ,tae ste,is met 'ese
- t a U e . te roe It aar "e s n . Ee To E .
B. Could the prettes ne,e evoeted a setetantial safety hasere se _ _
to t*e sette= *etstes to a sveitsae'et se'etr herste' RTis If *te". tnts itse es not escoetante ead to to f one enort *es'. If *Tes'.
, tus 9 tee is resortante eu suaet to totte7I.
- f. Is tats ties revertante eerseset to 20CFt217 _ _
K I. 3 r "Yes' easseeed to a e a er g a 5 3 E. stee is ressetatie persesat La 10tfo P1
- Atleth all necessary sessorting desisentat'en =
tiek 68vi.4Uuj temi& k biesse Hansger, assiese Liceastag g em a j e
W2/F002/a
STP59A (1 831 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWED COMPANY FROC. NO. REV.NO.
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT PROCEDURE MANUAL PLP-02 5 TaTLE PAGE OF PROJECT LICENSING PROCEDURE 21 24
" ' ' * ' ^ ' 5 5" 5 REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 05-21-85 DEFICIENCIES TO NRC ,
' ATTACHMENT 9.6 Page 1 of 1 CONTENTS OF WRITTEN REPORT TO NRC If it is determined that the deficiency is reportable ender 10CFR50.55(e), the i written report will contain all of the information, to ibe extent known,
, required by regulation. The report shall include a descriptior of the deficiency, an
~
analysis of the safety implications and the corrective a; tion taken, and suffi-cient information to permit analysis and evaluation of th2 deficiency and of the corrective action. If sufficient information is not available for a definitive report to be submitted within 30 days, an interim report containing all available information shall be filed, together with a statement as to when a complete report will be filed.
If it is determined that Part 21 is applicable, then the report shall contain the following information to the extent known:
i (1) Name and address of individual informing the Commission.
(ii) Identification of the facility and the basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply.
l
! (iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply.
(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which could be created.
(v) Date on which information on the defect or failure to comply was obtained. (i.e., date the determination of reportability pursuant to 10CFR Part 21 was completed.)
(vi) Number and location of all such ccmponents (includes other HL&P nuclearplants).
(vii)
Corrective action taken/to be taken, including responsibility for corrective action, schedule for corrective action or length of j time taken to correct.
l l
!. W2/F002/a
STP 59 A (1 831 Proc. No. r,E v . N o.
- HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT PROCEDURE MANUAL PLP-02 5 TITLE PAGE OF PROJECT LICENSING PROCEDURE 22 24 .
'' oArc issuno )
REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES TO NRC 05-21-85 ATTACHMENT 9.7 Page 1 of 1 PROCEDURE FLCW CHART Originator y Engineering Prepares f Reviews DEF DEF l
( Yes
/gnificanth?
i NS A Copy to
> / r Originator
/
Notification by AE.
Vendor Supplier. Con- 4 sultant. Contractor IRC IRC Review
( N[ VerifiesYes, Close I
At Least IRC Chairman Technical Potentially Reportable es4 Natifies NRC 9 Evaluation Prepared i
1RC Review I
Notify Reportable Written Close b NRC %o \
es) Report to NRC 9
, , . - . - ~ - - - ,
STP 59A (1 83)
HOUSTCN UGHTING S POWER COMPANY PROC.NO. F SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT PROCEDURE MANUAL PLP-02
- ~
TITLE PAGE OF PROJECT LICENSING PROCEDURE 23 REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION ATEjssuEo DEFICIENCIES TO NRC 05-21-8.,
ATTACHMENT 9.8 List of Responsible Individuals
! j Manager, STP Deputy Project Manager General Manager, Nuclear Engineering Manager, Engineering (STP)
Manager, Nuclear Purchasing Manager, QA Manager, Project QA Manager, Nuclear Services Manager, Nuclear Fuel Manager, Nuclear Licensing Principal Engineer, STP Special Coordinator SupervisingFrojectEngineer(Systems)
Supervising Project Engineer (Physical Design)
Supervising Engineer, STP Licensing Supervisor, Project Design / Procurement QA IRC Chairman W2/F002/a
STP59A (1 83)
PROC. NO. REV.NO.
HOUSTON LIGHTING & P;WER CCMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT PLP-02 5
- PROCEDURE MANUAL PAGE OF TITLE 24 24 PROJECT LICENSING PROCEDURE
)
ATE issuEo
'" REPORTING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 05-21-85 DEFICIENCIES TO NRC ATTACHMENT 9.9 Listing Of Those Individuals Responsible For The Architect-Engineer and/or NSSS Supplier Interface Manager, STP Deputy Project Manager Manager, Engineering Principal Engineer, STP SupervisingProjectEngineer(Systems)
Supervising Engineer, STP Licensing Supervisor, Project Design / Procurement QA )
l
/
IRC Chairman Licensing Engineer, STP 9
W2/F002/a
i 0-t l- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 3
4 In the Matter of )
)
5 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER ) Docket Nos. STN 50-498 OL COMPANY, ET AL.
