ML20108C028

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SPDS Display Design & Implementation
ML20108C028
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 01/31/1985
From:
OPERATIONS ENGINEERING, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20108C006 List:
References
8407-1, NUDOCS 8503070554
Download: ML20108C028 (46)
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Text

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Enclosure 2 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM i

l DISPLAY DESIGN l
.s s

AND .'

IMPLEMENTATION  :

OEI Document No. 8407-1 January,1985 l

. Prepared for

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'Public Service Electric and Gas Company l

Hope Creek Generating Station By Operations Engineering, Incorporated 39510 Paseo Padre Parkway Fremont, California 94638 j (415) 794-0770 8503070554 850226 PDR ADOCK 05000354 F PDR l- - - -. _ - . .

OBI Document No. 8407-1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Topic Pggg 1.0 OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 2.0 DESIGN BASIS OF DISPLAYS . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 3.0 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 3.1 Identification of Control Functions . . . . 3-1 3.2 Identification of Decision and Action [

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Functions . . . . . .;. . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 l

3.3 Control Function Interrelationships . . . . 3-2 3.4 Application of Analysis Results . . . . . . 3-4  :

4.0 INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS . . . . . . . 4-1 .

5.0 DISPLAY STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . 5-1 6.0 DISPLAY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 6.1 Display Format . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 6-1 6.2 Display Features . . . . . . . , . . . . . 6-5 6.3 Application of Human Factors Engineering Principles . . . . . . . . . . 6-6 7.0 CRT PRESENTATION OF DISPLAYS . . . . . . . . . . 7-1 8.0 VALIDATION OF CONTROL FUNCTIfb;.fA3AMETER VALUES . . . . . . . . . . 3 - . x . . . . . . . 8-1

.i 9.0 VERIFTCATION OF DISPLA! L CSK' . . . . . . . . . 9-1 P

10.0 OPERATOR TRAINING ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-1 APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Overview 1.0 OVERVIEW

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The design of Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) displays for tha Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) will use a methodology i

J! based or. a function and task anlaysis of the plant's Emergency

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'3 Operating Procedures (EOPs). The HCGS EOPs are being developed 1 from the symptomatic Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs) that

, have been developed by the BWR Owners' Group and approved for J implementation by the NRC.

7 Section 4.1.f of NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 stipulates that the SPD'S .

shall present information sufficient to assess plant safety status. Plant conditions affecting reactivity' control, reactor core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, radioactivity control, and containment integrity are specifically identified as parameters for which information should be pro-vided. The plant's EOPs fully address these conditions through the symptom-based approach to emergency response. Information l

requirement, are identified through a function and task analysis of the plant-BGPs, and a structured set of SPDS and associated supplemental diiplays is then designed to provide this informa-tion in a format directly usable by the plant operating staff. I An overview of-the process to be followed for SPDS display design and implementation is presented in Figure 1-1 (Page 1-2). Infor-mation requirements are identified through the EOP Function and 1-1

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1 OEI Document No. 8407-1, Overview EOP FUNCTION AND TASK ANALYSIS

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T I I

i CONTROL FUNCTIONS T 1 _______________________

i CONTROL FUNCTION ----> INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

-. PARAMETERS l l l CONTROL FUNCTION I l T I INTERRELATIONSHIPS l l l I I INFORMATION { l l l .

1 PROCESSING j l

1 I I e I I I I i

.T I Y Y I  ;

DISPLAY STRUCTURE I DISPLAY FEATURES I

i I I 'l i I i i l I i I

, t Y t HUMAN FACTORS

> DISPLAY DESIGN <---- ENGINEERING l PRINCIPLES I I I I I I T l l l l l 1 CRT PRESENTATION OF DISPLAYS <------------ 1 1

I . I I I l - .

1 EMERGENCY OPERATING USER I , l PROCEDURES TRAINING l l l l 1 I I l l T T Y I

l PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION OF DISPLAYS )

I I I I (Revisions - as appropriate) l l , _________________________________

i Figure 1-1: SPDS DISPLAY DEVELOPMENT PROCESE l

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Overview i

Task Analysis. Display features are designed to support these information requirements directly, and also to support the infor-mation processing (including decision making) performed by the operating staff when executing the EOPs.

-4 Additionally, the EOP Function and Task Analysis is used to i identifiy the specific set of emergency response control functions and control function parameters for the Hope Creek )

. s plant. The interrelationships between control functions are then g' analyzed, and the results of this interrelationships analysis are ,

used to define a logical structure for the SPDS and associated supplemental displays.

The defined display structure, identified information require-ments, and display features incorporating information processing are integrated in the design of individual displays. This pro-cess provides a basis for structuring, organizing, and accessing the set of displays in a manner which directly facilitates execution of the plant's EOPs.

