ML20079H017

Forwards Responses to Questions Re Station Blackout

ML20079H017
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	10/04/1991
From:	Skolds J SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9110100081
Download: ML20079H017 (221)

Text

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South C rolina Llictric & o:s nompany J hn ko de u w onera w s gent;n,.gc mcs SCE&G

, .co. wm 001 0 4 5 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR S'ATION DOCKET N0. 50/395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 RESPONSE TO NRC QUfSTIONS CONCERNING STATION BLACK 00T (%CG 880002-5)

On June 19, 1991 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) received a fecsimile containing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) questions concerning the Virgli C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) response to the Station Blackout (SBO) Rule (10CFR50.63). These six questions were telecopied rather than formally transmitted because the NRC's intent was to resolve the concerns via a conference call. Given the detail required to answer some of the questions. SCE&G decided, with the NRC's concurrence, to respond by letter.

Enclosures 1 and 2 provide the VCSNS response to the questions.

Add'tionally, provided as an attachment to this letter, is a copy of the VCSNS Station Blackout Evaluation Report. This report provides the baseline assumptions and analyses for SCE&G's response to 10CFR50.63.

Should ycu have any questions, please contact Mr. H. 1. Donnelly at (803) 345-4722.

Very truly yours, s/F John L. Skolds EWR:JLS:lcd A'.tachment(1)

Enclosures (2) c: (w/o Attachment)

O. W. Dixon Jr. NRC Resident Inspector R. R. Mahan J. B. Knotts Jr.

R. J. White D. O. Hicks S. D. Ebneter H. I. Donnelly G. F. Wunder RTS (REG 880002)

General Man 2gers File (811.05)

-9110100081 911004 PDR ADOCK 05000395 P PDR NUCLEAR EXCELLENCE - A SUMMER TRADITION! g C'T0103 ,p

LIST Of ENCLOSURES AND A'1ACHMENTS TO 03CUMENT CONTROL DESK LETTER (REG 880002-5)

Enclosure 1 -

ResponsetoNRCQuestionsonStationBlackout-(580)_

_ Enclosure 2 -

Table " Containment Isolation Valves Not Excluded by Regulatory Guije 1.155" Attachment 1 - Station ~.ackout Evaluation Report

Enclosure 1 to Document Control Desk Eetter Page 1 of 4 REG 880002-5 VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION RESPONSE 10 NRC QUESTIONS ON STATION BLACKOUT

1. CONDENSATE INVENTORY Ouestion:

The FSAR Section 9.2.6 states that the emergency reserve in the condensate tank is 160,000 gallons, yet the license submittal states that 172,000 gallons are available. Resolve this apparent discrepancy.

Responsq:

To ensure that there is 160,100 gallons available to the Emergency Feedwater System (EFW), the total volume in the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) must be 172,700 gallens. The 12,600 gallon difference is the unusable volume maintained below the EFW suction piping. The Virgil C.

Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Station Blackout (SB0) Evaluation Report addresses this issue in Section 7.2.1, " Condensate Inventory for Decay Heat Removal." This section states that, "Per the EFW System Design Basis Document Section 3.4-4, the amount of usable water is 160,100 gallcos (note that this amount is less than that based on the minimum water level from the Technical Specification Section 3.7.1.3 of 172,700 gallons)." The note differentiates between the total measured volume (172,700 gallons) and the usable volume (160,100 gallons). The VCSNS Technical Specifications require that the total volume be checked whereas the FSAR specifies the usable volume reserved for the EFW system.

2. CLASS 1E BATTERY CAPACITY Ouestion:

Discuss the proposed dedicated power source which will be used to support the battery chargers during a SB0 event, include in the discussion capacity of the power source, redundancy, reliability, fuel source, fuel quantity, the safety class of the power source (Class IE?), method of connection, applicability of quality assurance, physical location, and impact on the Technical Specification, etc.

Resoonie:

In the April 17, 1989, letter, SCE&G submitted plans to add a dedicated power source to supply power to the VCSNS battery chargers. SCE&G decided to add the dedicated power source because the batteries at VCSNS had insufficient capacity to meet the SB0 coping duration requirements without load stripping.

After the April 17, 1989, submittal, SCE&G determined that the most l effective method of meeting the 500 coping duration requirement was to l

-Enclosure 1 to Document Control Desk letter Page 2 of 4 REG 880002-5 replace the Class 1E batteries. This eliminated the need for a dedicated power supply for the battery chargers. VCSNS informed the NRC of this decision in a-letter to the Document Control Desk dated October 2, 1989. Consistent with this correspondence, SCE&G installed new Class 1E batteries during the VCSNS fifth refueling outage. The batteries currently installed have sufficient capacity to meet the required $80 duration wichout having to strip any loads.

3. COMPRESSED AIR Ouestion:

Discuss.the method of steam release from the secondary side to remove the decay heat. Include in the discussion the valves to be used, their power source, and any concerns for the habitability and communications should manual valve operation be employed.

Response

Decay heat is removed from the secondary side by means of steam release. The steam generator power operated _ relief valvet (IPV-2000, 2010, 2020-MS) provide the release path.

Emergency Operating _ Procedure (E0P) 6.0, " Loss Of All ESF AC Power "

step.19 directs the operater to depressurire and continuously regulate the steam generators (SG) as a means of removing decay heat. Step'19b (alternative) requires that, if any power relief valve can not be operated from the Main Control Board, an operator shall be sent to

" locally throttle open the a'fected steamline power relief valves."

Step 19e further instructs the operator to manually or locally regulate steamline power (operated) relief valves to maintain SG pressure at 240 psig.

The power operated relief valves are air operated (air-to-open, spring-to-close) valves designed to fail closed on loss of-air or DC power to prevent inadvertent release of steam. Each valve has six DC solenoid valves for manual and automatic operation. A manual handwheel is

.provided for local valve operation.

The SG-power operated relief valves are located in the 436' elevation of-the Intermediate Building and East and West Penetration Access areas. ' Emergency DC lighting is provided in these areas and will be evaluated to determine its adequacy to assist operators in accessing and operating the valves. While these areas are expected to include substantial heat generation sources, they will remain habitable for the short duration. required to operate the valves with~the handwheels. The temperature increases for the East and West Penetration Access areas l during a loss of HVAC:are discussed in Section 7.2.4.2, item 4 of the

-SB0 Evaluation Report. While operating these valves locally is difficult because of the handwbeel location, manual operation is feasible. The ability to locally operate the valves was verified during hot functional testing.

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Enclosure 1 to Document Control Desk Letter Page 3 of 4 REG 880002-5 If local operation is required, communication will be maintained

-between Control Room (CR) personnel and local valve operators with mobile radios. This is the normal method of communication between CR personnel and vperators in the field.

In summary,'the steam generator power relief valves (IPV-2000, 2010, 2020-MS) are used-to vent steam from the steam generators during a 500 event. Venting the steam provides for secondary side decay heat removal. During a SB0 event, the power operated relief valves can be

• operated locally with handwheels, if necessary. The areas where the valves are located will be habitable early in the SB0 event, and mobile radios will be used for communication between Control Room personnel and local valve operators.

4. LOSS OF VENTILATION

- Quest 10.0: ,

a. Provide a detailed description of the analyses that were done to verify that the control room and the relay room temperatures do not reach 1200F during a four-hour SB0 event. Include all major

-assumptions such as initial conditions, heat loads (equipment, i adjacent rooms, personnel, etc.), and ambient conditions, as well as a discussion of the results.

b. Provide a description of each of the dominant areas of concern listed in Section 4 of the April 17, 1989, submittal, and a list of the SB0 response equipment within each area. List the heat loads and the initial temperature used and the maximum temperature calculated for each area.

If a calculation package provides complete answers t'o the'se questions, please provide-the package, Resoonse:

Thesc questions are addressed in SB0. Evaluation Report Section 7.2.4,

" Effects of Loss of Ventilation," and its attachments.

4a. Section 7.2.4.2 of the SB0 Evaluation Report addresses the questions concerning the control room and relay room. Item 2 of this section discusscs the main control room with its heat loads-defined in Section 7. A*'tachment 7; item 3 discusses the relay room with its heat loads detailed in Section 7 Attachment 8.

Additionally, SCE&G provided further information on these analyses-in a March 23, 1990, letter to-the Document Control Desk.

4b. Sections 7.2.4 and 7.2.4.2 of the 5B0 Evaluation Report specifically address the dominant areas of concern and their

Enclosure 1 to Document Control Desk Letter Page'4 of 4

-REG 880002-5 evaluations. A list of SB0 response equipment is contained in Section 7 Attachment 6 of the 500 Evaluation Report.

5. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Question:

Provide a list of the containment isolation valves which can not be excluded based on the exclusion criteria of RG 1.155. Include for each of these containment isolation valves the function of the line, the size of the valve, the valve type, the failure position upon a loss of power, and the action to be taken to effect containment isolation during a SBO. De sure to include normally closed (not locked closed) valves.

Responst:-

Valves not excluried by Regulatory Guice 1.155 are listed in Table 7.2-1 of the 580 Evaluation Report. The requeJted details are summarized in Enclosure 2 to this letter.-

6. COOLANT INVENTORY question:

What are the conditions (i.e., temperature and pressure) of the reactor coolant system at the end of the four hour 500 event? Provide a summary, including major RCS equipment volume, mass, temperature information, on why the core will remain covered.

. Rg11tgn_1g:

To respond to the 500 issue (10CFR50.63), VCSNS utilized the guidelines developed by the Nuclear Management-and Resources Council (NUMARC) and promulgated in NUMARC 87-00 " Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors." As stated by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.155, " Station Blackout," NUMARC 87-00 provides guidance acceptable to-the staff for meeting the requirements of-10CFR50.63. One of the baseline assumptions in NUMARC 87-00 is that the reactor coolant loss during a four-hour SB0 does not result in core encovery. This assumption is based on the generic analyses performed in WCAP-10541, " Reactor Coolant-Pump Seal Performance following A Loss of All AC Power." WCAP-10541 addresses the pump seal leakage rates that would occur during station blackout l

conditions and confirms that the core will-remain covered during a four-hour SB0 event. Because VCSNS is a 3-loop Westinghouse plant, the genericWCAP-10541 analysis (andthereforetheNUMARC87-00 assumption) is applicable, l

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_ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ to Document Control Oesk letter Page 1 of 2 REG 880002-5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES NO_T EXCLUDED BY REGULATORY GUIDE 1,155

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VAtVE NO* $YSTEM SIZE TYPE POSITION (NORMAL) DURING $80 2000 M5 8" Globe Closed AutomatiuMan. Open period-2010 M5 8" Globe Closed ual controf of ically in (oct 2020 M5 8" Globe Closed MS prenure in down RC5 SG (Manual) 2802A,8 MS 4" Gate Open MS Supply to None EFW pump Note 2 turbine 3003A,B $P 10" Gate Closed Spray pump None discharge to Note 1 containment 3004A,B $P 12" Gate Closed Spray pump None suction from Note 1 re(irt. sump 8107 C5 3" Gate Open Normal chargmg Manually (lose-8108 C5 3" Gate Open tu RCS 3 < heck valves in senes mside Note 2 containment 8701A,B RHR 12" Gate Closed RHR Supply from None Note 1 RC5 8801A,B 51 3" Gate Closed High head None Note 1 injection 8811A,B 51 14" Gate Closed RHR pump None suction from recirt. sump 8884 51 3* Gate Closed High head saf ety None 8885 51 3* Gate Closed injection None 8886 51 3" Cate Closed None Note 1 888RA,a 51 10" Gate Open Low head safety Manually close -

injet tion (heck viv, inside Note 2 containment 8889 El 10" Gate Closed tow heaa safety None Note 1 injection 6797 F5 4" Gate Open fire service to Manually close-charcoal cleanup (he(k valve units inside Note 2 (ontainnient ATTENTION: Enclosure 2, page 2 contains the Note designations and a guide to the acronyms in this table.

Enclosure 2 to Document Control Desk letter Page 2 of 2 REG 880002-5 NOTES

1. AC motor operated valve normally closed - fails as is (closed) -

handwheel on motor operator.

2. AC motor operated valve normally open - fails as is (open) - handwheel on motor operator.

1.lST OF ACRONYMS CS - chemical and volume control EFW - emergency feedwater FS - fire service MS - main steam RCS - reactor coolant system RHR - residual heat removal SG - steam generator SI - safety injection SP - reactor building spray t

G AI Report No. 2782, Rev. 4  ;

August 22,1990 i

STATION BLACKOUT -

EVALUATION l

r VIRGIL C. SUM M E R NUCLE A R STATION

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Rev. 41 -August 22,:1990- CAI Report No. 2782 STATION BLACK 0UT. '

EVALUATION FOR VIRCIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR -STATION SOUTil CAROLINA F.LECTRIC AND CAS C0!!PANY

' COLUMBIA, SOUTil CAROLINA

PREPARED BY:

CILBERT ASSOCIATES INC.

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CONTPNTS

1. IntrMuction 1.1 Approach and Docum<:nt Structure 1.2 NUM ARC Initiative i 1.3 Supporting information

2. Evaluation of General Criteria and Baseline Assumptions 2.1 General Criteria 2.2 initial Plant Conditions 2.3 Initiating Event 2.4 Station illackout Transient 2.5 Reactor Coolant inventory Loss 2.6 Operator Action 2.7 Effects of Loss of Ventilation 2.8 System Cross-Tie Capability 2.9 Instrumentation and Controls 2.10 Containment isolation Valves 2.11 liurrienne Preparations

3. Evaiuation of Required Coping Duration Category 3.1 Cetegory Determination Overview 3.2 Category Determination Analyses and Calculationn 5.2.1 Step One: Determining the Off Site AC Power Design Characteristic Group 3.2.2 Step Two Classifing the Emergency AC Power Supply System Cont'iguration 3.2.3 Step Three: Determining the Calculated EDG Reliability 3.2.4 Step Four: Determining Allowed liDG Torgert lleliability 3.2.5 Step Five: Determining Coping D'iration Category 3.2.6 Required Action

4. Station Blackout Response Equipment and Procedures 4.1 Overview 4.2 Operating Procedures Goldelines 4.2.1 Station illackout Response Guidelines --- Initiative 2.a 4.2.2 AC Power Restoration - Inillative 2.b 4.2.3 Severe Weather Guldelines --- Initiative 2.c

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CONTENTS (cont'd) 4.3 Supporting information 4.3,1 Station Blackout Response Guidelines 4.3.2 AC Power Restoration Guidelines 4.3.1- Severe Weather Guidelines Attachment 1 (Table 4-1) SBO Equipment Required for Coping

5. Not Addressed in this Report

6. Not Addressed in this Report

7. Coping With a Station Blackout Event 7.1 Overview 7.1.1. Coping Methods 7.1.2 Coping Duration 7.2 Coping Assessment 7.2.1 Condensate Inventory for Decay Heat Removal 7.2.2 Assessing the Class IE Battery Capacity 7.2.3 Compressed Air 7.2.4 Effects of Loss of Ventilation 7.2.5 Containment Isolation Class IE DC System Related One-Line Diagrams Deleted l Battery Sizing Evaluation for SBO DC System Voltage Evaluation for SBO l Attachment 5 Logic Diagram to Assess the Effects of Loss of Ventilation during a SBO Attachment 6 (Table 7.2.4)- Evaluation to Address Equipment Operability in Dominant Areas of Concern Attachment 7 SBO Heat Loads and TDAC Evaluations for Main Control Room Attachment 8 SBO Heat Loads and TDAC Evaluations for Relay Room Attachment 9 (Table 7.2-1) - Containment Isolation - SBO Concern Exclusions Valve identification n .we. ..

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1.0 INTRODUCTIOti 1.1 APPROACil AND DOCUMENT STRUCTURE The ob}ective of this report is to provide an evaluation of the V C. Summer Nucicar Station (VCSNS) for compliance with the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) station blackout initiatives and to document whether the baseline

- assumptions identified by wuMARC are applicable to the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station.

Section 1 provides an introduction and discussion of the initiatives.

Section 2 provides a VCSNS specific evaluation of general criteria and baseline assumptions provided within NUMARC B7-00 concerning the course and nature of a station blackout. These assumptions define the major topics concerning station blackout which the initiatives are intended to address. Each assumption is accompanied by a basis discussion and an evaluation of its applicability to VCSNS.

Section 3 provides an evcluation of the required coping duration category consistent with the NRC Staff's Regulatory Guide 1.155.

Section 4 provides an evaluation to ensure that VCSNS plant specific procedures adequately address station blackout response.

Sections 5 and 6, concerning en.ergency diesel generator performance and reliability, were addressed by SCE&G independent of this report.

Section 7 provides an evaluation to assess the ability of the VCSNS to cope with a station blackout.

1.2 NUMARC INITIATIVES  ;

Late in 1985, the NUMARC Committee established a working group on stat, ciackout l to address USI A-44. The Nuclear Utility Group on Station Blackout (NUGSBO) has provided the major portion of the technical support for the NUMARC station blackout l wo&ing group. NUMARC determined that many of the concerns related to station h blackout could be alleviated througn industry initiatives to reduce overall station blackout risk.

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In light of these considerations, on June 10, 1986, the NUMARC Executive Committee

- approved four industry initiatives to address the more important contributors to station blackout risk.' These initiatives were described to the Commission by letter dated June 23,1986 which also forwarded comments concerning the proposed station blackout rule.

On Octo%r 2t,1987, the NUMARC Board of Directors approved one additional initiative and a modification to one of the originalinitiatives. The initiatives are:

_1. Initiative I A '--- RISK REDUCTION >

Each utility will review their site (s) against the criteria specified in -

NRC's revised Station Blackout Ilegulatory Guide 1.155, and if the site (s) fall into the category of an eight-hour or sixteen-hour site af ter utilizing all power sources available, the utility will take actions to

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reduce the site (s) contribution to the overall risk of station blackout.

Non-hardware changes will be made within one year. Har % are changes will be made within a reasonable time thereafter.

This initiative was changed by the October 22,1987 NUMARC vote to reflect changes in the NRC's criteria from those in NUREG-1109 which were incorporated in the original initiative 1.

Sections 2 and 3 of this report documents the compliance of VCSNS to Initiative 1 A.

2. Init'.ative 2 --- PROCEDURES

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Each utility will implement procedures at each of its site (s) for:

a. coping with a station blackout;

b. restoration of AC power following a station blackout event; and, l _:

c. preparing the plant for severe weather conditions (e.g., hurricancs) to reduce the likelihood and consequerces of a loss of off-site power and to reduce the overall risk of a station blackout event, l

Section 4 ot' this report documents the compliance of VCSNS to

-Initiative 2.

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3.- = Initiative 3 --- COLD STARTS Each utility _will.--if applicable, reduce or eliminate cold fast-starts of emergency diesel generators through changes to technical specifications

- or othar appropriate means.

Initiative 3 does not require any action because SCE&G's diesel generators are presently egalpped with prewarming and prelubrication systems.

4.- Ir.itiative 4 --- AC POWER AVAILABILITY

-Each ut_llity will monitor emergency AC power unavailability, utilizing data provided in !NPO on a regular basis, initiative 4 does not require any action because SCE&G presently has a

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program in place to monitor and determine diesel generator demand start reliability. _ Refer to Tech. Spec. Table 4.8-1, page 3/4.8-7.

5. Initiative 5 --- COPING ASSESSMENT Each utility will Asess the ability of its plant (s) to cope with a station blackout. Plants utilizing alternate AC power for station blackout response which can be shown by test to be available to power tha shutdown busses with 10 minutes of the c nset of station blackout do not

_need to perform any coping assessment. Remaining alternate AC plants will assess their at'llity to cope for one-nour. Plants not utill:Ing an alternate AC source will assess their ability to cope for four-hours.

Factors identified which prevent demonstrating the capability to cope for the appropri-te duration will be addressed through hardware and/or procedural changes so that successful demonstration is possible.

-Section.7 of this report documents the compliance of VCSNS to Initiative 5.

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1.3 SUPPORTING IN1'ORM ATION NUMARC report 87-00 states thit utilities are expected to ensure that the baseline assumptions are applicable.to thv'.c plants. Further, utilities are expected to ensure that analyses and related infortantlon are available for review.-

This report evaluates the station blackout initiatives and provides supporting documentation to address whether the baseline assumptions identified by NUMARC 87-00 are applicable to VCSNS.

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2.0 GENER AI, CIRTERIA AND llASRLINE ASSUMPTIONS (

This scetion contains general criteria and a lhting of the base line assumptions a brief description of their bases, a brief discussion with respect to applicability to the VCSNS, appropriate references to source material, and a discussion identifying any discrepancies and/or margins betwmt NUMARC and the VCSNS as-built design. The sections entitled NUMARC Assumptions and NUMARC Bases are verbatim from NUM ARC 87-00, and any re.'erences within these paragraphs are contained in that document. The toples in this section are:

Section 2.1 general criteria Section 2.2 initial plant conditions Section 2.3 the initiating event Section 2.4 station b!acNat transient Section 2.5 reactor coolant pump inventory loss Section 2.6 operator action Section 2.7 - effects of the loss of ventilation Section 2.8 system cross-tic capability Section 2.9 instrumentation and controls Section 2.10 containment isolation valves Section 2.11 hurricane preparations 2.1 GENERAL CRITERIA Procedures and equipment in ligL reactors relied upon in n statiori blackout should ensure that satisfactory performance of necesseiry deer,y heat removal systema is maintained for the required station blackout coping duretion. For a PW R, an additional requirement is to keep the core covered. For a BWR, no more than a momentary core uncovery is allowed. For both BWR's and PWR's, appropriate containment integrity should also be provided in a station blackout to the extent that isolation valves perform their intended function without AC powea.

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-c 5 ._ * , , - aa %+-.. _ + ,s4 -d -L.- , --.- L _- -_ +-- L-. . - , A-This general er!terion is applicable to VCSNS as well as all other stations. The remainder of this report will be directed toward demonstrating the compliance of VCSNS to these criteria.

2.2 INITIAI, Pl. ANT CONDITIONS 2.2.1 NJLM_A.RC Assumptions P

1. The station blackout event occurs while the reactor is operating at 100%

rated thermal power and has been at this power level for at least 100 days.

2. Immediately prior to the postulated station blackout event. the reactor and supporting systems are within normal operating ranges for pressure, temperature, and water level. All plant cauipment is either normally operating or available from the standby state.

2.2.2 NUM ARC 11 asis

1. The potential for core damage from a station blackout is bounded by events initiated from 100% power due to the prescr.ce of substantial decay heat. -

2. Transients initiated from normal operating conditions are considered most probable.

2.2.3 Application to V.C. Summer Nucicar Station -

1. NUM AP.C Assumption 1 is applicable to VCSNS. VCSNS !s an operating plant with no operating restrictions to limit thermal power below 100%-

- 2. NUMARC Assumption 2 is applicable t_o VCSNS in that normal operating conditions are most probable at the time of a transient since the plant is normally base loaded.

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2.2.4 References e VCSNS operating lleense NPF-12.

2.2.5 Discrepaneles and Margins No discrepancy exists in ' hat 'he V.C. Summer Nuclear Station initial plant conditions for a SBO coincide with those of NUMARC; tnerefore, no quantitative margin exists.

2.3 INITIATING EVENT 2.3.1 NUM ARC Assumptio,ng _

1. The initiating event is assumed to be a loss of off-site power (LOOP) at a plant site resulting from a switchyard-related event due to random faults, or an external event, such as a grid distutbance, or a weather event that affects the off-site power system ei'her throughout the grid or t the plant.

LOOP's caused by fire, flood, or seismic activity are not expected to occur with sufficient frequency to require explicit criteria and are not considered.

2. The LOOP is assumed to affect all units at a plant site. At a multi-unit site with normally dedicated emergency AC power sources, station blackout is assumed to occur at only one unit. At multi-unit sites with normally shared emergency AC power sources, where the combination of AC sourecs exceeds the minimum redundancy requirements for normal safe shutdown (non-DBA) vf all units, the remaining emergency AC power sources may be used as alternative AC power sources provided they meet the alternate AC power criteria in NUMARC 87-00. Appendix B. If there are no remaining emergency AC power sources in excess of the minimum redundancy requirements, station blackout must be assumed to occur at all the units. ,

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3. Emergency AC (EAC) power sources are assumed to be available as alternate AC power sources to cooe with the station blackout under the following conditions:

a. For the blacked-out unit. any emergency AC power source (s) in exces.s o[ the number necessary to meet minimum redundancy requirements (i.e. single failure) for safe shutdewn is assumed to be available and may be designated as an Alternate AC (AAC) power source (s) provided it meets the A AC critetin provided in Appendix U.

b. For multi-unit sites, EAC sources available from a non-biacked-out -

unit, after assuming a single failure at the non-blacked-out unit, may be designated as Alternate AC, if they Incet the A AC criteria provided in Aooendix B and are capable of meeting the necessary shutdown loads of both units.

4. design basis accidents or other events are assumed to occur immediately prior to or during the station blackout.

2.3.2 NUMARC Hasis

1. NRC analysis separates LOOP' events into three categories: plant centered, grid disturbance, and severe weather Plant-centered events involve hardware failures, design deficiencies, human errors in maintenance and switching, and localized weather-induced faults, such as due to lightning, salt spray, and ice. These plant-centered events reportedly occur at a frequency of 0.056 events per site-year, with a median duration of 0.3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. Grid disturbance events have been shown to be of much lesser concern for most plants.-. Events in this category reportedly have a frequency of 0.020 events per site-year, with a median duration of 0.7 hour8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. Severe weather events have a lesser experience with 0.011 events and a median duration of 2.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (Section 3, including Table 3.1, NUREG-1032).

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- Seismic, fire, and flooding events include accident scenarios for which l current licensing requirements specify protective measures. For example, the potential for a fire-induced station blackout is e.<tremely remote due to

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F the effectiveness of current fire protection programs and 10CFR50 Appendix R separation requirements imposed on shutdown _ systems. In fact,'some plants installed an alternate or dedicated shutdown capability in response to Appendix R which may also be used to respond to a station blackout event.

NRC analysis concludes that fire-induced station blackout is not a generic concern, citing a station blackout frequency of less than lx10-6 per reactor-year for most plants. Consequently, station blackout events th may occur l at a particular site involving fire initiators are not likely to occur, and are not addressed in this document.

The seismic and ficoding issues are similar to the fire risk concern regarding, the potential for' causing station blackout. The Class IE power system is currently designed to withstand scismic events. Similarly, flooding i

protection is addressed in the plant's licensing basis. As a result the

. potential for selsn.ically-induced or flooding-induced station blackout is on the same order as fire-induced events, and are not addressed in this b document.

For these reasons, seismic, flooding, and fire-induced station blackout events l are not addressed in these guidelines.

2-3. The major contributor to overall station blackout risk is the likelihood of losing off-site power and the duration of power unavailability. A LOOP may occur as a result of a switchyard problem either affecting a -8"gle unit, or possibly multiple units at a site. Alternatively, the cause of the LOOP may be a grid or area'-wide disturbance associated with severe weather conditions. Although these events ax a much smaller fraction of the total number of events (in fact, weather-related events represent on the arder of 10% of all LOOPS experienced tc-date), they can be significant because of

- the longer time to restore off-site power following such events. To be conservative, the LOOP is assumed to affect all units at a site.

The next most important contributor to station bltekout risk for a given ,

plant is low emergency diesel generator (EDG) availability. EDG availability varies among operating sites, based on the numoer of EDG's on-site' the reliability to start from a standby state, the overall availability of the m.., w ...e b'5

machine, and the potential for dependent failures, industry EDO reliability to start from a standby state is typleally in the range of 0.98-0.99. It is very unlikely to have un average EDG re!Iability for all machines at a site below 0.95 over a sustained period. Consequently, the contribution of EDG reliability to station blackout risk is well below that of LOOP for most plants. - ,

EDG failures may also occur due to dependent causes (i.e. common cause events). These failures may result from design or operating deficiencies that

- manifest themselves in a concurrent failure. The potential for these deficiencies affecting all EDGs for multiple unit sites is considered remote since most reactors have staggered operating e/cles. Staggered operating cycles also make it less likely that major maintenance activities are schedule at the same time. Similarly, redendant units are of ten designed and constructed on independent se' .ules, with initial commercial operation dates separated by up to . ..al years in time.

Generally high EDG reliability and low dependent failure rates provide a basis for screening EDG configurations. In support of this perspective, NUGSBO analyzed the likelihood of failure on demand for standby systems, such as for typical emergency AC power systems. The potential for simultar.cously_ falling two identical EDG's with each machine at industry average reliability (i.e., approximately 2% average failure rate on demand for.each machine) and nominal susceptibility to dependent failure (i.e.,2%) is approximately 7.8x 10-4. The likelihood of three identical EDGs simultaneously falling is even lower, at about 4.1x10-4 for machines with 0.98 reliability.

