ML20087P993

Control Room Design Review Task Analysis Guideline

ML20087P993
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	12/31/1983
From:	NUCLEAR UTILITY TASK ACTION COMMITTEE
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ML20087P978	List: ML20087P977 ML20087P984 ML20087P987 ML20087P991 ML20087P993
References
INPO-83-046(NUT, INPO-83-046(NUTAC), INPO-83-46(NUT, INPO-83-46(NUTAC), NUDOCS 8404100181
Download: ML20087P993 (141)

Text

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Nuclear Utility Tcsk  ;

Action Committee Control Room Design Review Task Analysis Guideline L December 1983 l

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CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW TASK ANALYSIS GUIDELINE _

Developed By Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee for Control Room' Design Review December 1983 INPO 83-046 (NUTAC)

Copynght 1984 by Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. All rights roserved. Not for sale. Unauthorized reproduction is a violation of applicable law. Reproduction of not more than ten copies by each recipient for its intomat use onlyis permitted.

Publications produced by a nuclear utility task action committee (NUTAC) represent a consensus of the utilities represented in the NUTAC. These publi-cations are not intended to be interpreted as industry standards. Instead, ,

the publications are offered as suggested guidance with the understanding that t individual utilities are not obligated to use the suggested guidance.

This publication has been produced by the NUTAC on control room design review (CRDR) with the support of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0).

The officers of this NUTAC were Chairman Hamilton Fish (New York Power Authority) and Vice Chairman Bill Gainey (Carolina Power & Light Company).

The following utilities and service organizations have actively participated in the development of this document:

Alabama Power Company Northeast Utilities Arizona Public Service Company Northern States Power Company Carolina Power & Light Company Pacific Gas and Electric Company Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company Pennsylvania Power & Light Company Commonwealth Edison Company Public Service Company of Colorado Consumers Power Company Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc.

Duke Power Company Public Sei vice Electric and Gas Company Duquesne Light Company Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation Georgia Power Company Sacramento Municipal Utility District Iowa Electric Light and Power Company Tennessee Valley Authority Mississippi Power & Light Company Texas Utilities Generating Company New York Power Authority Virginia Electric and Power Company Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Yankee Atomic Electric Company NOTICE: This document was prepared by a nuclear utility task action committee (NUTAC) with staff support of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). Neither this NUTAC, INP0, members of INPO, INP0 participants, other persons contributing to or assisting in the preparation of the document, nor any person . acting on behalf of these parties (a) makes any warranty or repre-sentation, expressed or implied, with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information contained in this document, or that the use of any information, apparatus, method or process disclosed in this document may not infringe on privately owned rights, or (b) assumes any liabilities with respect to the use of any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this document.

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FOREWORD -

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Control Room Desian Review Task Anal'vsis Guidelink'"was devel'oped by the nuclear utility task action c'mmittee o (NUT $C) on control room design review (CRDR) to assist individual utilities in con-ducting a task analysis as part of their control room' reviews.

The INPO Analysis and Engineering Division Industry Review ' Group identified the need for a utility committee to deal with the C,R,DR item of the TMI-Task Action Plan. The cha'rter for such a group

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was approved by INPO management. The CRDR NUTAC, form'ed after this approval, identified several.arE s in which utilities could use assistance in the implementation of CRDRs. In addition to this document, the following documents have been published:

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o Control Room Design Review Implementation Guideline

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INPO 83-026 (NUTAC)

Human Engineerina Principles For Contro[ Room Desian Review

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o INPO 83-036 (NUTAC) e ~

o Control Room Design Review Surveh Development Guidekine INPO 83-042 (NUTAC) ,

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CHARTER NUCLEAR UTILITY TASK ACTION COMMITTEE

'ON

-CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW The Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee (NUTAC) on CRDR has

- been established. by a -group' of representative utilities in recog-

.nition of the need for guidance on performing a CRDR. The prin-cipal; objectives are (a) to determine the boundaries of the CRDR, (b) to develop a methodologly,-(c) to define terms, (d) to inte-grate other initiatives with the CRDR (e.g., SFC' development, EOP development, staffing, and training), and (e) to provide practical implementation guidelines that include but are not limited to the following:

o a CRDR methodology.and implementation guideline o a guideline on the development of CRDR survey checklists o: a CRDR task analysis guideline o a set of human engineering review principles e

LThe:NUTAC will consider the need for other activities cf generic benefit to the industry af ter the - CRDR requirements are issued.

The NUTAC-will establish liaison and solicit support from indus-

-try groups, such as NSSS Owners groups, AIF, INPO, and EPRI.

Communication on this_ industry initiative will be maintained with the NRC. Providing the NUTAC consensus to-the NRC will help shape' both the . regulator and industry perspective on CRDR inte-gration issues.

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SUMMARY

This document was written.in response to a utility industry request for assistance in-the area of human factors, in general, and the CRDR,'in particular. This document is offered as refer-ence only. There is no obligation for any nuclear utility to follow any guidance contained in the document.

The process of task analysis has been dif ficult for nuclear util-ities to understand in the context of the CRDR. Although task

! analysis is a relatively straightforward technique used tradi-

! 'tionally during design, its use for identifying potential defi-l- ciencies in existing systems (i.e., control rooms) has caused confusion.among utilities and practitioners.

This document is intended for use by personnel performing a CRDR. lIt is designed to assist utilities in understanding and implementing that portion of their CRDR that requires the use of L task analysis. This document contains a discussion of the rudi-I ments of tasks and task analysis. Following the introductory discussion are descriptions of each phase required to implement g-

.the task analysis process in order to obtain the kinds of infor-

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mation necessary for the CRDR.

. Appendixes to thisEdocument provide a sample task analysis proce-dure as it might be' written by a utility, an example of the output of that procedure, and a reference list of NUREG-0700,

^$ection 6 items that are most appropriately addressed during the

.CRDR task. analysis.

The -task analysis methodology presented in this document provides 1 guidance for the development of an effective CRDR task analysis plan; of generic benefit to utilities. In addition to the CRDR Mask analysis, this document can be used as a review document in

'the development of an1 plant-specific task analysis program. For example, _ it can be used to analyze tasks not directly related to y

reactor operation that operators may be required to perform, such as + hose tasks associated with the implementation of the emer-gency plan. -In addition, guidance on job and task analysis for use in the development of training programs can be found in the following documents:

o Job and Task Analysis Users Manual (INPO 83-033) o Task Analysis Procedure (INPO 83-009) o ~ Training Systems Development Manual (draft)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Pace

1. INTRODUCTION............................................. I 1.1 Purpose............................................. 1 1.2 Background.......................................... 1 1.3 Organization of Document............................ 3 1.4 Definitions......................................... 5 1.5 Recommended Use of This Document.................... 9

2. THE CONCEPT OF A TASK.................................... 11 2.1 Introduction........................................ 11 2.2 Job Versus Task..................................... 11 2.3 Aspects Rel.ated To A Task........................... 12 2.3.1 Initiating Cues.............................. 13 2.3.2 Knowledge and Skills......................... 14 2.3.3 Con t rols a nd Disp lays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.3.4 Required Aids................................ 15 2.3.5 Terminating Cues............................. 16

3. TASK ANALYSIS OVERVIEW................................... 19 3.1 Introduction........................................ 19 3.2 Use of Task Analysis................................ 19 3.3 Task Analys is Program Obj ective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.4 Task Analysis Process............................... 23 3.4.1 Task Analysis................................ 24 3.4.2 Task Analysis Verification................... 24 3.4.3 Task Analysis Validation..................... 25

4. TASK ANALYSIS............................................ 27 4.1 Introduction........................................ 27 4.2 Determining the Purpose of the Analysis............. 27 4.3 Determining the Information Available From the Analysis............................................ 28 4.4 Determining the Resources Available................. 29 vii

Section Page 4.5 Selecting the Task Analysis Method (s) .............. 29 4.5.1 Paper and Pencil Method...................... 30 4.5.2 Table-Top Method............................. 33 4.5.3 Walk-Through Method.......................... 36 4.5.4 Simulator Method............................. 39 4.6 Planning for the Task An Alysis Methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4.6.1 Introduction................................. 42 4.6.2 Personnel Requirements....................... 43 4.6.3 Equipment Requirements....................... 44 4.6.4 Documentation Requirements................... 46

5. TASK ANALYSIS VERIFICATION............................... 49 5.1 Introduction........................................ 49 5.2 Verification Activities............................. 49 5.2.1 Document Verification........................ 49 5.2.2 Verification of Required Controls and Displays..................................... 50 5.2.3 Verification of Suitability.................. 51

6. TASK ANALYSIS VALIDATION................................. 53 6.1 Introduction........................................ 53 6.2 Validation Framework................................ 53 6.3 Validation Methods.................................. 54 6.3.1 Paper and Pencil............................. 55 6.3.2 Table-Top.................................... 56 6.3.3 Walk-Through................................. 57 6.3.4 Simulator.................................... 58

7. RESULTS OF THE TASK ANALYSIS PROCESS..................... 59 7.1 Introduction........................................ 59 7.2 Areas of Interest for CRDR.......................... 59 7.2.1 Operator / Plant Interface..................... 60 7.2.2 Procedures / Plant Interface................... 61 viii

Section Page 7.3 Other Areas of Interest............................. 63 7.3.1 Procedures / Operator Interface................ 63 7.3.2 Training / Plant Interface.................. . .. 64 7.3.3 Training / Procedures Interface................ 65 7.3.4 Training / Operator Interface.................. 66 APPENDIX A EXAMPLE PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCTING TASK ANALYSIS FOR THE CRDR APPENDIX B EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE ANALYZED USING PROCE-DURES IN APPENDIX A APPENDIX C TASK ANALYSIS OUTPUT USING PROCEDURES IN APPENDIX A APPENDIX D NUREG-0700, SECTION 6 ITEMS TO BE ADDRESSED DURING THE CRDR TASK ANALYSIS l

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1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 , Purpose The purpose of this document is to provide guidance that can be used by a utility in developing a procedure to

. perform. task analysis required-by the Control Room Design Review (CRDR). The objective-of the CRDR task analysis is to identify the tasks required to support emergency operation and to determine whether the design of the existing control' room, especially the controls and displays, allows and supports those tasks. This guidance can be used to identify the required input and output of such analysis. Although the focus of the document is on the CRDR, the guidance can be used to plan and execute task analysis for any major interface

-in a nuclear plant. A model is described that identi-fies and describes such interfaces. Task analysis is a reasonable vehicle with which to integrate the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirements in the areas of CRDR, emergency procedures, emergency response facilities, and training.

1.2 Backaround Since the TMI-2 accident, many requirements have been promulgated that are aimed at identifying and, where possible, eliminating human engineering problems in existing nuclear power plant control rooms. Although not widely used in the past, most human engineering principles and techniques are straightforward and intui-tive. However, one particular technique--task analysis--

has caused a_ great deal of confusion within the nuclear industry.

The reasons for much of the confusion are obvious, gi,ven the chronology.of the post-TMI requirements and the methods used to clarify those requirements. The immediate l

responses to proposed requirements contributed to the impression 6that-no one really understood _what task analy-sis island how it should be . applied to a review of control -

' rooms.

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This document utilizes ~and references compatible, existing industry. documents._ It attempts to. dispel the mystery surrounding task' analysis and to provide a clearer picture of theLunderlying~ principles and use of task analytic

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methods. ItLis written in a straightforward style as free of jargon-as possible. Wherever possible, examples are use'd to illustrate important~ points and, in all cases, the descriptive text is' aimed at' typical electric utility activities.

The task analysis-process' described in this document includes task identification and analysis of those tasks, verification, and validation. Since these activities can txa logically, separated from each other, they are described in separate sections of the-document, as shown below.

TASK ANALYSIS PROCESS TASK ANALYSIS (Section 4)

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o Task-LIdentif'ication o Analysis of' Tasks TASK ANALYSIS VERIFICATION (Section 5)

TASK ~ ANALYSIS VALIDATION (Section 6)

. The section numbers beside_the three major activities in

the task analysis process refer to the sections within th'is document ' where that - activity is . discussed in-detail.

-1.3' organization of Document This document, Control Room Design Review Task Analysis Guideline, departs somewhat from previous CRDR NUTAC docu-ments, in that the subject of task analysis is discussed both generally and as-'it relates specifically to the CRDR. Such a split is intentional and clarifies the relationship between task analysis, in general, and the specific application of task analysis to the CRDR. Task analysis is a tool that can be used to gather many kinds of information in a variety of applications. The task analysis conducted for the CRDR is more limited in scope

'than a more general task analysis.

The sections of this document that deal with the task analysis process, depicted in the previous section, begin with a general discussion of some aspect of task analysis, such as verification, and proceeds to the description of how that aspect is related directly to the CRDR task anal-ysis. To avoid confusion, the term "CRDR task analysis" is used when referring specifically to the task analysis-done to meet the requirements of NUREG-0737, Task I.D.l.

The term " task analysis".is used to refer to the more general case.

This document is presented in seven sections and four

. appendixes. To enhance the usability of the document, a brief description of-each major section and each appendix

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1.3.1 Section 1 - Introduction The introduction explains the purpose, background, organization, definitions, and recommended use of

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.the document.

r- j 1.3.2 Section 2 - The Concept of a Task This section distinguishes between the concepts of a job and a task. It describes the various aspects of a task and briefly explains why those aspects should be identified by task analysis.

1.3.3 Section 3 - Task Analysis Overview The overview section describes the principal uses of task analysis in a nuclear power plant set-ting. It also lists the various phases of task analysis, including setting objectives, perform-ing the analysis, verification, and validation.

1.3.4 Section 4 - Task Analysis This section goes-into considerable detail on the generic considerations of actually perform-

'ing task analysis.. These include determining the purpose of the analysis, the resources available, the method to be used, and the plan-ting that should occur.

1.3.5 Section 5 - Task Analysis Verification This section describes the objectives of verifi-cation in general and establishes the specific steps required for CRDR. task analysis verifica-tion.

1.3.6 Section 6 - Task Analysis Validation The validation section describes the methods available to ensure the task analysis process accomplished the objectives set out beforehand.

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1.3.7 Section 7 - Results of the Task Analysis Process This section describes the process of evaluating the task-analysis data as it pertains to various

. interfaces in the plant.

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1.3.8f Appendix A Appendix A is an example of the task analysis

. procedure used by the Horizon Generating Sta-tion, an imaginary plant. This procedure is accompanied, in Appendix C, by some example output of such an analysis performed on one emergency procedure guideline, found in Appendix B.

1.3.9 Appendix B Appendix B is a copy of the emergency response guideline analyzed using the Appendix A proce-dure. Emergency Response Guideline El, LOCA, is used for purposes of illustration.

