ML20080N158

Annual Rept for LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station for Period Jan-Dec 1994

ML20080N158
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	12/31/1994
From:	Ray D COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9503060165
Download: ML20080N158 (69)

Text

,

• ^ . Gimmonwealth IMison O)mpany l

.,f' IMalle Generating Station

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je 2601 North 21st Road

'jl Marwilles, IL 61341-9757 j Tel 815-3574761 '

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February 27,1995 1

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Enclosed for your information is the NRC Annual Report for LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station for the period January 1994, through December 1994.

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D. J. Ray M'Q Station Manager LaSalle County Station f

DIR/lja Enclosure cc: John B. Martin, Regional Administrator - Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector - I.aSalle Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety - I4alle Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety - Springfield, IL NR.R Project Lianager - Washington, D.C.

GE Representative - LaSalle Regulatory Assurance Supervisor - LaSalle Licensing Operations Director - Downers Grove -

Nuclear Fuel Services Manager - Downers Grove Off-Site Safety Review Senior Participant - Downers Grove ,

INPO Records Center  !

Central File C COO {[i 9503060165 941231 PDR ADOCK 05000373 /f R PDR A rnk om nimpan> {'_

I. Introduction The LaSalle County Nuclear station is a two-Unit facility owned by ,

Ccasmonwealth Edison Company and located near Marseilles, Illinois. Each unit is a Boiling Water Reactor with a designed not electrical output of 1078 Megawatts. Waste heat is rejected to a man-made cooling pond using the Illinois river for make-up and blow-down. The architect-engineer was Sargent and Lundy and the contractor was Conanonwealth Edison Company. ,

Unit one was issued operating license number NPF-11 on April 17, 1982.

Initial criticality was achieved on June 21, 1982 and consnercial power ,

operation was commenced on January 1, 1984.

Unit two was issued operating license number NPF-18 on December 16, 1983.

Initial criticality was achieved on March 10, 1984 and ccommercial power operation was comunenced on October 19, 1984.

This report was compiled by Michael J. Cialkowski, telephone number (815) 357-6761, extension 2056.

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,- p TABLE OF CONTENTS ,

I. Introduction II. Annual Reportable Documentation for Unit 1 and 2 j A. Suannary of Operating Experience l

1 B. Unit Outages and Power Reductions C. Radiation Exposure  ;

D. Failed Fuel Elements  ?

E. Tests and Experiments not covered in the Safety Analysis Report F. Changes to Procedures Covered in the Safety Analysis Report  ;

G. Sunenary of Changes to the Facility Which are Described in the ,

Safety Analysis Report  ?

M. Survey of Evaluation Results of Chlorine Shipments by Barge on the t Illinois River l I. Sununary of Events violating Technical Specification 3.4.5 Primary ,

Coolant Iodine Spiking Exceeding Allowable Limits Attachwaant A - Safety Related Maintenance Completed (Non-Outage [

Related)

Attachment B - Unit shutdowns Attachment C - Forced Reductions in Power .

Attachmaant D - Survey of Chlorine Shissnent in the vicinity of LaSalle County Station Appendix A - Critical Path Activities - L1R06 Refuel Outage Appendix B - Safety Reinted Corrective Maintenance- L1R06 Refuel Outage i

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o II. Annua % Reportable Docuanentation for Unit i and 2

, A. M rv of Onoratina wwnariance The nummary of the operating experience has been reported monthly in LaSa11e's NRC Monthly Reports (Section II.A) dated January 1994-through' December 1994. For safety related maintenance (non-outage related) performed during the period of January 1994 through December 1994, see Attachment A.

B. Unit Outanes and Power Reductions For unit outages, see Attachment B. For. unit power reductions see Attachment C.

C. Radiation wwnosure This information is reported annually for 1994 in the respective

s. actions relating to numbers compiled for LaSalle Unit 1 and 2 in the 10 CFR 20.407 annual report submitted under a different cover.

D. Failed Fuel El-- =ts This section has been reported monthly in LaSalle's NRC Monthly Reports dated January 1994 through December 1994. .

E. Tests and wwneri= ants not covered in the Safety analysis Renort During this reporting period, January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1994, there were no tests or experiments conducted that are not covered in the Final Safety Analysis Report.

F., Channes to Procedures covered in the Safety kn=1vais Renort LLP-94-018, Reactor Recirculation. Chemical Decontamination - LIR06 Administrative Procedure This procedure outlined the method to apply administrative controls for effective management of the Unit One Reactor-Recirculation Chemical Decontamination during its sixth refuel outage (L1R06).

LLP-94-029, Transfer from 1WZO1T to 2WZO2T through the suction spool pieces This procedure was written to transfer water from U-1 WZ chemical radwaste Collector (1WZO1T) to the U-2 WZ Process Tank (2WZO2T) . This allows normal processing to the Evaporators. ,

LLP-94-119, Unit 2 Amertap Train B Weekly Surveillance with Selector Switch in the TEST Position The Amertap tube cleaning system is designed to operate in an automatic ,

mode. The No. 1 Upper Screen will not electrically close. This special 1 j

procedure allows for the continued surveillance by performing the surveillance with the system in the TEST mode. The No. 1 Upper Screen / Collector Inlet Valve interlock is momentarily disabled via a switch jumper. The system function of maintaining the cleanliness of the Main condenser tubes was not impacted.

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F. ek-=--- to ProamAures Covered in the gafety immivals Ranort-fcontinued)

LST-93-062, Purging The VG Stack )

The purpose of this procedure is'to prevent moisture from entering the ,

• Standby Gas Treatment (VG) stack by purging it with Service Air (SA). Service i Air is injected into the VG discharge and stack piping. ]

Two check valves.in series at the test tap prevent any back flow into the-SA lines during performance of the procedure. The purging set up is isolated during scheduled runs of VG on either unit, andi during auto starts of either  !

L VG train, the purge set up would be isolated as soon as possible.

i LST-94-010, Thermal Overload Bypass Test of Motor Operated Valve IVQO38 This special test was written to verify proper operation of the integral j bypass circuit for the thermal overload device for the Vent Exhaust to Purge Train Inlet Valve IVQO38. This fulfilled test requirements of Technical Specification 4.8.3.3.1.b after maintenance on the motor starter. l LST-94-026, Temporary Backfill for Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Discharge line j This special test was written to provide a alternate water supply for RCIC to maintain piping fill while the water leg pump was out of service. A check valve and regulator were connected at 1(2)E51-R002 instrument line downstream of instrument rack root valve. A check valve was installed at the connection to ensure no back flow into system. The temporary backfill'was installed for 1 short duration (approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />) while maintenance was performed on the water leg pump (U-2).

LST-94-040, Division 1 Battery Single Cell Discharge This procedure provided the guidance for performing a single cell )

discharge for the Unit 2 Division 1 125 volt battery. The procedure conducted )

a discharge test on a single cell of the 125 volt battery string. The cell j was electrically isolated from the string by a jumper. The string was j considered operable with 57 cells connected. The cell to be. tested was not I removed from the battery rack for the test. The Unit 2 Division 1 DC system was cross-tied to the Unit 1 DC system to enable the installation of the junper. The Unit 2 battery was declared inoperable while cross-tied in accordance with Technical Specification 3.8.2.3.

LST-94-042, Unit 1 Reactor Protection System '

Alternate Power Source Voltage Recording During Reactor Recirculation Pump 1B33-C001A/B Start The procedure provided instructions for the recording of voltages at a 4 reactor protection system (RPS) alternate power source during the reactor j recirculation (RR) pump start. The test required temporary routing of testing  !

leads in the proximity of voltage regulator lAPA9E. The regulator was electrically isolated from the RPS bus during the testing.

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F. chenaam to ProomAures covered in the Safety h=1 vain Renort-(continued)

LST-94-043, Unit 1 Reactor Protection System Alternate Power Source Voltage Regulation Test The procedure provided instructions for testing the *Solatron" voltage regulator lAPA9E. This was done to verify that the regulator was capable of

• regulating its output voltage in accordance with manufacturer's operating characteristics.

LST-94-080, SBLC System Troubleshooting The purpose of this special test procedure was,to record operating pressures in various portions of the unit 1 SBLC system. Test equipment was installed for pressure monitoring the 1B SBLC system in the test mode, varied system discharge pressure ac required, and backflushed the "B" SBLC discharge piping. The system was operated in a manner consistent with its design. >

Pressure monitoring equipment is passive and designed to be compatible with expected discharge pressures (500-1400 psig). The SBLC system was inoperable (both trains) for a short period while the "B" SBLC pump discharge line was being backflushed. The "B" train of SBLC was inoperable at the time the test was started. This test rendered the redundant SBLC train inoperable ("A" train) to perform a backflush of the "B" train discharge piping. SBLC is classified as a control system and not a safety system. SBLC is a backup to -

the CRD system and provides a way of manually shutting down the reactor -

independent of the CRD system. Operation of the reactor is permitted by technical specifications for short periods (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />) with the SBLC system inoperable (both trains) due to the highly reliable CRD system as stated in the basis of technical specification 3.1.5 (SBLC). Furthermore, SBLC is a manually initiated system and this capability was not lost during this test.

The "A" train would be immediately available following the cycling of three ,

manual valves which were placed in abnormal positions during the test. r LAP-100-37, Plant Communications LAP-100-37 was revised to add precautions (1) that radio communications in the drywell without the repeater installed requires a talk around (TA) channel to be used and to update the number of talk groups and their designations. The 3 procedure revision is an enhancement to personnel safety. During initial drywell entry, the portable repeater can't be placed in the drywell because the equipment hatch is installed and the interlocks on the personnel access hatch are not defeated. The use of talk around channels provides a means of safe and offective communications between confined space entrants in the drywell and attendants until the time that the repeater is installed and working in the drywell. The nomenclature of talk group designation in the procedure were changed so that they are all consistent. UFSAR Section 9.5.2.2.5, Intraplant Radio System, will also be revised to include a description of the " Talk Around" mode.

LAP-240-1, Use of Lccks On Valves )

The procedure was revised to reflect valve 2E51-F049 being changed from- j Locked Open to Locked Throttled Open. The position change was originally implemented per Temporary System Changes (TSC) 2-0198-94, to limit the current drawn by the motor of pump 2E51-C004.

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LAP-920-2T, Review and Approval Requirements for Procedures The procedure was revised to update' approval authorities and department  !

head titles to reflect the current organization. Various review and approval requirements for existing or new procedures were incorporated. UFSAR Section ,

13.5 is to be revised to reflect the conduct of review and approval r requirements.

LAP-820-11TA, Plant Specific Technical Guidelines LAP-820-11TE, Emergency Operating Procedure Setpoint Controls The procedure changes incorporated revised values for indicated standby liquid control (SBLC) tank levels for both hot and cold shutdown boron  ;

weights. Also changed was the value at which reactor level should be verified i if recirculation flow control valves cannot be runback to minimum prior to '

tripping the reactor recirculation pumps. The changes were incorporated as a result of engineering analyses and revised calculations.

LAP-1300-1, Action / Work Request Processing Procedure This procedure revision reflects the change to the work request system, which encompasses work control initiatives and allows for electronic processing. The procedure affects only administrative functions and '

processes.

5 LGA-08, Primary Containment Flooding ,

LGA-10, ATWS RPV Control ,

The procedure revisions were performed to enhance the usability of flowcharts within them, and to resolve human factors concerns.

LIP-GM-956, Analysis of Static-O-Ring Differential Pressure (SOR DP) Switch Data l The procedure provides instructions for the analysis of data obtained from SOR l i

DP switch operability testing to determine if the differential pressure switches are acceptable for use in LaSalle Units 1 or 2. Tne procedure revision changed the acceptance criteria fc repeatability and static shift of the SOR DP switches installed in the Unit 1 and 2 Emergency Core Cooling i System minimum flow bypass instrument loops. The instrument loops are not activated until these systems are started. The revision did not modify the instrument loops, change Technical Specification limits or calibration f setpoints for the instrumentation, or change the: operation or_ function of the i system.

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. F. N==-== to Proe=Aneas covered in the Safety in=1vais ma - t-fcont4===A)

LIS-RH-203A, Unit 2 RHR A (LPCI Mode)

Minimum Flow Bypass Quarterly Calibration LIS-RH-203B, Unit 2 RHR B & C (LPCI Mode)

Minimum Flow Bypass Quarterly Calibration Procedure LIS-RH-203A provides instructions for test and calibration of RHR A Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI Mode) Minimum Flow Bypass Trip and High Flow Alarm in Emergency Core Cooling System Division 1.

Procedure LIS-RH-203B provides instructions for test and calibration of RHR B&C (LPCI Mode) Minimum flow Bypass Trips and High Flow Alarms in ECCS-

- Division 2.

The procedure revisions reduce the number of administrative failures by revising the action and reject limits for the Static-O-Ring Differential Pressure (SOR DP) switches installed in the Unit 1 and 2 HPCS mininum flow bypass instrument loops to agree with the limits specified for the equivalent Unit 1 RHR switches, and these instrument loops are not activated until HPCS is started. In addition, the changes did not modify instrument loops, revise the Technical Specification limits or calibration setpoints for the instrumentation, or change the operation or function of the system.

LIS-HP-105, Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray Minimum Flow Bypass Calibration LIS-HP-205, Unit 2 High Pressure Core Spray Minimum Flow Bypass Calibration The procedure revisions increased the action and reject limits for Unit 1 and 2 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) minimum flow bypass switches 1(2)E22-N006, to the same limits specified for the equivalent Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) switches, to redace the number of administrative failures. The procedures outline the method used to perform a HPCS Minimum Flow Bypass Calibration.

The procedure changes revised the action and reject limits for the Static-0-Ring Differential Pressure (SOR DP) switches installed in the Unit 1 and 2 HPCS minimum flow bypass instrument loops to agree with the limits specified for the equivalent Unit 1 RHR switches, and these instrument loops are not activated until HPCS is started. In addition, the changes did not modify the instrument loops, revise the Technical Specification limits or calibration setpoints for the instrumentation, or change the operation or function of the system.

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W F. Fkanaes to Procedures Covered in the Safety Analysis ReDort-fcontinued)

LIS-LP-102, Unit 1 LPCS Minimum Flow Bypass Quarterly Calibration LIS-LP-202, Unit 2 LPCS Minimum Flow Bypass Quarterly Calibration These procedure revisions increased the action and reject limits for Unit 1 and 2 LPCS minimum flow bypass switches 1(2)E21-N004 to the same limits specified for the equivalent Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) switches.

This was done to reduce the number of administrative failures. The procedures provide instructions for test and calibration of Low Prcssure Core Spray Minimum Flow Bypass trip in Emergency Core Cooling System Division 1.

The procedure changes revised the action and reject limits for the Static-0-Ring Differential Pressure (SOR DP) switches installed in the Unit 1 and 2 HPCS minimum flow bypass instrument loops to agree with the limits specified for the equivalent Unit 1 RHR switches, and these instrument loops are not activated until HPCS is started. In addition, the changes did not modify the instrument loops, revise the Technical Specification limits or calibration setpoints for the instrumentation, or change the operation or function of the system.

LMP-VQ-16, Temporary removal of cable raceway for procedure Cable tray sections 1371AB, 1371D, 1371E, AND 1354R, cable tray support 2HV1, conduie. support CC-83 and the associated 3" diameter conduit, a 3/4" flexible conduit, and cables 1RH744, ILP111, AND 1RE130 were temporarily removed to allow work to be performed on valve IVQO31 per procedure LMP-VQ-16, "1VQO31 Valve / Actuator Removal and Installation".

LOA-IA-01, Loss of Instrument Air and/or Service Air LOA-SA-01, Loss of Service Air Procedure LOA-IA-01 was revised and Procedure LOA-SA-01 was deleted. The response to a loss of service air was incorporated in to LOA-IA-01. UFSAR Section 13.5 will be revised to reflect the procedure changes.

Temporary Procedure Change to LOP-MS-06, Wetting of the Inboard and Outboard MSIVs.

The temporary procedure change allowed wetting of the B Main Steam Line Isolation Valves (MSIV's). Changed the drain valve in step F.4.L.5 from 1B21-F068 to IB21-F069. The 68 valve was unable to be cycled due to the lack of a stem nut. The option of draining the steam line by opening the outboard M3IV when line pressure decreases to less than 1 psig was removed. This was done to keep from addir.g too much water to the loop seal installed per LOP-MS-08 and causing structural strain on the Main steam line (MSL). A step to verify the MSL is completely drained through the 1B21-F025B and 1B21-F026B valves was also added.

Temporary Procedure Change to LOP-MS-06, Wetting of the Inboard and Outboard MSIVs.

This procedure changed condenser drain valve to 1B21-F069 from 1B21-F068.

Steps were deleted from the procedure that allow opening of outboard Main .

Steam Isolation Valves with water in the steam line. Limitations and Action ]

were added to track the Secondary Containment in the Degraded Equipment Log i until draining of the Main Steam Lines was complete.  !

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LOP-RH-17, Alternate: Shutdown Cooling LOP-RX-03, Transfer of Shutdown Control to the Remote Shutdown Panel

, When the reactor is in Operating Condition 1, 2 or 3 the following valves

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.shall be administratively controlled in the closed position with the power  !

removed. .

i 1 (2 ) E12-F011A/B, 1 (2 ) E12-F026A/B, 1(2)E12-F051A/B, r 1(2)E12-F052A/B, 1(2)E12-F065A/B, 1(2)E12-F073A/B, L

1 ( 2 ) E12 -F074 A/B , 1 (2 ) E12 -F087A/B , 1(2)E51-F064 and 2E51-F091 L l The purpose of the revisions is to procedurally identify the required closed position for any of the above listed valves referenced by;the procedures to satisfy the requirements of UFSAR Appendix H Section 4.6.3, License Condition 2C(15) (1) of LaSalle County Station Unit 2 license NPF-18, and Engineering Letter CHRON #122980 dated 11/15/93, " Reclassification of Components Associated With Residual Heat Removal Steam condensing Mode of Operation." -j LOP-RH-07, Shutdown Cooling System Startup, Operation, and Transfer  ;

i The procedure was revised to allow the Shift Engineer to authorize waiving 3 the pre-warming of shutdown cooling (SDC) during emergency conditions provided  !

the SDC water temperature is within 25 degrees F of moderate temperature and  :

the number of thermal cycles is tracked. a LOP-RI-02M, RCIC The position of RCIC condenser condensate pump discharge valve 2E51-F049 as stated in the procedure was changed from locked open to locked throttled open. This change limited current drawn by 2E51-C004 to within the vendor  !

recommended limits of the motor by reducing flow.

LOP-RP-04, RPS Bus B Transfer The procedure revision incorporated defeating the primary containment  !

isolation trip of the 2B21-F032A/B check valves during a bus transfer. It -i installed jumpers in the feedwater check valve logic to keep the solenoid i valve energized in the open position while performing a bus transfer. l~

Inhibiting closing of the 2B21-F032A/B check valves during a bus transfer-prevents oscillations of the feedwater turbines due to their running up to  ;

associated high speed stops.

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LOP-RT-05, Reactor Water cleanup System Filter /Demineralizer Backwash i

The procedure was revised to change timer settings for fill time following j backwash and to allow use of an air bypass valve to increase the air flow  !

rate.

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F. * = === to Pr~~mAures Covered in the Safety 1M*1YSiB M* Met =fcont{numA) i 14P-VG-01, Preparation for standby operation of the standby gas treatment system Revision 7 to LOP-VG-01, Preparation for_ standby operation of the standby gas treatment system deleted precautions on shutting down one train if both auto start and running two trains in non-accident conditions. Limitations and actions on the VG minimum run time and chemistry samples were also deleted.

Editorial changes and clarifications were added. Chemistry supervisor was changed to chemistry technician, j LOP-VG-02, Shutdown Of The Standby Gas Treat ~ t System  ;

The following changes were incorporated into the procedure revision:

The prerequisite for no auto initiation signal present and a precaution when i both trains are desired to be running were deleted. Steps to shut down a train on an unaffected unit during valid initiation signals were added. A step to adjust sample flow on standby gas treatment wide range gas monitor if both '

trains were running was revised and a clarification of VG run time in the limitations and actions section of the procedure was added. .i The safety evaluations for the above listed items in section II.F concluded that no unreviewed safety questions existed. ,

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.. i G. Summary of Chansas to the Facility Which are Descr4 w in tha' safety h=1vais  ;

Ranort i i

M01-1-88-014C Radweste Cranes "A" and "B" were upgraded from an existing 7.5 tons capacity to 9.3 tons capacity. This was accomplished as a result of a structural analysis performed by the crane manufacturer and installation of a

-new steel cable and strength 3ning of the hook support assembly. Besides i upgrading the increased load capecity, the braking and speed control was improved. These changes facilitate the processing of radwaste shipping  ;

containers in the north Intermediate Storage Area. The following UFSAR

• sections will be revised due to the Modification: 11.4.2.4, Drum Handling Equipment, Table 11.4-1, Solid Waste Management System Equipment and Storage i Design Capabilities Radwaste Building, ard G.3.6.3, Elevation 706'0", Fire Zone 6B2 (Radwaste Truck Bay).

M01-1-89-013A l

Modification M01-1-89-013A replaced the General Electric Company  !

hydraulics and the G.W. Dahl company electronics used to control feedwater j turbine speed with hydraulics and electronics from Lovejoy controls Corporation (LCC). The previous design was obsolete and could not adequately maintain turbine speed and feedwater flow and required extensive maintenance.

UFSAR Section 7.7.4 is being revised to reflect the installation of the modification.

M01-1-92-001  !

Modification M01-1-92-001 removed the actuators and limit switches from I

dampers IVP01Y, IVP02Y, 1VP08Y, and IVP09Y, and added a locking device for each of the dampers. This eliminates the need for periodic maintenance on the  :

actuator and limit switches. These changes do not alter the basic function of  !

the VP system. The dampers will continue to provide the original design '

function of maintaining the CRD area at less than 185 degree F during normal operating modes. The temperature in the CRD area will be maintained by manually setting the dampers.