These results suggest that the ptential for more than two EDCs failing at a unit is very low. Consequently, assuming failure of EDGs in excess of those required for minimum redundancy is not necessary to assure that the risk of a station blackout is sufficiently low. For multi-unit sites (assuming an EDG single failure at the non-blackedout unit), the marginal probability of an additional EDO failure at the non-blacked-out unit is so low that the remaining EDG's are assumed available if they meet the applicable AAC criteria. One-out-of-two shared (1/2S) and two-out-of-three shared (2/3S) o,...-,,_...

2-6

a configurations do no_t meet Alternate AC power criteria. At single unit sites with EDG's in excess of the number necessary to meet the minimu'm'-  ;

redundancy requirements (such as units with 3 or more diesels), these additional EDG's are candidates for Alternate AC. At multi-unit sites,

~

where the combination of emergency AC sources exceeds the minimum redundancy requirements for normal safe shutdown (non-DBA) for all units, the remaining emergency AC power sources may be used as alternate AC power sources provided they meet the AAC power criteria of Appendix B.

The availability of EDG's as an Alternate AC source may be assumed if the machine satisfies the Alternate AC power source criteria provided In'

- Appendix B. This includes criteria designed (1) to minimize the potential for dependent failure events adversely affecting the Alternate AC power source in station blackout scenarios, and (2) to provide requirements for power

= source availability.

The Staff's stated objective of the proposed station blackout rule is to reduce the core damage frequency due to station blackout to approximately 10-5 per

' year for the average site. As provided in the proposed rule, this objective could be obtained by ' extending the current nominal two-hour coping

capability to four hours. Comparable safety benefits may exist from the utilization of an AAC power source. To investigate these benefits, NUGSBO extended the emergency AC power _ system model to include the contribution-E of off-site power system failure frequency and power restoration. A 7 1.

l=

composite LOOP duration distribution was constructed based on the LOOP events reported in NUREG-1032. Assuming a LOOP frequency of 0.1 per o

year, industry average power restoration distributions, a 1/3 EDG configuration, and failure likelihoods of 2% for each machine and 2%

dependent failure, a two-hour coping capability yields a station blackout core-L damage frequency of well below the 10-5 per year. This frequency is below the threshold sought by the Staff in the station blackout rulemaking.

i (Section 4, NUREG-1032; see also NUREG-1109, page 9 wherein the Staff assumes "... that all plants. as currently designed, can cope with a station blackout for 2 haurs, and with proper procedures and training, plants could s , -, o ., ....m

cope with a 4-hour station blackout without having to make major modifications.") _

4. - The likelihood of a design basis accident or other event coincident with a station blackout is considered remote and is not addressed in this document, 2.3.3 Application to v.C, Summer Nuclear _ Station

1. NUMARC Assumption 1 is applicable to VCSNS. The initiating event for a LOOP could be switchyard related, a grid disturbance or weather related.

LOOP's caused by fire, flood and seismic activity are not expected due to their infrequent occurrence, plant design, and location. Fire, flooding (external and internal), and seismic activity were addressed in the VCSNS design..

Fire related evaluations and protective actions are addressed b the FPER.

FSAR Section 2.4.2 discusses the external flooding potential for VCSNS. Tre '

plant site is protected against potential external floods up to elevation 438.0' (for details see FSAR Sections 2.4.10 and 3.4). The probability and severity of external flooding was found acceptable per the VCSNS Safety Evaluation Report Section 2.4.2.

-Internal flooding of the plant was analyzed during the design and HELB review of VCSNS. Safety related components are either located above the flood level elevation or design features are provided for detecting and isolating the flood. The watertight wall between tiie turbine building and the Intermediate building, and circulating water pump trip and valve closure protects against the worst case flooding potential in the turbine building (a circulating water pipe break) from affecting safety related components such as the diesel generators and turbine driven emergency feedwater pump (Ref.

layout drawing E-001-012). Internal flooding of the safety related buildings was addressed in the HELB review of VCSNS. The worst case for flooding is the main feedwater !!nc break (Refer to the FW DDD Section 3.9.3.6.d). For this event a combination of system isolation and building features, high curbs and flood water drainage prevents a loss of safety related components such w un n,w.

],3

, , , r1y r

1 as the turbine driven emergency feedwater pumps and AC switchgear. The diesel generator is located in a separate building and is protected against flooding. Therefore the potential of internal flooding has been assessed in the VCSNS design and protective actions / features are in place.

The VCSNS is seismically designed to withstand the operating basis earthquake and fcr safe shutdown after the design basis earthquake (Ref.

FSA R Section 3.7). In addition, antift.!!down design prevents overhead gravity missiles from compromising safety systems. Therefore VCSNS has protective features to cope with seismic events without damage to safety related systems.

2. NUMARC Assumption 2 is appilcable to VCSNS. VCSNS is a single unit station. There are no diesel generators in excess of minimum redundancy requirements when a station blackout is assumed to occur.

3. NUMARC Assumption 3 is not applicable to VCSNS. There are no diesel generators in excess of the minimum redundancy requirements.

4. NUMARC Assumption 4 is appilcable to VCSNS. For purposes of the station blackout assessment for VCSNS, no design basis accident or other event is assumed to occur coincident with a station blackout.

2.3.4 References

~ 1.

• FS AR Figure 8.2-1 (SS-200-005)

• FSAR Figure 8.2-2 (C-229-054)

• FSAR Figure 8.2-2a (E-229-001)

• FSAR Section B.2.1.2

• FSAR Section 1.2.1.3,4 and 6

• Westinghouse T&D keference Book,4th Ed. Chapter 16, Section 111

• FSAR Section 2.5, 2.5.2.9

• Appendix R DBD

• VCSNS Safety Evaluation Report Section 2.4.2

• - G/C (Dept. 0428) Calculation No. PR-C) and PR-41

• FW DDD

%.n c o -, .. ..-

2-9

e FPER e E-001-012

• SDD for the Circulating Water System o FSAR Sections 2.4.2, 3.4, 6.3.2.2.7, 7.6.5.1.2, 10.4.7.2.3

• FSAR Section 3.7 2-3.

• E-206-005. Rev. 2

• E-206-012, Rev. 21 s

4. e Definition of "Statior. Blackout" as delineated by NRC 10CFR 50.2 and NUM ARC 87-00, Appendix "A".

2.3.5 Discrepancies and Mandns

1. No quantitative margins are app!! cable for this assumption lioweM,;9.d disturbance related LOOPS should be less in frequency as VCSNF 'a geog = apt.ically located such that it is not at the " tall end" of a grid or powre pool network and therefore has more than " limited" access to and support from the surrounding grid, in addition, the duration should be 5 s ' ('..an the NUMARC basis due to plant tie lines to the Parr and Fairf>=ad Stations.

These stations can be used as direct power feeds to t,'e VCSNS. Both stations have hydro-power for quick return to on-line capability and the Fairfield hydro station has black start capability. Parr is also equipped with gas turbines which offer a return to on-line capability with less than the NUMARC median outage duration of 0.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

The Class IE electrical system is seismically designed to withstand ground motions of 0.15g and 0.25g for rock and soll, respectively. The Safe Shutdown Earthquake maximum expected ground motions are 0.13g and 0.20g for rock and soll, respectively.

2-3. There is r.o margin fcr VCSNS (diesel generators in excess of minimum redundency).

4. This assumption is consistent with the requirements of NRC 10CFR 50.2 which defines the meaning of " Station Blackout". No quantitative margins are applicable to this assumption.

-,..o-.i.,,....

! 1-10

2.4 STATION BLACKOUT TRANSIENT 2.4.1 NUMARC Assumptions

1. Following the loss of all off-s'.te power, the reactor automatically trips with sufficient shutdown margin to maintain suberlticality at safe shutdown (i.e.

hot standt or hot shutdown as appropriate). The event ends when AC power is restored to shutdown busses from any source, including Alternate AC,

2. The main steam system valves (such as main steam isolation valves, turbine stops, atmospheric dumps, etc.) necessary to maintain decay heat removal functions operate properly.

3. Safety / Relief Valves (S/RVs) or Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) operate properly. Normal valve rescating is also assumed.

4. No independent failures, other than those causing the station blackout event, are assumed to occur in the course of the transient. The potential for mechanistic failures resulting from the losl of HVAC in a station blackout event is addressed in Section 7 of this docu nent.

5. AC power is assumed available to necessary shutdown equipment within four hours from either the off-site or blacked-out t ilt's C! ass IE sources or is available within one hour from an Alternate AC source.

2.4.2' EM ARC Basis 1-3. These aesumptions outline some of the more important features of the statio blackout transient. The basic considerations are a normal LOOP transient, proper unit trip with full reactivity insertion, and MSIV closure as appropriate for the design of the plant. In addition, the likelihood of PORV or S/RV malfunction in a station blackout is on the order of I-2% (see Section 2, NUREG/CR-1988; Section 2 and 6, NUREC/CR-2182; and NU R EG-1032).

i c..t.. . t .m ..e 2-11

4. Imposing additional independent failures on the station blackout response capability has diminishing safety significance for most power plants. This is because the dominant aceldent contributors to a station blackout event generally involve off-site power system reliability, the reliability and level of redundancy of the emergency AC power system, and the station blackout coping capability, in that order. Since a number of failures must occur to result in a station blackout event, additional independent f ailures are of secondary importance. The station blackout response capability also depends on systems that are highly reliable due to the design and maintenance standards used. Consequently, the potential of random failure in these systems is low. Finally, the safety effects of response capability loss are of most significance only if they are experienced early in the station blackout transient (i.e., primarily in the f t .t 30 minutes). This potential has been addressed in NRC Staff analysis which estimates the probability of decay heat removat system failure early in a station blackout event to range from 0.001 for High Pressure Core Spray.(l!PCS)/RCIC combinations to 0.04 for a single st9an; turbine-driven train auxillary feedwater system (AFW). These results underscore the lower significance of additional non-mechanistic failures in the station blackout scenario (Appendix C, particularly Table C.2.

NU R EG-1032).

5. Historically, the vast majority of LOOP events are of short duration. NRC Staff analysis reports the median AC power restoration time for all LOOP events to be about 1/2 hour, with off-site power restored in approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> for 90% of all events. Consequently, assuming a four hour restorat!on time addresses the bulk of postulated station blackout events. For AAC systems, one hour is considered an acceptable period of time to lineup the AAC power source and restore power to a shutdown bus (Off-site power restoration times are taken from Supplementary Information, Proposed Station Blackout Rule,51 FR55, at 9830).

2.4.3 Apolication to V.C. Summer Nuclear Station

1. NUM ARC Assumption 1 is applicable to VCSNS. A loss of all off-site power trips the reactor with sufficient margin to safely go to hot shutdown. The reactor is directly tripped upon undervoltage on the RC pump AC busses ra.. m . ,~,- .,,

2-12

l i

i provided ths tor is not at low power (P7). Prompt trip of the reactor is i assured in that the undervoltage relays. located in the lleactor Trip Switchgear, are backed up by DC shunt trip cotts which will also trip the reactor based upon low reactor coolant flow. Also, the reactor control rods will drop as a result of losing balance of plant AC power to the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CROM) motor generator (M/G) set motor. The main feedwater and motor driven emergency feedwater pumps are also lost, but the turbine driven emergency feedpump (TD EPP) starts to remove decay heat. Fuel damage is prevented by the prompt tripping of the reactor, with cord cooling achieved by means of natural circulation. The transient resembles a complete loss of forced reactor coolant flow and the loss of normai feedwater trenstents envered by FSAR Section 15 analyses. The l

- reactor coolant system (RCS)is protected against overpressure by prescurizer power operated relief valves (PORV) and safety valves. The l PORVs are controlled by the reactor control system which is powered by the j station ba'tery system throu';h inverters and instrument air (with accumulators) as long as available. The pressurizer safety valves are spring loaded and need no power.

2. NUMARC Assumption 2 is applicable to VCSNS. The main sten:n valves necessary for decay heat removal and main steam isolation function properly i or can be manually controlled for a SDO. Matr. . team is available to operate the turbine drivu emergency feedwater pump for decay heat removal.

Overcooling is prevented by automatic closure of the highly reliable turb5e stop valves via a turbine trip signal from the Reactor Protection System  !

(RPS). 'she normaMy closed tu-bine bypass (steam dump) valves are blocked

. closed due to condenser unavailability. The normally closed atmospheric dump valves (ADV) and main ateam PORV's are blocked closed upon a reactor trlp, however, decay heat can be relieved manually by the main steam PO51V's.' The main steam safety valves and PORV's are highly reliable safety telated valves. The safety valves are tested to assure operability at the propet setpoints, and the main rteam PORV's can be operated with their handwneels. The main steam isolation valves will drift closed on loss of alt but can be manually closed earlier from the control room if desired (i.e., to

!solata main jteam to the moisture separator reheaters).

1 (plD$ $ f ' %S+9 & $ .M F 13

r

3. NUMAllC Assumption 3 is applicable to YCSNS. Initial control of main  ;

steam pressure will be by the main steam safety valves cycling open and close. Long term modulating control can be accomplished with handwheels  !

$ on the main steam POltV's. j

4. NUMAllC Assumption 4 la applienble to VCSNS. No independent failures other than those causing the station blackout need to be considered.

- The Condensate Storage Tank supplies emergency feedwater in the event of i loss of main feedwater. This tank is located in an open area north of the Water Treating 11ullding and is potentially subject to the weather conditions that could cause a station blackout. Therefore, availability of the Condensate Storage Tank during a station blackout at the VCSNS was evaluated. !t can be coacluded that this tank will be available during a severe weather Induced station blackout for the following reasons:

a. The tank mests s.imilar severe weather requirements applicable to alternate AC sources. The NUMAltC 87-00 document states that the alternate AC soarces should be protected against weather in accordance with the Uniform !!ullding Code (UI3C). The tank is designed for 100 mph wthds which are in excess of the UUC requirement for the region. The U13C does not address tornadoes or missiles,

b. The probability of a tornado is low having a return period of 1389 years ,

for the site as noted in Section 1.2.1.3 of the FSAll. This low probability justifies precluding the consideration of tornado gene *ated - e missiles striking the tank during a station blackout. Not withste iding i this preclusion. the procedures for severe weather preparation includes specific actions to reduce potential tornado missiles, as directed by j Section 4.2.3 of NUM AltC 87-00. 1

5. NUM AllC Assumption 5 is applicable to VCSNS in that offsite or standby AC

_ power ls assumed to be restored within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

l l

co omewwm bl4

- . - _ - _ . _ _ . . . . __ . . - _ _ . _ , . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ . . . _ . - - ~ , . _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ . _ _

2.4.4 jl1(trcnf y e FSAll Section 7.2.1.1.2 e FSAll Section 15.2.5

• FSAll Section 15.3.4 e FSAll Question 211.80 e Drawing D 302-011 e 1MS 41-011-10 7

• Drawing D 302-085

• Eru DDD Section 2.1

• Technical Speelflention 3/4-7.1.3

• Uniforta Dullding Code e DSP-209-044461000. "Fleid Erected. Nuclear Safety Class Storage Tanks" 2.4.5 J)]sfign!tn_qlcLand Mirgi,m 1-3. The least negative moderator temperature coefficient was used in the analyses, which resulted in maximum core power during the initial part of the transient to yield DNHit in excess of 1.30.

4. VCSNS is designed for 100 mph winds which exceeds the Unlform Bulldlng Code requirem:nt for the region. The 500.000 gallon condensate storege tank has a contained volume of at ! cast 172.700 gallons for emergency feedwater supply, which provides sufficient supply safe shutdown at the l- turbine drivea feedwater pump design flowrate.

5. No discrepancy exists in that the VCSNS restoration of power within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> coincides with NUMAllC Assumption No. 5.

2.5 itEACTOft COOLANT INVENTollY 1,OSS 2.5.1 NUMillC AssumpRom Sources of expected PWit and BWit renetor coolant inventory loss include (1) normal system leakage, (2) losses from letdown, and (3) losses due to reactor coolhnt pump seal leakage. Expected rates of renetor coolant inventory loss under station blackout

u. m . ,_.. . . -

- - . ~ - . _ - - - - - . - - . - - - -- - . -._. .~

i l

conditions do not result in core uncovering for a PWR in the four hour time period.

Therefore, makeup systems in addition to those currently available under blackout conditions are not required, There exists sufficient head to maintain core coolmg under j natural circulation. l i

2.5. WDM A_RC liasis l

\

Normal system leakage is limited by technical speelfications to a low rate. These rates are not a=sumed to increase under station blackout conditions. Emergency operating procedures developed in accordance with NSSS vendor Emergency Procedure Guidelines or individual plant analysis should be used to direct operators to take appropriate action.

RCP sealleakage is assumed not to exceed 25 gpm per pump for 'he duration of the station blackout event.11owever, this assumption is currently the subject of a resolution program (NRC Generic Issue 23).

If the final resolution of Generic issue 23 results in higher RCP leakage rates, then the coping duration analysis will need to be reevaluated.

Generic NSSS vendor analyses and studies listed below show that for the assumed leakage rates core uncovery does not occur in the four hour time period. These studies also show that sufficient head exists to maintain core cooling under natural circulation for a PWR, and that decay heat remova! capability is maintained for a UWR,

1. Analyses submitted in response to the TMI accident and emergency procedure guidelines, including IEll 79-05. NUREG-0578, NUREG-0660, and NU R EG-07371

2. Analyses submitted in response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 concerning station blackout response procedurest

'3. C. D. Fletcher,"A Revised Summary of PWR Loss of Off-site Power Calculations". EGG-CAAD-5553. EG&G Idaho. September 1981:

u,..,n-...-,,

2-16

4. D.11. Cook, et. al., " Station 11thekout at Ilrowns Ferry Unit one - Accident Sequence Analysis", NURE0/ Cit-2182. Oak llidge National I aboratory, November 1981: and

5. A. M. Kcinezkows.kl and A. C. Payne. .)r., " Station illackout Aceldent Analys.s". NUllEO/ Cit 3220 Sandin National Laboratories. May 1983.

2.5.3 6.pplignLlo_n.1q1G_Suni!rtrtjuqlynt_Shil.og  ;

The NUMAllC assumption does upply to VCSNS. An analysis by the Westinghouse owner's group, WCAP-10541, addresses pump seal lenkage rates that would occur during station blackout, and confit ms that core uncovery will be prevented. Natural circulation of coolant provides suffielent flow for renetor core residunt hent removnl after llCP constdown.

Iteview of WCAP 10541 has been made to confirm that itCS inventory loss has been addressed. Signifiennt margin exists to conclude that core uncovery will nol o occur in the four-hour Station illockout scenario.

Ilesolution of Generic issue 23 wl!! confirm the itenetor Coolant Pump sent leakage assumption is vaild.

2.5.4 Ilt[ctrnets e lleactor Coolant System Design liasis Document dections 2.4 and 4.1.2 o Technical Speelflentions Section 3.4.6.2 o WCAP-10541 "Itenctor Coolant Pump Sent Performance Following a 1.oss of All AC Power, llev. 2, November 1986 2.5.5 DIserepaneles.nnd Margins WCAP-10541 concludes that the expected itCP sent leakage is 21.1 gpm/ pump.

Fig. 8-5 of WCAP-10541 shows that even with 150 gpm/ pump, the ilme to core uncovery is greater than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This extra 128.9 gpm/ pump or 386.7 total for 3 pumps, more than compenuntes for any possible " neglected" leakages as listed in 9

the Technical Specifications (sum of Technical Specifleation allowable lenkages

" identified" and " unidentified" is 13 gpm).

I,etdown and normal RCP seal return lines are isolated as part of EOP 0.0 procedures as discussed in Section 4.3.l(4) of this report.

2.6 OPEll ATOR ACTION 2.6.1 EtLMELCJgntmp1Lons Operator setton is assumed to follow the Plant Operating Procedures of the underlying symptoms or identified event scenario associated with a station blackout.

2.6.2 NUM AItC llaats NRC analyses supporting the proposed station blackout rulemaking assume that a i reasonable set of operator actions will occur. The governing document for defining operator actions is the plant's procedures (Appendix II, NUllEG/Cil-3226).

2.6.3 6ppil tation to V.C. Summer NucitatMallon The NUMAllC assumption is applicable VCSNS. Section 4 discusses the necessary procedures in more detail.

2.6.4 liefergnmg e SCE&G Co. Emergency Operating Procedure EOP-0.0,"1.oss of All AC Power" e SCE&G Co. Emergency Planning Procedure EPP 015. " Natural Emergency (Earthquake, Tornado)"

l 2.6.5 ll!ggrp_nJmif.UDdJdHIKhle l

Not applienble l

c. i .. r ,, u. .. m 2-18

I 2.7 EFFECTS OF LOSS OF VENTILATION 2.7.1 NUMf_BC Assumptions  ;

1. lLquipment Occrnbility infide Containmem Temperatures resulting from the loss of vent!!? tion are enveloped by the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and high energy une break environmental profiles.

2. Eauloment Occrolllity Outside Coniginment L

a. Areas containing equipment required to cope with a station blackout need only be evaluated if (a) the area is a dominant area of concern, and (b) the dominant area of concern has not been previously evaluated as a harsh environment due to a high or moderate energy line break.

The dominant areas of concern ares (1)  !!PCl/IIPCS and RCIC rooms (BWR only) - decay heat removal equipment (2) Steam driven AFW pump room (PWR only) - decay heat removal equipment (3) Main steam tunnel (UWR only) - high temperature cutout for decay heat reti. oval equipment Assumptions concerning the potential for thermal-induced equipment failure in a station blackout for the dominant areas of concern are separated into three distinct conditions based on bulk air temperatures L a m o -, ..

2-19

-_ _-___ ___ ___ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ .__ _ _ - - _-___ ________ ____ __ -_- - __ __ _ =

f CR!1d.lll2fLI.  !

Equipment located in Condition I rooms are considered to be of low conecrn with respect to elevated temperature effects and willlikely require no special actions to assure operability for a 4-hour station blackout. This condition is defined by a steady state temperature of 120*F.

Condition 2 Equipment located in Condition 2 rooms generally require no forced cooling In order to assure operability for a 4 houe station blackout. If additional cooling is needed, such actions as opening doors may be sufficient to support er,ulpment operation to mitigate a s?ntion blackout event. This condition is defined b/ a steady-state temperature of 150'F. - ,

GtRG12R3 Equipment located in Condition 3 rooms require plant specific treatment of j the potential for thermal induced fallure. Such treatment may include j (1) further plant specific analysis. (2) providing forced cooling, and (3) replacement by equipment designed or quallfled for the environment.

NOTEt Plant procedures need to reflect the operator actk is neecasary to enhance cooling fcr rooms in above conditions. I i

The control room complex (l.c., area (s) containing instrument indications and ,

associated logic cabinets which the control room operator relles upon to cope with a statto.i blackout) is considered to be in Condition 1. Ily opening >

cabinet doorts adequate air mixing is achieved to maintain internal cabinet ,

temperature 11n equilibrium with the control room temperature. Thorefore,

- cabinets containing instrumentation and controls required for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown in a station blackout are considerad to be in Condition 1. As such, additional cooling may be provided in a station' blackout by opening cabinet doors within 30 minutes of the event's onset. i i

- k o.o ume...an -

1 *Y

. . _ _ . . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ , _ . ~ . _ . . . _ . , _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ . . , _

For multi unit control ioom complexes (i.e., aren(s) contalnhg instrument  !

Indleations and associated logic cabinets which the control room operator l relles upon to cope with a station blackout) where a portion of the liVAC ls powered from the non blacked-out unit, no signifleant temperature rise  ;

above normal operating conditions is expected. For this situation, the effects of loss of ventilation need not be considered further.

b. Loss of heating in the battery room does not result in a decreate in battery electrolyte temperature suffic!cnt to wntrant battery capacity concern for a four-hour period. ,

3. Cp_n. trol Room linbitability Loss of cooling in the control room for a four- hour period does not prevent the operators from performing necessary actions.

3 2.7.2 NUM ARC liasta

1. Equipment Operability inside Cor'.alnment No design basis accidents (DUAs)(i.e.. LOCAs or steam line breaks) or beyond DB As (1,e.. resulting in core damage) are assumed coincident with a station blackout. Therefore, environmental concerns inside containment are limited to (1) loss of cooling water, and (2) loss of ventilation systems. In both cases, no sudden onset of extreme temperature conditions or humidity is j expected. Station blackout results in a slow heatup of containment due to g loas of ventilation. Absent DBA conditions, temperatures in a four-hour station blackout are expected to be bounded by thermal profiles considered for the high energy line break events.

The response of a large, dry containment to a station blackout was previously analyzed in the course of preparing Emergency Procedure Guidelines (see Westinghouse ECA-0.0). For two, three, and four loop plants, assuming 50 gpm per pump RCP seat leakage, containment temperature rises less than 15'F from the initial temperature.

s w.. m...

2 21

t r

i Other PWR containments can be expected to perform within an acceptable ,

thermal range. based on the relative volume of other containments to the l

large dry containment. For example. lee condensers offer a somewhat

• smaller amount of free volu'ne, combined with several million pounds mass  ;

of tee. Even ignoring the cooling capacity of the lee baskets containment heating is not itxpected to result in excess temperatures substantially greater than 50 60'F above normal operating conditions. These temperature increases are well below the thermal profiles established for ice condenser containments. ,

For DWRs, analyses indicate that conditions inside containment under station blackout conditions will be within typical tuermal !!mits established for

. equipment qualification for pressure .uppression conthinments (e.g., see letter from '4r. N. W. Curtis (Pennsylvania Power and Light Company) to Mr. A. Schweneer (NRC), dated June 15. 1982),

i

2. Equipment Operability Outside Containment-

n. As with inside containment, the temperature rise in a station blackout outside containment over a four-hour period is not expected to exceed conditions associated with a high or moderate energy line break. With .l reactor shutdown and station blackout initiation, a significant amount ,

of equipment is de-energized with a resultant reduction in heat load.

Process piping and other high temperature surfaces do not efficiently transfer heat to air, particularly when forced ventilation is not present.

Consequently, the potential for si,inificant heatup is negligible in a-four-hour period.

l l

Under station blackout conditions. the effects of the loss of ventilation are less severe due to the associated loss of lighting and AC powered .

equipment heat ' loads. The potential for mechanistic failures of systems and components due to loss of ventilation is dependent on the time required for temperatures to rise in closed rooms and cabinets. '

Temperature buildup in a compartment is a slow proecss due to the normally large thermallag associated with natural convection and the

}

loss of AC supplied heat sources. This large thermal lag allows c ai,.w.n., u.. ...

~)*2N

i i

I suffielent time for operator actions to supplement cooling in order to f limit the thermal bulldup. NUGSBO has analyzed the potential for  !

temperature bulldup in closed rooms over a four hour period. The results show that opening doors early in a sthtlon blackout (i.e.. Within j approximately 30 minutes) significantly limits any temperature rise due '

to loss of forced ventilation.

i i

Occasionally, supplemental cooling measures (such as opening doors to  !

increase natural circulation and ventilation) may confilet with other  !

safety or administrative considerations. For example, procedural requirements may exist for keeping fire or flooding doors clo.ed. .

Despite these procedural considerations, opening doors would be acceptable during a station blackout to increase natural circulation for necessary shutdown Instrumentation. Other techniques, such as using permanently mounted small battery-operated fans inside cabinets. ,

- could also be considered (Section 5 and Appendix 1, NUREG/ Cit-3226). ,

Conditip.n.1  !

f Condition 1 rooms are assumed to have a relatively small potential for thermally-induced failure during a four hour station blackout. This as,sumption is based on operating experiences and studies concerning the operability of various classes of equipment exposed to elevated temperatures, i

in a station blackout. forced cooling will be lost to most plant areas-and the potential exists in Conditlev 1 areas for bulk air temperatures ji to rise up to 120*F. For most mechanical and electrical equipment and instrumtatation found in Condition I dominant areas, temperature rises up to 120'F would likely not adversely affect operability.

^

Condition]

! Condition 2 rooms are likely to include a relatively substantial heat i~

• generation source and a small room geometry. These conditions are more typical of rooms containing steam driven mnkeup pumps, such as j .'-

f.}lDp1 (GMumme!ws geti 2 13-

l RCICS and AFWS which are generally quallfled or designed to operate in elevated temperatures.

The NRC has considered equipment operability during station blackout conditions (see Jacobus (19871). One of the conclusions of this review is that certain classes of components (e.g., relays and switches) will likely remain operable in thermal environments of 150'F to 300'F for up to eight hours. While the Jacobus study was not extensive, the general as. onption of equipment operability for Condition 2 thermal environment is considered valid because (1) only a fcur hour station blackout event is considered, and (2) in practice, less than the full four hours would be involved since there would be a period of thermal buildup during the front-end of the station blackout translcnt.

Condition 3 Condition 3 rooms represent classes of thermal environments where plant-specific consideration may be appropriate.