) STN 50-499 OL 6 )
(South Texas Projects, Unit 1 )
7 and 2 )
8 9 TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,
10 OF THOMAS J. JORDAN, ALFREDO LOPEZ AND WALTER R. FERRIS 11 12 0.1 Mr. Jordan, please state your full name and current 13 position.
14 A.1 (TJJ) My name is Thomas J. Jordan, and I am currently 15 South Texas Project (STP) Quality Assurance (OA) 16 Manager for Houston Lighting & Power Company ( HL&P) .
17 18 02 Please describe your educational background and profes-19 sional experience.
20 A.2 (TJJ) I received my B.S. in Nuclear Engineering from 21 Texas A&M University in 1975. While an undergraduate, 22 I participated in the cooperative education program as 23 a Construction Inspector for the U.S. Army Corps of 24 Engineers, performing OA inspections on the Port Arthur 25 Hurricane and Flood Protection Project, and conducting 26 surveillance, surveying activities and other quality 27 28
< 1 control activities. I also performed field laboratory 2 testing on, among other things, moisture and density 3 characteristics of soils.
4 In 1976 I joined HL&P as a Junior Engineer. I 5 became an Associate Engineer - STP Mechanical OA Group 6 in 1977, and was responsible for performing formal and 7 informal surveillance of a variety of site construction 8 activities, as well as procedure review and interface 9 with the NRC during inspections. In 1978, I was 10 promoted to Lead Engineer-STP Mechanical QA Group, and 11 provided technical and administrative direction to the 12 Mechanical OA Group. In 1980, I was promoted to 13 Supervisor - Quality Systems, and was responsible for 14 directing the development and implementation of, among 15 other things, the STP OA program and procedures, NRC OA 16 commitment tracking system, Project OA training system, 17 OA trend analysis system, and the review and approval 18 of contractor QA programs.
19 I became Project QA Supervisor, Design / Procurement 20 in 1982 and provided direction to the Project 21 Design / Procurement Group. That Group conducted audits, 22 surveillance and implementation reviews of design, 23 procurement, records management and QA monitoring 24 activities performed in the architect-engineer's design 25 office, and monitored the transition process from Brown 26 & Root to Bechtel Energy Corporation (Bechtel) in those 27 areas. In 1984, I was promoted to my current position 28
- 1 in which I have responsibility for ensuring the proper 2 planning, development, implementation, coordination and 3 administration of the STP QA program.
4 5 03 Mr. Lopez, please state your full name and current 6 position.
7 A.3 (AL) My name is Alfredo Lopez and I am currently 8 Bechtel Civil / Structural Engineering Group Supervisor 9 for the STP.
10 11 04 Please describe your educational background and profes-12 sional experience.
13 A.4 (AL) I received my B.S. in Civil Engineering in 1964 14 and my M.S. in Structural Engineering in 1966, both 15 from the University of California, Berkeley. From 16 September, 1966 until May, 1972 I served as a senior 17 structural engineer for Fluor Corporation, involved in 18 steel and reinforced concrete structural design, and 19 dynamic analysis of structures for heavy machinery 20 related to petrochemical facilities.
21 I joined Bechtel Power Corporation in May,1972 and i 22 served as an Engineering Group Leader, first for the 23 auxiliary and fuel handling buildings and subsequently 24 for seismic Category I structures, at the San Onofre 25 Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3. In that 26 capacity I was responsible for seismic dynamic 27 analysis, general structural analysis and design, and 28
t i
e 1 technical interface with fabricators and equipment 2 suppliers. I was subsequently promoted to 3 Civil / Structural Engineering Group Supervisor, and was 4 responsible for supervising and directing the 5 Civil / Structural discipline, including programming of 6 work, development of design criteria and technical 7 specifications, interface with the owner, vendors and 8 other engineering disciplines, and the overall 9 structural engineering design.
10 I was assigned to my current position at STP in 11 July, 1982 and I am responsible for activities similar 12 to those which I performed at San Onofre as 13 Civil / Structural Engineering Group Supervisor. I am a 14 Registered Professional Engineer in California.
15 16 05 Mr. Ferris, please state your full name and current 17 position.
18 A.5 (WRF) My name is Walter R. Ferris and I am currently a 19 consultant to Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc., on 20 geotechnical matters.
