ML20054M756

Forwards Response to Joint Intervenors Motion to Reopen Record & Signature Page to Rc Anderson Affidavit W/Wh White Signature

ML20054M756
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	07/07/1982
From:	Crane P PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
Shared Package
ML20042C752	List: ML20042C751 ML20054M756
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NUDOCS 8207140373
Download: ML20054M756 (3)

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Secretary ,, ne, & Sw.

g U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission +

Washington, DC 20555 v i Re: Docket No. 50-275 (Low Power Proceeding)

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is the original copy of our Response to the Joint Intervenors' Motion to Reopen and the signature page to the R. C. Anderson et al. affidavit bearing the signature of William H. White.

Very truly yours, t

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, 77 BE ALE STRECT, S AN FR ANCISCO, C ALIFORNI A 94106 TELEPHONE (415) 781 4211

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. July 7, 1982 p_. , , ,. ///// ,

so .. e .i' 3Ei ;c Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Re: Docket No. 50-275 (Low Power Proceeding)

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is the original copy of our Response to the Joint Intervenors' Motion to Reopen and the signature page to the R. C. Anderson et al. affidavit bearing the signature of William H. White.

Very truly yours, Philip A. Crane, Jr.

PAC:nl l Enclosure l cc: Service List (WHWhite signature page only) t s

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i 1 9. While the overall verification effort has 2 identified a number of Open Items, Deviations, and Errors, 3 in our judgment, the findings thus far in the review of the 4 s eismic design for the Diablo Canyon plant would not have 5 caused any system, structure or component to fail to perform 6 its intended safety function.

. 7 -

8 Dated: June 30, 1982 9 .

10 11 /s/ Richard C. Anderson /s/ Michael R. Tresler Richard C. Anderson Michael R. Tresler 12 hA

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13 /s/ John B. Hoch -

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Ichn B. Hoch William H. White 14 15 /s/ Gary H. Moore Gary H. Moore 16 17 18 Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of July, 1982 19 20

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' Nancy J. Zemaste V 21 Notary Public in and for the City and County of San Francisco, 22 State of California.

My commission expires April 14, 1986.

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. esnac f -3 JUL 121982> 1

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA E' --

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ' '{f{!",'j' A

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL / OARD 6 Iio 00C ETE.-

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In the Matter of Docket No. 50-2 g ,

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC ) g//

COMPANY ) (Low Power Proceeding)- [-

. . - ) Us.~-(, . . . e.f t (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power ) C "' e Plant, Unit N.o.

1

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)

RESPONSE OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY TO JOINT INTERVENORS' MOTION TO REOPEN THE RECORD i

i MALCOLM H. FURBUSH PHILIP A. CRANE, JR.

RICHARD F. LOCKE Pacific Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120 I (415) 781-4211 ARTHUR C. GEHR Snell & Wilmer 3100 Valley Center Phoenix, Arizona 85073 (602) 257-7288 BRUCE NORTON Norton, Burke, Berry & French, P.C.

3216 N. Third Street Suite 300 Phoenix, Ari?.ona 85012 (602) 264-0033 Attorneys for Pacific Gas and Electric Company a

DATED: July 2, 1982

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2

Page 3

4 I INTRODUCTION AND STATUS OF PROCEEDING . . . . . 2 II FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5

! 6 III THE COMMISSION'S ACTION OF NOVEMBER 19, 1981 ESTABLISHING THE PROCEDURE FOR RESTORATION OF THE SUSPENDED LICENSE 7

LEAVES THIS BOARD WITHOUT JURISDICTION 8 TO ACCORD JOINT INTERVENORS THE RELIEF THEY ' REQ'UEST ~~." . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 9

IV EVEN IF THE APPEAL BOARD HAD JURISDICTION TO 10 ACT HEREIN IT SHOULD DENY THE MOTION BECAUSE THE JOINT INTERVENORS HAVE NOT MET THE 11 HEAVY BURDEN REQUIRED TO BE MET TO REOPEN A CLOSED RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 12 A. The Motion Does Not Address A Signifi-13 cant Safety Issue In Light Of The Commission Ordered Review Procedure . . . 25 14 27 B. The Motion Is Not Timely . . . . . . . . .

15 C. A Different Result Would Not Have Been 16 Reached If The New Information Had Been Considered By The Board . . . . . . 31 17 V JOINT INTERVENORS DO NOT MEET THE TESTS 18 WHICH MUST BE SATISFIED TO ADMIT LATE-FILED CONTENTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 19 A. No Good Cause For Failure To File On Time Has Been Shown . . . . . . . . . . 33 20 l

21 B. Other Means Exist Whereby The Joint Intervenors' Interest Will Be Protected . 33 22 C. Joint Intervenors' Participation Will Not Assist In Develoning A 23 34 Sound Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24 25 a 26

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4 1 Page 2 D. The Joint Intervenors' Participation Will Broaden The Issues And Delay The 3 Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4

VI Certificate of Service 5

VII Affidavit of R. C. Anderson, J. B. Hoch, i 6 G. H. Moore, M. R. Tresler, W. H. White

~

7 Attachments -

8 Technical Qualifications 9 Glossary 10 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant -

Unit 1, Independent Design 11 Verification Program, Program Management Plan, Phase I 12 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant - -

13 Unit 1, Independent Design Verification Program, 14 Program Management Plan, Phase II 15 VIII Affidavit of Richard S. Bain i

16 Attachments 17 Technical Qualifications 18 Attachments 1-4 19 IX Affidavit of Warren A. Raymond, Charles W. Dick, Michael J. Jacobson I

Attachments 21 Technical Qualifications 22 Response to Reedy Report 23 24 25 g 26

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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

4 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD 5

6

^^

y .