1.3.10 ' Appendix C Appendix C is an example of the written output of the CRDR task analysis as it might be gener-ated using the procedures in Appendix A.

. 1.3.11 Appendix D Appendix D is a listing of those NUREG-0700, Section 6 items that are best addressed during the CRDR task-analysis.

f 1.4 Definitions

. To establish uniformity in the meaning of key-words used

-in this guideline, the following definitions are pro-

'vided.

Control Room Simulator - A device that dynamically models thelplant' functions as presented ~in the control' room.

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Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) - Plant procedures directing operator actions :necessary to mitigate conse-

quences of transients 1and accidents that cause plant parameters to_ exceed reactor protection setpoints, engi-neered safety. feature setpoints, or-other appropriate l technical. limits._

. Emergency Operating Procedure Guidelines ( EPGs ) -- Guide-

lines,; developed from system analysis of transients and accidents, that provide technical bases for the develop-ment of EOPs.

Emergency Response Guideline (ERG)'- See EPG. The emer-gency procedure guidelines developed by the Westinghouse Owner's Group are called ERGS.

EOP Network - The set of;EOPs and all procedures-that

- are called out in'the EOPs'or that support the use of

-thenEOPs during_ emergency conditions.

Mock-Up - Static device (e.g., model, photos drawings)

that portrays control room hardware and configuration.

Emergency Response-System (System) The. emergency

-response system _is composed of.four integrated compo-nents::

o The " operator"_ consists of the control room operating crew.

o The " plant" consists of the plant as seen from its

' control. room with its instruments and-controls.

The" procedure" consists of the;EOP set and support-

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~ing system operating - procedures - (EOP Network ) .

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o The " training" consists of the operator training program.

Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) - A characteristic of the existing control room that does not comply with the human engineering criteria used in the control room design review.

Paper and Pencil Task Analysis - Method of task analysis where one or more persons break down, on paper, a fairly high-level function into the tasks required to support that function. This is generally the first step in a CRDR task analysis.

Simulator Task Analysis - Method of task analysis whereby control room operators perform actual control functions on simulated equipment during a transient scenario while their actions are monitored by an observer or review team.

Source Documents - Documents or records upon which each of the four system components is based.

Symptoms - Plant characteristics that directly or indi-rectly indicate plant status.

System Operational Correctness - A characteristic of the overall emergency response system that indicates the degree to which its four components are compatible as they work together to mitigate the consequences of emer-gency conditions.

System Validation - The overall evaluation of the emer-gency response system performed to determine that the, four system components, illustrated in Figure 1 on page 20, work together to accomplish the desired results.

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Table-Top Task Analysis - Method of task analysis where-by personnel explain and/or discuss action steps in response to a proposed scenario.

Task - A well-defined unit of work having an identifi-able beginning and end.

Task Analysis - The systematic process of identifying and examining operator tasks in order to identify condi-tions,. instrumentation, skills, and knowledge associated with the performance of a task. In the CRDR context, task analysis is used to determine the individual tasks that must be completed to allow successful emergency system operation. In addition, this activity can verify and validate the match of information available in the con-trol room to the information requirements of the emer-gency_ operating tasks.

Validation - The process of determining whether the control room operating crew can perform their tasks effectively ~given the control room instrumentation and controls, procedures, and training. In the CRDR con-text, validation implies a dynamic performance evalua-tion.

Verification - The process of determining whether instrumentation, controls, and other equipment exist to meet the specific requirements of the emergency tasks performed by operators. In the CRDR context, verifica- l tion implies a static check of instrumentation against human engineering criteria.

-Walk-Through' Task Analysis - Method of task analysis whereby control room operators conduct a step-by-step enactment of their actions during a transient scenario for an observer review team without carrying out the actual control functions.

1.5 Recommended Use of This Document This document is organized to address a utility's indi-vidual task analysis program. Program objectives, eval-uation criteria, and the program process are described.

An example program with evaluating criteria is presented in the appendixes.

The task analysis methodology presented in this document provides recommendations for an effective plan of gen-eric benefit to utilities. This document may be used in whole, in part, or simply as a review document in the development of a plant-specific task analysis program.

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2. : THE-CONCEPT OF A TASK 2.1 Introduction Before discussing a task analysis program, the concept of a task must be understood. Generally, discussions of task analysis in-books or other references start with a detailed breakdown of a job into functions, tasks, steps, etc. Unfortunately, such detailed definitions allow the reader to lose sight of the main purpose of the' discussion. This section presents a general, opera-tion-oriented discussion of the concept of a task.

2.2 Job Versus Task Different' slots in-an organization are assigned job titles.- In a nuclear power generating plant, for exam-ple, the job titles include plant manager, operations supervisor, maintenance. foreman, control room operator, etc. Each job has associated with it some function that

the_ person who bears that job title, the job incumbent, is supposed to fulfill. These functions normally are written into a job description. In its simplest form, the job-description summarizes what is done by the job incumbent. In the case of a control room operator, a job function might include something like " Detects and diagnoses off-normal plant status and takes appropriate action to safeguard the plant equipment and the health andLsafety of the public."

Although it is' straightforward to state generally what tasks the operator should do, determining how the opera-tor can and should do those tasks is quite a different matter. Therein lies the distinction between a job and altask. A job is a-finite set of tasks. The job description tells what tasks the operator is supposed to do. The next logical level of analysis must ask how the operator does the tasks that the job calls for him or

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'her1to do. At the general level, a job can be ,

fconsidered a combination of activities an individual can do in series ~, in parallel, or, as in real life, both in series-and' parallel.

Some= activities go<on more or less continuously. For

example, monitoring the net electrical output of the-

-generator is something-that goes on all the time. This is true even though an operator does not stare at the

, megawatt readout all the time, but glances at the read-ting to. periodically update his memory. Other activities have . a specific beginning and end. For example, manu-ally' tripping the turbine is an activity that begins and ends at:a definite point in time. After it ends, the

-turbine is tripped. For purposes of this document, a

~ task- is an activity that has . a definite beginning and a definite end.

By:this' definition, a task can be a pretty small unit of a, job. It might seem more appropriate to define a task as an activity of relatively long duration (e.g., manu-ally start the HPCI' system) and define a step.within that task as 'a shorter duration activity-(e.g., open the-

~HPCI' turbine steam ~ supply valve). The point to remember is ' that it makes no difference, from a' practical stand-

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point, how one: defines the duration of a task as long as-the . task has a specific beginning and end ' point.- The

-appropriate length'of any activity to be considered a task 1will.usually be obvious from the context in which

. the activity- is i being analyzed.

2.3. Aspects Related-to a Task-

~Some. tasks are more-technically difficult to perform than . others, 'some are more physically demanding than others, and some tasks . require tools and procedures, whereas others:do~not. Nearly everyone is familiar with instances in which obviously unequally difficult tasks are treated as though they require the same level of effort. For example, the statement " verify safety injection" is found.as one of the first tasks in some emergency procedures. Obviously, it is more easily written than done. As a precursor to discussing task analysis it is important to determine the aspects related to any task that might be important during the analysis.

2.3.1 Initiating Cues An initiating cue for a task can be just about anything that lets a person know a particular task should be started. From the working defi-nition given earlier, every task has a beginning point. A task may be the next step in a proce-dure. For example, one step in a valve lineup procedure-might call for the high pressure injection (HPI) suction valve to be aligned to the condensate storage tank (CST). In such a case, the initiating cue for this task is the completion of the previous step. A task may be initiated as the result of a plant parameter reaching some predetermined value. For instance, reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) might have to'be tripped manually when the reactor coolant system (RCS) primary pressure falls to some low value.

In this case, the initiating cue for the task (tripping the RCPs) is the operator detecting a sufficiently low RCS pressure.

In addition to the procedure-step and parameter value cited above, initiating cues can be verbal commands, annunciators, steps in system operating sequences, elapsed times, days of the week, etc.

m In other words,.an initiating cue is anything l that cues the' individual to begin a certain

-task.

2.3.2~ Knowledge and' Skills Most tasks in a power: plant require some degree of knowledge to complete. The level'of knowledge-can vary significantly from task to task. For example, the task, " Turn switch HPI-9-24 to 'ON'" does not require the same type or depth of knowledge as the' task, " Borate RCS to ensure adequate shutdown-margin." Likewise, some' tasks require a special skill on the part of the person performing the tasks. For exam-ple, a task such as " Weld RTD well into piping using TIG welder" requires considerable skill to perform. Whereas, " Fill ink reservoir on chart recorder CR-2-13" does not require the same skill level.

The' main thing to remember is that nearly every task requires some. level of knowledge and/or skill on the part of the person performing the task. It is easy to lose sight of this fact, since many tasks require only rudimentary skills

.and superficial knowledge and it is sometimes assumed that people automatically possess these attributes.

2.3.3 Controls and Displays The terms " controls" and " displays" should be interpreted in the most general way when associ-ating'them to tasks. In addition to CRTs, ver-

-tical : edge meters, chart recorders, and similar displays, a display.for a task.should be inter-

.preted to includeLdirect indications, such as steam escaping from a valve, the subjective speed of a visible shaft drive, and the position of a valve stem. Displays can even include sounds, vibration, smell, and heat. Likewise, controls should be interpreted as broadly as necessary to get an accurate picture of the controls necessary to perform a task. In many activities associated with the emergency opera-tion of a power plant, the tasks performed by operators require the existence of certain con-trols and displays. For the control room opera-tor, in particular, nearly all emergency tasks involve the use of the controls and displays

, located inside the control room. Equipment that is used for maintenance or sampling and other such activities is discussed in Section 2.3.4, Required Aids.

2.3.4 Required Aids A task aid can be interpreted very broadly to mean anything that normally is not built into a person's environment, but is necessary to per-form a task as intended. With this interpreta-tion, an aid can be anything from a wrench, to welding goggles, to a C-clamp, to an SPDS dis-play.

Besides knowledge, skills, and the existing con-trois-and displays, other prerequisites may exist for certain tasks. Examples of such task

" aids" are written or verbal procedures, hand tools, power tools, test equipment, access to a computerized data base, telephones, PA system--

in short, anything a person has to have at hand to complete a task. These aids should not be considered as just nice things to have around or

conveniences. A task aid is any aid necessary to perform the task as the task is meant to be performed. Without the required aid, extra and perhaps more dif ficult steps must be taken to perform-the task.

A-good example of a task aid is the written pro-cedure used to perform a surveillance test.

With the procedure, the test is a simple step-by-step process easily carried out by a trained technician. Without the procedure, the techni-cian must have an in-depth understanding of the system under test plus prior knowledge of the purpose of the test, the location of test points in the system, and the expected values to be obtained during the test.

2.3.5 Terminating Cues As with initiating cues, terminating cues are anything that cues the individual that a certain task is complete. Just as each task has a starting point, it~also must have an end point.

To qualify as a task, an activity must have some observable event that signifies it is complete.

As with initiating cues, terminating cues can and should be interpreted-in the broadest sense.

For most common control-room-oriented tasks, the terminating cue will be the observation that some plant state has been obtained, some param-eter has reached a desired value, or some proce-dure has been completed.

Terminating cues can be simple or complex. For example, the terminating cue for the task "Open valve MS-3-24" is an indication that this valve has been opened. For the task " Verify turbine i

i tripped and in safe configuration," there are many terminating cues, such as stop valve posi-tions, oil lift pump status, turning gear

. status, etc. Terminating cues do not have to be instrument indications. For instance, if the last step in a surveillance procedure is to replace an instrument cover, then that is the cue that the surveillance task is complete.

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3. TASK ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 72; >

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3.1 Introduction "*

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The trained ' operator, pe'rforming a given task in'Yne control room as'he is guided by procedures creates a g'-

dynamicsystemconsistpigof_thefollowing four~ inte-grated components: --

• o operator - the indihidualperformingagiventask ,

o plant - that part.of the plant with which-the indivi-

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dual is interfacing _,

-o procedures - both written and unwritten instructions governing the actions. performed by the -individual-o training program - the program covering the actual training received by the. individual resulting in his curredt. level of skills and knowledge v -

This operator plant procedures-training system, referrfd:

to as the' System, can bG depicted as shown in _ Figu'fe -l'-.' y

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The vertices represent the four components of the --

System. The interf aces are represented by the lines between the-vertices. , Task analysis is a tool that can

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c 't be used to des,cr ibe and analyze each interface.

3.2 Use of Task'Analysif /, , .

Information on one or nbre i6terfaces between the,. opera-tor' and the other three components can be obtained .

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through task analysis focused on the given interfaces. #~

-The use for the information produced by such an analysis is dependent on the status of'the plant, i.e., operating ,.

or under construction, and on the system interface being --

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For a near-term-operating-license (NTOL) plant, task analysis conducted for the three interfaces containing the operator can produce the followings o operator / plant - specification of required operator actions within the plant or hardware design require-ments for preconstruction plants o operator / procedures - development of function-oriented procedures and identification of the required level of detail o operator / training - identification of conditions, standards, knowledge, and skills for developing per- ,

formance objectives and lesson plans i

For an operating plant, task analysis conducted for the three interfaces containing the " operator" component can

-produce the following:

o' operator / plant - an evaluation of the existing plant component status and its effect on required operator actions o operator / procedures - development or review of func-tion-oriented procedures and their level of detail o operator / training - evaluation of conditions, stan-dards, knowledge, and skills for reviewing perfor-

'mance objectives and lesson plans Based in part on the results of any task analysis con-ducted, the system is either designed and implemented by NTOL plants or modified by operating plants. The gen-eral process of task analysis remains' the same regard-less of the interface.being studied. The objectives of the analysis will, of. course, vary with the purpose of 9

l the analysis. Section 4 describes the task analysis pro- l cess as it is applied to a nuclear power plant setting.

The implementation of task analysis, for any purpose, will involve the specification of four items. They are the followings o the objective of the program o the task analysis method to be used o the verification method to be used o the validation method to be used The validation criteria are used to determine if the program's objective has been satisfied by the task anal-ysis. Therefore, the objective and the validation cri-teria are developed first and are applied, as appro-priate, each time the task analysis is used.

3.3 Task Analysis Program Obiective The objective of a task analysis program will depend on the system interface being studied. For the CRDR, the objectives are to identify the tasks required to support emergency operation and to determine whether the design of the control room allows and supports those tasks.

Thus, the CRDR looks directly at the operator / plant interface and the procedures / plant interface.

The objective (s) must be decided before the task analy-sis process begins. Additional interfaces can be exam-ined in a CRDR task analysis program. For example, the knowledge and skills required to perform emergency oper-ation can be identified at the same time the information for the CRDR is being gathered. To do this requires some extra ef fort, but the-incremental cost is small compared to the cost of conducting an entirely different task analysis program to get such training information.