Human factors epgineering princples are applied in the design of displayfeatureh,inthedesignofeachindividualdisplay,and

! in the presentation of displays on the system CRT.

After the displays are designed, a dynamic evaluation is conduc-9 ted using the plant EOPs. Operators will be trained on the use of procedures and on the SPDS design prior to participating in 1-3 r.. _ -- , _ - - - --

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Overview the dynamic evaluation of the displays. Where evaluation results indicate that revisions to the displays are appropriate and necessary, such modifications will be incorporated prior to dinal system implementation.

J The display design process interfaces with system hardware as

shown in Figure 1-2 (Page 1-5)

L o Data aquisition and input to;the computer system evolves

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from the information requirements identified in the EOP Function and Task Analysis.  ;

o Data processing takes the aquired data and processes it -

consistent with the information processing incorporated in the design of the various display features.

o Display structure and composition considers hardware provided for accessing and presenting the displays on the computer system's CRTs.

Additional 'etail d on the aspects of SPDS display design is pro-vided in the subsequent sections of this report.

Definitions of erms used to describe the program for developing the Hope Creek Generating Station SPDS and associated supple-mental displays are provided in Appendix A.

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Overview l INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS l l i I I C i 1 0 l T M Y P DATA AQUISITION l U l INFORMATION l -------------------l T [

l PROCESSING l---> DATA PROCESSING l E s r

a .

U s

l DISPLAY STRUCTURE l<------'---> E

R l DISPLAY DESIGN l<----------> I N

T I HUMAN FACTORS l E i ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES l<----------> R

__________________________ y A

C E

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. T k CRT PRESENTATION OF DISPLAYS

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Figure 1-2: SPDS DISPLAY DESIGN - INTERFACES WITH SYSTEM HARDWARE 1-5

OEI Document No. 8407-1, Design Basis of Displays l

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l 2.0 DESIGN BASIS OF DISPLAYS The Hope Creek Generating Station SPDS employs a procedures-based display concept. Whereas displays could be developed to serve as an incipient accident detector, industry experience with previous SPDS designs indicates that displays would be more meaningful and useful to operators if the displayed information would closely -

support emergency response (e.g., the operators' actions, and the  !

. 6 decisions that must be made in order for the correct emergency I i

response actions to be taken).

Emergency response actions and the associated decision-making carried out by the operating crew are directly supported by developing the SPDS displays and the additional displays which supplement the SPDS displays such that they support execution of the HCGS EOPs. Since the EOPs address unanticipated multiple failures and severely degraded plant conditions, use of procedures-based displays fully satisfies this system's purpose as defined in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. The HCGS SPDS displays will fully cover the information required to be presented on this systemasshown{inTable2-1(Page2-2).

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Design Basis of Displays TABLE 2-1 _.

NUREG-073'7 SPDS INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS AS ADDRESSED BY THE HCGS EOPs NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.1.f Information Recuirements Associated HCGS EOPs

1. Reactivity Control i
a. OP-EO.ZZ 101, " Reactor / i Pressure Vessel Control" f
b. OP-EO.ZZ 207, " Level / Power Control"  ;
2. Reactor Core Cooling a. OP-EO.ZZ 101, " Reactor / ~

and Heat Removal Pressure Vessel Control"

b. OP-EO.ZZ 201, " Level Restoration"
c. OP-EO.ZZ 202, " Emergency Depressurization"
d. OP-EO.ZZ 203, " Steam Cooling"
e. OP-EO.ZZ 204, " Spray

, Cooling"

--- . f. OP-EO.ZZ 205, " Alternate Shutdown Cooling"

g. OP-EO.ZZ 206, " Reactor Flooding"
h. OP-EO.ZZ 207, " Level / Power Control"

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Design Basis of Displays TABLE 2-1 --

(Continued) -

NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.1.f

. Information Reauirements Associated EOPs

3. Reactor Coolant a. OP-EO.ZZ 101, " Reactor /

System Integrity Pressure Vessel Control" h

b. OP-EO.ZZ 207, " Level / Power )

Control" t~

c. OP-EO.ZZ 102, " Containment Control"  ;
4. Containment Integrity a. OP-EO.ZZ 102, " Containment Control"
b. OP-EO.ZZ 103, " Reactor Building Control"
5. Radioactivity Control a. OP-EO.ZZ 103, " Reactor Building Control"
b. OP-EO.ZZ 104, "Radioac-tivity Release Control" The EOPs art" Utilized in the display design process via function andtaskanalysfaoftheprocedures. The EOP Function and Task Analysis satisfies the requirements stated in NUREG-0737 Supple-ment 1, Sections 5.1.b(ii) and 4.2.a. In fact, although the results of the analysis are to be used as the basis for SPDS i

j display development, the analysis was initially developed as part 2-3 ,

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Design Basis of Displays of the HCGS Control Room Design Review (CRDR) . Therefore, function and task analysis is used as design input for display  ;

development rather than post-implementation review criteria. l l

J Since the EOPs address all of the functions and conditions specified in NUREG-0737 Supplement.1, Section 4.1.f, and since the EOP Function and Task Analysis identifies the operator's emergency response information requirements, the display develop- [ ,

. i ment methodology being employed binds Section 4.1.f with Sections g?