)

8 In the Mat _ter_of__ .

) Docket No. 50-275

)

9 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC )

COMPANY ) (Low Power Proceeding) 10 )

(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power )

11 Plant, Unit No. 1 )

)

12 13 14 RESPONSE OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY TO JOINT INTERVENORS' MOTION -

15 TO REOPEN THE RECORD 16 17 On June 8, 1982, Joint Intervenors moved this 18 Board pursuant to 10 CFR 2.718(j) to (1) reopen the record 19 of the low power licensing proceeding for the " submission of 20 relevant evidence"; (2) vacate the Atomic Safety and 21 Licensing Board's ("ASLB") findings approving the Diablo 22 Canyon quality assurance program as set forth in the ASLB 23 July 17, 1981 decision; and (3) revrike the Applicant's now 24 suspended low power license. Pacific Gas and Electric 25 Company ("PGandE") respectfully requests 1. hat this Board s

26 deny Joint Intervenors' Motion in all respects for the

1 rule and direct Commission review of the ASLB July 17, 1981 2 decision. The motions were opposed by PGandE and the Staff.

3 On September 9, 1981 the ASLAB issued its decision approving 4 PGandE's site security plan. On September 10 and 11, 1981, 5 respectively, the Joint Intervenors and Governor Brown filed 6 applications for a stay of the ASLB July 17, 1981 decision 7 with the ASLAB. The motions were opposed by PGandE and the -

8 Staff. On_ September,14, 1981 the ASLAB issued an order 9 providing that if it had not yet issued its decision on the 10 motions for stay, PGandE was to notify the ASLAB at least 11 three business days before the date criticality was 12 scheduled to be achieved. On September 21, 1981 the 13 Commission issued an order (CLI-81-22 ) (i) providing that 14 subject to certain conditions later fulfilled the ASLB 15 decision of July 17, 1981 was to become effective 16 immediately, (ii) denying the motions for waiver of the 17 immediate effectiveness rule and directed certification, and 18 (iii) directing PGandE to notify the Commission of its 19 intention to reach criticality at least 14 days before doing 20 so. On September 22, 1981 the Director of the Office of

, 21 Nuclear Reactor Regulation issued Facility Operating License l

22 No. DPR-76.

23 On September 28, 1981 PGandE notified the Regional 24 Administrator of the NRC's Region V Office of Inspection and 25 Enforcement of a potential problem in the analysis of piping s

26 systems contained in the annulus area of the containment

1 reasons set forth in the following Memorandum of Points and 2 Authorities and the Exhibits and Attachments thereto which 3 are incorporated herein by reference.

4 5 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 6

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7 I -

8 _ INTRODUCTION AND STATUS OF PROCEEDING 9 On July 17, 1981 the ASLB issued a Partial Initial 10 Decision authorizing the Director of Nuclear Reactor 11 Regulation to issue a license authorizing PGandE to load 12 fuel and conduct tests up to 5% of rated power at Unit 1 of 13 its Diablo Canyon facility. The decision was subject to a 14 favorable decision by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal 15 Board ("ASLAB") on the remaining security plan issues. On 16 July 22, 1981 the Commission issued an order providing that 17 the time for Commission review under 10 CFR 2.764 would not i

18 begin to run until issuance by the ASLAB of its decision on 19 the physical security plan. Exceptions to the Partial 20 Initial Decision were filed on August 3, 1981 by Governor

21 Brown and the Joint Intervenors. If On August 13 and 14, 22 198i, respectively, Governor Brown and the Joint Intervenors 23 filed motions seeking waiver of theiimmediate effectiveness 24 ///

25

• If Briefs in support of these exceptions were filed Sep-26 tember 2, 1981.

1 building. In response the Staff issued Board Notification 2 No. 81-27 and scheduled the first of a series of meetings 3 with PGandE to discuss the problem. On November 19, 1981 4 the Commission issued its order suspending license No.

5 DPR-76 (CLI-81-30). The Commission stated in its order that 6 contrary to PGandE's license application errors in design 7 and violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B had occurred. -

4 8 On that basis,,the Commission suspended the low power license 9 and specifically prescribed what must be done to lift that 10 suspension in Attachment 1 to the order.

