ML20211F620

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Proposed Tech Specs Section 3/4.5.1,adding Surveillance Requirement to Perform Monthly Valve Position Verification for Each of Four Residual Heat Removal cross-tie-valves
ML20211F620
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 09/24/1997
From:
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Shared Package
ML20211F613 List:
References
NUDOCS 9710010141
Download: ML20211F620 (4)


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1 document Control Dock LR-N970618 l

Attochment 3 LCR H97-17 i

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE HPF-57 DOCKET No. 50-354

REVISIONS TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 1

) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES WITH PROPOSED CHANGES 1

. The following Technical Specifications for Facility Operating

License No. NPF-57 are affected by this change request:  ;

Technical Specification Page k- 3/4.5.1 3/4 5-4

! Bases for 3/4.5.1 and 3/4.5.2 B 3/4 5-1 4

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i 9710010141 970924 i PDR ADOCK 05000354 P PDR i

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$UWE!LLWf ~ ~ '!ENWTS-i 4.5.1 The emergency core cooling systems shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE by:

i m 6 a. At least once per 31 days:

!, Y jl#p { 3b]h 1. For the core spray system, the LPCI systes, and the MPCI systee i ( { a) Verifying by venting at the high point vents that the

! y a o systes p' ping from the pump discharge valve to the systes j '_;; Q. ' isolation va' ve is filled with water. .

i 0u b) Verifying that each valve, nonval, power operated or i "d- sutoestic, in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or

] [\ OW e n g otherwise secured in position, is in its correcta position.

ForIhe HpCI system, verifying that the NPCI pump flow controller l% y '+ 7 1 2.

is in the correct position, o4

'* b Verifying that, when tasted purstant to Specification 4.0.5:

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' y g, t e . d.veis, a fio of at i.ast uso p . gainst . s.stThentworessure core spray syst q g72 corresponding to a reactor vesse pressure of 1 105 psi above yag suppression pool pressure. -

Each LPCI pump in each subsystes develops a flow of at least

! j 2.

g 10,000 pa against a test line pressure corresponding to a i

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+d 0 .p reacter vessel to primary containment differential pressure of

> 20 psid.

l  % -d 3. The NPCI pump develops a flow of at least 5600 gpa against a i '+MI 0 test line pressure corresponding to a reactor vessel pressure of 1000 psi when steam is being supplied to the turbine at 1000, i

c s oG +20 80 ps g.**

l 9 c. At least once per la months:

1. For the core spray system, the LPCI system and the HPCI system, perforsing a systas functional test which Includes simulated auto-antic actuation of the system throughout its emergency operating seguence and verifying that each automatic valve in the flow j

path actuates to its correct position. Actualinjectionof l

coolant into the reactor vassel may be excluded free this test.

I "bcept that an automatic valve capable of automatic return to its ECCS j position when an ECC5 signal is present may be in position for another mode i of operation.

' **The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the j surveillance is perNrsed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after reactor steam pressure is

. adequate to perform the test.

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HOPE CREEK 3/4 5 4 1

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! V4.5 DEM CORf COOLING SYSTEM i '

l BASES .

3 1 3/4.5.1 and 3/4.5.2 ECC$ OPERATING and $NUTDOWN 1 The core spray system (C$$), to:pether with the LPCI mode of the RHR s j is pNvided to assure that the Core is adeqVately Cooled fellowing a loss *ystem, 0f*

coolant accident and provides edequate core cooling capac.ity for all break i sizes up to and including the double ended reacter recirculatten line bmak, l and for smaller breaks following depressurization by the AD$. -}

j The C$$ is a primary source of energency core cooling after the reactor i

vessel is depressurized and a source for flooding of the core in rase of accidental drainir.3 .

l The surveillance frements provide adequate assurance that the C$$ will j be OPERA 8LE when requi . Although all active componer.ts are testable and full flow can be desenstrated by recirculatten through a test leap during reacter operation, a complete functional test requires reacter shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and te start cooling at the earliest essent.

The low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mede of the RHR system is

! provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-l coolant accident. Four subsystems, each with one pump, pavide adequate core

! flooding for all break sizes e to and including the double-ended reactor i

recirculation line break, and for small breaks following depressurization by l . the AD$.

- The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the LPCI

pystie will be OPERA 6LE when required. Although all active components am

! testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test l

loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test requims reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is mair.tained full to prevent water hasser damage to piping and te start cooling at the earliest sement.

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The high pressure coelagt injection (HPCI) system is provided to assure that the macter core is adequately cooled te liett fuel clad temperatura in

A the event of a sea 11 break in the reactor coolant system and loss of coolant which does not result in rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel. The HPCI systas petuits the reacter te be shut down while maintaining sufficient reactor vessel water level inventory untti the vessel is depmssurized. The NPCI system continues to operate until reacter vessel pressure is below the pressure at sdtich C15 eperation or LPCI mo4e of the RHR system operation maintains pero cooling. -

The capacity of the system is selected to provide the required core cooling.

1he HPCI pump is designed to deliver greater than or equal to $600 sps at reactor p mssures between 1120 and 200 pois. Initially, water free the condensate l

l storage tank is used instead of injecting water from the suppression pool into i the reactor, but no credit is taken in the safety analyses for the condensate j storage tank wtter.

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INSERT A
Verification every 31 days that each RHR System cross tie valve f on the discharge side of the RHR pumps is closed and power to its j operator, if any, is disconnected ensures that each LPCI subsystem remains independent and a failure in the flow path in one subsystem will not affect the flow path of the other LPCI subsystem. Acceptable methods of removing power to the operator j include de-energizing breaker control power or racking out or

, r<smoving the breaker. For the valves in high radiation areas, verification may consist of verifying that no work activity was e performed in the area of the valve since the last verification j was performed. If one of the RHR System cross tie valves is open <

i' or power has not been removed from the valve operator, both associated LPCI subsystems must be considered inoperable. The 31

! day frequency is acceptable, considering that thes. valves are ,

i under strict administrative controls that will ensure that the I

valves continue to remain closed with either control or motive i power removed.

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