4.2.a (design basis of SPDS displays) and 5.1.b.ii (use of EOP

function and task analysis). As a result, the displays developed through this process fully support emerg'ency response information '

requirements, which in turn encompasses the basis functions and conditions specified in Section 4.1.f. ,

The HCGS EOPs are symptom-based in that they specify operator actions for restoring and maintaining a small set of control function parameters (e.g., RPV water level, suppression pool temperature, etc.) within ranges which assure continued safe

plant operation. This small set of control function parameters

! is defined such!that the plant will be maintained in a safe condition as long as these few parameters are maintained in the I

specified ranges. Since the actions specified in the symptom-based EOPs are directly keyed to the values of these parameters, i

l j the status of these control function parameters constitutes "the l SPDS". Additional information identified through the EOP 2-4

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Design Basis of Displays Function and Task Analysis will be displayed by the system to supplement the SPDS information. --

In executing these EOPs, the operator is not required to identify the event or sequence of events which initiated the emergency.

Rather, actions are specified to directly control a few param-eters which can be directly monitored. By designing the SPDS displays based on the information required to execute the EOPs, .E I

this same symptomatic approach to emergency response is totally 4

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integrated for the operating crew. ,

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l OEI Document No. 8407-1, Emergency Response Functional Analysis 3.0 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 3.1 Identification of control Functions -

The HCGS EOPs define eleven emergency response control functions performed by the operating crew when responding to off-normal conditions defined by the EOP entry conditions. These control functions are the following:

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EOP Control Function ACRONYN 4

l. Monitor and control RPV water level. RPVWLC
2. Monitor and control RPV pressure. RPVPC
3. Monitor and control reactor power. RXPC
4. Monitor and control suppression pool SPTC temperature.
5. Monitor and control drywell temperature. DWTC
6. Monitor and control primary containment PCPC (drywell and cupprcacion chamber) pressure.
7. Monitor and control suppression pool SPWLC water level.
8. Mo'nitor and control reactor building RBTC aree-temperatures.
9. Monitok and control reactor building RBRLC radiation levels.
10. Monitor and control reactor building RBWLC sump and area water levels.
11. Limi': radioactivity release into areas RRC outside the primary and secondary y containments.

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Emergency Response Functional Analysis 3.2 Identification and Analysis of Decision end Action Functions The EOPs specify performance of the control functions in ~a"series of procedural steps containing decision and action functions.

These decision and action functions were identified in the EOP Function and Task Analysis. In the display design development process, these functions will be separately analyzed as follows:

1 Action Function - how the specified action directly affects status of each control function; mechanisms by which an -

action may affect a control function include energy  ;

transfer, neutronics, mass transfer, etc.

Decision Function - what control function status and system status information is required in order to make the decision 3.3 Control Fonction Interrelationships The results of the decisions and actions analysis will be used to determined 'which EOP steps.are closely related to which control functions and, subsequently, how the control functions themselves

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are interrelated.

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,.1 OBI Document No. 8407-1, Emergency Response Functional Analysis l

l l For example, consider the following EOP step sequence of the l " Reactor / Pressure Vessel Control" procedure (OP-EO.ZZ 101)_:

"Are any SRVs cycling or open?" ... " Manually open SRVs until RPV pressure drops to 935 psig."

This step sequence addresses the reactor pressure control I function (RPVPC), and in the functional analysis is broken down

i 1 into one decision function and one action function
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Decison Function: "Are'any SRVs cycling or open?"

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! Action Function: " Manually open SRVs until RPV pressure j .

drops to 935 psig."