Thus,-integrating the objectives of other ongoing activities with those of the CRDR can be a very cost-effective and time-saving approach to gathering task information.

3.4 Task Analysis Process The actual methods used during the task analysis process will vary Lfor individual utilities and will depend on many factors, such as the availability of resources and the depth of analysis desired. An example of a specific CRDR task analysin procedure is presented in Appbadix n to illustrate how one might take the general guidance in this document and use it to build a plant-specific pro-gram.

The; task analysis process described in this document includes task identification and analysis of those-tasks, verification, and validation. Since these activ-ities can be logically separated f rom each other, they are described in separate sections of the document, as shown below.

TASK ANALYSIS PROCESS TASK ANALYSIS J (Section 4) o Task Identification-o Analysis of Tasks TASK ANALYSIS VERIFICATION (Section 5)

TASK ANALYSIS VALIDATION (Section 6)

'The1 section numbers. beside the three major activities in the taskfanalysis process refer to the sections within

'this document where that activity is discussed in detail.

i f 3.4.1 Task Analysis Although the task analysis process, shown above, includes verification and validation, the task analysis step within that process consists of identifying the tasks required to carry out particular job functions and then analyzing those tasks to identify one or more of the com-ponents described in Section 2. There are sev-eral methods that can be used to conduct task analysis. Some of these methods are better suited than others to the requirements of the CRDR task analysis. Section 4 discusses the available task analysis methods and the suit-ability of each method for the CRDR task analy-sis. In addition, the planning and resource allocation for this step in the overall task analysis process is described.

3.4.2 Task Analysis Verification Verification of task analysis is a relatively straightforward activity meant to ensure two things. First, it should ensure the technical accuracy and completeness of the information generated during task analysis. For the CRDR task analysis, this amounts to a double check on the revision level of emergency procedures or guidelines used, and the accuracy of transcrip-tion of information from one document to ano-ther. In addition to this traditional idea of verification, CRDR task analysis verification also ensures that the necessary displays and controls exist in the control room and are designed to fulfill the control and information requirements identified during the analysis.

L

3.4.3 Task Analysis Validation The purpose of validation is to determine if the task analysis methods used in the task analysis process actually accomplished the program objec-tive(s). Task analysis validation is discussed in Section 5. The CRDR task analysis validation

-method chosen by individual utilities will depend on many of the same factors that influ-enced their decision as to the task analysis method they used. Validation is an extremoly important step in the CRDR program, since the CRDR task analysis deals almost exclusively with emergency plant operation.

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4. TASK ANALYSIS 4.1 Introduction In its. simplest, most general form, task analysis con-sists of dividing a job (what has to be done) into its individual tasks (how it gets done). Ultimately, each task is then analyzed to determine its components, i.e.,

initiating cues,-knowledge and skills, etc. Although a certain amount of customization is inevitable for any particular application, several aspects of task analysis can be generalized. That is, some things are required regardless of the situation. These general character-istics of' task analysis are described below.

4.2 Determining the Purpose of the Analysis The first step in any task analysis is to ask and answer the question "Why am I doing this?" It is essential to understand, before any analysis takes place, what one

-wants to wind up with when the analysis is over. This seems' like such an obv'ious and trivial point that it hardly bears emphasizing. However, the failure to spec-ify the desired results of task analysis is responsible for a great many useless products of such analysis.

-The purpose and desired output of task analysis must be .

specified before conducting the analysis. One output of a 'CRDR . task analysis will be a list of information.

required to complete all the steps in emergency proce--

dures. This list is necessary to determine if all con-trols and displays required for emergency. operations are present in the control room and are appropriately designed to- transmit the necessary Linformation.. On the Lother hand, the desired output of a' training-oriented t task' analysis might be a list of knowledge and skills

-required for control room operators to use a new SPDS

. display. Unless one knows what the results of task analysis are to be used for, it is difficult to deter-mine which questions to ask during the analysis.

4.3 Determining the Information Available From the Analysis Assuming that the purpose of the task analysis is decided, the next logical question is "What kind of information can I expect to get from task analysis?"

Ultimately, the answer to this question depends on the lengths one is willing to go to get information. How-ever, fairly simple task analytic techniques exist to determine the major components of a task, as given in 4 Section 2.3. For the CRDR task analysis, these com-ponents include the following:

o initiating cues o controls and displays o required aids o terminating cues These are not the only aspects of a task that might be of interest for applications other than the CRDR. For example, other frequently cited aspects of task perfor-mance are knowledge and skills, staffing requirements, crew interaction, conformance to. operating philosophy, management interaction, and cost.

The emphasis placed on specifying the purpose of the analysis and the information required from the analysis is done so everything is "up front." If it is deter-mined that certain information is not obtainable with the task analysis methods ~at one's disposal, the neces-sity for that information should be reevaluated before proceeding with the task analysis. Only when such a front-end analysis is done can task analysis proceed in an orderly and realistic manner.

1

4.4 Determining the Resources Available In determining the resources availab'le for task analy-sis, such resources can be grouped under the categories of personnel, equipment, and time. Time usually dic-tates the availability of other resources. Equipment resources for. the CRDR task analysis include the control room, a control room simulator, a control room mock-up, or classroom. For the CRDR, in general, and particu-larly for CRDR task analysis, the availability of personnel is a major consideration. Manpower resources could include licensed personnel and non-licensed per-sonnel with technical specialities.

It is important to remember that a mix of operational experience will best serve the purpose of the CRDR task analysis. Although " seasoned" operators may be quite ,

familiar with the system, they may not recognize flaws, discrepancies, or have the same problems in interacting with the system as less experienced personnel. Like-wise, novice operators will lack the exposure to many specific system modes and operating constraints that are familiar to more experienced operators.

4.5 Selecting the Task Analysis Method (s)

There are four methods commonly available for task anal-ysis: paper and pencil method, table-top method, walk-through method, and simulator method.

In selecting the method or combination of methods to be used, the advantages and shortcomings of each method must be weighed relative to the obiectives of the task analysis. This point can hardly be overstressed. The purpose of the task analysis and the information output required from the analysis must be explicitly specified before choosing the methods for the analysis. Other constraints will enter the decision, such as manpower, o

cost, and availability of equipment and facilities.

However, these constraints will not matter if the meth-ods to be used cannot fulfill the purpose for conducting the analysis in the first place.

One further point should be made concerning the selec-tion of task analysis methods. Of the four methods described, any one might produce the required output to support a given set of objectives. For the CRDR task analysis, however, some combination of the following methods is generally most appropriate for the informa-tion output required. These methods are best combined in a serial fashion to get the depth and type of infor-mation with which to assess control and display require-ments, location, and design. For example, paper and pencil analysis, followed by table-top analysis and validated by walk-throughs in a mock-up or simulator is a' commonly used combination of methods.

For'the CRDR task analysis, the paper and pencil method is very narrowly defined in this guideline and should not be used by itself. It is included because it is a useful preliminary step in the CRDR task analysis and because, for'other task analysis purposes (other than CRDR), it can produce entirely acceptable results. The following subsections describe each method and list the advantages and limitations of each.

4.5.1 Paper and-Pencil Method One of the most common forms of task analysis is paper and pencil analysis. As the name implies, paper and pencil analysis consists of separat-

~

ing, _on paper, a fairly high level function into tasks or-tasks into their components. This

. analysis is ideally done during the design pro-cess.but is most.often'done as one step in writing training manuals, system descriptions, or operating instructions. _It is very narrowly defined for the purposes of this guideline and is distinguished by the absence of a subject matter expert (SME). That is, such an analysis is generally performed by one or two system designers, procedure writers, or training per-sonnel who may have little or no actual operat-ing experience.

Paper and pencil analysis is a worthwhile first step toward a more operation-oriented CRDR task analysis, in that it can encourage the analyst (s) to make explicit any baseline assump-tions concerning the design of the system. If the paper and pencil method does nothing more than list the designers' assumptions concerning when, where, and under what conditions the sys-tem will be operated, then it is a valuable exercise. One thing that a paper and pencil analysis should do is delineate what the analyst perceives as the necessary and sufficient actions that must occur for the system to per-form properly under the assumed operating condi-tions.

In a classic systems approach to design, the allocation of system functions to man and machine should occur after the preliminary paper and pencil analysis is completed. However, for most systems now under study, the allocation between automatic and manual operation has already been done. About the most that can be expected of function allocation for such systems is that the paper and pencil analysis will o

indicate when automatic actions can be accom-plished-manually if the automatic systems fail.

For each method that might be used in the CRDR task analysis, th ce are certain advantages and limitations compared to other methods. The paper and pencil technique potentially has the following advantages:

o Relatively Low Time Requirement--A paper and pencil analysis does not usually require as much time as more involved methods--on the order of one or two days per procedure if the analyst has some familiarity with the sys-tem (s) involved.

o Low Manpower Requirement--A paper and pencil analysis usually involves only one or two people.

o Low Support Requirement--A paper and pencil analysis generally will not require elaborate support facilities such as a simulator.

o Few Constraints--Since a paper and pencil analysis is done in a fairly abstract envi-ronment, the results need not be constrained by the limitations of existing hardware, training, or staffing.

o Design Input--A paper and pencil analysis provides a good vehicle for introducing engi-neering design considerations into the opera-tional requirements.

The paper and pencil method has the following limitations:

1

o Limited Applicability--The results of a paper and pencil analysis should not be applied without operational input and some type of validation.

o Narrow Perspective--The analyst (s) may not be aware of the " Big Picture," that is, how the system or function being analyzed interacts with other systems and functions.

o Potentially Inaccurate--Since the analyst is not necessarily an SME, his or her perception of the conditions of operation or other vari-ables may be erroneous due to lack of expo-sure to.such variables.

4.5.2 Table-Top Method A technique that overcomes many of the limita-tions of the paper and pencil method as far as completeness and applicability is the table-top method. The table-top method consists of a group of individuals literally sitting around a table and verbally dissecting a function into tasks or analyzing the aspects of specific tasks. It is characterized by the ability of the individuals involved to look at the problem from different perspectives. The table-top method uses a group'of people with varied back-grounds as opposed to one or two individuals with similar backgrounds working together.

The-table-top method's strength is in the diver-sity of the individuals in the group. For a CRDR task analysis, such a group might include people with expertise in design, operations, training, procedures, human engineering, instru-mentation and control (IEC), and other special-ties. Ultimately,'any task analysis method must determine how certain tasks are performed and what prerequisites exist for task performance.

The table-top method ensures that operational requirements are not determined in a vacuum and that engineering, psychophysical, and other aspects of. tasks are considered also.

The value of the table-top method can be easily appreciated by considering the analysis that must take place to write emergency procedures.

Given a fairly high-level task, such as "Manu-ally Switch the Safety Injection System From Hot Leg to Cold Leg Discharge," it is then necessary to provide a procedure to accomplish this switch. From experienced operations people, it is certainly possible to determine how that task has been - accomplished in the past, either at the plant under analysis or, for NTOLs, at similar facilities. .Without engineering input, however, it is-difficult to determine whether the accepted operational sequence is the preferred sequence, or even the correct sequence. When such ques-tions arise, as they ' inevitably do, it is desir-

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able to bring as many different perspectives to the problem as practical.so the best overall solution -can be . obtained.

As.with other CRDR task analysis methods, table-top analysis has its-advantages and limitations.

The advantages of.the table-top _ method include theLfollowing:

o Broad Perspective--The big plus for the table-top method is the diversity of exper-ience of the analysis group.

o Operational Input--Table-top analysis will usually result in task sequences and task characteristics that are operationally fea-sible and realistic.

o Interactive--The analysis achievable with the table-top method is generally more complete and usable than would be the sum of analyses performed separately by individual members of the analysis group.

o Low Support Requirement--A table-top analysis can usually be done without the use of high cost support facilities, such as a simulator.

o Relatively Fast--While not as fast as a paper and pencil analysis, table-top analysis can be performed in a fairly short time. Ulti-mately, the time required is a function of system or function complexity and the level of detail of the analysis.

Among the limitations of the table-top method for CRDR task analysis are the following:

o People Intensive--The one resource the table-top method uses rather intensively is people.

For this method to be successful, the partic-ipants must be willing to devote a substan-tial proportion of their time to the analysis.

o Too General--There is a tendency for table-top discussions to diverge from specific into more general topics.

o Territorial--Sometimes, the table-top anal-ysis group represents the first time indivi-duals from design, operations, training, etc., have attempted to analyze something together. A period of adjustment is gener-ally required while people learn to " talk the same language."

P 4.5.3 Walk-Through Method some individuals in a table-top analysis group will be familiar with the real operating envi-ronment. It is the goal of the table-top analy-sis group to come to a consensus on how certain tasks are performed (or should be performed).

However, a general truth in task analysis is, "Just because a group of people agree that a certain task should be done in a particular way doesn't make it true." There may be reasons why a preferred task sequence is not or cannot be performed in a realistic operational setting.

For the CRDR task analysis, one essential ele-ment of the walk-through method is the partici-pation of full-time control room operators.

This requirement has a connotation that should be understood. A control room operator is not someone who used to be an operator or someone who knows what' operators do, but a full-time, on-the-boards operator. That distinction is important because the failure to discriminate between those who do'the job and those who only l

know about the job can lead to erroneous results during the CRDR task analysis.

In its simplest form, walk-through analysis con-sists of observing an operator walking through some function (e.g., maintain steam generator level between low-level and high-level trip set-points) or task (e.g., manually . trip reactor) while recording his use of available controls, displays, and other resources. The object of a walk-through is to determine how the job incum-bent performs a given task or, perhaps, what tasks the incumbent must perform to fulfill a particular function. This technique is some-times called a walk-through, talk-through because the job incumbent may be asked to explain each action as it is being done.

Two characteristics distinguish the walk-through method from the methods discussed so far. First,

'the participation of a control room operator is required for the walk-through. Also, a walk-through must be conducted with some representa-tion of the actual work environment. For the CRDR, the last requirement means doing the walk-through with a mock-up of the control boards, a simulator, or the actual control room.

The advantages of using walk-through analysis include the following:

o Operator Input--In the case of the CRDR, real operators are asked to walk through a series of tasks and explain their activities.

o Realistic Setting--As a minimum, a pictorial control board mock-up is used in a walk-through. The spatial relationships of controls and displays are realistically represented.

o Start /Stop Nature--Observing and recording operator actions are facilitated by being able to stop certain task sequences, discuss any questions, and then continue.

o Relatively Low Cost--It is not essential to use either a simulator or the real control room for a walk-through. A mock-up can be used with little loss of applicability.

o Applicable Results--Since this method uses job incumbents and a representation of the real task environment, the results are likely to be applicable to the actual control room.