21 22 06 Please describe your educational background and 23 professional experience.
24 A.6 (WRF) I received my B.S. in Civil Engineering from 25 Queens University, Belfast, Northern Ireland in 1951, 26 and my S.M. in soil Mechanics from Harvard University 27 in 1955. From 1951 to 1952, I served as a junior 28
- 1 engineer for Sir William Halcrow & Partners, London, 2 England and worked on the design of several dams in 3 Scotland. In 1952, I joined Power Corporation of 4 Canada, participating in the design of several dams and 5 providing remedial design services for various existing 6 hydroelectric plants in Canada.
7 From 1953 to 1954, I served as a civil engineer for 8 H. G. Acres & Company, Niagara Falls, Canada during 9 which I was in charge of field exploration, and later 10 design, of the Bersimis I rockfill dam in Quebec, and 11 field inspection of earth embankments for the McArthur 12 Falls hydroelectric plant. I also established a soils 13 laboratory for H. G. Acres.
14 From 1955 until 1959, I lectured in soil mechanics 15 at Harvard University and taught courses in soil 16 testing, applied soil mechanics and engineering 17 geology. I also assisted Drs. Casagrande and Terzaghi 18 in their consulting practices on embankment dam 19 projects in Brazil, Kenya, Canada, Utah. Connecticut 20 and California.
21 From 1959 until March, 1985 I was employed by 22 Bechtel Civil & Minerals Inc., and was Chief Soil 23 Engineer for the last 12 years. In that capacity, I 24 was responsible for the design of earth and earthrock 25 dams, tailings dams, foundations of major power plants 26 and heavy industrial structures, airfields and 27 highways.
28
1 I have consulted on and participated in the 2 preparation of foundation reports and earthwork studies 3 for numerous nuclear and fossil fuel plants in the 4 U.S.A., Korea, Taiwan, and Spain. Nuclear plants in 5 the U.S.A. included Pilgrim, Hope Creek, Vogtle, 6 Monticello and Palisades. Earth dams designed under my 7 direction during this period include the Ruth Dam, 8 Aurora Rampart Dam, Skookumchuck Dam, Carmen Smith 9 Dams, three earth dams for the Oroville-Wyandotte 10 Irrigation District, Turner Dam, Wells Dam, Ute Dam,
- 11 and others. I also participated in the design of a 12 number of rockfill dams during this period, including
.13 Round Butte Dam in Oregon, Little Grass Valley Dam in 14 California, the Homestake asphalt-faced dam for the 15 City of Aurora in Colorado, and the Ok Ningi water 16 supply dam in Papua New Guinea, as well as a 17 feasibility study for the Xialongdi dam in the People's 18 Republic of China. I have also been involved in the 19 design of numerous tailings dams and mining facilities 20 for tar sands, gold, copper, iron, and molybdenum j 21 projects in the United States, Canada, South Africa, f 22 Papua New Guinea, Brazil and Colombia.
- 23. I am a Registered Civil Engineer in Minnesota and 24 California, and a member of the American Society of v~ 25 Civil Engineers, the U.S. Committee on Large Dams, the 26 International Society for Soil Mechanics and Foundation 27 Engineering, and the Deep Foundation Institute.
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1 07 Gentlemen, what is the purpose of your testimony?
2 A.7 (TJJ, AL, WRF) The purpose of our testimony is to 3 respond to Issue B/D-1 which states:
4 Is-there reasonable assurance that the backfill placed at STP by Ebasco is in 5 conformity with the construction permits and the provisions of Commission 6 regulations in light of the two violations in the area of " soils and foundation" 7 discussed in I&E Rept. 83-26 (dated April 20, 1984) and findings 23 and 24 in the 8 programmatic audit filed by HL&P on May 25, 1984 (ST-HL-AE-1095)?
9 Our testimony will show that such reasonable assurance 10 exists and that the Category I backfill placed by 11 Ebasco will adequately perform its structural function.
12 13 08 Please describe the organizations that participate in 14 the placement, testing and inspection of Category I 15 backfill at STP.
16 A.8 (TJJ) There are four organizations at STP that 17 participate in the placement, testing and inspection of 18 Category I backfill. HL&P is responsible for ensuring 19 l that backfill-related activities are performed in l 20 accordance with applicable regulatory and Project 21 requirements. HL&P carries out that responsibility by 22 providing programmatic direction and overview to l 23 l Project contractors, and by performing OA audits, 24 l
surveillanta and inspections.
