ML20077D293

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Proposed Tech Specs Re Relocation of Tables on Instrument Response Time Limits
ML20077D293
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 11/30/1994
From:
Public Service Enterprise Group
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ML20077D292 List:
References
NUDOCS 9412080159
Download: ML20077D293 (11)
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ATTACHMENT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES WITH PEN AND INK CHANGES LICENSE AMENDMENT APPLICATION RELOCATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TABLES ON INSTRUMENT RESPONSE TIME LIMITS FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-57 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION NLR-N#4177 DOCKET NO. 50-354 LCR 94-09 The following Technical Specifications have been revised to reflect the proposed changes:

Technical Specifications Paaes 3.3.1 3/4 3-1 4.3.1.3 3/4 3-1 Table 3.3.1-2 3/4 3-6 3.3.2 3/4 3-9 4.3.2.3 3/4 3-10 Table 3.3.2-3 3/4 3-26 3/4 3-27 3.3.3 3/4 3-32 4.3.3.3 3/4 3-32 Table 3.3.3-3 3/4 3-38 3/4.3.1 Bases B 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.2 Bases B 3/4 3-2 3/4.3.3 Bases B 3/4 3-2 9412080159 941130 PDR ADOCK 05000354 P PDR

. 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protection system instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE with the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM

-RESPONSE-TIME a; chown in Table 3.3.1-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.1-1.

ACTION: >

a. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system, place the inoperable channel (s) and/or that trip system in the tripped condi-tion
  • within twelve hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for both trip systems, place at least one trip system ** in the tripped condition within one hour and take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each reactor protection system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.1.1-:.

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4.3.1.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automttic operat'on of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.

4.3.1.3 The RE' ACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip functional unit shown h Table 3.3.1-2 shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. teach test shall include at least one hb channel per trip system such that all channels are tested at least once every dN$k N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip system. gg 4.3.1.4 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 or 3 from OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 for the Inter-mediate Range Monitors.

"An inoperable channel need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur. In these cases, the inoperable channel shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1 for that Trip Function shall be taken.

    • If more channels are inoperable in one trip system than in the other, place the trip system with more inoperable channels in the tripped condition, except when this would cause the Trip Function to occur.

HOPE CREEK 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 54

g TA8LE 3.3.1-2 E

n REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TINES M

m FUNCTIONAL UNIT RESPONSE TI (Seconds

1. Intermediate Range Monitors: '
a. Neutron Flux - High
b. Inoperative NA

_{

2. Average Power Range Monitor *: r
a. Neutron Flux - Upscale, Setdown MA 3
b. Flow Blased Simulated Thermal Power - Upscale
c. Fixed Neutron Flux - Upscale < 0.09** D +
d. Inoperative 7 0.09 N' NA m 449
3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High _

M 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 b < 0.55 Z-

  • i 1.05 T

5.

6.

Main Steam Line Isolation Valve - Closure This item intentionally blank gb i 0.06

~

M2.

7. Drywell Pressure - High NA l 3 I

C. Scram Olscharge Volume Water Level - Hi NA Q

a. Float Switch NA p
b. Level Transmitter / Trip Unit. NA p-
9. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure -c
10. Turbine Control Valve Fast C1 ,

-< 0.06 Trip 011 Pressure - Low fii

11. Reactor Mode Switch Shut

< 0.08f Position HA ]

12. Manual Scram NA f
    • freeh tron Not including exempt from response time testing. Response time shall be measured detectors output or free the input of the first electronic component in the channel.

the detecto mulated therwal power time ionstant 6

  • 0.6 seconds.

F fMeasured f start of turbine contml valve fast closure.

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_ _ _ - _ _- _a 4.-w- _ _________m - -__- - ._ _ e __== _- -- r- m. *- ser * -- T-_ r* _ _ _ _ _ ___

4 INSTPUKENTATION 3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUKENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2 The isolation actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent wit 3 thr values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.2-2 cr.d with !. iFJ 4 N 0707 ::

-RBSPONSR--TIE se e .g... 1.. Tebl. 3.3.2-3.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.2-1.

ACTION:

less

a. With an isolation actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.2-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum OPERABLE channels per trip system requirement for one trip system, either
1) place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition within a) I hour for trip functions without an OPERABLE channel,
  • b) 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for trip functions common to RPS instrumentation, and c) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for trip functions not common to RPS instrumentation, or
2) take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1. .

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

c. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum OPERABLE channels per trip system requirement for both trip systems,
1) place the inoperable channel (s) in one trip system in the tripped condition within one hour, and
2) a) place the inoperable channel (s) in the remaining trip system in the tripped condition within
1) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for trip functions without an OPERABLE channel, l l

2) 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for trip functions common to RPS instrumentation, and 3) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for trip functions not common to RPS instrumentation, l l

or  !

l b) take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

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Amendment No. 70 i HOPE CREEK 3/4 3-9

. INSTRUMENTATION i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

^

4.3.2.1 Each isolation actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL. CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.2.1-1.