N01-1-93-001, M01-1-93-003, M01-1-93-005 Modifications M01-1-93-001,'003, and 005 replaced the ECCS and RCIC water leg pump discharge lift check and globe stop check valves with swing check and globe stop valves. Some of the replacement valves are repositioned to minimize piping stress and ensure accessibility. The valves were replaced to reduce the amount of required maintenance and improve the reliability of the valves. The lift check valve has proven to be susceptible to binding due to the small clearances within the valve. The replacement-swing check valve, with its simple design and larger clearances, is considered a more reliable valve. The required functions of the removed valves will be performed by the i replacement valves. The number of check valves in each system will be decreased from two to one, since only one check valve is needed to perform the backflow isolation function. The globe stop valve will provide the isolation necessary for maintenance. UFSAR Section 6.3.2.2.5 will be revised to reflect the modifications.

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ev of ph==~ee to the Facility Which are Described in the safety an=1vsis

=~t - (continued)

M01-1-93-009 l M01-1-93-010  !

Modification M01-1-93-009 replaced the motor pinion gear, worm shaft gear, and the power cables for RHR MOV'1E12-F042A and the valve actuator and power cable for LPCS injection valve 1E21-F005. The replacement actuator has a 1 starting torque of 80 ft-lb and running torque 16 ft-lb., compared to 40 ft-lb and 8 ft-lb for the previous motor Modification M01-1-93-010 replaced the motor pinion gear and the worm i shaft Gear for HPCS MOV 1E22-F004.

The implementation of the modification is intended to satisfy operability concerns raised in NRC Generic Letter 89-10 and related documents. Revisions to UFSAR Tables 6.3-2 and 6.3-3, and Section 7.3.1.2 to reflect'the installation of the modifications will be incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update.

M01-1-93-012 This Modification to the 1E12-F024A Valve replaced internal valve parts .

with multi-stage, multi-path, high pressure drop anti-cavitation trim parts.

The control circuit for the valve was also modified by adding a seal-in contact in the closing circuit, to prevent valve hammering in the presence of  !

an isolation signal. The new trim reduces the valve plug area by approximately ,

75%. This dramatically reduces the thrust required to operate the valve.

Upgrade or replacement of the existing operator was not required.

M01-1-94-006 ,

i Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) A Scram Data Capture Modification Test. The test ensured that the scram data capture function of the modified RWM A .

successfully detected and captured full in position indication for control rods which have traveled beyond their last full in reed switch. Implementation of hardware logic changes required for scram data capture did not interfere with normal RWM operation was verified. Scram signals were simulated for testing purposes to force the RWM in to scram mode of operation. All testing

• requiring actual control rod motion was performed in conjunction with other '

regularly scheduled plant evolutions or tests. Control rod movement was performed in accordance with procedures already established for those activities.

M01-1-93-021, M01-1-93-022 1 M01-1-93-023, M01-1-93-024 M01-1-93-025, M01-2-93-024 M01-2-93-025, M01-2-93-026 Modifications M01-1-93-021, 022, 023, 024, and 025, and M01-2-93-024, 025, and 026 installed Reactor pressure Vessel Reference Leg Backfill lines in response to NRC Generic Letter 93-03. Revisions to UFSAR Sections 6.2 and 7.7.1.2 will be incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update to reflect the modifications.

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M01-2-88-060 -

Line break switches 2E31-N007AB/BB, 2E31-N012AB/BB and 2E31-N013AB/BB were deleted. They are SOR type 103AS-B203 differential pressure (dP) switches which have a high diaphragm failure rate and are subject to additional' '

surveillance requirements because of NRC commitments. Eliminating the switches reduces maintenance and surveillance costs.

M01-2-89-022  ;

This Modification added two restraints to Subsystem 2DV27 and one restraint to subsystem 2DV23. These restraints reduce the vibration. induced' e displacements of these lines, and minimize vibration induced stress in the' piping, support components and equipment connections.

ECR 93-908 This Exempt Change added a 3/8" carbon steel nipple (weldolet) and cap (plug) to the vent line of the Unit 1 Stator Cooling Head Tank (1GC01T) located on elevation 731', Column 2, Row D. This vent was used to vent the ,

hydrogen expelled by the new generator hydrogen monitor during the Unit 1 ,

generator pressurization /depressurization procedures. The monitor was used  ;

during the pressurization /depressurization procedures and was connected to the vent point with polyflow. After the pressurization /depressurization procedure was completed, the polyflow was removed and the nipple capped.

ECR 93-918 The Exempt Change replaced the PSA strut for Support RHA6-1002X on line ,

1RHA6A-14" with a LISEGA strut Type 3962RR1. The new strut is an adjustable  !

restraint which provides additional installation / removal flexibility.

Each refuel outage, the strut was removed so that a spool piece could be '

added to line 1RRA6A-14" to allow for the following activities: Suppression Pool (SP) Clean-up via the Condensate Polishing System, Reactor Well Transfer to the SP, and Condenser Transfer to the SP. To remove the strut, the holding pins had to be removed. Because of the rigidity of the line, it is very l difficult to remove these pins. Installation of an adjustable restraint l allows these pins to be easily removed and re-installed. The LISEGA strut fits in the same space area as the PSA-10 strut. The PSA-10 rear brackets are .

comp &tible with the LISEGA Type 3962RR1 strut. t ECR 93-919 The original sample probe in the Reactor Recirculation Pump discharge line [

1RR01AB-24" was furnished by General Electric Company (GE) . This probe was l made of 3/4-inch stainless steel pipe with spaced holes, which serve as sample entry ports. F i

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ECR 93-919 (continued) l.

During preoperational testing at a GE Boiling Water Reactor 6 Plant, a ',

sample probe broke off inside the recirculation pipe and traveled through the jet pumps into the bottom head of the reactor pressure vessel. A detailed flow induced vibration analysis was performed by GE. The analysis concluded that the probe failure was caused by high cycle fatigue caused by flow induced .

vibration. In.GE Services Information Letter No. 518 dated August 6, 1990, GE provided an improved sample probe design that is less susceptible to flow ,

induced vibration. A probe of this design was installed into the Unit-2 Reactor Recirculation piping system. This Exempt Change installed a  !

replacement probe in the Unit 1 Reactor Recirculation piping, with a design similar to that of the Unit 2 probe. The basic function of the Unit 1 probe was not changed.  ;

ECR 93-935A This Exempt Change Request added three sample taps to the Unit 1 Turbine Oil Reservoir, 1T001S. The Reservoir is located in the Turbine Building at elevation 735', between Columns 13 and 15, and between Rows U and S. The taps '

consist of 1/2" NPT piping, 1/2" ball valves, and 1/2" threaded caps. All piping, fitting and valve material are of 304 stainless steel to avoid contamination of Turbine Oil Samples. These sample taps help in obtaining oil samples in a safe and uniform manner while performing surveillance LOS-TO-Q1, Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir Quarterly Oil Samples.  !

ECR 93-938 Motor Operated Valve MOV 1HG001A is a normally closed containment '

isolation valve for the hydrogen recombiner system. The exempt change replaced the 2 foot-pound motor with a 5 foot-pound motor, operating at the .

same nominal speed, to improve valve operability. l ECR 93-939 Motor Operated Valve MOV lHG001B is a normally closed containment isolation valve for the hydrogen recombiner system. The exempt change replaced the 2 foot-pound motor with a 5 foot-pound motor, operating at the same nominal speed, to improve valve operability.

ECR 93-953 I Exemp't Change 93-953 repaired the 2B21-F010A check valve preventing the recurring local leak rate testing (LLRT) failures. These LLRT failures are attributed to the seat ring and disc alignment. Seat alignment is dependent. >

primarily on two conditions; disc bushing / hinge pin clearances and the .

relationship between the body bores retaining the hinge pins to the disc bushing bores. During previous valve repairs an additional counterweight to ,

the disc was installed to compensate for the imbalance created during field  ;

i machining. The replacement disc should not require the additional counterweight providing the disc's center of gravity is not altered upon installation. This will eliminate the secondary soft seat / hardware, disc bushing lock tabs and eccentric bushings providing satisfactory disc / seat ring alignment can be accomplished upon repair.

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ECR 93-981A, ECR 93-981B  !

1 Motor operated valves (MOV) 1E12-F040A and IE12-F040B are normally closed RHR rystem isolation valves. They may be opened to reject water from the RHR system to the Main Condenser and the Reactor Building Equipment Drain Tank.

Exempt changes EC-93-981A/B replaced the motor pinion and worm shaft  ;

pinion gears to obtain an overall Actuator Gear ratio of 100.0:1 (previously 47.85:1). The gear change will.have the effect of slowing the valves' full r stroke time in each direction from about 7.6 seconds to about 16 seconds.  !

This improves valve reliability by increasing the operator's motor gearing capacity. The increased motor gearing capacity increases the available torque at the operator's drive sleeve, thus providing increased thrust to the valve l stem.

ECR 93-994A The Exempt Change removed the filters from the Unit-2 VP 2VP01FA and '

2VP01FB (the main coolers), and 2VP15SA, SB, SC, SD, SE and SF (the area 'I coolers). These filters were removed in compliance with NRC Bulletin 93-02,  ;

Debris Plugging of Emergency Core cooling Suction Strainers. This bulletin i requires any fibrous air filters not designed to withstand a LOCA be removed from primary containment prior to power operation. The removal of the filters t will eliminate the possibility of filter fibers plugging the ECCS suction strainers. A revsion to UFSAR Section 9.4.9 and the associated Table 9.4-26 will be incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update to indicate that the filters are removed from Unit 2.

ECR 94-901  ;

Exempt Change 94-931 modified the bonnet sealing method for the 3/4" piston check valve 2B33-F017A. The previous valve was supplied with a seal ,

welded bonnet. Due to leakage past the seal weld from repeated installation and removal of this weld for periodic valve inspection, the sealing requirement wAS changed by replacing the valve with one of a screw on bonnet / graphitic seal design. The valves are functionally similar in regards ,

to hydraulic requirements. Valve 2B33-F017A is the outboard containment ,

isolation valve on line 2RR24AA-3/4 which supplies cooling and '

flushing / purging water to the RR pump seal assembly. Water supply for the seal injection flow is provided by the CRD Hydraulic System. This valve  ;

provides an isolation function and ensures against reverse flow from the RR pump seal system into the CRD system. Therefore, the valve is also an  !

isolation for the reactor coolant pressure boundary. .t 6

ECR 94-903A, ECR 94-903B ECR 94-903C, ECR 94-903D ,

Exempt Changes 94-903A,B,C, and D removed the interval timers from battery .)

chargers 1DC03E, IDC09E, 1DC17E, and 1DC19E. The equalize mode will be manually controlled by the equalize / float switch. A review of FSAR/UFSAR Sections 7.3.1.2.1 (high pressure core spray instrumentation and controls),

7.4.1 (reactor core isolation cooling system instrumentation & controls), >

8.3.2. (de power systems), 15.2.9 (failure of RHR shutdown cooling), 15.5 (increase in reactor coolant inventory), and 15.6 (decrease in reactor coolant  !

inventory) identified section 8.3.2.1.1 as being affected. Section 8.3.2.1.1  !

lists components associated with the de system and will be revised to reflect .

the removal of the interval timers.

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=~t - fcantinie=d1 ECR 94-902

-The Exempt Change removed the filters from the Unit-1 VP IVP01FA and IVP01FB (the main coolers), and IVP15SA, SB, SC, SD, SE and SF (the area coolers). These filters were removed in compliance with NRC Bulletin 93-02, Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers. This bulletin requires any fibrous air filters not designed to withstand a LOCA be removed from primary containment prior to power operation. The removal of the filters will eliminate the possibility of filter fibers plugging the ECCS suction strainers. A revision to UFSAR Section 9.4.9 and the associated Table 9.4-26 will be incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update to indicate that the filters are removed from Unit 1.

ECR 94-905 This exempt change added isolation and vent valves to the two main' headers of the drywell pneumatic (IN) system. The new valving will allows each header to be independently isolated and vented for ease of maintenance and testing.

The new valves were installed inside the drywell, near the IN system supply line primary containment penetration. The valving to isolate and vent line lIN36A-1" (supplying the MSIV accumulators) were installed on a riser near the drywell personnel access hatch. The valves will be easy to access and operate from the 740' elevation grating. The valving to isolate line lIN09C (supplying the SRV accumulntors) was installed near the drywell personnel access hatch about fifteen feet above the 740* elevation grating. A ladder or scaffold will be required to gain access to these valves. There is no location for these valves that provides better access for operation, without major piping rerouting.

ECR 94-907A The exempt change provides the tie-in connections to the reactor feedwater for the supply and return piping associated with the permanent Zinc Injection Skit. Injecting a soluble zine solution into the feedwater during normal plant operation can result in substantially reduced radiation buildup on primary piping and components.

ECR 94-908A, ECR 94-908B The purpose of these exempt changes is to ensure full closure of Motor Operated Valves 1E12-F068A and 1E12-F068B when closing against high flow. In the former configuration, a limit switch *open" (LS/0) contact was used for the TSC bypass. The LS/O contact opens as soon as the valve starts to close.

When the LS/O contact opens, the current path for the closing circuit is through the torque switch TSC contact. Therefore, if the TSC contact opens due to high flow, the valve is deenergized in a mid-stroke position. These exempt changes allow the TSC contact to be bypassed until the valve has cutoff flow just prior to hard seat contact. This was accomplished by disconnecting the LS/O b" 48 3 contact and reconnecting spare LS/IO contact 15-15c in its place. Thy a exempt thanges did not implement a functional design change in that the originally intended operation of the valves are reinforced. The design changes did not involve an unrcviewed safety question.

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ECR 94-909B The Exempt Change replaced a Barksdale Pressure Switch Model No. B1T-M12SS (2C71-N003C) with Static-O-Ring (SOR) Model No. 6N6-B45-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ, requiring splicing of the associated cable. The instrument tubing was reused.

This change was implemented to alleviate the excessive drift from the required setpoint experienced by the Barksdale Pressure Switch.

The basic function of the pressure switch 2C71-N003C is to sense turbine L first-stage pressure. Along with three other switchen, in a one-out-of-two i twice arrangement, it activates a turbine atop valve and control value trip bypass if the turbine'is operating below 3%% of rated power for the plant.

This bypass is provided to permit continual reacter cp6 ration at low power . ,

levels when the turbine valves are closed. L'naer nornal operating conditions, i the stop valve closure would cause a reactor trip. Removal of this bypass is a automatically accomplished as the reactor power and turbine first-stage j pressure becomes elevated to the 30% setpoint valve. The original design basis '

(i.e., logic and function) of the reactor protection system was not changed.

ECR 94-910A This exempt change installs a anti-hammer circuit in Motor Operated Valve 1E12-F052A.

Valve Hammer is caused by cycling of the torque switch 'TSC contact in the MOV closing circuit. 'Upon closing, the 'TSC' contact opens thereby deenergizing the valve. When the valve is deenergized, the actuator gearing relaxes sufficiently to allow the torque switch contact to close again. HThis cycle continues until the operator releases the control switch. This exempt change eliminated valve hammer by installing an auxiliary 'a' starter contact in series with the torque switch contact. When the valve is deenergized by the open torque switch contact, the auxiliary 'a' contact opens. The valve must be reopened until the limit switch intermediate open (LS/IO) contact resets before the closing coil can be reenergized. This exempt change did not i inplement a functional design change in that the originally intended operation j of the valve for Emergency Core Cooling or Shut Down Cooling is reinforced.

ECR 94-916B i This Exempt Change eliminated valve hammer by installing and auxiliary 'A' starter contact in series with the torque switch contact for Motor Operated Valve (MOV) lE12-F048A. When the valve is deenergized by the open torque switch contact, the auxiliary 'A' contact opens.. The valve must be reopened until the limit switch intermediate open (LS/IO) contact resets before tha closing coil can be reenergized. This change did not implement a functionOl design change in that the originally intended operation of the valve is reinforced.

ECR ~4-928 A revision to UFSAR Sections 6.2.1.2.2 and 6.2.1.2.3 incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update reflected the exempt change. The update revises the description of the Design Features of the Biological Shield Annulus.

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This exempt change clears Temporary System Change (TSC) 1-1307-92 for Motor Operated Valve 1E12-F017A, Drywell Spray Inboard Isolation Valve.

The operator motor for the subject valve was changed from a fifteen foot- -

pound unit to a twenty-five foot-pound unit per Temporary System Change 1-1307-92 in December 1992. The associated therral overload ~ relay was replaced with Klockner-Moeller model ZO-6.6/K-NA to support the new motor's electrical requirements. The larger motor is required *,o improve the motor gearing ,

capacity of the valve operator. The requirement to increase motor gearing  ;

capacity is the result of motor operator design reviews performed in response to US NRC Generic Letter 89-10. The exempt change is to make permanent the .

temporary system change.

ECR 94-945 This Exempt Change replaced the Reactor Recirculation (RR) System process sampling stop valve 1B33-F059 furnished by Anderson, Greenwood & Company with ,

a new valve furnished by Rockwell-Edward. The stop valve is installed in the Reactor Recirculation (RR) process sampling line 1RR13A-3/4" located inside

? drywell at approximate elevation 759'4". The valve is used for isolating the Sample Probe 1B33-D014 from the RR Loop "B" process header 1RR01AB-24". The ,

. valve was replaced as a result of excessive seat leakage. I ECR 94-946A l

Exempt Change 94-946A, replacement and settings change of K-M type feeder i circuit breaker for RPS MG set A in MCC 235X-2. i Circuit breaker type Klockner-Moeller N2MH6-160/ZM6-63/800 in MCC 235X-2, compartment A5 was replaced with circuit breaker type K]ockner-Moeller N2MH6-160/ZM6-100/1200, which has higher thermal and magnetic trip ranges. The circuit breaker was replaced because it was tripping during the MG set start. l The replacement circuit breaker allows its thermal and magnetic trips to be l set at a higher value and their new settings will prevent nuisance tripping of l the circuit breaker during MG set start. ,

I ECR 94-946B  :

l Exempt Change 94-946B, replacement and settings change of K-M type feeder circuit breaker for RPS MG set B in MCC 236X-2.

Circuit breaker type Klockner-Moeller N2MH6-160/ZM6-63/600 in MCC 236X-2, compartment B3 was replaced with circuit breaker type Klockner-Moeller N2MH6-160/ZM6-100/1200, which has higher thermal and magnetic trip ranges. The circuit breaker was replaced because it was tripping during the MG set start.

The replacement circuit breaker allows its thermal and magnetic trips to be I set at a higher value and their new settings will prevent nuisance tripping of the circuit breaker during MG set start.

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G. e- rv of r%mnaes to the Facility thich are Described in the safety Analysis manort - (continued)

ECR 96-946C Exempt Change 94-946C, replacement and settings change of K-M type feeder circuit breaker for RPS MG set A in MCC 135X-2.

The Circuit breaker, type Klockner-Moeller N2MH6-160/ZM6-63/800 in MCC 135X-2, compartment A5 was replaced with circuit breaker type, Klockner-Moeller N2MH6-160/ZM6-100/1200, which has higher thermal and magnetic trip ranges. The circuit breaker was replaced because it was tripping during the MG set start. The replacement circuit breaker allows its thermal and magnetic trips to be set at higher values to prevent nuisance tripping of the circuit breaker during MG set start.

ECR 94-946D Exempt Change 94-946D, replacement and settings change of K-M type feeder circuit breaker for RPS MG set A in MCC 136X-2.

Circuit breaker type Klockner-Moeller N2MH6-160/ZM6-63/800 in MCC 136X-2, compartment B3 was replaced with circuit breaker type Klockner-Moeller N2MH6-160/ZM6-100/1200, which has higher thermal and magnetic trip ranges. The circuit breaker was replaced because it was tripping during the MG set start.

The replacement circuit breaker allows its thermal and magnetic trips to be set at higher values to prevent nuisance tripping of the circuit breaker during MG set start.

ECR 94-952C The exempt change package added a hydrolazing port and resloped the Reactor Building sample sink drain line (1REL9A-1 1/2"). The hydrolazing port will facilitate decontamination efforts. The Station will have better capability of dislodging crud and contaminated particles adhering to the ,

sample sink drain line utilizing the hydrolazing port and maintaining exposure l ALARA. l The exempt change also corrected the reverse slope on the horizontal run of the sample sink drain piping running along Column J in the Unit 1 Reactor Building at Floor Elevation 710'. This line is routed from the sample sinks i drain pan and branches to the main condenser and the Reactor Building Equipment Drain (RE) System via a Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)

System interface. The slope of the drain line was corrected to achieve a negative slope such that drainage is towards the RE System. The drain line was sloped 1/8 inch per foot, minimum, to ensure no " pocketing" occurs resulting in crud settlement.

The RE System is essentially a gravity drain system which relies on a negative sloping of the piping to transfer drainage into the collection tank.

With portions of the RE piping having a positive slope (i.e., sloping away from collection tanks and/or sumps), pockets in the piping system are formed resulting in crud settlement and localized " hot spots". Correcting the slope of the piping in the specific area reduced background dose in this high traffic area.

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ECR 94-961  !

During routine Inservice Inspection of the Steam Separator during the L1R06 Refueling Outage a total of seven of 22 gussets which act to support the ,

middle shroud head bolt support ring were observed to have various degrees of cracking. The cause of the cracking is believed to be high cycle fatigue from 1 differential thermal expansion cycles which result from feedwater impinging on the Steam Separators middle shroud head bolt support ring,.and gussets. This Exempt Change installed a newly designed gusset plate on one side of the completely fractured gusset to reestablish structural restraint and provide structural margin. This change did not alter the original function of the .

gussets, support ring, or steam separator.

ECR 94-968H i The design change for Motor Operated Valve (MOV) 2HG003 replaced the original 2 foot-pound motor of MOV 2HG003 with a 5 foot-pound motor. The replacement motor operates at the same nominal speed as the original motor (1800 rpm). The motor was replaced to address concerns raised in NRC Generic Letter 89-10 and other related documents.