Appendix F provides a method for assessing the operability of equipment exposed to Condition 1,2, and 3 environments.

The operability of a representative set of control room complex (i.e., area (s) containing ins (rument indications and associated logic cabinets which the control room operator relles upon to cope with a station blackout) cabinet .

equipment was estsblished with actual experience invo!ving los, of control room ventilation for several hours (see Chiramal (19861). During this extended loss of ventilation event at McGuire, there was negligible operability effects on equipment or instrumentation.

b. firotery capacity is reduced if the electrolyte temperature drops signifleantly below design temperatures. Class lE batteries are housed in seismic Category I structures, and are not typically subjected to the I, direct effects of the external environment. Therefore, the j temperature decrease in the battery room is not significant over a four-hour period. Also, the mass of battery electrolyte is sufficient to l

4 e en t u wwwt=

2-24

resist significant temperature drops ovir a four-hour period due to lower battery room temperatures since battery cell mater!als are not efficient thermal conductors. Therefore, a decrease in battery capacity due to temperature decreasen in electrolyte under station blackout conditions does not warrant further consideration.

3. Control Room l{abitability 1

Control room habitability h not an important contributor to htenson blasout risk, particularly for events of 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> durations. NUltEG-1032 points out that the dominant accident sequences involve either an early core cooling failure or a subsequent loss of core cooling (see Appendix C, NUllEG 1032 for a more complete discussien of station blackout accident sequences).

Iloth sequences are dominated by the fa!!ure of automatic equipment to properly function on dem nd. Even these events have failure probabilities of less than 1% per event, reflecting the exceptionally high reliability of these systems and components. With respect to human error, such as due to habitability concerns. NUllEG-103? states: "The potential effect of 9perator error causing loss of decay heat removal has not been found tv be a large contributor to core damage frequency, li adequate tralning and procedures exist." (draf t NUllEG 1032, page C-15). Since NUM AltC Initiative 2. as provided in Section 4 guidelines, assure adequate training and procedures will exist, the concern regarding operators' nolilty to perform cognitive tasks is

-insignificant.

As to the expected environment within the control room it has been shown that temperatures are not likely to exceed 110*F should a station blackout

. event actually occur (Chiramal l19861). In the McGuire avent discussed by Chiramal, habitability was never an lasue. Studies suggest that long term

. occupancy in higher temperature environments doc.* not prevent performance of tasks of various difficulties (see dichna [19451) and llumphries and Imalls (1946] for military applications). Svah studies have been the basis of-guidance in the heating and ventilating industly handbooks (e.g., ASilVE

, (1950] and ASilR AE (19851). A5iiR AE. in partleular, correlates temperature.

o..e u -~..-

humidity, and pressure and concludes that light work at Il0*F and relative humidities up to 50% would not be intolerable. '

Defore the station blackout event, it is assumed that the control room is at 78'F and about 35% relative humidity. Although temperature inercases may be expected due to loss of IIVAC, the relative hur.. jlty actually decreases to approximately 30%. Guidance provided for military appileations may establish a technical basis for defining habitability standards for power plants in a station blackout. The operative standard, MIL STD-1472C.

concludes that a dry bulb temperature of Il0'F is tolorsble for light work for a four hour period while dressed in conventional clothing assuming the relative humidity is approximately 30% Loss of }{VAC would impose a slow heatup on the control room. It is expected that steady-state control room air temperatures will be well below Il0*F for most plants under loss of IIVAC conditions. For the conservative case when it is assumed that a control room is initially at 78'F and experiences an exponential temperature rise to a steady-state 110*F should ilVAC be lost in a station blackout, the ,

bulk air temperature at the end of the first hour would be approximately

'97' F. At the end of the second hour, the air temperature would be approximately 104*F. At the end of the third hour, it would be approximately 108'F. Since it would take some time for a control room to heatup once llVAC is lost, the operator is not exposed to the thermallimit for the duration of the event. Therefore, it is not expected that operator actions would be impacted significantly by projected temperature and humidity conditions and, further, that a dry bulb temperature of Il0*F appears to be a conservative limit for control room habitability.

[

2.7.3 Application to V.C. Summer Nuclear Station

1. NUMAllC Assumption 1 is applicable to VCSNS. The Westinghouse analysis (ECA-0.0) for a large, dry containment, assuming 50 gpm of RCP seal leakage and resulting in a 15'F maximum temperature rise yields margin. A LOCA analysis performed in the early stages of containment design yielded a 283'F maximum temperature. FSAR Figure 6.2-7 shows that a LOCA event

-results in a temperaturo gr(ater than 180*F for four hours (14400 sec.).

With an initial containment temperature of 120 F, the station blackout

..a.,,o...,.--

Y*

t t

l event, which causes loss of ventilation, is easily bounded by the LOCA profile.  ;

5 The Ucstinghouse analysis (ECA 0.0) has been reviewed and found appilcable to VCSNS.

2. NUMARC Assumption 2 is generally applicable to VCSNS. The turbine  !

driven emergency feedwater pump area is a dominant area of concern consistent with the NUM ARC assumption bases. Even though that aren '. us previously been identified as being subject to harsh environments due to high energy line breaks, and the turbine driven pump does not rely on cooling from the area air handling unit, the evaluation in Section 7.2.4 confirms its operability. ,

r Loss of heating in the VCSNS battery room is not expected to result in a significant decrease in electrolyte temperature. G/C llVAC Calculation 32 10 3. hows that no heating load is expected in a loss of power situation and a damper is closed to further ensure no cold air entering the rooms.

The Control Room and Relay Room have been identified by G/C as potentially dominant areas. Further analysis has been performed to determine whether these rooms meet the criteria of condition 1,2, or 3 areas. Refer to Section 7.2.4 of this raport for the actual analysis of equipment operability within these rooms, as well as for operability of equipment within other areas which have been identified as potentially dominant. -

Some plant areas requiring operator entry are expected to meet the criteria of condition 2, but should remain habitable for the first hcur, giving adequate time for necessary operator actions (such as the 436 ft. floor elevation of the East and West Penetration Access Areas for operation of main steam PO R V's).

3. NUMARC Assumption 3 is applicable to VCSNS. Loss of cooling in the Control Room for four hours is not expected to produce conditions which l

4 o o( mm,***se

. 2 27 L-

i would inhibit operator netion. Refer to the analysis in Section 7.2.4 for additional justification.

2.7.4 References a llVAC DBD. Sectiors 4.2.1 and 5

• G/C llVAC Calculation 321B 2 e G/C llVAC Calculation 321B-3 e G/C llVAC Calculation 32C0 2

• EFW DDD, Section 5 e FW DDD, Section 5.2.6

• Westinghouse Analysis ECA0.0," Loss of All AC Power" 2.7.5 Discrenaagles and Marzira

1. Station blackout ir expected to result in 135'P maximum centainment temperature. All components inside containment are designed for a LOCA event in which the temperature is 45*F higher at the end of four hours, and up to a maximum of 142*F greater at peak temperature conditions. i

2. Except for the Control Room and Relay Room, all potential dominant areas of concern were previously evaluated per 10CFR 50.49 for equipment -

operabillty to more severa harsh environmental conditions than those anticipated to occur during a SDO. Refer to Section 7.2.4 for actual analysis.

3. The VCSNS control room normal conditions are maintained at 75'F and 50%

relative humidity as compared to tne 78'F and 35% Ril as identified !"

NUM ARC for pre- station blackout conditions.

2.8 SYSTEM CROSS TIE CAPAlllLITY ,

2.8.1 NUM ARC A_ssu2ptLons Under station blackout conditions it is assumed that multi-unit sites with fluid or DC electrical system cross-tie capability will be able to achieve and maintain safe shutdown u n..., u - ~ , n 2 28

in the affected unit by procedurally utilizing the unaffeed unit's cross-tied systems.

Systems of the unaffected unit must be electrically independent of the blacked-out unit as appropriate in order to credit their availability to bring the affected unit to safe shutdown.

2.8.2 N O M A R_QJasts NRC analyses supporting other rulemakings (i.e.,10CFR50 Appendix R) permit multi-unit sites to rely on cross tic capability of fluid systems to bring the affected unit to safe shutdown conditions.

2.8.3 6ppilgation to VaQuSunjmetJ{uclear Station Since VCSNS is not a multi-unit site. NUMARC Assumption 2.8.1 is not applicable and has no consequence to this analysis.

2.8.4 [teft rente3 e FSA R Section . 0 2.0.5 Discre,.paneles and Marrins .

Not app!! cable 2.9 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL,S 2.9.1 NUM ARQA$synipJigns l Actions spelfled in Emergency Procedure Guldelines for station blackout are predicated on use of instrumentation anc controls powered by vital buses supplied by station Datteries. Appropriate actions will be taken by operations personnel to assess plant status in the event c.f erratic performance or f ailure of shutdown instrumentation, cim .~

.4 2-29

~ _- . .. . , . _-- .- . - - . . . - - _

2.9.7 NUMARC Ilasig NSSS emergency procedure guidelines identify instrumentation and controls requirements to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. Operator training includes the use of backup instrumentation and methods for identifying erratic performance.

2.9.3 Apphen[qp tp V CuSym_ met N ucienLS tatlog The NUMAllC tasymption applies to VCSNS In that the V.C. Summer Emergency Operating Procedures for safe shutdown are based on the use of instruments and controls powered through inverters from the station batteries. Also, based on implementation of NitC ReJ. Guide 1.97, Category 1 devices which are fed from Class 1E power can be esod to cope wi'.h a 500. EOP 6.0, covering complete loss of all AC power, provides insUuctions with alternatlve actions to be used by operating personnel Ir. restoring AC power stabillring recetor coolant and secondary system conditions, ensuring adequate core cooling and preserving itCP seul integrity. Iteview of the EOP's in Section 4.0 and the coping assustr.ent in Section 7.0 ensure that required instrumentation is available to cope with a 5110.

2.9.4 Rt[ttratn

• EOP 6.0 Revision 2 e EOP 6.1 llevision 2 e EOP 6.2 Revision 2 7.9.5 91LscrrpancicminGarx(ns No discrepancy exists in that the VCSNS EOP's for loss of all AC power identify Instrumentation power by vital buses as assumed by NUM ARC therefore, no quantitative mnrgin exists.

-i..~.~.m.

2-30

2.10 CONTAINMl!NT ISOI.ATION val.VI!S 2.10.1 NUM ARC A E stm21Lons Containment isolation valves either fall in the scfe condition in accordance with the design bases of the plant or can be manually closed.

2.10.2 NUM ARC !!as,lg 10CFR50 General Design Celteria (GDC) 55 through 57 speelfy requirements for isolating piping systems penetrating containment, including reactor ceolant pressure boundaries. These requirernents call for combinations of redundant locked closed and automatic isolation valves for reactor coolant pressure boundaries and any containment penetration line directly connected to the containment atmosphere. In cases where automatic isolation valves are used, the GDC specifies that the valves fall upon loss of power in a position which provides greater safety. All other containment penetration valves must meet the requirements of the GDC by being rautomatic, or locked closed, or capable of remote manual operation.

Most containment isolation valves are in the normally closed or failed closed position during power operation. These valves can also be closed manually l.oss of AC does not affect the design basis for these valves. Some valves, such as MSIVs. charging and letdown !!nes, and reactor water cleanup lines, are normally open. Typically, these valves are air-operated, failed closed valves and do not need AC power to close. A few DC operated containment isolation valves exist, such as valves in the shutdown cooling or residual heat removal systems. These DC operated valves are normally closed during power operations, and generally are locked or have DC breaker control power removed by racking out the circuit breaker for the valve operator. The position of these DC operated valves is not affected by the station blackout.

l 2.10.3 Application to V.C. Summer Nuclear Station l

l l The NUMARC assumption is applicable to VCSNS. FSAR Table 6.2-54 summarizes all containment isolation valves by type, location actuator, normal and failure position, power source and backup actuation. Most VCSNS isolation valves are normally closed or l fall closed. Others are either air operated valves which fall closed on loss of air or

. . + , . . . ~ . . . . ,

l 2-31

power er check valves or motor operated valves which fall as-is but have handwheels to facilitate manual closure. The 111111 pump suction lines do not require outside isolation valves but are normally closed with electrical power " locked out". The coping assessment of containment isolation valves in Section 7.2.5 and Table 7.2-1 ensures that appropriate containment integrity can be provided during a SiiO.

2.10.4 References

• FSA R Section 6.2.4.2 2.10.5 Qlsgrepaneles and Martins No discrepancy exbts in that the VCSNS containment isolation capability coincides with the NUMAllC assumptions a quantitative margin is not applicable.

2.11 IIUllRICANE PitEPARATIONS 2.11.1 NUM AltC Assumpt[(Lns Procedural actions taken in anticipation of the eft'ects of a hurricane provide significant safety benefits and reduce the risk of station blackout. Plants which are impacted in their " extremely severe weather" grouping primarily due to the effects of a hurricane have a basis for classifying their "off-site power design characteristic group"(P2', or P3*) in a lower group.

2.11.2 NUM ARC liasig NUMARC Guidelines in Section 4.2.3 specify actions to be taken to prepare a plant to cope with a station blackout due to an anticipated hurricane-induced LOOP. These actions can be separated into two groupst (1) actions taken in the 24-hour period prior to anticipated hurricane arrival, and (2) a commitment to be in safe shutdown two hours before the anticipated hurricane arrival at the site. These actions result in a coping categorization consistent with Section 3.2.1 Part 1E(13) and Section 3.2.5 of these guidelines.

,-+.m..~...----

2-32

The following actions are important for achieving an enhanced coping espablif ty under hurricane conditions:

1. Plant in safe shutdown at ! cast two hours before the anticipated hurricane arrival at the rito (i.e.. sustained winds in excess of 73 m.p.h.) so that major decay heat loreds can be dissipated using non-emergency plant equipment

. prior to the occurrence of a LOOP:

2. Enhancement and verlflettlon of EDO reliability by prewarming, prelubricating, starting and load testing (see, Section 4.2.3):

3. Topping off condensate storage tank inventory and placinii bnttery systems on charges and.

4. Expediting the restoration of important plant systems and components needed to cope with a hurricane induced LOOP:

and other actions as detailed in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.3.- Such actions have the capability to enhance the coping capacity for the reasons discussed below.

The timing of anticipatory actions is tied to hurricane tracking performed by both utilities and the National Weather Service. llurricane tracking normally begins when tropical depressions are first detected far out in the Atlantic Ocean. Forward motion does not normally accelerate until the hurricane approaches the Eastern seaboard or Gulf coast. Even at landfa!!, hurricane forward speeds are generahy below 35 knots speeds that permit adequate tracking and warning.

Continuous position information for hurricanes is provided to the Natlanal llurricane Center by reconnaissance aircraft and geostationary satellites, and are updated at six hour intervals. This tracking permits National Weather Service analysis to project the time and location of landfalls and to issue hurricane watches and warnings for affected areas (see NWS [1987])i llurricane watches are issued for an area 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> prior to the expectation of hurricane conditions. Hurricane warnings are irsued for an aren 'J4 hours ,

. prior.to the expectation of wind speeds in excess of 73 mph. With the institution of a 2 33

i f

hurricane warning, plant operators will have sufficient time to take action prior to hurricane arrival, ,

During the 24-hour period prior to hurricane arrival. NUMARC station blackout Initiatives direct plant operators to take actions to enhance the normal EDO reliability f

- and coping capnbility. These actions include reviewing procedures, restoring systems  !

and components to service, warming, lubricating, starting and load testing EDGs.  !

increasing CST levels, and charging batteries. The safety benefits offered by these t f

actions result from increased EAC availability, above-normal available coping resources I (and extended coping times), and lower potential for operator error for hurrienne events.

With EDO testing in advance of hurricane arrival, the average EDO will realize a reduction in EDO failures up to 50% depending on mode of failure (i.e.. stress versus demand), based on Industry EDO failure data reported in NUREG-1032. Thls data l suggests that approximately 50% of fallores can be repaired within four hours in non cmergency situhtlons with normal staffing. With 24-hours available. Figure 4.0 of NUREG 1032_ Indicates up to 75% of EDO failures may be repatrable under normal conditions. Enhancement and verification of high EDO reliabilities is one of.two major improvements that can redur,e 'he risk of n station blackout, the other is plant snfe t shutdown in sufficient advance of an anticipated hurricane-induced LOOP to dump a significant portion of the decay heat load.

Tne relative amount of decay heat removed in a two hour period by the main condenser  ;

is approximately.60% of the energy generated in the first four hours following shutdown.

By removing this energy through the main condenser, the station blackout coping rm. 'urces nomally reserved for proecssing this decay heat would be preserved, per iltting longer coping times for a four hour water supply.

During the hurricane warning period. " topping-off" water supplies can also extend a normal four hour water supply by several hours. For example, increasing the condensate available for coping above a technical specification level of 65% to 100% available capacDT 4'n add several hours of coping time to a rated four hour capability. Topping off tl t conc, nsate storage tank and placing the plant in a safe shutdown several hours before W..urricane induced ! OOp reduces the likelihood of core damage from a subsequent station blackout event.

rm i %,- .,~,. . .

2-34

Actions are also available to extend the time to battery depletion in order to support enhanced coping. Analysis demonstrates that for a typleal plant. pre-hurrienne actions can eflectively support enhanced coping enpubility for hurrienne events. With the plant in an early shutdown, certain londs would not be needed should a station blnekout subsequently occur as a result of a hurrienne-induced LOOP. Further, other londs could renhonably be stripped af ter initiation of a 1,00P in order to extend the effectiveness of the available charge.

During early shutdown, many air operated valve operations necessary for decay heat removal following shutdown would also be secomplished while air compressors are nyallable. These operations would result in fewer air operated valve operations in a station blackout und longer coping capability involving this resource in any event, alr-operated valves necessary for shutdown enn be manually operated or are equipped with backup means for ensuring proper positioning in a station blackout.

The combined effects of these actions li.e., implementation of plant speelfle pre-hurrienne shutdown requirements and procedures) provide an eight-hour enhnneed coping capability under anticipated hurrienne conditions.

2.11.3 6ppllgation to V,G,JpinmerJgqltarJta1193 The NUM AllC assumption la not applienble to VCSNS since it is not a coattal plant subject to hurtlennes. Procedures to withstand severe weather conditions are addressed in Section 4.3.3.

2.11.4 ILefpj($ntej e FS All Section 1.2.1.3 e Uniform Hullding Code Chapter 23. Figure 4 2.I1.5 [Lisqrfpan.glesJncLM.negi_ns V.C. Summer structures are designed for 100 mph winds, whleh is in excess of '.he Uniform Duilding Code requirement of the maximum 80 90 mph for this regiou.

vi .w._ , .. .,

2-35

3.0 RiiQ1!1Bi[D COPING DUMTION CATECOlX t 3.1 CATEGOllY DETEltMIN ATION OVEllVIEW This section provides the analyses and calculations that determine the required station blackout coping duration for the VCSNS.

3.2 CATEGOilY DETEltMIN ATION ANALYSES AND CALCULATIONS The method used to determine the required station blackout coping duration is in accordance with NUMAllC B7-00, Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors, Section 3.

3.2.1 Step One Determinion the Off-She_ AC Power Design Characteris11g_Oroup Part 1.At Determining Site Susceptibility to Grid llelated Loss of Off-Site Power Events The frequency of grid related loss of offsite power events greater than five minutes for the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) is expected to be less than the industry average of .020 events per Mte year used in NUM ARC 87-00. The reasons are as follows:

e VCSNS is geographically located such that it is not at the " tall end" of a grid or power pool network and therefore has more than "llmited" access to and support from the surrounding grid, e VCSNS is fed by two different voltage systems (230kV and 115kV) over several right of ways, o The 230kV switchyard at VCSNS has tie lines to the Fairfield Pump Storage Project 1.24 miles away. Tae Fairfield Project has " Black Start" capability.

• The 115kV 3afeguard line is 2.6 miles long and is directly tied to the Part Substation which is tied directly to combustion turbines and hydro units.

l wi < o - o n.. .* --

3-1

e SCE&G's sy= tem has tie lines at 230kV and 115kV to five different system utilities namely South Carolina Public Servlee Authority.

Southeastern Power Administration, Duke Power Company, Carolina Power and Light Company and Georgia Power Company.

• The SCEaG power system has not lost its 115kV or 230kV system grid as of the present time.

Therefore the VCSNS is no_1 classifico as a P3 site as the expected frequency of Isrld-related events causing loss of offsite power should not exceed once per 20 years. Further analysis, as provided in Parts 1.0, l.C.

1.D and 1.E. Is required to determine if VCSNS is either a P1 or P2 site.

Part 1.0: Determining the Frequency of Loss of Off-Site Power Due to Extremely Severe Weather (ESW Group)

The method used to determine the ESW Group for VCSNS is based on NUMAitC 87-00, 3.2.1 Part 1.0, Method D. Table 3-2. Using Table 3-2, the VCSNS is in ESW Group 3.

Part 1.C: Determining the Estimated Frequency of Loss of Off Site Power Due to

< Severe Weather (SW Group)

The method used to determine the SW Group for VCSNS is based on N U M AllC 87-00, 3.2.1. Part 1.C. The f actors used in NUM AllC's equation to determine the frequency for loss of olf-site power due to severe weather are taken from Table 3-3 in NUM AflC 87-00 and are as follows:

h1 = 2 h2 =.000106 h3 =.12 h4: 0 b r 12.5 as the VCSNS has multiple rights of way as shown on FSAil Figure 8.2-1 e : 0 as the VC3NS is not subject to salt spray

. 4. , o .m. ..

3-2

'{

Substituting in the above inetors in NUM A RC's equation for the frequency yields the following results f n ((1.3 x 10-4) x 21 + 112.5 x .000106] 4 l(1.2 x 10-2) x .12] + [0 x 01 f1 (2.6 x 10 4] + (13.25 x 10 4] + 114.4 x 10 4] + [0l f : 30.25 x 10 4 or .003025 Using Tabic 3 4 in NUM AltC 87-00. SW Group 1 is selected for n frequency of loss of off-site power due to severe wenther of 0.003025. Therefore, the VCSNS is in SW Group 1.

Part 1.D: Determining the Independence of Of f-Site Power System (I Group)

The method used to %.trmine the Independence of Off-Site Power System

(! Group) for VCSNS is onsed on NUM AllC 8 7-00, 3.2.1. Part 1.D.

Thn response to question A is "YES". The reason is the ll5kV safeguard line from Parr Station, although not electrically connected to the 230kV switchyard, does enter vin a common tower with a 230kV line from Parr Stat) 9 and passes through the 230kV switchyard vin buswork. The "YES" response is therefore the most conservative response. Reference FSAll Figure 8.2-2n.

The response to both questions 11(1) and 11(2) is "NO". The normal source of AC power to the ESF busses for VCSNS is from the off-site power system.

One ESF train (11 train) is normally supplied from the 230kV system and the other train (A train) is normally supplied from the 115kV system.

Therefore, per the NUM AllC 87-00 logie. VCSNS is assigned to the i 1/2 Group as the answer to question A is "YES" but the answers to both questions ill and U2 are "NO".

Part 1.E Determining Off-Site AC Power Design Charneteristic Group (P Group)

The method used to determine the off-site AC power design charneteristic group (P Group) for VCSNS is based on NUM AllC 8 7- 0 0. 3.2.1. P o rt 1. I'..

u..m,-,,,...,,

3-3

{ - s.

Table 3-Sa is used for VCSNS because the plant is in the 11/2 Group and is located inland and most probably will not be subjected to lor.g duration hurtleane indaced LOOP's. Therefore using Table 3-Sa and the previously determined values of 3 for the EFW Group and 1 for the SW Group. VCSNS is categorized as being in the Off-Site AC Power Des!gn Charactaristic Group Pl.

3.2.2 Sten Two: Classifying the Emergency AC Powier_Suppjy Sv4 carlC onfigug1193 Part 2.A Determining the Number of EAC Power Supplies Normally Available The method used to determine the number of EAC power supplies normally available is based on NU M AllC 87-00. 3.2.2. Part 2.. . . For VCSNS. the number of EAC power supplies normally available that are rLql being used .

as an alternate AC power source is two. These two supplies are the two diesel generator- .)cfinitions of standby and alternate ne poe.cr sourecs are based on Appendix A to NUMAllC 87-00.

Part LD: Deterr-)!ning the Number of Necessary EAC Standby Power Supplies The number of EAC standby power supplies required by VCSNS to operate safe shutdown equipment during a station blackout is one. Each traln's diesel generator can support its train's safe shutdown land (Ileference FSAR Table 0.3-3). Only one train is required to safely shutdown the plant.

Part 2.C: Determining the EAC Power Configuration Group Using Table 3-7 in NUMAllC 87-00 and the previous responses from Section 3.2.2, Parts 2. A and D the VCSNS is in EAC Power Configuration Group C (2 supplies available.1 necessary for safe shutdown).

3.2.3 Sico Three - DettrmJning the Caleylated_EDO llellability The calculated EDG Rellability is determined in necordance with NUM AllC #87-00.

Section 3.2.3 with reference to NS AC-108. Section 2. EDG test data used is obtained from CCSS-4330 NL.

,,s.o,,.,~......--

3-4

i 1

NSAC-108 defines EDO reliability as the product of EDO Start rollability and EDG load run reliability. These speelfic reliabilities are subsequently defined respectively as  !

Number olfygpglulytlitts Total Number of Demands to Start .

r and.

Number of Successful Lond runs

. Total Number of Demands to Load Given the conservative assumption that the number of demands to load !s half the number of demandito start and that failures are associated with demands to load. It is i determined that for worst case considerations, the calculated EDO reliabilities (last 20  ;

$0 and 100 " valid tests", see VCSNS Technical Speelficattor" Section 4.8.1.1.2 for diesel generhter testing procedures) for the Nuclear Unit (EDO A and D) are as follows:

i i

No.of No.of Valid Successful EDO licllabilitiM _ l Tests S', arts Lp.!ni-Rum Diesel Diesel Ayer,,3e EDO EDG Qenerator "A" Generntor "H" Unit '

I,oad- Load-(Last) A l)

. -4 11 Start -Rg Unit Start Run 1)2 11 20 -20 -20 9 10 1.00 0.90. 0.90 1.00 1.00- 1.00 0.05 50 50 50 24 25 1.00 0.06 0.96- 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 100 100 100 48 48- 1.00 0.96 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.96 NOTE: The number of demands to start is equal to the number of valid tests while the '

number of demands to load is equal to the number of valid testa divided by two. I

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, - , , - , - . .~ _ _ _ _ - . _ . _ . _ _ _ . - ... .. ,__ _ .-- . ._ ___. _ . .

. . . . .- - . - . . = -- _

3.2.4 Steo Four - Determinine Allowed RDG Target Reliability The Allowed EDG Target Reliability to be used in determining minimum required station t ackout coping duration is determined in accordance with NUM ARC 87-00 Section 3.". 4.

bhizing the results for calculated average unit EDG reliabMty .'om the previous Section 3.2.3 (0.96 - Last 20 valid tests,0.98 - Last 50 valid tests and 0.96 - Last 100 valid tests) and the results from Section 3.2.2, Part 2.C which classified the VCSNS as being in EAC Group C, it is dei :.nined that the VCSNS satisfies the evaluation criteria set out in NUMARC 87-00, Section 3.2.J(1) allowing an EDG target reliability of 0.'35.

3.2.5 Determinine Cocing Duration Category The required coping dur: tion category is based on Table 3-8 of NUM ARC 87-00. From the previous sections' r.nalycis and calculations, the VCSNS is in off-site power group P1,-

in EAC Group C and has an allowed EDG target reliability of 0.95.

Based on Table 3-0, the required coping duration category for the VCSNS is 4 (hours).

3.2.G Reuulred Actica No further action by VCSNS is required to redt.ee the assessed risk of station blackout as the plant is not le the 8 (hour) or 16 Ihour) tategory.

ei!N#$ (t)MWpnWS4ej9 3-6

4. O S_TATION BLACKOUT RESPONSE PROCEDURES 4.1 OVERVIEW Existing plant procedures are 'vased on procedure guidelines generated by the NSSS vendor or plant-specific analysis, and provide the operator with substantial direction for responding to a station blackout event. Plant procedures also address power restoration and severe weather concerns. The VCSNS plant emergency procedures were reviewed for the actions below that are important considerations during a station blackout.

As provided by NUMARC Station Blackout initiative 2, the VCSNS reviewed and revised, as appropriate, the emergency operating precedures using the technical bases and associatml gu!deliri:s ')rovided in this document. Appropriate plaat personnel will be trained on the re.ised procedures resulting from this initiative.

4.". MUMARC OPERATING PROCEDURES GUIDELINES

..! tA lon Blackout Rem sse Gulcelines (NUM ARC Station Blackout initiative 2.a) 1 c.k met n provides the NUMARC guidance for operator actions to be taken in a sution F4ckout event. Section 4.3.1 contains additional information for VCSNS and bases for the guidelines provided in this section.