4.3.2.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.  ;

i 4.3.2.3 The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each isolation trip functionst shc,wn in Teble 3.3.2-3 shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at 1 g.

once per 18 months t Each test shall include at least one channel per trip dc+ecters

-system such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months,are oeq*

where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific isolation trip [ l system.

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HOPE CREEK 3/4 3-10

A THIS PAGE INTENTICNALLY LEf 7 (blAML

. TABLE 3.3.2-3 ISOLATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIME TR. FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME (Seconds)#

1. PRIMARY CONTAIMENT ISOLATION
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level
1) Low Low, Level 2 NA
2) Low Low Low, Level 1 l NA
b. Drywell Pressure - High
c. NA -

Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation - High NA

d. Manual Initiation
2. SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2
b. NA Drywell Pressure - High NA
c. Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation - < 4.0  :

High(b) O -

d. Reactor Building Exhaust b < 4.0 Radiation - High(b) hy
e. Manual Initiation V NA
3. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION e
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - L Low Low, Level 1

$ 1.0*/1 13(,)..

b. Main Steam Line Radiation - gh,High(a)(b) < g(a)**
c. Main Steam Line Pressure - ow
d. Main Steam Line Flow-Hig I 1.08/< 13(a) j e.

7 0.588 13(a),,

Condenser Vacuum - Low RA

~ ,

f. Main Steam Line Tunnel emperature - High
g. NA Manual Initiation NA .

4.

REACTOR WATER CLEANUP S TEM ISOLATION '

a. RWCU A Flow - Hi NA
b. RWCU A Flow - gh, Timer ^

NA

c. RWCU Area T rature - High NA
d. RWCU Area Ve flation A Temperature - High ,

NA

e. SLCS Initi ion i NA  !

f.. Reactor V sel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 NA

g. ManualfI itiation NA 5.

REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ISOLATION

a. RCIC/ Steam Line A Pressure (Flow) - High NA
b. RC Steam Line A Pressure (Flow) - High Timer NA  !
c. R C Steam Supply Pressure - Low l NA
d. CIC Turbine Exhaust Ofaphrage Pressure - High )

NA

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HOPE CREEK 3/4 3-26 Amenthent No. 53 t

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. T1-llS PAGE INUTioNAll-Y LEFT WK TABLE 3.3.2 3 (Continued)

ISOLATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIME TRIP FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME (Seconds # l REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM. ISOLATION

e. RCIC Pump Room Temperature - High NA
f. RCIC Pump Room Ventilation Ducts a Temperature

- High NA

g. RCIC Pipe Routing Area Temperature - High. NA DELETC-D ,
h. RCIC' Torus Compartment Temperature - High N
1. Drywell Pressure - High A
j. Manual Initiation NA
6. HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM ISOLATION
a. HPCI Steam Line A Pressure (Flow) - High NA
b. HPCI Steam Line a Pressure (Flow) - High, T'mer NA
c. HPCI Steam Supply Pressure - Low NA
d. HPCI Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure High NA
e. HPCI Pump Room Temperature - High NA
f. HPCI Pump Room Ventilation Ducts a Temperature - High NA
g. HPCI Pipe Routing Area Temperature - High NA
h. HPCI Torus Compartment Temperat e - High NA  !
i. Drywell Pressure - High NA l
j. Manual Initiation NA
7. RHR SYSTEM SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE / SOLATION
a. Reactor Vessel Water Leve}/- Low, Level 3 NA
b. Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut 'h Permissive)

Pressure - High NA

c. Manual Initiation NA (a) Isolation system instru entation response time specified includes diesel generator starting an sequence loading delays.

(b) Radiation detectors re exempt from response time testing. Response time shall be measured rom detector output or the input of the first electronic compo ent in the channel.

  • Isolation system instrumentation response time for MSIVs only. No diesel generator de fys assumed for MSIVs.
    • Isolation ystem instrumentation response time for associated valves except M Vs.
  1. Isolat on system instrumentation response time specified for the Trip Func on actuating each valve group shall be added to isolation time sho n in Table 3.6.3-1 and 3.6.5.2-1 for valves in each valve group to ,

o tain ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME for each valve. ,

HOPE CREEF 3/4 3-27

l JNSTRUMENTATION ,

3 /4. 3.'3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUM

\

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3 The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) actuation instrumertation  !

channels.shown in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE i l ._

of with Tabletheir 3 3.3-2 trip setpoin i

- . set co.nsistent reem-~.~,

with the

,mme ,mm . ,values,shown u cur,co errnnmerin the Trip Setpo nt co umn ,_<,_ , , ,.

,,mr __ _ < _ . _

i j

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.3-1. i i

ACTION:

a.