ECR 94-977A The exempt change replaced the Motor Operated Valve 1HG005A, Hydrogen Recombiner System Containment Isolation Valve's 2 foot-pound valve operator motor with a 5 foot-pound unit. The operator spring packs were replaced with Limitorquo model number 0101-091. The respective molded case circuit breakers and thermal overload relays were replaced and set to support the new motors' electrical requirements.

ECR 94-977B The exempt change for Motor Operated Valve 1HG006A replaced the valve's 2 foot-pound valve operator motor with a 5 foot-pound unit. The operator spring a

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packs were replaced with Limitorque model number 0101-091. The respective molded case circuit breakers and thermal overload relays were replaced and set to support the new motor's electrical requirements.

ECR 94-993 i

Brass-bodied drain line valves on station air intake line numbers OSA4CB and ISA24B were replaced with valves made of PVC plastic. The weight of the brass valves is believed to be the cause of cracks in the intake lines (also '

made of PVC plastic). The PVC valves are compatible with the intended service and are expected to place less stress on the piping.

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P01-1-90-006 Additional pressure gauges were added to.the "1B" Diesel generator air start system per P01-1-90-006 to monitor pressure downstream of the pressure regulator when the DG is in standby.

This change involved additional pre.ture gauges to the "1B" Diesel Generator Air Start System. The installation of the pressure gauge and valve. .

do not affect or impede the delivery of air to the DG starting air valve, and L does not introduce any new failure modes. l This addition does not affect the operating mode of the diesel as it only adds a normal operating mode for the positioning of the 3-way ball valve associated with the new pressure gauge. Ports one and three shall be open in the normal operating mode to monitor pressure to the air start motors.

P01-1-90-005 This Minor Plant Change prevents the IB DG Cooling Water Pump from-stopping when the DG is shutdown with the Control Switch in all positions except "stop" and " pull to lock".  ;

1 The change in the pump control circuit allows the pump to run following a i trip of the 1B Diesel Generator without having to place the pump handswitch in the " start" position.

P01-1-91-545 i

I NRC Generic Letter 89-10 requires that nuclear plant licensees evaluate the ability of certain motor operated valves to be repositioned when subjected to design basis conditions of flow and differential pressure. Minor change P01-1-91-545, Valve 1HG003 Motor Operator Replacement increases the thrust i that the actuator delivers to the valve stem by replacing.the 2 ft-lbf motor ]

with a 5 ft-lbf motor. The new motor operates at the same nominal speed as '

the previous motor (1800 RPM). The additional actuator thrust ensures the valve's reliability under design basis flow and differential pressure conditions.

P01-1-91-550 MOV 1E12-F094 provides a flow path which connects the "B" Fuel Pool Emergency Make-up Pump to the piping downstream of the "B" RHR Pump. This flow path provides a means of supplying lake water to the "B" RHR system. The flow path is normally isolated by means of the MOV 1E12-F093, MOV 1E12-F094, and a removable spool piece upstream of MOV 1E12-F094.

1 This minor change increases the available actuator thrust by changing +he' l overall actuator gear ratio from 43.8:1 to 100:1. This was accomplished by replacing the motor pinion gear and the worm shaft pinion gear. The additional actuator thrust ensures the valve's reliability under design basis flow and differential pressure conditions. i

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G. Summary of Channes to the Facility which are Described in the safety h=1vais {

=-t - feantinued) i P01-1-91-554 The design change for Motor Operated Valve (MOV) 1E12-F064A increased the thrust that.the actuator delivers to the valve stem by replacing the motor pinion gear and the worm shaft gear to increase the operator's overall gear ratio'from 52.2:1 to 82.0:1.

P01-1-91-555 i The design change for Motor Operated Valve'(MOV) 1E12-F049B replaced the 2 foot-pound motor of the valve operator with a 5 foot-pound motor. The new notor operates at a nominal speed of 1800 rpm, as did the original motor. The new motor delivers increased actuator thrust to the valve stem, addressing ,

concerns raised in NRC Generic Letter 89-10 and related documents.

P01-1-92-509 The design change for Motor Operated Valve (MOV) 1E12-F068B replaced the operator motor pinion / worm shaft pinion gear set for the valve. This increased thrust available to operate the valve, addressing concerns raised by the NRC Generic Letter 89-10 and related documents. The original 15 foot-pound 1800 rpm motor was replaced with a 25 foot-pound, 1800 rpm motor.

P01-1-92-510 The design change for Motor Operated Valve (MOV) 1E51-F013 replaced the motor operator on valve 1E51-F013, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)

System injection valve, to increase thrust available to operate the valve.

This was done to address concerns in NRC Generic Letter 89-10 and related documents. Revisions to UFSAR Tables 6.2-21 and 8.3-11 will be incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update to reflect this modification.

ECR 93-957F, ECR 93-957G, ECR 93-957H l ECR 93-957I, ECR 93-957J Motor Operated Valves 1E12-F042A/B/C, 1E21-F005, and 1E22-F004 had a 1/4" vent hole installed in the reactor-side disc of each of the subject valves.

The purpose of the vent hole is to eliminate the possibility of the valves becoming pressure bound while in the closed position. This work was performed .,

in response to various industry and regulatory notices.

Motor Operated Valves 1E12-F042A/B/C, 1E21-F005, and'1E22-F004'are emergency core cooling system injection valves. They are part of the residual heat removal (RHR) system, the low pressure core spray (LPCS) system, and the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system, respectively. When the ,

applicable ECCS is initiated,these valves are required to open to allow i injection of coolant to the reactor vessel. During normal operation, these valves must remain closed and seal tightly because they form part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and the primary containment boundary.

The Exempt Changes do not alter the basic functions of the valves or their respective systems, i

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ECR 93-957F, ECR 93-957G, ECR 93-957H ECR 93-957I, ECR 93-957J (continued) '

These valves are normally closed. They are exposed to reactor pressure on the downstream side and the applicable ECCS pressure on the upstream side l during normal plant operation. They are required to be leak-tight when  ;

closed, and are required to open upon receipt of an ECCS signal, with the l applicable permissive conditions satisfied.

The Exempt Changes prevent valve bonnet pressure locking via the installation of a vent hole on the reactor-side valve disc. With the vent E hole installed, these valves will seal effectively in one direction only, when subjected to high differential pressure (greater than about 200 psid). The valves will seal under high differential pressure conditions only if the vented side of the valve is exposed to the higher pressure. The higher pressure on the back side of the non-vented valve disc will force the disc into its seat and provide flow shut-off. If the higher pressure is applied to the face of the non-vented disc, the resulting force will tend to lift the disc off of the seat and allow fluid to leak past the solid disc and then through the vented disc. '

A revision to UFSAR Section 6.2 will be incorporated in the UFSAR Revision-11 update to reflect the exempt changes.

P01-1-92-529 The design change for Motor Operated valve (MOV) 1E12-F068A replaced the operator motor pinion / worm shaft pinion gear set for the valve. This increased thrust available to operate the valve, addressing concerns raised by the NRC Generic Letter 89-10 and related documents. The original 15 foot-  ;

pound, 1800 rpm motor was replaced with a 25 foot-pound, 1800 rpm motor.

P01-2-93-502 The 2B DG Governor Cover Assembly was replaced with an Energize-to- I shutdown solenoid Governor Cover Assembly.  ;

1 The design change revised the Energize-to-run logic of the DG to Deenergize-to-run logic. It also revised the control circuit so that the DG ,

can be shut down only from the Emergency Stop Pushbutton when a LOCA signal is ]

present and the DG can be shut down with manual control switch /pushbutton only i when a LOCA signal is not present. The entire Governor Cover Assembly including the solenoid was replaced. The design change was proposed to reduce the frequency of DG starting failures due to Governor solenoid malfunctions. ]

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Out-of-Services 1-0024-94 and 1-0025-94  !

and operability evaluation for IVR04YA. 1 The safety function of the damper is to close within 10 seconds, thus.

isolating a secondary containment penetration.

The required closure time for the secondary containment isolation dampers is less than ten seconds per UFSAR Section 9.4.2.2.G. The intent of the design as described in the UFSAR is that both of the dampers would close fully.

Since the IVR04YA damper closed fully in less than ten seconds, with the IVR04YB damper open the performance of the dampers is operable but degraded.

This degradation of the damper does not prevent it from providing its safety l function-because the design of these dampers assumes that one will fail to close. Since this damper only failed to fully close with the other damper  !

fully closed these dampers meet the requirements of a single active failure ,

because either damper will fully close if the other fails to close. I 1

There are no mitigating measures required to be taken because the degraded J condition of the damper does not affect its ability to maintain secondary containment integrity and the performance of the applicable surveillance will ensure that the damper fully closas.  ;

Out-of-Service 1-1441-94 ,

i This Out of Service addresses the removal of the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator Air Compressor.

The air dryers associated with each of the Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start Systems may be removed from service without affecting the operability of its associated engine as long as one of the two redundant compressors is available to pressurize the associated air receivers. The effects of removing <

one or both air dryers from service is minimal to the overall operability and designed function of the DG Air Start System as long as one of the redundant air compressors is available to pressurize the air start receivers. The dryers associated with the DG Air Start systems are used to remove moisture from the compressed air before it enters the air start receivers. This process is desirable to diminish corrosion within the air receivers. The air start receivers associated with all five diesel generators are blown down on a daily basis to ensure no moisture precipitate is allowed to form in the receivers.

i The ef fects of removing one of the redundant air start conpressors from the starting air system is minimal, as long as one of the compressors is available to ensure pressure will remain above the Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.a.7 requirement of 200 psig.

Out-of-Service 2-0109-94 This Out-of-Service 2-0109-94 removed fuse F9C to disable the 30% bypass of the main turbine stop and control valve fast closure EOC-RPT. If this OOS is implemented at a power above 30%, the bypass is and should be disabled by  !

design. However, this OOS will allow an EOC-RPT' actuation at reactor power levels below 30%, with the fuse pulled. This is a more conservative  ;

condition. ,

4

4__

G. Ph===== to the Facility Mhich are Described in the Bafety analysis a=W - f centinggdl, Out-of-Service 2-0186-94 This OOS defeated the interlock between the air lock doors at the Access to the P? fuel Floor. This was desired due to the potential of trapping personnel on the Refuel Floor during Fuel Handling accidents. Some scenarios

. have been experienced where the doors became locked preventing egress from the floor area. Therefore, for safety reasons, during fuel handling activities, these interlocks were defeated. This was accomplished by opening the 120 volt breakers for door 452 at MCC 236X-1, compartment E1, circuit 14, and door 453 at MCC 234X-1, compartment El, circuit 11. Defeat of this interlock allowed both doors to be open simultaneously.

Replacement of existing Thermo-Lag material.

This change involves the removal of the existing Thermo-Lag 330-1 material presently installed on the Division II cable trays in the Diesel Generator Corridors and the re-installation of the new Darmatt KM1 Fire Barrier System.

The Thermo-Lag's material qualification was determined to be indeterminate because it failed various fire endurance tests conducted by and for several utilities and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC's concerns over this materials' performance have been covered by Bulletin 92-01, supplemental Information Notices (IN) 91-47, 91-79, 92-46, 92-55, 92-82 and Generic Letter (GL) 92-08. This unqualified status as a fire barrier material lead the NRC to request additional information and actions from those stations having this material installed pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f). LaSalle's response to this concern addressed that the Darmatt KM1 Fire Barrier System is LaSalle's replacement material. This new material successfully passed the 1 (one) Hour Fire Barrier requirements stated within Generic Letter 86-10, Supplement No. 1 and meets the 10CFR50.48 requirements for achieving the necessary separation between redundant electrical systems.

In addition, this Safety Evaluation addresses the removal of one silicone elastomer wall penetration seal in the Unit 2 Diesel Generator Corridor and its subsequent replacement with grout, as part of the above Exempt Change.

This seal replacement is necessary to assure that the field conditions for which the Darmatt KM1 material must cover remains the same as the "as tested" qualified configurations. The re-grouting of the seal will not require any drawing change, since it will conform to the as designed configuration presently shown.

Work Request L17361 1m opening was created in the secondary containment when the packing was removed to allow the Mechanical Maintenance Department to repack a valve. The line was unisolatable from the RCIC Steam Supply Drain Trap Bypass Valve, 1E51-F054, to its penetration of the Main condenser. The opening created by the packing removal was approximately 0.7 square inches.

4 G. Changgs to the Facility Which are Described in the safety Analysis Renort - (continued)

Unit 1 mechanical gagging of the high pressure (HP) heaters shellside relief valve 1DV001A and 1DV001B.

The Unit 1 HP heaters were found with their shellside relief valves gagged closed. With mechanical gags installed on 1DV001A and IDV001B, there would be no overpressurization protection for the Unit 1 HP heater shells.

Overpressurization of the heater shells could occur due to two possible sources, extraction steam and feedwater pressure caused by a tube failure.

Overpressurization caused by extraction steam is not likely because of the throttling pressure drop at the turbine stop valves, turbine control valves, and turbine stages 1 through 3. Overpressurization caused by a tube failure is not possible because system design logic would not allow this to happen. A tube rupture would result in heater shellside level increase to a level at which the high high trip would occur. Upon a high high level, the extraction steam valve isolates steam flow, the cascading drains isolate flow and more importantly, the emergency drain valve opens to the condenser.

In the unlikely and worst case scenario, a catastrophic failure of both HP heaters, final feedwater temperature would drop approximately 67 degrees F.

This scenario includes loss of the associated drains. The 67 degree drop in final feedwater temperature is below the amount that the fuel cycle was analyzed to accept. The acceptable amount is 100 degrees F. The 67 degree drop in final feedwater temperature was determined by the PEPSE computer model.

Temporary Deletion of Emergency Air Filter OVC01SB Inlet Temperature Indication in Control Room due to Temporary Removal of Control Room Emergency Make-up Air Filter B Inlet Temperature Transmitter OTT-VC145.

This change temporily removed temperature transmitter OTT-VC145 from service. This transmitter monitors the temperature at the inlet to Emergency Make-up Air Filter OVC01SB and sends a signal to control room temperature indicator OTI-VC145. The transmitter and indicator do not perform any control or alarm function.

Surveillance procedure LOS-VC-101 requires the operators to record the inlet train temperature as indicated on instrument OTI-VC045 during the operability test on the B control room emergency make-up unit. Thus, this temperature was required to be obtained from other instruments while this transmitter was out of service.

Operability Determination for 2E51-F063 RCIC Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Valve.

Calculations for the 2E51-F063 indicated that the torque switch setting was too low to meet the minimum required thrust when re-evaluated using the higher valve factor suggested by EPRI's testing. A subsequent Engineering evaluation recommended that the valve remain operable.

a O.. N =--_ to na Facility which are Described in the safety an=1valg

== M - f cant i nugg,},

Removing the Emergency Diesel Generator Air Compressor Refrigerated Air Dryers &om service.

The air dryers associated with each of the Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start Systems may be removed from service without affec. ting the operability of its associated engine as long as one of the two redundant compressors is

/

l available to pressurize the associated air receivers. The effects of removing one or both air dryers from service is minimal to the overell operability and designed function of the DG Air Start System as long as one of the redundant l air compressors is available to pressurize the air start reedvers. The dryers associated with the DG Air Start systems are used to reaove moisture

from the compressed air before it enters the air start receiver 2. This process is desirable to diminish corrosion within the air receivecc. The air start receivers associated with all five diesel generators are blown down on a daily basis to ensure no moisture precipitate is allowed to form in the receivers. ]

i The effects of removing one of the redundant air start compressors from l.

l the starting air system is minimal, as long as one of the compressors is

! available to ensure pressure will remain above the Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.a.7 requirement of 200 psig.

Potential of Loss of Function from Water Hammer with concurrent LOCA/ LOOP while Pool Cooling with RHR A/B or LPCS.

An evaluation of RHR A/B and LPCS was conducted to address the impact of water hammer with the system running suppression pool to suppression pool at the time of simultaneous LOCA and LOOP.

Water hammer from pipe draining which could occur if A or B loop RHR or LPCS is running suppression pool to suppression pool for cooling or mixing purposes at the same time of Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and Loss of  :

Offsite Power (LOOP) occurs. RHR and LPCS piping has been analyzed under the postulated water hammer event and has been determined to maintain structural j integrity to piping and to primary containment piping penetrations.

The A and B RHR systems are used during a safe shutdown. No auto start signal is required under those postulated conditions. RHR C and HPCS Systems are run in suppression pool to suppression pool mode only for testing purposes. Low frequency of operation of these systems reduces the probability of occurrence of water hammer of these systems. Therefore the original basis of the FSAR for these systems is not changed in regard to the potential of water hammer. A revision to UFSAR section 5.4.7.2.4 will be incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update to reflect the evaluation.

L G. "k=aaes to *h= Facility which are Descr4had in the safety ma=1vais

== - t - (continued)

LaSalle County Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Second 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program Rev. O.

LaSalle Station is required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g) to update the Inservice Testing Program Plan every 10 years. The IST Program shall be updated to the latest version of ASME Section XI (within 12 months of scheduled institution date) approved by the NRC. The 2nd 10-year IST Program meets the requirements of the 1989 Edition of ASME Section XI, Subsection IWA, IWV, and IWP. This version of Section XI requires the adherence to ANSI /ASME OM Parts 1, 6, and 10 through OMa-1988.

The new IST Program is intended to determine operability and monitor degradation of systems and components important to safety (this is not a change from the previous program). This testing is developed to verify design function of equipment is met. The new code or program does not involve changing system design or function to perform testing. The intent is to have the system operate as a designed to allow for measurement of parameters which would indicate equipment is unable /able to meet design function during accident conditions. Revisions to UFSAR Sections 3.9 and 5.2 are to be incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update to reflect this program.

LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 Second 10-year Interval Inservice Inspection Program - Rev. O.

LaSalle Station is required by 10CFR50.55a(g) to update the Inservice Inspection Program Plan every 10 years. The ISI Program shall be updated to the latest version of ASME Section XI (within 12 months of scheduled institution date) approved by the NRC. This 2nd 10-year ISI Program meets the requirements of 1989 Edition, No Addenda of the ASME Section XI Code.

Technical Specification 4.0.5 invokes the ASME Section XI Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code to perform inservice inspection and inservice testing of Code Corponents. However, the Technical Specification does not specifically state which year and addenda of the code is required to be followed. This update of the ISI Program to a new Edition of the ASME Code maintains compliance with the Technical Specifications. The new code has been approved by the NRC. Revisions to Sections 3.9 and 5.2 of the UFSAR will be incorporaced in the UFSAR Revision 11 update to reflect the version of the ASME Section XI Code to be used during 2nd ISI Interval.

e G. Chances to the Facility Which are Described in the Safety Analysis Report - (continued)

Hydrogen Recombiner Operability On Tuesday January 25, 1994, a walkdown of the Hydrogen Recombiner System Check Valves was being performed to gather data for placing the valves in LAP-300-30, check Valve Preventive Maintenance Program. During the walkdown, the physical orientation of three of the check valves ( 1HG016, 2HG007 and 2HG016) were discovered to be 90o off center. Visually this could be determined by noting the position of where the hinge pin for the Check valve protruded through the valve body. If the valves were mounted correctly, the hinge pin would be visible at the 12 o' clock and the 6 o' clock positions. With these three valves, the hinge pins were noted to be at the 3 o' clock and the 9 o' clock Position.

These particular check valves are designed with two flaps hinged in the middle of the valve body. Under normal condition, flow through the valve will cause the flaps to move toward the middle and allow flow. Without flow, spring force will move the flap back against the valve body.

With the valves mounted in the horizontal portion, the flaps are positioned horizontally instead of vertically. With this configuration the flap on the top falls back and rests in the middle of the valve body, thus allowing unrestricted flow in both directions. The flap at the bottom will function as before, however any flow past the bottom flap must overcome the weight of the flap.

The check valves are designed to allow flow to the respective Hydrogen Recombiners from the drywell and also provides a non safety function to prevent cross flow between Unit 1 and Unit 2 Drywells. The check valve bodies also serve as a pressure boundary for the Primary Containment. The check valves do not perform a Primary Containment Isolation Valve function.

The orientation of the check valves has no impact on the ability of the Hydrogen Recombiner to draw a suction on the Drywell. With the top flap always open, a flow path always exists to the Drywell when the respective suction valves are open. The ability of the subject check valves to perform a check valve function is impaired.

A review of the applicable procedures was performed to ensure that the possibility of crosstying the Drywell did not exist.

The review verified that when suction from one Unit's Drywell is taken, the suction valves from the other Unit's Drywell for that Hydrogen Recombiner are always verified to be closed. This effectively serves the function of the Check Valves.

A review of applicable surveillances concluded that in all cases, surveillances had been completed satisfactorily and proper flow through the system had been verified.

The Operability evaluation concluded that the orientation of Check Valves lHG016, 2HG007 and 2HG016 had no affect on the operability of the Hydrogen Recombiner system.

t

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G. Ph====_= to *ha Facility which are Describ=d in the safety ma=1vais mona t - (cant (nn=A) 1E21-F005, Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) injection valve operability ,

During a review of availabic Motor Operated Valve (MOV) data, it was concluded that the potential existed to place the 1E21-F005, Low Pressure Core i Spray (LPCS) injection valve's actuator motor in a stall condition. If the motor is stalled for more than 5 to 10 seconds, the motor may be damaged  ;

preventing further operation of the valve. Normally, the thermal overloads  ;

would protect the motor, however, these are bypassed when an injection signal- ,

is present.

l The postulated sequence of events leading to this condition is as follows: >

1) LPCS auto initiates and the injection valve opens to flood the reactor vessel.

2) The injection valve is throttled in the closed direction to control reactor vessel water level. l

3) This throttling continues until the injection valve is at or near hard seat contact. At this point, the valve has no ' lost motion' and insufficient valve motion in the closed direction in which the motor can ,

normally come up to full speed (i.e. the motor is attempting to start fully loaded).

4) If a closed signal is given to the valve in this condition with the electrical bus at degraded voltage, the motor may stall before overcoming  :

the valve actuator's spring pack force sufficiently to trip the torque ,

switch. If held for more than 5 to 10 seconds the motor may be damaged, >

preventing re-opening of the valve.