11 PGandE meanwhile had begun an independent design 12 verification program, retaining Robert L. Cloud Associates, 13 Inc. ("RLCA") and subsequently submitted a program for 14 Phase I (pre-fuel load) to the NRC Staff for its approval 15 Pursuant to Commission order. On March 1, 1982 the Staff 16 issued SECY-82-89 in which the Staff concluded, in pertinent 17 Part, as follows:

18 "With respect to the technical adequacy and scope of the proposed seismic design 19 verification, we believe that the Phase I program is acceptable and, if l 20 Properly implemented, would meet the l criteria specified in CLI-81-30. Sec-l 21 ondly, we believe that the proposed seismic design verification program 22 considers appropriate elements of the seismic design and quality assurance 23 Programs for Diablo Canyon in sufficient depth to allow determination of whether 24 there is reasonable assurance that the overall seismic design is in conformance 25 with the application to permit fuel

• loading and operation of the plant up to 26 five Percent of full power."

l l

• I

1 The Staff also expressed opinions on the various contractors 2 involved and recommended that a contractor such as Teledyne 3 Engineering Services, Inc. ( "TES ",) be given responsibility 4 for the performance of the Phase I program. At a meeting on 5 March 4, 1982 the Commission approved SECY-82-89 with 6 certain revisions. On March 12, 1982 PGandE formally 7 nominated TES as the contractor for the Independent Design .

8 Verificati_on, Program ("IDVP") and on March 19, 1982, 9 pursuant to Commission direction, the Staff approved this 10 celection. RLCA and R.F. Reedy Inc. ("RFR"), a firm 11 retained to investigate the design quality assurance 12 Programs of PGandE and its principal design consultants, act 13 as subcontractors and report to TES under the IDVP.

14 Phase I of the IDVP was formally approved by the 15 NRC Staff in a letter dated April 27, 1982. Phase II of the 16 IDVP was submitted to the Staff for its approval on June 18, 17 1982. Another design verification program is being 18 conducted internally by the PGandE/Bechtel Project 19 Organization (" Project"). This program was also approved by 20 the Staff's letter dated April 27, 1982. Pursuant to the 21 Commission's Order dated November 19, 1981, the Project, 22 TES, RLCA, and RFR have filed bimonthly reports covering the 23 work completed during the previous npecified period. These 24 reports have been distributed by the Staff to the NRC Com-25 missioners, the parties and others by means of various Board a 26 notifications. In addition, the IDVP has submitted its

-S-l

i' 1 First and Second Interim Technical Reports on June 10 and 2 23, 1982, respectively.

3 II 4 FACTS 5 Joint Intervenors' Motion relies exclusively upon 6 the.May 24, 1982 affidavit of Richard Hubbard. The Hubbard 7 affidavit is a carefully crafted document which frequently -

8 mischaracterizes_or misstates facts and conclusions, and is 9 generally misleading. Of equal importance, the affidavit is 10 curiously silent as to counterbalancing facts and 11 ' conclusions which are well known to Mr. Hubbard.

12 Unfortunately Joint Intervenors utilize the Hubbard 13 affidavit to further exaggerate the already painstakingly 14 distorted facts and conclusions in their Motion. For 15 example, Mr. Hubbard states that there are a " number of 16 serious design errors" (affidavit at 7) and an additional 17 "one-hundred eighty-five (185) design and construction 18 discrepancies" (affidavit at 14). In their Motion, Joint 19 Intervenors tell this Board that there are "200 serious 20 design errors" (Motion at 3) and "200 serious flaws in the I

21 design of the facility" (Motion at 14). In a magical 22 transformation Joint Intervenors convert "a number" to "200" 23 and " discrepancies" become " serious design errors" or 24 " serious flaws in design. " In fact, as shown below, the 25 vast majority of the discrepancies are not even errors.

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26 ///

1 The IDVP is managed and supported by TES with 2 RLCA, RER and the Stone and Webster Engineering Company 3 Performing independent design verification work in their 4 respective areas of responsibility: RLCA -- seismic, 5 structural and mechanical design; RFR -- quality assurance; 6 Stone and Webster -- systems design. The IDVP performs 7 indeperident analyses and reviews, on a sampling basis, to .

8 verify the adequacy of the design. Some of the areas in 9 which technical verifications are performed include 10 structures, piping and supports, equipment qualification, 11 electrical raceways and ventilation duct supports, and 12 system design. Moreover, the verification program is, by 13 definition, designed to be self-expanding if deemed 14 warranted by the IDVP. The program establishes criteria for 15 Performance of such additional verifications resulting from 16 either the QA reviews or the sample calculations. (Anderson et al., affidavit at 2-3.) Detailed descriptions of the 17 18 IDVP are contained in "Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant -

19 Unit 1, Independent Design Verification Program, Program 20 Management Plan, Phase I," and "Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power 21 Plant - Unit 1, Independent Design Verification Program, Proiram J Management Plan, Phase II." (These plans are part 22 23 of the Anderson et al. affidavit which is attached hereto 24 and incorporated herein by this reference.)

2r The Project internal technical program includes s 26 verification work performed by a combined team of PGandE and

, . \

1 Bechtel personnel. As a part of the technical. program, 2 URS/Blume has conducted the Blume Internal Review (BIR).

3 The Project program work includes reverification of 4 additional samples as well as responding to the findings of 5 the IDVP. The program also includes specialized analysis 6 and qualification work being performed by Westinghouse 7 Electric Corp. and TERA Corp. The technical verifications -

8 are being yer. formed in the areas of seismic and non-seismic 9 safety-related structures, systems and components.

10 (Anderson, et al. affidavit at 3-4.)

11 Both the IDVP and Project programs have been 12 established in strict accordance with the November 19, 1981 13 Commission order, and the letter from Mr. Harold Denton of 14 the same date. All verification efforts are being performed 15 in accordance with the latest approved Quality Assurance 16 programs for the involved companies. (Anderson et al.