With an ECCS actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less l i

conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value; Table 3.3.3-2, declare the channel inoperable untl with the Trip Setpoint value.

1 b.

With one or more ECCS actuation instrumentation channels inoperable, l take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.3-1. l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l 4.3.3.1 Each ECCS actuation instrumentation channel OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, shall CHANNEL F be de f CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS a I

frequencies shown in Table 4.3.3.1-1.

4.3.3.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic ope  ;

all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months. '-

The ECCS RESPONSE TIME of each ECCS trip function '- Each l 4.3.3.3 '

shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.

ll channels l number test shall include at least one channel per trip system) of redundant channels in a specific ECCS trip system. f 1

5 3/4 J-32 NOPE CREEK

, THIS 'PAGE irdT_r3TierdALLy. LEFT ELANX.

TABLE 3.3.3-3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RESPONSE TTMES ECCS RESPONSE TIME (Seconds)

1. CORE SPRAY SYSTEM $ 27
2. LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION MODE OF RHR SYSTEM S 40 ,
3. AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM NA 4

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM $ 35

5. LOSS OF POWER N

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HOPE CREEK 3/4 3-38 Amendment No. 24

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3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION I i

BASES 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The reactor protection system automatically initiates a reactor scram to:

a. Preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding,
b. Preserve the integrity of the reactor coolant system.
c. Minimize the energy which must be adsorbed following a loss-of-coolanta accident, and
d. Prevent inadvertent criticality.

This specification provides the limiting conditions for operation necessary to preserve the ability of the system to perform its intended function even during periods when instrument channels may be out of service because of main-tenance. When necessary, one channel may be made inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required surveillance.

The reactor protection system is made up of two independent trip systems.

There are usually four channels to monitor each parameter with two channels in each trip system. The outputs of the channels in a trip system are combined l

in a Icgic so that either channel will trip that trip system. The tripping of both trip systems will produce a reactor scram. The system meets the intent of IEEE-279 for nuclear power plant protection systems. Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30851P, " Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to T. A. Pickens from A. Thadani dated July 15,1987). The bases for the trip settings of the RPS are discussed in the bases for Specifi-cation 2.2.1.

f The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides  ;

assurance that the protective functions associated with each channel are com- i pleted within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

Response ttaa may be demonst, rated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurement, provided such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either (1) inplace, onsite or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times. The. respcrse Mrnc, limas arc, ccntained in uFSAR. Chctpter ~7 crd upcbAed in ctccr-darte_

wi+h loCFR 00.~T1 (e).

HOPE CREEK B 3/4 3-1 Qnendment No. 26 JUN 5 1989 8

. INSTRUMENTATION --

We reS e 4ime timA.3 are contained (n LtFSAl2 CFnp4er I, Or'd y ofed in etcrordance, wRh locre c.>o.- n Ce) .

BASES

==================================================================

3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION This specification ensures the effectiveness of the instrumentation used to mitigate the consequences of accidents by prescribing the OPERABILITY trip setpoints and response times for isolation of the reactor systems.pSpecified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30851P-A, Supplement 2, " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," and NEDC-31677P-A, " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation."

The safety evaluation reports documenting NRC approval of NEDC-30851P-A, Supplement 2 and NEDC-31677P-A are contained in letters to D. N. Grace from C.E.

Rossi dated January 6, 1989 and to S. D. Floyd from C. E. Rossi dated June 18, 1990. When necessary, one channel may be inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required surveillance. Some of the trip settings may have tolerances explicitly stated where both the high and low values are critical and may have a substantial effect on safety. The setpoints of other instrumentation, where only the high or low end of the setting have a direct bearing on safety, are established at a level away from the norr-1 operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the systems involved.

Except for the MSIVs, the safety analysis does not address individual sensor response times or the response times of the logic systemu to which the sensors are connected. For D.C. operated valves, a 3 second delay is assumed before the valve starts to move. For A.C. operated valves, it is assumed that the A.C. power supply is lost and is restored by startup of the emergency diesel generators. In this event, a time of 13 seconds is assumed before the valve starts to move. In addition to the pipe break, the failure of the D.C.

operated valve is assumed; thus the signal delay (sensor response) is concurrent with the 10 second diesel startup. The safety analysis considers an allowable inventory loss in each case which in turn determines the valve speed in conjunction with the 13 second delay. It follows that checking the valve speeds and the 13 second time for emergency power establishment will establish the response time for the isolation functions.

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip setpoint but within its specified Allowable Velue is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that are beyond the ability of the operator to control. This specification provides the OPERABILITY requirements, trip setpoints and response times that will ensure effectiveness of the systems to provide the design protection.4S pecified The re%gry;c. timc. limas cire centnaned inurSAR. OFcpler 7, a -d upialed in occutbite. wi+h to cpR. So 1 i (el B 3/4 3-2 Amendment No. 70 l HOPE CREEK 4

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