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For the decision function, in order for an operator to be able to make the decision asked for, knowledge of the value of the control function parameter " reactor pressure" is required (current value and trend) and a comparison is then made to the lifting pressure setpoint of the lowest set SRV. Additionally, knowledge of SRV status is r' quired e (positions open/ closed / cycling) in order to make the decisipn.

g For the action

  • function, opening SRVs affects the status of three i '

j control function parameters:

Reactor pressures directly 3

Suppression pool temperatures through transfer of heat 3-3

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OSI Document No. 8407-1, Emergency Response Functional Analysis energy (steam) from the reactor to the water in the suppression chamber via the open SRV suppression pool water level: through transfer of mass (steam) f rom the reactor to the water in the suppres-sion chamber via the open SRV I All steps of the EOPs will be analyzed in likewise fashion, and the complete interrelationships analysis results documented. I j

. f By grouping EOP steps under their respective principal control functions, the relative strength of the interrelationship between i

each control function and -all other control functions can be -

determined. For the example step previously discussed, this step <

i sequence is grouped under the RPVPC control function and, via I

this step, the interrelationship that control function RPVPC has with control functions SCWTC and SCWLC is identified and docu-

! mented.

4 3.4 Application i

The results of this interrelationships analysis, conducted for all the steps oI the EOPs, determines a logical structure for the displays: developing a hierarchical structure based on grouping control function and systems information on one display for multiple control functions that are closely related. (Refer to

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Section 5.0 for a discussion of display structure development.)

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l OEI Document No. 8407-1, Information Requirements Analysis 4.0 INFORMATION REQUIREMElrFS ANALYSIS In the EOP Function and Task Analysis, each step is subjedted to evaluation to determine associated information requirements.

In the evaluation of decision functions, each identified decision function is examined in terms of the information that the opera-

tor requires to effect an evaluation of plant conditions and make the decision. i j

li In the evaluation of action functions, each identified action i

l function is examined in terms of system status information, plant I condition information, and information feedback required to ~

execute the action.

I In the EOPs the operator must exercise controlling action over

! various systems. Since there is frequent, multiple reference to the use, status and performance of these systems, the information l requirements and interrelationships analysis format will l incorporate, reference mechanisms whereby system information

, requirementa..nmed not be unduely repeated.

At the conclusi~9n of the information requirements analysis of

, action and decision fuentions, a compilation of information needs 1

is assembled. This information set then serves as the data base 1

for the displays.

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Display Structure 1

i 5.0 DISPLAY STRDCTURE DEVELOPMENT The EOP control functions and the interrelationships betwEen-

! these control functions (refer to Section 3.0) provides the basis for developing the structure of the displays.

i A hierarchical structure evolves by assigning an individual dis-play to each control function on a one-for-one basis, and then I

l grouping displays according to the relative strength of the j

identified interrelationships between the included control -

j functions at progressively higher levels.  ;

Below the hierarchical structure, supplemental displays are -

incorporated to provide additionally detailed information on the i

status of individual systems, plant status relative to setpoints and limits, data aquisition and processing, etc.

The structure described above is illustrated, conceptually, in Figure 5-1 (Page 5-2). Note: the actual number of levels in the I

HCGS SPDS display structure may or may not be 3, as is shown in Figure 5-1, -depending upon the results of the control function interrelationstfips analysis when it is completed for HCGS.

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l OEI Document No. 8407-1, Display Structure 1

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l 1.1 -.

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2.1 2.2 l

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e 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 T T -T T* T T 1 I I I I I T I T I 1 1 I I I I I

I I I T T T 1

1 1

l Hierarchical display structure Supplemental display structure i

i Hierarchical display l NOTE: l Any display can l l be reached by 1 i

i direct access l Supplemental display -----------------

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Figure 5-1: SPDS DISPLAY STRUCTURE S-2

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l OEI Document No. 8407-1, Display Design Considerations 6.0 DISPLAY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 6.1 Display Format -

Display format development (general composition and organization of displays) proceeds after the display structure has been defined.

As stated previously, the purpose of the displays is to assist J E

plant operations personnel in the action-taking and decision- t making processes required to execute the EOPs. The status of plant and system parameters is monitored, assessed, and then acted upon. Systems and components are' subsequently operated to l

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control these parameters relative to defined limits, setpoints, l and other operational criteria.

The plant parameter set compiled from the information require-j ments analysis (refer to Section 4.0) identifies and categorizes t

i. formation required to support EOP action and decision 1

i functions. Monitorina primarily involves the processing of l information"3Trectly'related to the control function parameters.

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contro111napriharilyinvolvestheprocessingofinformation directly related to system availability and performance. This I

categorization of information requirements provides the technical

basis for defining the general format of the displays.

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OBI Document No.'8407-1, Display Design Considerations While all displays located at one level in the hierarchical display structure will present information in basically the same format, ,

the format adopted at one level differs from that at another level. The format at a given level is a function of the intended primary user of the display and that person's functions, duties, and responsibilities.

Development of display formats begins at the functional control .I

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level (the lowest level in the hierarchical display structure), 4 f

l with the display area being divided into approximately equal ,

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quadrants (Figure 6-1).