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1 Bechtel issues design documents, approves 2 contractors' work procedures, and performs audits and 3 surveillance of implementation. Bechtel Quality 4 Control (OC) verifies the performance of the testing 5 contractor in testing backfill material upon receipt.
6 Ebasco Constructors, Inc., and Ebasco Services, 7 Inc., (Ebasco) place and inspect backfill and 8 coordinate the efforts of the testing contractor.
9 Ebasco performs these functions by supervising 10 construction work, conducting audits, inspections and 11 surveillance, providing direction to the testing 12 contractor regarding the number and location of tests 13 to be performed, and accepting the results of relative 14 density testing.
15 Finally, Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory (PTL) , the 16 testing contractor, is responsible for performing field 17 and laboratory tests and submitting its results to 18 Ebasco.
19 Throughout the process of receiving, placing, 20 inspecting and testing Category I backfill, appropriate 21 controls have been established to provide adequately 22 compacted backfill.
23 24 09 Please describe the nature and scope of STP Category I 25 backfill work performed by Ebasco to date.
26 27 28 r
1 A.9 (AL) Category I backfill at STP is designated for all 2 the buildings and foundations within the power block 3 (main plant area), the essential cooling water (ECW) 4 pipe trench, and the ECW intake and discharge 5 structures. Approximately 2,200,000 cubic yards of 6 Category I backfill have been procured for STP to date.
7 Of that total, almost 2,000,000 cubic yards were placed 8 by the previous contractor and about 200,000 cubic 9 yards were placed by Ebasco.
10 The backfill which has been placed by Ebasco is 11 essentially limited to the ECW pipe trench, localized 12 areas around the ECW intake and discharge structures, 13 and small excavations for piping connections into 14 buildings and for miscellaneous facilities (ductbanks, 15 manholes, equipment, etc.,) within the power block.
16 The backfill for Category I buildings within the power 17 block of both units was placed by the previous 18 contractor.
19 20 0 10 Please describe the nature and scope of STP Category I 21 backfill work remaining to be performed by Ebasco.
22 A.10 (AL) Only about 106,000 cubic yards of Category I 23 backfill remain to be placed by Ebasco. This backfill-24 is to be placed in small amounts around manholes, 25 ductbanks, auxiliary feedwater tanks and isolated areas 26 of the ECW pipe trench. Most of the ECW work is beyond 27 the power block, though small portions of that work may 28
. _ 10 _
1 be performed at locations within the power block.
2 There is no single area where future backfill work is 3 expected to exceed 5,000 cubic yards, and no Category I 4 backfill remains to be placed under any major 5 structures of the power block.
6 7 0 11 Please describe the "first" violation in the area of 8 soils and foundation which is mentioned in Issue B/D-1.
9 A.ll (TJJ, AL) The first violation mentioned was Notice of 10 violation 83-24-02, a severity level IV violation, 11 issued by NRC Region IV on January 30, 1984. It cited 12 HL&P for f ailure to comply with an aspect of American 13 Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard 14 D2049-69, which had been incorporated by reference into 15 a Bechtel specification.
16 In particular, ASTM D2049-69 specifies that a 17 funnel pouring device be utilized for determining the 18 minimum density of soil samples where soil particles 19 from such samples have a maximum size of 3/8 inch, and 20 that a scoop pouring device be utilized where soil
- 21 particles may exceed 3/8 inch in size. Contrary to the
! 22 specification, Bechtel authorized PTL to utilize a 23 scoop, rather than a funnel, for determining the 24 minimum density of all Category I backfill at STP, 25 regardless of the actual maximum size of the particles 26 present in the sample.
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1 0 11 Can you identify Applicants' Exhibit 67?
2 A.ll (TJJ) Yes. Applicants' Exhibit 67 is a letter dated 3 March 23, 1984 from Mr. George W. Oprea to Mr. John T.
4 Collins, and its enclosure, HL&P's response to Notice 5 of violation 83-24-02.
6 7 0 12 What action was taken in response to this violation?
8 A.12 (TJJ) PTL was directed to perform future minimum 9 density testing in strict conformance with the ASTM 10 standard, and a review was initiated of the technical 11 adequacy of utilizing the scoop, rather than the 12 funnel, for testing STP Category I backfill. That 13 review demonstrated that the scoop provides a more 14 representative and consistent method for determining 15 the minimum density of STP Category I backfill material 16 than the funnel, and that the actual relative density 17 of such soil is more than adequate.
18 In addition, HL&P management was extremely 19 concerned that deficiencies may have occurred in the 20 backfill area which were reminiscent of deficiencies 21 that had been corrected after the 1980 Show Cause 22 Order. As a result of discussions between Mr. J. H.