Some of the limitations of the walk-through method for CRDR task analysis are listed below:

o Static--Due to the start-stop nature of the walk-through method, the dynamic nature of real plant behavior and operator response is lost.

o Limited Cues--The numerous cues available to the operator in a dynamic control room set-ting are limited or unavailable using the walk-through method. This is especially true in the case of pictorial mock-ups used for walk-throughs.

1 I

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o Relatively High Level of Support--The walk-through method requires the time of actual job incumbents and the use of a mock-up, simulator, or actual control room.

o Heavy Front-End Analysis--The walk-through method is most useful after a paper and pen-cil or table-top analysis has already been completed. It is less effective to attempt a walk-through without first doing some front-end analysis, o Cumbersome--The actions and explanations of the job incumbent (s) must be recorded for later, more detailed analysis. This can require a sizeable commitment of people and, possibly, equipment.

o Biased--Each job incumbent approaches tasks differently. The perspective of any indivi-dual is influenced by past experience, personal preference, operating philosophy, mental " set," etc.

4.5.4 Simulator Method The walk-through technique is a relatively attractive method for performing the CRDR task analysis due to its ability to use mock-ups to represei.t the control room environment. Walk-throughs can be quite thorough when preceded by adequate front-end analysis. The one aspect of operator-plant interaction that cannot be repre-sented using a mock-up is the dynamic nature of actual plant operation. Also, very few mock-ups contain real controls and displays, nor are they

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capable of activating status lights, annuncia-tors, motor trip relays, etc. The presence or absence of such attributes is generally classi-fled as the " fidelity" of the representation.

High fidelity representations are very "true to life," that is, they look and feel like the real control room. Full-scale simulators are high-fidelity representations of a particular control room.

For task analysis, high fidelity is desirable.

The reason is simple. Task analysis aims to describe the tasks required to do a job and the characteristics of those tasks in the actual environment in which the tasks are performed.

Unless there is some prior reason for eliminat-ing characteristics of the task environment from consideration, then any element in that environ-ment might function as an initiating cue, data source, or terminating cue for a particular task. High fidelity is necessary to identify important task characteristics.

If a dynamic simulator is used for the CRDR task analysis, it should conform as closely as possi-ble to the configuration of the actual control room where, ultimately, the tasks to be analyzed will be performed. As with the walk-through, control room operators should be used for the analysis. The basic analysis consists of operat-ing the simulator in the appropriate mode (e.g.,

full power, start up, etc.) and recording the operators' performance for later review. Simu-lator analysis requires the same front-end work as the walk-through method. In fact, most simu-lator analysis is done in phases that include

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some type of slow-time walk-through talk-through during which the operator (s) describe their activities during the real time scenario.

There are many advantages to using dynamic, full-scale simulators for the CRDR task analy-sis. These include the following:

o Realistic--A full-scale simulator is as real-istic a setting as possible without the actual use of the control room. Even if the simulator being used is for a slightly dif-ferent control room configuration, the real-ism induced by the dynamic nature of the displays may make up for any slight dissimi-larities.

o Dynamic--A simulator is designed to portray an actual plant, with realistic time con-stants for the physical processes in the plant.

o Directly Applicable--Real operators manipu-late actual controls and are confronted with entirely appropriate sensory input. The results from a simulator analysis are directly applicable to the simulated control room.

o Flexible--Many transients that would be unlikely to appear in an operating plant can be run on a simulator. This is especially relevant to task analyses' performed to sup-port emergency procedure development and

~Y abnormal operation.

o Ef ficient--Dynamic transients can be run on the simulator in much less time than it would take to talk through those transients on a mock-up.

Although the advantages are many, simulator task analysis also has several limitations. Among the limitations are the following:

o Expensive--Simulator time is very cor ly.

e Unavailable--Simulators are used extensively for training operators. The heavy demand coupled with the relatively low number of simulators cause such high fidelity machines, where they even exist, to be in use most of the time.

o Heavy Front-End Analysis--Even more than with the static walk-through method, the use of simulators for task analysis requires thor-ough analysis before going into the simula-tor.

o Cumbersome Data Gat.hering--The dynamic nature of simulators (one of their greatest advan-tages) makes recording task data in real time very challenging.

4.6 Planning for-the Task Analysis Methods 4.6.1 Introduction Once the methods have been selected, planning for the CRDR task analysis must begin. Person-nel, equipment, and documentation resources

[

required for the chosen methods must be allo-cated. Following is a list for consideration when checking the availability of resources:

o generic EPGs, plant-specific EOPs if avail-able, plant technical specifications, related technical documentation, results of operating experience review o room equipped with adequate table surface to layout EOPs and related documentation o support equipment (for walk-through and simu-lator methods) real equipment simulator mock-up operator auxiliary equipment (e.g., res-pirators, protective clothing, radiation detectors) if required A/V equipment if videotape is to be used o required personnel control room operators nonoperating specialists observer / review team support equipment operators o task analysis and debriefing forms to be used l

4.6.2 Personnel Requirements Several options for combining operators and observer / review team personnel can be used for the walk-through and simulator methods:

o one-on-one - one member of the observer /-

review team for each operator l

o one-on-crew - one member of the observer /

review team for an operating crew o team-on-crew - the observer / review team for the operating crew o team-on-one - the observer / review team for one operator Each combination has advantages and limitations.

While conducting a walk-through or simulator anslysis, one-on-one may be necessary due to the amount of information that must be recorded.

More' operator and observer / review team partici-pants may result in greater insight into the operational correctness of the system. In gen-eral, the number and type of participants in a table-top or walk-through task analysis will depend on the-followings o the number of operating /nonoperating people available to participate in the task analysis o the number of qualified observer / reviewers and their availability o the background and skill level of people available 4;6.3 Equipment Requirc.,ents Planning for the simulator method is more com-plex than the other task analysis methods'due to the need to integrate hardware, software, and personnel during relatively short periods of simulator availability. Therefore, appropriate personnel should be organized, documents should be researched, and appropriate' checklists and debriefing forms should be prepared for this method in accordance with a well thought out timetable.

The simulator to be osed should conform as closely as possible to the configuration of the actual plant control room and to the physical plant dynamics. Where differences in the char-acteristics of human factors design, operational design, work-space design, communications system design, and dynamics do exist between the simu-lator and the control room, it is important to understand that the CRDR task analysis is being done for the actual plant and not for the simu-lator. The simulator is simply being used as the setting for the CRDR task analysis process.

A comparison of the two settings with respect to the actual control room's design, operational design, work-space design and communication sys-tem design will aid the observer / review team members later in determining whether or not operator performance in the simulator setting would occur in the same way in the actual plant.

In addition, the observer / review team members might be able to identify potential problem areas that would arise at the simulator but not at the actual plant.

l i

Changes to the simulator should be made if nec-essary to increase compatibility between the simulator and the existing control room. For example, if a system is demarcated in the plant, the corresponding simulator system should be demarcated to obtain an equivalent human factors design. Operational differences between the

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plant and simulator can be minimized by adapting the initial symptoms designated in the scenario on the plant to equivalent simulator systems through programming.

i

Differences that remain between actual plant i

equipment and simulator equipment may be resolved by rewording the references to the plant-specific equipment in the procedures .

However, the strict intention of amending the procedures is only to reword references to plant-specific equipment such that the proce-dures' characteristics are not altered and the operators will not be faced with equipment sub-stitution decisions as they use the procedures on the simulator.

4 .

Planning the techniques for detecting and recording operator performance data on the l simulator during the analysis is also neces-sary. These data collection techniques will fall into two major categories--automatic and/or manual. Automatic data collection techniques require the use of recorders, computers, and l software whereas manualitechniques would involve experienced-personnel who observe operator actions using observation forms and/or video-tape. A combination of these measures can be 4

employed by the utility to record operator per-formance and provide a reliable task analytic  !

- data base.

4.6.4- - Documentation Requirements The details of documenting the CRDR task anal- '

ysis will depend on-the task analysis method chosen. There are general documentation k

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requirements, however, that apply' regardless of

,the method used. The basis,for task analysis documentation should be that an individual who -

was not involved in the task , analysis process ,_

can read and understand what was done, by whom, for what purpose, and the findings. Some of 6his information will be in the summary report presented to the NRC. By its very nature a summary report cannot 'contain the level of detail that should exist somewhere~~in the CRD4 ~

task analysis documentation. -

The documentation.-f;or the CRDR task analysis should include butshould not.be limited-to the, ,

following: _ _

o a summary of the background of individuals ,

.;1 conducting the CRDR task anelysis '>

t o a list of EPGs and plant-specific EOPs that were analyzed A

o standard forms:co'ntaining task breakdowns for -

each procedure or guideline analyzed i

o worksheets listing the verified, but prevali- ,'

dation, CRDR task analysis output (e.g.,

instruments, controls, etc.-) for=each proce-

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f dure or_ guideline analyzed g/. ,

o worksheets' listing the vefified, but prevali~

r- dation, CRDR task analysis for each;. plant system analyzed (e.g., HPCI) ,. r o descriptions'of the analysis and validation -

[- techniques 'used ,

o validated task worksheets for each procedure or guideline analyzed o a list of human engineering discrepancies (HEDs) identified during the CRDR task analy-sis and task analysis validation Such documentation will ensure that questions concerning the adequacy of the current control room for emergency operation can be answered.

Perhaps as important as determining the adequacy of the present control room, documentation of the quality described above can be used in the design and engineering change process. In that context, future control room modifications can be reviewed to ensure that the current opera-tional basis of the control room, as depicted in the CRDR documentation,-is not compromised.

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5.: TASK ANALYSIS VERIFICATION s ..

5.1 Introduction Verification of.the task analysis output-is a relatively straightforward activity, but one that should not be overlooked. .In the context of the CRDR task analysis, i verification consists of three steps. These are (1) verification of documentation, (2) verification of.the existence oforequired controls and displays, and (3).

verification of'the suitability of existing controlsfand -

displays. The'first step is intended to. ensure that the;

' documents used in'the CRDR task analysis'are the correct [ ,

documents'and that they are updated to their most cur- /

rent revision level. The final two steps are meant to

. determine.the existence and suitability of control room *

-instrumentation required for emergency operation.

'For the'CRDR. task analysis,. verification can help the

. review' team make sure they have analyzed the correc't revision level of the.EPGs, that all applicable EPGs

'have been. studied, and that the support documentation is technically accurate-and up to date.- Further, verifica-tion will: determine'whether displays'and controls called for by' the EPGs are : present in the control room and are designed to support the decisions and control actions 4

called out'in the EPGs.

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Y h 5.2 ' Verification Actisities The .following sections briefly: describe each step appli-

-cable to the--verification.of the CRDR task analysis.

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5.2.1 Document V$rification

.The/CRDR task analysis is.very much document-oriented. Not onlh-are several kinds of docu-ments used as source and reference material,'but

,the output of the CRDR task analysis consists 1.

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4-a mainly of written instrument lists, worksheets, i I

comment forms, etc. In such an undertaking, there is ample opportunity to retrieve and use ,

incorrect source documents and to err while transcribing information from one document to another, f

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Document verification, although listed here as a discrete step, should be practiced in an ongoing manner during the entire CRDR, including the task analysis phase. It is not feasible to specify a single mechanism to ensure that docu-

<- mentation is verified - the most sensible mech-anism will vary from utility to utility. As a 4

minimum, however, a single person or group -

should be assigned the responsibility of check-ing all source documents to ensure correctness.

Further, some amount of independent review should be considered for output documentation.

5.2.2 -Verification of-Required Controls and Displays One output of the CRDR task analysis-will be a list of information and controls required to L proceed with each step in the EPG or plant-specific procedure. During the CRDR task

< ~ analysis, there should have been-no attempt to associate-existing control room displays and controls with'the information'and-control -

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requirements gleaned from the emergency proce-

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dures (or guidelines). For example, one step in a procedure.or guideline might'have called for a ,

specific action, such as stopping all reactor' coolant: pumps (RCPs), to be taken . when a partic- i ular parameter, such lus RC pressure, reached a predetermined setpoint. The information require-

ments for this step are that RC pressure has r i

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reached the setpoint and that the RC pumps have been' stopped. The controls required are those necessary to stop the RC pumps.

The purpose of verification is to associate existing controls and displays with the control and information requirements identified during the CRDR task analysis. To follow the specific example given above, the existence of an RC pressure indicator, RC pump status indicators, and RC pump motor controle should be ascer-tained. If such displays and controls exist, then the next verification step (5.2.3) should be completed. If any of these dispicys and controls do not exist in the control room, then that fact should be documented as an HED and any alternate instrumentation that exists to accom-plish the required steps should be noted for possible use during the assessment of the HEDs.

5.2.3 Verification of Suitability In. addition to noting the existence of required displays and controls, the verification must check the design of those displays and controls against the requirements listed during the CRDR task analysis. Thus, using the RC pressure example once again, the existing RC pressure display must be scaled so the RC pump trip set-point is readable from the normal operating location. Also, the location of the RC pump motor controls must be evaluated relative to the location of the RC pressure indication. Finally, the RC pump motor status displays need to be evaluated as to their ability to transmit status information to the operator.

Although described here as two separate steps, verification of the existence and suitability of required displays and controls can usually be done simultaneously. As the review team goes through the process of comparing the list of required displays and controls to the existing control room instrumentation, plant-specific identifiers for those controls and displays that match the requirements should be recorded for later reference.

6. TASK' ANALYSIS VALIDATION 6.l~ Introduction To ensure that the'CRDR task analysis process has.cor--

rectly portrayed-the emergency operational environment,

a validation of .the process should be conducted. In

, theory, the CRDR task analysis process is capable of identifying' tasks, task conditions, controls and dis-plays, etc. In practice, however, the process is con-strained to use specific equipment and personnel that may.not produce a completely accurate picture of the operational 1 environment.

,One must choose certain operators to participate in the CRDR. task analysis process. Usually such a sample of J. operators will be small and may not be representative of

.the general population of operators at a particular plant or utility. .The remainder of this section will identify and describe some of the more common validation techniques that.might be used to validate the CRDR task analysis process- ,

15 .:2 . Validation Framework Regardless of the validation technique to be. used', 'there

< is a general. validation philosophy that should be under- .

stood and adopted. The concept of validity has several

' aspects, but the kernel of the concept is quite simply stated.. A process is valid ~if it does what it is.