1 INFORMATION ON PLANT l l INFORMATION ON THE PARAMETER.c AND CONDITIONS I

, I CONTROL FUNCTION DIRECTLX RELATED TO THE l l PARAMETER CONTROL FUNCTION PARAMETER l

_______________________________+______________________________

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, SYSTEMS SYSTEMS I

INPORMATION IhFORMATION

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Figure 6-1: FORMAT OF CONTROL FUNCTION DISPLAYS i

Located in the top right quadrant is information specific to the

y control function parameter of that display. Information on i

associated plant parameters and conditions directly related to 6-2

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Display Design Considerations i

the control function parameter is located in the left-adjacent quadrant. The remainder of the display field, the bottom-two 4

quadrants, presents information on the status of systems specif-

}. ically identified in the EOPs which may be used to control the

,. control function parameter.

l The display format described above reflects both the monitor and

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! control functions of the operator in that a proportionate amount J

, 5 l of space is provided for displaying information on plant condi- g i

4. tions and information on systems status.

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4 l At levels in the display structure above the functional control level displays, progressively less systems information is pro-j vided and more space is allocated to providing information on

! control function parameters and overall plant status (Figure 6-2, Page 6-4). This format reflects the broader role of super-l t

{ visory personnel, the anticipated primary users of the higher level displays, and directly supports assessment of overall plant i

operating status with respect to execution of the EOPs.

i The formats despribed above may be slightly modified to accommo-date unique considerations as each individual display evolves.

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OBI Document No. 8407-1, Display Design Considerations INFORMATION ON l l .

ASSOCIATED PLANT l

  • I PARAMETERS AND l INFORMATION ON I l
l CONDITIONS l CONTROL FUNCTION l

l PARAMETERS I

SYSTEMS l 1 1

INFORMATION l l -

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i Figure 6-2: FORMAT OF DISPLAYS ABOVE THE .

CONTROL FUNCTION LEVEL The uniqueness of displays in the supplemental display structure precludes being able to establish one generic format for all of the types of displays at this level. However, within a type, i

consistency of display formats is maintained to the maximum degree i possible. For examples data displays read left-to-right; curves I

depicting variable limits and setpoints have their axes oriented such that increasing values progress to the right or upward.

Like other disp}ays in the structure, the format of the supple-mental displaysimay be slightly modified to accommodate unique considerations as the specific' design of each individual display evolves.

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OEI Document No. 3407-1, Display Design Considerations 6.2 Display Features Individual display features are developed to directly assist the operator's decision-making process. The methods chosen to present information on the displays must have a technical basis and must do more than simply replicate existing control room instrumentation. To meet these criteria, the following process will be employed for designing display features: )

)

1. Each' identified decision function is examined to deter-mine the information required to make the decision  ;

(refer to Sectio,n 4.0).

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2. Each decision and its associated information are then examined to determine what processing the operator is required to perform on the information in order to be able to make the decision.

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3. The result of this information processing is identified.

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4. A display feature to present this information processing result,is designed.

i This process results in the development of display features which relieve the operator of the task of processing much of the infor-l mation contained in the parameter set in order to make the y decisions required for execution of the EOPs.

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1 OEI Document No. 8407-1, Display Design Considerations l

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Display features designed to support the decision functions, and the explicit information requirements supporting action func-l tions, are combined in a display consistent with the general principles of display format, the technical scope of the display, and the location of the display within the display structure.

6.3 ADDlication of E-= Factors Emineerina PrinciDies t

Consistent with the guidance provided in Section 4.1.e of

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NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, " accepted human factors principles" will be employed in the SPDS display development process. Relevant  ;

criteria will be derived from the Computer System survey results of the HCGS CRDR conducted by PSE&G's human factor's consultant.

Additionally, the guidance provided in " Computer-Generated Dis-play System Guidelines, Volume 1
Display Design," (EPRI Report NP-3701, September 1984) will be consulted and followed where appropriate. In general, the following human factor's aspects of display design will be emphasized:

o Logical, functional arranagements and groupings of

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information'

? l o Consis ency in the manner of presenting information o Acceptable content density o Readability of presented information 6-6

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1 OSI Document No. 8407-1, Display Design Considerations i

o Effective, unambiguous, consistent, and readily identifiable color usage .

o Understandability of presented information o Efficient utilization of display area o Use of hierarchical labeling to promote readability and

unambiguous interpretation of presented information [

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ORI Document No. 8407-1, CRT Presentation of Displays 7.0 CRT PRESENTATION OF DISPLAYS SPDS and associated supplemental displays and the supplemental displays will be presented on control room CRTs via the control Room Integrated Display System (CRIDS), a part of the Plant Computer Systems (PCS). CRIDS utilizes dual redundant Honeywell TDC 45,000 computers with Honeywell 7100 remote I/O. For a description of the PCS and CRIDS, refer to HCGS FSAR Section ,1

. s 7.5.1.3.3. 4 f The plant computer systems are not Class lE. However, the sys-  ;

tems do present information to the operator during all plant .

conditions using data acquired from both class lE and non-Class lE circuits. Where the computer input / output is connected to Class lE circuits, isolation devices are provided. (Refer to the response to HCGS FSAR question 421.13 for a complete discussion of these isolation devices.)