23 Goldberg, HL&P's Vice President-Nuclear Engineering and 24 Construction, Mr. J. L. Barker, HL&P's Principal 25 Engineer Site Engineering and myself, it was determined 26 that, in addition to responding to the specific 27 violation, a comprehensive programmatic / technical audit 28 1
1 1
1 of Category I backfill activities at STP would be i
.2 performed by a joint QA and Engineering team. That 3 audit included a review of licensing and criteria 4 documents, specifications, testing procedures, test ;
5 data results and OC procedures and covered every 6 organization involved in STP Category I backfill 7 activities (Bechtel, Ebasco and PTL) . A letter dated 8 May 25, 1984 from Mr. George W. Oprea to Mr. John T.
9 Collins, and its enclosure, a summary of the audit 10 findings, is Applicants' Exhibit 68.
11 12 0 13 What is minimum density?
13 A.13 ( WRF) The minimum density of soil, as understood in 14 soil engineering, is the loosest possible state of 15 density the soil can achieve, with the particles in 16 grain to grain contact, and without segregation of
^17 particle sizes or arching.
18 19 0 14 What is the purpose of determining minimum density?
20 A.14 ( WRF) The minimum density of Category I backfill is 21 determined in order to calculate the " relative" density 22 of compacted backfill. Relative density is calculated 23 based upon the minimum density, in-place density, and 24 maximum density and is evaluated to verify that the 25 backfill meets the design criteria for structural 26 adequacy.
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- 1 0 15 What are the criteria for relative density governing 2 STP Category I backfill?
3 A.15 (AL) For STP, the criteria governing Category I 4 " structural" backfill, including backfill within the 5 power block and around the ECW intake and discharge 6 structures (which are outside the power block), are a 7 minimum relative density of 80% and a running average 8 relative density of 84%. The criterion for Category I 9 " yard" backfill outside the power block is a minimum 10 relative density of 70%.
11 12 0.16 How do variations in the determination of minimum 13 density affect the calculated relative density?
l 14 A.16 ( WRF) If the minimum density is increased (and the i
15 maximum and in-place densities remain constant) , one 16 would compute a lower relative density. Acco rdingly ,
17 use of a test method that yields higher " minimum" 18 density values will result in a lower relative density.
19 For example, given an in-place density (D) of 120 20 pounds per cubic foot, a maximum density (D Max) of 124 21 pounds per cubic foot, and a minimum density (D Min) of i
! 22 104 pounds per cubic foot, relative density (R) would 23 be calculated as follows:
24 D Max D - D Min x 100 = R(%) or 25 D D Max - D Min 26 82.7%
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l- 1 If, however, the calculated minimum density (D Min) is 2 102 pounds per cubic foot, relative density would be 3 calculated to be 84.5%.
! 4 0.17 Why does ASTM D2049-69 specify use of the funnel 5 pouring device for determining the minimum density of 6 backfill with a maximum particle size of 3/8 inch?
7 A.17 ( WRF) The funnel pouring device is specified in the 8 ASTM standard in order to provide a procedure that can 9 be readily used by different technicians to achieve 10 determinations of the minimum density of soil in a 11 repeatable manner and with an acceptable range of 12 error.
l 13 14 0 18 Does the scoop method produce an unreliable or invalid 15 minimum density value for samples which do not contain 16 particles in excess of 3/8 inch?
17 A.18 ( WRF) No. On the contrary, so long as the method of 18 soil placement in the test mold does not result in 19 segregation of the soil, and the procedure can be 20 readily repeated with essentially the same result, the 21 method which provides the lowest density should be l
22 judged the most representative of the actual minimum 23 soil density. With the Category I backfill at STP, the 24 funnel pouring device has been found to yield mean 25 minimum density values 1.3 to 3.3 pounds per cubic foot 26 higher than those obtained using the scoop method.
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1 Therefore, although the relative density values using 2 the funnel device will be slightly lower than those 3 determined with the scoop, the values determined with 4 the scoop more closely reflect actual minimum 5 densities.
6 In fact, I have reviewed and concur with the 7 conclusions of the independent committee of soils 8 experts in Applicants' Exhibit 6, (" Expert Committee's 9 Final Report on Adequacy of Category I Structural 10 Backfill, South Texas Project Electric Generating 11 Station," January 30, 1981, at 32), that "there is 12 considerable evidence that the minimum density [of STP 13 Category I backfill] may actually be somewhat lower 14 than determined by [the scoop] method." Furthermore, 15 another study of eleven different methods for deter-16 mining minimum density, determined that "the scoop 17 method is a valid method for determining minimum 18 density without segregation."