17 affidavit at 4.)

18 Over the past 9 months an extensive amount of 19 verification and review work has been performed under the 20 two verification programs. The organizations involved in 21 the programs have expended approximately 2,500 man-months, 22 or in excess of 400,000 man-hours, in reviewing structures, 23 systems and components. In this effort literally thousands 24 of calculations and analyses have been reviewed. (Anderson 25 et al. affidavit at 4.)

26 ///

(

1 The IDVP to date has yielded 172 findings. Under 2 the classification system used in the IDVP, all findings are 3 first characterized as an "Open Item." 2/ An Open Item is 4 either a QA or design control deficiency, a violation of the 5 verification criteria, or an apparent inconsistency 6 identified in the performance of the work. Each Open Item 7 is ultimately recategorized as an " Error," a " Deviation," or -

8 a " Closed __ Item. " _ Errors are broken down into four 9 categories, with Class A Errors being the most significant 10 and Class D Errors being the least important. When the IDVP 11 effort related to an Open Item is complete, the IDVP issues 12 a completion report. Of the 172 IDVP findings to date, 13 completion reports have been issued for eighty-nine (89) 14 items, which have been categorized as follows: only one (1) 15 Class A Error (may require physical modifications or changes 16 in operating procedures); no Class B Errors (resolvable by 17 more realistic calculations or retesting); six (6) Class C 18 Errors (no design criteria or operating limits exceeded);

19 seventeen (17) Deviations (departure from standard procedure 20 which are not mistakes in analysis, design, or 21 construction); and fifty-two (52) Closed Items (neither l

22 Errors nor Deviations, with no further IDVP action 23 24 2f A Glossary of terms is attached to the Anderson et al.

affidavit which is most helpful in putting into per-25 spective what is, in the context of these proceedings, "

the precise meaning of such terms as deviation, error, 26 Open item, etc.

.9 -

l l

1 required). Of the remaining eighty-three IDVP findings for 2 which no completion reports have been issued, the IDVP has 3 identified these findings as follows: five (5) Class A 4 Errors; one (1) Class B Error; fifteen (15) Class C Errors; 5 no Class D Errors; seven (7) Deviations; fifty-four (54) 6 Open Items; and one (1) Closed Item. (Anderson et al.

I- 7 affidavit at 4-5.) -

l 8 To ,further put into perspective Joint Intervenors 9 assertion of "200 serious design errors" it should be noted 10 that while "the overall verification effort has identified a 11 number of Open Items, Deviations, and Errors, the findings 12 thus far in the review of the seismic design for the Diablo 13 Canyon plant would not have caused any system, structure or 14 component to fail to perform its intended safety function."

15 (Anderson et al. affidavit at 7.)

16 In his affidavit, Mr. Hubbard goes to great 17 lengths in an effort to establish that the construction 18 QA/QC program at Diablo Canyon must have been faulty. How-19 ever, no, new facts concerning that program are presented M 20 the affidavit. His effort includes citations to construc-21 tion audit findings, none of which are new information in 22 any sense of the word, and all of which were rectified.

23 (Bain affidavit at 6.) The Hubbard affidavit states that 24 "there is insufficient data to support a conclusion that 25 QA/QC for site activities, particularly construction, met 26 Appendix B requirements," and that " site QA/QC activities S

I were covered by the same QA manual as design QA. . . .

2 (Affidavit at 92.) Mr. Hubbard asserts that because of QA 3 deficiencies in the area of design that "one (Hubbard) is 4 led to believe" that similar difficulties exist in the area 5 of construction. PGandE QA reviews and NRC inspections 6 confirm that there is no such evidence. (Diablo Canyon 7 Reverification Study, Transcript February 17, 1982, p. 31.) ,

8 Attachments 1 and 2 to the Bain affidavit show 9 clearly that in 1968 and 1969 there were quality control and 10 quality assurance requirements placed on manufacturers and 11 contractors. Beginning in 1969, prior to the effective date 12 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B (Appendix B), PGandE required 13 that each contractor performing work at Diablo Canyon have a 14 quality assurance program qualified to PGandE and NRC 15 requirements. (Bain affidavit at 5.) All contractors and 16 subcontractors or suppliers providing work at Diablo Canyon 17 adhered to these procedures in the performance of work at 18 the site or any other location affecting materials or 19 Products ultimately destined for Diablo Canyon. (Bain 20 affidavit at 5.)

21 The Bain affidavit establishes unequivocably that 22 site QA/QC activities were, except where deficiencies were 23 noted and corrected, in compliance yith Appendix B at all 24 times material hereto. Quality control at the Diablo Canyon 25 site was a multi-tiered operation. (Raymond et al.

s 26 affidavit at 14.) As a part of all bid specifications, each 1

l

1 contractor was required to prepare and staff a site quality 2 assurance / quality control organization adequate to inspect 3 the quality of work performed. PGandE field engineers and 4 inspectors reinspected this work for compliance with the 5 applicable design documents and specifications. The General 6 Construction quality control on-site group was then directly 7 involved in the verification of the adequacy and effective- .