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Validation 8.0 VALIDATION OF CONTROL FUNCTION PARAMETER VALUES This section describes the processing employed in validating the displayed values of the eleven control function parameters as presented on the SPDS displays.

S RPV Water Level:

r The value of RPV water level presented on the SPDS displays is~a ) ,

4 compensated averaged value, determined by the processing of 4

)

information listed below.

1. RPV water -level as determined by each SHUTDOWN RANGE RPV water level instrument channel i 2. RPV water levol as determined by each WIDE RANGE RPV water level instrument channel i

j 3. RPV water level as determined by each NARROW RANGE RPV water level instrument channel

4. RPV water level as determined by each FUEL ZONE RPV water}evelinstrumentchannel
5. Reactor recirculation flow rate
6. Temperature near the RPV water level instrument cold l

t reference leg vertical runs

.I l

7. RPV pressure (determination of the validated value of 1

l 8-1

OEI Document No. 8407-1, Validation l

l this control function parameter is described separately) '

8. " Instrument Zero" for each of the RPV water level

~

instruments identified above

9. Calibration conditions (RPV pressure and temperature, drywell and secondary containment temperature) for each of the RPV water level instruments identified above I

t The validated.value of RPV water level is obtained by performing d data processing as follows:

1. Determining whi_ch indicated values of RPV water level .

are within the instrument indicating range (i.e.,

confirming that the value indicated by the instrument channel is not up-scale high or down-scale low), taking into account the criteria detailed in EPG Caution 47,

2. For each on-scale indication (as determined by #1 above),

applying appropriate corrections to the indicated value ohRPVwaterleveltocompensateforoff-calibration conditions (recirculation flow, instrument reference leg temperature, RPV pressure, RPV temperature, etc.).

3. Linearly compensating the results of #2 above to refer-l ence all RPV water level values to a common " instrument l = zero".
4. Arithmetically averaging the results of 43 above.

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i l

OSI Document No. 8407-1, Validation l

i RPV Pressure l

The value of RPV pressure presented on the SPDS displays is an j averaged value, determined by the processing of information

)

listed below, i

1. ,
1. RPV pressure rs determined by each WIDE RANGE RPV pressure instrument channel l

.I

. 6

2. RPV pressure as determined by each NARROW RANGE RPV g I

l l

pressure instrument channel i

The validated value of RPV pressure is obtained by performing ,

data processing as follows:

4

1. Determining which indicated values of RPV pressure are within the instrument indicating range (i.e., confirming that the value indicated by the instrument channel is not up-scale high or down-scale low). l
2. Arithmetica11y averaging all on-scale indications (as deteemined by #1 above).

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8-3

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OEI Document No. 6407-1, Validation Reactor Power:

For APRM reactor power: the value presented on the SPDS displays is an averaged value, determined by the processing of information listed below.

1. Reactor power as determined by each neutron monitoring l system APRM instrument channel  !

. .I

2. APRM bypass switch positions (each channel) '

'3. APRM INOP logic status (each channel)  :

The validated value of APRM reactor powdr is obtained by perform-ing data processing as follows:

1. Determining which APRM instrument channels have an indi-cated value within the instrument indicating range (i.e., confirming that the value indicated by an instru-ment channel is not up-scale high or down-scale low).
2. De'ermining t which APRM instrument channels are not by-passed g i
3. Determining which APRM instrument channels are operable (as defined by INOP logic status).

.?

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i OEI Document No. 8407-1, Validation 1

4. Arithmetica11y averaging all on-scale, un-bypassed, and operable APRM instrument indications (as determised by
  1. 1, 92, and #3 above, respectively).

i For IRM reactor power: the value presented on the SPDS displays is an averaged value, determined by the processing of information listed below.

I

1. Reactor power as determined.by each neutron monitoring i i

I 4

system IRM instrument channel (accounting for the -

position of each channel's range switch)  :

2. IRM bypass switch positions (each channel)
3. IRM INOP logic status (each channel)
4. IRM detector postitions (each channel)

The validated value of IRM reactor power is obtained by perform-ing data processing as follows:

1. Determining which IRM instrument channels have an indi-cated ya3.ue within the instrument indicating range (i.e.,I.canfirming that the value indicated by an instru-ment channel is not up-scale high or down-scale low).
2. Determining which IRM instrument channels are not by-

, passed.