These gu;delines assume a single path to achieve and maintain safe snutdown conditions in a station blackout. In addition to repeated attempts at restoring AC power to a l shutdown bus, the path corsists of performing operations designed to stabilize the plant I using available equipment. Guideline (1) reflects attempts at AC power restoration which may be made from either the preferred or a standby (Class 1E) power source. If I an / oower source is avellable, it may also be used to restore power. Guidelines (2) l (13) address items to be considered in stabilizing the plant until AC power is i cm t.

1 (1) Plant procedures should identify site-specific actions necessary to restore off-site or sttadby (Class IE) AC power sources. If an AAC power source is available, it should be started as soon as possible. Plants relying on AAC power sources should start the AAC power source and commence loading shutdown equipment within the first hour of a station blackout.

4-1

(2) Plant procedures should specify actions necessary to assure that shutdown equipment (including support systems) necessary in a station blackout can operate withcut AC power.

(3) Plant procedures should recognize tne importance of AFWS/IIPCIS/IIPCS/RCICS during the early stages of the event, and direct the operators to invest appropriate attention to assuring their continued, reliabic operation t'iroughout the transient since this ensures decay heat removal.

(4) Plant procedures should identify the sources Lf potential reactor inventory loss and specify actions to prevent or limit significant loss.

(5) Plant prc,cedures should ensure that a flowpath is promptly established for makeup flow from the CST to the steam generator / nuclear boiler and identify backup ,

water sources to the CST in order of Intended use. Additionally, plant procedures should specify clear criteria for transferring to the next preferred source of water.

(6) Plant procedures should identify individual loads that need to be stripped from the plant DC buses (both Class 1E and non-Class 1E) for the purpose of conserving DC power.

(7) Plant procedures should specify actions to permit appropriate containment isolation and safe shutdown valve operations while AC power is unavailable. These actions may include:

(a) providing additional bottled air or nitrogen at the valves; (b) specifying manual valve operation to maintain shutdown (e.g., manunl valve seating to reduce system losses)

(c) ensuring appropriate containment integrity.

(8) Plant procedures should identify the portable lighting necessary for ingress and egress to plant areas containing shutdown or AAC equipment requiring manual operation.

4-2

i (9) Plant procedures should consider the effects of AC power loss on area access, as well as the need to gain entry to other locked areas where remote equipment operation is necessary.

(10) Plant procedures should consider loss of ventilation effects on specific energized equipment necessary for shutdown (e.g., those containing internal electrical power supplies or other local heat sources that may be energized or present in a station blackout). These procedures should address (a) specific room or cabinet tempcratures or symptoms (e.g., alarms or indication of loss of cooling) readily identifiable by the operator, and the response thereto (b) methods for providing necessary ventilation and/or supplemental cooling within 30 minutes; (c) the potential need for operator action to override HPCIS/RCICS steam line isolation on high temperature; (d) opening cabinet doors containing instrumentation in control rooms necessary for safe shutdown in a station blackout within 30 minutes, as required; and, (e) effects of actuation of fire protection features due to elevsted temperature.

(11) Plant procedures should consider habitability requirements i.t locations where operators will be required to perform manual operations.

(12) Non-Class 1E equipment relied upon to cope for the required station blackout coping duration should be c.ddressed in a maintenance program.

(13) Plant procedures should consider loss of heat tracing effects for equipment necessary to cope with a station blackout. Alternate steps, if needed, should be identified to supplement planned action.

4.2.2 AC Power Restoration (NUMAllqStation illackout Initiative 2.b)

This section provides the NUMARC guidance for operations and load dispatcher personnel concerning the proper course of action for restoring AC power in a station 4-3

blackout. Section 4.3.2 contains additional information for VCSNS and bases for the guidelines provided in this section.

(1) Load dispatchers should give the highest possible priority to restoring power to nuclear units. Procedures and training should consider several potential methods of transmitting power from blackstart capable units to the nuclear plant.

(2) Should incoming transmission lines to a nuclear power plant be damaged, high priority should be assigned to repair and restoration activities to at least one line capable of feeding shutdown equipment.

(3) Repair crews engaging in power restoration activities for nuclear units should be given high priority for manpower, equipment, and materials.

(4) Portable AC generators should be designated as backup sources, if available, and directed to nuclear power plant sites. Procedures should address pre-planned actions and identify required equipment.

(5) Once preferred and/or standby (Class 1E) AC power becomes available, station procedures should speelfy the sequence of circuit breaker operations required to restore AC power to shutdown equipment. Any additional netions such as pulling or replacing fuses should also be identified.

4.2.3 Severe Weather Guidelines (NUM ARC Station Blackout initiative 2.e)

This section provides the NUMARC guidance for operators to determine the proper course of action due to the onset of severe weather, particularly hurricanes. Section 4.3.3 contains additional information for VCSNS and bases for the guidelines provided in this section.

The characteristics of hurricanes which allow them to be tracked provides advance warning and the opportunity for actions to put the plant into a shutdown condition.

These actions can greatly reduce the consequences of a hurricane-induced LOOP with a subsequent station blackout. With sufficient warning, actions may also be taken to enhance the reliability of AC power sources.

4-4

Actions for Hurricane (1) The plant procedures should identify site-specific actions necessary to prepare for the onset of a hurricane. These actions should be initiated when a hurricane warning is issued for the plant site area and should includes (a) inspecting the site for potential missiles and reducing this potential;

-(b) reviewing the adequacy of site staff to support operations and repair; (c) expediting the restoration of important plant systems and components to service; (d) warming and lubricating standby (Class 1E) AC power sources; (e)- determining the status of Alternate AC sources (if available) and taking necessary actions to ensure their availability; (f) increasing CST inventory; (g) placing battery chargers in service (if applicable); and, (h) start and load test EDGs.

(2)- Utility procedures should identify additional plant support staff and the met 1od of contacting them once a hurricane notice has been issued by the National Weather u Service.

.(3) Plant procedures should specify actions necessary to ensure equipment required for station blackout response is available. l (4) Plant procedures should address the following items prior to a hurricane arrival at

! a sites (a) the site-specific indicator should ensure that the plant would be in safe l

shutdown two hours before the anticipated hurricane arrival at the site (ie.,

sustained windspeeds in excess of 73 mph);

l (b) operator review of station blackout procedures; and, 4-5

(c) operator review of procedures to line up and operate the switchyard spraydown system (if installed).

The actions identified in items 1-4 above result in a coping categorization consistent with Section 3.2.1, Part IE(D) and Section 3.2.5 of these guidelines.

. Actions for Tornado Plant procedures should identify site-specific actions necessary to prepare for the onset of a tornado. These actions should includes (a) inspecting the site for potential missiles and reducing this potential and (b) expediting the restoration of important plant systems and components to service.

4.3.0 VCSNS SUPPORTING INFORMATION 4.3.1 Station Blackout Response Guidelines This section provides the bases and supplemental information for VCSNS emergency operating procedures, to the NUMARC guidelines of Section 4.2.1.

(1) Actions Required to Restore AC Power V.C. Summer N.iclear Station EOP 6.0, Rev. 2 " Loss of All AC Power" contains specific instructions to attempt restoration of ac power in event of the loss of all AC power by initiating emergency diesel generator starting to SOP-306, blocking auto start of specific safeguards equipment and dispatching of operators with specific instructions to attempt to locally start and load a diesel generator.

V.C. Summer Nuclear Station EPP-001, Rev.14 covers the emergency actions required for.a loss of AC event including announcements, alarms, notifications to security and emergency response personnel and dispatch of emergency response personnel.

(2) Actions Required to Shutdown Without AC Power V.C. Summer Nuclear Statio't EOP 6.0, Rev. 2 specifies actions to assure that 1eces ary plant shutdown equipment can operate without AC power. The TD EFP is the only rotating equipment required to be operated, but requires no auxiliarv 4-6

cooling from other systems for a SBO, therefore it is independent of AC power.

The procedure also addresses actions for transients not postulated to occur concurrent with a SBO such as isolation of faulted steam generators.

(3) Early Requirements for Decay H^at Removal V. C. Summer Nuclear Station EOP 6.0, Rev. 2 recognizes the importance of establishing auxiliary feedwater immediately following a station blackout to ensure decay heat removal with the steam generators and steam dump to the atmosphere. The TD EFP !s automatically started by a loss of AC (blackout signal) to ensure a source for steam generator cooling (decay heat removal).

Initial pressure control will be with the main steam safety valves and long term control manually with the main steam PORV's.

(4) Actions Required to Limit RC Inventory Loss V. C. Summer Nuclear Station EOP 6.0, Rev. 2 identifies reactor coolant system valves requiring isolation to limit RCS Inventory losses. Pressurizer relief and RCS letdown valves are to be isolated immediately, and RCP seals are to be isolated locally.

(5) ' Actions Required to Establish EFW Operation V. C. Summer Nuclear Station EOP 6.0, Rev. 2 recognizes the need for promptly establishing EFW flow from the CST to the steam generators with the TD EFP, and to transfer to fire se:vice water when the CST level falls to 6 feet,-without availability of the SW primary backup during a SBO.- Although this transfer is possible, the dedicated 160,100 gallons of EFW in the CST is sufficient to permit TDE FP operation well beyond 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of decay heat removal to cope with a SBO.

(6) Load Stripping From DC Buses V. C. Summer Nuclear Station EOP 6.0, Rev. 2 recognizes the importance of conserving de power by shedding non-essential de loads (Class IE and non-Class 1E) when possible. Large non-Class IE de loads such as the main feedwater pump (FWP) emergency oil pumps are to be stopped when the FWP reaches zero speed for this reason. Specific non-essentialloads associated with the Class 1E batteries identified in Section 7.2.2 of this report may be shed per Step 16 of EOP 6.0 in l

4-7

order to conserve de power. liowever, the Class 1E "A" train and "B" train

-batteries are sized adequately to support the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO coping duration without load stripping. These non-essential loads are identifled for Information only in Attachment 4 to EOP 6.0 as a recommended change.

(7) Actione for Containment isolation and Safe Shutdown V. C. Summer Nuclear Station EOP 6.0, Rev. 2 " Loss of All AC Power" Identifies appropriate valve operations to safely shut down the plant, remove decay heat, preserve RCS inventory, and ensure containment integrity following a SBO. )

Analyses of valves requiring manual operation to cope with a SBO are covered in  !

Section 7.2.3 and valves requiring closure for containment isolation are covered in Section 7.2.5.

(8) Portable Lighting Much of the equipment identified to cope with a SBO, including emergency lighting, is also included on the list of Appendix R equipment required for safe shutdown in event of a fire. Consequently adequate 8-hour fixed emergency lighting is provided to perform all required functions including ingress, egress and operation of equipment without resort to hand held lights by existing compilance to Section 111 J.10CFR Appendix R.

(9) Access to Local Areas The V.- C. Summer Nuclear Station security system is supplied with AC power from non-essential inverters backed by the plant IX battery, however the operators have keys to gain access to locked areas in event of a SBO and failure of power to the security system.

(10) Loss of HVAC Equipment locations and environmental zones as well as control action and control

. locations are tabulated on the SBO Equipment Required For Coping (SBOERC)

Table 4-1, included as Attachment 1 to Section 4. Since the rules for coping with a SBO assume that no single failure and no design basis accident will occur concurrent with a SBO, only one train of electrical equipment is required.

Ilowever, both trains of electrical equipment were listed on Table 4-1 in order to 4-8

y address the capability of achieving hot standby or hot shutdown using either l

electrical train equipment. - Analysis for the effects of loss of heating and/or coollhg in these plant locations in Section 2.7.3 showed that the loss of liVAC is ,

not significant within the time required to cope. Fire protection in these plant locations consists of sprinkler and deluge systems and CO2 systems whose 4 setpoints are well outside the elevated environmental temperatures possible on loss of HVAC so as to preclude false actuation. j (11) Habitability-The V.C. Summer Nuclear Station SBOERC Table 4-1 identifies plant Icestions f requiring operator entry, primarily the intermediate building and penetration access areas to control decay heat removal operations. Habitability in these locat!ons was analyzed in Section 2.7.3 and shown not to be significantly impacted by loss of HVAC. ,

(12) Non Class IE Eaulpment-The V.C Summer Nuclear Station EOP's and the SBO Coping Equipment list do not show the need for any non IE equipment, therefore the V.C. Summer Nuclear Quality Related Program (QRP) is not applicable, (13) f Loss of Heat Tracing =

The V.C. Summer Nuclear Station CST is located outdoors with level sensing

-tubing and the outdoor portion of the EFW outlet piping heat traced for freeze t

protection. The loss of heat tracing to this insulated (warm) piping and tubing has been analyzed to show tnat it will not freez, during the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> time to cope with a

' SBO, and the flow of water in the outlet piping would prevent freezing in event of L a SBO during cold weather in the relatively mild South Carolina plant location.

4.3.2 AC Power Restoration Guidelines This section provides the baser and supplemental information for VCSNS to the NUMARC AC power restoration guidelines of Section 4.2.2.

(1)- Load Dispatch Actions 4-9 ,

. . . - , , - - . . . . - - - - - . - . - . - . - - ~ .-~. . - .-

l s ,

d VCSNS takes no credit for AAC following a SBO, however SCE&O has adjacent hydro and gas turbine plants and a pumped storage plant that is cycled daily between hydro generation and pumped storage modes. The SCE&G load j

- dispatchers have these potential offsite sources under their jutisdiction as well as j more remote sources.

(2) Repair of AC Transmission Lines VCSNS has incoming transmission lines to the substation from three different directions to minimize likelihood of a single event causing loss of all offsite AC power, while also creating the possibility of repair of individual line(s) in the most efficient manner to restore AC power. The electrical power distribution _.

9erangement of VCSNS allows for use of either 115kV or 230kV offsite power for

-the station auxillaries, thereby adding to the flexibility of repair for partial

. restoration of offsite AC power.

(3) Repair Crew Activities Although VCSNS has no specific procedures to address repair crew activities, repair work is given a high priority.- Repair crews are immed!ately dispatched to repair and restore AC power equipment which may be damaged.

' (4) TPortable AC Generators VCSNS takes no_ credit for any_ portable AC sources in case of a SBO and thus have no procedures dealing with the use of portable AC generation sources.

'(5) 1AC Power Restoration.

' VCSNS EOP-6.2 and 6.1, Rev. 2 " Loss of All AC Power Recovery With and Without

- SI' Required" respectively, provide step by step instructions for restoration of AC power to shutdown equipment or safety injection equipment. Safety injection (SI).is not_ required for a SBO event, therefore only EOP-6.1 is applicable for AC recovery, which in turn refers to the following supplemental procedures for.

- various steps of the recovery:

EOP-12.0 Monitoring of Critical Safety Functions 4-10

EO P-1.3 Natural Circulation SOP-102 Chemical and Volume Control System (Excess Letdown)

SOP-114 RB Ventilation System SOP-123 Spent Fuel Cooling SOP-125 Industrial Cooling Water SOP-306 Emergency Diesel Generator SOP-501 HVAC Chilled Water System SOP-502 Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System SOP-503 Intermediate Building HVAC SOP-505 Control Building Ventilation System EOP-6.1 also covers recall of operators that may have been dispatched to manually control valves in EOP-6.0.

4.3.3 Severe Weather This section provides the bases and supplement information for VCSNS severe weather procedures to the NUMARC guidelines of Section 4.2.3.

Actions for llurricane The VCSNS is not in a location subject to severe hurricane weather. Therefore, the VCSNS does not need nor does it have procedures that address a course of action to cope with hurricanes.

VCS is not a coastal plant and therefore is not subject to severe hurricane weather, such as long periods of high winds with heavy rainfall, and possible salt spray. FSAR Section 1.2-1.3 indicates that hurricanes pass within 250 miles of the plant and occur about once every two years. The fastest wind speed for a 100-year return period is 100 miles per hour, sustained for about a 30 to 40-second duration.

4-11

Actions for Tornado VCSNS Appenclx 3A tc the FSAR states that structures, systems and components are constructed and/or protected against the design basis tornado (Regulatory Guide 1.76) and the resulting postulated missiles to ensure that (1) the plant can be safely shutdown and maintained in a safe condition (2) doses from the postulated related fallares will be within acceptable limits. The Reactor Building has been designed to withstand.the design basis tornado and the control room vents are provided with a tornedo missile shield. Design features utilize 1 (nelude redundancy, separation, barriers, o probability considerations.

VCSNS Emergency Plan Procedure EPP-015, Rev. 9 " Natural Emergency (Earthquake, Tornado)", provides guidelines for Initiating actions when a tornado threatens plant structures or personnel. The procedure establishes actions to be taken immediately following a tornaco " watch" and a tornado " warning," and encompasses the guidelines of NUMARC initiatives addressing Station Blackout.

The " watch" alerts the emergency repair team to maintain a standby condition. The

" warning" procedure directs the emergency repair team to ensure that all exterior doors to plant structures are closed and secured, and to secure any equipment / materials in the protected area that could become missiles in high winds and put all heavy equipment in a safe condition (l.c., lowering crane booms). The procedure requires that the repair team consist of Operational. Health, Physics and Maintenance personnel.

P ocedure EPP-015. Rev. 9, therefore conforms to the NUM ARC guidelines and does not require updating.

l 4-12

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l 7.0 COPINO WITil A STATION llLACKOUT EVENT 7.1 OVERYlEW This section provides an overview of the evaluations performed to address the capability of the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station to cope with a station blackout. These evaluations were based on a simplified assessment procedure for coping with a station blackout as delinanted by the guidelines provided oy NUMARC 87-00. There are five steps to the procedure, addressing the following toplest (1) Condensate inventory for decay heat removall (2) Assessing the Class 1E battery capacity; (3) Compressed air; (4) Effects of loss of ventilation and, (5) Containment isolation.

The procedure is structured to utilize information readily available from licensing documents (e.g., FSAR. !! censing submittals), existing calculations, purchase speelfications, and drawings. Plant speelfic analyses wer a used to supplement the NUMARC procedure for the coping assessment in Section 7.2 for certain toples listed above.

7.1.1 Goolne Methods Coping methods for the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station will be performed in accordance with the "AC-Independent" approach delineated in NUMARC 87-00. In this approach, plants rely on available steam, DC power, and compressed air to operate equipment necessary to achieve safe shutdown conditions (i.e., llot Standby or llot Shutdown, as appropriate) until off-site or emergency AC power is restored.

The definition of a station blackout as delineated in NRC 10CFR 50.2 assumes that no single failure and no design basis accident will occur concurrent with the 500.

Therefore, hot standby or hot shutdown can be achieved during a SBO using only one train of electrical equipment. However, both trains of electrical equipment were I

<.~.__...

1-1 J

evaluated for operability to address the capability of coping with a Silo at the VCSNS using either train.

7.1.2 poolna DurJilqD The V.C. Summer Nuclear Station was determined to be an "AC-Independent" plant and, therefore, must meet the requirements of this methodology for at least four hours.

<. w .~.n.,

7-2

i i

7.2 COPINO ASSESSMENT 7.2.1 Condensil.e Inventory for Decay IIcat Removal Discussiom The purpose of this procedure is to ensure that the V.C. Summer plant has adequate condensate inventory for decay heat removal during a station blackout for the regoired duration of four hours.

The necessary condensate inventory is assessed by a bounding analysis. If the quantity required for a SBO is less than the Technical Specification minimum requirement for the condensate storage tank (CST), then the plant's current condensate inventory is adequate. If not, other sources of water that can be aligned and transferred under station blackout conditions are identifled and considered.

Step 1: Plant rating from V.C. Summer operating license A = 2785 Mwt Step 2: Required Condensate Based on the NUMARC equation B = A * (22.12 Gal /Mwt) + C D = 27 8 5

• 2 2.12 + 0 B = 61604 gallons Note: C = 0 as the emergc 7 operating procedures do na require a primary system coole m, but only recommend it. Westinghouse Owners Group Report WCAP 10541 shows that an operator initiated manual cooldown is beneficial, but is not required to prevent core uncovery for 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.

l

. ea w (.m . w .nn l 7-3

1 Step 3: Technloal Specification for CST Usable Volume

' Per the Emergency Feedwater System Design Basis Document Section 3.4.4, the amount of usable water is 160,100 gallons (note that this amount is less than that based on the minimum water level from Technical Speelfication Section 3.7.1.3 of 172,700 gallons).

D = 160,100 gallons (dedicated for EFW) f i

Step 4: Review of Adequacy - Cirr Quantitles t

B = 61,604 is less than D = 160,100, therefore adequate condensate is available.

Discussions if the operator decides to initiate a manual cooldown, there is still  ;

adequate condensate available due to the reserve in the CST  ;

(98,500 gallons). '

7.1.1 hanensinr the Class 1RJaltery Canacity Discussions The purpose of this section is to ensure that the VCSNS has adequate battery espacity to support decay heat removal during a station blackout for the required 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> coping  !

t. . duratlon.. -

l-The NUMARC 87-00 procedure offers two analytical methods that can be used to ensure  !

sufficient capacity exists. NUM ARC 87-00 indicates that IEEE-STD-485, or other l

design basis battery analyses updated as necessary to reflect current loads, should be used. The two alternatives presented in NUMARC 37-00 are outlined below.

(a) Use an existing battery capaelty calculation or perform one that verlfles sufficient coping capacity under station blackout cortdttlons.

useu,emme.

(b) Use an existing battery capacity calculation or perform one that verlfles sufficient coping capacity by stripping loada in order to extend the battery life in a station blackout.

Battery capacity for the VCSNS was evaluated based on alternative (a).

Battery Capacity Calculation - No Load Stripping Step 1: Review for Battery Adequacy The de system related loads connected to the Class IE "A" train and "D" train batteries are as identified on one line diagrams includea as Figures 1 through 10 of Attachment 1 to Section 7 of this report. Figures 1 througn 10 were compared to Table 4-1. Included as Attachment 1 to Secticn 4 of this report, to ensure that loads which are listed or required to support "SDO Equipment Required for Coping" as !!sted on Table 4-1 are addressed in the battery capacity evaluation.

The original SDO evaluation was performed using method (b) and showed that the existing station batteries had sufficient capacity to meet the 500 loads if non-essentialloads were stripped. plant modification MRF-21595 was subsequenUy performed in which larger replacement batteries sized to meet the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SDO load profile without load shedding were Installed.

Step 2: Review for Adequacy - Without Load Stripping O/C Calculation No. DC 832-005, Rev. 7 documents the adequacy of battery capacity for the new Class 1E "A" train and "D" train batteries installed per plant modification MRF-21595 referenced in Step 1. Refer to Attachment 3 to Section 7.2.2 for a background discussion relative to battery cap"ity.

Supporting Informations i

The total DC power requirements for a four hour station blackout depend on the required loads, their duration of operation and the capacity of the batteries to hold a eharge.

c. .u . m .

75

Design basis documentation for the VCSNS Class ll{ DC system is based upon l demonstrating that batteries XDA-1 A-ED and XDA 10 ED have sufficient capacity and voltage to support required loads. The DC power requirements for station blackout at the VCSNS were estimated using the same methodology for which the plant is licensed.

A 10 percent margin for load uncertainty for allloads and a 5 percent inargin for future load growth were applied consistent with the existing VCSNS Class IE DC System design basis.

The standard design for the VCSNS is based on providing Class IE 125V DC system power supplied by two redundant full capacity batterles and/or two redundant static battery chargers. Since 480V AC power is not available during the S00, only "A" and "D" train batterles can supply DC power to cope with S00. Iloth redundant Class lE batteries, XBA-1 A-ED and XDA-10-ED, are manuf actured by C&D and are des:gned with 60 type LCR-31 lead-calcium cells which have 15 positive plates por cell. l ,

Although each battery normally has 60 cells connected, existing design basis calculations have been performed to address battery espacity of the "A" and "!!" train DC systems with $8 cells connected.

In order to represent worst case conditions at the time of a station blackout, battery capacity evaluations were performed to demonstrate the ability of the "A" and "D" train battery to support " Silo Equipment Required for Coping for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> with only 58 cells connented. Also, the batteries were derated for aging and temperature considerations.

Steps 1 and 2 of the "Dattery Capacity Calculation --- Without Load Stripping" l document that both the "A" and "B" train batteries have required capacity, based on battery size, to cope with a station blackout at the VCSNS.

G/C Calculation No. DC-832-010 Rev. 6 demonstrates and documents that the voltages l

available at the output terminals of batteries, XDA-1 A-ED and XB A-ID-1ED, as well as those at the assoc!ated connected essentlat load equipment terminals, exceed the voltages required. Refer to Attachment 4 to Section 7.2.2 for a background discussion relative to de system voltages.

The results of these calculations ensure that the Class IE batteries at the VCSNS have sufficient capacity to cope with a SDO for a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> period. It should Le noted that this j SDO evaluation includes clesel generator related loads both during and at the end of the u.c ....

76

4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> duty cycle for both the "A" train and the "B" train batteries. This approach ensures that either battery can supply SBO loads for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and still have sufficient capacity to start a diesel generator if restoration of AC power from an on-site source is desired.

7.2.3 Comoressed Air Purpose The purpose of this section is to ensure that air operated valves required for decay heat removal have sufficient reserve air or can be manually operatea under station blackout conditions for the four hour duration.

Procedure Step la identification of Air-Operated Valves Necessary for Decay llcat Removal Listed below are all alt-operated valves required to be cycled during a station blackout IFV-03536 SG A TD EFP Flow Control Valve IFV-03546 SG B TD EFP Flow Control Valve IFV-03556 SG C TD EFP Flow Control Valve IPV-2000 Main Steam Header A, Power Operated Rellef Valve IPV-2010 Main Steam Header B, Power Operated Relief Valve IPV-2020 Main Steam Header C, Power Operated Relief Valve Step 2: Backup Air Supplies None of the valves listed in Step 1 are supplied from backup air sources.

Step 3: Criteria for Manua! Operation Slece none of the decay heat removal valves are supplied by backup air, the following criteria for manual operation is app!! cables on .u.

7-7

(a) Procedures Specify Manual Operation for Valves in a Station Blackout VCSNS Emergency Operation Procedure E.O.P.-6.0, Rev. 2 provides instructions for responding to loss of no power. Action step 4 of E.O.P.-

6.0 Rev. 2 requires verification that total EFW flow is greater than 390 gpm snd if not, the steps to ensure that steam supply valves are open and that EPW valves are properly aligned for TD EFP operr.tlon.

E.O.P.-6.0, Rev. 2 specifies types of measurements and functions of manually operated valves. Recommended revision of the EOP will incorporate Indicator tag numbers and tag numbers of the valves requiring cycling listed in Step 1 above to ensure EFW flow, SG level and 50 pressure requirements to malnuln decay heat removal.

The EFW control valves have dual DC solenold valves to manually select open/ closed / modulate operation, and will remain open (vented) af ter a SBO since they would have been open (ready for EF auto start.) Control room modulation is not possible s!nce no back-up air is provided, but manual operation is possible with the valve handwheels on the basis of control room directions from observation of flow and steam generator level.

The main steam power operated relief valves each have six DC solenold valves for manual and automatic open/close/ modulate operation, and are arranged to remain vented (closed) upon a SDO. Lack of instrument air for modulation requires that they be manually operated with their handwheels to control steam generator pressure based on control room observation of steam pressure.

(b) Accessibility in a Station Blackout Valve Tar No. Location Env. Zone IFV-3536 18-423-11-03 10-03 IFV-3546 18-423-l{-03 10-03 IFV-3556 18-423-11.4-36 1D-03 IPV-2000 W P-4 36-L-07 PAA-02 IPV-2010 IB 436-l{-4.4 18 08 IPV-2020 EP-436-K.5 pal-2

.%u .- .

7-8

The three emergency feedwater control valves IFV-3638, IFV-3546 and IFV-3556 are located in the same general location in the intermediate building, and accusible from the floor. Main steam relief valves IPV-2010 and IPV-2020 are accessible from the floor, and IPV-2000 is approximately 9 feet above the floor, but is accessible from a nearby platform. Valve handwheels are side mounted and accessible.

(c) Identification During a Station Blackout The flow and relief valves identified are major equipment and are properly tagged. These components require manual operation for other plant transients, and therefore ope atcr famillarity exists.

(d) Necessary Tools, ReachrtA or CMins are Normally Present None of the valve nave tur require tools, reachrods, or chains to operate the handwheGs.

(e) Appropriate indication and Means for Communications are Provided Communication with control room operators for monitorMg EFW flow, stearr generator level and steam generator pressure is accomplished with w alkie talkies. Steam generator level local indication is near the emergency feeowater flow control valves. Operators normally carry walkie talkies and a! e trained to deal with interference problems experienced in certain areas of the plant.

(f) Sufficient Manpower is Available On-shift to Accomplish Specified Tasks South Carolina Electric and Gas Company has reviewed Engineering Operating Procedures (EOP's) and has adequate manpower to perform required actions as delineated by E.O.P. 6.0, Rev. 2.