-intended to'do. Establishing the objective for the task analysis (Subsection 3.3) defines what the task analysis process is intended-to do. .The validation technique 4

must determine whether the objective has been met. ,

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1To determine-whether.the.CRDR task analysis is valid, the results1obtained with the operators who participated in the analysis must be related to the general operator

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population at the plant. The techniques for accom-plishing this validation are described later. A repre-sentative sample of operators, other than those who participated in the CRDR task analysis, should be selected for the process of validation. The intent of validation is to ensure that the results obtained with the original sample, or. group, of operators is represen-tative of the entire operator population. Therefore, the individual operators who were used to produce the  :

CRDR task analysis results cannot be used to validate those results.

An example will illustrate the framework within which validation should take place. The objective for a CRDR task analysis is to identify plant-specific displays and controls required for emergency operation as specified in'the EOPs (or EPGs)'and to determine whether those displays and controls exist in the control room and are appropriately designed and~1ocated for emergency opera-

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tion. Suppose a utility chooses to use the simulator method of task analysis and selects two crews, currently undergoing requalification training at the utility's simulator,-to participate in the CRDR task analysis.

After the CRDR task' analysis has been conducted, a list of required' controls and displays is produced along with a list of possible' problems with control and display location and arrangement.'.The question now becomes', How valid . is this CRDR task analysis? Put another way, Are the results of this analysis representative of the oper-i ators~at this plant or are the results somehow peculiar to the two crews that participated in the task analysis? i n

'6.3 Validation Methods

The list of task analysis-validation methods is identi-cal to the list of task analysis techniques. The dif-ference comes in the execution of the technique. During

the task analysis process, the level of detail of the information that is recorded and the level of effort on the part of the review / observer team will vary consider-ably from the levels necessary during validation.

While any validation method is feasible, the choices will be limited ~in practice. From a pragmatic stand-point, it is not likely that a utility would choose a validation method that requires a significantly greater commitment of resources than the method they choose for the CRDR task analysis itself. The validation methods discussed below are presented in greater detail in the Component Verification and System Validation Guideline, INPO 83-047 (NUTAC) written by the ERC NUTAC. Whether or not a formal validation method is used, the opera-

-tor's performance during real emergencies will demon-strate the validity (or lack of validity) of the CRDR task analysis.

6.3.1 Paper and Pencil The usefulness of the paper and pencil method for task analysis validation is limited, in that it does not require operational input. It can provide some degree of validation in two spe-cific areas, however. First, the output of the l

task analysis is a list of tasks and associated controls and displays. The paper and pencil method can be used to get engineering judgement as to the correctness or optimality of the task sequences identified during the analysis. For example, suppose the operators who participated

-in the CRDR-task analysis agree that they per-form a given sequence of tasks to start a turbine-driven coolant injection pump. It is possible that the sequence of tasks agreed upon is not correct from an engineering perspective.

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That information can be obtained using the paper and pencil method of validation.

A second. potential use of this validation method is to get other operators to examine the output

. of.the CRDR task analysis and comment on how closely those task sequences conform to their method of operation.- Although.this is not a very' reliable way to gather such information, it should - provide an indication of how representa-tive the results from the operators who partici-pated are to the entire population of plant operators.

6.3.2 Table-Top Table-top validation consists of'the task anal-ysis team meeting with operators, other than those who participated.in the analysis, and discussing the results of the analysis. For the CRDR task analysis, this method allows engineer-ing input like that described in the paper and pencil method and input.from a representative sample of plant operators. The advantage of cable-top validation, over paper a'nd pencil I st.lidation, is that the table-top method is I highly interactive. Perhaps there are opera-

. tional reasons why certain task sequences cannot

! be executed in1the optimum engineering _configur-i.

[ ation. 'The~ interactive nature;of table-top-validation is more likely to identify these con-flicts than-is the paper and pencil method.

i-As validation' methods, both_ table-top and paper and pencil suffer from a common shortcoming.

That is, both- techniques- can be applied outside the operational environment. What is done, t

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essentially,-is to ask a group of operators whether the task sequences delineated during the CRDR task analysis are correct from~their per-s spective as operators. The problem.is that~the 1:

1. recollection of operators concerning how they do certain tasks is.not necessarily complete or even accurate. The methods described below can b -

overcome this shortcoming by putting operators into a semblance of the operating environment during validation.

6.3.3 Walk-Through The walk-through method of validation is very

.similar to the walk-through method of task anal-ysis.' For the CRDR, both the process and vali-dation technique require.the use of a control p room mock-up or simulator. It is not necessary for the representation of the control room to be capable of dynamically depicting indicators and controls. A walk-through validation consists of having operators,-other than those who partici-

-pated in the CRDR task analysis, go through the actions. they would normally do to complete cer-

'_ tain activities. They essentially walk through these actions using the~ control room mock-up,

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simulator, or the actual control room.

r In the case of the CRDR, the activities to be walked through come.from the symptom-oriented EPGs or the plant-specific EOPs. The big dif-ference in the walk-through done for validation and.that done for:the analysis is that during validation the observer (s) is looking only for-i dif ferences between1the task- sequences developed f rom .the analysis and those . observed during ' the validation. Major differences may indicate that n '

the operators who participated in the CRDR ' cask analysis may not be representative of Cne entire operator population.

6.3.4 Simulator The simulator method of validation is very similar to the walk-through method. For the simulator method, operators complete certain activities in real time on a dynamic, full-scope simulator. The operators perform in real time.

For the CRDR, the activities to be done on the simulator are taken from the symptom-oriented EPGs or plant-specific EOPs.

As in the walk-through method, the observers are looking for differences between the task sequences delineated during CRDR task analysis and the tasks observed during validation. Simulator validation comes as close as possible to real plant validation without actually using the real plant equipment.

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7. RESULTS OF THE TASK ANALYSIS PROCESS

7. l~ Introduction The product.of the CRDR-task analysis will be a signifi-cant quantity _of information concerning the operators' relationship with the control room, the emergency proce-dures, and the training program. The use one makes of L this information depends on the purpose-for.which the taskEanalysis is conducted. If the operator, plant,

. proce'du re s , and training are considered in the context of the System model (see Figure 1, page 20), then the information from task analysis can be used to evaluate the interfaces between each pair of system components.

For the CRDR, the major interfaces examined are the operator / plant interface, the procedures / plant inter-

' face, and-the procedures / operator interface. Of these

-interfaces,.one not likely to be improved by direct control room modification is the procedures / operator interface. This is not to say that other areas of interest should not be pursued during the CRDR task r analysis process. In fact, the simple addition of some relevant questions during.the CRDR tadk analysis can yield.information concerning the system interfaces involving training.

-The following subsections describe'the type of informa-t tion-potentially available concerning each system interface and how.that information~can be combined with information from other sources to yield valuable insights into particular system-interfaces.

7.2 Areas of Interest for-CRDR

! The. specific information required from task analysis willivary,' depending on'the particular interface being studied. LThe results ofitask analysis can be evaluated by posing a series of questions concerning each system interface. The questions listed below can be thought of as criteria with which to evaluate the information obtained during the CRDR task analysis.

7.2.1 Operator / Plant Interface The operator / plant interface is the main focus of the CRDR. The objective of performing the CRDR task analysis is to ensure that controls and displays exist and are appropriately located and designed to support emergency operation in the control room. The following questions, at least, should be resolvable using the informa-tion obtained during the CRDR task analysis.

This list is not exhaustive, but concentrates on major categories of information.

o Are indications available for all parameters required by the operators during emergency operation?

o Are there situations in which the operators cannot perform control manipulations because of time constraints?

o Does the placement of controls and related displays require one person to read a display while another manipulates the control?

o Is any control or display that is required for emergency operation located on a back panel?

o Do certain alarms and annunciators mislead or distract the operators?

o Does the arrangement of the control room tend to cause the members of the operating crew to get in each other's way?

o Are there instances where initiating cues for specific emergency tasks do not exist in the control room?

o Is the information from computer systems used as an aid for emergency operation and, if so, is it in a readily usable form?

In addition to the information generated by the CRDR task analysis, data are available from the operating experience review and the control room survey. Taken together, a relatively comprehen-sive picture of the appropriateness of- the con-trol room design 1(operator / plant interface) should emerge.

7.2.2 Procedures / Plant Interface The CRDR task analysis deals exclusively with emergency operation. For this reason much can be learned about the adequacy of the interface between the emergency operating procedures (EOPs), or emergency operating procedure guidelines (EPGs), and the control room. The CRDR task analysis can be used

to help write and/or evaluate the plant-specific EOPs l

from the generic EPGs. The following questions can I

be used to organize the task analysis information concerning the emergency procedure / plant interface.

The extension of this technique to normal operation is direct but will not-be explored here.

o Are indications available for all parameters used for decision and branching points in the emergency i operating procedures or guidelines?

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o If time constraints are contained in the pro-cedures or guidelines, are the constraints reasonable for the control room as designed?

o Are the entry and exit conditions for each

-procedure or guideline observable with the existing displays and controls?

o Does the control room layout allow the tasks listed in the procedures or guidelines to be accomplished by the number of people on shift?

o Do all equipment controls, and displays used by the control room operators to perform the steps in procedures or guidelines actually exist in the control room?

o Is the name or label of equipment, controls, and displays called out in a procedure or guideline the same as the name or label in the control room?

o Are the range, precision, and units of para-meters referenced'in procedures or guidelines compatible with those available in the con-trol room?

o Are there instances where the operator is forced to do mental arithmetic or remember seldom-used numbers or setpoints due to lack of proper controls or displays in the control room?

As with the operator / plant interface, the infor-mation concerning the procedures / plant interface

should be supplemented with data from the opera-ting experience review.

7.3 Other Areas of Interest In addition to the two system interfaces directly addressed in the CRDR task analysis, other interfaces can be analyzed. The questions listed below can be used to help evaluate those interfaces not directly examined by the,CRDR task analysis. These questions are provided to assist utilities that may want to go beyond the basic CRDR requirements and integrate the CRDR task analysis with other task analysis programs.

7.3.1 Procedures / Operator Interface The CRDR task analysis may not indicate the adequacy of the existing EOPs, since plant-specific EOPs might not be written prior to the CRDR. However, even if generic EPGs are used for the CRDR task analysis, the results of the analysis can be used to gen e~ rate useful plant-specific procedures.

The following questions can be used to relate task analysis information to emergency operating procedures.

o Is there any-ambiguity in the procedures con-cerning the action (s) the operator is to take?

o If more than one procedure is active at any time,.is there a clear priority of execution among the different procedures?

o Can the operating crew members read and understand the procedures?

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o Can procedures, or points within procedures, be easily located when referenced?

I o Are notes and-cautions in the procedures clearly written, properly located, and easily distinguishable from the normal procedure steps?

Some data from the operating experience review may be useful in evaluating the procedures /

j. operator interface.

7.3.2 Training / Plant Interface The:three system interfaces involving training are not studied explicitly during the CRDR. The CRDR is, however, an ideal time to collect information concerning the training interfaces.-

It is ideal because the operator training pro-gram must incorporate the very aspects of control 1 room design and: procedures that are

• examined during the CRDR. The following ques-tions pertain to each-individual task and give

an_ idea of the type of-'information necessary to

' . describe the training / plant interface.

o What skills and knowledge are required to operate specific plant systems safely.and correctly?

o Have the operators been _ trained L tx) function in the control room as.it actually exists in the plant?

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o What skills and knowledge are required to facilitate response to annunciators?

o What skills and knowledge are needed to pre-vent information from controls and displays being misinterpreted?

o Have operators been informed of all modifica-tions to systems or equipment and trained to use such equipment as modified?

o Do operators understand what effect the man-ipulation of one system may have on intercon-nected systems?

The aim of examining the training / plant inter-face is to ensure that the operator trainees have a complete and accurate picture of the physical plant as it really exists.

7.3.3 Training / Procedures Interface In most training programs, the plant procedures are used as the foundation for instructional material when training on procedures. Certain information can be gathered during task analysis of emergency procedures that will help ensure the adequacy of the training program for those procedures. The following questions indicate' the type and level of information required to help develop the training program as it relates to procedures.

o What skills and knowledge are required to perform each step in a procedure?

o How are plant systems referenced in the pro-cedures?

o Is there an explicit priority of execution for emergency operating procedures?

o -What conditions will cause an operator to recognize the necessity of going to an emer-gency operating procedure?

o What skills and knowledge are required for the operator-to use titles and numbers for locating referenced or branched procedures?

o What is the overall priority of emergency operating procedure execution? Is that clear to the operator?

The object of analyzing the training / procedures interface is to ensure the operator knows-what the procedure assumes he knows. For example, a procedure might not list every step in a sequence of steps to start a turbine-driven pump. It is incumbent on the training program to make.cer-tain the operator knows what those steps are and has the skill to perform them.

-7.3.4 Training / Operator Interface Of all the-interfaces between training and the remainder of the: System, the most basic is the interface Lbetween the training program and the operator. -As important as the characteristics of the operating crew are during normal opera-tion, they can be critical during emergency operation. The'following' questions illustrate the kind of task analysis information needed to evaluate the requirements of the training pro-gram as it relates to the operating crew.

o Is there confusion as to who is in charge during- emergency operation?

o Are verbal instructions passed among opera-tors? If so, are they understood correctly?

o Are procedures used and followed?

o Is any one operator overburdened?

o Does the operating crew appear to be follow-ing any particular strategy to determine the cause(s) of transients?

o Does the appropriate person take charge dur-ing transients?

o Is there sufficient coordination between the control room and support personnel outside the control room?

These questions are all aimed at determining whether the training program teaches operators to function in the plant environment with the existing crew structure.- It also can help iden-tify modes or periods of operation during which the operating-philosophy of the utility may not be appropriate.

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APPENDIX A EXAMPLE PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCTING TASK ANALYSIS FOR THE CRDR f

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CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW TASK ANALYSIS PROCEDURE ACWORTH POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY HORIZON GENERATING STATION i

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INTRODUCTION As part of the Control Room Design Review (CRDR) for the Horizon Generating Station-(HGS), Acworth Power and Light Company (APLC) intends to conduct task analyses for certain

-emergency procedures (or associated guidelines). The purpose of this task analysis and its relationship to the overall CRDR is described in the document Program Plan for Implemen-tation of Control Room Design Review recently submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by APLC. A fairly detailed outline of the task analysis procedure is also con-tained in the APLC program plan.

This procedure has been written to develop the goals of the CRDR task' analysis more fully and to provide more specific guidance to those individuals who will actually conduct the analysis. The CRDR task analysis described herein is a

-straightforward process that will identify control room design characteristics that might degrade emergency opera-tion.

2.. CRDR TASK ANALYSIS PROCESS The HGS CRDR task analysis will consist of three distinct phases:

o task identification and analysis- of tasks o verification of controls and displays o validation of control room functions i Each phase will.be described briefly and the procedure to be

.used for each phase will be delineated in the next chapter.

