ML20114E317

Final 10 CFR Part 21 Report for Masoneilan Model 8005N Transducer

ML20114E317
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	04/23/2020
From:	Rash B Arizona Public Service Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
102-08100-BJR/SPD
Download: ML20114E317 (4)

Text

10 CFR 21.21 BRUCE J. RASH Vice President, Nuclear Engineering/Regulatory Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072 Mail Station 7602 Tel 623 393 5102 102-08100-BJR/SPD April 23, 2020 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Reference:

Arizona Public Service Company (APS) Letter No. 102-08017-BJR/LMW dated November 15, 2019, Interim 10 CFR 21 Report for Masoneilan Model 8005N Transducer [ADAMS Accession Number ML19323C971]

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket No. STN 50-528, STN 50-529, and STN 50-530 License No. NPF 41, NPF 51, and NPF 74 Final 10 CFR Part 21 Report for Masoneilan Model 8005N Transducer Arizona Public Service (APS) submitted the referenced interim report pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2) that provided information regarding an on-going evaluation of a deviation in a basic component identified during pre-installation testing.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4), APS is reporting the completion of this evaluation and the conclusion that the deviation could cause a substantial safety hazard and is therefore a defect. The details of the evaluation are provided in the enclosure.

APS makes no commitments in this letter. Should you need further information regarding this submittal, please contact Matthew Kura, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Department Leader, at (623) 393-5379.

Sincerely, Rash, Bruce Digitally signed by Rash, Bruce (Z77439)

(Z77439) DN: cn=Rash, Bruce (Z77439)

Date: 2020.04.23 12:00:16 -07'00' BJR/SPD

Enclosure:

Final 10 CFR Part 21 Report for Masoneilan Model 8005N Transducer cc: S. A. Morris NRC Region IV Regional Administrator S. P. Lingam NRC NRR Project Manager for PVNGS C. A. Peabody NRC Senior Resident Inspector PVNGS A member of the STARS Alliance LLC Callaway

• Diablo Canyon

• Palo Verde

• Wolf Creek

Enclosure Final 10 CFR Part 21 Report for Masoneilan Model 8005N Transducer

Enclosure Final 10 CFR Part 21 Report for Masoneilan Model 8005N Transducer Arizona Public Service Company (APS) submitted an interim report on November 15, 2019, that provided information regarding an on-going evaluation of a deviation in a basic component identified during pre-installation testing. After further evaluation, APS has determined that the deviation represented a substantial safety hazard and is therefore a defect.

The following information is provided pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4).

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

Bruce J. Rash Vice President, Nuclear Engineering/Regulatory Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072 (ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Facility: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket No. STN 50-528, STN 50-529, and STN 50-530 License No. NPF 41, NPF 51, and NPF 74 Basic Component: Transducer Model 8005N (iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Dresser, LLC 12970 Normandy Blvd.

Jacksonville, FL 32221 (iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

During pre-installation testing, five Masoneilan Model 8005N electro-pneumatic transducers were unable to be calibrated and exhibited additional non-conformances.

• Two of the transducers could not be calibrated for the full required range output of 3-15 pounds per square inch (psi). After they were sent to vendor and returned to APS, they would not calibrate.

• Two of the transducers exhibited problems with the flapper wire that would cause the sapphire ball nozzle to jam in one transducer and to fall out in the other. The transducer with the jammed sapphire ball was also missing a brass plug, which caused excessive air leakage from the system.

• One transducer was missing a brass plug, which caused excessive air leakage from the system.

The function of the transducer is to provide remote control of the Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) from the Control Room (CR) and/or the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP). The failure of the transducer would be unknown until called upon.

The transducer receives a 4-20 milliamp signal from the Unit CR or RSP and translates it to 3-15 psi output to the positioner. This is accomplished by varying the supply air from 23-30 psi to the appropriate 3-15 psi signal.

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Enclosure Final 10 CFR Part 21 Report for Masoneilan Model 8005N Transducer The ADVs remove heat from the Reactor Coolant System when the Steam Bypass Control System is not available.

As a result, the PVNGS evaluation of the deviation determined that a substantial safety hazard could have been created if any of the five transducers would have been installed. The nature of the defects were such that the ADV would either not operate as needed to mitigate analyzed accidents and/or cause excessive air system leakage that would preclude the ADVs from operating for their full mission time.

The vendor was notified that the transducers failed to meet calibration criteria during bench testing and on September 26, 2019, the five transducers were returned to the vendor for evaluation and repair.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

This defect was evaluated according to the PVNGS Part 21 reporting process.

The evaluation was completed on March 19, 2020, and the reporting officer was informed on March 25, 2020. The defect was reported to the NRC by way of the Event Notification process on March 27, 2020 (EN 54621).

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

Only one of the five transducers that were repaired by the vendor passed bench testing after being returned to APS. That transducer is currently installed in PVNGS Unit 2 and the other four transducers were returned to the vendor.

APS does not know if other licensees use these transducers in safety-related applications.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

This defect was documented in the PVNGS corrective action program. The vendor was notified and the five defective transducers were shipped back to the vendor on September 26, 2019 for evaluation and repair.

Upon return from the vendor, four of the five transducers did not satisfactorily pass bench testing and were returned to the vendor.

A vendor corrective action report was generated and issued to Dresser, LLC. A response is pending.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

None.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This event does not involve an early site permit.

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