1 o m e ... ~,..an 7-9

Step 4: Adequacy of Manual Valve Operation V.C._ Summer Nuclear Station Procedure E.O.P. 6.0, Rev. 2 currently provides actions and mear"ead variables required for decay heat removal during a station blackout emu 7.1.4 Effsets Ofi L gyl%QQh j 7.2.4.1 Discussion The purpose of this section is to assess the effects of loss of ventilation within areas of the plant containing equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown during

- a station blackout (500). This section determines dominant areas of concern and ..

evaluates operability of SBO Equipment Required for Coping based on the increase in teraperature resulting from loss of ventilation within the dominant area of concern  ;

(DAC). Dominant areas of concern are those areas of the plant meeting all three of the following criterias (a) areas containing equipment normally required to function early in a station blackout to remove decay heat (b) areas with the presence of significant heat ,

generation terms (af ter AC power is lost) relative to their free volume, and (c) areas with the sheence of heat removal'espability in a 580 without operator action. Refer to ,

- Section 7.2.4.3 for supporting information relative to DAC determinations.

- A logic diagram representing the general approach used to assess the effects of loss of l ventilation on' operability of SBO. Equipment Required for Coping is included as Attachment 5 to Section-7 of this report. Table 7.2.4, included as Attachment 6 to Section 7 of this report, documents the results of the evaluation performed to assess 500 equipment operability.

Operability of SBO Equipment Required for Coping was assessed for each potential r

dominant area of concern. The results of these evaluations are documented in

~

- Section 7.2.4.2 and confirm that the equipment and components needed to operate in

any CAC are capable of performing their required SBO functions at the expected '

elevated temperatures TDAC' L

-7 10

7.2.4.2 Evaluations This section evaluates the following areas at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station which were determined to be potential dominant areas of concerns

1. The Steam Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Room No.12-10 (Environmental Zone 10-03).

2. The Main Control Room No. 63 05 (Environmental Zone CD-04).

L

3. The Relay Room No. 36-11 (Environmental Zone CD 03).

4. Environmental Zones previously evaluated as harsh, inciudingt e Reactor Building (Environmental Zones RD-02,04,05,06,08,09 and 10)

• Intermediate Building - 436 f t. Fl. Elevation (Environmental Zones 10-08 and 09) e East Penetration Access Area - 436 f t. Fl. Elevation (Environmental Zone pal-2)

• West Penetration Access Area - 436 f t. Fl. Elevation (Environmental Zones PAA-02 and 03)

Evaluations tu address the effects of loss of ventilation within the aforementioned dominant areas of concern are based on average steady state temperature determinations performed in accordance with procedures delineated by NUM ARC 87-00, Section 7.2.4 and Appendix "E", or by previous analyses performed specifically for the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. The requirements for determining a DAC temperature (TDAC), as well as the methodologies used to assess operability of equipment needed to cope with a SDO are as outlined in NUM ARC 87-00, Appendix "F". The Appendix F approaches used to address equipment operability are identified on Table 7.2.4, included as Attachment 6 to Section 7 of this report.

1 Gai,c .e 7-11

I

1. Steam Turbine Driven EPW Pump Room No.12-10 (Environmental Zone 10-03).

The following evaluation determines heat loads, average steady state area temperature, and assures the operability of equipment needed to cope with a station blackout using the methodologies outilned in Section 7.2.4 of NUM ARC 87-00.

Step 1: Dominant Area Geometry Prom Drawing D-101-017, the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Steam Turbine Drlven EFW Pump Room is approximately 22' x 20' x 11' which yields a total room (Inside) surface area, excluding the floor, of A = 127 square meters Step 2: Domingpt n Area !!eal, Generation Rates The heat generation rate for the Steam Turbine Driven EFW Pump 11oom is the sum of the heat gains from steam piping and the heat gain from the turbine.

The heat generstion from pipes is based on the NUMARC equation:

Q= (0.1 (0.4 + 15.7 (Ts - Talr)l/6 D 1/2 + 170 (Ts - Tair)l/3 D1 (Ts - Tair)

+ 1.4E -7 D (Ts4 - Tw4 )}L wheret Q = the heat generation of the pipe in watts D = the diameter of the pipe in meters Ts a the surface temperature of the pipe in *K Talr : the air temperature of the room at station blackout onset in *K Tw = the surface temperature of the wallin 'K L = the length of the pipe in meters c,%c. .

7-12 _ _ _. __ - _ - _ _ - _______ _ _

O/C HVAC Calculation 3211M yleids the following values for the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station AFW Pump Room:

D = .20 meters for 4" pipe and .43 meters for 14" pipe Ts = 322*K >

Tale a 313

• K L = 7.62 meters Solving the equation yleids:

Q4a = 1089 watts Q14a a 1621 watts The heat generatten from the turbine is based on the NUMARC equation:

Q = 0.1 (2 + 37.0) (Ts - Talr)1/4 D3/4) D (Ts - Talr) + 1.4 E-7 D2 (Ts4 - Talr4 )

where Q s the heat generatlon of the turbine in watts D = the equivalent diameter of the turbine in meters Ts a the surface temperature of the turbine in *K Talr a the air temperature of the room at station blackout onset in 'K O/C HVAC Calculation 3218-2 yleids the following values for the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Steam Tarbine Driven EFW Pump Room:

D = .96 meters (based on a .46 cuble meter volume)

Ts a 442*K (average temperature)

Talr = 313*K -

Solving the equation yields:

Qp = S187 watts om.m. - ..

13

- .- - . .- _-- -. . .~ . _ . - . . _ ~ - . . . - . _ _ . - . - . .

l l

The total heat generation rate Q 8 Q4" + Q14" + 9p

= 1089 watts + 1621 watts + 5187 watts Q = 7897 watts l

Step 3: 1,0 1Temperatures t

T = 46'Cl Ref. Cale. 3218 2 Step 4: SteadtState Room Temocrature Pollowing Loss of Ventilation Dased onjhe NUMARC countion:

Tf a [Q(1)/A(1)](3/4) + T(1)

Tf = 62*C = 144*F Step 5: Effect of Opening Area Doors For conservatis.n, no credit is taken for opening the door.

Step 6: Hensonable Assurance of Eaulpment Oocrnbility

• This step evaluates the capabilltles of plant equipment, which is located within the Steam Turbine Driven EFW Pump Room, and which is necessary to achieve and maintain plant shutdown during a statten blackout (SUO). Refer to Table 7.2.4, included as Attachment 6 to Section 7 of this report, for a list of SBO

. equipment and components locateu within this dominant area of concern, as well as applicable reference data for addressing equipment operability. An evaluation of the equipment located within the Turbine Driven Emergency

. Feedwater Pump Room is provided as follows:

1 cat.,c.. .e 7-14

Generah Section 2.7.2, Paragraph 2 of NUMARC 87-00 states that for equipment operability outside containment the temperature rise for a Station Blackout situation is not expected to exceed conditions associated with a high or moderate energy line break. For this reason NUMARC concludes that all equipment quallfled for "flarsh" environment is also quallfled for station blackout conditions. While this evaluation concurs with NUMARC that the peak temperature conditions will not be exceeded, the evaluation also considers station blackout conditions from a time duration standpoint. The station blackout environmental profile is one which will display a slower increase in temperature over a longer period of time than the postulated accident ,

conditions in this room. The postulated smallline break accident conditions in this room, for which 500 electrical equipment is quallfled, Indicate that the 200'F peak accident temperature conditions will return to normal in I approximately three-and-one-half hours after the accident. Although the accident temperature versus time profile does not completely envelop that of the 580, the fact that the electrical equipment and components associated with valve IFV02030 are quallfled for a far more severe peak temperature transient provides reasonable assurance that the subject equipment will be operable for a lower and Icss severe temperature transient over a longer pealod of time.

• IFV02030 Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Supply Flow Control Valve Valve IFV02030 is a normally closed electro pneumatic actuated valve that is required to open following a 500. The ducical components associated with valve IFV02030 operation have been quallited Sr " Harsh" environment operation under the V.C. Summer Equipment Qualificap c Review program. Because the electrical components for IFV02030 are quallfled to "!!arsh" environmental conditions, and because the environmental conditions for station blackout will not exceed the peak aceldent test temperatures for which IFV02030 electrical components were quallfled, IFV02030 electrical components are capable of operating under station blackout conditions. This approach is consistent with NUMARC 87-00 Section 2.7.1 which Indicates that equipment which has previously been evaluated for opration in a "llarsh" environment due to a high l

l G4erM emmenwe ente l 7-1$

L

or moderate energy line break need not be evaluated again for station blackout conditions.

The pneumatic valve actuator for IFYO2030 was previously not evaluated under the V.C. Summer Equipment Qualification Review program. Table 7.2.4, included as Attachment 6 to Section 7 of this report. Indicates that the valve actuator must only operate for the first 60 seconds of the SDO. During the ..rst 60 seconds following a SDO the valve actuator will only be subject to temperature slightly greater than that experienced during normal plant operation. Also, the potential for failure of the valve actuator when the SDO temperatures reach their peak will not affect the position of the valve and therefore, further evaluation for station blackout is not required.

The mechanical portion of valve IFV02030 was previously not evaluated under the V.C. Summer Equipment Qualification Review program. The analysts of the mechanical portton of the valve is based upon the generic temperature allowance for valves established in NUMARC 87-00. Appendix F. The temperature limit for valves within the Appendix is set at 200*F for a duration of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This limit is well above the 144*F ambient temperature <:alculated for SBO conditions within the Steam Turbine Driven EFW Pump Room.

e XPP00008 Emergency Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump XPP00008 is a turbine driven emergency feedwater pump. The analysis of whether the pump can function during SDO conditions is based upon the generic analysis provided in Appendix F to NUMARC 87-00. The temperature lin.it for both pumps and turbines within the Appendix is set at 180*F for a duration of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This limit is well above the 144*F ambient temperature calculated for SBO conditions within the Steam Turbine Driven EFW Pump Room, e XVT02865 Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine Throttle Valve XVT02865 is a preset (non-electrical) mechanical valve that is required to remain in an open position for station blackout. The analysis to determine valve XVT02865 operability in the 144*F calculated TDAC temperature is based upon the generic temperature limit for valves given in NUMARC 87-00. Appendix F.

- - uw.- .m 7-16

The temperature limit for valves within the Appendix is set at 200'F for a duration of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This limit is well above the 144*F temperature calculated 500 conditions w' thin the Steam Turbine Driven EFW Pump Room.

• Generic Equipment (Cables, Spilces, etc.)

The generic electrical equipment within the room is limited to Instrument '

Cable. Control Cable and !!arsh Environment Splices. The generic equipment associated with valve IFV02030 in the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Room has been quallfled under the V.C. Summer Equipment Qualification Review program. The V.C. Summer Equipment Qualification Review program has met the Intent of 10CFR50.49 and/or NUREG 0588. Refer to the " General" paragraph relative to operability of cquipment located in DAC which were previously evaluated as "llarsh" environmental areas.

Conclusion The preceding evaluations provide reasonable assurance that all station blackout required equipment located in the Steam Turbine Driven EFW Pump Room is capable of coping with SBO conditions.

2. Main Control Roam No. 63-05 (Environment al Zone CD-04)

The NUMARC procedure used to determine temperatures is based on the assumpt',on that the wall temperatures will not change appreciably throughout the transient. While this is true for the concrete walls of the Steam Turbine Driven EFW Pump Room, it is not true for the gypsum board partitions of the Main Control Room at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. Therefore, alternate methods were used to determine the temperature (TDAC)in the Main Control Room. A previous transient calculation (G/C AEA Department Calculation File Code 2.4.8.1) was reviewed and shown appropriata for the Station Blackout scenario. This calculation had similar but more conservative heat toads than >

those determined for the 500 evaluation with or without load stripping and took into account the time period tor the room to heat up. Refer to Attachment 7 to Section 7 of this report for an evaluation of heat loads in the Main Control Room.

t L

GdheMommonweeHh 1

7-17

L l

G/C AEA Department Calculation Filt Code 2.4.8.1 Indicates that the temperature in the Control Room after 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following a station bleckout event will be 120*F. From the time versus temperature profile curve included in Attachment 7 to Section 7 of this report, it is obvimis that assessing SBO l

squipment operability based on a TDACf or the Control Room of 120*F for the full 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO duration is an extremely conservative approach.

This section evaluates the capabilities of the pl'Lnt equipment, which is located within the Main Control Room, and which is necessary to ach!sve and maintain plant shutdown ~ Mg a station blackov- (SBO). Refer to Table 't'.2.4, included ns Attachmen > Lection 7 of this rep < rt, for a list of SBO equipment and components .ated within this dominant area of concern, as well as applicable reference data for addressing equipment operability. An evaluation of the SBO equipment located within the Main Control Room is provided as follows:

• XCP06100 Main Control Board with Original and Field Installed Components, including:

Age. stat Relays - Field Installed on the Main Control Board and oilginally supplied with the Main Control Board Microswitch Switches - Field installed on the Main Control Board Westinghouse OT! Selector Switches - Field installed on the Main Control Board Gould Shawmut Fuse - Flcid installed on the Main Control Board Bussman Fuses - Field installed on the Main Control Board Cutler Hammer AC Relays - Field installed on the Main Control Board General Electric Fuse Block - Field installed on the Main Control Board Cutler Hammer AC Relays - Field installed on the Main Control Board i

l GtherMommemowth 7-!8

- Fiberglass Switch Module Barriers (non-1E)

Matrix Connectors General Electric ET-16 Indicating Lights - Field installod on the Main Control Board General Electric Selector Switches - Field installed on the Main Control Board The components originally supplied with the Main Control Board and the components field installed on the Main Control Board, except Agastat relays and fuses, were quallfled per the test program associated with the Main Contiof Board. Subject test information is found within Wyle Test Repcet 43703-1, included in EQ Qualification File RE4-C15-0785A. The Environmental Qualification program exposed all the devices it quellfled to temperature aging cycles of 212*F minimum for 32 deys. This test temperature is well above the SBO projected TDAC temperature of 120'F for the Control Room. The Cutler liammer relays in the qualification program did have their coils ener;'ized during the temperature aging cycle thereby accounting for any self heating affects. All other components quallfled with the Main Control Board are expected to see little or no temperature change due to self heating effects.

This includes the ET-10 indicating lights which are only rated at 6.25 watts and therefore will not drive temperatures within the bulb much above the calculated 120*F TDAC station blackout temperature.

. In addition to using the qualification report data for demonstrating station blackout operability, all switches and relays are covered under the Appendix F qualification of generic equipment. Appendix F has establisned an allowable station blackout operability temperature limit of 185'F for four hours for all relays and switches. Thl3 limit is well above the ca;culated control room TDAC temperature of 120*F for station blackout.

The Agastat relays installed within the Main Control Board were not purchased from Reliance as part of the board but they are similar to others which were purchased as part of the board. As stated for the other relays, Appendix F qualification of the generic equipment has established an allowable station blackout temperatura limit of 185*F for four hours for all relays. This limit is na. m . ~ .nn L

7-19

L

.well above the expected station blackout temperature to be experienced within the Main Control Room.

The Dussmann fuses installed within the Main Control Board were addressed by vendor test data included in Bussmann Report 470-7," Product Qualification Speelf! cation for Class '? Equipment." The subject report indicates that a sampling of Bussmann fuses have successfully passed a high temperature -

humidity test of 212*F for 404 hours0.00468 days <br />0.112 hours <br />6.679894e-4 weeks <br />1.53722e-4 months <br />. The Gould-Shawmut fuses installed within the Main Control Board are similar in construction and materials to the Bussmann fuses. The Gould-Shawmut fuses were addressed by vendor test cata included in Gott.1 Speelfication Control No. GEFD-001. "Puse Quallflection Specification for Class IE Equipment". The subject speelflention indicates that a ssmpling of Gould-Shawmut fuses have successfully passed a high temperature-humidity test of 212*F for 107 hours0.00124 days <br />0.0297 hours <br />1.76918e-4 weeks <br />4.07135e-5 months <br />. The 212'F test temperatures are well above the 120*F TDAC temperature expected to be experienced by the fuses on the Main Control Doard and was for a period of time much greater *.han the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO duration. Note that the temperature rise with!n the device la limited based upon small resistance and the fact that the fuses are loaded to less than 80% of fullload. Therefore, the self hekting effects will be limited and well within the bounds of the test temperature. The preceding vendor test data provides reasonable assurance that the Bussmann fuses and the Gould-Shawmut fuses will remain operable when subject to the anticipated station blackout e nditions in the Main Control Doard at the VCSNS.

• XCP07071& XCP07072 Nuclear Instrumentation Syster mm.es Panels XCP07071 and XCP07072 are Nuclear instrumentation System Consoles.

The ability of the panels to function in the calculated TDAC temperature of 123*F is based upon the qualification report of the panels which provided a quallfled test temperature of 120"P for an operability time based on two - 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> cycles. The tested temperature is equal to the Station Blackout temperature and the time duration exceeds the expected time duration of station blackout by a factor of 6. Subject test information is found within EQ Qualification File PAS-W01-0585A, Table 1.

7-20

1 e Generic Equipment (Instrument Cables and Control Cables)

The acceptability of the generic equipment (Instrument Cables and Control Cables) used in the Main Control Room is based upon the same justification used for the cables located in the Steam Turbine Driven EFW Pump Room (refer to the item 1 evaluation). Sub]cet cables used in both environments are Class 1E

" Harsh" environment quallfled and are of the same quality.

Conclustom The precedlnr evaluations provide reasor.able assurance that station blackout required equipment located in the Main Control Room is capable of coping with SBO conditions.

3. Relay Room No. 36-11 (Environmental Zone CD-03)

The NUMARC procedure used to determine temperatures is based on the assumption that the wall temperatures will not change appreciably throughout the transient. While this is true for the concrete walls of the Steam Turbine Jriven EFW Pump Room, it is not true for the gypsum board partitions of the Relay Room at the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station. Therefore, alternate methods were used to determine the temperature (TDAC) in the Relay Room. A calculation (G/C AEA Department Calculation File Code 2.4.8.18) was performed to determine the maximum average ambient temperature in the Relay Room based on heat loads with or without load stripping. Refer to Attachment 8 *.o Section 7 of this report for an evaluation of heat loads in the Relay Room. In order to reduce ambient Relay Room temperatures, the calculation assumes that the doors to the North and East electrical chases and the double doors to the Turbine Building will be opened within the first hour following a SBO. These doors must be opened to cope with a SBO regardless of whether or not load stripping is performed.

G/C AEA Department Calculation File Code 2.4.8.18 indicates that the maximum average ambient temperature in the Relay Room during the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> station blackout event will be 119.4*F. From the time versus temperature profile curve included in Attachment 8 to Section 7 of this report, it is obvious l

oa u. a i 7-21

that assessing SDO equipment cperability based on a TDAC for the Relay Room of 119.4'F for the full 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> $80 duration is an extremely conservative approach.

This section evaluates the capabilitics of the plant equipment, which is located within the Relay Boom, and which is necessary to achieve and maintain plant shutdown during a str.tlon blackout (SDO). Refer to Table 7.2.4, included as Attachment 6 to Section 7 of this report, for a list of S00 equipment located within this dominant area of concern, as well as applicable reference data for addressing equipment operebility. An evaluation of the 500 e. y pment located within the Relay Room is provided as follows:

• APN5901 thru APN5904 APN5907,APN5908 DPN111A2 and DPNillB2 AC and DC Distribution Panels All of the distribution panels installed in the Relay Room contain Square D, type

/A and KA circuit breakers. The circuit breakers are the only devicei within the panels which are temperature sensitive. The following table contains the significant materials of construction used in the molded case circuit breakets and their UL temperature index (this information is taken from Square D Company's Qualification Report for Class 1E Panelboards to meet IEEE Standard 323-1974, EQF file number PA7-S03-0785D).

Material Category UL Temperature Index

1. Thermoset molding compounds:

phenolic, polyester, silicone, DA? 130'C (266 F) minimum

2. Thermoplastic molding compounds:

nylon, modified PPO, acetal, polyester 85*C (185 F) minimum

3. Laminated and sheet insulatiom phenolic, polyester, melamine, vulcaniz~1 fiber 105*C (221 F) minimum From the above table it can be determined that the UL temperatures identified exceed the 119.4*F TDAC temperature for station blackout by a great extent.

me . ...

7-22

e XIT05901 thru XIT05004. XIT05907 and XIT05908 instrument Supply inverters The inverters installed within the Relay Room were qualified per EQ Qualification File PS2-W01-0685. Table 1 to temperature extremes tests of 120*P for an operability time based on two - 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> cycles. This test temperature is greater than the calculated TDAC station blackout temperature of 119.4*F for the Relay Room, and the test duration exceeds the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SDO duration by a factor of 6.

o XPN06001, XPN06002, XPN06004, and XPN06005 Dalance of Plant Instrument Panels The Balance of Plant instrument panels installed within the Relay Room were quallfled per EQ Qualification Filo PA9-W01-0785, Table 2 to temperature extremes tests of 120*F for an operability time based on two - 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> cycles.

This test temperature is greater than the calculated TDAC station blackout temperatur of 119.4*F for the Relay Room, and the test duration exceeds the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO duration by a factor of 6.

e XPN07001 thru XPN07004 Process !&C Racks The Process !&C Racks installed within the Relay Room were qualified per EQ Qualification File PA9-WO1-0785, Table 2 to temperature extremes tests of 120*F for an operability time based on two - 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> cyc!cs. This test temperature is greater than the calculated TDAC station blackout temperature of 119.4*F for the Relay Room, and the test duration exceeds the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO duration by a factor of 6.

e XPN07010 XPN07011, XPN07020, and XPN70721 Solid State Protection System Cabinet and Test Panels The Solid Stste Protection System Cabinets and Solid State Protection System Test Panels installed within the Relay Room were quallfled per EQ Qualification File PA9-W01-0585, Table i to temperature extremes tests of 120 F for an operability time based on two - 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> cycles. This test temperature is greater i than the calculated TDAC station blackout temperature of 119.4"F for the c..w ...

7-23

Relay Room, and the test duration exceeds the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 500 duration by a factor of 6.

e XPN07034 and XPN07035 Auxiliary Safeguards Cabinets The Auxillary Safeguards Cabinets installed within the Pelay Room were quallfled per EQ Qualification File PA9-WO1-0685. Table 1 to temperature extremes tests of 120'F for an operability time based on Wree - 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> cycles.

This test temperature is greater than the calculated TDAC station blackout temperature of 119.4*F ior the Relay Room, and the test duration exceeds the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO duration by a factor of 9.

• Generic Equipment (Instrument Cables, Control Cables, and Low Voltage Power Cables)

The acceptability of the generic equipment used in the Relay Room is based upon the same justification used for the cables located in the Steam Turbine Driven EFW Pump Room (refer to the item i evaluation). Subject cables used in both environments are Class 1E "llarsh" environment quallfled and are of the same quality.

Conclustom The preceding evaluations provide reasonable assurance that station blackout required equipment located in the Relay Room is capable of coping with SDO conditions.

4. Environmental Zones Previously Evaluated as "llarsh" There are several locations at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, previously defined as "Ilarsh" per the Equipment Qualification Review program, which also meet DAC criteria a, b, and c. These locations are shown on Table 7.2.4, included as Attachment 6 to Section 7 of this report. All equipment arid components, other than generic electrical components (cables, splices etc.), located within these

" Harsh" environments and required to operate during a SDO have been listed on this table. Electrical components, other than generic electrical components, o w n - .n.

7-24

associated with "SBO Equipment Required for Coping" which are not included on Table 7.2.4 are not required to operate for station blackout conditions.

General:

Section 2.7.2, Paragraphs 1 and 2, of NUMARC 87-00 state that for equipment operability both inside and outside containment the ambient area temperature rise for a station blackout is not expected to exceed conditions associated with high or moderate energy line breaks. For this reason NUMARC concludes that equipment quallfled for "llarsh" environments is also qualified for station blackout conditions. While this evaluation concurs with NUMARC that the peak accident temperature conditions will not be exceeded by those resulting from a SBO, the evaluation also considers station blackout conditions from a time duration standpoint. The station blackout environmental profile is one which will display a slower increase in temperature over a longer period of time than that associa.ed with postulated accident conditions within the DAC. The postulated accident conditions inside containment, for which SBO electrical equipment is quallfled, are expected to completely envelop the temperature versus time SBO conditions inside containment. The dominant areas of concern located outside containment and previously evaluated as "llarsh" are areas containing Main Steam lines. Environmental zone data for these areas included in G/C Drawing No. S-021-018, Indicates that these zones are subject to postulated short term transient Maia. Steam Line Break (MSLB) and !!!gh Energy Line Break (HELB) accident conditions with worst case peak ambient temperatures of 283*F and 431*F, respectively, in the Intermediate Building, and 320*F and 482*F. respectively, in the Penetration Access Areas. These zones are also subject to postulated longer term Small Line Break (SLB) accident conditions with a worst case peak ambient' temperature of 200*F. The postulated small line break accident conditions outside of containment, for which SBO electrical equipment is quallfled, Indicate that the 200*F peak accident temperature conditions return to normal in approximately three-and-one-half hours af ter the accident. Although the accident temperature versus time profile does not completely envelop that of the SBO, the fact that the electrical equipment is qualif!ed for far more severe peak temperature transients provides reasonable assurance that the subject equipment will be

c. m. .

7-25

. - . -~ ._ _ _- .. . - - .- -. -. .-

operable for a lower and less severe temperature transient over a longer period

-of time.

In April'and May of 1988, temperature tests were performed during normal plant operation at the VCSNS to determine worst case peak smblent temperatures in the East and West Penetration Access Areas at the 436 ft. Fl. Elevation with -

HVAC fans (supply and exhaust) turned off. The test results revealed that the worst case (maximum) ambient temperature in the East Penetration Access Area attained a peak of 130*F, while that in the West Penetration Access Area attained a peak of 122*F. _ A time period.in excess of si t hours was required to attain the maximum' ambient area temperature from the time all HVAC was turned off. This test data is documeated in an SCE&G Co. personnel Technical

. Work Record File, Staa Crumbo TWR #09952-31EQ. The results of these tests also support the NUMARC assumptions and bases discussed in Section 2.7 as well aslthe statement made in the introduction to NUMARC 87-00, Appendix F, which indicates that the temperatures in dominant areas of concern outside containment'are not expected to exceed 150*F.

• - Electrical Components Class 1E electrical equipment listed on Table 7.2.4 and generic Class 1E electrical equipment used in " Harsh" environments have been reviewed for environmental _ qualification and meet the requirements of 10CFR50.49 and/or NUREG 0588.

Previous Class 1E electrical equipment qualification for equipment located in a

'" Harsh" environment was based on VCSNS postulated environmental zone data, and whether the equipment had to operate to mitigate the consequences of an accident causing the " Harsh" environment, or whose failure could be detrimental to plant safety .or accident mitigation.- Electrical equipment categorized as

~

"Al" or "A2" is required to operate in order to mitigate the consequences of an accident within the same area, while that categorized as "B1" or "B2" is required not to fall in any manner which could be detrimental to plant safety or accident mitigation. Electrical components which are required to operate for NRC Reg.

Guide 1.37 and are located in a " Harsh" environment are categorized as "El-H",

"E2-E", or "E2-H". The electrical equipment and components which are located nai,.c .

7-26

l In environmental zones previously evaluated as " Harsh" and which are identified on Table 7.2.4 as located within a DAC, as well as associated generic electrical components not listed, have previously been environmentally quallfled to postulated accident conditions, with the following exceptions:

NAMCO limit switches associated with valves XVC01009A, B, C-EF and v.VT08153-CS are categorized as "C1" or "C2". Therefore, these components did not require previous qualification to " Harsh" environmental conditions.

These devices are NAMCO. type EA180, limit switches and are similar in construction and material to the same type of NAMCO limit switches quallfled per 10CFR 50.49 to " Harsh" environmental conditions caused by a LOCA and/or MLSB within the DAC. Therefore, reasonable assurance of equipment operability for SBO is established for all Class 1E electrical equipment and components located in envircnmental zones previcusly evaluated as " Harsh".

• Non-Electrical Components Operability of the non-electrical equipment and/or components, which are located within the " Harsh" environment - dominant areas of concern other than the Steam Turbine Driven EFW Pump Room, and which are i.ecessary to achieve and maintain plant shutdown during a station blackout are discussed below:

XVT08153-CS Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger inlet Valve XVC01009 A, B, C-EP SG EF Header Discharge Isol. Check Valves IPV02000, 02010, 02020-MS Main Steam Header Relief Valves XVG02802 A, B-MS Main Steam Hender EF Pump Turbine Supply Valves XVM02801 A, B, C-MS Main Steam Header Isolation Valves XVR02806 A thru N, P Main Steam Safety Valves l

v.--.-- n 7-27

D L

XVT02869 A~, B, C-MS Main Steam Header Stop Valve Bypass Valves  :

PCV004448-RC Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves PCV00445 A, B-RC 1

.The mechanical portions of the aforementioned valves were previously not evaluated under the V.C. Summe Equipment Qualification Review Program.