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- 2 .1 Task Identification and Analysis of Tasks The task identification phase consists of two steps.

The CRDR task' analysis is based on the Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS) developed by the Westinghouse l Owners Group (WOG).- The first step involves extracting from the-ERGS to be analyzed the tasks required to com-A-3

plete those ERGS. As stated in the APLC program plan, HGS has not yet generated plant-specific procedures from the WOG ERGS so this task extraction process ultimately will aid in writing such procedures, The second step in the task identification and analysis phase is to iden-tify the plant parameters and, ultimately, the displays and controls necessary to actually accomplish the tasks delineated in the first step.

When the task identification and analysis phase is com-plete, the HGS review team will have a list of tasks, and the displays and controls required by those tasks, to complete the WOG ERGS that have been selected for analysis.

2.2 Verification of Controls and Displays The verification phase consists of two steps involving the controls and displays identified during the task identification and analysis phase. First, a determi-nation will be made as to whether the controls and dis-plays necessary to make the decisions and implement the tasks identified previously are, in fact, present in the control room. If not, any such instance will be defined as'an HED and documented accordingly.

For those controls and displays found in step one, the second step will be a comparison of those instruments with appropriate human engineering design criteria, based on their use in the ERGS. Although the control room survey examined all control room instrumentation for conformance with human engineering design criteria,

-this verification step is required to determine if a meter, for example, has the appropriate range and scale gradations to support a particular ERG or system-specific task.

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-2.3 Validation of-Control Room Functions The final' analytical phase in the CRDR task analysis is to validate that the tasks delineated earlier are indeed the tasks that must be performed to carry out emergency functions and that those tasks can be completed in the existing HGS . control room by the normal operating crew.

In order- to integrate the CRDR and the emergency operat-ing procedures, the-validation will be completed after HGS-specific EOPs are written from the WOG generic ERGS. This will allow the task analytic information developed for the CRDR to be used in writing the HGS

., emergency-operating procedures. Likewise, the EOP validation will automatically check the CRDR task analysis and the new procedures.

The CRDR task analysis validation will be conducted in two' steps. The first will be done immediately af ter the task identification and analysis and verification phases are complete, but before the- HGS-specific EOPs are writ-ten. This will validate the list of required controls

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and displays. For this first step, the HGS control room mock-up will be used to determine if the controls and displays called for in the ERGS are located so they can be used easily by the number of individuals normally on shift. This activity will not duplicate the CRDR sur-vey, since the survey was not really concerned with such

( operational constraints as the use of specific controls '

and displays during emergencies. For the final valida-tion step, specific transients will be selected that will require operators to use-the HGS-specific EOPs.

These transients will bet run on the Sunrise Plant Simu-

, lator and an HGS operating crew will walk through the

tasks that are required tar the EOPs.

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3. CRDR TASK ANALY3IS PROCEDUIES The following procedures will be followed by the HGS review team when conducting the HGS CRDR task analysis. 13eferences are made, where appropriate, to standardized forms developed by APLC for this task analysis. Blank forms are included in' this document. / ,

f 3.1 Task Identificati n and,ASalysis of Tasks 3.1.1 Personnel Ast'ignments -

The review team leader!will supplement the core review team w'ith at ledat one individual from the s

areas of training snd procedures. These indi-viduals plus the' individuals in-the core team will conduct the'jask identification and analysis portion of the CRDR ' task analysis.' ' If this team c'i 1 . >

requires indi,viduals from other disciplir,es dur-ing this phas'e\of the task analysis, the' review team leader will arrange to have such expertise made available to the review team.'

3.1.2 Resources Required The identMication and analysis of emergency tasks will require that the review team have easy access,to the WOG ERGS, HGS system operating l- ,

instruc,tions, and other documentation. The review team leader;will arrange for the following, docum'entation to be available on a-conti'n'uous basistot}e.reviEhteam: ># '

o the1terhversionofWOGERGsEb,El, h2, E3,,

and /Lal'1 fdnction restoration 64tdelines s {

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o. the 7 generic task analysis .docurrentation gener-T ated by the WOG as pa'rt of a project by the i '

WOG So supply wharever generic information possible to 1~ts members

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o a complete set of HGS system operating proce-dures (SOPS) o a complete set of HGS system drawings, includ-ing elevation, block diagram, and P&I drawings o any existing system descriptions including those used for training and FSAR system docu-mentation o a complete set of the current HGS Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) - even though those EOPs are not based on the WOG ERGS o a copy of the HGS instrument tabulation o a complete set of annunciator procedures This documentation will be assembled in a loca-tion to be provided on an extended basis for the use of the review team. Should other documenta-tion be required during the CRDR task analysis, the review team leader will obtain such documen-tation, if available, through the HGS Document Center.

3.1.3 Initial Task Identification For each guideline to be analyzed, an initial l list of tasks will be identified using the appro-priate ERG, the WOG generic task analysis, and HGS system descriptions. This list will be com-piled by a subset of the review team composed of the reactor operator (or operations technical advisor), the human factors specialist, and the procedures individual. These tasks will be A-7

entered on the " Control and Display Requirements" form (See Page A-17) in the " ERG Task / Step" col-umn.

3.1.4 Control and Display Identification After the initial list of tasks is compiled, the types of controls and displays required to com- ,

plete those tasks will be identified and entered on the " Control and Display Requirements" form.

The same individuals who compiled the initial tank list will be responsible for identifying required controls and displays. During this process, emphasis will' be given to identifying the controls and displays that should be avail-able to complete the given tasks, not just the controls and displays that are used normally because they happen to be in the control room.

In addition to the tyras of controls and displays required, the capabilities of these and any -

required supporting instruments will be identi-fied. The list of control and display require-ments will be reviewed by the I&C specialist and the design engineer for their concurrence-that appropriate control and display types have been listed.

3.2 Verification of Controls and Displays 3.2.1 Existence of Required Controls and Displays With the initial task list and the list of required controls and displays complete, the review team members who generated these lists will go through the control room and determine whether each listed control and display exists.

For example, if a step in an ERG calls-for action' A-8 ,

. . . _ _ . . =. .

to be taken based on pressurizer level, then in instrument displaying pressurizer level should be located in the control room. If so, the instru-ment number, location, and range, if applicable, will be entered on the " Task Analysis Worksheet" (See Page A-19) for the appropriate ERG. Any control or display on the required list that is not located in the control room will be counted automatically as an HED and documented as such.

If any instances should occur when a required control or display is not in the control room, the review team members will ascertain whether the function of that instrument is fulfilled by other controls or displays in the control room and list those instruments on the " Task Analysis Worksheet." During the assessment phase of the CRDR, this information will be considered when -

formulating the resolution for HEDs associated with missing controls and displays.

3.2.2 Suitability of Controls and Displays Af ter identifying the required controls and dis-plays that exist in the HGS control room, the suitability of those controls and displays will be verified by the operations and I&C special-ists. The human factors specialist will act in I an advisory capacity for this activity. The suitability will be checked by comparing the characteristics of each listed control and display with the requirements of b 'ask that control or display supports. For e. a nyle, if performing a task requires that steam generator pressures be compared and a dif ference of 100 psig be detected, the SG pressure displays would Ima examined to determine whether their location A-9

allows simultaneous readings and their scales permit a 100 psig pressure increment to be detected.

To facilitate this suitability verification, the task analysis worksheet contains space to note the task requirements of each control and dis-play. As the verification is being done, any control or display on the requirements list that is judged not to be suitable for its purpose in an emergency task will be considered an HED and documented as such.

3.3 Validation of Control Room Functions The task identification and analysis and verification phases of the CRDR task analysis will result in a list of tasks, a control and display requirements list, a listing of HGS-specific controls and displays that are matched to the requirements list, and findings as to the suitability of the HGS-specific controls and displays for their emergency task requirements. The final step is to validate that (a) the CRDR task analysis has yielded an accurate listing of emergency tasks and (b) those emergency tasks can be performed in the HGS con-trol room by the normal shift personnel complement in the required time frame. This second validation step will occur after the HGS emergency procedures are writ-ten. The first validation step will be completed imme-diately.following the verification phase of the CRDR task analysis.

3.3.1 Mock-up Walk-through-The first validation step.will be completed by conducting a series of walk-throughs in the HGS mock-up. These walk-throughs will be done using actual HGS operations crews, whose actions will A-10

be observed and recorded by a team of individuals under the direction of the review team. The purpose of the walk-throughs is to answer the following questions concerning emergency opera-tion at HGS using the new procedures. Some of these questions are oriented toward development of the new procedures, while some are aimed spec-ifically at the CRDR task analysis.

o Does the placement of controls and related displays require one person to read a display while another manipulates a control?

o Is any control or display that is required for emergency operation located on a back panel?

o Do operators have any difficulty reading required displays or reaching required con-trols?

o Does the arrangement of the control room tend to cause the members of the operating crew to get in each other's way?

o Are there instances in which initiating cues for specific tasks do not exist in the control room?

o Are there emergency tasks that potentially cannot be done in the manner specified by the number of persons normally on shift?

o Are there instances when the operator is forced to do mental arithmetic or remember seldom-used numbers or setpoints?

A-11 L

I o Are there instances during the walk-throughs when tasks or task sequences are performed that are significantly different than the ,

tasks and sequences developed during the task identification and analysis phase?

l A positive answer to most of these questions connotes potentially poor emergency design and should be documented as HEDs and assessed during the CRDR assessment. A positive answer to the last question listed above carries more subtle implications than does a potential design prob-lem. The walk-thro' ughs will be done using the task worksheets developed from the ERGS used in the task identification and analysis phase, but will use two operational crews that will not have been involved in the CRDR, except for filling out operational experience questionnaires. There-fore, if one or both of the walk-through~ crews perform in a manner that is inconsistent with the predefined task sequences, the reason for.such inconsistency-should be ascertained.

Since the walk-throughs will consist of having HGS crews walk through the HGS mock-up, the general flow of tasks will be, by definition, the same as.that defined during the task identifi-cation and analysis phase. However, the ERGS contain some fairly high-level tasks that may be.

performed differently by different crews. Mem-bers of the review team have supposedly identi-fied the optimal HGS-specific _ sequence that should be followed to accomplish the high-level tasks. Significant deviations from this sequence may._ indicate that the review team'is not aware of certain operational constraints, the operating A-12

crews have not been trained in the " correct" task sequence for specific operations, or the task sequence may not be critical to correct system operation.

The mock-up walk-throughs will be recorded using task analysis worksheets on which thq tasks defined.during the task identification and anal-ysis have already been entered. The controls and displays associated with each task also will have been entered on these worksheets. During the walk-throughs, the observers will record any deviation from the task sequences and control and display usage listed on the data sheets. Any discrepancies will be discussed with the operat-ing crew members. The resolution of discrepan-cies will be recorded on the data sheets under

" Comments."

The walk-through for each task worksheet will be conducted in the same manner. Each operating crew member will be assigned to the same role he or she fulfills when actually on duty (e.g., RO, SRO, SS). The entry conditions will be discussed by the crew and observation team. This discus-sion will result in a specification by the crew of (a) what each entry condition means, (b) the displays used to detect entry conditions, and (c) l the location of these displays. These will be recorded by the observation team.

Each step in the guideline will be taken in turn, and the crew will specify (a) what actions are required to complete the step, (b) which controls and displays are used, and (c) which member (s) of I the crew has primary responsibility for those A-13

actions. Each step in the Westinghouse ERGS con-tain an action with expected response and an <

instruction in case the expected response is not obtained. For the HGS CRDR walk-through, the crew will specify the above three items of infor-mation for both eventualities.

Where steps in the ERGS are high level, e.g.,

manually trip turbine, the observation team will make certain that the operating crew has speci-fied all the HGS-specific steps necessary to complete that high-level procedure step.

3.3.2 Simulator Transients While the mock-up walk-throughs will provide much information on the accessibility of controls and displays and during emergency operation, they cannot realistically simulate the dynamic nature of actual plant operation. For that purpose, a second validation step will consist of having HGS operational crews respond to several transients on the Sunrise. plant simulator using the HGS-specific EOPs, when written. The Sunrise plant control room is very similar, although not-iden-tical, to the HGS control room. The two plants' dynamics are very similar. Currently, all HGS operators complete their requalification training on the Sunrise simulator.

The simulator validation will follow the pro- ,

cedures outlined in_the Emergency Operating Procedures Validation ~ Guidelines developed by the EOPIA Review Group (INPO 83-006). The checklists and simulator scenario forms contained in_the A-14

appendix of that document will require few, if any, modifications to be useful for the HGS EOP validation.

The purpose of running transients on the Sunrise simulator is to answer the following questions concerning emergency operation at HGS using the new emergency procedures:

o Are there situations in which the operators cannot perform emergency control manipulations because of time constraints?

o Do certain alarms and annunciators mislead or distract the operators?

o Does the arrangement of the control room tend to cause members of the operating crew to get in each other's way? ,

o Is information from computer systems used as an aid for emergency operation and, if so, is it in a readily usable form?

o If time constraints are contained in the pro-cedures, are the constraints reasonable'for the control room as designed?

o Can procedures, or points within procedures, be located easily when referenced?

< A-15

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A-16

Form HNP-CRDR-4 Pags of CONTROL AND DISPLAY REOUIREMENTS

. ERG NAME: REVISION NUMBER:

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APPENDIX B EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE ANALYZED USING PROCEDURES IN APPENDIX A j.

t E

Number Symptesn/

Title:

Reveelen No./Dese 88838 E1 LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT 1 Sept.1981

- STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED - !

t NOTE Foldout page should be open.

l 1 Check itWST Level:

a. RWST level - SLOWLY DECREASING a. F RAPIDLY decreasing, THEN go to step 9.

2 Check Cantoiament Semp Level:

a. Containment sump level - c. IF NOT increasing, THEN rediagnose INCREASING event, go to E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, STEP 29.

1 hMh'Ast Alternate water sources for AFWpumps will be necessary if CSTlevelis low.

3 Check Steam Generster Levels:

a. Narrow range level - GREATER a. IF less than m %, THEN maintain

. THAN #1 % full AFW flow until narrow range level is greater than n) g,

b. Throttle AFW flow to maintain b. IF narrow range level in one narrow range level at C% steam generator continues to increase, THEN go to E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.

4 Check Pressurizer PORV Black Velves:

a. Power available to block valves o. Restore power to block volves,

b. Block valves - OPEN b. Open block valve unless it was closed to isolate a faulty PORV.

(1) Enter plant specstle value showmq level just in the narrow rante including allowances for normal enannel accuracy. post acendent transmitter errors and reference let process errors.

