ML20134F383

Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.3.1,3/4.3.2 & 3/4.3.3 Re Reactor Protection Sys Instrumentation,Isolation Actuation Instrumentation & Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation

ML20134F383
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	10/25/1996
From:	Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Shared Package
ML20134F376	List: ML20134F373 ML20134F383
References
LR-N96348, NUDOCS 9611050194
Download: ML20134F383 (4)

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LR-N96348 ATTACHMENT 1 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGES I

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3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The reactor protection system automatically initiates a reactor scram to:

a. Preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding.

b. Preserve the integrity of the reactor coolant system.

c. Minimize the energy which must be adsorbed following a loss-of-coolant accident, and

d. Prevent inadvertent criticality.

This specification provides the limiting conditions for operation necessary to preserve the ability of the system to perform its intended function even during periods when instrument channels may be out of service because of maintenance. When necessary, one channel may be made inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required surveillance.

The reactor protection system is made up of two independent trip systems.

There are usually four channels co monitor each parameter with two channels in each trip system. The outputs of the channels in a trip system are combined in a logic so that either channel will trip that trip system. The tripping of both trip systems will produce a reactor scram. The system meets the intent of IEEE-279 for nuclear power plant protection systems. Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30851P, " Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to T. A. Pickens from A. Thadani dated July 15, 1987). The bases for the trip settings of the RPS are discussed in the bases for specifi-cation 2.2.1.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective functions associated with each channel are com-pleted within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

Response time may be demonstr6ted by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurement, provided such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either (1) inplace, onsite or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times. Selected sensor response time testing requirements were eliminated based upon NEDO-32291, " System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R.A. Pinelli from Bruce A. Boger, dated December 28, 1994). The Reactor Protection System Response Times are located in UFSAR Table 7.2-3.

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3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION This specification ensures the effectiveness of the instrumentation used to mitigate the consequences of accidents by prescribing the OPERABILITY trip l setpoints and response times for isolation of the reactor systems. Specified l surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been l

determined in accordance with NEDC-30851P-A, Supplement 2, " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," and NEDC-31677P-A, " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation." The safety evaluation reports documenting NRC approval of NEDC-30851P-A, Supplement 2 and NEDC-31677P-A are contained in letters to D.N.

Grace from C.E. Rossi dated January 6, 1989 and to S.D. Floyd from C.E. Rossi l dated June 18, 1990. When necessary, one channel may be inoperable for bricf l intervals to conduct required surveillance. Some of the trip settings may have tolerances explicitly stated where both the high and low values are critical and may have a substantial effect on safety. The setpoints of other instrumentation, where only the high or low end of the setting have a direct bearing on safety, are established at a level away from the normal operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the systems involved.

Except for the MSIVs, the safety analysis does not address individual sensor response times or the response times of the logic systems to which the sensors are connected. Selected sensor response tiae testing requirements j were eliminated based upon NEDO-32291. " System Analyses for Elimination of Selec*.ed Response Time Testing Requd rements," as approved by the NRC and docunented in the SER (letter to R.A. Pinelli from Bruce A. Boger, dated Decenber 28, 1994). The Isolation System Instrumentation Response Times are located in UFSAR Table 7.3-16.

l Operation with a trip set less consarvative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided j to initiate actions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that are beyond l

the ability of the operator to control. This specification provides the l OPERABILITY requirements, trip setpoints rad response times that will ensure f effectiveness of the systems to provide the design protection. ECCS actuation ,

instrumentation is eliminated from response time testing requirements based on l NEDO-32291, " System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing j Requirements ," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R.A. Pinelli from Bruce A. Boger, dated December 28, 1994). The Emergency Core Cooling System Rssponse Times are located in UFSAR Table 7.3-17.

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times l have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30936P-A, "BWR Owners' Group Technical Specification Improvement Methodology (With Demonstration for BWR ECCS Actuation Instrumentation)," Parts 1 and 2. The safety evaluation l reports documenting NRC approval of NEDC-30936P-A are contained in letters to D. N. Grace from A. C. Thadani (Part 1) and C. E. Rossi (Part 2) dated December 9, 1988. Although the instruments are listed by system, in some cases the same instrument may be used to send the actuation signal to mo*

than one system at the same time.

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but l within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the l

difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

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