Therefore, the analysis of tho -

• cal portform of these valves is based upon-

' the generic temperature aM 'r e 'es established in NUMARC 87-00,

~

Appendix F. -The temperatun > n withln the Appendix is set at 200*F for a duration of 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />s- e x . rs Neding discussion ard the results of recent ambient area La - 15- ihe East and West Penetration Acceas Areas at the VCr MMlpated that any of the preceding valves will experience a TDAC tempe.e.re greater than 200*F - >

/during a station blackout occurrence. Therefore, reasonable assurance of - ,

. equipment operability for the mechanical portions of the aforementioned valves is established.

The pneumatic valve actuators associated with the respective valves were previously not evaluated under the.V.C. Summer Equipment Qualification Review program.1 Table 7.2.4, included as Attachment 6 to Section 7 of this report, identifies the various times for which the different. valves are required Et o remain operable'atter a station blackout event. Valves XVT08153, '

XVT02869A, B, C, PCV0444B and PCV00445 A, B are valves wb!ch are normally

closed and must simply remain closed during a SDO. Therefore the valve

. actuators associated with these valves are not reqJired to operate. Valves a XVT02801 A,~D, and C are valves which are normally open, but will be closed to ensure containment isolation within the first few mlnutes following a the SDO.

These valves are located in the VCSNS Intermediate Building, Room No. 36-02.

. This room is' an open area with a large free volume of air. For all practical ,

t purposes, during those first few minutes, the valve actuators will only be

. subjected to a temperature slightly greater than that experienced during normal plant operation. Valves IPV02000, IPV02010 and IPV02020 are valves which will be manually operated during the station blackout occurrence. 'The potential failure of the actuator will not affect the ability of the valve to be manually adjusted during the time of the station blackout. Valves XVC01009A, D and C i

, ca.w. ~..

7-28

. -. ~ - . - - - - . -. ... . -. . - . .. , ~.. - .- . - - _ - . . -

i are power (spring) assisted closure check valves which are normally closed.

Even in the closed (de-energized) position, these valves will open to pass forward flow of emergency feedwater from the Turbine Driven EFW pump to the steam generators provided sufficient head (>25 psi) is available. Therefore, the pneumatic valve actuator is not required to be operable for a S00. In all cases the potential failure of the valve actuators when the SBO temperatures reach their peak will not affect the SBO position of the valve and therefore, further evaluation for station blackout is not required.

Note: Valves XVR02806A through N, and P are normally closco (non-electrical) spring loaded mechanical safety valves which will be opened by direct action of system fluid (main steam) pressure and are not equipped with pneumatic valve actuators.

Conclustom The preceding evaluations provide reasonable assurance that station blackout required equipment located in the " Harsh" environments determined to be dominant areas of concern are capable of coping with SDO conditions.

7.2.4.3 Supporting information Since station blackout is not considered to be a design basis event reasonable assurance of equipment opera'uility need not be provided to the same level of precision and detail required by 10 CFR 50.49 for safety related equipment located in harsh environments.

For this reason, a representative analysis approach is provided, with attention concentrated on the few situations where equipment operability is especially important to core cooling in a station blackout.

The representative analysis provided in this section addresses a limited set of plant areas deert.ed to be potentially susceptible to heatup upon loss of ventilation, such as

- would occur in a station blackout. These areas are defined by three f actors: (a) their containing equipment normally required to function early in a station blackout to remove decay heat,(b) the presence of significant heat generation terms (af ter AC power is lost) is relative to their free volume (l.c., process steam or DC electrical power 1

GilhenCommemvwtm 7-21s

_ _ _. . _ . .m _ _ _. _ _ _ - - _ . -- .

supplies in small rooms or enclosures), and (c) the absence of heat removal capability in a station blackout without operator action.

All areas within the Reactor Building were considered to meet criteria "a, b and c", and therefore, were determined to be dominant areas of concern.

All areas outside the Reactor Building were considered to meet criteria "a and c", with the exception of the yard for which criterion "c' is not applicable. Criterion "b" became the limiting factor for determining dominant areas of concern. Areas outside the Reactor Building were considered to meet criterion "b" if the areas were of a limiting size and contained DC and/or vital AC inverter (Datiery backed) power supplies, or if the areas contained high temperature piping systems which would continue to operate during a SBO.

Areas other than those evaluated in Section 7.2.4.2 are viewed as posing a significantly reduced concern for a variety of reasons. Safe shutdown equipment in many plant areas is already quallfled to operate in a harsh environment. The station blackout event is bounded by analyses previously performed for these areas. Other plant areas will not be exposed to significant heat generation terms since: (1) a station blackout results in the elimination of process steam from most plant areas, or (2) these areas do not contain equipment required for decay heat removal.

Only piping systems associated with main steam were considered to generate significant heat loads during a station blackout. Process steam or auxiliary steam systems as well as AC-driven equipment, will not be operable during a SBO and therefore, areas of the plant containing only these normal plant operating heat sources failed to meet criterion "b' for determining dominant areas of concern.

7.2.5 Containment isolation Discussion The purpose of this procedure is to ensure that containment integrity can be provided for the four hour duration of a SBO.

l 7-30

, - .,7,-,.

. .-._m. .. . ~ _ . _ , _ _ _ . . _ _ .. . -. _.___.._ ,

A.

' Appropriate containment integrity is defined such that the capability for valve.

position indication and closure of certain containment isolation valves is I

provided independent of the " Preferred" or " Standby" AC power supplies. The containment isolation valves requiring this capability are those identifled in technical specification that may b. In the open position at the onset of a SBO, Acceptable means of position indv ...an include local mechanical indication or DC powered indication (including AC through inverters). Acceptable means of closure include manual operation, air operation (including those that close on j

- loss of alt) or DC powered operation.

r iT k'

GeertConwnenweenn 7-31.

i i

Procedure Step 1: Valve identification Review of the list of containment isolation valves identified in technical specifications has been made for NUMARC exclusion considerations es follows:

1. Valves normally locked closed during operation

2. Valves that f all closed on loss of ac power or air

3. Check valves

4. Valves in non-radioactive closed-loop systems not expected to be breached in a SBO (with the exception of lines that communicate directly with the containment atmosphere); and,

5. All valves less than 31pch nominal diameter A tabulation of all containment isolation valves, and the basis for exclusion from SBO concern per Step 1 is shown on Table 7.2-1, included as Attachment 9 to Section 7 of this report. Additional data for the contair. ment isolation valves can be found in FSAR Table 6.2-54.

The remaining valves are the containment isolation valves of concern for a SBO.

Step 2: Containment Isolation Valves Requiring Manual Operation Table 7.2-1 identifies the containment isolation vGlves from Step 1 that are of concern and which need to be operated to cope with a station bhekout event for the required 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> duration.

The SBO Equipment List, Table 4-1 includes these valves and Indicates that they can be operated independent of the " Preferred" and " Standby" AC power supplies and have valve position indication (e.g. local mechanical or DC powered.) that is independent of the preferred and blacked-out unit's Class IE power supplies, c.iwe-7-32

The containment isolation valves of concern that were identified in Step 2 as requiring manual operatten in order to cope with a SBO are the main steam power operated relief valves listed below:

Tar No. Deserlotiqn IPV-2000 MS l{ ender A Power Reflef Valve IPV-2010 MS llender B Power Relief Valve IPV-2020 MS liender C Power Relici Valve The main steam power operated relief valves are accessible and manually operable as discussed in Section 7.2.3. They have independently DC powered (through inverters) Engineered Safety Features (ESP) monitoa lights in the control room. These valves will be manually throttled following a SBO to control steam generator pressure as directed by the control ;oom operator.

Step 3: Containment Isolation Valves Requiring Closure Capability Table 7.2-1 further identifies containment isolation valves requiring cemaining chsure capability as the valves from Step 1 not identifled in Step 2. These valves can be closed independent of the " Preferred" and " Standby" AC power supplies and have valve positten Indication (e.g. local mechanical or DC powered) that is independent of the " Preferred" and blacked-out unit's " Standby" AC power supplies as discussed below.

Certain motor operated valves are normally open and fall"as is". liowever, these valves all have handwheels to facilitate closure for a SBO per Step 3 even though their associated systems are not required to operate. Local mechanical position indication is available, t

l 4

64thett4 egtenosw.,seitM ---

7-33

Normal Post Accident SBO Tag No. Syste m Position Position Position Remarks XVG 8888A St Open Open Open* LP Si to RCS XVG 8888B St Open Open Open* LP Si to RCS XVG 8107 CS Open Closed Closed CS to Regen. H.E.

XVG 8108 CS Open Closed Closed CS to Regen. H.E.

XVG 6797 FS Open Closed Closed Fire Serv. Deluge Not required for containment isolation - closed only for hot Icg recirculation.

The following motor operated valves were identified as falling "as is" where the normal plant operating position was the same as required for a SBO, cnd therefore technically not of concern per Step 3. In the unlikely event that any of these valves are being tested at the instant of a SBO, the valves can still be returned to their normal position with handwheels on the motor operator. Local mechanical valve position is available in the event that post SBO operation is required.

Normal SBO Tar No. System Position Position Remarks XVG 8701A RH Closed Closed XVG 87018 RH Closed Closed XVG 2802A MS- Open Open Reg'd open for EFP turbine oper.

XVG 28028 MS Open Open Reg'd open for EFP turbine oper.

XVG 8885 St Closed Closed XVG 8889 SI - Closed Closed XVG 3004A SP Closed Closed XVG 3004B SP Closed ' Closed XVG 8811A St Closed Closed XVG 3003A SP Closed Closed

- XVG 3003B SP Closed Closed XVG 8886 St Closed Closed XVG 8884 St Closed Closed XVG 8811B SI Closed Closed XVG 8801A St Closed Closed XVG 88010 SI Closed Closed l

l Glheeg CMwneth 7-34

C/C Report #2782 Rev. 3 Section 7 (Ref. Section 1.2.2)

Attachment 1 COVER SHEET ATTACHMENT 1 CLASS 1E DC SYSTEM RELATED ONE-LINE DIACRAMS INCLUDED WITHIN ATTACHMENT 1 ARE:

" A" TRA[N Figure 1 Panels DPN1HA, 1HAl, lHA2, and lHA3-ED Figure 2 Panels DPN1HAl and lHA2-ED (continuation from Figure 1)

Figure 3 Panet APN5901-EV Figure 4 Panet APN5902-EV Figure 5 Panet APN5907-EV "B" TRAIN Figure 6 Panels DPN1HB, lHB1, 1HB2, and lHB3-ED Figure 7 Panels DPN1HB1 and lHB2-ED (continuation from Figure 6)

Figure 8 Panet APN5903-EV Figure 9 Panet APN5904-EV Figure 10 Panel APH5908-EV NOTEt This attachment is for information only.

C/C Report #2782. Rev. O Section 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.2)

At t a c hrnent 1 Sheet 1

'A' Train 125Vdc Distnbution System One Line Diagram

~

xBA 1 A ED T

EDE22A 5 HUNT Rua 100mv + 800A s 0 000125 OHM 5 DPN1HA ED

? O  :  ? t-4 e o Brkr 22 WW Brkr 20 WH Brk.r 18 WM Brhr 16 h EDE23A kEDE24A b" EDE30A

---o -

DPN8014 ED

> EDE25A

'* EDE27A Q ,

Q <;

c 4> EDE28A

-4 -*- -o-XIT5901 EV (see Fig 3) XIT5902 EV XIT5907 EV (See Fig. 4) (See Fig 5) OPN1HA3 ED UPN1HAl ED DPN I H A2-E D o---* '

9- 4 0 -

0 Brkr 1 Brkr 2 Brkr 3 Brkr 5 Brkr 1 Brkr 1 Brkr 2 A L50 ^ $ MCE4A N N N k MCESA h' AHE3A ESE34A k E5E35A k[ nn:a c.

nou f f -+-

f -<-

f 7,2kV 5wgr, MCB HVAC Bd. 7,2kV Swgr. 480V Swgr, X5W10A E5 XPN7106 MC XC?6210 AH X5W1EA E5 X5W1EA1.E5

_4 (XPN7170) 480V Swgr.

X5W1DA1 E5 Conunued -.-o- - Continued on Figure 2 480V Swgr. on Figure 2 X5W1DA2 E5 FIGURE 1 i EQUlVALENT CIRCUIT DIAGRAM i

l l-

References:

1. G/C Dwg. No. E-2G6-062, Sneet 1, Rev. 28 l 2. G!C Calc. No. DC 832-005, Table 1

3. Tabulation of "SBO Equipment Required for Coping" l

l

. C/C Report #2782. Rev

'A' Train 12,. dc Load Equipment section 7 (Ref. Section. 7.2.2)

One Line Diagram Attachment I sheet. 2 DPf41 H A l-E D CONTifiUED

9  :  : " 0 *-

• GN FIG 1

--O Brkr.6 Brkr.8 Brkr.9 Brkr 10 Brkr.11 Brkr.12 B rk r.13 Brkr.14 Brk r.15 Brkr.22 Brke. 4 -

c e CCE11A CCE1A E5EB2A DGE 14A DGE23A

( CREIA 4sOGE27A Aum. Relay Rk. D G. Eng. Cont. Pnt. D.G. Fid. Flash R T Swgr.

X5WU001 CR h CC Pp. 5W X ES2001 A-CC CREP XPri7200A-CE XPN5303-E5 XPN5503-DG XEX4201-DG CCE21A ESE 101 A DGE4A DGE32A DGE21A R P. UF Pn!. D G Cont Pnl D G Enc. Reg Cub.

D G. Fuel Oil Pp. CC Pp Xf ER XW XE X4201-DG XPN6011-E5 XCX5201-DG X E50006-DG X ET2001C-CC

- , DPN 1 H A2-E D CON TirJ UE D ^ ' ^

ON HG 1 ~+ +

' Brkr.2 Brkr.3 Brkt.4 Brkr.6 Brkr 7 Brkr.8 i Br k r.14 B r k r.15 s 2 AHE7A SGE11A RCE1A g RME4A fs AAE7A I,LDE4A fs ESE102A (< TXE1A

$ $ b b Aux Sf d Cab R P. UF Pni. b XPrJ7 34-5G XPN6012-E5 AHE4XA AAE1XA > iDE2XA 'I RCE4(A

> TXE2XA 2 RME2XA >

4 4 2 R Rad Mon. Pnt. HVAC Alarm Pr.! Ann Aux. Rel. L.D. Ann. Przr. H tr. Pnt. ISCisol Cab.

XCP6210- AH XPN6091-AA XPN0059A-LD APN4101-RC XPN7226A-TX XCP6200-RM (XPN7170)

FIGURE 2 EQUIVALENT ORCUlf DIAGRAM

References:

1. G!C Dwg. No. E-206-062. Sheet 1. Rev. 28

2. G C Calc. No. DC-832-005. Table 1

3. Tabulation of ~580 Equipment Required for Coping"

C/C. Report l#2782, Re_ O' -

Sect ion ' 7- (Ref . Sect ion ! 7.2.2) .

.' Attachment 1.

Sneet.3 APN5901-EV

; g . . - -.

3 Brkr 6 Brkr 7 lBrkr8 Brkt 9 Brkr 10 arkr 11 arkr 12 Brkt 13

'Brkr 2 Brkt 4 3rkr 5 SGV3A . EVV41A' < XfVI A Q> ICV 11A taV1A t 4

ESVIA

'2>

A MCV3A '.f,SGV2A  % .

6 RCV11A

. NIV2A . .

ESV2A q_ ..

XPN5255-EM .

e XPfe6011-E5 XCP6231 A-IC: XCP7071-N! XPN7010-5G XPN7020-5G XPN7001-XI

. / E5]S1A:

-*- --a s

-c- _, _e_

EW47XA ' -

XPN5303-ES XPN7248-RC XCP7071.ra XPN7110-MC

-o- _._

APN5912A-EV XPNS472-E5 continued from above O O  : 7 f

Brkt 15 - Brkr 16 Brkt 17 Brkt 18 - Brkr 19 N O- -Brkt 20 Bekr 21 N O. Brkt 27 N C Brkr 31 N.O.

Brkr 14 J

$GV4A SGVSA NIV11 A EVY31A EVV23A AHVI A RCV1A j A EVV36A 7

EVK3A

$>5GV6A N *"

XPN5255-EM TB EV-11*

~O- ~8-' XPN5255-EM CBL STO BOX -

XPN6020-5G j XIT5901 EV XPN7170- A H g IdVI2A (" "" ' ( }

RCV2XA HH 5GV23XA ~4- -a>- ,

(VV34A XPN7034-5G APN5907-EV CBL STO Breaker 19

-e- Brkr 25 -at-.

~"- (bus tie) XIT5907-EV l(back-up source)

XPN7031-5G XPN7.218-RC (alternate back-up NiV!4A source)

XPN7303-Ni

' FIGURE 3 EQUlVALENT CIRCulT DIAGRAM FOR APN5901-EV' Referes.ces: 1. G!C Dwg. No. E-206.-062 Sheet 1, Rev. 28 *Re: connections i 2_ G/C Calc. No. DC-834-002, Table 1

'3 Tabulation of "$80 Equipment Required For Coping" _

C/C Report #2782, Re O Section 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.2)

Attachment 1 Sheet 4 APf45902 EV

- J--

J :ontinued below Brkr 1 Brkr 2 Brkr 4 Brkt 5 Brkr 7 Brkr 8 B kr 9 L

MCV11D h SGVED

) e NIV3D h'EVV43D SGV7D 4

tJIV4D g

• XPtJ5256-EM XPN7113-MC X PN7011-5G EVV49XD

-e- && _4_

XPtJ7304-Ni XCP7072-tJI XCP7072 Nt XPN7010-5G i APN5912C-EV

• " a s.onirnued f rorn above , ,

Bike 12 Brkt 13 Brkr 15 Brkt 21 N O. Brb r 25 N C Brkr 10 Brkr 29 N O.

XIV3D XIV4D C EVV38D ESV5D EVV24D

%.> (

SGV90 TB EV-11

• EVK4A XPt45256-EM h XPf46012-E5

~~

2

1. " 1 C # EVV34A X IT 5902-EV (norrn.11 sour (e)

MVDXD XPN7020-5G EM

-o - --*- XIT5907-EV XPN7006-XI XPN5412-E5 (alternate back-up (back-up source) source)

FIGURE 4 EQUIVALENT CIRCUlT DIAGRAM FOR APN5902-E*!

References:

1. G/C Dwg. No. E-206-062, Sheet 1, Rev. 28 *Re: connections

2. G/C Calc. No. DC-834-002, Table 2

3. Tabulation of ~5BO Equipment Required For Coping"

C/C Report #2782, Re 3 Section 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.2)

Attachment i Sheet'5 xiT5907-EV (norma! source)

EVV34A To Frgure 3 4-- TB Et-l u -+ To Figure 4 AFNS901 Brk r 21 ..

APf45902 Bri r 21 l

EVVd1A APNS907-EV g _

l l

Brkt 2S N.O. Brkr 26 Brkr 29 N O. Brkr 32 Bd r 17 Brkt 24 Brkt 14  % ,

l EVV36A > E va.12 A C 5 XIV2A J

g g

BPv6A f RHv1A '

} f Rnv3A

'7"

• /Pri7034 5G xPtJ5155 EM _e- __,._

% __ APN1FA-EM APN5901-EV xpr.;6001-BP Brkr 19 Brkr 15 (back-up -*-

(bus tie) _

$ RHV2A sourte) XPN5477-RH 5 xiV11XA XPN6004-BP

~*--- XPN7005-XI XPN5484 RH FIGURE 5 EOulVAL EfJT CIRCUIT DIAGRAM FOR apt:5907-EV G/C Dwg tJo E-206-062, Sheet 3 Rev.12 *Re. Normal Connection

References:

1.

2. G/C Calc. No. DC-834-002, Table 5 3 Tabulation of 'SBO Equipment Required for Coping"

C/C Report #2782 Rev. O Section 7 (Ref. Section 1.2.2)

Attachment 1 Sheet 6

'B' Train 125Vdc Distribution System One Line Diagram

~

xBA 18 ED T

EDE328

<L SHUNT Rua 100mv + 800A = 0 000125 C AMS DPN1HB ED

-+ '

+ L :wn 9 Brkt 19 Brkr 20 Brkt 21 Brkr 1B Brkr 26 Brkr 16 Brkr 22

1. '* EDE40B kEDE338 h, EDE148  :::

DPN80158 s .

5 EDE358 D EDE378 D

Q -n w

, 4 _,

Brkr 1 Brkr 2 Brkr 3 Brkr 5 Brkr 3 Brkr 1 Brkt ?

$ E5Gts  % MCE6B $,ESE248 $ #

<? > ESE250 AHE1B kl ESU:9 tune k( MCE7B -.-

g MCB HVAC Bd, 7.2kV Swgr. 480V Swgr.

7,2kV Swgr. 4 X5W1DB E5 XPN7130 MC XCP6210. AH X5W1EB E5 X5W1E B1.E5

-4 H (XPN7176) 480V Swgr.

X5W1DB1.E5 Continued -< H Continued on Figure 7 480V Swgr. on Figure 7 X5W1DB2 E5 FIGURE 6 EQUIVALENT CIRCUlT DIAGRAM

References:

1. G/C Dwg. No. E 206-062, Sheet 2, Rev. 28

2. G/C Calc. No. DC-832-005, Table 1

3. Tabulation of *580 Equipr.1ent Required for Coping" J

f

B Train E " " 1.2.2)

OneLi Dia9 ram At t achinen t 1 Sheet 7 DPi11 HB 1-E D CONTINUED

e  :  : 0 -e '

e e ON FIG 6

-o .  :  :

Brkr.6 Brkt.7 Brkr.8 Brkr.9 Brkr.11 Brkr.13 B:Lt.14 Brkt.15 Br k r_16 Brkr.17 Brbr 23 Brkt.4 f CRE3B tj DGE288 h CCE148 ( CCE2B E55848 ( DGE158 CEE3XB DGE248

<, s s < <

S CC Pp. 5p. SW Aux. Relay Rk. D G Eng Cont. Pnl D G Fid Flash R.T. Swgr. CREP XES20018-CC XPN72008-CE XPN5303-E5 XPN5504-DG XEX4202-DG X5W0001-CR CCE22B DGESB DGE268 E5E103B DGE22XB

)

R P. UF Pnt.

XPN6013-E5 D G Cont, Pnt.

D G FuelOilPp. CC Pp. XF ER XW DGE P9 X ET2001C-CC XCX5202-DG XE a O DG XP 47213 CE XE50007-DG DPN1HB2-ED COfJTINUED U *

• ON FIG 6

• Brkr.1 Brkr.2 Brkt.4 Brkr.5 Brkr.7 Brkr 8 Brk r.15 RCE2B AAE8B AHE8B RME3B L DF. 5B 2' SGE13B h TXE3B

. ~ ~ ~ > < <

h

~

b b b Aus 5fg.1 Cab b XPfJ7035-5G l

RCE5XB AAE2XB AHE2XB RME1XB LDE3XB TXE4xB Przt. H tr. Pn!. Ann. Aux. Rel. ItVAC Alarm Pni. Rad. Mon. Pnl. LD. Ann. TSC isol. Cab.

APN4102-RC XPN6094-AA .XCP6210-AH XCP6200-RM XPN00598-LD XPN72268-TX (XPN7176)

FIGURE 7 EQUlVALENT CIRCUIT DIAGRAM

References:

1. G/C Dag. No. E-206-062,5heet 2. Rev. 28

2. G/C Calc. No. DC-832-005. Table 2

3. Tabulation of ~5BD Equipment Required for Coping

'C/C Report.'#2782,' Re- :13

' Section 7 (Ref. Section'7.2.2).-

e

' Attachment l '-

? Sheet 8 APN5903 EV : g gg n . . . . a u y n a 7 p Brkt 9 Brkt 10 - ' Brb r' 12 Brkt 13 Brkt 14 Brkr 8 -

Brkr 3 N.C- Brkt 4~ 18rkt5 Brkr 6 B r k t ._7 EVV428 .. MCV5B .f5V108- ' AHV28

, NIV6B SGV128 kEVV378 k XIV5B NIVSB b E5V118 SGV118 OXPN6013 E5

. 9' XPN5257-EM

_o- - _,_

- o.n __o_ _,_ gg .

XCP7073 Ni XPN7020-5G XPf47123-MC -

E51538:

APN5908-EV XPtJ7003-X)

Brkr 25  ; PWR Supply # 1 2 -

l ' "---~

--e-- ----o- -4 + EVVa8XB

} ,(bus tie) -

XCP 7073-Nt '

XPN7176-AH I

XPN5303-E5 XPN701'0-5G l w_ _._

APN59128-EV XPN5525-E5 -

continued r .

n . n . m from above Brkr 15 . Brkr 17- Brkr 18 ' Brkt 19 Brkt 21 N.O. Brka 25 N C - Brkt 29 N.O.

Brkt 16 EIV1B SGV14B SGV158 EVV328 EVV258

$GVl3B .

ICV 128 IB EV-12* EVK58 XPfJ5157-EM XPN5257-EM gg EVV35B

' XPN6025-5G . XPN7035-5G XIT5903-EV l 4 (norrnal EIV2XB 5GV24XB --o- _ , _ _ source) ---o-

1. ~

XCP62318-IC XIT5908-EV

-o-~ Brkr 19 (alternate back- . (back-up source)

XPN6041-El XPN7032-5G up source)

FIGURE 8 EQUIVALENT CIRCulT DIAGRAM FOR APN5903 EV-

References:

-1. G/C Dwg. No. E-206-062, Sheet 2. Rev. 28 *Re: Connections i 2. .G/C Calc. No. DC-834-002, Table 3

3. Tabulation of "SBO Equipment Required For Copiag

C/C Report #27820 Re O Section 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.2)

Attachment 1 Sheet.9 APN5904-EV

.' (ontinued below Brkr 7 Brkr 8 Brkr 9 Brkr 10 Brkr 11 Brkr 4 Brkr 5

$GV17E PJ1V8E SGV18E k XIV8E h NIV7E 5 4 SGV16E kg :V7E X

p L_ + a >-

XCP7074-Ni XPN7020-5G XPN7021-5G

< XIV14xE

--o- _ o __ _ s--

XCP7074-Ni XPN7010-5G xpn7004.xi

-1>--

XPN7003-X1 (ontinued from above f ^

Brkt 20 Brkt 21 N.O. Brkr 23 N C- Brkr 27 N O.

I Brkr 13 Br6r16

< 4 MCV 12E RCV3E EVV39E <

- - EVV26r. EVK68 RCV12E

_g_ XPfJ5297.E M TB EV-12* _

XPtJ7122-MC XIT5904-EV APN1F B-EM 4 Brkr 23 g (nor mal EVV358 scure) (back-up source)

XPN7248-RC I

--o- -c-XPN7218-RC XIT5908-EV (alternate back-up source)

FIGURE 9 EQUIVALENT CIRCUlT DIAGRAM FOR APN5904-EV

References:

1. G/C Dwg No. E-206-062, Sheet 2, Rev. 28

• Re: Connections

2. G/C Calc. No. DC-834-002, Table 4

3. Tabulation of ~580 Equipment Required For Coping"

C/C Report #27820 RC g 1 .. .. -j

.' Sectionl7 (Ref. Section' l7.2.2) .,

Attachment 1 Sheet 10 XIT5908 EV EVV35B To Figt.re 8 -

APN5903 Estkr 21

' +-- TB EV-12*

4 ; To Figure 9 APN5904 Brkr 21

~l EVV828 --

l .-

APNS908 EV Brkr 29 N C 9 .{ .

Brkr 22 ' Brkr 23 Brkr 28 ' Brkr 24 Brkr 25 N.O. Brkr 26 Brkr 21 XIV6B RPV98 RHV118

^

RHV13B BPV78 ' XIV218 O XPN7035-5G .

XPN5257-EM EVV378-

--4 w XIV13XB XPN6005-BF RHV128

.I MW Mw MW

}

XPN5483-RH -- o-- XPN6002 bP XPN7003-XI ML APN5903-EV XPN5484-RH .PWR Supply #2 XPN7007-XI Brkr 3 (bus tie) flGURE 10

' EQUIVALENT CIRCulT DIAGRAM FOR APNS908-EV i

References:

1. G/C Dwg. No. E-206-062, Sheet 3, Rev.12 'Re: NormalConnection

2. G/C Calc. No. DC-834-002, Table 6

3. Tabulation of ~580 Equipment Required for Coping"

, . , . .+ , , . - . ~ . - -.