(2) Enter plant spectfic value corresponding to no-load steam generator levelincluding allowances for post <ccutent transmstter errors and reference let process errors.

1 of 7 B-1

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• E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT (Cont.) 1 Sept.1981 l

- STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT O8TAINED -

l l

5 Check Pressurizer PORVs:

a. PORVs - CLOSED a. Manually close PORVs. E any valve cannot be closed, THEN manually close its block volve.

i f2M!!^^t If any pressurizer PORY opens because of high RCS pressure, repeat step 5 after pressure drops below POR Y setpoint.

6 Check if 51 Con Be Terndneted:

a. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN o. DO NOT TERMINATE SI.

2000 PSIG AND INCREASlNG Go to step 8.

b. Pressurizer level - GREATER b. DO NOT TERMINATE SI.

THAN 50% Go to step 8.

c. RCS subcooling - CPFATER c. DO NOT TERMINATE S1.

THAN #1 *F Go to step 8.

d. Secondary heat sinks d. E neither condition is satisfied,

1) Total AFW flow to non-faulted THEN DO NOT TERMINATE SI.

steo:n generators - GREATER Go to step 8.

l THAN /21 GPM

-OR-

2) Narrow range level in at least one non-foulted steam generator - GREATER THAN (3) %

l l

i I

(1) Enter sum of temperature and pressure measurement system errors translated into temperature using saturation tables.

(2) Enter plant specufic value derived from background document.

l (3) Enter plant specsfic vaite showung level just in the narrow range including allowances for normal accuracy.

postwcudent transmitter errors and reference leg process errors.

2 of 7 B-3

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LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT (Cont.)

1 Sept.1981

- STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED -

l 7 Terminste SI:

l o. Go to ES-1.1, Si TERMINATION FOLLOWING LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT 8 Check if Lew. Heed $1 Pomps Sheeld Be Stoppal:

a. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN

• a. IF RCS pressure low or PSIG AND STABLE OR INCREASING decreasing, THEN go to step 9.

b. Reset Si

c. Stop low-head 51 pumps and place in stondby fA]MflAg e If RCS pressure drops below m psig, the low. head Cpumps must be manually restarted to supply water to the RCS.

e Sealinjection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

9 Check if RCPs $heeld Be Stepped:

a. Si n)nning - CHECK FOR FLOW OR a. DO NOT STOP RCPs. Go to PUMP BREAKER INDICATOR LIGHTS step 10.

LIT l

• Charging /SI

-OR-

• High-head 51

b. RCS pressure - EQUAL TO OR LESS b. DO NOT STOP RCPs. Go to THAN m PSIG step 10.

c. Stop all RCPs 10 Compere RC5 And Steen Generater Pressures:

a. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN OR o. IF RCS pressure less than steam EQUAL TO STEAM GENERATOR generator pressures, THEN go PRESSURE to step 12.

(!) Enter plant specific shutoff head pressure oflowhead sipumps.

(2) Enter plant spect/ic value aertved from background document to E.O.

3 of 7 B-5

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me senm.. mu m E-1 aasic LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT (Cont.) I sept.1981

- STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED -

11 Decrease Steen Generster Pressere To (t) pglg:

a. Dump steam to condenser a. Dump steam with steam generator

1) (Enter plant specific steps] PORVs.

12 Impiament E51.2, POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION 13 Check For Switchever To Cold Leg Reciresistion

a. RWST level - AT al a. Until RWST reaches a> , perform a preliminary evaluation of plant status in steps 14 to 17.

b. Align 51 system for cold leg recirculation per ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION FOLLOWING LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT 14 Check Costelement Spray System:

l a. Spray pumps - RUNNING a. IF pumps not running, THEN go to step 15.

b. Containment pressure - b. IF pressure high, THEN maintain LESS THAN /J> PSIA containment spray until containment j pressure is reduced to normal range.

c. Roset containment spray signal

d. Stop containment spray pumps and place in standby

1) (Enter plant specific steps) l tI) Enter plant specsDe value corresponding to 200 pst below the lowest steam generator safety valve serpoint.

(2) Enter plant specx6e value correspondinr to R WST switchover alarm in plant spectDe unsts.

(3) Enter plant spectSc value.

i ad7 B-7

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m wam., mu m sosic E.1 LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT (Cont.) 1 Sept.1981 i STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED -

fAlMh'A% Sirecirculation Row to RCS must be maintained at al times.

15 Check Anzillery Building Radiation:

a. [ Enter plant specific list] - NORMAL o. Try to identify and isolate leakage.

16 Ivelvete Plast Equipmeet:

a. [ Enter plant specific list) 17 Obtain Semples:

a. [ Enter plant specific list) 18 Propero For Switchever To Hot leg Reciresistion:

a. Verify control room volve switches a. Set valve switches to proper in the following position: position.

1) (Enter plant specific list of normally deenergized volves used for transfer to hot leg recirculation with their corract position during cold leg recirculation]

b. Verify circuit breakers for the b. Energize circuit breakers, as following valves are energized. required.

1) (Enter plant specific list of valves used for transfer to hot leg recirculation]

5 of 7 B-9

0-B-10

w Sympeems/ Title Revision Ms./Dese ass' E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT (Cont.) 3 3,p,, a STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED -

19 At$_ Hours After Event initiation, Align 51 System For Hot Leg Recirculation Per E51.4, TRANSFER TO NOT LIG REClRCULATION.

20 Plant Staff Should Determine if Reactor Yessel Hood Should Be Vrnted. -

21 Evelvete Long Term Plant Status.

- END -

t!) Enter plant specutic time.

6 of 7 B-11 --

B-12

r-1 '

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r APPENDIX C TASK ANALYSIS OtJTPUT USING PROCEDURES IN APPENDIX A t

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0 6

FORM HNP-CRDR-4 Page 1 of 4 CONTROL AND DISPLAY REQUIREMENTS ERG NAME: El LOCA REVISION NUMBER: 0 ERG TASK / STEP REQUIREMENTS CAPABILITY USED WITH OK

1. Check RWST RWST Level Slowly Decreasing N/A Level Slowly Trend Decreasing

2. Check CTMT Containment Increasing N/A Sump Level Sump Level Trend Increasing

3. Check SG STM Generator >60% N/A NR Levels NR Level Throttle AFW AFW Flow Throttle SG NR Flow to Maintain Control Level SG NR Level Indicators

4. Check PRZR Voltage 120 Volts N/A PORV Block AC Valve Power PORV Block PRZR PORV Open/ Closed PRZR PORV Valves Open Block Valve Block Valve Position Controls

5. Check PRZR PRZR PORV Open/ Closed PRZR PORV PORVs closed Position Control

6. Check RCS RCS Pressure >2000 psig N/A -

Pressure Increasing

>2000 psig & Trend Increasing Check PRZR PRZR Level >50% N/A Level > 50%

Check RCS RCS Subcooling >50' F RCS Pressure Subcooling Margin RCS Temp.

>50' F Total AFW Flow Total AFW >300 gpm AFW Flow to Non-Faulted Flow Control SGs > 300 gpm NR Level in STM Generator >60% N/A One Non-Faulted NR Level SG > 60%

C-1 s

.c ,

l FORM HNP-CRDR-4 Page 2 of 4-i i

CONTROL AND DISPLAY REQUIREMENTS e ERG NAME: El LOCA REVISION NUMBER: 0 ERG TASK / STEP REQUIREMENTS CAPABILITY USED WITH OK 7.- Terminate Procedure ES-1.1 N/A SI '

SI Termination Following LOCA it 8.. Check RCS. RCS Pressure > 2000 psig N/A Pressure- Stable or r  :) 2000 psig & Increasing Stable or Incr. Trend Reset SI SI Reset. Reset SI Initiation 3 Signal Control Display Reset.ED/G D/G Load Reset Load Sequence Sequencers Sequencer Actuation Indication Stop Low Low Head On/Off/ Standby

~

SI Pump Status Head SI a -SI Pump- Indicator Pumps & Place Controls i SI Pump Motor in-Standby Current 9.- Check SI Charging Pump On/Off- RC Pump Running or Hi-Head SI On/Off Controls Pump Status / Current Any: Amps ,

SI Flow Any' Flow Check RCS RC Pump RCS Pressure < 1500 psig Pressure Controls

<,1500 psig

)

Stop All RC Pump ' On/Off RC Pump Status RC Pumps Controls RC Pump Motor Current RC Flow

. 10. Check RCS. RCS Predsure RCS >SGs N/A

Pressure SG Pressures '

> SG Pressures Lil. Use"STM Dumps / Condenser STM Throttle SG Pressure-to Reduce SG' ' Dump-Valve Dump 'Va'lve

. Setpoint Pressure.to Controls or SG Position 975 psig ~PORV Controls Adjustment PORV Position PORV Setpoint

. j '

! Condenser s Vacuum- i C-2

FORM HNP-CRDR-4 Pago 3 of 4 CONTROL AND DISPLAY REQUIREMENTS ERG NAME: El LOCA REVISION NUMBER: 0 ERG TASK / STEP REOUIREMENTS CAPABILITY USED WITH OK

12. Implement Procedure ES 1.2 Post-LOCA Post LOCA Cooldown Cooldown Depressurization

13. Check RWST RWST Level >_12,000 N/A

' Level >

Gal

-12,000 ' Gal Align SI for Procedure ES 1.3 Cold Leg Xfer to cold Recirculation Leg Recirc.

Following LOCA

14. Check CTMT CTMT Spray .

CTMT Spray Spray Pumps- Pump Status 'On/Off/ Standby Pump Controls

, Running Motor Current Any Amps Aux Bldg RAD Flow Any GPM Monitors Check CTMT CTMT Pressures 9.5 psia CTMT Spray Pressure- Controls

.< 9.5 psia

. Reset CTMT CTMT Spray Reset CTMT Spray Spray Signal -Initiation Initiation Control Stacus Stop CTMT CTMT Spray on/Off/ Standby CTMT Spray Spray-Pumps & Pump Controls Pump Status

~ Place in Standby Motor Current Flow

, 15.-Ch'eck Aux Aux Bldg 10-5 pC/cm 3 N/A I

Bldg

<10-5 UC/cm b" "

16. Evaluate Plant Eqpt List Eqpt Eqpt Equipment Dependent Dependent i: _17. Obtain Samples Sample List Communication N/A w/ Chem. Dept .

! 18. Verify' Hot Valve Lineup Depends on Valve Leg Recire List ~with Valve Controls Valves are in. Valve Status Correct Position Indication L for Cold' Leg.

Recirc.-

i C-3 L

I FORM HNP-CRDR-4 i P ga 4 of 4 l

CONTROL AND DISPLAY REQUIREMENTS ERG NAME: El LOCA REVISION NUMBER: 0 ERG TASK / STEP REQUIREMENTS CAPABILITY USED WITH OK Energize Circuit Breaker Close/Open Voltage Circuit Breakers Controls Indication for Hot Leg Recirc Valves

19. Align SI for Procedure ES 1.4 N/A Hot Leg Xfer to Hot Recirculation Leg Recirculation

20. Determine if Procedure Function N/A Vessel Head Restoration Must be Procedure for Vented Low Inventory C-4 A

FORM HNP-CROR-5 Task Analysis Worksheet Page 1 cf 10 ERG Titig: LOCA Plant: HNP REVISION NUMBER: 0 CONTROL (S)/ INDICATOR (S)/

N0. STEP NAME/ ACTION LOCATION LOCATION FEEDBACK BRANCH POINT COMMENTS Check RWST level LR 13-9 Trace on If rapidly How slowly is 1 is slowly N/A LR 13-10 recorders decreasing, slowly?

decreasing LI 13-6 shows level go to Step 9.

slowly (PANEL 9-2) decreasing Check containment LR 5-4 Meter and If not inc., What if sump pump 2 sump level is N/A LI 5-2 recorder show then go back is cycling on &

increasing Lights above level increas- to E0. off?

HS-512 ing or sump pump "on" o (PANEL 9-1) continuously w

Check STM Gen LI 7-1 All levels 3a levels N/A LI 7-2 LI 7-3 -> 60%

-> 60% narrow range LI 7-4 (PANEL 9-4)

, If 3a is HAS 7-8 LI 7-1 Levels being If one or Can AFW be 3b satisfied, HAS 7-9 LI 7-2 maintained at more levels thrcttled while throttle AFW flow HAS 7-10 LI 7-3 60% NR continue to reading NR level to maintain NR HAS 7-11 LI 7-4 increase--go indicators?

level at 60% (PANEL 9-4) (PANEL 9-4) to E-3

FORM HNP-CRDR-5 Task Analysis-W;rksheet Page 2 cf 10 ERG

Title:

LOCA Plant: HNP REVISION NUMBER: 0 CONTROL (S)/ INDICATOR (S)/

NO. STEP.NAME/ ACTION LOCATION LOCATION FEEDBACK BRANCH POINT- COMMENTS-Check power' HS-33A Lights above Lights show 4a .available to PRZR HS-33B HS-33A red-breakers PORV block valves HS-33C .HS-33B (9-4) closed HS-33C (PANEL 9-4) VI-33A Voltage avail-VI-33B (9-9) able on PORV VI-33C block valve BUS Verify PRZR PORV HS 33-1 Lights above Lights show Do not open block 4b' block valves open HS-33-2 valve controls red, valve if it is n HS-33-3 indicating closed to isolate ds (PANEL 9-4) block valves a faulty PORY (PANEL 9-4) open Verify PRZR PORVs HS-33-8 Lights above . Lights show If any PORY cannot 5 closed HS-33-9 PORV controls green, be closed, HS 33-10 indicating manually close its (PANEL 9-4) PORVs closed block valve (PANEL 9-4)

Check if RCS PR 10-2 Present value If not, do

6a pressure-> 2000 N/A is > 2000 & not terminate psig and (PANEL 9-3) trace shows SI. Go to increasing positive slope Step 8.

l

FORM HNP-CRDR-5 Task Analysis W:rksh :t Page'3 cf 10 ERG

Title:

..LOCA Plant: HNP' REVISION NUMBER: 0 CONTROL (S)/ INDICATOR (S)/-

N0. STEP NAME/ ACTION LOCATION LOCATION FEEDBACK BRANCH POINT COMMENTS Check if PRZR LI 10-3 Present level If not, do If instruments 6b level > 50% N/A LI 10-4 shows > 50% not terminate disagree, use LI SI. Go to 10-3.'

(PANEL 9-3) Step 8.