I ,

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Validation i

3. Determining which IRM instrument channels are operable (as defined by INOP logic status). --
4. Determining which IRM detectors are fully inserted.
5. Arithmetically averaging all on-scale, un-bypassed, and operable IRM instrument indications for channels with the respective detector fully inserted (as determined by
  1. 1, 92, #3, and #4 above, respectively).

'~

i For SRM reactor power: the value presented on the SPDS displays ,

i is an averaged value, determined by the processing of information

-' ' ~

listed below.

1. Reactor power as determined by each neutron monitoring system SRM instrument channel
2. SRM bypass switch positions (each channel)
3. SRM INOP logic status (each channel)
4. SRM detector postitions (each channel)

ThevalidatedvflueofSRMreactorpowerisobtainedbyperform-ing data processing as follows:

1. Determining which SRM instrument channels have an indi-cated value within the instrument indicating range 3

8-6 w - n

OEI Document No. 8407-1, Validation (i.e., confirming that the value indicated by an instru-ment channel is not up-scale high or down-scale. low) .

2. Determining which SRM instrument channels are not by-passed.
3. Determining which SRM instrument channels are operable (as defined by INOP logic status).

f s

4. Determining which SRM detectors are fully inserted. t
5. Arithmetically averaging all on-scale, un-bypassed, and
  • operable SRM inatrument indications for channels with the respective detector fully inserted (as determined by
  1. 1, #2, #3, and #4 above, respectively) .

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ORI Document No. 8407-1, Validation Suppression Pool Temperatures  !

i The value of suppression pool temperature presented on the SPDS  :

displays is a bulk average value, determined by the processing of suppression pool temperature monitoring system information (all monitors and channels). .

The validated value of suppression pool temperature is obtained by performing data processing as follows: I i '

,r )

1. Determining which indicated values of suppression pool temperature are within the instrument indicating range (i.e., confirming that the value indicated by the instrument is not up-scale high or down-scale low).
2. Arithmetica11y averaging all on-scale indications (as determined in #1 above).

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1 9 4 OEI Document No. 8407-1, Validation SuDDression Pool Water Level:

The value of suppression pool water level presented on the'SPDS displays is an averaged value, determined by the processing of information listed below.

1. Suppression pool water level as determined by the WIDE RANGE suppression pool water level instrument (all I

channels) .

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2. Suppression pool water level as determined by the NARROW RANGE suppression pool water level instrument (all

, channels) -- -

The validated value of suppression pool water level is obtained by performing data processing as follows:

1. Determining which indicated values of suppression pool water level are within the instrument indicating range (i.e., confirming that the value indicated by the in$trument is not up-scale high or down-scale low) .
2. Arithm5tically averaging all on-scale indications (as determined in #1 above).

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Validation Drvwell Pressure:

ThevalueofdrywellpressurepresentedontheSPDSdisplahsis an averaged value, determined by the processing of information listed below.

1. Drywell pressure as determined by the WIDE RANGE drywell pressure instrument (all channels)

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. 6

2. Drywell pressure as determined by the NARROW RANGE dry- g f

well pressure instrument (all channels)

The validated value of drywell pressure is obtained by performing data processing as follows:

1. Determining which indicated values of drywell pressure are within the instrument indicating range (i.e., con-firming that the value indicated by the instrument is not up-scale high or down-scale low).
2. Arithmetically averaging all on-scale indications (as determined bn #1 above).

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Validation Drywell Temperature:

The value of drywell temperature presented on the SPDS displays is an averaged value, determined by the processing of drywell temperature monitoring system information (all channels).

The validated value of drywell temperature is obtained by per-forming data processing as follows:

I

1. Determining which indicated values of drywell temper- t ature are within the instrument indicating range (i.e.,.

confirming that the value indicated by the instrument is not up-scale high or down-scald low).

2. Arithmetically averaging all on-scale indications (as determined in il above).

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OBI Document No. 8407-1, Validation Reactor Buildine Water Level The value of reactor building water level presented on the SPDS displays is selected from the sump / area water level instruments 4

for areas identified in OP-EO.ZZ 103, " Reactor Building Control,"

3 as follows.

1. If no reactor building floor drain sump or area water level is above its respective maximum normal operating

, )

6 value, the water level with the smallest margin to its g' maximum normal operating value (as a percentage of full-scale indicating range) is displayed.

2. If any reactor. building floor drain sump or area water level is above its respective maximum normal operating value, the water level with the smallest margin to its maximum safe operating value (as a percentage of full-scale indicating range) is displayed.

1

3. If any reactor building floor drain sump or area water 1

level is above its respective maximum safe operating value,.the water level most above its maximum safe operating value (as a percentage of full-scale indica-ting range) is displayed.