8 ness of the_qontractors' quality assurance program and the 9 Company's following inspections. Finally, Corporate on-site 10 quality assurance engineers verified the adequacy and 11 effectiveness of the entire process. (Bain affidavit at 12 5-6.) .

13 PGandE started formal audits of construction 14 activities in December, 1969 when the QA Engineering 15 Department was originated. Construction audits were

, 16 conducted on a regular basis in accordance with NRC i

17 regulations as described in the PGandE QA Manual. The 18 corporate QA/ construction QC audits from 1969 through 1981 19 exceeded 1500. This total does not include the hundreds of 20 audits conducted by the NRC and contractors in accordance 21 with their QA programs. (Raymond et al. affidavit at 6-7.)

[

22 There are various reasons why program deficiencies l

1 23 in the area of design QA should not be indicative of the 24 quality of construction or the effectiveness of a construc-i l 25 tion QA/QC program. QA programs for design and construction s 26 activities function in significantly different ways. In

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• f , j g i at 1 construction, one deals with a product (structures, systems, 2 and components) which permits' hands-on type : verification, 3 such as inspection and test. In design', one deals with a , ,

4, " paper" product and verification must be accomplibbed by I

, i 5 measures such as checking,' design reviews, approvals [ and/or 6 limited testing. It is no' accident that design quality has ,,

7 historically relied more heavily on,professirinal judgment, .-

-  !. ' ii .

8 and less on_ QA/QC controls, ,than has c,onst.luctio:n . One important reason for this' ~has been of 9 th[) difficulty 10 developing methods for design verificat' ion as effec'tive as 11 those available for construction verification. (Raymond et, '

l' '. >

12 al. affidavit at 11.) .,

4 13 For example, in applying the relevant criteria af;j i

14 Appendix B there are differdnces between design and

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15 construction in organizational sttuctuies' and I h '

16 responsibilities, verification approaches. for. acturing ,

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design adequacy and product conformance, ' knowledge and I; i

1 17 7' 18 skills required 'for QA/QC personnel, appropriate' remedial .

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19 and corrective actions, and, most important, , the process of ( - i, i i

20 verifying adequacy and detecting deficiencips. 3 Contrary to ,

21 Hubbard's assertion (Hubbard aff. at 92), PGandE' recognized , '}

22 these differences in the organization of the original QA ,

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i 23 Manual. It was writte'n to specifdcally address the S

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24 requirements of the various departments associated with t -s, 25 nuclear activities. One Section of the QA Manual prescribed

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26 engineering requirements sTRE); another section rela}ted;to', ,

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1 1 construction work (PRC); and another section to procurement

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2 of materials (PRP). Thus, the PGandE QA manual incorporated E

3 a set of separate requirements for engineering, procurement 4 'and construction. (Raymond et al. affidavit at 11-12.)

5 , The time span covered by formal construction 6 verification programs for DCPP is longer and the programs 7 are more detailed than in design. Construction cohtrols -

were easier _to develop and implement than design controls.

l 8 9 For example, it was not until 1971 that ANSI N45.2 was 10 issued, and 1974 for ANSI N45.2.11 (the basis for Regulatory 11 Guide 1.64). These constituted the first industry wide 12 standards for design control QA requirements; and Regulatory 13 Guide 1.64 was the first on design control issued by the 14 NRC. As late as June, 1976, Regulatory Guide 1.64, 15' Revision 2, was issued, further evolving the design control 36 i guidance issued by the NRC to interpret Appendix B, Criteria

1

'if; lII. Previously, other requirements existed in codes and 18 other standards, or drafts thereof, but these were

19 relatively specialized and were not directed toward i

20 management programs for quality. (Raymond et al. affidavit 21' .

at 12-13.)

22 l .; In contrast, for construction activities at Diablo

, 6/

23 ~CanJon, " quality assurance" requirements were an integral i

24 ,

.Part of every contract specification for construction, even l

25

t. hose issued prior to the time Appendix B was issued for ,

26 comment in 1969. (Bain affidavit at 4.) These requirements l

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1 covered the areas of testing, material procurement, 2 inspection, reporting, personnel qualification, etc., either 3 directly or by reference to detailed codes and standards.

4 The requirements were further supplemented by the ASME 'N' 5 Stamp program used by contractors working on the project.

6 When formal QA programs became a requirement for future 7 nuclear work, the changes for construction contractors at ,

8 DCPP were significantly less than the changes and additions 9 required for design activities. This was not unique to 10 PGandE, but was characteristic of the situation throughout 11 the nuclear industry. (Raymond et al. affidavit at 13.)

12 The Commission Order establishing Phase'I of the i

13 IDVP also included a requirement for an independent review 14 of the QA Programs for PGandE and its design consultants.

15 R. F. Reedy, Inc. ("RFR") performed this review for the IDVP 16 and submitted a Report dated March 8, 1982 (" Reedy Report").

The RFR effort had as an objective the identification of 17 design areas where the IDVP could most effectively 18 19 concentrate its efforts. (Teledyne Interim Technical Report 20 dated June 23, 1982.) To accomplish this objective Reedy 21 used present day interpretations and understandings of 22 Appendix B in' place of the differing interpretations and 23 understandings applicable at the tirge work was done. This 24 approach established a low threshold for the reporting of 25 non-conformances or potential areas for investigation.

a 26 (Raymond et al. affidavit at 9.)

l _- ._

1 The Hubbard Affidavit relies heavily on the 2 findings of the Reedy Report both in his general 3 condemnation of the PGandE Quality Assurance program and his 4 inference of " breakdowns" in the construction QA/QC program.