19 Accordingly, it is my opinion that the actual 20 relative density of STP Category I backfill is higher 21 than calculated with either the scoop or funnel method, 22 and that the scoop method provides technically valid, 23 consistent and more representative minimum density 24 values than the funnel method.
25 26 0 19 Have you reviewed the analysis of the scoop method 27 described in Applicants' Exhibit 67?
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t 1 A.19 (WRF)- Yes.
2 3 0 20 Do you concur with the conclusions of that analysis?
4 A.20 (WRF) Yes. In order to confirm the validity of those 5 conclusions, I have had a separate evaluation under-6 taken, in which the minimum density values obtained 7 between April 6, 1983 and February 3, 1984 -- the 8 period during which the scoop was exclusively utilized 9 -- have been increased by 3.3 pounds per cubic foot, in 10 order to account for the higher values which may have 11 resulted if the funnel had been utilized. Although the 12 minimum density values were increased by 3.3 pounds per 13 cubic foot, actual differences between values obtained 14 with the scoop and the funnel are likely to be lower.
15 Thus, 3.3 pounds was selected as a conservative 16 adj us tment . After the minimum densities were so 17 adjusted, new relative density values were calculated 18 and compared to the criteria governing STP Category I 19 backfill.
20 For the Category I " structural" backfill within the 21 power block, of 1,134 test values, 185 fell below the 22 80% minimum relative density criterion and 122 (many, 23 the same values which fell below the minimum relative 24 density criterion) fell below the 84% running average j 25 relative density criterion. Of 2,351 test values for 26 Category I " yard" backfill, 255 fell below the minimum 27 relative density criterion.
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1 0.21- Is there any technical significance to the test values 2 which fell below the minimum criteria?
3 A.21 ( WRF) No. With respect to the " structural" backfill, 4 the purpose of the design criteria is to provide a 5 stable foundation support for Category I buildings 6 under all loading conditions, in order to assure 7 satisf actory performance of such buildings during the 8 life of the plant. None of the lower test values, 9 however, were directly below STP Category I buildings.
I 10 Since none of the low values were directly below 11 building foundations, bearing capacity and settlement 12 are not a concern. Accordingly, the principal design 13 consideration for both the " structural" and " yard" 14 Category I backfill is the margin of safety against 15 liquefaction of the fill during a Safe Shutdown 16 Earthquake (SSE) event. Since the values below the 17 design criteria are randomly located and represent a 18 very limited volume of the backfill, there would be 19 negligible impact on liquef action potential.
20 In fact, even when the test values are adjusted for 21 densities obtained by use of the scoop, the factor of 22 safety against liquefaction for all of the test values 23 at STP exceeded 1.6, and over 99% of the values 24 exceeded 1.7. A factor of safety against liquefaction, 25 which is well established in the nuclear industry as 26 27 28 l
l i-I conservative, is 1.5. Thus, there is an ample margin 2 of safety against liquefaction of the STP Category I I 3 structural backfill.
4 Accordingly, since the minimum density values 5 obtained with the scoop more accurately reflect the 6 actual minimum densities of STP Category I backfill, 7 the scoop method provides a more appropriate basis for 8 determining the actual relative density of the 9 backfill. However, even if the values obtained with 10 the scoop were conservatively adjusted to account for 11 use of the funnel, the resulting relative density of 12 the STP Category I backfill would have been demon-13 strated to be adequate to provide the necessary 14 structural integrity.
15 16 0 22 What is the status of violation 83-24-02?
17 A.22 (TJJ) HL&P's corrective actions have been completed 18 and submitted to the NRC Staff for its review.
l 19 20 0 23 Please describe the second " violation" which is l 21 referred to in Issue B/D-1.
l 22 A.23 (TJJ) Although Issue B/D-1 refers to "two violations 23 in the area of ' soils and foundations' discussed in I&E 24 Rept. 83-26," the second item identified as a " viola-25 tion" in I&E Report 83-26 was issued as an Unresolved 26 Item, rather than as a violation. Unresolved Item 83-27 24-01 related to the frequency of OC inspection of l 28
1 backfill placement. It noted, in particular, that 2 Ebasco's OC procedure only required daily monitoring of 3 such activities, and that accordingly, the potential 4 for inadequate OC inspection existed.
5 6 0 23 Were backfill placement inspections being performed 7 only on a daily basis?
8 A.23 (TJJ) No. Although the procedure required only daily 9 monitoring, Ebasco OC had been inspecting virtually 10 every significant lif t on every workshif t.
11 12 0.24 What actions were taken in response to this Unresolved 13 Item?