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Validation i Reactor Buildina Radiation Level The value of reactor building radiation level presented on the SPDS displays is selected from radiation monitors for the areas identified in OP-EO.ZZ 103, " Reactor Building Control," as follows.

l. If no reactor building area radiation level is above its respective maximum normal operating value, the radiation l

level with the smallest margin to its maximum normal operating value (as a percentage of full-scale indica-ting range) is displayed. ,

2. If any reactor building area radiation level is above its respective maximum normal operating value, the radiation level with the smallest margin to its maximum safe operating value (as a percentage of full-scale indicating range) is displayed.
3. If any reactor building area radiation level is above its~Y5spectfve maximum safe operating value, the water l levelhostaboveitsmaximumsafeoperatingvalue(asa i

l percen'tage of full-scale indicating range) is d33 played.

l 8-13 I

OBI Document No. 8407-1, Validation Reactor Buildina TeEDerature The value of reactor building temperature presented on the SPDS displays is selected from temperature monitors for the areas identified in OP-EO.ZZ 103, " Reactor Building Control," as follows.

1. If no reactor building area temperature is above its h

respective maximum normal operating value, the tem- )

perature with the smallest margin to its maximum normal operating value (as a percentage of full-scale indica-ting range) is displayed. ,

2. If any reactor building area temperature is above its respective maximum normal operating value, the tem-perature with the smallest margin to its maximum safe operating value (as a percentage of full-scale indica-ting range') is displayed.
3. If any reactor building area temperature is above its res)Retive daximum safe operating value, the temperature mostahoveitsmaximumsafeoperatingvalue(asaper-centag'e of full-scale indicating range) is displayed.

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l l OEI, Document No. 8407-1, Validation 1

Radioactivity Release Rates The value of off-site radioactivity release rate presented on the

. SPDS displays is a computed value, determined by the processing of containment effluent noble gas radioactivity release rate information as specified in HCGS FSAR Table 11.5-1.

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Verification of Display Design 9

9.0 VERIFICATION OF DISPLAY DESIGN Verification that the SPDS meets system performance require -

ments will be completed prior to SPDS implementation. An

', integrated program will be developed detailing verification i

! criteria and objectives, qualification requirements of review team members, assessment of evaluation findings, and the i

mechanism for incorporating recommended modifications to the  !

displays as appropriate and neesssary. 4 -

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OSI Document No. 8407-1, . Operator Training i

10.0 OPERATOR TRAINING Control room operators will be trained on the use of the -

displays, their information content, the means of accessing i

displays, and the anticipated use of displays during both normal

.j and off-normal plant conditions prior to implementation of the SPDS. Formal operator training on these topics will be conducted

$ after the SPDS verification process (Section 9.0) has been com- }

i pleted. g f

Use of SPDS will also be incorporated in the EOP Verification an'd ;

Validation Program, and in the EOP Training Program. , _

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OEI Document No. 8407-1, Appendix A S

APPENDIX A i

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4 '

e DEFINITIONS

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OBI Document No. 8407-1, Appendix A ,

DEFINITIONS Although many of the terms listed below are often used in a -

broader sense, the following definitions have been adopted for j use in describing the Hope Creek Generating Station SPDS Display Design program.

AGTION FUNCTION:

1 An operator function involving the performance of a con-l

~

scious movement, operation of controls, or execution of a series of procedural steps.  ;

Example: " Inject boron into the RPV with SLC."

DECISION ANALYSIS:

A specialized form of task analysis in which operator decisions are identified and systematically examined to identify associated information requirements.

DECISION FUNCTION:

An operator function involving a determination, evaluation, or judgement through which a procedural branch path or action is selected.

Example: "If suppression pool temperature cannot be I

maintained below the Heat Capacity Temper-ature Limit, ...

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A-1

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o OEI Document No. 8407-1, Appendix A PUNCTION:

A higher order activity by which the plant operating crew meets the objectives of the operating procedures. Within I the context of the SPDS Display Design description, functions include decisions and actions.

i FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS:

t The process of identifying and analyzing the functions per-

[

r formed by the control room operating crew in executing the -

Emergency Operating Procedures. .

INFORMATION REQUIREMENT: . .

Knowledge of system or plant status required as an input to making a decision or taking an action.

Examples: RPV pressure, pump status, spray flow, etc.

TACK:

A well defined subdivision of a function; a specific activity contributing toward the accomplishment of a function.

Exampdes: Starting a pump, opening a valve, etc.

TASK ANALYSIS The process of identifying and analyzing the tasks performed i i

by the control room operating crew in executing the  !

? Emergency Operating Procedures.

A-2

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