5 The Reedy effort was directed at quality assurance in the 6 area of seismic design and did not involve site o r_

,. 7 construction quality assurance. (Raymond et al. affidavit .

8 at 9. ) The Reedy Report was thoroughly discussed at the NRC 9 meeting of April 1, 1982. The Reedy Report does not address 10 the issue of whether PGandE's quality assurance program met 11 the criteria as interpreted at the time seismic design work 12 was being done. Reedy applied 1982 interpretations of the 13 criteria which were significantly more stringent than 14 earlier interpretations. This is admittedly an unfair 15 standard as Mr. Reedy himself stated that:

16 "I have to agree with you that the strict interpretation that we use[d] was 17 completely unfair. The order to me did not seem to be fair to begin with, and I 18 made a comment at the time that the evaluation should be done to the criter-19 ia that was in use at the time this pro-gram was accepted by the NRC and audited 20 by the NRC, but we did not go back and say we will accept what the NRC audited 21 and what they accepted. We will use the criteria in the order. Now I don't 22 think that is fair, but that is what we did." (Tr. pp. 32 & 33.)

23 24 Following that meeting PGandE responded to the Reedy Report 25 on April 15, 1982. That response is attached to the s

26 affidavit of Raymond et al. and is incorporated herein by

1 this reference. That verified response evidences, contrary 2 to the conclusions drawn by Mr. Hubbard, that PGandE did 3 institute QA/QC program control measures.

4 TES, as program manager of the IDVP, filed its 5 " Interim Technical Report: Evaluation of the Quality 6 Assurance Program and Implementation Reviews" dated June 23,

. 7 1982. ("TES Interim QA Rpt.") In that report TES states: ,

8 "The issue to be resolved by the IDVP is to determine whether or not DCNPP-1 is 9 in compliance with the PG&E License Application as it pertains to seismic 10 safety-related contracts prior to June 1978. The initial generic sample and 11 the additional verifications and addi-tional samples identified through the 12 RLCA efforts form a part of the back-ground to be considered in establishing 13 the additional verification to be per-formed in unique response to the QA 14 Findings." (at 9.)

15 Baced upon its review, TES concluded as follows:

16 "a. The RFR Phase I QA Audit and Review Reports satisfactorily evaluate the 17 QA Programs and their implementa-tion to the criteria adopted by 18 RFR.

19 b. The criteria adopted by RFR are conservatively responsive to the 20 Order. The use of more appropriate criteria would have been extremely 21 difficult, if not impossible.

22 c. The RFR conclusions must be consid-ered only with respect to the RFR 23 criteria and scope. .The RFR con-clusions are not a complete measure 24 of the design control practices actually applied to the seismic 25 design efforts. Of equal impor-tance, the RFR conclusions are not s 26 intended to apply outside of the l

L

I scope of the RFR effort, seismic design by service relative contrac-2 tors and PG&E prior to June 1, 1978.

3

d. The real interpretative process is 4 the effect of the QA related work on the recommendations for addi-5 tional verification or additional sampling of the design process."

6 (at 24. )

^

7 -

TES went on to state:

8

~~ '"With' respect to additional 9 samples, it is important to note that the design efforts of PG&E and of the 10 contractors reviewed by RFR were included in the initial sample. During 11 the April 1, 1982 meeting (TR., p. 75, lines 1-12) Dr. Cloud who originally 12 developed and implemented the Phase I plan, made the following statement: -

13

'But with respect to decisions and 14 implication of this report, I think -- I think it's very impor-15 tant to recognize that our part of the verification program was 16 formulated and designed in such a way that it would not in any way 17 rely on the QA program or practice nor would it rely on any other of 18 the paper trail; and when we are finished with our work, the plant 19 will have been verified for its seismic adequacy whether or not 20 there was any QA program or not; i and I think it's --

I think the --

l 21 the -- that Roger's report and it's one of its main values is that it 22 rationalizes or explains why some of the findings are turning up in 23 the independent calculations that in fact are turning up.'

24 The point of Dr. Cloud's remark is that 25 verification of the design process has been conducted with the basic assumption

• 26 that there may have been significant a

1 deficiencies in the formal QA program or in their implementation. TES concurs 2 with this opinion, and in reviewing the RFR reports has sought to determine if 3 there are significant gaps in the initial and expanded (per the first ITR) 4 design process verification program which must be filled in order to 5 complete this work." (at 31.)