Check RCS XI 10-7 Digital value If not, do If subcooling 6c subcooling > 50 F N/A of subcooling not terminate indicator (PANEL 9-3) > 50 SI. Go to unavailable, use Step 8. RCS pressure & hot leg temp n

4 Verify total AFW FI 7-8 Sum of flows See 6d (2) Requires mental 6d flow to non- N/A FI 7-9 is > 300 gpm arithmetic by

, (1) faulted SGs > 300 FI 7-10 operator gpm FI 7-11 OR (PANEL 9-4)

NR level in at LI 7-1 If neither 6d least one non- N/A LI 7-2 6d(1) nor (2) faulted SG'> 60% LI 7-3 6d(2) is LI 7-4 satisfied, do ,

not terminate (PANEL 9-4) SI. Go to Step 8.

W 9

FORM HNP-CRDR-5 Task Analysis W rksh: t Page 4 cf 10

~

ERG

Title:

LOCA' Plant: HNP REVISION NUMBER: 0 CONTROL (S)/ INDICATOR (S)/

NO. STEP NAME/ ACTION LOCATION LOCATION FEEDBACK BRANCH POINT COMMENTS Terminate SI Go to ES 1.1 7 N/A N/A SI TERMINATION FOLLOWING LOCA Check RCS Pressure PR 10-2 Present value If not, then If recorder is

> 2000 psig and N/A is > 2000 & skip to Step unavailable, then 8a stable or (PANEL 9-3) trace is level 9. use WR PI 16-6 and increasing or shows PI 10-7.

positive slope

?

co Reset SI HS 22-1 Annunciator 4B " Auto SI 8b HS 22-2 on panel 9-2 Blocked" and ECCS annunciator (PANEL 9-2) status panel lit and "SI initiate" off on status panel HS 41-3 ECCS Status "D/G Load Step 8b Panel Reset" cont (PANEL 9-6) and "D/G Load Seq Actuate" Lights go off

FORM HNP-CRDR-5 Page 5.cf.10 Task Analysis Worksheet ERG

Title:

LOCA Plant: HNP' REVISION NUMBER: 0

. CONTROL (S)/ INDICATOR (S)/

. NO. STEP.NAME/ ACTION -. LOCATION LOCATION FEEDBACK BRANCH POINT COMMENTS-Stop low-head SI HS 22-6 Lights above Lights go from 8c pumps and place in HS 22-7 HS 22-6 8 22-7 red to green.

standby (PANEL 9-2) XI 22-6 Amp Meters XI 22-7 Read 9 Amps.

(PANEL 9-2)

Check if SI N/A Lights above Any lights red Do not stop 9a running HS 22-8 or RCP's if SI 22-9 is running.

n 22-10 Go to Step

& XI 22-8 10.

XI 22-9 amp meters XI 22-10 show > 9 amps (PANEL 9-2) ,

Chtck if RCS N/A PR 10-2 Pressure is < If pressure > 2/3 instruments 9b pressure PR 10-4 1500 psig 1500, do not must show < 1500

< 1500 psig PR 10-5 stop RCPs. psig to stop RCPs.

Go to Stet (PANEL 9-3) 10.

FORM HNP-CRDR-5.

Page 6 cf 10 '

Task Analysis Worksheet ERG

Title:

LOCA Plant: HNP REVISION NUMBER: 0' CONTROL (S)/ INDICATOR (S)/

.NO. STEP NAME/ ACTION . LOCATION LOCATION FEEDBACK BRANCH POINT COMMENTS Stop All RCPs HS 6-2 Lights above Lights go from 9c HS 6-3 HS 6-2 red to green HS 6-4 6-3 HS 6-5 6-4 6-5 (PANEL 9-3) XI 6-2 Amp meters 6-3 read 9 amps 6-4 6-5 (PANEL 9-3)

?

- Check RCS Pressure PR 10-2 RCS pressure >-- If RCS How many SGs does 10 > Steam Gen. N/A PI 10-4, 10-5 all SG pressure < RCS press have to F'ressures (PANEL 9-3) pressures SG. pressures be less than PI 7-1, 7-2, Go to Step before skip to 7-3, 7-4 12. step 12?

(PANEL 9-4)

Decre.ase SG HAC 7-2 PI 7-1, 7-2, Main steam If condenser is 11 pressures to 975 HAC 7-3 7-3, 7-4 isolation unavailable, then psig using cond. 'HAC 7-4 Valve position bypass valves use SG Porus.

dumps HAC 7-5 indicators on open, Stm dump HAC 7-1 HAC 7-2, 7-3, opens, steam 7-4, 7-5 flows to cond.

SG pres. goes (PANEL 9-4) (PANEL 9-4) to 975 psig

FORM HNP-CRDR-5 Task Analysis Worksh=t ERG

Title:

~_LOCA P1 ant: HNP REVISION NUMBER: 0 CONTROL (S)/ INDICATOR (S)/

N0. STEP NAME/ ACTION LOCATION LOCATION FEEDBACK BRANCH POINT CGMMENTS Decrease SG HC 7-12 Valve Position PORVS open SG 11 pressures to 975 HC 7-13 Indicators on pressures psig using SG HC 7-14 HC 7-12, 7-13, decrease to PORVS HC 7-15 7-14, 7-15 975 psig

'(PANEL 9-4) PI 7-1, 7-2, 7-3, 7-4 (PANEL 9-4)

Cooldown & N/A N/A Go to ES 1.2 Should ES 1.2 be

? 12 Depressurize Post-LOCA completed before

[ Cooldown a going to the next Depressuri- step?

zation Check RWST Level = N/A LR 13-9 Current level Until RWST How is operator 13a 12,000 Gallons. LR 13-10 shows RWST at reaches cued back to 13b LR 13-6 or slightly 12,000 gal., after Step 17.

below 12,000 do steps 14 (PANEL 9-2) gallons. thru 17.

Align SI for cold N/A N/A Go to ES 1.3 13b leg recirculation TRANSFER TO

- COLD LEG RECIRCULATION F0LLOWING LOCA

FORM HNP-CRDR-5 Page 8 sf 10 Task Analysis.Warkshrst ERG

Title:

LOCA Plant: HNP REVISION NUMBER: 0 CONTROL (S)/ INDICATOR (S)/

NO. STEP NAME/ ACTION LOCATION LOCATION FEEDBACK BRANCH POINT COMMENTS Check containment N/A Lights above Lights above If pumps not Do both pumps have 14a spray pumps HS 16-1, 16-2 HS 16-1 & 16-2 running, go to be off before.

running are red to step 15. skip to step 15.

XI 16-1, 16-2 Current meters XI 16-1 & 16-2 (PANEL 9-1) show Amps Check containment N/A PI 16-22 Current value If CTMT 14b pressure < 9.5 PI 16-23 < 9.5 psia pressure >

psia PR 16-15 9.5 psi a ,~-

then go to

? step 15.

.- (PANEL 9-1) w Reset containment XS 16-12 Annunciator ID " Containment 14c spray system on PANEL 9-1 Spray Activated" (PANEL 9-1) Annunicator is off.

Stop Containnent HS 16-1 Lights above Lights above 14d spray pumps and HS 16-2 HS 16-1, 16-2 HS 16-1, 16-2 place in standby XI 16-1, 16-2 go from red to (PANEL 9-1) green Current meters show p Amps.

(PANEL 9-1)

4 FORM HNP-CRDR Task Analysis Workshut ERG

Title:

LOCA Plant: HNP REVISION NUMBER: 0-CONTROL (S)/ INDICATOR (S)/

N0. STEP NAME/ ACTION LOCATION LOCATION FEEDBACK BRANCH POINT COMMENTS Check auxiliary N/A ARM 41-2 Current No control room 15 buildgngradjation ai rborne action other than

< 10- pC/cm activ ty notification if 3

ARM BACK PANEL < 10- pC/cm radiation is above normal.

Evaluate plant Depends on Depends on use plant 16 equipment Eqpt Eqpt , Eqpt Checklist i

[ Obtain N/A N/A Radiation Use plant- Requires 17 samples levels in specific communication with samples sample list Chemistry Dept.

Verify hot leg HS 22-17 Lights above Control Light 18a recirc valves are HS 22-18 controls 22-17 Red in correct cold HS 22-19 listed. 22-18 Red leg recirc HS 22-31 22-19 Green position. HS 22-33 22-31 Green (PANEL 9-2) 22-33 Green (PANEL 9-2)

FORM HNP-CRDR-5 Page 10 cf 10 Task Analysis Worksheet

' ERG

Title:

LOCA Plant: HNP REVISION NUMBER: 0 CONTROL (S)/ INDICATOR (S)/

N0. STEP NAME/ ACTION LOCATION LOCATION FEEDBACK _ BRANCH POINT COMMENTS

' Verify circuit HS 44-P1 Lights above Lights go from 18b breakers for above .HS 44-P2 HS 44-P1, P2, green to red valves energized HS 44-P3 P3.

VI 44-1, 44-2 Voltage shows 480V (PANEL 9-9) (PANEL 9-9)

Align SI system N/A N/A Go to ES 1.4 19 for hot leg TRANSFER T0 recirculation H0T LEG

? RECIRCULATION Determine if N/A N/A Go to FR 20 vessel head should procedures be vented for low inventory

e APPENDIX D NUREG-0700, SECTION 6 ITEMS TO BE ADDRESSED DURING THE CRDR TASK ANALYSIS i

{

NUREG-0700-

-ITEM NUMBER DESCRIPTION 6.1.1.1.A Presence of Required Instrumentation 6.1.1.1.B Arrangement of Instrumentation 6.1.1.2.A Adequacy of Control Room Manning 6.1.1.2.B Utilization of Additional Personnel 6.1.1.3.C.1 Operator Access to Workstations 6.1.1.3.C.2 Operator Positioning at Workstations 6.1.1.3.D.2 Interference Between Operators 6.1.2.2.E.2 . Horizontal Displacement of Displays 6.1.2.2.F Lateral Spread of Controls and Displays 6.1.2.3.F.1 Lateral Spread of Controls and Displays

.6.1.2.3.F.2 on Sit-down Consoles 6.1.2.5.A.2 Control Height for Precise / Frequent Adjustment 6.1.2.5.B.2 Display Height for Precise / Frequent Reading 6.1.3.1.A Equipment Arrangement 6.1.3.1.B Location of Senior Operator Station 6.1.3.1.C Sharing Personnel Between Units 6.1.5.5.C Reductions in Background Noise 6.3.1.2.A.2 Annunciator Set Point Selection 6.3.1.3.D Criteria for First-Out Annunciators 6.4.1.1.A.1 Adequacy of Controls 6.4.1.2.F Sequential Control Positions 6.4.2.2.D.1 Visually Identifiable Shape Coding

6.4.2.2.D.2 Tactually Identifiable Shape Coding 6.5.1.1.A Task Analysis 6.5.1.1.B' Completeness of Available Information 6.5.1.2.A Display Scale Selection 6.5.1.2.B. Elimination of Operator Conversion

6. 5.1. 2 . D.1- Span of Display Scale Range 6'.S.I.2.D.2 Appropriateness of Scale Ranges 6.5.1.2.D.3 Auxiliary Wide-Range Instruments 6.6.3.3.C Consistency of Labels With Procedures 6.8.1.1.A Control / Display Grouping by Sequence of Use l D-1

6.8.1.1.B Control / Display Grouping by System Function 6.8.1.1.C Control / Display Grouping by Importance and Frequency of Use 6.8.1.2 Effective Panel Layout 6.8.2.1.A.1 Display Grouping by Sequence of Use 6.8.2.1.A.2 Control Arrangement by Sequence of Use 6.8.2.1.C.1 Control / Display Grouping by Functional Outcome 6.8.3.1.C Simultaneous Actuation of Controls 6.9.1.1.A Proximity of Related Controls and Displays J6.9.1.2.A.5 Normal Order of Control Arrangement 6.9.1.2.B.5 Normal Order of Display Arrangement 6.9.2.1.B.1 Left-to-Right Sequence of Use 6.9.2.1.B.2 Top-to-Bottom Sequence of Use 6.9.2.1.B.3 Combined Ordering for Sequence of Use 6.9.3.2.A Precision of Control Movement 6.9.3.2.B Display Resolution D-2 u.

QUESTIONNAIRE

-GENERAL This questionnaire will assist in collecting additional and prac-tical information on the applicability and use of the CRDR task analysis guideline. Its value can only be judged by you, the user. Please.take a few minutes and-comment on the four ques-tions.

OUESTIONS

1. Was this guideline.useful? If not, why not?

s-

2. How'did.you use this guideline (e.g., in total, as back-ground, selected portions)?

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3. What would you recommend to improve this guideline?

I I

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, 4. .What-other sources (if'any) did you use to develop your approach? (Please include name and-telephone number of a contact person.)

COMPLETED OUESTIONNAIRE This guideline was developed by industry apresentatives and should not be considered an INPO document, although INPO supplied

-the publication and other staff support. Please forward your comments and questionnaire to the address below:

CRDR NUTAC

. Communications' Division Institute of Nuclear-Power Operations Suite 1500 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339 4

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QUESTIONNAIRE GENERAL This questionnaire will assist in collecting additional and prac-tical information on the' applicability and use of the CRDR task

' analysis guideline . Its value can only'be judged by you, the user. Please-take a few minutes and comment on the four ques-tions.

OUESTIONS 1

1. Was this guideline useful? If not, why not?

2. How did you use this guideline (e.g., in total, as back-i -ground, selected portions)?

3.- What would you recommend to improve this guideline?

er- w- --+w - + g- y_ , ,,--

4. What other sources (if any) did you use to develop your approach? (Please include name and telephone number of a contact person.)

COMPLETED OUESTIONNAIRE This guideline was developed by industry representatives and

' should not be considered an INPO document, although INPO supplied the publication and other staff support. Please forward your comments and questionnaire to the address below:

CRDR NUTAC Communications Division

. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite ~ 1500

. Circle ~75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339 t'

6 2

7. -

1 OUESTIONNAIRE GENERAL This questionnaire will assist in collecting additional and prac-

'tical information on the applicability and use of the CRDR task analysis guideline. Its value can only be judged by you, the

^

user. Please take a few minutes and comment on the four ques-

. tions.

OUESTIONS

1. Was this guideline useful?

- If not, why not?

J 1: .2. How did you use this guideline (e.g., in total, as back-ground, selected portions)?

i~

-3 . :What would 'you recommend to improve this guideline?

(.-

[

L i

l'

4. What other sources (if any) did you use to develop your approach? (Please include name and telephone number of a contact person.) l l

I l

COMPLETED OUESTIONNAIRE This guideline was developed by industry representatives and should not-be considered an INPO document, although INPO supplied

-the publication and other staff support. Please forward your comments and questionnaire to the address below:

CRDR NUTAC Communications Division Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500

. Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339

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