To prevent this from occurring, a caution card was hung on the valve's +

control switch directing the operators to release the switch immediately upon ,

receiving full closed indication when closing the valve.  !

t This condition does not affect opening the valve from any position, or closing the valve from full to mid position.

Operability Determination of the Unit 2 RCIC Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Valve, 2E51-F063 The current calculations for the 2E51-F063, Unit 2 RCIC Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Valve, are based on the original equipment manufacturers supplied test data for this specific valve model and size. EPRI test results revealed that, in saturated steam blowdown flow conditions, a similar valve,  :

an Anchor Darling 6 inch parallel disc gate valve, exhibited a higher valve factor than was predicted from standard industry calculations using typical  ;

friction factors. Valve factor is directly proportional to the apparent  ;

friction coefficient. This higher valve factor was exhibited only when ,

closing against blowdown velocity saturated steam flow and only during the valves closing stroke between flow isolation and hard seat contact. The EPRI date further indicates that at the point of flow isolation in a gate valve .

closing stroke, the disc should fully cover the seat, and the flow has [

essentially stopped (although it may not be leak tight).

s

G. "h===^= to th= Facility Which are Meecribed in the Safety analysis

=W - (continued)

Operability Determination of the Unit 2 RCIC Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Valve, 2E51-F063 - (continued)

The 2E51-F063 valve is an Anchor Darling 10 inch parallel disc gate valve used to isolate saturated steam flow in the event of a Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) line break. The calculations for the 2E51-F063 indicate that the torque switch setting is too low to meet the minimum required thrust when

- re-evaluated using the higher valve factor suggested by EPRI's testing.

In-the RCIC pipe break event, the 2E51-F063 valve, with its current torque switch setting, will close, as a minimum, to the point of-flow isolation. At this point in a gate valvo closing stroke, the hydrodynamic forces have ceased, the disc should be fully on the seat, and the valve has essentially stopped the flow. Although it may not be leak tight,-the valve has successfully performed its isolation function by cutting off flow, thus terminating the loss of coolant event. The passive failure of the RCIC piping is considered as an initiating event and does not have to be considered coincident to the Loss of Coolant Design Basis Accident. Since this break occurs outside the primary containment and no core damage results from the event, barrier performance (leakage integrity) within the primary containment envelope is not applicable. .The consequences of this event are bounded by the Main Steam Line rupture outside of primary containment event and are not ,

increased by this change.

f Failure of damper IVR05YB to fully close i On October 27 1993, damper IVR05YB failed to fully close. The cause of the failure was that the East side blade of the damper did not close because its (pneumatic cylinder) actuator was obstructed from moving full stroke. The cause of the actuator sticking appears to have occurred during assembly by the manufacturer. An anti-oxidant was used instead of lubricant on the cylinders piston and seals. The menufacturer has indicated that the use of this anti-oxidant could have caused the sticking of the actuator. l The damper actuators are replaced every refuel outage, and have historically shown the ability to go the full cycle without difficulties.

This actuator failure occurred after approximately 12 months of service.

Several. actuators were inspected during a visit by a manufacturer's >

representative and all actuators with "JJ" as the first two characters of the ,

serial number appeared to have this anti-oxidant in them. Through a '

combination of inspections, stores inventory checks, and work history reviews it seemed likely that all the actuators installed on the VR dampers on both units were involved. This amounted to 8 dampers, with 2 actuators per damper.

During the Unit 1 forced maintenance outage which started February 18, 1994, all of the damper actuators were replaced with new stock of actuators that were properly assembled with lubricant.

The failure of a damper to close due to a sticking actuator would not affect the integrity of secondary containment as long as the other damper in series with it closed. If one of the damper actuators stuck concurrent with a single active failure of the.other damper, the result would be the loss of secondary containment integrity. Secondary containment integrity is required  !

to ensure that 10 CFR 100 limits as well as the GDC 19 limits are not exceeded.

[

c a

9 G. chanaes to the Facility Which are Described in the Safety Analysis annort - (continued)

Failure of damper IVR05YB to fully close - (continued)

The dampers and associated actuators were operable.

It was assumed that all the actuators on Unit 2 have anti-oxidant in them instead of grease. Over time the anti-oxidant appears to dry out and the actuator becomes more prone to failure. Prior to installation the actuators are stored with the ports sealed so the process of drying out would not begin until after installation. The drying out of the anti-oxidant appears to be dependent on the length of time in service and the temperature of the air stream in which they operate.

The actuators in the Unit 2 dampers were installed in October 1993. Based on the previous Unit 1 damper actuator history of satisfactory operation for up to 12 months, the Unit 2 damper actuators were expected to have successful operation during the 6 month period from installation up to the end of April 1994. Because the actuators dry out more quickly on exhaust, the exhaust damper actuators were replaced first followed by the supply actuators.

Control Rod Drive Slow Start of Motion

- ASCO SSPV Diaphragm Degradation Through previous discussions with the Washington Public Power System (WPPS) Control Rod Drive (CRD) System Engineer, the LaSalle CRD System Engineer was informed of recent problems experienced at WPPS with degradation of the CRD Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve (SSPV) diaphragms.

The WPPS problem condition was initially detected by slowed CRD scram times of selected CRDs. Specifically, WPPS observed degradation of the ' Start of Motion' times as shown on CRD scram time traces (Position 48 to 45).

The safety function potentially affected was the ability of the SSPVs to provide a timely pneumatic response to the SCRAM Reactor Protection System (RPS) electrical signal (de-energize). Technical Specifications require that the Control Rod Drive System provide scram rod insertion, initial motion plus the remainder of travel, within specified time limitations.

The concern postulates degradation of the CRD SSPV diaphragm elastomer material, causing a slowed, or sluggish, pilot solenoid valve response. A slowed SSPV response will cause a subsequent slow response of the corresponding scram inlet / outlet valve - thus retarding Control Rod start-of-motion. The remainder of Control Rod insertion sequence remains unaffected.

The operability evaluation concluded that the scram time performance for all potentially affected CRDs has been verified to be within required limits, with no trending towards adverse performance.

(

d e, channes to *ka Facility which are Described in the safety 1==1vais e.% . feantin==di H

~

Division 3 Battery Capacity 1(2)DC18E A potential discrepancy in UFSAR load tables for the Division 3 battery concerning the HPCS diesel generator (DG) de soakback (Turbocharger) pump and the fuel priming pump motors was previously identified. The Division 3 battery load pJofile appeared to account for only one of the motors.

Battery capacity and voltage was reviewed and found to be acceptable.

This review included the additional load. -Based upon surveillance tests and capacity tests performed, it was determined that there is sufficient battery capacity to account for the additional load (DG soakback oil pump motor).

The safety evaluation concluded that the HPCS DG de soakback oil pump motor and the fuel priming pung motor were considered functional.

Temporary Shielding Safety Evaluation Temporary radiation shielding was installed in the vicinity of the control Rod Drive (CRD) Ultrasonic Cleaner, CRD pump suction lines, the 1PLl4J sample panel drain line, and the RH Service Water Process Radiation Monitors. This shielding was not seismically qualified for permanent installation, but the shielding is a requirement until a permanent design can be mada and installed.

Operability Evaluation for Results of Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve (SSLN)

Inspection for Diaphragm Degradation The operability evaluation determined that a batch of Unit 2 SSPV diaphragms were considered operable. This was based upon the verification of the scram perfornance of potentially af fected rods, and the SSPV diaphragms at LaSalle have exhibited performance consistent with current industry performance.

Potential for Debris in Unit 2 Pressure Suppression Pool (PSP) and Impact on Unit 2 Operations Based on Unit 1 debris recovery from the PSP, the potential for debris plugging of Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) suction strainers was evaluated against design margins.

Operability Evaluation for Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Limit Switch Failure to Resee The Operability Evaluation concluded that the satisfactory operation of the MSIV limit switches was ensured by functional testing of the MSIVs.

Volume of Water on Drywell Floor During LIMO 5 During the 5th Maintenance outage of Unit 1 (LlM05), a. leak of water / hydraulic fluid was found in the drywell floor drain sump. An inventory of radwaste found the value to be 20 partially filled drums. All fluids were removed from the drywell prior to start-up from LIMOS. The leak was attributed to post-maintenance testing of the reactor recirculation T. ump seal.

p i

..'4 g.- ek==--- to th= racility ashich are n==cr4hmA in the Safety ha1yala H =~t - feaut4===di Reverse Leak Rate Test of Valve 1E12-F009 Shutdown Cooling Inboard Containment Isolation Valve ~1E12-F009 was local leak rate tested in the reverse direction. This is not the routine testing t'

method. The outboard side of the flex wedge disc was challenged rather taan r.

the inboard side of the flex wedge disc.

Limit Switch Wiring Changes for Motor

! operated Dampers IVQO37 and IVQO38 The 120 Volt AC control circuits of dampers IVQO37 and IVQO38 were modified by adding a limit switch. intermediate open (IO)' contact to the closing circuits. This allows closing on limit rather than on torque, to prevent unnecessary tripping of the thermal overload relays during the damper closure stroke.

Temporary Jystem Change 1-0029-84 The IVXO2Y damper was wired in the closed position and damper IVXO3Y was wired in the open position. This bypassed x tomatic temperature control of the dampers. The Operating Department wa; Nne to control the position of the i

recirculation damper and the supply damper as needed, per the Shift Engineer.

Temporary System Change 1-0039-94 Temporary System change 1-0039-94, Defeat of level detector switches 1LDS-SWO10 and ILDS-SWO18, installation of switch jumpers to bypass 1LDS-SW-010 and ILDS-SWO18.

This Temporary System Change installed switch jumpers at Lake Screen House traveling nereen control panel 1PL20J, which bypassed the level detector switches for Unit 1 traveling screens 1A-1B and IE-1F. This was required due to icing conditions in the lake which were inducing faulty level indications ce the traveling screens.

Installation of the jumpers bypassed interlocks between the circulating water pump (1A and IC) and the level differential detectors. This prevented the circulating water pumps from tripping when the level differential reached or exceeded 12" water column. Level differential was monitored every 15 minutes while the Temporary System Change was installed. The TSC was to be manually bypassed if level differential exceeded 12".

Temporary System change 1-0195-94 This Temporary System Change allowed for transfer of water from chemical waste collector tank IWZO1T to U-2 chemical waste process tank (2WZO2T) . It involved installing a temporary hose from the suction of IWZO1P chemical waste collector pump to suction of 2WZO2P chemical waste process pump. When

. transferring water from IWZO1T to 2WZO2T, the low level pump trip was defeated.

G. Fhannes to the Fa.gility Which are Described in the safety in=1vsis manort - (continuagl Temporary System Change 1-0204-94 The TSC removed snubber RR00-1008S from the 1A Reactor Recirculation (RR) pump suction piping. The snubber was found in the failed condition with its associated support steel damaged after shutdown for the Unit 1 forced outage 24 (LIF24). The snubber had to be removed in order to test it.

An operability determination concluded that shutdown cooling and the reactor pressure vessel remained operable in the cold shutdown condition without the snubber.

Temporary System Change 1-0262-94 This Temporary System Change installed switched jumpers at panel 1FPO4JA to allow operations Department to take detection zones 1-16, 1-16P, 1-30, 1-31, 1-32 and 1-33 out of service (0.0.S) during welding, cutting and grinding operations in the subject detection zones. Welding, cutting or grinding in the vacinity of an inservice detector could result in alarms at the fire protection control panels.

Temporary System Change 1-0504-94 This Temporary System Change installed a support bracket on Reactor Building Ventilation (VR) isolation damper IVR05YA in order to reduce damper sag by lifting each damper half (valve plata). This reduced blade-to-body friction, thereby decreasing the resistance encountered by the damper return (closing) springs. The net effect was better damper closing. An engineering evaluation on the seismic effects determined that the damper would remain seismically qualified with the bracket installed.

Temporary Syste.n Change 1-0933-94 The 24 point CAM panel IPL15J was changed to sample only 23 points teeporarily until sample point "10' was repaired. The CAM monitors the air in the drywell to dotect any radioactivity which could indicate a possible leak from the reactor pressure vessel or any component within the drywell.

The CAM did not sample point "10" (near valve 1B33-F067B) and was not able to detect an increase in radioactivity in the area of the sample point, while the TSC was installed.

Temporary System Change 1-1021-94 The TSC installed a switched jumper in series with the 'B' RR FCV actuator seal leakof f high flow alarm to allow the alanm to be bypassed. With the switch in ALARM (closed), the actuator trouble alarm remained up blocking the other inputs. This change defeated the inputs and allowed other inputs to bring up the alarm.

Temporary System Change 1-1133-94 tN Temporary System Change installed a temporary sealing device on the upstream flange of the IB flow straightener section of the IB Feedwater line flow venturi (IC34-N001B). The device consisted of a mechanical clamp filled with a sealant.

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i Temporary System Change 2-0123-94 Installation of this Temporary System Change installed switch jumpers at Lake Screen House traveling screen control panel 2PL20J, which bypassed the level detector switches for Unit 2 traveling screens 2C-2D and 2E-2F. This was required due to icing conditions in the lake which were inducing faulty.

level indications at the traveling screens.

• Installation c! the jumpers bypassed interlocks between the circulating water pump (2B and 2C) and the level differential detectors. This prevented the circulating water pumps from tripping when the level differential reached [

or exceeded 12" water column. Level differential was monitored every 15  !

minutes while the Temporary System Change was installed. The TSC was to be  ;

manually bypassed if level differential exceeded 12".

t Temporary System Change 2-0198-94  !

The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) condenser condensate pump l discharge valve 2E51-F049 was throttled and locked in place in order to allow the pump to draw less current. The pump performed work with a reduction in current drawn. This brought the measured current down to the acceptable range recommended by the pump vendor. The operability evaluation concluded that the condensate pump would deliver adequate flow to satisfy the demand of the RCIC ,

system inputs into the condenser.

Temporary System Change 2-0223-94 A blanket filter element was installed to create an isolation to back up [

the discharge check valve with the EHC system under pressure to allow repairs to the 2A EHC pump train. The 2B pump controlled the system pressure during this evolution.

Temporary System Change 2-0240-94 The Temporary System Change defeated control room indication of the 2B Reactor Recirculation pump #2 seal cavity temperature. This thermocouple was degraded resulting in sporadic alarms.

Temporary System Change 2-0252-94 This Temporary System Change lif ted a lead and jumpered around device 2ZS- ,

- 2VR002AX. This bypassed a start permissive of the ventilation for open position of 2VR05YB isolation damper to permit restart of the Reactor Building Ventilation.

UFSAR Chapter 5 The revision to UFSAR Section 5.4.7.2.2.2 will be incorporated in the  !

UFSAR Revision 11 update to reflect the deletion of the prewarming requirement to Pre-Warm RHR if Delta-T is Less Than 250 Dog F".

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G. ph=---- to thm Faellity which are n==crihmA in the Safety n==1vais  !

= ~* t - (cantinu=d1 .

UFSAR Chapter 7 I The revision to UFSAR Section 7.7.4 incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 i update to reflect the Replacement of the Feedwater Turbine Speed Control i Hydraulics per Modification M01-1-89-013A.  ;

UFSAR Chapter 8  ;

The safety functions of the RPS loads actuate on loss of powwr, Documentation was provided that demonstrated RPS loads can tolerate out of specificatien voltage or frequency for up to 4.0 seconds. UFSAR Section 8.3 l war revised to reflect the trip delay time band of 0.1 to 4.0 seconds. This revision was included in the recent Revision 10 update of the UFSAR. ,

UFSAR Chapter 9 l UFSAR Section 9.5.4.4 was revised to reflect Technical Specification Amendments No. 97 (Unit 1) and No. 81 (Unit 2). The amendments allow fuel oil requirements for the diesel generators to be in accordance with ASTM-975-88  :

(or latest revision), ASTM-D2276-89 (or latest revision), and the manufacturer's recommendations. This revision was included in the recent .

Revision 10 update of the UFSAR. l The change to UFSAR Section 9.2.1.2 (Water Systems Description) involved rephrasing the application of chemical biocide to the cooling water at the LaSalle County Station. The reference to sodium bromide in section 9.2.1.2  !

should be consistent with the reference to sodium bromide in section 9.2.2.2. ,

Section 9.2.1.2 is changed to state, "The biocide consists of a mixture of a r sodium hypochlorite solution, or a sodium hypochlorite/ sodium bromide l I

mixture."

Revision to description of UFSAR Section 9.5.2.2.5, Intraplant Radio  !

System, and LAP-100-37 to include a description of the ' talk around" mode. i This revision will be included in the UFSAR Revision 11 update. j i

UFSAR Chapter 11 The revision to UFSAR Section 11.4.2.2 will be incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update to reflect the Abandonment of the Manual Actuator for OWX116A, CY Condensate to OA Decant Line.

i The IRSP Meets the originally-specified design criteria on external l radiation exposure levels and that public exposure resulting from normal operation of the IRSF is at acceptably low levels. Radiological calculations were performed to assess the public exposure consequences of accidents including fire, tornado, container drop, and container contact with shield  !

walls. The consequences were well below 10 percent of 10 CFR 100 limits, i UFSAR Section 11.4 and Table 11.4-1 (sheet 2 of 2) will be revised to reflect. l use of the Interim Radwaste Storage Facility (IRSF), and will be included in the UFSAR Revision 11 update. i i

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===a-t - (cont 4=nad) l l

UFSAR Chapter 13 UFSAR Chapter 13.1 was revised to reflect the station and corporate structure as a result of recent reorganizations. Chapter 13.2 reflects a few minor changes in the administration of training programs. These changes were included in the recent Revision update of the UFSAR.

UFSAR Chapter 3 UFSAR Appendix B i

Revision to UFSAR Sections 3.8.1.7.3.1, 3.8.7.3.1.3, 3.8.1.7.3.1.4, and Appendix B are to be incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update to reflect the approval of Technical Specification Amendment Nos. 100 (Unit 1) and 84 1 (Unit 2), Deletion of Primary Containment Structural Integrity (2endon Testing) From Technical Specifications.

UFSAR Chapter 1, 4, 7, 15 and Table 15.4-1 UFSAR Update due to Lowering of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) Low Power Setpoint (LPSP) and Low Power Alarm Point (LPAP). Setpoint Change Roquest 91-009 lowered the Unit 1 RWM LPSP from 20% to 10% power and the LPAP from 30% to 25% power by replacing relays K2 and K1, respectively, on, alarm card FS-1C34-K608. Setpoint Change Request 91-008 lowered the Unit 2 RWM LPSP from 20% to 10% power and the LPAP from 30% to 25% power by replacing relays K2 and K1, respectively, on alarm card FS-2C34-K608. j UFSAR Sections 1.2, 4. 0, 4. 3, 7. 0, 7.7, 15.4, and Table 15.4-1 were j revised to reflect the Setpoint Change Requests, and included in the recent ]

UFSAR Revis4.on 10 update.

l 1

I UFSAR Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 10 UFSAR Sections 5.4, 6.2, and 10.4 were revised in the Revision 10 update to reflect piping modifications M01-1-86-072, M01-2-86-049, M01-1-87-095, and M01-2-87-082 (HPCS and RCIC buried piping).

UFSAR Chapter 6, Chapter 15 LOA-AP-08 Revision 10 incorporated requirements related to commitments made and analyses performed for the Station Blackout rule. The scope of the procedure addresses overall plant response.

UFSAR Section 6.3.2.2.6, ECCS Pumps NPSH, was revised to reflect the results of calculations performed in response to Station Blackout concerns.

Additionally, UFSAR Section 15.9, " Loss of All Alternating Current Power (Station Blackout)" was created and incorporated in the recent update, UFSAR Revision 10.

UFSAR Chapter 3, Chapter 9 Revisions to UFSAR Sections 3.1.2.6.2.1, 9.1.1.2, and 9.1.1.3, are to be l incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update to reflect allowing the new fuel i storage vault to be used for storage of other refuel equipment. l 1

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UFSAR Chapter 4, Chapter 6 and Chapter 15 Revision 10 of the UFSAR included changes to Chapters 4, 6, and 15 that eliminated cycle specific items from the UFSAR. The cycle specific items were ,

relocated to the station Administrative Technical Requirements (AThs). The updating of ATRs for cycle-specific items is less of an administrative burden on the station staff.

UFSAR Chapter 3 and UFSAR Appendix B Unit 1 amendment No. 100 And unit 2 amendment No. 84, Qualifying LaSalle unit 1 and 2 as twin unit.and applying Regulatory Guide 1.35 Rev. 3 for testing and inspection requirements.

The structural integrity of the containment is maintained by utilizing a '

periodic surveillance program which includes both scheduled jntegrated leak tests (ILRT) and containment post-tensioning system examination. The  ;

amendment deleted technical specifications section 3/4.6.1.5, Primary l Containment Structural Integrity, including surveillance requirements from technical specifications and places it in technical specification administrative controls section 6.2.F.6. This program is based on Regulatory Guide 1.35 Rev. 3 which allows to alternate between visual only and complete I physical (ie, tendon lift off, detensioning, and wire tensile tests) including visual. Revised technical specifications treat LaSalle station as a twin unit and adopt Regulatory Guide 1.35 Rev. 3 in its entirety. The changes to the inspection methodology will not degrade structural integrity and/or i predictability of any degradation of structural integrity of the containments.  :

UFSAR sections 3.8.1.7.3.1.1, 3.8.1.7.3.1.3, 3.8.1.7.3.14, and UFSAR appendix B will be revised to reflect the amendment to the technical specifications.

UFSAR Appendix H ,

Revisions to UFSAR Sections H.3.2.21 and H.3.5.5, Non-Fire Rated Penstrations in the Fire Barrier separating Fire Zones 5B1 and 2K, are

• incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update to reflect Exempt Change E01 94-990.

l i l

A revision to UFSAR Section H.3, will be incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update to reflect an increase in fire loading due to the i installation of larger drain buckets on'the reactor recirculation hydraulic l power units (HPUs).