6 It cannot be overemphasized how craftily Mr.

- 7 Hubbard has contrived his affidavit. He has carefully taken ,

8 selected truths, hal f-truths , generalizations, unsupported conclusions and mischaracterizations to fashion a damning 9

10 indictment. 3f There is no dispute that certain design 11 discrepancies and errors occurred. (Anderson et al. affi-davit at 4-5.) There can be little dispute that certain 12 13 deficiencies in the implementation of design QA/QC pro-14 cedures may have been the cause of some of those discrepancies and errors. Hyperbole aside, the real 15 16 question facing this Board in light of the facts, Commission action, and the design verification programs extant, is 17 whether the record should be reopened. It is respectfully 18 19 submitted that in view of the Commission's action 20 establishing procedures to be followed, this Board has neither sufficient jurisdiction nor reason to do so. What 21 22 we have here is simply a substantial open item which has 23 been mandated by the Commission to,be resolved to the satisfaction of the Staff and Commission under a rigorous

! 24 25 procedure.

s 26 ///

1 III 2 THE COMMISSION'S ACTION OF NOVEMBER 19, 1981 ESTABLISHING THE PROCEDURE FOR 3 RESTORATION OF THE SUSPENDED LICENSE ,

LEAVES THIS BOARD WITHOUT JURISDICTION 4 TO ACCORD JOINT INTERVENORS THE RELIEF THEY REQUEST.

5 6 This Commission has assumed exclusive jurisdiction 7 over the low power licenae at this time. It has suspended .

8 the license _until certain reviews, reports and modifications 9 are completed to its satisfaction. Joint Intervenors urge 10 this Board to reopen the record in this proceeding for 11 " hearing and submission of relevant evidence." (Motion at 2

)? and 16.) They also request that the ASLB's findings issued 13 July 17, 1981 approving the Diablo Canyon quality assurance 14 Programs be vacated and the low power testing license I 15 authorized by the Board's July 17, 1981 Order be revoked.

16 (Motion at 2 and 15.) The Joint Intervenors Motion is a 17 challenge to the Commission's order of November 19, 1981.

18 In effect, Joint Intervenors are appealing that Commission 19 order to this Board.

20 Notwithstanding the many emotional and misleading 21 statements made by Joint Intervenors, PGandE urges this l

22 Board to assess its authority to grant the relief requested 23 by the Motion in light of the action previously taken by the 24 Commission on November 19, 1981 (CLI-81-30). In that Order 25 the Commission stated that the Staff had identified weak-s 26 nesses in PGandE's quality assurance program. Accordingly, S

1 the Commission ordered the suspension of the low power 2 license (DPR-76) pending satisfactory completion of actions 3 specified in Attachment 1 to the Order. Those detailed 4 actions included, inter alia:

5 (1) the conduct of an independent design verification i

6 Program on all safety related activities performed 7 Prior to June 1, 1978 under all seismic service- .

8 related contracts which were involved in the 9 design process for safety-related structures, 10 systems and components, 11 (2) a technical report fully assessing the basic cause 12 of all design errors identified by the independent 13 Program, the significance of design errors found, 14 and their impact on facility design, 15 (3) PGandE's conclusions on the effectiveness of the 16 design verification program in assuring the 17 adequacy of facility design, and 18 (4) a schedule for completing any modifications to the 19 facility required as a result of the program along 20 with a justification for not completing any 21 required modifications prior to fuel load.

22 The Order further provided that the results of the seismic 23 design program and any resultant plant modifications be 24 completed prior to restoring authorization to proceed with 25 fuel loading. The Commission also stated that it might s

26 impose additional reauirements prior to fuel loading

1 necessary to protect health and safety based upon its review 2 o_f the program including any information provided by PGandE.

3 Finally, the Commission noted that it might require 4 completion of certain of the items noted in the Staff's 5 letter of November 19, 1981 to PGandE which outlined actions 6 that had to be taken prior to proceeding above 5% power 7 (Phase II) before it would authorize fuel load. .

8 _As ,the foregoing amply illustrates, the Commission 9 has assumed complete jurisdiction over the low power license 10 and formulated and imposed directly upon PGandE a comprehen-11 sive verification program to be conducted by independent 12 reviewers approved by the Commission to resolve the quality 13 assurance and design issues that have arisen at Diablo 14 Canyon. This suspension action was taken by the Commission 15 after Governor Brown and Joint Intervenors repeatedly urged 16 both the Staff and Commission to revoke the low-power 17 license. The Commission's Order now stands as the law of 18 the case. The Commission has decreed the process by which 19 the low power license can be restored. In the interim, the 20 Commission as well as the Board and the parties to this 21 Proceeding have been kept apprised of all developments in 22 the case affecting these issues through Board notifications 23 and other communications.

24 In this posture, we submit that the Commission 25 established the exclusive procedure for suspension and 26 restoration of the license thereby relieving the Appeal 4

1 Board of the burden and authority to entertain a different 2 procedure. The Appeal Board simply lacks authority to 3 overrule or otherwise modify the procedures established by 4 the Commission's Order of suspension. The Appeal Board and 5 the Licensing Board derive their jurisdiction and authority 6 from the Commission. (See 10 CFR 2.721 and 2.785.) In the

. 7 case of the Appeal Board, 10 CFR 2.785(b) of the ,

8 Commission's regulations prescribes the Board's jurisdiction 9 as consisting of ". . . [the] exercise [of] authority . . .

10 which would otherwise have been exercised . . . by the 11 Commission. . . .

