ML20202B617

Revised TS Bases 3/4.6.1.1,revised to Clarify When Verification of Primary Containment Integrity May Be Performed by Administrative Means

ML20202B617
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	01/19/1999
From:	Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Shared Package
ML20202B614	List: ML20202B609 ML20202B617
References
NUDOCS 9901290141
Download: ML20202B617 (2)

Text

1

=

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 3/4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses.

This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

j i

In high radiation areas and in areas posted as neutron exposure areas and j

controlled in a manner similar to high radiation areas, use of administrative means to verify position of valves and blind flanges is acceptable for Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.b since access to these areas is typically restricted in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.12 and/or plant procedures.

In addition, field verification for these components is performed before restarting from each refueling outage. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these components, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

3/4.6.1.2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE The limitations on primary containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the accident analyses at the design basis LOCA maximum peak containment accident pressure of 48.1 psig, P.

As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate (Type A test) is further limited to less than or equal to 0.75 L during performance of the periodic tests to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

Operating experience with the main steam line isolation valves has indicated that degradation has occisionally occurred in the leak tightness of the valves; therefore the special requirement for testing these valves.

The surveillan e testing for measuring leakage rate? is consistent with the Primary conta3 ant Leakage Rate Testing Program.

3/4.6.1.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS The limitations on closure and leak rate for the primary containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Only one closed door in each air lock is required to maintain the integrity of the containment.

3/4.6.1.4 MSIV SEALING SYSTEM Calculated doses resulting from the maximum leakage allowance for the main steamline isolation valves in the postulated LOCA situations would be a small fraction of the 3 0 CFR 100 guidelines, provided the main steam line system from the isolation valves up to and including the turbine condenser HOPE CREEK B 3/4 6-1 January 19, 1999 9901290141 990119

~

PDR ADOCK 05000354 P

Pm

~. _. - - -

~..

l

)

j

{

=

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l

BASCS 3 / 4. 6 '.1. 4 MSIV SEALING SYSTEM (Continued) i remains intact. Operating experience has indicated that degradation'has occasionally occurred in the leak tightness of the MSIV's such that the specified leakage requirements have not always been maintained continuously.

The sealing system will reduce the untreated leakage from the MSIVs when i

j isolation of the primary system and containment is required.

l

^3/4 6.1.5 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY l~

.This' limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment j

will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of j

-the unit.

Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 48.1 psig in the event of a LOCA. A

. visual inspection in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate-j Testing Program is sufficient.

3/4.6.1.6 DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on drywell and suppression chamber internal pressure ensure that the containment peak pressure of 48.1 psig does not exceed the design pressure of 62 psig during LOCA conditions or that the external pressure differential does not exceed the design maximum external pressure

. differential of 3 psid. The limit of -0.5 to +1.5 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 48.1 psig which is less than the design pressure and is consistent with the safety analysis.

3 /4. 6.1. 7 DRYWELL AVERAGE AIR TEMPERATURE l

The limitation on drywell average air temperature ensures that the i

containment peak air temperature does not exceed the design temperature of j

340*F during LOCA' conditions and is consistent with the safety analysis. The 135"F average temperature is conducive to normal and long term operation.

l

- 3 / 4. 6.1. 8 DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER PURGE SYSTEM i

'The 500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> /365 days limit for the operation of the purge valves and j

(

the 6" nitrogen supply valve during plant Operational Conditions 1, 2 and 3 is j

(J intended to reduce the probability of a LOCA occurrenca during the above

. operational conditions when the applicable combination of the above valves are open.

Blow-out panels are installed in the CPCS ductwork to provide additional assurance that the FRVs will be capable of performing its safety function subsequent to a LOCA.

i HOPE. CREEK ^

B 3/4 6-2 January 19, 1999

.