14 A.24 (TJJ) The applicable OC inspection procedure was 15 modified to more closely conform to Ebasco's practice 16 by requiring that inspection of backfill placement be 17 conducted on at least one lift per area, per work 18 shift, and by clarifying that for each backfill lift 19 being evaluated, the inspection characteristics 20 reviewed be identified.
21 22 0 25 As to the soil which was placed before the procedure 23 was changed, is its adequacy in question as a result of 24 Unresolved Item 83-24-01?
25 A.25 (TJJ,WRF,AL) No. Since Ebasco was adequately 26 monitoring the placement and compaction process, and 27 the only responsive action necessary was to modify the 28
1 procedure to more closely reflect actual practice, 2 .there is no basis for questioning the adequacy of the 3 soil placed prior to the procedural change.
4 5 0.26 Did the NRC Staff review the actions taken by HL&P in 6 response to Unresolved Item 83-24-017 7 A.26 (TJJ) Yes. Region IV verified that each of the 8 changes had been incorporated in the OC inspection 9 procedure and conducted a subsequent inspection of 10 earthwork and testing laboratory activities and in-11 process backfill inspection reports. That inspection 12 (Inspection 85-04) indicated that Unresolved Item 83-13 24-01 had been addressed satisfactorily, and the Item 14 was closed.
15 16 0 27 Please identify the audit referenced in Issue B/D-l.
17 A.27 (TJJ) As indicated earlier in my testimony, in 18 response to Notice of Violation 83-24-02, HL&P per-19 formed a comprehensive, programmatic / technical audit of 20 backfill-related activities at STP. That audit was 21 conducted in March-April, 1984. (See Applicants' 22 Exhibit 68).
23 24 0 28 Please describe audit finding 23 which is referred to 25 in Issue B/D-1.
26 A.28 (TJJ) That finding stated that:
27 28
- 1 "[t] he Soils Inspection Procedure
[0CP-10.10] does not provide criteria 2 on density variation with depth to enable OC to determine the correct 3 location for testing as required by Specification . . . and the FSAR.
4 Therefore, the field test evaluation selection process does not give 5 representative density information for all depth intervals within the lift.
6 HL&P's concern was that, contrary to the FSAR and the 7
applicable specification, the inspection procedure did 8
not provide sufficient instruction to OC Inspectors as 9
to the depth within an individual lift at which testing 10 of in place soil density should be performed in order 11 to obtain representative in place density information 12 for depth intervals within the lifts.
13 14 0.29 What is a lift?
15 A.29 ( WRF) A lift is a term utilized in soil engineering to 16 define the individual layers of soil that are placed, 17 spread and compacted in the backfill.
19 0.30 What did the FSAR provide regarding the determination
! 20 of representative in place density information for depth intervals within each lif t?
A.30 (TJJ) The FSAR required that possible variations in 23 i
density with depth be considered in determining test
- 24 locations, and that the testing depths be selected such l
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1 that a series of consecutive tests will provide 2 representative density information for all depth 3 intervals within the lifts.
4 5 0 31 What did the specification provide regarding the 6 determination of representative in-place density 7 information for depth intervals within each lif t?
8 A.31 (TJJ) The Bechtel specification generally required 9 that variations in density with depth depending on lift 10 thickness, placement and compaction methods be con-11 sidered, and that the test depths be distributed to 12 obtain the true condition of the backfill.
13 14 0.32 What guidance did the inspection procedure provide 15 regarding the determination of representative in-place 16 density information for depth intervals within each 17 lift?
18 A.32 (TJJ) The procedure simply stated that testing should 19 be performed in accordance with the specification.
20 21 0 33 What is the technical significance of this finding?
l 22 A.33 ( WRF) Since the variation of in-place density within l
23 the backfill lif ts at STP is small (if overlayed by 24 another lift), the determination of in-place density at 25 any depth within a lift will be representative of that 26 lift. Furtne rmore , in-place density testing at STP has 27 i
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1 been performed at varying depths within the lifts, 2 providing further assurance that representative 3 information is being obtained.
4 In any event, the judgment as to the adequacy of 5 the STP Category I backfill is based on the overall 6 distribution of test sample locations (both vertically 7 and horizontally) within the backfill, rather than on 8 density variations within individual lifts. Accord-9 ingly, a failure to obtain information regarding the 10 depth of samples within each lif t would not cast doubt 11 on the adequacy of the STP Category I backfill. s 12 13 0 34 What action was taken to address this finding?
14 A.34 (AL,TJJ) Because it was determined that the requirement 15 to obtain density information for all depth intervals 16 within each lift was unnecessarily conservative, the 17 FSAR was amended to require that testing be conducted 18 such that representative density information is 19 provided for all lif ts within the fill, rather than for 20 specific depth intervals within individual lif ts.