G/C liepurt #2792, llev. 3 Section 7 'Ref. Suation 7.2.2)

Attachrt.' nt 2 COVER SilEET ATTAC1(MENT 2 120 VOLT CLASS 1E VITAL AC INVEllT21t LOADS DELETED This attachment originally documented the reduction of 120 volt Class IE vital ac inverter loads after 30 minutes following a station blackout at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. Since the new battery capacity is sut*1clent without load shedding, this attachment was no loriger required.

G/C Repou #2782. Rev. 3 Szetion 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.2)

Attachment 3 COVER SHEET ATTACllM HE12 BA'ITERY SIZING EVALUATION l'OR Silo OBJECTIVE:

This attachment describes the existing battery sizing calculation (DC-832-005) which demonstrates that sufficient battery capacity exists to support a SBO at the V.C.

Summer Nuclear Station tvithout load shedding.

NOTES:

Battery Duty Cycle Curves Dattery duty cycle diagrams are as presented in G/C Calculation No. DC 832-005.

w.y .-

.v---w -p-y4- y --., y - - - - + --w+- g e--- P f u uss'-r= y r- 7 W y *

('-~ ' ' - -

G/C fleport #3783. Rev. 4 Section 7 (Ref. Section 7.3.3)

Attachment 3 Saeet1 Cet! Size The maximum enil size was determined and documented in C/C Calculation No.

DC-832 905 to assess Class IE battery capacity. Refer to ecil sizing work sheets for 1

ba'terles XUA-1A ED and XDA-!D ED to dete.*mine the number of positive plates

}

required to support the respective duty cycle diagram loads. The required amperes per I positive plate were determined for various time periods based on extrapolation of the C&D type LCR-31 battery cell characteristic curve for an end of-discharge voltage of 1.862 VPC (1.862 VPC x 58 ce!!s = 108V de).

DACKGROUND:

As previously discussed in Step 1 of Section 7.2.2. the batterles installed at the time the-V.C. Summer Nuclear Station was originally evaluated for 500 did not have sufflclent capacity to cope with a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SDO duration without load stripping. Therefore.

evaluations were performed to demonstrate that the 18 batteries were adequately sized to cope with a 500 if non essentialloads were shed. In order to maintain operator action to a minimum, SCE&G Co. decided to replace the existing C&D 00 cell, type LC-15, batterles with larger C&D G0 cell, type LCR 31, batterles which were specifically designed and sized with the additional requirements of 500 in mind. The methodology used for the previous design was also used for the new design with the exception of the duty cycle load profile requirements which were extended from two hours to four hours. T1.s newly designed batteries were installed per plant modification g

M R F-21595.

Battery size for the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station design basis analysis is documented in G/C Calculation No. DC-832-005. G/C Calculation No. DC 832-005 ovaluates and ,

documents Class IE battery capacity for the Class IE da system based on worst case accident condl; ions. This calculation was performed in accordance with accepted methodology in IEEE Recommended Practice for Slzing Large Lead Storage Batteries

)

for Generating Statinns and Substations (IEEE-STD-485). IEEE-STD 485 incorporates design margins for aging and temperature correction and uses methodology whleh calculates battery load requirements for various sections of time. The magnitude of de loads for each such section of time is referred to as the section size. Various section

- = ----- - -. = -

5 G/C Report #270 Rev. 4 1 Ssetton 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.2)

Attachment 3 Sheet 2 sites are calculated in order to construct a battery duty cycle. The battery is then sized to address the maximum section calculated for the entire duty cycle. ,

G/C Calculation No. DC 832 005 evaluates battery size to ensure that each Class IE battery has sufficient capacity (ampere hours) plus margin to independently support ,

required safety loads for a four hour duty cycle (SILO duration) with non essential ,

(parasitle) loads connected. An end-of-discharge voltage for each battery of 108V de l was selected to ensure that sufficient voltage will be available at the input terminals of the Class 1E Vltat ac System inverters at the end of the duty cycle. Note that the number of positive plates required to support the applicable ampere-hour load demands for each battery were increased to include 10% design margin for load uncertainty,25%

l to compensate for degradation with age, and 11% to compensate for a reduction of battery capacity due to temperature variation (ie., the lowest temperature anticipated is 60'F). Battery duty cycle diagram load current values are based on expected loads at rated voltage.

DC system capacity was evaluated based on 58 cells connected, since this approach provides the worst case conditions. Refer to " Supporting information" discussion included in Section 7.2.2 of this Report.

i r

l

G/C Report #2782, Rev. 3 Section 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.2; Attachment 4 COVER SilEET NITACllMENiT3 DC SYSTEM YOLTAGE EVALUATION FOR Silo OBJECTIVE:

This attachment documents the evalus'.lon to demonstrate that the batteries have adequate capacity to supply suffielent voltage to equipment required for coping with a SBO at thu Y.C. Summer Nuclear Station for a 4-hour duty cycle. The dcVOLTPRO computer output reports which support the evaluation are contained in G/C Calculation No. DC-832-010.

0/C lleport #37"2, llev. 3 i section 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.2)

Attachment 4 Sheet i UACKOROUND:

This evaluation is based on methodology and margins previously used to demonstrate sufficient Class 1E de system voltage for the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station . Sufficient battery voltage for the existing V.C. Summer Nuclear Station design basis analysis is documented in 0/C Calculation No. DC-832 010. G/C Calculation No. DC 832-010 evaluate; and documents Class 1E de system load component operability based on available voltage at the load component termlnnis. This calculation demonstrated that sufficient voltage will be available to ensure operability during worst case accident conditions.

The input to DC-832-010 is based on the same rated load current values and the same 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 500 duty cycle used to determine battery size per IEEE-485 as documented in O/C Calculation No. DC-832-005.

Since IEEE-485 methodology does not address adjustment of rated load current to compensate for voltage variations resulting from fluctuations of battery voltage and voltage drop, dcVOLTPRO, a computer program developed by O/C Inc. was used to calculate available voltage at the load eqidpment terminals. Load current decreases with a decrease in the voltage for constant resistive type loads, while load current increasee with a decrease in voltage for constant kVA type loads (eg. Inverters). DC system component operability is ultimately contingent upon having sufficient voltage at the load component terminals. Therefore, battery capacity with respect to battery size (ie., number of positive plates per tell) to supply required ampere-hours to connected loads for a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> duty cycle, as well as the ability of the batteries to supply sufficient l

dc load component voltages were evaluated to demonstrate Class lE de system and component operability, dcVOLTPRO uses the latest IEEE-485 methodology to calculate overall battery current and voltage based on battery characteristics. Individual rated de system load current values and equivalent circuit resistances. Through iterative calculstions the program determines battery and load voltages based on adjusted loud current for the various time periods of the battery duty cycle.

Attachments 85 and 87 of G/C Calculation No. DC-832 010 reflect the SUO battery l duty cycle requirenients as described in Section 7.2.2, Step 2 of the " Battery Capacity l Calculation --- Without Load Stripping". DC system voltages with 58 cells connected were evaluated, since this approach provides the worst case (minimum) voltage

0/C Report #2782. Rev. 3 Section 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.2) i Attachment 4 1 Sheet 2 conditions. Refer to " Supporting information" discussion included in Section 7.2.2 of this report.

r

l GiC Report 02181. Rev 0 Section 7(Ref Section 7 2 4)

Attachtneht 5 5*ett 1 of I LOG'C D ACRAM 'O A55155 Nf fif f qll or 10% OF (fitgtioy DUmNG A 560 The foHomng logic ciagram represents tne approuh used to assent the of'ect of loss of ventitat.on on operab.hty of SBO (au pment Peovired fof Cooing 3

idento vStat'on Black out.5BO tupment Reasireo for Cr o<ngin e Accorcance mtn Section a of NUMARC RMO tinctuce #eavaeo i ectr:cai hbcomponents Associated with 5B0 f ouipmeat oentif *o o" Attn

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• s Reporo Determine the feme Period Assume the tauipment Mutt identif y 500 t automent Location that tne f ouipreent Must Remain Operan:o for tre Entire and Environmental Zone s emain OperaDie for the su' abor o' t*e Station B'un out Aporophate Station Bla(> out ( e , One two, or four howeg)

• Coping Methoa - 9 Evaluatt P'aN beal where 580

[auipment it Located to Determine Dominant Areas of Concern. DAC,in NUM ARC Defined Acordance mth 5ectiont 2.7.1 and turbine Dnven 7 2 4 of NUMARC 87 00 (mergency ieedwater Pumo Room an a DAC t

1. " is the 580 touipment - N" i Located in a DAC)

Wal the D AC Previously as Ivaluated al a Maf%h Envirorim e nt '

t if No Determine the 580 temperature f or the OAC, T3g, m

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in accorcance mth Section 7 2 4of NUMARC87 00 orin accordance with previoul VC$N$ Analysis

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Does the tauipment Fit into a Generic Category)(see f able vn F f and Toperai Report Sections 2 and 3 of Ano ***

to NUMARC 87 00 0

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Estatmsh Reasonabie Assurance of Reasonable Assurance of I Operabihty U$ing the Methodt Discussed in 5B0 t ausprnent Operab;nty Sechons F 2 through F 7 of App "F" to I

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tottaw 493 eres meC acM atory Gu+ 1 97 rasu=i tarr't s .

, of evt.wne ames to ackiress wetc (Aaa ts elial def Dr*Et *Gn> Si Cate*Uf 'es ef e 8s f CI Ie; S. Inese cotseed indent if y t% WCth% en.*s ars=-nt et c at egor Det etiese. Category 9 tGefvt s f ees esquagserrbt les eted Sn 4 etid ertwSFE88efte .

Date e s es ent r acted f rse the WCb45 I .G.

M9Dnttscrin Of M $ calegod4es a .t s tor e s e6 soret f or eA *t's at s aa f es t * *ar* t o me t a e.t e sa ws a t s '*C

• • f e t y A8e SW *e f e'It.A8 e .

that cou4d empre serve etee eewernsamentet cordet scsw of design :ases (toCA at - E <pgmarnt Sn t h8' eLC DOret enetrarmairst for the t nee regattow f or AC edent et t 1944 ten esofft thabl 9 f led to dreumrW tf mee (gmeret>tl 5 y

'8* U***' # "'

8 8% # =87 5a9 ** t st*88 8*"P U*d 8'"3 4 'M I cureja t nyen of oness grg getsis i true twe-se asi kMt s,

- t pegstret tf at gewM d es6"# 1*'ru e the enyarmourret at W t e w eret 1 08 the t ter t %5 8 d N mc & 44

• 4 Al to r.p.at if bed to Opemanstf ate a(mer etre f e f e m the act thf

.at $t h b t %Jb8 f upE 1 tset 89 me a e$ete satd aCC SME > eriES that mit egat e.st nie t% saf et y eas esn to f asture.

,er i6 ein .E .t t .t,c,,ea t, e m.:s ,....t .,.,,t ,,

.,. , samed . no, at . ,, e.m e 4m , e e pt . a ,,,, F,e ., . ut a,t ,4i ,. SJt el y enst $t84 16 fa s ted e.

a 'l *

• I % Sat MM t flat i 44,& 4 4 Ape, >< . e m I?te f ediat ten evie trerentent #4sr the t eser reg.ast ed f ee scc ideei8 ** t I $e# 8 Jr's est tft 4,paal 6 f e ed t o Ormurt:st r ate Mrdbt ! # r y

letne ! 2.4 Grc separt a 2T82

v. C. Sieser mutteer iteteen Sect een T E8ef. $est ese* F 2 4 Stet sen electeur atteshavet 6

$heet; 35 03/1T189 6200:30 tveeuetsort te astress 4 spespnent Operat:44 ety see Ocamanent Asces of Corm eve tcystpment t ist #-ey By tecat sceus Aweedte & e,6 lOPP f(FP DAC' TOAC marmst ac turef Upwr. Isee Assessment 0588 1.91 MtEt, ta f eie Opee . tesgn p.aret een Cr 6 t erie (y *gAC f esp.

str.sdet e.eter _ (er, . )D ) Approach (41 Cat, O] (at,OJ euder (6) [Dee. f1t h ter s , )( $ 1 e*=ns< 6 s

. nw. Fot3 . loom ec. A B C (See fit?) f ee. 40. M Deser tut s on mottS : ( Cou t . )

31 -f9esseernt that coute eagno sence enveraramentet caratss tons of design tSes.es it0LA) est edent enten#, A kh si rared rua awa t e<s, eor se t eget ton ei seed .a ( adertt, tmet lttete the cesseDat ety to esthsteruf through eAsch 15 aust not f ast en e enerver detresamt et to pterst safety or accident eettget tert, and thet t s spast e f led te _

arty acc 6 dent enwarorement for stas time ciar stes eAects at aunt not sett with safety mergin to festure.

e2 - igayeens the: could esper verue enwitorumental cardit swa et den eyi 44ests t Ine tweak actsdents, encitssing seen steem isee tweek and other 8 tre breaks, through Aeth e t reed not fwst ten f or met agelsen of seed actsdentt, tmst threngh eAith st saast see f eel en e marewt detromentet 8e ester =t setety er escedent met tget een, and that es caset tfied to demeistrate the capabit ely to e6ttesterms any arcident erar*rerswet f or the g ame dar sag nA nch e t met emit feet with befety enrg6n to feelure.

31* - tcps pment that costd esperiasse encreased radiet more esposure <mse is post accident rei.orcudet eorn through amtd st veed not lieut ters for se t eget een of seed ecs sdents, tmat through which $3 met not feet en a server dett smentet to pteret sately or ecCt4 Brent estigetten, one ghet ss cp.et st eed to desunktrete the capabetity to east %sterus arty redtetion envaroseenit for the time dJrteig aAsch et met not f ait erith safety mergen to festure.

C1 - ickstgeent that Could erpeciere[e enwtfereunteret tenditions of desegn tusses (LOCA) acc edent through eAsch it need not twu tien ter enttgettert of seed &*Cedent, and neone feiture (en any made) to deveerd ret eletrheentet to ptsit safety or accodent estiset ter*. maal eeed not te ap.et sfied f ar any acsident esteiraroevit, tmst is spset tf eed f or the nere-accsdent service enverm.

C2 - tapsopment that could eager tence enestormentet cardit sens of dessen t** sis isne teeet acendents; inckdsag mesa steem a see tweeks swed other i one treets, the omash eAech et need est (wrt sen e.e ottigetten of seed acc 6 dents, and ediese fallege (en ery mode) t4 deemed not detrimentet to plant sefety or scen<seret ett testeen, ered rtreG sept be (p.ast Bfied for any ecCident enettergetest, tmst 19 cpsi sfieq$ ffr 3959 feast ec.CEdent Bef w&Ce ertwiterament.

twut tore for est age iert r et seed ecs 6 dent er hos Cl* * { cpsspesent that ceistd espef senre tratfeesed f edeat 6en esposure (RJe to post 4LOCA) ettedent throup6 edied et eteed part

1. s dreeted dept drtfiserdet to pt erwt Ecuupteted sJ furEtionet fetysf reerns pr ter to eressorament getseg harsh, eral e&ose fellWre etter Etat)tellfag fwart tert ( tot any mus9*)

saf et y (dr SCC ldertt m8 t t got iert, artl need 8 tot te q. net it eed f or any ecC Dd'=nt enyttereent, but I* cpat tfled for fW nes.Cedevut setwete eriescorumpnt.

D a (seeepsent that ===sid not emperserse envsvaruerntet cardst eens of desegn t. asis accedents ard that ase 64 tw cyaet sind to demieintrate operabai sty en the nuemet ord etsioe ms t set w ate env ereroent . thes egetsesent et tseated outsacera cent oasement .

bef enst earin of seg. Lesede 3.9T tateiparses:

I t m - e 9,G_ 1.97 Categ: sty 1 deWGCe af 4r.h Ss (ot eted 6s' e sa id enutr gnment.

4 Imble 1.2.4 E/C 8esere e 2782 W. C. Esseer nuclear station sect een T taef Secteen F.2.4)

$tatvon teactout Attactur-at 6 sheets f4 85/1T/89 02:38:35 tvaluat ewe to Acktress igaggument Ogerabst ety in Domenant As &as of f.ortern Emaipment (Bst Sammary by tocat eers Ag4,rne, s e ,s. twS 30Pr CAC ICAC Ammaf ecturer (ger. Isme Assessment 0588 1.97 SCEAG to t ele ther. *eaga. Dureteen Cri t er iam DAC Temp. #*mer t s setniet theseser { prs,)(3) Agge oech t t ) Cet , 0) Cat . 0 ) shmaert6) (Dee. f )t T) (Er f . )(B) nw. fone Rooms so. A 9 C (f.eg . f)til 149 No. M Dese r tsst ion f

se h0tf$; (Ctmi) f El-te - A e.G.1.91 Category 1 device located en a harsh enwererserit. In geeetet, sarace Category 1 dewsces are smed for operater ac t een er for operef or determinat sare y of the type et acc edent te st has oc. *ed, 6t is tecessary to t oast ambiguous enformation presented to the eserefor. As sush, Category 1 cesserents are generetty gaat sf sed f or the accedent eetch the comparent may see teaceptiens are classtised es f1- A).

h u _. . A . ... . 9, Cat-y 2 ec. eh ecie t s .oc.t.d .n . .n., -r_ .

k (21 - A t &.1.9F Category 2 devere *Aich is secoved en a hersh en=6teramert for .mich entst eng fou t senet wee eficarean tesisting etets esas dresipisteen) meets er -eceees q _:s has est teen made.

' the regs4 resents of the Cstegory 2 8.G. emniteiring twst6en. eccordingly, detested f.e. ewelust een of the e.l. l.97 resproreernes for these c _

a 12-m A S.E.1.91 Categrey 2 device eesch as located in a harsh enverersment for eAlth en anetyses has shunset that the cessaurent weit te regaered to perfose ets destyeted R.G.1.97 fest sen tsar steg the accident sit ast son eAtch created the harsh erswIrarsamt.

Not e: 6everever a dewece serves as teth e Category 1 and a Category 2 dewsce, the Category 1 s.E. (a foersrement es sesed as the overet desegrator es st =4tt te the

(.

y sest earengent.

Data is as estf acted f rom the VC5ms f.e. Database,

6. thes cotusn adrot oises the aspi ecebte M1&L E .G. 9 ele no dur.somteng vCsa$ enetrarmentet 9,et tf ecatsen.

T. Stat tare Blacteut Operebet 6ty lesserature EIUPe) es the teeperature for eAicle ressenable assim ance of eterabs tity mas been estat*4 tshed for a specif ec cessannent or f or an 4gassumeria categary. Ihts temperature es estat>tsatted f or a. worsety of ewegament categories on the Asgenden f tapecet eeport, aras may t>e establ eshed for ers1 eve &amt equagment usong the spproacaset. descr6ted thereen.

8. This cotsan udentif ees the time per sed for eAerb the ogsegument was eagmased to tfle $ tat eere Glacheart usermos t esy lesserature it0PP) and to eAsch the espapsnent esas demorustrated operable.

9. 580 ewysment seerabelsty attesnament es ret rewered f or tho equessamt located en Ammerwres areas of cortiern whette were prevsan=*y categur ered arms evatw.ed as harsh enwseosamental areas at the WC5mi. Itse: asproerb is t.esec en ausenet &f-tse, Aspeesses f, see. 1, nes t een f.1 A "Assasug t eens and Def enst eens ,

Assuspf ban 2 eAtch provedes stie taases for agpt testion of Ag:perufem f . 9eter to Sectifwa 2.I for etseaaC ef-00 pesetten en the s.heect. An se wef er to bec t een 1.2.4.2 for en emporused bases appt ecatate to the WCi*1$.

10.. keesorincde assurarece of eserabet ety f or thes owegament e.es est atal e shed based on the f act that these cassaarwne s ar e s ome t er to *me sene t ype of sungsament s area et sens een..

gaat at eed per 10Ef 4SO A9 to her sn enverureentat seemise ease comed by a 40CA armster sest8 methan tae chamarwsret

- ._. .- - . - - . . s

m aesmas a 2*Ed taue 12.t> sec t.wi T teet, Sett aen T. 2 L A V. C. be.Wurf eutteer staf f ert a t e es sment 8 st et seus 81an aon,t sawet : M C1/S TIL** GJM *r t wetust eur, ea adare2 e f w.eset Oper atn i s t , en Far:rmer.e eree. of tesem 4.ssiww t s.t s.e or, ty t.C at iens l

N Fe l#e As.gsrvef oe 4 ed.

1.F 5 16e t G

• s e e E4mre . t ems. , Gures e.sw TC&C Or;mrf . f reur ennesmaserd 46M * ~ *.

E4C maswf ec t.ser e m u_ _ toes e n?.fi t~ ner

{rgyW teC least r ea e 6 cev< w a *-w a me i =r s . @ sere W cet. t$ t GT 61 7,=. e x. = > ._ . a e c wea . f n z s wits _ mas s str*t s 6 pap 4 or isw3eevoltage en t>ases TCa er 44; r eehn s s9 esevi f or 6 W 540 ras et ist - i#e A13 solen'd eet oe 's

1) (gee ers te sa 60 secada et t er lid t sess: e.

@ del a f ted to 1CEA test Car @ t s.ere ese66CW enett ap F9e $60 teruSit twi beC t t een I.T I .

1s pr ers3rd t.ewegt een Ekste&C S? IX#, 464*r C

• I I DP*C et 9epur !,

12_ 9es4muaD4 e ets# art e eI cget 4;t & 4f r 9er fe2s e@,15ent**t c$e rebi t tt y, eraf 19merefere, re=3atte egeteepe ter* te eripure eOdganPr4 util ter eerwel t y oper st*Q f or $40 Eks Ref II f let tf 6Cet eaAEeaglorw*'45 es&GCiefed ma tt ee4 pet a@ 6 Cit wefe e4CIss3rd ffen BSDte lle, te or ossoc iated es tet the 5 a. ore T ad ders 6ese e s tama t tee eecs is Cag:. state of mit*st areitne tengerettsr em ess-et ti at thauipt t*e st4t teaseretare i test trig metef ies t$ttCS, enous e 14 ef fected et aut $ ent 14*4wf e*,e9 eeC e*@smg ifA *f . i

.e e,. e,e .,1,ea rfteretf. tetos..

-ete > ,,.e e .., f TC,e .

n.e . ,

esteedtng 18%*f, TSe tureemef s* eleCf f 84 et pef fereusve, e t uC, et ma-f e to m-, es tP fespect 1-eme f, te

.a g esur-gasrfect e, .e.,td es.t i ,.e , ,~ ete se oe.,

e.e,, et 4, e .r. t-et . .s wa t- et,e. ~ .e e,ie.d -d.t . r m, et e e s rf.t.en - d . - ,C, ted. s~ d e en (M swef teenf Cerg3+t ien SA e Fessed amm#st of f ese, te f thefe 66 FemowwC4 e ebenderte 141 E9te threshef arttl est tres;puettentir to C erede I 1 Drus ,

f e" EJ es et 543 erswer erenr e itet C.sunit eur*s i ae. , f esservet.ees f ess than li. Irs.m2.ef terat erief ge tet uust et so4 eretd eat es es a ressel t of esmet. Bet 3+eref ore, sanpecerne oest es 4 to t toedbesariet t rCas*

ywtt fCMT=*arret ae tme pwpcee of time sw e,et e ton.

1Wp eres noreret ret eteve aussast e s ** .st red *ta, erd Aes cor reed a trolee to mustwee the sete, Seed glestt iM f, W at t etC 1.sSrd f rom Imbd e I.E6.

sel(Che%/C Jr't8Ct4 eet 83 are FIOr fd4 t 83rtelI y FeSaared te Egarf ete f gt s>f tee, S8 m44 d te ?mpeed atrat e4 et t f 5 c en dahr et t er e,t u g erg 3 t teur er e Leyed crs grewe'1C wors3mr test erec/ar cef a:opsr Sata. et 05er AC t t tt y 1 eager etwe ! Y}e ) #Gu8Pwer, e ert JIIb8 ent tceEarf er sre (QfhL) et 18 f , t'G

'S .

e A f e res.peC E T O I free ' CL#f eest Chr em tef 9 el E C 6, mand d e etf et f ed et arb eA*M erft testef eture et 212*f .

s e gee f f E FT C R er'agt tet eleC t r Ret 4Mr#C ter t S$1Cs esm+4d De eagef 3 erred.

er e t,=bpeii grn aggA 5a eb4 e westritr iest re, asp 1 dete Dfbrf4 4 + 4ed &Pb tat

• e'ef *** * $CI % i G. f4&M.

• '. 4.g.ard'stH i S T y f ester et ta(e ( ige) #si 1 '> stir

@#M b 19 be t &N4 t t er$ Mulf ".a*sta eGacEist ed elin f %.de faaewf t et.1 e*Wi r VWRdet BI turhrs Me 43 lifbendh # m & #W'@ b4 NI et t 3 ar* 7 ** ^ .e s5* * * ** t f- t see M* a tear

• m8 s osaen set wes em sce s as e 4 & tar Cbrand t t.E** ef & 1 t me t s most t < ee' y te t i me m ; tot.cr wea es s ug.it*%#3s . e, C, er.1 avestgaK14, e, mres C en e rageen (, y%,

!9 ise eet sart t ,eur per sed of Clug ge Ms rot geren st egn e 4* wy Frec e Ste (Qi' 6. 5, $ t ep te f ed (en.*esi, d $9r.c a t teerpt e g4ng. e f tg If age *e'er er f t en ts *wt 4+se t tsted es these f 8he f it st iie enemtes 9+4 t smo seg seu E4f es them M etsmates. sew e W ?Me4 J e, 4i I4 #W ete'it eptmd*I 4'ev eg.o r eg f ge eCeed O$

the I s rant iew eestades filltasang e W, ar43 54triser tret t ett y e Se( (the we4 arPm mEiI t e* 4 d I Dhed #4 e retad4I ef 1 erb a Oe 484%t D.8BE'"T e4I .

A.M 3 ei ekIaE2 5 38Med $$ 1 PA' e'ed' $'M C48r8 ebb 3 8IT t

• d's -

J labte T.2.6 LtC S gert 8 2782

v. C. Las=rr satteer stet ten Secaten F (met. Sect eert f 2 43 Stetten Stacaewt Attachuwnt 6 sheet; 36 61/17/89 til: Se:Su twelustion to Address igngsmet Operabst ery to Sammerit asees of Ccsucre tcpessummt t est 0-ey by tocatiens AggMse 9 4,G. TUPP 6'tdPP DAC ' IbAC marnat ac turer Oper. Isme Assessment 0508 '1.91 SCt&G (G S ete (4=e. Temp. Dure s tors

[Oterla(1) DAC f eep. ' 9 amer e t Ceser tot ten 8eadet am (nry,)t)) A;preerh H) . Cat . Og {3.d) 1 _Wt6) (Seg. f )(T) (ett,j([}

-tnw. Ione Emm 1 A 6 C (Bee. f)(2) f ee. 80. y eW2TES : (COhf.)

20. these consuurents are oral.ated for seferene enay. Seewe the <<mszwwsts are essecteced with wetwee assects estI remem en their nenne4 operat og samation to cope

=6th a 580, egaspeena operabst 6ty steed nr4 tae addressed.

21. l&4iet eest velwes EWC010u9a. 3 ard C are snowmat e r closed sanser e.sessed a-coeure check wetwes wheces mots open te paes forsere ttom et emeremy feedseter frees the turbeste driweft flW glaagt to the Stees perf eter$ graveded suf f eCient head- (Q$ PSI) le toellable. Ihese selves Care tue epeeted by epeteter ett een wet setecter testic%rs art the MaH6 Centret Seerd. Newever, even if opened the wolves esill f ait Closed et a recedt of less of enstrummt est, erd Stelt etteur suff ersent ifW flow, 1herefore, an operabelsty stee for ne pneumet 6c actuator ered setenced need root te ertstA 6shed.

G/C Raport #2782, Rev. 3 Szetion 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.4)

Attachment 7 Sheet 1 SBO IIRAT LOADS AND TDAC EVALUATIONS FOR MAIN CONTROL ROOM

' GENERAL-This attachment documents the methodology used to determine heat loads generated during a SBO, and the basis for establishing TDAC within the Main Control Room at the i VCSNS.

SUMMARY

RESULTS The total heat load generated from energized equipment in the Main Control Room was

. determined to be 14,865 ' watts during the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO duration. Although the aforementioned heat leads do not include contributions from operating personnel, the >

heat loads' determined for the SBO scenario with or without load stripping are very

- conservative when compared to the total heat load used for establishing average area ambient conditions within the Control Room as previously calculated and documented by G/C AEA Department Calculation File Code 2.4.8.1. This existing calculation assumed total loss of ac power, subsequent loss of HVAC, and was based on a total continuous

-. heat load of 29,000 watts.