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• -t - feontin M UFSAR Appendix H - (continued)

Sections H.3.7.1, H.3.7.2, H.3.7.3 AND H.3.8.2 (For fire zones 7A1, 7A2, ,

7A3 and 8A2 respectively) of the UFSAR previously indicated that the floor slabs of these fire areas are three (3) hour rated except for an oversized exhaust stack penetration. These sections were revised to clarify that the exhaust stack penetrations are unrated because of their size. This is consistent with the wording in UFSAR section H.3.8.1 (for fire zone 8A1). The i

stack penetrations do not introduce any fire hazard to the diesel generator rooms or associated ventilation equipment rooms because of the presence of the- l unrated seal. .The penetration seals are of the same materials and  !

construction as other rated penetration seals but must be considered unrated I because they are of a larger size than those that have been tested.  !

UFSAR sections H.3.7.4, H.3.7.5, H.3.7.6, H.3.8.3 and H.3.8.4 (for fire '

zones 7B1, 7B2, 7B3, 8B1, and 8B2, respectively) previously indicated that the ceiling of the rooms are three (3) hour rated except for an oversized exhaust stack penetration. These sections were revised to clarify that the exhaust stack penetrations are unrated because of their size. This is consistent with the wording in UFSAR section H.3.8.1 (for fire zone 8A1). Additionally, UFSAR sections H.3.7.4 (for fire zone 7B1) and H.3.8.3 (for fire zone 8B1) were revised to indicate which fire zones are located directly above them. The above changes were incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 10 update.

UFSAR Table 6.2-21 (Sheet 1)

Table 6.2-21 " Summary of Lines Penetrating the Primary Containment" (sheet

1) was revised to reflect valve 1(2)E51-F357 (RCIC steam line drain to Main condenser stop valve) being recognized as a containment isolation valve. The valve is included in the 0.6 La accountability program for local leak rate test purposes. ,

UFSAR Table 8.3-14 The Division 3 battery load profile provided in UFSAR Table 8.3-14 will be revised to reflect the DC Soak Back Oil Pump Motor for HPCS Diesel Generators 1B and 2B, rated at 3/4 hp. The DC Soak Back Pump is an existing load and is part of the original design.

UFSAR Table 8.3-14, "ESF Division 3 (HPCS) 125-VDC Battery load Requirements" does not currently include the load for Unit 1 or Unit 2 DC Soak Back Pump. The continuous, 0-1 minute, and 60-240 minute loads for " GEN CONT CAB S001" and the " TOTAL" will be revised to account for the additional load for both units. The Electrical Load Monitoring System (ELMS) will also be revised to account for the additional load. The impact of not including the Division 3 DC Soak Back Oil Pump motor in the battery service test has been previously evaluated and found to have no effect on operability. This evaluation does not impact any system function. The revision will be incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update.

UFSAR Figure 3.8-5 UFSAR Figure 3.8-5, Drywell Head and Ring Girder Connection is to be revised as a result of a drawing update. The revision will be incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update.

4 3

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G. r'h = = = = to the Facility Whigh are Described in the BAggtv in=1valg mannet - (continued)

UFSAR Figure 5.4-6 UFSAR Figure 5.4-6, Reactor Water Cleanup System Process Diagram (Sheet 2 of 3) will be revised to reflect an onsite review conducted in response to the discovery of a missing reactor recirculation (RR) system sample probe in Unit

1. The revision is to be incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 11 update.

UFSAR Figure 13.5-1 UFSAR Figure 13.5-1 was revised due minor change P01-0-90-008. The previous workspace areas of each unit Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) and '

center desk are replaced with modular workstations. These charges provide operators with adequate desk space for the computer cathode ray tubes, full accommodation of the Emergency Operating Procedures, orientation of the NSO ,

towards the 1(2)H13-P601 panel, and storage for procedure books and logs. l The revision to Figure 13.5-1 was incorporated in the UFSAR Revision 10 update. ,

The safety evaluations for the above listed items in section II.G concluded that no unreviewed safety questions existed.

M. Survey of Evaluation Results of Chlorine shitments by Baroe on the -

Illinois River For the 1994 Survey of Chlorine Shipment in the Vicinity of LaSalle County Station, see Attachment D.

I. E-- *v of Events Viointina Technical soecification 3.4.5 Pr4mmev Coolant Iodina snikina tweeeding Allowable Limits During this reporting period, January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1994, there were no violations of Technical Specification 3.4.5, Primary Coolant Iodine Spikes Exceeding Allowable Limits.

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4- I I

ATT n umT A SAFETY-RELATED MkINTENANCE COMPLETED  :

(NON-OUTAGE RELATED) t

---

UNIT 0------------------------------------

WANUN SYS EPN DESCRIPTION 940061358-03 AR 0AR000 INSTALL DARNATT EM-1L AROUND DIV II C3L TRAYS 940050900-01 CE OCK000 D/G 0 STARTING AIR PRESS LOW ALARM UP.

930040302-01 DG ODG01K INSPECT ALL 20 CYLINDER LINERS ,

- 940056998-01 DG OMS-DGS001A CLEAN / INSPECT SBN CONTROL SW. ,

. 930045651-01 DG ODG023A DISASSEMBLE, EXERCISE AND INSPECT CHECK VALVE i 930045654-01 DG ODG0235 DISASSEMBLE, EXERCISE AND INSPECT CEECK VALVE 940057094-01 DG ODG0335 OPI-DG0985 INDICATION ERRATIC, RECALIBRATE g 940059004-01 DG OEI-DG066 OUT OF TOLERANCE / REPLACE 930046194-01 DG OPI-DG0985 PRESSURE GADGE AT REGULkTOR IS ERRATIC 930047456-01 DG ODG01P VERIFY OILER SETTINGS ,

930046500-01 DO ODOO1P LEAKS OIL 940057670-01 Dit ORE-D10N511 CHECK SOURCE IS ERRATIC 930048407-01 D18 ORE-D10N513 ERRATIC, WON'T COME BACK DOWNSCALE 943060078-01 D18 OUS-D18R515 PANEL LOCIED IN LAMP TEST NODE 940057060-01 Dit OhX-D10R519 MIGH RANGE DETECTOR / RECORDER IS SPIKING 940057864-M D18 ORR-D18R520 VG LOW RANGE CHECK SOURCE IS ERATIC 940059967-Oi IS OISDR003 SHIMS NEED TO BE REPLACED 940060212-01 IS OISDR004 CENTER BUSEING ON MANDNHEELS WORN OUT 940057901-01 IS OISDR017 TACK WILD ON PIVOT PIN IS BROKEN 940058372-01 IS OISDR020 REPAIR-SIDE PINS WOULD NOT NOVE 940059923-01 IS OISDR020 UPPER 2 PINS ON RIGHT SIDE MONT OPERATE-930046174-01 RD ORD000 FAILED LEAK TEST, REBUILD  ;

940091044-01 VC OVC05CB B VC COMPRESSOR TRIPPING ON HI DISCHARGE TEMP

• 940057901-01 VC OVC015A PRE-ALARM LOCAL PANEL & ALARM AT 15 J l 940058385-01 VC OVC015A REPLACE 940061469-02 VC OVCO2YA DAMPER IS NOT FULLY CLOSED / ADJUST ACT LINKAGE 940060593-01 VC 0FR-VC028 REFUSES TO ADVANCE 940065346-01 VC OvC05CB TRIPPED ON MIGH OIL TEMP 930045410-01 VC OXY-VCGSSB PCNER ON LAMP IS BURN OUT 940060670-01 VC OVC12YB FLILED TO CLOSE AFTER SYSTEM MAS RESET 940058029-01 VC 0XY-VC125A FLOW LIGHT IS OUT 940059517-01 VC OXY-VC125A FLOW LIGHT FOR OKY-VC125A MOULD NOT STAY LIT 930045413-01 VC OXY-VC1255 REPLACE CARRIERS 940057609-01 VC OVC15YB ADJUST ACTUATOR SO DAMPER IS FULL CLOSED 940058302-01 VC OXY-VC165A WTR IN FLOW NTR/NEW BULB-STILL DOES NOT LIGHT 940057525-01 VC 0XY-VC1655 REPLACE CARRIERS 940058267-01 VC OXY-VC165B INVESTIGATE OPERATION OF TAPE DRIVE MECHANISM 940077480-01 VC 0XY-VC1655 DETECTOR TRIPPED AND WILL NOT RESET.

940084322-01 VC OVC005CA N CONTACTOR AND RELAYS R5 AND R6 STUCK 940060455-01 VE OVE04CB FREON LEAK ON SUCTION PRESS SENSING LINE 930045492-01 VE OVE01CB INSPECTION OF VC/VE ACCESS HA'tCH 940058010-01 VI OVE0::CA FIX OR REPAIR KINKED COPPER TUBING 930047338-01 VI OVE03CB EXCESSIVE VIBRATION, INSPECT FAN 940059946-01 VE OVE04CA REPAIR 2 FREON LEAKS

- 930046704-01 VE OTS-VE101 OIL TEMP HIGH WITH COMPRESSOR IN STANDBY

---

UNIT 1------------------------------------

WRNUM SYS EPN DESCRIPTION 940050079-01 AP 1AP71E-B1 FOUND BAD LUGS ON WIRES DURING LES-GM-104 940057571-01 AP 1AP72E-A6 INSULATION OUTSIDE OF CRIMP ON LUG 940057572-01 AP 1AP725-A4 RESET PUSH BUTTON ON CUBICLE DOOR IS BROKEN 940057573-01 AP 1AP72E-A2 OL RLY FOR SPACE ETR WOULD NOT CRANGE STATE 940058005-01 AP 1AP73E-D5 DID NOT TRIP AS REQ'D ON THERMALS l

l

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• 1 ATTACEMENT A SAFETY-RELATED MAINTENANCE COMPLETED (NON-0UTAGE RELATED)

---

UNIT 0------------------------------------

WRNON SYS EPN DESCRIPTION 940061354-03 AR OAR 000 INSTALL DARMATT EM-1L AROUND DIV II CBL TRAYS 940054900-01 CI OC1000 D/G 0 STARTING AIR PRESS LOW ALARM UP i 930048302-01 DG ODG01K INSPECT ALL 20 CYLINDER LINERS  !

940056998-01 DG OBS-DGS001A CLEAN / INSPECT SBN CONTROL SW 930045651-01 DG OD00231 DISASSEMBLE, EXERCISE AND INSPECT CEECK VALVE j 930045654-01 DG ODG0233 DISASSEMBLE, EXERCISE AND INSPECT CHECK VALVE 940057094-01 DG ODG0333 OPI-DG0988 INDICATION ERRATIC, RECALIBRATE j 940059004-01 DG OEI-D0066 OUT OF TOLERANCE / REPLACE  !

930046194-01 DG OPI-D00983 PRESSURE GAUGE AT REGULATOR IS ERRATIC l 930047456-01 DG ODG01P VERIFY OILER SETTINGS 930046500-01 DO OD0017 LEAKS OIL i 940057670-01 D18 ORI-D14N511 CEECK SOURCE IS ERRATIC i 930048407-01 D18 ORE-D18N513 ERRATIC, WON'T COME BACK DOWNSCALE 940060078-01 D18 OUS-D14R515 PANEL LOCKED IN LAMP TEST NODE  ;

940057060-01 D18 ORR-D18R519 EIGE RANGE DETECTOR / RECORDER IS SPIKING i 940057864-01 D18 ORR-D18R520 VG LOW RANGE CEECK SOURCE IS ERATIC [

940059967-01 IS DISDR003 SEIMS NEED TO BE REPLACED I 940060212-01 IS DISDR004 CEFTER BUSHING ON BANDWEEELS WORN OUT i 940057981-01 IS OISDRO17 TACK WELD ON PIVOT PIM IS BROKEN l OISDB020  !

940058372-01 IS REPAIR-S W ?TNS WOULD NOT NOVE 940059923-01 IS OISDR020 UPPER 2 7p4 bN RIGHT SIDE WONT OPERATE l 930046174-01 RD ORD000 FAILED LEAi TEST, REBUILD .

940091044-01 YC OVC05CB B VC COMPRESSOR TRIPPING ON HI DISCEARGE TEMP j 940057901-01 VC 0VC018A PRE-ALARM LOCAL PANEL & ALARM AT 15 J ,

940058385-01 VC 0VC01SA- REPLACE  !

940061469-02 VC OVC02YA DAMPER IS NOT FULLY CLOSED / ADJUST ACT LINEAGE f 940060593-01 VC OFR-VCO28 REFUSES TO ADVANCE '

940065346-01 VC OVC05CF TRIPPED ON EIGE CIL TEMP 930045410-01 VC OKY-VC0643 POWER ON LAMP IS BURN OUT i 940060678-01 VC OVC12YB FAILED TO CLOSE AFTER SYSTEM WAS RESET I 940054029-01 VC 0XY-VC1251 FLOW LIGHT IS OUT f 940059517-01 VC OKY-VC125A FLOW LIGHT FOR OXY-VC125A WOULD NOT STAY LIT  ;

930046413-01 VC OXY-VC12SB REPLACE CARRIERS l 940057689-01 VC OVC15YB ADJUST ACTUATOR 80 DAMPER IS FULL CLOSED l 940058302-01 VC 0XY-VC165A WTR IN FLOW NTR/NEW BULB-STILL DOES NOT LIGHT 940057525-01 VC OKY-VC1658 REPLACE CARRIERS 940058267-01 VC OIY-VC165B INVESTIGATE OPERATION OF TAPE DRIVE MECHANISM j 940077480-01 VC OKY-VC165B DETECTOR TRIPPED AND WILL NOT RESET.

940084322-01 VC OVC005CA M CONTACTOR AND RELAYS R5 AND R6 STUCK I 940060455-01 VE OVE04CB FREON LEAK ON SUCTION PRESS SENSING LINE 930045492-01 VE OVE01CB INSPECTION OF VC/VE ACCESS HATCH {

940058018-01 VE OVE02CA FII OR REPAIR KINKED COPPER TUBING t 930047338-01 VE OVE03CB EXCESSIVE VIBRATION, INSPECT FAN 940059946-01 VE OVE04CA REPAIR 2 FREON LEAKS +

930046784-01 VE OTS-VE101 OIL TEMP EIGH WITH COMPRESSOR IN STANDBY ,

---

UNIT 1------------------------------------

WRNUM SYS EPN DESCRIPTION i 940058079-01 AP ik /1E-51 FOUND BAD LUGS ON WIRES DURING LES-GM-104 l 940057571-01 AP 1AP725-A6 INSULATION OUTSIDE OF CRIMP ON LUG l 940057572-01 AP 1AP72E-A4 RESET PUSE BUTTON ON CUBICLE DOOR IS BROKEN 1 940057573-01 AP 1AP72E-A2 OL RLY FOR SPACE ETR WOULD NOT CHANGE STATE 940058005-01 AP 1AP73E-D5 DID NOT TRIP AS REQ'D ON THERKALS l I

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ATTACHMENT A SAFETY-RELATED MAINTENANCE COMPLETED (NON-OUTAGE RELATED)

............__.....__............... UNIT 1..__........__.......__..........___

l WRNUM SYS EPN DESCRIPTION 940057002-01 AP 1AP76E THERMAL OVERLOAD IS CRACKED 940057642-01 AP 1AP76E-D6 WIRES FOUND WITH BAD CRIMPS 940057486-01 AP 1AP76E-F6 BRKR NOT PASSING THERMAL O/L TRIP TEST 940058182-01 AP 1AP80E-D5 BAD LUG CRIMPS ON WIRES 930045318-01 AP 1AP82E-C3 WIRES HAVE INSULATION PULLED BACK FROM LUGS 940057328-01 AP 1AP82E-D5 DEFECTIVE ADJ KNOB ON MAGNETIC BREAKER 930045026-01 AP 1AP83E-B4 RPLC FOR STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL PUMP 940058061-01 AP 1AP75E FAILED TIME CRITERIA 940057061-01 AP 1AP01E REFURBISH BREAKER 940057369-01 AP 1AP01E FOUND BROKEN 940056958-01 AP 1AP04E LUBRICATE OPERATING MECHANISM 940056959-01 AP 1APO4E LUBRICATE OPERATING MECHANISM 940056999-01 AP 1APO4E LUBRICATE OPERATING MECHANISM 940057172-01 AP 1APO4E LUBRICATE OPERATING MECHANISM 940058805-01 AP 1APOSE LUBRICATE OPERATING MECHANISM 940057166-01 AP 1AP06E LUBRICATE OPERATING MECHANISM 940057167-01 AP 1AP06E LUBRICATE OPERATING MECHANISM 940057430-01 AP 1AP06E LUBRICATE OPERATING MECHANISM 940057440-01 AP 1AP06E REMOVE OPERATING MECHANISM FROM BREAKER 940057481-01 AP 1AP06E LUBRICATE OPERATING MECHANISM 940058216-01 AP 1AP07E CRACKED WELD ON DISCH LATCH 930047381-01 AP 1AP20E REFURB/ REPLACE BREAKER 930047385-01 AP 1AP20E REFURB/ REPLACE BREAKER 940057597-01 AP 1AP20E REFURB/ REPLACE BREAKER 930045882-01 B21 1821F013B REMOVE REPLACE WITH SPARE SRV 930046947-01 521 1B21F013D REMOVE REPLACE WITH SPARE SRV 930045878-01 B21 1B21F013J REMOVE REPLACE WITH SPARE SRV 940060445-01 B21 1ES-B21F022B THE RPS INDICATION LIMIT SWITCH 940057355-01 B21 1B21F036J DEPRESSURIEED AFTER IN WAS ISOLATED 940061330-01 B21 1LR-B21R884A RED (LVL) PEN IS STICKING 940057109-01 B33 1B33C001A INSPECT THERMAL BUSHING 940060673-01 CM 1RIT-CM011 READING IS OUT OF SPEC 940057469-01 CM 1PR-CM028 SOME SEGMENTS ON RCDR DISPLAY NOT LIT 940061353-01 CM 1PR-CM028 RED PEN FAILED TO MOVE 930048278-01 CM 1UR-CM029 MINUS SIGN LED BURNED OUT ON DIGITAL READ OUT 940060119-01 CM 1TR-CM037A LEAST SIG NUMERICAL HAS A BURNT OUT 940075126-01 CM 1TR-CM037B PEN 81 DOES NOT MATCH DIGITAL DISPLAY 930046286-01 CM 1 AIR-CM048 PEN MOTOR IS DRIVING HARD DOWH'CALE 940058097-01 C11 1C11D001065 RPLC DCV 120 DUE TO TIMING C A LEMS 940057541-01 C11 1C11D088111 PACKING LEAK 940057460-01 C11 1C11D001108 ROD SCRAMMED DURING LOS-RP-M1 940091050-01 C11 1LS-C11N013B DURING SCRAM ON 12-18 SWITCH STUCK IN OPEN 940060873-01 C34 1LI-C34R606A FAILED SHIFTLY CHANNEL CHECK 940060500-04 C41 1C(;F029B CHANGE SETPOINT TO 1340 PSIG 940078519-01 C41 1C41F033B INSPECT CHECK VALVE 940078519-02 C41 1C41F033B INSPECT CHECK VALVE 940057635-01 C41 1TE-C41N006 LOOSE WIRE ON THERMOCOUPLE 930047249-01 C51 1RY-C51K605BH ALARM 18 UP WITH NO DOWNSCALE LPRM*S 930048393-01 C51 1RY-C51K605FU ALARM IS UP WITH NO DOWNSCALE LPRM'S 940085729-01 C51 1RY-C51K605GS FAILED DOWNSCALE 940079689-01 C51 1RR-C51R603B BAD DISPLAY / PLEASE REPLACE 940057028-01 C51 1C51000 DOWNSCALE CIRCUITRY FAULTY 940057511-01 C51 1C51000 R PT 723 SEALED IN WITHOUT AN APRM HI 940057510-01 C71 1C718001B B RPS MG SET OUTPUT BREAKER TRIPPED 940058254-01 DC 1DC01E CELLS 93,94,111,&112 HAD LOW GRAVITIES 940061866-01 DC 1DC01E CELL HAS LOW SPECIFIC GRAVITY

e d

ATTACHMENT A SAFETY-RELATED MAINTENANCE COMPLETED (NON-0UTAGE RELATED) a----------------------------------UNIT 1------------------------------------

WRNUM SYS EPN DESCRIPTION 930048361-01 DC 1ER-DC020 GROUND DETECTOR HAS 10 VDC POSITIVE GROUND 940054509-01 DC III-DC023 REPLACE AMMETER 930044533-01 DC 11I-DC043 READS -10 AMPS, NORMALLY 0 930048298-01 DG 1DG01K INSPECT ALL 20 CYLINDER 940062050-01 DG 1DG01K REPLACE CYLINDER TEST VALVES l 910047642-01 DG 1DG000 CALIBRATE EXCITOR VOLTMETER A 940078245-01 DG 1PS-D0047 REPLACE CRANKCASE PRESSURE SWITCH 930045669-01 DG 1DG049B INSPECT CHECK VALVE l 940085084-01 DG 1DG01K 1B D/G LOCK 0UT RELAY COIL IS BAD l

940092601-01 DG 1DG20M SUPPLY HOSE TO MOTOR COOLER IS LEAKING 930045477-01 E12 1E12F003A INSPECT ACTUATOR 910047229-01 E12 1E12F004A REPLACE SMB 00 TORQUE SWITCH 930045476-01 E12 1E12F040A INSPECT ACTUATOR 930047426-01 E12 1E12F094 REMOVE & CLEAN STEM, STEM NUT 930045658-01 E12 1E12F313A SETPOINT TEST VALVE 930045345-01 E12 1E12C002A INSP/ CLEAN /RPLC GASKET TORQUE CASING NUTS 930047532-01 E12 1E12C003 VERIFY PROPER OILER SETTING 940065728-01 E12 1E12C300C TAKE MEGGER/ CURRENT READINGS ON MOTORS 940065729-01 E12 1E12C300D TAKE MEGGER/ CURRENT READINGS ON MOTORS 930047455-01 E12 1E12C300D VERITY OILER SETTING 930047964-01 E21 1FT-E21N003 INSPECT CONDUIT SEAL AND WIRES 930047531-01 E21 1E21C002 VERITY PROPER OILER SETTING 940065780-01 E21 1E21C002 RESET OILER / REBUILD PUMP IF REQD.