21 Similarly, the specification was modified to provide 22 that test locations be selected such that the distri-23 bution of tests both laterally and vertically within 24 the fill provides a record that demonstrates the true 25 condition of the backfill, and by eliminating the 26 requirement for consideration of variations in density 27 with depth depending on lift thickness.
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. 1 0 35 Please describe audit finding 24 referred to in Issue 2 B/D-1.
3 A.35 (TJJ) That finding states:
4 The Soils Inspection Procedure does not require test depths to be 5 recorded and thus no evidence, in general, can be provided to demon-6 strate backfill installed by Ebasco has been tested at the required 7 depth. Specifically, no evidence exists to-demonstrate tests below 8 the 30~ inch diameter ECW pipes are taken at a depth of 7 inches below 9 the invert. Additionally, test depth information has not been 10 provided by PTL.
11 HL&P's concern, in this finding, was that the Ebasco 12 inspection procedure did not require that test depths be 13 reccrded, and that test depth information was not being 14 provided to PTL by Ebasco for inclusion in PTL test 15 reports. Ebasco was, however, recording the elevation 16 of the lift in which the sample was taken.
17 18 0.36 What is the effect of the failure to record the test 19 depths?
20 A.36 ( WRF) As indicated in my prior answer, there is no 21 need to identify or document the testing depths for 22 purposes of assessing the adequacy of the STP Category 23 I backfill. Since Ebasco was recording the elevation 24 of lif ts in which samples were taken, suf ficient 25 information was available to assess the adequacy of the 26 overall fill.
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- 1 0.37 What action was taken in response to this audit 2 finding?
3 A.37 (TJJ) The specification and inspection procedure were 4 modified to require that Ebasco record specific test 5 depths, and the specification was modified to require 6 Ebasco to provide test depth information to PTL.
7 8 0.38 In light of your testimony, what is your overall 9 conclusion regarding the adequacy of the Category I 10 backfil: placed at STP by Ebasco.
11 A.38 ( WRF, AL) The Category I backfill placed at STP by 12 Ebasco is more than adequate to perform its intended 13 structural function and there is reasonable assurance 14 that such backfill conforms to applicable regulatory 15 requirements.
16 17 0.39 In light of your testimony, is there any reason to 18 believe that future Ebasco Category I backfill activi-19 ties will not be carried out in a manner consistent 20 with applicable requirements and sufficient to assure 21 the adequacy of the backfill?
22 A.39 (TJJ,WRF,AL) No. Since there is no basis for 23 questioning the technical adequacy of the Category I 24 backfill placed by Ebasco to date, appropriate measures 25 have been taken to assure that future work is carried 26 out in compliance with applicable regulatory and 27 Project requirements, and only a limited amount of such 28
m
. I work remains to be performed, there is reasonable 2 assurance that future Category I backfill activities 3 will comply with applicable requirements and that 4 backfill placed in the future will be adequate to 5 perform its intended structural function.
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t pM UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DEKUG BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 15 JWi27 40:48 In the Matter of )
)
) Docket Nos. 5 1._C'Q ECRtfAn4 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER SC 0 'W pg$@gkhERVlU COMPANY, ET AL. )
)
.(South Texas Project, Units 1 )
and.2) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Testimony on Behalf of Houston Lighting & Power Company, et al., have been served on the following individuals and entities by deposit in the United States mail, first (*),
class, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery as designated with an or by courier service as designated by (**), on this 26th day of' June, 1985.
Charles Bechhoefer, Esq.* Brian Berwick, Esq.**
Cha.4.rman, Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing for the State of Texas Board Environmental Protection U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Division Washington, D.C. 20555 P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, TX 78711 Dr. James C. Lamb, III**
Administrative Judge Kim Eastman, Co-coordinator 313 Woodhaven Road Barbara A. Miller
. Chapel Hill, NC 27514 Pat Coy Citizens Concerned About Frederick J. Shon*- Nuclear Power
. Administrative Judge 5106 Casa Oro Atomic Safety and Licensing Board San Antonio, TX 78233 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lanny Alan Sinkin*
3022 Porter St., N.W., #304 Mrs. Peggy Buchorn Washington, D.C. 20008 Executive-Director Ray Goldstein, Esq.
Citizens for Equitable Utilities, Inc. Gray, Allison & Becker Route 1, Box 1684 100 Vaughn Building Brazoria, TX 77422 807 Brazos Austin, Texas 78701-2553
<(rl 4
h Oreste Russ Pirfo, Esq.*
Robert G. Perlis, Esq.
Office of the Executive Legal ,
Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 l
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