The results of the calculation indicate that the Control Room would attain an amblent -

temperature of 120oF at !.he end of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following loss of ac power. Therefore, this SBO evaluation conservatively assumes a TDAC of 1200F within the Control Room for the full 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO duration based on previous G/C analysis.

'A tline/ temperature profile representating a 7 hour8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> temperature transient in the Control Room following a loss of all ac power is provided for reference on the following sheet.

.-+

r Gihen (ammem. wen

.. , , , _ ~ . , . . - . - - - . -

- Vf 4 ' es t yvs s 4.>e.., ..w.. .

Section 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.4)

Attachment 7 Shest 2 IDAC IN CONTROL ROOM SBO SCENARIO WIT 1100T LOAD STRIPPING I l TDAC in Control Room 7-hour temperature transients in Control Room following a loss of all

+

150 ac Power.

Run # A6302D 81065 09.17.25.62 i l -1 i 130  ;

Temp

- (* F)

., I 2.0 *F 110 90

.;g 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 17 Time (Hours)

GeaterKommenwesam

- - +. -

G/C Report #2782, Rev. 3 _ i S:ction 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.4)

Attachment 7 3~

Sheet 3 DETERMINATION OF HEAT LOADS IN CONTROL ROOM ASSUMPTIONSO

1. The only heat sources in the Control Room are those associated with battery backed power sources; XBA-1 A-ED, XBA-18-ED, and XBA-1X-ED.

~

2. Hect load contributions from equipment whose power is supplied from Class 1E l Inverter ao output is based on load data identified in G/C Drawing No. SS-200-852, under the steady state LOOP operating condition.

3. Deleted.

4.- Heat load contributions from equipment whose power is supplied from non-Class

1E inverter XIT5906-EV ac output is based on conservatively assuming that 20% of the fullload inverter output capacity is used for Control Room loads. Refer to discussion addressing XIT5906-EV included in Attachment 8 to Section 7 of this report. These heat load contributions apply for the full 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.- l

5. DC power related heat load contributions (Class IE and non-Class IE) for the main

- control board (MCE) and HVAC control board will be based on a review of equipment components that may r.otentially be energized during a SBO. The heat load contributions for the MCB and HVAC control board apply for the full 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

6. Class 1E de power related heat load contributions, other than those for the main control board and HVAC control board, will be based on load data identitled in -

G/C Calculation No. DC-832-010 Attachments 85 and 87.

7. - There are no heat load contributions from 125V de or 120V ac control power cables since these cables are' routed below the Main Control Room' floor and enter electrical equipment from the bottom.

l I

1 l

1 Geibert Comnenweseth

G/C Report #2782, Rev. 3 Section 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.4)

Attachment 7 Sheet 4 DETERMINATIOri OF IIEAT LOADS IN CONTilOI, ROOM Electrical and I&C equipment located in the Main Control Room, as shown on G/C Drawing No. E-005-001, provide the basis for evaluating heat load contributions for SBO. The following is a list of that equipment. Symbols are used to identify de battery backed lor.ds. Equipment without a symbol receives power from non-regulated ac sources and are de-energized during a SBO.

SJmbols Dattery Backed Power (Class 1E and/or Non-1E)

A Non-lE ac supply

> Non-1E de supply a

Class 1E de supply -

• Class IE ac supply QONTROL ROOM NO. 63 05 Non-lE Eautoment IE Pautoment XPN6040 oa,20e XCP6100 XPN6042 *a>17.19e XCP6210 aa XPN6200 e XCP7071 XPN6220 e XCP7072 a XPN6230

• XCP7073 XCP7058

• XCP7074 a XCP7060 e XPN7218 XCP7065 XCP7230A l XCP72308 XCP7231 A l XCP7231B XCP7232 L

a Emerg. Ltg. (fed from DPN8014A and DPN80158) l can c.... an

G/C Repoet #2782, Rev. 3 l Section 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.4)

Attachment 7 Sheet 5 DETERMINATION OF llEAT t.OADS IN CONTROL ROOM COMPOSITE RESULTS The compositn results shown below apply for the full 4-hour SDO duration. l de Supolled Londs (1E & Non-lE) Watts Att. 7 Ref.

Sht. #

11 Main Control Board (XCP6100): 3,514 11 HVAC Control Board (XCP6210): 6,1 6 Rad. Mon. Cab. (XPN6200): 550 6 Emerg. Ltg. (DPN8014 A & 80158): 2.558 SUBTOTAL: 7,259 ac Sucolled Londs (1E Backed) 7 Main Control Board (XCP6100): 2,920 7 HVAC Control Board (XCP6210): 359 t

7 Ni Cabinets (XCP707 *-7074): 2,006  !

l 7 Reactor Core Cooling (XPN7218): 270 SUBTOTAL: 5,555 ae Sucolled Loads (Non-1E Hncked]

8 From Panel APN5906 1,600 8 Computer Oper. Console 451 SUBTOTAL: 2.051 TOTAL EQUIPMENT & LIGHTING: 14,865

-c....c.....

G/C Report #2782, Rev. 3 Section 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.4)

Attachment 7 Sheet 6 DETERMIN ATION OF HEAT LOADS IN CONTROL, ROOM CONTROL ROOM CLASS 1E de SUPPLlHD LOADS OTilER TilAN TIIOSE ASSOCIATED WITil Tile M AIN CONTROL llOARD AND IIVAC CONTROL llOAltD de input at end of G/C Cale. #

Equipment 1 Minute DC-832-010, Tag No. <-

Att. No. /

Amps Volts Watts Page No.

XPN6200 2.52 109.10 275 85 / 12 XPN6200 2.52 109.11 275 87 / 12 SUBTOTAL 550 DPN8014 A 10.48 109.06 1,143 85 / 12 DPN8015B 12.94 109.37 1,415 87 / 12 SUBTOTAL 2,558 TOTAL: , 3,108 NOTE:

There are no non-1E backed de loads in the Main Control Room other than those associated with the Main Control Board and HVAC Control Board.

l l

l l

l e._...._...

~ ~

G/C Report #2782, Rev. 3 Section 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.4)

Attachment 7 Sheet 7 DETERMIN ATION OP IIEAT LOADS IN CONTROL, ROOM CONTROL, ROOM - C1,A531R INVERTER ac SUPPL. LED I,OADS 01ATTERY 11ACKED)

Load af ter G/C Dwg. No.

u Pment 1 Minute SS-200-852

.pfg j, (Watts) Ref. Page No.

XPN06100 MC - -

XPN07110 MC 1170 4 XPN07113 MC 225 4 XPN07122 MC 555 5 XPN07123 MC 970 5 XCP06210 AH - -

k XPN07170 AH 179.5 2 XPN07176 AH 179.5 2 XCP07071 NI 732 (Total) 5 XCP07072 NI 732 (Total) 5 XCP07073 NI 132 (Total) S&6 XCP07074 N1 410 (total) 6 e XPN07218 RC 270 (Total) 6 SUBTOTAL: 5,555 N/A w

o.m.n v....~ .

l G/C Report #2782, Rev. 3.

S:ction 7 (Ref. Ssotion 7.2.4)

Attachment 7 Sheet 8-DETERMINATION OF HEAT I,OADS IN CON'(ROI, ROOM -

Control Room se Supolled Non-lE inverter 1,oads Lpeds Supolled from' APN05905' The only Miln Control Room equipment whose power is supplied from APN05905 is the Westinghouse 2500 computer.

IMS29-057 3 2 W 2500 Computer COMPUTER ROOM Power Cabling Diagram LINE - TAPE -CARD CARD

' CRT'S PROGRAM PRINTER REA05R - RE ADER - PUNCH CONSOLE CAB 00 l -l l l -- l l AC AC ~

- AC DIST - Ol5T - DIST .

-LOG TREND oPER ALARM FRT- REAR Tw - im CONSOLE T,w CAB--

- 01/02/03 (1) Console (P2500) WIO CRT 2 Amp =

- 220 watts

.(2)- -IBM Selectric 735 Typers 3 x 0.7 Amp = 231 watts

.(3) Digital Display (included in Console Load) = --

451 watts-Loads Sucolled from APN05906 Assume 20% of expected ac output load from APN05906 contributes to heat load within the Main Control Room. -Refer to appl _lcable discussion included in Attachment 8 to l -- Section 7 'of this report.

l' (0.20) (10,000 VA) (0.8 pf) = 1,600 watts I

m.u..

G/C Report #2782, Rev. 3 Ssetion 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.4)

Attachment 7 Sheet 8a DETERMINATION Of HEAT I,OADS IN CONTROI, ROOM MCH & HVAC HD EQUIPMENT COMPONENTS INVOi, VINO IIEAT LOSSES Annunciator light boxes (Beta)

Microswitch Switch / Light Modules (DC Valves only)

GE ET 16 Indicating Lights (Switchgear operated equipment)

Relays ESF Status Monitor Lights Count of MCB & HVAC HD Eauloment (E-201- drawings)

Annunc. ESF CMC SDM XCP Windows Status Lts. SW/LTS (ET 16 I,TS) 6101/02 90 10 51 10 6103/04/05 60 110 54 19 6106/07 66 16 51 3 6108_ 60 -

70 6 6109 78 16 26 3 6110 48 2 1 -

6111/12 72 16 40 2 6112 72 20 54 4 6113 66 -

13 18 6114 30 14 26 -

6115 72 8 33 -

6116 96 - -

35 6117 132 - -

21 6118 36 - - -

TOTAL MCD 978 212 419 118 6210 - Left 43 -

35 12 6210 - Mid 43 -

33 3 6210 - Right _4_3 41 7 TOTAL IIVAC 129 -

109 22

<.. w m ... ...

l G/C Report #2782. Rev. 3 Ssetion 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.4)

Attachment 7 Sheet 9-4

- DJIERMINATION OF HEAT LOADS IN CONTROL ROOM ,

- MCB & HVAC BD EQUIPMENT COMPONENTS INVOLVINO llEAT LOSSES Count of Relays (IMS-28 Dwes.) - Sub Panels

. SP NO.'- Relaya SP NO. EslaY2

.1 -28~ 10/10A/108 36

-2 21~ 11 40 12

~

3 20 - 15 4 25 13/13A 27 51 7 14 3 6: 20- 15 21 7 20 16 18

-8 '19 17 6 9 47 18- 10 (E 201-306)-

393 Total MCD Relays Assume 45 Relays - HVAC f 3nunc. Power - Beta Dwr. C-800-652 (IMS-948-672) 100 % -50% -

' All Lights On All Lights Off - Lirhts Onlv- Lights Train A - 433- 118 Train B .392 107 NSSS- 763- 275-BOP :: L1.223 33,9 3 -

2.811 - minus 839 =- 1,972- 986 MCB = 978 LLight Boxes (88%) 0.88 x 986 = 871 watts HVAC = 129 Light Boxes (12%) - - 0.12 x 986 =~ 11]! watts

- 1,107 -. Total in CR = 986 watts

. CR Heat Loss from' Lamp Boxes = Assuming 50% Lit = 986 watts

-RR Heat Loss from XPN 6091/92/93/94/95/96 =- 839 watts

- NOTE: SBO assumes all 12SVdc to be losses in RR on basis of power feed to XPN6091/92/93/94/95/96 versus 839 watts.

l.

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(

' G/C Riport i2782, Rev. 3 Saction 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.4)

Attachment 7 Sheet 10 TDETERMINATION OF HEAT kOADS IN CONTROL ROOM MCB & HVAC BD EQUIPMENT COMPONFNTS INVOLVING IIEAT LOSSES ET 16 blehts - Reliance IMS-940-436 Review of E-201 drawings revealed an average of (3) ET 16's per SBM (MCB) and (2) per

SBM (HVAC). SBM's assumed 'o all be switchgear operated with DC power for control and lights average 2 lit /SBM (MCB) and 1 Lit (SBM)(HVAC). Watts per 1833 lamp (55V x ,05A = 2.75W).- Resistor heat loss is N/A since located in Term Cabinets in cable spreading area.

MCD- - 118 x 2 x 2.75 = 649 watts

-HVAC; 22 x 1 x 2.7 5 = 61 watts 710- watts total CMC Lirhts -

t: Each CMC switch has (4) lights. Assume 3 lit at a time. Assume 75%(*) of CMC's for DC solenoid valves and balance for AC equipment. Each 1829 lamp used la CMC's

-requires 1.14 watts per Evaluation CGGS-35458, dated November 20, 1986.

-MCD 212 x 3 x 0.75 x 1.14 = 547 watts HVAC '109 x 3 x 1.00 x 1.14 = -360 watts 907 watts total

(*) 100% DC CMC's assumed for HVAC BD

- ESF Status Monitor Lirhts -

Assume lamp wattage same as CMC's. Assume 50% illuminated at a time.

, MCB 212 x 0.50 x 1.14 = 121 watts o.%c... ...

_.__._____._____._____.m. _ _ _ _ _ . _ _

G/C Rcport #2782. Rcv. 3 Srction 7 (Rsfa Section 7.2.4)

Attachment 7 Sheet 11 DETERMINATION OF llEAT I.OADS IN CONTROL llOOM MCB & IIVAC DD EQUIPMENT COMPONENTS INVOLVING IIEAT I,OSSES Relays - Reliance IMS-948-436 Review of Ins,tr. Manual reveals Agastat 7000 TD relays 8 watts, HFA (DC) 6 watts, HFA (AC) 12 watts, Cutler Hammer 13 watts

. Use an average of 9 watts / average DC relay Assume 75% of MCB relays are DC, of which 50% are energized Assume 100% of HVAC relays are DC, of which 25% are energized 393 x 0.75 x 0.50 x 9 = 1,326 watts MCB 45 x 1.00 x 0.25 x 9 = 101 watts HVAC 1,427 watts total RECAD MCB HVAC TOTAL CR Annunc. (50% lit) 871 115 986 ET 16 Lts 649 61 710 CMC Lts 547 360 907 ESF Lts 121 -

121 Relays 1,326 101 1.427 l TOTAL 3,514 637 4,151 l

l Getbermemenwesien

G/C Report #2782, Rev. 3 I

S:ction 7 (Rof. 52ction 7.2.4)

Attachment 8 Sheet 1 SBO IIEAT LOADS AND TDAC EVALUATIONS FOR REI AY RGOM OENERAL This attachment documents the methodology used to determine heat loads generated during a SBO, and the basis for establishing TDAC within tne Relay Room at the VCSNi

SUMMARY

RESUI.TS The total heat load generated in the Relay Room was determlued to be 33,410 watts for the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO duration.

A ca;culation, doeur. it3 .i >:/C AEA Departmen' File Code 2.4.8.18, was performed to determine the maxituum a erage ambient temperature in the Relay Room based on the aforementioned heat loads for the S130 scenario. The cale;!* tion assumed an initial j ambient room temperature of 77'F and considered heat transfer characteristics as well.

as the physicallayout of the Relay Rosm to perform the temperature transient analyses. Since vedor data was available to substantiate operability of required SBO equipment located in the Relay Room if expowd to an ambicnt temperature of 120*F, the goal of the evaltation was to demonstrate tha*. the TDAC temperature would not exceed 120*F, Therefore, in order to reduce the ambient room temperature, opening various combinations of doors was considered. Opening doors was determined to be necessary ba"' on the SBO scenario with load stripping, a time / temperature profile was calculated based M a total continuous heat load of 33,410 watts generated during the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO durann This calculation assumed that the single doors to the North and East electrical chases and the double doors to the Turbine Building will be opened within ( e hour following a SBO.The results of this calculation indicate that given this scenario the Relay Room would attain a TDAC of 119.4*F at the end of the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO duration.

A time / temperature profile representing a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> temperature transient in the Relay Room following a SBO is provided for reference on Sheet 2.

0/C Report #2782. Rev. 3 Stetton 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.4)  !

i Attachment 8 Sheet 2  :

F IDAClN REldXJOOM .

EllQECENARlO W1T110UT t,OAQ STRIPP1F_Q i

(Bued on opening doors to the North and East Electrical Chases and the double doors to the Turbine Building within one hour following a station blackout)-

I l

._TDAc in Relay Room 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> temperature trarrient in ,,

Relay Room following a 580. I 150 O/C AEA Dept. File Code 2.4.8.18  !

130-I

-ll9.k'f /l3 Z'I Temp

- (' ?)

110 u -

.a .

I

'b 70

-0 1 2 3 4

\

Time (1 tours) ,

na c. .

, mN., ...m-r-,,.i. ..,J_...,_,,,,,_,,-..,,_<--,.,m,,,-,,,,,,,-,.e.,m.-,,-....-,...,-,,,,.,-,,,-,-..-,,--,-m-rm,',,,,v-ym_,.., .

l O/C Rcport #2782, Rev. 3 S:ction 7 (Ref. S:ction 7.2.4)

Attachmcnt 8 Sheet 3 pf_II'tMINATION,QF HE AT LOADSJN RELAY ROOM ASSUMPTION 81

1. The only heat sources in the Relay Room are those associated with the battery backed power sources; XBA-1 A-ED, XBA-10-ED and XDA-1X ED.

2. Except for inverter input load, all de power (load amps O calculated voltage) entering the Relay Room is given off as heat.

3. The six 7.5kVA class 1E inverters and the one 10kVA non-Class 1E Inverter located in the Relay Room generate heat based on 80% efficiency. Therefore, each Class 1E inverter generates (0.20)(7500VA)(0.8pf) = 1.2kW, for a subtotal of 7.2kW and the non-Class 1E inverter generates (0.20)(10,000VA)(0.8pf) = 1.6kW, for a total of 8.8kW. These heat load contributions apply for the full 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

4. All 120V ac Class 1E Inverter associated power supplied to equipment located within the Relay Room is given off as heat within the Relay Room.

5. Heat load contributions from Class IE Inverter supplied load equipment during the full 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO duration are identified in O/C Drawing No. SS-200-852 under the steady state LOOP operating condition.

6. Deleted.

7. The non-Class 1E inverter XIT5906-EV ac output load is divided between the Control Room (20%), Relay Room (20%), and other plant areas (60%). The VCSNS Feeder List provides the basis for this assumption. These heat load contributions apply for the full 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

8. The heat ' cad contributions from de power supplied load equipment in the Relay Room will be based on load data identifled in G/C Calculation No. DC-B32-010 Attachme: ts 85 and 87 and G/C Calculation No. DC-831-003 for Class 1E and non-Class 1E de power supplies, respectively. The heat load contributions from Class 1E and non-Class IE power sources apply for the full 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, j i

um.c... in I

0/C Rcport #2782, Hov. 3  !

S;ction 7 ( Acf. Scotton 7.2.4) i Attachm:nt 8 Sheet 4 j

9. llent load contributions from 125V de and 120V ao control power feeder cables are negligible when co.npared to the overall heat load contributions and, therefore, where not included. Also, note that the conservatism used in determinbg heat load contributions from equipment easily compensate for heat generated by power cables. l

10. Since specifle information is not readily available for determining the heat load contributions from the Class 1E Inverter distrioution panels: heat load contribution l

from APN05901,2,3,4,7 and 8 will be based on ongineering judgement. This evaluation assumes that APN05901 through 4 will generate 100 watts per panel.

This assumption is based on the fact that distribution panels during normal operating conditions are not significatnly warmer to the touch than normal ambient room temperature conditions, it is anticipated that placing a 100 watt light bulb in a de-energized panel would provide an outside panel surface terr.perature greater than that experienced during normal energized conditions.

Therefore, the nasumption is considered to be realistic. Panels APN05907 and 8 will only generate 50 watts per panel since these panels have approximately half as many circuit breakers as APN05901 through 4.

i c.wa .-.. ..

G/C ll port #2782, ilev. 3 S:ction 7 (Ref. S2ction 7.2.4)

Attachm:nt 8 Sheet 5 DETER MIN ATION OF llE AT i,O A DS RPl.AY ROOM EQUIPMENT Electrient and l&C equipment located in the Relay Room, as shown on G/C Drawing No. E-005 001, provide the basis for evaluating heat load contributions for SI)O. The following is a list of that equipment. Symbols are used to identify de battery backed loads. Equipment without a symbol receives power from non-regulated ar. sources and are de energized during a S130.

Symbols llattery Backed Power (Class 1E and/or Non-lE)

A Non-1E ac supply

& Non-1E de supply

• Class 1E de supply

• Class IE ac supply REl.AY ROOM NO. 36-11 Non-1E Equioment IE Eautoment APN1FX APN1PA APN1FX1 APN1FD a APN5906

• APN5001 APN8012 A

• APN5002 APN80130

• APN5903 APN8029

• APN5904 APN9005A

• APN5907 APN90060

• APN5908

> DPN111X1 DPN111A2 a XIT5906 DPN111112 a XPN6003

• XIT5901 l a XPN6006

• XIT5902 a XPN6031

• XIT5903 a XPN6032

• XIT5904 a XPN6033

• XIT5907 u.,c. .

0/C II: port #2782, lley. 3 S:cti:n 7 Otef. 5:ction 7.2.4)

Attachm:nt 8 Sheet 6 a>26 XPN6034

• XIT5008 l l e XPN6041 a ** XPN5303 j a XPN6050

• XPN6001 l

>8 XPN6060

• XFi16002 )

a XPN6061

• XPN6004 l XPN6070

• XPN6005 XPN6091

• XPN6020 XPN6092

• XPN6025

>2 XPN6093 e XPN7001 XPN6094 e XPN7002 l

>1 XPN6095

• XPN7003 a XPN6096 e XPN7004

• XPN7005 e XPN7010

• XPN7006

• XPN7011

• XPN7007 e XPN7020

• XPN7008

• XPN7021 a XP- 019 e XPN7034 ,

• XF.47031 e XPN7035

• XPN7032 XTFIFA a>15 XPN7033 XTFIFU XTF1PX XTF9005A XTF9006D

o. % .,. .. . .

0/C !!cport #2782, llov. 3 3:ction 7 (Ref. Stetton 7.2.4) '

Attachm:nt 8 Sheet 7 I

p_tffMRMINATION OF IIEAT I,OADLS IN R]i.It AY ROOM C_QMPOSITE REElll4TH T1.e composite results shown below apply for the full 4-hour Silo duration. j de Supplied Lonsis (1E & Non-lii)

Att. 8 Watts Ref.

Sht, #

9 1E battery backed 1451 9 non-1E battery bucked: 2113 SUllTOTAL: 4,967 no Suoolled Logijp (IE Uncked) 10&11 IE Loads 19,177.2 12 Non-lE Loads 6.065.8 SUDTOTAL: 25,243 ao Supol_I t d Londs (Non-lE Dncked) 4 & 14 inverter (XIT5906): 1,600 4 & 13 Inverter losser (assumes 20%):

(0.20)(10,000VA)(0.8pf) h00q SUDTOTAL: 3,200 TOTAL EQUIPMENT: 33,410 i

o.4 c . ..

l

\ _

G/C Rsport #2782. Rev. 3 Section 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.4)  ;

Attachment 8 l Sheet 8 I DETERMINATION OF IIEAT I,OADS IN REl.AY_RQQB REl.AY ROOM de SUPPt. LED I,O ADS de Input at end of C/C Calc f Equipment 1 Minute DC-832 010, Tag No. Att. No. /

Amps Volts Watts Puge No.

XPN5303 0.47 110.39 $2 85 / 13 XPN5303 0.47 110.27 52 87 / 13 XPN6091 2.86 109.55 313 85 / 13 XPN6094 2.59 108.88 282 87 / 13 XPN7034 3.81 109.94 419 B5 /13 XPN7035 3.04 109.53 333 87 / 13 IF Subtotal: 1,451 0/C Cale f DC-831-003 Page No.

XPN0034 3.7 120 444 28 XPN6060 2.0 120 240 28 XPN6093 7.8 120. 936 27 XPN6095 9.8 120 1176 27 XPN7033 6 120 720 28 Non-18 Subtotal: 3.516 TOTA 1, det 4.967

<....u..,..-

_. , . _ . . - ~ . _ . . - - _ . - _ _ . _ , . - - , . . . . _ . . _ . , . _ _ _ _ , _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _. . . _ - .

0/C Report #2782, llov. 3 i S:cti:n 7 (Ref. S;ction 7.2.4)

Attachment 8 Sheet 9 i DETERMINATION OP llHAT I,OADS IN RBI,AY llqQM BELAY ROOM - Cl. ASS 1H INVERTER so SUPPL, LED I,QAQH

[hr*tary hankadi Load Af ter 0/C Dwg. No.

Equipment 1 Minute SS-200-852 Tag No./Sys. (Watts) Ref. Page No.

=

APN05901 EV 100 See Assumption 10 of this Attachment APN05902 EV 100 See Assumption 10  :

of this Attachment l

APN05903 EV 100 See Assumption 10 of this Attachment APN05904 EV 100 See Assumption 10 of this Attachment I

APN05907 EV 50 See Assumption 10 of this Attachment APN05908 EV 50 See Assumption 10 of this Attachment XIT05901 EV 1200 See Assumption 3 of this Attachment XIT05902 EV 1200 See Assumption 3 of this Attachment ,

XIT05903 EV 1200 See Assumption 3 of this Attachment XIT05904 EV 1200 See Assumption 3 of this Attachment XIT05907 EY 1200 See Assumption 3 of this Attachment XIT05908 EV 1200 See Assumption 3 of this Attachment XPN05303 ES 0- 3 XPN06001 BP 1900 2 1E Loads Subtotal: 9,600 N/A om,u . . ..,

yy +-m -.w%gw-=---m-,7--

p v-' * 'w'"

G/C Report #2782. Rev. 3 Section 7 (Ref. Section 7.2.4)

Attachment 8 Sheet 10 Load After G/C Dwg. No.

Equipment 1 Minute SS-200-852 Tag No./Sys. (Watts) Ref. Page No.

XPN06002 BP 1000 2 XPN06004 BP 340 2 XPN06005 DP 340 2 XPN06020 50 830 7 XPN06025 SG 830 8 XPN07001 XI 1222.4 10 XPN07002 XI 1222.4 10 XPN07003 XI 1222.4 10 XPN07004 XI 1100 10 XPN07010 SG 200 (Total) B XPN07011 SG 0 8 XPN07020 SG 200 (Total) 8&9 XPN07021 SG 0 9 XPN07034 SG 85 9 XPN07035 SG 85 to IE Loads Subtotalt 9,577.2 N/A

0/C Report #2782, Rev. 3 l S:ction 7 (Rsf. Ssetton 7.2.4)  ;

Attachment 8 l Sheet 11 Load After O/C Dwg. No.

Equipment 1 Minute SS-200 852 Tag No./Sys. (Watts) Ref. Page No.

XPN06041 - El 150 2 XPN07005 XI 1278.4 10 XPN07006 XI 1628.4 to XPN07007 XI 906 11 XPN07008 XI 1663 11 XPN07031 50 315 9 XPN07032 SG 125 9 Non-1E Loads Subtotal: 6.065.8 N/A t

..wa. .

l

G/C Rcport #2782, Rov. 3 S:ctirn 7 (Rcf. S:ction 7.2.4)

Attachment 8 Sheet 12 Non lR Inverter XIT5906 generated hentlogia Givent 10kVA 118Vac Assumed: 0.8 pf 0.8 efflelency Ref. Info Calc. DC-831-003, page #27 Indicates that the de load on DPN111X, circuit breaker 24 is 6G amps and Infers a battery voltage of 120Vdc. This data indicates that the inverter load on the de system is 8,160VA. Assuming 20%

losses (Input - output + Input), the inverter losses equal (0.20)(8,160) or 1632VA. At a 0.80 pf the losses in watts equal (1632VA)(0.8 pf) or 1305.6 watts.

For conservatism this evaluation assumes 20% losses of full load or (0.20)(10,000VA)(0.80 pf) * 'e'io watts.

VCSNS feeder !!st data 1/5/89 Indicates that 80+% of the ac load on XIT5900 (APN5906)is used to supply the page/ party communications system and other equipment located outside the Relay Room and Control Room. The following is a list of breakers associated with loads outside Control Room and Relay Room as identifled on the VCSNS.

Feeder List:

Equipment Outside of Relav Room or Control Room kg351 Ukr. No. Ukr. Size (AT)

XPN0082 0.60kW 1 15 XPN7248 3 15 XPN5410 27 20 XPN0007 (Doron Panel)- 1.00 A 05 20 XPN0007 (Gas Panet) 1.50 A 06 20 XPN0007 (Llquid Panet) 5,00A 07 20 1RM0008 21 15 Plant Page Party Line System 54.00 A 22 60 mc.-. ..

G/C Rcport #2782, nsv. 3 S:ctirn 7 (Ref. S:ction 7.2.4)

Attachment 8 Sheet 13 RSLLV Status Lights 24 20 APN5913, 5914, 5915, 5916 25 20 5 Breakers - Control Room 12 Ilreakers - Relay Room Dased on the aforementioned Information, it is conservative to assume that 20% of the ac output load (1600 watts) is used in the Control Room and another 20% is used in the Relay Room.

l osec ,a

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