930048303-01 E22 1E228001 INSPECT ALL 20 CYLINDER LINERS 940085085-01 E22 1E228001 AIR START CHANGE 0UT AND FLYWHEEL INSP.

940058115-01 E22 1STS-E22J901 INTERMITTENT INDICATION 940058217-01 E22 1TS-E22M511 REPLACE BROKEN TEMP SWITCH 940058222-01 E22 1TS-E22N516 WOULDN'T MEET RESET SET POINT 940078222-01 E22 1TS-E22M517 SWITCH IS LEAKING 940058221-01 122 1PI-E22RS22 MOVEMENT INSIDE GUAGE BINDING 930047530-01 E22 1E22C003 VERITY PROPER OILER SETTING 940064396-01 E31 1PDS-E31N008A ERRATIC SW hCTION 940063314-01 E31 1PDIS-E31N008C REPLACE SWITCH 940090141-01 E31 1PDIS-E31N008D REPLACE SWITCH 930046488-01 E32 1E32F008 VALVE HAS PACKING LEAK 930042659-01 E32 1E32F009 PACKING LEAK 930045035-01 E32 1E32B001E CHECK CLAMP SCREWS, JUMPER CABLES 930045036-01 E32 1E32C002B REPLACE CONTACTOR AT MCC 930045037-01 E32 1E320003F REPLACE CONTACTOR AT MCC 940061604-01 E32 1FT-E32N053J WIRE BROKE OFF LUG FOR POLE 1B 930045484-01 E51 1E51F010 REFURB ACTUATOR AND TEST SPRINGPACK 930046928-01 E51 1E51F019 PERFORM VOTES TEST 930045475-01 E51 1E51F046 REFURB ACTUATOR AND TEST SPRINGPACK 930046905-01 E51 1E51F059 PERFORM VOTES TEST 930043221-01 E51 1E51F011 LEAK AT THE DOWNSTREAM FLANGE 940082923-01 E51 18U-E51J901 TROUBLESHOOT RCIC SPEED CONTROL CIRCUITRY l 930044983-01 E51 18Y-E51K902 INSTALL NEW AUD CALIBRATE 930043893-01 E51 1LSH-151N010 CABLE BRITTLE FROM HIGH TEMP COND 930045121-01 E51 1LSH-E51N010 MAGNETROL LEVEL SWITCH HAS FAILED 940060845-01 E51 1PI-E51R001 NEEDLE FOUND BENT 930047533-01 E51 1151C003 VERIFY PROPER OILER SETTING 940057457-01 FC 1FC27A INSTALL /RMV FOR HYDRO OF FUEL POOL COOLING 940057456-01 FC 1FC28A INSTALL /RMV FOR HYDRO OF FUEL POOL COOLING 930047462-01 FC 1FC03PA REPIPE OILER 940058869-01 FC 1FC047B PACKING LEAK 940058127-01 FC 1FC118 REPAIR HAND WHEEL FOR VALVE

f l

' ATTACHMENT A SAFETY-RELATED MAINTENANCE COMPLETED (NON-0UTAGE RELATED)

....................................Uv!T 1....................................

WRNGM SYS EPN DESCRIPTION 940058095-01 FC 1FC133 VALVE LEAKS j 940062010-01 FP 1FP053 VALVE LEAKS PAST SEAT 940065054-01 FW 1FWQ1PC MEGGER/ CURRENT READINGS ON MOTORS 930045474-01 EG 1R0003 REFURE ACTUATOR AND TEST SPRINGPACK 940057450-01 EG 180016 PERFORM INSPECTION 940060057-01 R13 1E13P611 WOULD NOT ADJUST 940058092-01 E13 1513P628 EINGE BROKEN 930043654-01 E13 1H13P631 INSTALL BANANA PLUG JACK AT TERMINAL AA-86 i

940060407-01 LV 1LV94E INSTALL COVERS ON ELECTRICAL PENETRATION l 940060404-01 LV 1LV95E INSTALL PENETRATION ENCLOSURE COVERS 940090155-01 PC 1PCM111 REPLACE INNER PERSONAL HATCH DOOR SEAL 940057213-01 PC 1PCM112 RMV/ REINSTALL FOR WORK DURING L1F23 930046297-01 PC 1PC000 FAILED TO MEET THE PRESSURE CRITERIA 940057721-01 PC 1PC000 REMOVE BROWN BANANA JACK AT TERM BOARD CC 940058247-01 PC 1PC000 REMOVE ABANDONED CABLE 940058091-01 PL 1PL17J INSPECT BMA RELAY CONTACTS AND CLEAN 930045032-01 PL 1PL33J INSPECT WIRES CONNECTING PILOT LIGHT & BASE 940060540-01 PM 1PM133 SHIELD WIRE BROKEN OFF 920047481-01 RI 1RI000 INSTALL BANANA JACKS 940057215-01 RP 1RP000 TEST / VERIFY / ADJUST RELAY SETPOINTS 930045480-01 VG 1VG001 INSPECT ACTUATOR 930045481-01 VG 1VG003 INSPECT ACTUATOR 930043973-01 VG 1FC-VG003 PERFORM CAPACITOR REPLACEMENT 940060750-01 VG 1FI-VG003 INSTALL YELLOW BAND FROM 0 TO 5,000 CFM 940060746-01 VG 1YG018 REPLACE CHARCOAL, INSTALL SAMPLE CANISTERS 940062025-01 VG 1VG013 REPLACE RECA SCREEN, DELUGE HEADER 940057888-01 VQ 1VQO37 REPLACE MOTOR HI/ LOW CONNECTIONS 930045483-01 VQ 1VQ038 INSPECT ACTUATOR 940057722-01 VQ 1VQ000 REPLACE BROWN JACK 940057983-01 VR IVR000 REPAIR OR REPLACE SQL VALVES & LIMIT SWITCHES 930045330-01 VR IVR04YA REPLACE VR DAMPER 940057478-01 VR IVR04YA INSTALL HANGER ON DAMPER TO RELIEVE SAGGING 940057513-01 VR IVR04YA ADJ BLADE POSITION .

930045329-01 VR 1VR04YB REPLACE VR DAMPER I 930045332-01 VR IVR05YA REPLACE VR DAMPER 930045331-01 VR IVR05YB REPLACE VR DAMPER 940057229-01 VK 1 TIC-VIOO7 NOT CONTROLLING INLET + RECIRC DAMPERS 940057596-01 VK 1TE-V1007A INSPECT CUTSIDE AIR DAMPER ACTUATOR 940082412-01 VI ITIC-VID09 RETURN AIR TEMP HI WONT CLEAR 940077556-01 VI 1VIO8Y DAMPER FAILED CLOSED

---

UNIT 2------------------------------------ I WRNUM SYS EPN DESCRIPTION 940057176-01 AN 2AN000 ALARM INDICATES VALVE IS NOT OPEN '

940057934-01 AN 2H13P601 F303 ALARMS & IMMEDIATELY RESETS 940072549-01 AP 2AP76E-D6 TERMINAL BLOCK HAS BROKEN SPACER 940087624-01 AP 2AP76E-A5 REPLACE CIRCUIT BREAKER 940057132-01 AP 2AP83E-01 CABLE 2HT570, SCORED & KNICKED 920041939-01 AP 2AP000 WIRES HAVE MELTED INSULATION 920046984-01 AP 2AP000 REPLACE TIMERS AND TEST 940056931-01 AP 2AP04E LUBRICATE OPERATING MECHANISM 940073486-01 AP 2AP04E-10 CRACK IN RED SHELL OF ARC CHUTE

l

. l I

ATTACHMENT A i SAFETY-RELATED MAINTENANCE COMPLETED (NON-0UTAGE RELATED)

---

UNIT 2------------------------------------

WRNUM SYS EPN DESCRIPTION l 940073544-01 AP 2APO4E-10 CONTROL DEVICE BROKEN 940057174-01 B21 2ES-321F022D RELAY 2C711-K3H FAILED TO ENERGIZE l 930048200-01 321 2B21-F028A OTBD No INDICATION WHEN OPEN l 940057224-01 B21 2ES-B21F020B VALVE DOES NOT SHOW FULL OPEN 940058828-01 B21 2LIS-321N706C CALIBRATION UNIT DID SHON PROPER MV VALUE 940079991-01 CM 2RR-CM011 BAD DISPLAY, REPLACE 940079990-01 CM 2 AIR-CM012 BAD DISPLAY REPLACE 940059934-01 CM 2UR-CM031 DIGITAL DISPLAY MISSING SEGMENTS, REPLACE 940060600-01 CM 2TR-CM038B PEN 1 READS ~67 DEGF + PEN 2 READS ~107 940057265-01 CM 2TE-CM057A READING IS ERRATIC 940059018-01 CM 2HS-CM117 STICKING 930044361-01 C11 2C11D001005 REBUILD CRD 910047614-01 C11 2C11D001009 REBUILD CRD 930044372-01 C11 2C11D001022 REBUILD CRD 930044365-01 C11 2C11D001028 REBUILD CRD 930044370-01 C11 2C11D001038 REBUILD CRD 930044358-01 C11 2C11D001040 REBUILD CRD 930044374-01 C11 2C11D001047 REBUILD CRD 930044363-01 C11 2C11D001050 REBUILD CRD 930044362-01 C11 2C11D001058 REBUILD CRD 910047610-01 C11 2C11D001064 REBUILD CRD 930044373-01 C11 2C11D001074 REBUILD CRD 930044369-01 C11 2C11D001077 REBUILD CRD 930044359-01 C11 2C11D001079 REBUILD CRD 940058117-01 C11 2C11D001087 NITRO CYLINDER LEAKING AT BOTTOM 930044345-01 C11 2C11D001101 REBUILD CRD 930044341-01 C11 2C11D001102 REBUILD CRD 930044354-01 C11 2C11D001107 REBUILD CRD 930044348-01 C11 2C11D001110 REBUILD CRD 930044355-01 C11 2C11D001114 REBUILD CRD 930044343-01 C11 2C11D001125 REBUILD CRD 930044342-01 C11 2C11D001141 REBUILD CRD 930044349-01 C11 2C11D001151 REBUILD CRD 910047595-01 C11 2C11D001164 REBUILD CRD 930044350-01 C11 2C11D001171 REBUILD CRD 930044351-01 C11 2C11D001178 REBUILD CRD 940058131-01 C11 2PS-C11N051 N2 LEAK ON PRESSURE SWITCH 930048336-01 C11 2LS-C11N259 ALARM COMES UP BUT PRESS IS 000D 940072866-01 C11 2C11000 REPLACE SSPV DIAPHRAGMS, 117 AND 118 VALVES 940060403-01 C34 2PDT-C34N004C OUT OF TOLERANCE 940057085-01 C51 2RY-C51K600AA NAS WITHDRAWN W/ALL RODS FULL IN 940057119-01 C51 2RY-C51K600BA LOOSE CONNECTION AT PRE-AMP 940060409-01 C51 2RY-C51K601C ERRATIC RESPONSE 940061900-01 C51 2RY-C517.501D SPURIOUS 1/2 SCRAM OCCURRED 930046763-01 C51 2RY-C51K601E REPAIR BRACKET ON TRIP UNITS Z16 AND 117 940060926-01 C51 2RY-C51K601E IRM E PRE-REGULATOR HAS FAILED 940075451-01 C51 2RY-C51K601E HI VOLTAGE CABLE PULLED OUT OF J7 CONNECTOR 930048206-01 C51 2RY-C51K601F ERRATIC DURING START UP 930046764-01 C51 2RY-C51K601H REPAIR BRACKET ON TRIP UNITS Z16 AND Zi7 940061901-01 C51 2RY-C51K601H SPURIOUS 1/2 SCRANS OCCURRED 940079278-01 C51 2RY-C51K601H RANGE 5 DOES NOT RESPOND DURING CALIBRATION 930048251-01 C51 2RY-C51K605EN READS NORMAL BUT INDICATES DOWN SCALE 940062087-01 C51 2RR-C51R602 DIGITAL BAR GRAPH IMPROPER INDICATION 940060912-01 C51 2RR-C51R603B DIGITAL DISPLAY MISSING LIGHTS 940077808-01 C51 2RR-C51R603B AECORDER PEN 8 2 ERRATIC AFTER ALARM CHECK 940056928-01 C51 2C51POJ PWR SUPPLY OUTPUT VOLTAGE IS DRIFTING

t a

4 e

I ATTACEMENT A SAFETY-RELATED MAINTENANCE COMPLETED (NON-0UTAGE RELATED)

..................._____...---------UNIT 2------------------------------------

l WRNUM SYS EPN DESCRIPTION 940057865-01 C51 2C51000 REPLACE EAD POWER SUPPLIES 940058266-01 C51 2C51000 FAILED DURING TESTING 940080546-01 C51 2C51000 REPLACE NEUTRON MON. CIRCUIT BOARDS 940057084-01 C71 2PS-C71N003C A2 ALARM CLEARED & RESET CAUSING EALF SCRAM .

940058107-01 DC 2DC06E MCC 2214 COMPT 2C APPEARS TO BE BAD 930048341-01 DC 2DC06E 20 VDC NEGATIVE GROUND IS UP 940060098-01 DC 2II-DC050 READS DOWNSCALE 940060527-01 DC 3II-DC050 IND 10 AMPS, LOCAL IND IS 2 AMPS 930040876-01 DC 2DC16E PERFORM CHARGER CAPACITY TEST / INSPECTION 930048246-01 DG 2DG01E EEHAUST FLANGED CONNECTION MISSING LOWER NUT 930048301-01 DG 2DG01E INSPECT ALL 20 CYLINDER LINERS 940062053-01 DG 2DG01K REPLACE CYLINDER VLYS WITH NEW STYLE VLVS 940078773-01 DG 2PS-DG047 REPLACE CRANKCASE PRESSURE SWITC2 940057711-01 DG 2DG049A DISASSEMBLE / INSPECT CHECK VALVE 940061474-01 DG 2DG049A DISASSEMBLY /EKERCISE/ INSPECT CHECK VLV 940061475-01 DG 2DG049B DISASSEMBLE /EEERCISE/ INSPECT CHECK VLV '

940061682-01 DG 2DG049B VALVE STICKING OPEN INTERMITTENTLY 940060769-01 DG 2DG01P CLEAN AND INSPECT SBN CONTROL SWITCH 940065049-01 DG 2D001P MEGGER/ CURRENT READINGS ON MOTORS 930047457-01 DG 2DG01P VERIFY OILER SETTINGS 940059682-01 Do 2D004T MAN-WAY COVER GASKET LEAKS 940059681-01 Do 2D005T MAM-WAY COVER GASKET LEAKS 930047352-01 D18 2RIY-D18K751A FIE FAULTY VC RAD MONITOR FUSE CLIPS 940056929-01 D18 2RIY-D18K751D SPIKES UPSCALE, ERRATIC INDICATION 940079586-07 E12 2E12F003A PERFORM EQ INSPECTION, TEST SPRINGPACK l 930046743-01 E12 2E12F024A LUBE VALVE 940072487-01 E12 2E12F040B PERFORM EQ INSPECTION OF MOV 910045393-01 E12 2E12F049B PERFORM EQ INSPECTION OF MOV  !

940058063-01 E12 2FI-E12R602A PERFORM DIAGNOSTIC TEST 930047516-01 E12 2E12C003 FLOW DROPPED TO EERO 940057173-01 E12 2E12C300A VERIFY PROPER OILER SETTING 940057059-01 E12 2E12C300B VERIFY OILER SETTINGS 930047518-01 E21 2E21C002 VERITY OILER SETTINGS 940090902-01 E22 2E22-C002 PUMP TRIPPED BRKR 930048300-01 E22 2E228001 INSPECT ALL 20 CYLINDER LINES 940083288-01 E22 2E228001 REPLACE CYLINDER VALVES WITH NEW STYLE VLVS 940061471-01 E22 2E22F362A DISASSEMBLE, EEERCISE, INSPECT CHECK VLV 940061472-01 E22 2E22F362B DISASSEMBLE /EEERCISE/ INSPECT CHECK VLV 940065766-01 E22 2E22C002 NEGGER/ CURRENT READINGS ON MOTORS 940091081-01 E22 2E22C002 REPLACE CLNG. WTR. PMP. MTR. CONTROL SWITCH 930047517-01 E22 2E22C003 VERITY PROPER OILER SETTING 940059405-01 E22 2122C003 OIL SEAL LEAKING / REPLACE COUPLING 940060451-01 E31 2PDS-E31N010D SWITCH WILL NOT REPEAT 940056933-01 E31 2TS-E31N608A RILEY OUT OF CALIBRATION 940060727-01 E32 2E32B001J PERFORM 18 MONTH INSPECTION PER EQ-LS018 930047999-01 E32 2PT-E32N056 VENT VALVE WOULD OPEN ONLY 1 TURN 940057986-01 E51 2E51C002 REMOVE, INSPECT, CLEAN & REPLACE .

940057955-01 E51 2E51D001 RUPTURED, DISASS/ INSPECT & REPLACE t 940057959-01 ES1 2E51D004 INSPECT FOR WATER LEAKAGE 940057985-01 E51 2E51D008 INSPECT LINE 2RI13A-1" 940057962-01 E51 2E51D010A INSPECT FOR WATER LEAKAGE 940057958-01 E51 2E51D010B INSPECT FOR WATER LEAKAGE 940057956-01 E51 2E51F040 DISASSEMBLE AND INSPECT 930042727-01 E51 2PS-E51NO34 INSTALL JUMPER ACROSS TERMINALS GG1 AND 003 940057993-01 E51 2PI-E51R001 CHECK OPERATION OF 2E51-R001 + 2E51-NO34 940057984-01 E51 2E51000 CHECK FOR TURBINE SPEED PICK UP

=. \

1 ATTACHMENT A l SAFETY-RELATED MAINTENANCE COMPLETED 1 (NON-0UTAGE RELATED) l

..................................--UNIT 2------------------------------------

1 WRNUM SYS EPN DESCRIPTION i 930047515-01 E51 2E51C003 VERIFY PROPEA OILER SETTING 940058044-01 E51 2E51C003 OIL LEAKAGE l 930047460-01 FC 2FC03PA REPLACE OILER WITH GLASS BUBBLER j 930047461-01 FC 2FCO3PB REPIPE OILER To DRAIN PLUG l 940058136-01 B13 2H13P601 OPEN INDICATION LOST WHEN VALVE FULL OPEN 940081944-01 PL 2PL76J PANEL FAILED LIS-PC-207 940060927-01 PL 2PL77J READINGS ARE SWINGING ERRATICALLY 940068536-01 PL 2PL77J READINGS ERRATIC 940080374-01 PL 2PL77J VENDOR TO INSPECT / TROUBLESHOOT l 940068117-01 RD 2RD000 REPLACE DIAPHRAGMS AND GASKETS ON NCU'S I 940061140-01 RF 2RF000 REMOVE / INSPECT FLOW ORIFICE l 940058016-01 RI 2RI000 INSPECTION 940058045-01 RI 2RIl0B REPLACE 2RIl0B-3/4" 940060716-01 VG 2VG003 PERFORM INSPECTION PER EQ 940072471-01 VG 2VG003 EQ INSPECTION AND TEST SPRINGPACE 930046229-01 VG 2FC-VG003 RPLC ELECTROLYTE CAPACITORS PER EQ-LS060 940060752-01 VG 2FI-VG003 INSTALL YELLOW BAND FROM 0 TO 5,000 CFM '

930046230-01 VG 2FB-VG009 REPLACE ELECTROLYTIC CAPACITORS PER EQ-LS061 930046231-01 VG 2FS-VG036 REPLACE ELECTROLYTIC CAPACITORS.PER ES-LS061 l 940072794-01 VQ 2VQO37 PERFORM EQ INSPECTION OF MOV l 940072808-01 VQ 2VQO38 PERFORM EQ INSPECTION OF MOV l 940058009-01 VR 2VR04YA REPLACE ACTUATOR LUBRICANT ,

940058010-01 VR 2VR05YA REPLACE ACTUATOR LUBRICANT l 940058839-01 VE 2VE02Y DAMPER DOESN'T RESPOND TO CHANGES IN TEMP l 940057688-01 VE 2VE08Y LEAKS GREASE ON FLOOR FROM ACTUATOR SEAFT l l

l l

i e I c.

): ' ATTwmunuT 5 II.B UNIT SIUTDONNS f (UNIT 1) j t

DATE: 940122 GENERATOR OFF.LINE: 214.0 OUTAG7 TYPE: Scheduled (L1M05)

(YY3BEDD) (Bours) ,

REASON: .~ Maintenance Outage to replace the '1A' Reactor Recirculation Pump seals.

i CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Replacement of the 1321F0135 safety relief valve.

I Replacement of the 1521F013J safety relief valve.

Replacement of ITE switchgear breakers. .

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (FIF/LERS if applicable): None.

I RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE / EXPOSURE OVER 10% ALLONABLE VALUES: None.  !

l SAFETY RELATED CORIECTIVE MAINTENANCE COIEPLETED: [

NRNUM SYS RPN Description ,

940057368 01 MS 1521F013D LEAEING, RPLC W/ANOTEER OF SAME SET PRESSURE DATE: 940131 GENERATOR OFF-LINE: 10.7 OUTAGE TYPE: Forced (L1F23)

(YYleIDD) (Bours)

REASON: Main Turbine trip due to a Moisture Separator Drain Tank high level. .

1 CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Identification of cause of high tank level.  ;

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LERS if applicable): PIF #3732009400238PIF.

RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE / EXPOSURE OVER 10% ALLOWABLE VALUES: None. t A.

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE COMPLET?De  !

t WRNUM SYS EPN Description  !

940057269 01 DC 1DC06E REPLACE WITE IDICP BREAEER AND ADJUST SETPOINT ,

DhTE: 940218 GENERATOR OFF-LINE: 664.0 OUTAGE TYPE: Forced (L1F26)  !

(YYleIDD) (Hours)  !

REASON: Manual scram to repair a Main Condenser 'C' boot seal leak. l CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Replacement of Main Condenser 'C' hood boot seal.

Replacement of Main Condenser 'A' hood boot seal. [

'A' and 'B' Reactor Recirculation Pump flow control  ;

valve actuator replacements.  ;

'D' Condensate pump rebuild.

Replacement of damper actuators on Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers.

P CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LERf if applicable): PIF #3732009400302PIF.

RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE / EXPOSURE OVER 10% ALLOWABLE VALUES: None.

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE COMPLETED: None.

t h

i m,; .

q )

,, s

'4

- ATTACNIEENT E l II.E UNIT SNUTDONES '

(UNIT 1) i

.DnTE: 940313 ammm1 TOR OFF.LINE: 2432.8 OUTAGE TYPE: Scheduled (L1R06)

(YTINEDD) (Ecurs)  !

REASON: Refuel outage.

CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: See Appendix 1.  !

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LERG if applicable): None.'

RADIO &cTIVITY RELEASE /EEPOSURE OVER 10% ALMNIAELE VALUES: None.

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTEIIANCE COIEPLETED: See Appendia 5.

1}

DATE: 940623 aumanTOR OFF.LINE: 1.1 OUTAGE TYPE: Scheduled (L1M06)

(YYINEDD) (Bours) i REASON: Main Turbine overspeed test.  ;

CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Completion of overspeed testing.

I CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LERS if applicable): None.  !

RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE /EEPOSURE OVER 10% ALLONAELE VALUES: None. [

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE COMPLETED: None.

DATE: 940628 GENERATOR OFF.LINE: 0.7 OUTAGE TYPE: Scheduled (L1M07) '!

(YYINEDD) (Ecurs) ,

REASON: Main Turbine overspeed test. f CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Completion of overspeed test.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LERG if applicable): None.

EADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE /EEPOSURE OVER 10% ALLOWAELE VALUES: None. ,

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE COMPLETED: None.

............................................................................... j DATES 940629 GENERATOR OFF.LINE: 1.2 OUTAGE TYPE: Scheduled (LIMOS)  ;

(YYINEDD) (Bours) 1 REASON: Main Turbine overspeed test. j CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Completion of overspeed test. l l

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LER# if applicable): None. I RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE /EEPOSURE OVER 10% ALLOWAELE VALUES: None.

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTERIANCE ColfPLETED: None.

1 i

I ATTACEMENT 5

,. II.B UNIT SNUTDONES (UNIT 1).

i L ...............................................................................

!- DhTE: 940705 GENERATOR OFF.LINE: 51.2 OUTAGE TYPE:-' Forced (L1F25)

(YYIBRDD) (Ecurs) l REASON: Reactor scran due to the Reactor Water Level Control signal loss j to the '15' Turbine Driven Reactor Feed Pump speed controller CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Troubleshooting and repair of the Foodwater control system.

b CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (FIF/LERG if applicable): PIF #3731809401614PIF ,

LER 894-010 l RADICACTIVITY RELEASI/IEPOSURE OVER 10% ALLONABLE VALUES: None.

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE C00tPLETED: None.

DATE: 940708 GENERATOR OFF-LINE: 83.3 OUTAGE TYPE: Forced (L1F26)

(YYletDD) (Ecurs)

REASON: Reactor scram due to Feedwater signal spike following a Main Turbine trip due to a high Reactor water level signal.

CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Troubleshooting and repair of the Feedwater control i system. 1 Inspection and repair of Main Turbine thermocouples l and vibration probes. 1 Inspection of the '1B' Diesel Generator air boxes.

Inspection and repair of a thermocouple for the

'1A' Reactor Recirculation Pump.  ;

Inspection of the linkage for a 345 kv main power i transformer disconnect.

Repair of the 'C' Source Range Monitor of the Neutron Monitoring system CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LER8 if applicable): PIF #3731809401641PIF LER 894-011 RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE /EEPOSURE OVER 10% ALLOWABLE VALUES: None.

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ColtPLETED: None.

I. -

. . j

-8 /

ATTACEMENT 5-II.B UNIT SEUTDOWNS  ;

(UNIT 1). .j DATE: 941212 8E8828170R OFF.LINE: 126.8 OUTAGE TYPE: Forced (L1F27) l (YYINEDD) (Ecurs)  ;

i REASON: Primary Containment isolation and a Reactor scran dus to Main J Steam Isolation Valve limit switch actuation from Main Steam Line Righ

' Flow signal.

l l

CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Identification of the isolation signal.

Repair of the Rod Position Indication System. l t

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (FIF/LERG if applicable): PIF 83731809402588PIF LER 894 015 l RADIQACTIVITY RELEASE /EEPOSURE OVER 10% ALLOM1BLE VALUES: None.

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTEMANCE COMPLETED:

WRNUE SYS EPN Description 940089193 01 LC 1PDIS.531N009C SWITCE WILL NOT REPEAT. SWITCE CYCLED i ANYNEERE FROM 98 PSID. <

940089193 02 LC 1PDIS.E31N009B SWITCH WILL NOT REPEAT. SWITCH CYCLED ANYNEERE FROM 98 PSID.

940090139 01 RI 1RY.C51E601A READING ERRATICALLY ON FRONT AND BACE PANEL.

l I

DATE: 941219 GENERATOR OFF.LINE: 78.8 OUTAGE TYPE: .'orced(L1F28) '

(YYINEDD) (Bours)

RRESON: Manual reactor scram due to problems with the Rod Position i Indication System.  ;

CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Troubleshooting and repair of the Rod Position

• Indication System.

Repair of the '16B' Heater mergency drain valve .

1ED059B.  !

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LERG if applicable): PIF #3732019402622PIF RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE /EEPOSURE OVER 10% ALLOWABLE VALUES: None. .

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE COMPLETED: None.

5 u

l i

,, ATTACEMENT B- i II.B UNIT SEUTDOWNS .!

(UNIT 2): i DhTE: 940108 GENERATOR OFF.LINE: 242.3 -OUTAGE TYPE: Scheduled (L2N09) e (YY3AIDD) (Bours)

REASON: I$aintenance Outage for Main Steam Isolation Valve repair. Reactor  !

scran during startup activities while on shell warming the Main Turbine due to personnel error. I CRITICAL ACTIVITY PA'3: Repair of the stoaa leaks on the 2321.RSELV1 valve. f Repair of the '2A' Source Range Monitor.  ;

Replacement of the limit switches for the r Main Steam Isolation Valves 822A','22D',828A' -

and '2858 j CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LER$ if applicable): PIF #3741809400108PIF LER 894 001  ;

RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE /EEPOSURE OVER 10% ALLONABLE VALUES: None.

t SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE COMPLETED: None.

• DhTE: 940621 GENERATOR OFF.LINE: 112.2 OUTAGE TYPE: Forced (L2F20) I (YYIGEDD) (Bours)

REASON: Automatic reactor scram due to the tripping of the Feedwater breaker to switchgear 231A and 2313 and vessel low level.

CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Repairs of the 'D' Intermediate Range Monitors. l Reactor Recirculation snubber replacement and testing.

Repair and testing of the 231A and 231B switchgear.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (P!F/LERG if a:pplicable): PIF #3741809401557PIF LER 894 004 RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE / EXPOSURE OVER 10% ALLOWABLE VALUES: None.

t I

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE COMPLETED: None.

DATE: 940825 GENERATOR OFF.LINE: 132.9 OUTAGE TYPE: Forced (L2F21) r (YYIstDD) (Hours)

REASON: Reactor scram due to spurious opening of the Main Tarbine Bypass '

Valves. ,

CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Troubleshooting and repair of the Electro Hydraulic  !

Control System. ,

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LER8 if applicable): PIT 83741809401930PIF LER 894 006 i

RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE / EXPOSURE OVER 10% ALLONABLE VALUES: None.

SAFETY RELkTED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE COMPLETED: None.

i l  :

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_ATTACNNENT B II.B UNIT SEUTDONNS (UNIT 2)

DATE: 941019 manum 1T01 0FF-LINE: 129.3 OUTAGE TYPE: Forced (L2F22)

(TTINEDO) (Ecurs)

REASON: Reactor scran due to Electro-Eydraulic Control line break.

l CRITICRL ACTIVITY PATNs Inspection and repairs of the Electro Eydraulic- 1 Control system.

Repairs of the Generator Voltage Regulator.

Solenoid repairs of both Feodwater Turbines.

Repairs of the 'E','F' and 'O' Intermediate Range Monitors.

Repair of the 'A' Source Range Noaitor.

CORABCTIVE ACTIONS (FIF/LERS if applicable): PIF 83741809402280PIF L. . 008 l

RADIOACTIVITY maang/g1POSURE OVER 10% ALI4tlABLE VALUES: None.

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE COMPLETED:

1 WANUM SYS EPN Description )

940061677 01 PL 2PL773 BOTE OIYGEN AND EYDR00EN READINGS OSCILLATED 940076500 01 NR 2RR-C51R603D F IRN READING EIGNER TRAN OTHERS 940076501-01 NR 2RY-C51K6019 EXIIBITED EXCESSIVE NOISE FOLLOWING SCRAN 940076665-01 PL 2PL76J READING LON DURING SAMPLING AND FAILED SPAN .

940077143-01 RP 2ES-C715006C TURE STOP VLV. 83 RPS LEVEL SWITCH 2C71-N006C NOT FUNCTIONING l

l l

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____________j

m.

i

-ATTACEMENT C II.E FORCED REDUCTIONS IN POWER GREATER TEAN 20% IN DESIGN POWER LEVEL (UNIT 1)

DATE: 940122 OPERATION AT REDUCED POWER: 19.0 '

(YYMMDD) (Hours)

REASON: Power reduction for a maintenance outage for the repair of '1A' Reactor Recirculation Pump seals.

CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: None.

1 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (FIF/LERG if applicable): None.

RADICACTIVITY RELEASE /EEPOSURE OVER 10% ALLOWABLE VALUES: None. ,

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE COMPLETED: None.

DATES 940218 OPERATION AT REDUCED POWER: 5.0 (YTMMDD) (Hours)

REASON: Inspection of the Main condenser for leakage. Unit was taken to shutdown condition to repair boot seal leakage. .

CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: None. ,

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LERS if applicable): None. ,

RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE /EEPOSURE OVER 10% ALLOWABLE VALUES: None.

i SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE COMPLETED: None. l (UNIT 2) ,

DATE: 940107 OPERATION AT REDUCED POWEP.: 11.7 (YYMMDD) (Hours)

REASON: Power reduction for a maintenance outage for the Main Steam Isolation Valves. '

CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: None.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LER8 if applicable): None. '

RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE /EEPOSURE OVER 10% ALLOWABLE VALUES: None.

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE COMPLETED: None.

DATE: 940428 OPERATION AT REDUCED POWER: 71.0 (YYNMDD) (Hours)

REASON: Power reduction to take the '2B' Condensate Pump off-line due to high vibration levels.

CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Investigation of high vibration levels.

Changeout of speed increaser gear set.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LER8 if applicable): 3742009400165PIF RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE /EEPOSURE OVER 10% ALLOWABLE VALUES: None.

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE COMPLETED: None.

i

,o ATTACEMENT C

, II.B FORCED REDUCTIONS IN POWER GREATER TEAN 20% IN DESIGN POWER LEVEL (UNIT 2)

DATE: 940527 OPERATION AT REDUCED POWER: 10.0 (YY1BEDD) (Bours)

REASON: Power reduction to repair the '26B' Feedwater Beater normal drain valve 2ED026E.

CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Perfore.ance of valve repair.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LERS if applicable): 3742019401347PIF RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE /EIPOSURE OVER 10% ALLOWABLE VALUES: None.

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE NAINTENANCE CONPLETED: None.

DATE: 940926 OPERATION AT REDUCED POWER: 444.0 (YYMMDD) (Bours)

REASON: Power reduction to perform maintenance on the 82A' and '2D' Condensate Pumps.

CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Repair of the Condensate Pumps.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LER9 if applicable): 3742019402146PIF RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE /EEP08URE OVER 10% ALLOWABLE VALUES: None.

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE COMPLETED: None.

DATE: 941026 OPERATION AT REDUCED POWER: 83.0 (YY10EDD) (Bours)

REASON: Power reduction due to loss of the 'C' Condensate pump.

CRITICAL ACTIVITY PATE: Inboard pump bearing inspection.

Bearing replacement.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (PIF/LER9 if applicable): 3742009402330PIF RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE /EIPOSURE OVER 10% ALLOWABLE VALUES: None.

SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE CONPLETED: None.

< lx, j

l h Attcchment D l

SURVEY OF CHLORINE SHIPMENT IN THE VICINITY OF LA SALLE COUNTY STATION l

A. DURODUCTION  !

i 4

'Ihis survey of chlorine shipments 5e= the 1975,1986,1988 and 1991 surveys. Storage facilities and bulk users of chlorine within a five mile radius of T mhlla station are identified in this report. Also included are the shippers and modes of transportation of chlorine shipments.

The purpose of the survey is to review the shipment of chlorine by barge on the Blinois River i near Imhlte Station. 'Ihis information is used to evaluate the need for special protective measures against chlorine to ensure control room habitability. The information collected during '  ;

the 1994 survey is consistent with the previous surveys, and supports the conclusion that no j special protective provisions against chlorine are required at LaSalle County Station. j B. REGULNIORY GUIDES i

'Ihe applicable regulatory guide is 1.78, " Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a  :

Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical- Release."

Regulatory Guide 1.95, " Protection of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Against an i Accidental Chlorine Release," describes types of chlorine releases and methods of protection  !

against these releases.  !

(

Position 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.78 states that chlorine stored or situated at distance greater than i five miles from the station does not have to be considered in the analysis of control room l habitability. '

i C. ORIGINAL SURVEY EXPLANATION  !

The location of the plant and the transportation routes in the vicinity of the site are described in .;

section 2.1.1 of the l2Salle County Station Final Safety Analysis report (FSAR). FSAR section l

2.2.2 describes the industrial facilities, products and materials, pipelines, waterways located nearby and projections of industria! ;;rowth. There are no industries or bulk users of chlorine i within a five miles radius of the plant. FSAR section 2.2.2.4 briefly describes the uses of the l Illinois River in the vicinity of the plant as a waterway. j 1

FSAR section 2.2.3.1 states that the Blinois River is the only transportation route carrying  ;

hazardous materials within 5 miles of the plant. Section 2.2.3.2.c requires that this survey be i performed every three years to ensure that a chlorine hazard does not exist. FSAR table'2.2 4  !

listed the commodities shipped on the Illinois River in 1974. 'Ihere was no break down on {

chemical shipments to provide data on chlorine shipments. 'Ihe original survey showed that small  !

quantities of chlorine were being used by the Illinois Nitrogen Corporation, appro.Jmately 5 l miles north of the station. 'Ihere was not enough information available to determine that Illinois  !

Nitrogen was not receiving chlorine shipments by barge. Therefore, in order to expedite the l station licensing process, chlorine detectors were installed in the outside air intake of the control l 1

. j i

o .

- Atto;hment 0 - icontinued) room ventilation' system.

t D. CURRENT SURVEY  ;

A current list of active chlorine barges in the U.S. and Canada are shown in table 1. According to the Institute's Vice President, he is not aware of any chlorine barges operating on the Illinois River.

Table 2 list the government agencies and trade organizations contacted. None of these organizations are aware of any chlorine shipments by semi or barge within a 5 mile radius of the station.

N Marine Safety Office records show that no barge terminals betwa the Starved Rock and Dresden locks can recieve a chlorine barge. 'Ihe Marine Safety Office is a division of the U.S.  :

Coast Guard.

The results of this survey are the same as the 1991 chlorine survey and summarized below:

the Chlorine Institute is not aware of any chlorine shipments on the Illinois River.

area business located along the river either do not use chlorine at all or use it in small ;

bottle quantities. These business are: Kaiser-Estech, Inc.; Texas Gulf Chemical Co.; l Continental Grain; Black Marine; Shipyard Terminal & Industrial Park, Seneca, IL.; and Quantum Chemical.

i no chlorine barges operate on the Illinois River.

E. CONCLUSION OF FINDINGS t No significant amounts of chlorine traffic, within a five mile radius'of LaSalle Station, was found to exist. 'Ihere are no chlorine barge terminals located between the Marseilles and Dresden locks on the Illinois River. 'Ihe conclusion of the 1994 survey is that no chlorine of a significant amount is transported within a five mile radius of LaSalle Station, therefore chlorine detectors on the supply air intake of the control room ventilation system are not m*=y.

n f

y 9

a

[ .

Attcchment D - (continued)

TABLE 1 ACTIVE CHLORINE BARGES IN THE U.S. AND CANADA OWNER REPORTING BARGE NOS NOMINAL CI, MARKS CAPACITY (10N)

Canadian Oxy (1) Metlakatla* 900 (3 x 300)

Occidental (10) OCC 1103 - 1111 1100 (4 x 275) 1100 (4 x 275) 1100 (4 x 275)

Chet Roberts

• 600 (2 x 300)

Olin (7) SBI 601 - 603 1110 (6 x 185)

OMCC 651 & 652 100 (4 x 275)

OL 654 & 655 1050 (4 x 262+)

Elf Atochem (2) Tyee* 1200 (4 x 300)

Totem

• 1200 (4 x 300)

PPG Industries (8) PPG 400 - 407 1100 (4 x 275)

• Coast-wise barges, operate in Pacific Northwest, rest on intercostal waterways.

F c;.

c :,

r. Attcetunent D - (continued) >

+

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND TRADE ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED ,

1. Chlorine Institute, Washington, D.C.

2. Illinois Department of Transportation, Hazardous Materials Division., Springfield,

• IL. .

3 3.. Lockmaster, Dresden lock and Dam. -

4. U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, Rock Island, IL.

5. U.S. Coast Guard, Chicago, IL.

6. U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Marine Safety, Marine Safety, Burt Ridge. IL.

t l

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.c. Atte.ctument D - (continued)

REFERENCES l t

1. Mr. Michwl Iey0n, Chlorine Institute, Washington , D.C. (202) 775-2790. i Personal comrmmication. ,

2. Mr. Tom Wise, Illinois D#s.t of Transportation, Hazardous Materials Division, . i Springfield, IL. (217) 785-3064.- Personal communication.

3. Imekmaster, Dresden Dam, Morris, IL. (815) 942-0840, Personal communication.

4. Imekmaster, Starved Rock Imck and Dam, Utica, IL. (815) 667-4114, Personal communication.  ;

5. Mr. Jim Hinde, Marine Safety Office, U.S. Coast Guard, Burr Ridge, IL. (708) 789-  !'

SR30, Personal communication.

6. Mr. Paul Soyke, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Rock Island, IL. (309) 794-5231, i Personal communication. ,

7. Mr. Jerry Starkey, Quantum Chemical Corporation, USI Division, Morris, IL. (815) l 942-7285. Personal communication. i l

8. Clerk, Kaiser-Estech, Inc., Marseilles, IL. (815) 795-4151. Personal communication. l

9. Mr. Paul Decoke, Texas Gulf Chemical Co. Marseilles,' IL. (815) 795-5111, Personal communication. i i

10. Mr. George Lamb, Shipyard Terminal and Industrial Park, Seneca, IL. (815) 357--  ;

6721. Personal cornmunication  ;

11. Black Marine, Inc. Seneca, IL. (815) 357-6666 l i

i l

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f' ,_ q.

Oge(

• APPEEDIX A' CRITICA1s PATE ACTIVITIES REFUEL OUTAGE (L1R06)

- ' Station Auxiliary Transfoamer available

'A' Feel Fool Cooling essergency anakeup available

• E' Fuel Pool Cooling emergency anskaup available

-Cool Reactor to cold shutdown .,

Inspect Drywell at pressure  !

Establish 'A' Shutdown cooling  !

'B' Shutdown Cooling functional 5

'A' Shutdown Cooling functional -i Emin Turbine Generator off-line  ;

'A' Fuel. Pool Cooling available  ;

'Be Fuel Pool cooling available

'O'-Diesel Generator operable' .

'B' Loar Pressure Core Injection functional .

• B' Residual Beat Removal available for decay. heat (

i

• Be Diesel Generator operable .

Station Auxiliary Transforseer functional '

'A' Diesel Generator operable )

• B' Loer Pressure Core Injection functional 1 Eigh Pressure Core Spray inservice test  !

Run 'A' Residual Meet Removal for Suppression Pool  !

Secure 'A' Shutdown Cooling ..

l Unit Aux Transformer and Main Power out of service  ;

Shutdown Cooling.from 'A' RER to 'B' RER i

• B' Diesel Generator Out of' Service ]

'B' Loer Pressure Core Injection flush .

'C' Loar Pressure Core Injection flush Comunence Division III maintenance i Cassmence Division I maintanance  !

i Eigh Pressure core Spray leak testing

'C'.. Residual Esat Resnoval system leak testing Reactor Mead removed Cavity floodup .

i Casumance Safety Relief Valve maintenance )

Fuel Pool cooling as shutdown Cooling alternate l Install Emin Steam line plugs i Drain Main Steam lines j

'n' Diesel Generator trip and trip bypass test ,

'A' Residual Beat Removal systema leak testing l

'C' Lour Pressure Core Injection functional test Commaance Division III DC battery maintenance .

Oil circuit areaker 10 11 inspection Loir Pressure Core Spray leak testing ,

Remove Fuel Pool gates Inspect Refuel Bridge interlocks  !

Unioed Reactor Core .

Unit Aux Transforsner backfeed available ,

Unit Aux Transforsner available  !

'A' Diesel Generator out of service Consmance Division II DC battery maintenance  ;

Eigh Pressure Core Spray boundary out of service  ;

Station Aux Transformer out of service Commence control Rod Drive maintenance l Ccessence Division II maintenance ]

Reactor Core unloaded j Change out Lour Power Range Monitors

'A' Diesel Generator trip and trip bypass test Cassmence Division I DC battery snaintenance

'B' Loir Pressure Core Injection functional test 011 circuit Breaker.1 13 inspection Cavity drain doorn for chemical decontamination

'A' Diesel Generator operability test

'A' Diesel Generator operable Reactor Vessel drain down Division I batteries operable Station Aux Transformer operable

'O' Diesel Generator trip and trip bypass test i

i 4 , . J. ., , , , , . _ -, ~ - _

_ _ . - - _ . - - . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ -____I

7, m . ,

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2.: -

p [*E APPEEDIE A

?g ~

CRITICAL PATE ACTIVITIES l'

REPUEL OUTAGE (L1R06). l

, ................................................................................ i SeritekSear 1341 and 134b out of service

• 0* Diesel.. Generator operable 2:4.or Control Center 1323 1,3,4,5 out of service i t suppression Pool cleanup available Refill Reactor vessel-  ;

f' Retill. Reactor cavity-  !

'B' Diesel Generator operubility test  !

'38. Diesel Generator operable l j

'A Diesel Generator start and load acceptance test 1 Division III batteries opacable .

'B' Diesel Generator start and load acceptance test  !

Reactor Protection System Bus 'A' transfer .j Righ Pressure core Spray operability test  ;

'B' Diesel Generator 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> run Div III meer Core Cooling response time test ' i

'O' Diesel Generator start and load acceptance test .:

aus 141Y out of service  !

'A' Fuel Fool cooling system available-  ;

'A Fuel Pool Cooling emergency makeup available  ;

Loir Press Core Spray operability and pressure test 'l

'A' Diesel Generator operable  !

Eigh Pressure Core Spray operable  !

Mydrolase Jet Pumps j Division II batteries operable '

Complete control Rod Drive work i

'O' Diesel Generator 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> run

'A' ' Residual Neat Removal operability and press test ,

'A' Loir Pressure Core Injection  !

Division I response time test  !

• 08 Diesel Generator operable .

acCS Division I in service _

'A' Shutdown Cooling operable -

ll 6 Lour Pressure Core Spray operable Puol Pool gates removed  !

Load fuel l

' A' Fuel Pool cooling as alternate shutdoern cooling i

'B' Fuel Pool Cooling as alternate shutdoern cooling i

'C' Residual Beat Removal operability and Rydro ]

'C' Loir Pressure Core Injection operable  ;

complete Safety Relief Valve work I

'B' Residual Neat Removal operability and hydro i

'A' Diesel Generator 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> run j Div II Ener Core Cooling System response time test I

'B' Loer Pressure Core Injection operable )

'B' Shutdoorn Cooling operable  !

'B' Residual Neat Reasoval available for decay heat -j Install Fuel Pool gate J Unit Aux Transformer and Main Poeper out of service sus 152 out of service sus 152 energized Reactor vessel hydro preparation Install Moisture Seperator Reactor wtr Cleanup as alt for shutdoern cooling Lour Pressure Core Spray flush Eigh Pressure Core Spray flush Reactor vessel hydro Install Drywell heaG

$ Integrated leak rate test Main Condenser as alternate for decay heat ressoval Mode switch to startup Mode switch to run l

,-- - - - . + ~-. .. - .- . . - . - - , - . - - , ,+ - , . , - .w, -- - - , --. - -

e APPENDIX D

. REFUELING OUTAGE (L1R06)

. SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE WRNUM SYS EPN DESCRIPTION 940058214=01 CM iPI-CM056 GE-150 COULD NOT BE ADJUSTED 940059973-01 CM 1PI-CM056 INDICATOR IS PEGGED LOW 940059009-01 CM 1CM102 FAILED TO OPERATE

( 940059693-01 CM 1CK23BA REPLACE LINE l 940059214-01 C11 1C11D001 MISSING COVERS AT 2 LOCATIONS: 18-27 + 1807 l 940059276-01 C11 1C11D003111 LEAKS AROUND STEM WHEN VALVE IS CLOSED 920040513-01 C11 1C11D001014 LEAKAGE DURING PERFORMANCE OF LTS-1100-17 940059103-01 C11 1C11D027111 VALVE PACKING LEAKING 940057524-01 C11 1C11D001065 DOUBLE NOTCHING 940059355-01 C11 1C11D001104 VALVE IS CHATTERING OFF ITS SEAT 940059503-01 C11 1C11D001115 LEAKS AT INSTRUMENT BI4CK 940059210-01 C11 1C11D001137 SCRAM VALVES FAILED TO DEENERGIZE

940059036-01 C11 1C11D001167 SCRAM VALVES FAILED TO DEENERGIEE l 940059244-01 C11 1PS-C11N020 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE PSIG OF TRIP l 940059245-01 C11 iPS-C11N021 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059246-01 C11 1PS-C11NO34 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059247-01 C11 1PS-C11NO35 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059248-01 C11 1PS-C11NO38 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE

940059249-01 C11 1PS-C11N049 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059250-01 C11 1PS-C11N055 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059251-01 C11 1PS-C11N073 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059252-01 C11 1PS-C11N074 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE I

940059253-01 C11 1PS-C11N075 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059254-01 C11 iPS-C11N101 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059255-01 C11 1PS-C11N105 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059256-01 C11 1PS-C11N118 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059257-01 C11 1PS-C11N134 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059258-01 C11 1PS-C11N135 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059259-01 C11 1PS-C11N144 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059260-01 C11 1PS-C11N146 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059261-01 C11 1PS-C11N150 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059262-01 C11 iPS-C11N163 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059098-01 C11 1PS-C11N170 SWITCM DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059263-01 C11 1PS-C11N178 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059264-01 C11 1PS-C11N190 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059265-01 C11 1LS-C11N247 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE l 940059266-01 C11 1PS-C11N387 SWITCH DOES NOT ACTUATE 940059496-01 C11 1PI-C11R052 BROKEN / UNABLE TO READ PRESEURE 940060108-01 C11 1PI-C11R052 LOOSES PRESSURE l 930046399-01 C11 1C11F102079 WITHDRAWAL LINE VENT VALVE LEAKING 940059574-01 C41 1C41M600A ALARM CHATTERING IN & OUT 940060104-01 C51 1RY-C51K600CA COUNTS FAILING DOWNSCALE/INOP 940060150-01 C51 1RY-C51K600CA VOLTAGE REG +15 VDC READING 13.2 l 930041579-01 C51 1RY-C51K600DB SHORT PERIODS ALARMS IN CONDITIONS 4 AND 5 l 940060082-01 C51 1RY-C51K605C LPRM IS DRIFTING l 940058251-01 C71 1C71AK010B CONTACTS FAILED TO CLOSE l 940058249-01 C71 1C71AK010E CONTACTS FAILED TO CLOSE l 940058209-01 C71 1071AK16B COIL BUZZING 940058151-01 DC 1DC01E REPLACE POST NUTS FOR INDIVIDUAL CELLS 940058641-01 DC 1DC07E REPLACE BATTERY 940058476-01 DC 1DC14E REPLACE BATTERY 940059046-01 DC 1DC11E PERFORM REQUIRED MAINT ON BUS AND BRKRS 940058625-01 DG 1DG000 OIL FITTING LEAKING OIL 930047US-01 DG 1TS-DG040 TEMP SW NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY 940058 mig-01 DG 1DG049A VALVE STUCK OPEN 7

94005G966-01 DG 1DG341007X BOLTING DOES NOT FULLY PENETRATE NUTS 930044730-01 DG 1TS-DG901B INSP FOR PROPER OPERATION OF DRYER 940058570-01 DO 1DOO5T DAY TANK " MAN-WAY" COVER GASKET LEAKING 940059516-01 D18 1RIY-D18K751D WOULD NOT RESPOhT 940058654-01 D18 1RE-D18N009D FAILED DOWNBCALE 940060179-01 EH 1EH000 #3 + #4 DID NOT CLOSE SIMULTANEOUSLY 940059995-01 E12 1ESO-E12F041B TOP LIMIT SWITCH IS BROKEN 930046260-01 E12 1E12F041B IKDICATING ROD FAILS TO MOVE 920048569-01 E12 1E12F050B SEALTITE IS PULLED FROM ITS FITTING

.r. m - - ._ -- . _ . - _ _

4  :

.f . . ,

.y APPENDIX D  ;

g.. REFUELING OUTAGE (L1R06)

.! SAFETr RELATED m ===eTIVE NAINTENANCE l NEMENE ~SYS -EPN DESCRIPTION {

940059998-01 312 ^ 1ES-312F0505 INDICATES CLOSED WITE B rem 3DC ON i 940058591-01 E12 1E12F0503 FAILED MIGE PRESS MATER LEAK TEST t

-940059290-01 E12 1E12F000 . PERFROM INSPECTION }

930048100-01 .312 1312F017A DISASSEMBLE AND INSPECT VALVE

-940059300-01 .312 1312F024A RENIRE ROMR 03 ,

940059073-01 E12 1E12F0245 INSPECT VALVE INTERNALS j 940059510-01 B12 1E12F0495 PACKING LEAK ^

940059282-01 E12 <1312F0641 TRIPPED TEERNAL OV m a m GOING OPEN 940057794-01 -512 1512F068A- PACKING L MK i

~930047233-01 .E12. 1512F0605 PACKING LEAK ,

940050855-01 312 1312F093 VALVE EAS INTERNAL SEAT LEAK 940058962-01 312 1512F099A HIGE RUNNING AMPS 920040370-01 'E12 1312F0995 SEALTITE IS FULLED FRON ITS FITTING ,

940059456-01 E12 1312F0995 VALVE NOT SEATING l 930041404-01 E12. 1512F3365 PACKING LEAK l 920048233-01 E12 1E12D3005 . REPLACE manen SECTIONS ON NAIN COVER j 940056901-01 E12 1E12F030 . INSPECT . l 930046038-01 E12 1E12F331A' UPPER GASKET IS LEAKING '[

940059302-01 312 1E12F359A CNBCK VALVE FAILED TO ISOLATE FLON L 940059303-01 E12 1E12F3595 CHECK VALVE FAILED TO ISOLATE FICN 8 940057921-01 E12 1E12C002A BEARING DEGRADATION .{

940059104-01 E12 1E12F015A IOCATE & REMOVE FOREIGN NETALLIC OBJECT l 940056962-01 E12 1512F072A VALVE LEAKING BY  !

930040850-01 E12 1E12F092C REPAIR PACKING LEAK  !

940059491-01 E12 1E12F0905 REPACK VALVE l 940059356-01 E12 1E12F337A STOP VALVE MISBNG PACKING RETAINER NUT  !

940059738-01 E21 1E21F012 WILL NOT CLOSE AGAINST PUNP DISCH PRESS l 940059307-01' E21 1E21C001 INTram* DIRTr  ;

940060059-01 E21 1521C002 BREAKER TRIPPED 940050653-01 E21 1E21F331 STEN DOES NOT NOVE '

940050481-01 E22 1STS-E223901 TROUBLESHOOT AND REPAIR AIR START NOMRS I 930044406-01 E31 1FT-E31N035 EQUALIEER VLV FOUND LEAKING BY  ;

940059761-01 332 1PT-E32N051A LhKING i 940059759-01 E32 1PT-E32N051E LEAKING  ?

940059760-01 E32 iPT-E32N0513 LEAKING 940059762-01 332 1PT-332N051N LEAKING 940058062-01 E32 1PI-E32R651A INDICATION ERRATIC f 940058021-01 E32 iPI-E32R658 UNCALIBRATABLE PER LIS-I4-106 $

i 940059837-01 E51 1 ESC-E51F004 DUAL INDICATION WHEN OPEN 940059836-01 E51 1 ESC-E51F025 DUAL INDICATION IN OPEN & CLOSED t 930046493-01 E51 1E51F054 AIR-REGULATOR TO VALVE LEAKING i 940059530-01 E51 1E51F065 PACK 7NG LEAK  ;

930046404-01 E51 1E51F013 VALVL BAS SMALL PACKING LEAK . l 940058409-01 E51 1E51F022 LEAKAuE DURING PERPORNANCE OF LTS-100-48 940059482-01 E51 1HS-E51AS001 CONTROL SNI'tCH STICKS IN THE CLOSE POSITION f 940057923-01 E51 1E51C002 RECALIBRATE t 940060123-01 E51 1E51F025 VALVE OPENS WITH AIR, DOES NOT CLOSE l' 940050463-01 E51 1E51F002 FAILS TO BOLD PRESS IN CLOSED POSITION 940054464-01 E51 1E51F004 FAILS TO HOLD PRESS IN CLOSED POSITION j 930045506-01 E51 1E51C001 PUNP FOUND LEAKING i i

940050013-01 F21 1PI-F21R901 NEEDS TO BE REALIGNED WITH THE FORCE SWITCH 940058642-01 G33 1933F004 FAILED LLRT-SEAT LEAKAGE NOTED AT VENT 940057989-01 NG 1HG005B LEAKING PAST VALVE SEAT

, 940058056-01 BG 1HG006A BREAKER TRIPPED WHILE VLV WAS OPENING '

940059458-01 NG 1HG006A TESTING SHONS HIGH DISK PULLOUT 940059963-01 NG 1HG000 UNABLE TO PERFORN LIS-MG-101 940058735-01 HP 1HP521804X ADD ADDITIONAL SPACER AT PIPE CLAMP 940050975-01 H13 1813P601 CONTACT STUCK OPEN 940058129-01 N13 1H13P622 WOULD NOT LIGHT 940059666-01 H13 1H13P801 PANEL NOT BOLTED PROPERLY 940058514-01 IA 11A186 REGUALTOR NEEDS TO BE CALIBRATED 940057982-01 IN 11NO38 LEAKING BY THE SEAT 940050261-01 IN IIN0958 CROSS THREADED 940059601-01 IN IIN097A DRAIN STOP VALVE LEAKS BY THE SEAT

t 9

= ,' i APPENDIX D

')' REPUELING OUTAGE (L1R06) l SAFETr RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTEMAuCE WRNUM SYS EPN DESCRIPTION 930046675-01 DG ODG01F UPSTREAM INSTRUMENT TAP IS PLUGGED STEUT SDG04-0005K MAS I4OSE IACK MUT 940059288-01 DG ODG040005X 940058770-01 DG OPS-DG119 CAINIOT ADJUST WITHIN CALIBRATION LIMITS 930045214-01 DO ODOO2T MANMAY COVER GASKET LEAKING 3 940058771-01 VC 0FE-VC0415 DAMPER STICKS IN CIASED POSITION  !

940057074-01 VC .0VC05CB DOES NOT ADBQUATELY COCL 4 940050192-01 VC OTT-VC145 REPAIR / REPLACE $

940059475-01 VC 0xY-VC1655 FLOW LIGHT NOT LIT j 930046352-01 VI OVE01CB REPAIR METAL SCREEN ON EUCTION SIDE OF FAN  ;

940050661-01 VI OVE04CA REPLACE FAULTY ETR Mf2muuT  !

940057924-01 VI OTI-VE044 Umanf2 TO CALIBRATE  !

940050590-01 47 1AP735 namarna DID NOT PASS TRIP TEST l

- 940059060-01 AP 1AP73E-D4 BREAKER DID NOT PASS TRIP TEST l 940059061-01 AP 1AP73E-D4 INSTALL NEW mawaren j 940058565-01 AP 1AP755-C3 A PHASE WOULN'T TRIP DURING TESTING  !

940059368-01 AP 1AP75E-C3-F AUX CONTACTS BAD, REPLACE ,

940050655-01 AP 1AP76E-A6 BREAKER FAILED TRIP TEST ,

940050847-01 AP 1AP76E-D5 BAD 74 RELkY/ REPLACE I 940059372-01 AP 1AP82E-E4 BROKEN, REPLACE f 910047920-01 AP 1AP000 OVERHEATING PC BOARD ON RELAY I 940059394-01 AP 1AP76E INSTL NEW 27" DOOR ON FRONT OF NCC COMPT F5 i 940058449-01 AP 1AP21E A PHASE AND C PHASE EC TRIP DEVICES LEAKING j 940057482-01 AP 1AP06E REFURB OPERATING MECHANISM  ;

940057503-01 AP 1APO4I REFURB OPERATING MECHANISM I 940057504-01 AP 1AP01E REFURB OPERATING MECHANISM l 940057506-01 AP 1AP08E REFURE OPERATING MECHANISM l 940057507-01 AP 1AP00E REFURB OPERATING MECHANISM  !

940057505-01 AP 1AP09E REFURS OPERATING MECHANISM t 940057508-01 AP 1AP093 REFURE OPERATING MECHANISM  !

920045978-01 B13 1RE-B13D193A LPRM IS DRIFTING  !

l 930047392-01 B13 1RE-513D193AK REPLACE 930043155-01 513 1RE-B13D193CK SPIKED UPSCALB AND CAUSED 1/2 SCRAM  !

930047393-01 B13 1RE-B13D193DT REPLACE l 930047395-01 313 1RE-B13D193E AEPLACE

• 940057360-01 B21 1821F013D LEAKING, REPLACE 930046943-01 521 1521F013K LEAKING, REPLACE p 930046944-01 B21 1821F013M LEAKING, REPLACE  !

930046946-01 521 1521F0138 LEAKING, REPLACE 920042217-01 521 1521F022B REPLACE AIR ACTUATOR l 920042210-01 B21 1521F028B REPLACE AIR ACTUATOR l 940050181-01 B21 1B21F410B REPLACE REAT DAMAGED CABLE t 940058039-01 B21 1821F040D LOW PRESSURE ALARM CAME IN DURING TESTING  !

940059835-01 B21 1821F3283 VALVE FAILED TO OPERATE WITH ADEQUATE FLOW >

910044464-01 521 1321F449 VALVE FAILED TO OPERATE WITH ADEQUATE FLOW l 910044463-01 321 1B21F475A VALVE FAILED TO OPERATE WITH ADEQUATE FLOW  !

940059816-01 521 1521F570 WOULD NOT RESET AFTER TESTING  !

930046653-01 321 1PS-321N020B SEAL TIGHT IS DAMAGED i 940058971-01 B21 1LT-B21N044A TRANSMITTER FAILED WHILE PERFORMING TEST  !

940059025-01 B21 1LT-B21N400C REC'D ALARMS FROM 1821-N400C & 1821-NA02C 940057705-01 521 1PT-B21N401A REPAIR  :

930040085-01 B33 1533F060B REPLACE UPPER THRUST BEARING AND PACKING l 940059486-01 B33 1B33F0235 PACKING LEAKAGE  ;

940059026-01 B33 1533F305B VALVE FAILED TO OPERATE -

920040257-01 533 1533F317A VALVE FAILED TO OPERATE l 940050128-01 333 1833F339B DUAL INDICATION WHEN VALVE WAS CLOSED >

930046321-01 B33 1B33F026B VALVE MANDMMEEL IS STRIPPED I 940059877-01 B33 1833F029 YOKE NUT RIDES UP THE STEM WHEN CLOSING l 940050967-01 CM 1CM002 REPLACE INTERNALS 940058516-01 CM 1CM022A LEAK PAST SEAT 940050515-01 CM 1CM014A LEAK PAST SEAT 940057655-01 CM 1CM025A STAYED OPEN ON SYS SHUTDOWN 940058015-01 CM 1LR-CM027 LED DISPLAY NOT LIT 940057669-01 CM 1TR-CM037B DIGITAL INDICATION N _~ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ - __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1 4

f g, APPENDIX D l REFUELING OUTAGE (L1R06)

}$ SAFETY RELATED CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE WRNUM SYS EPN DESCRIPTION 940059603-01 IN 1IN098C VENT VALVE FOR ACCUMULATOR LEAKS 940059602-01 IN 11N098U VENT VALVE FOR ACCUMULATOR LEAKS 940059945-01 LL 1LL39E BREAKER TRIPS, WILL NOT RESET l 940059101-01 LP iLP17A REMOVE ARC STRIKE Ts PERFORM NDE l 940059145-01 LP LP28 1039X SUPPORT-SWIVEL BUSHING IS PARTIALLY OUT 940059143-01 LP 1LP281040X REPAIR SUPPORT BUSHING 940059860-01 LV 1Lv95E FAB ta INSTL COVERPLATE FOR INBOARD SIDE 940059650-01 MS 1MS000 WEST SPRING CAN ON SUPPORT IS DETACHED 940058331-01 NB 1NB15A STRUT NB-15 1008X BENT-REPAIR AS REQUIRED 940059715-01 PC iPCM111 LEAKING FROM OUTER DOOR HANDWHEEL SHAFT 940058384-01 PC iPC001A SEAL EXCEEDED AININ LEAK RATE LIMIT 940060079-01 PL 1PL76J OXYGEN + HYDROGEN SAMPLE FLOWS ARE LOW 940058757-01 RH 1RH0415168 PIPE CLAMP BOLTING LOOSE, TIGHTEN 940059440-01 RH 1RH141016S SUPPORT, POSSIBLE INTERNAL DAMAGE 940058573-01 RH 1RH1410478 SUPPORT IDOSE, TIGHTEN 940059439-01 RH 1RH1410518 SUPPORT, POSSIBLE INTERNAL DAMAGE 940059531-01 RH 1RH1410518 SUPPORT OUT OF TOLERENCE 940058895-01 VD 1TZ-VD000C APPEARS TO HAVE FAILED OPEN 940058483-01 VG 1FR-VG009 CHART PAPER NOT ADVANCING ,

940059820-01 VP 1VP02CB TRIP CLOSED FUSE WHEN TRYING TO START FAN 940059420-01 VP 1VP053A VALVE NEEDS TO BE REPACKED 940058142-01 VQ 1VQO27 GASKET FAILED LEAK TEST 940058742-01 VQ 1VQO31 VALVE BINDING, BEARINGS BAD 940058968-01 VR IVR04YA REPLACE LOWER SOLENOID VALVE 940059180-01 VR 1VR04YB REPLACE TOP SOLENOID VALVE 940058572-01 VX 1VX07C INSPECT AND REPAIR 940059930-01 VY 1TZ-VYO24B FOUND CLOSED WHILE FANS WERE RUNNING 930042179-01 WR 1WR029 PACKING LEAK 940059536-01 WR 1WR179 FAILED LEAK TEST I

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