" The proposition that the Appeal Board 12 has limited authority and jurisdiction as determined by the 13 Commission is well recognized. (42 U.S.C. 22.41; 10 CFR 14 2.721 and 2.785; Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo l 15 Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-1, 3 NRC 16 73 (1976).) In this particular instance, the Commission has j 17 exercised its jurisdiction and authority by mandating a

! 18 thorough and independent verification program and by so 19 doing has precluded this Board from granting the requested 20 relief. Indeed, the Commission has exercised discretion to i

21 withhold jurisdiction from an appeal board in another recent 22 case which involved the TMI-1 incident. (See Metropolitan 23 Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 24 No. 1), CLI-79-8, 10 NRC 141, 147 (1979).)

25 Finally, the Commission's Order ensures that all s

26 necessary actions to protect the public health and safety l l . - - -.-- .

1 will be taken, obviating the necessity for a duplicative 2 exercise of jurisdiction by this Board. Compare (South 3 Carolina Electric & Gas Company, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear 4 Station, Unit 1, Docket 50-395, infra.)

5 IV 6 EVEN IF THE APPEAL BOARD HAD JURISDIC-TION TO ACT HEREIN IT SHOULD DENY THE

... 7 MOTION BECAUSE THE JOINT INTERVENORS -

HAVE NOT MET THE HEAVY BURDEN REQUIRED 8 T,0 BE MET TO REOPEN A CLOSED RECORD.

9 The heavy burden required to be met to sustain a 10 reopening of a closed hearing record has been explored many 11 times in the Diablo Canyon proceeding. (See, for example, 12 Pacific Gas and Electric Company, (Diablo Canyon Nuclear 13 Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-5, 13 NRC 361 (1981) 14 citing Kansas Gas & Electric Co. et al. (Wolf Creek 15 Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-462, 7 NRC 320 (1978);

16 Pacific Gas and Electric C_ompany (Diablo Canyon Nuclear 17 Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) ALAB-644, 13 NRC 903 (1981).

i l 18 Briefly, the requirements to reopen a closed hearing record 19 are as follows:

. 20 "The motion must be both timely pre-sented and addressed to a significant l

21 safety or environmental issue. . . .

Beyond that, it must be established that 22 'a 'different result would have been reached initially had [the material sub-23 mitted in support of the motion] been considered.'" (Wolf Creek, supra, 24 P. 338.)

25 /// s

26. ///

S

1 A. The Motion Does Not Address A Signifi-cant Safety Issue In Light Of The Com-2 mission's Ordered Review Procedure.

3 PGandE has embarked upon an extensive independent 4 design verification program using independent reviewers 5 approved by the NRC. This program is designed to meet the 6 requirements specified in the Commission's order and Staff

. 7 letter, both dated November 19, 1981. The program provides ,

8 for analysis of various structures, systems and components 9 of the plant, to be expanded as necessary, a plan for 10 identification of any defects discovered and a program for 11 correction of any such defects. Thus, there is no need for 12 the Board to involve itself in this matter because the pub-13 lic health and safety are assured through operation of the 14 Commission mandated IDVP, subject to the approval of the Com-15 mission and NRC Staff. Thus, Board involvement could add nothing.

16 In thir respect the situation is similar to the 17 Summer case (South Carolina Electric & Gas Company 18 (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), Docket 50-395, 19 Memorandum and Order (April 28, 1982). There, an intervenor 20 Proposed a new contention after the close of the record, 21 based upon a Staff report critical of operating and emergen-22 cy procedures at the facility. 4f The Board noted that the 23 e 24 4./ Preliminarily, the Licensing Board ruled that the <

intervenor must satisfy the " stringent standards" for 25 reopening a case in addition to the five-factor test set out in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1) for late contentions. s 26 (Slip OP. at 2-3.)

1 contention was based on new information brought to inter-2 venor's attention only after the close of the hearing, and 3 that the proposed contention was filed shortly thereafter.

4 Even so, the Board held that intervenor had failed to show 5 the significance of the allegations within the context of 6 that particular proceeding at that late stage:

. _ . . 7 To be sure, each of the alleged defi- -

ciencies with regard to Applicants' 8 operating procedures contained in the TNRC - Staff] report would have some 9 significance to the safety of the plant if it actually exists and were to go 10 uncorrected. But Intervenor has not alleged, nor do we see any support for 11 such an allegation, that there is any danger that the alleged deficiencies 12 will go uncorrected. The affidavits submitted by Staff and Applicants es- .

13 tablish that the shortcomings to Appli-cants' operating procedures are being 14 routinely handled by Staff, and Appli-cants have committed themselves to

! 15 upgrade and correct the operating pro-l cedures in accordance with Staff's sug-16 gestions. M the face of this estab-lished procedure for identifying the i 17 deficiencies and correcting them, their I mere existence loses its significance M 18 the context of this operating license proceeding. Were the Board to take this

19 issue and determine that the alleged de-

! ficiencies actually exist, we could do 20 no more than order that they be corrected and that the corrections be 21 monitored b_y Staff - a procedure that Is already e effect without Board inter-l 22 vention.

23 If we were to reopen the record every time that Staff discovered a 24 safety defect and reported it to us, we could never bring this proceeding to 25 completion. See ICC v. Jersey City, 332 U.S. 503, 514 (1944). We see no

• 26 correlative benefit for further delay 4

1 here, since Board involvement is unne-cessary to assure the public health and 2 safety." (Slip. op. at 3-4; emphasis addt.d.)

3 4 Here the IDVP guarantees. that any identified deficiencies 5 will be corrected if necessary, and the Appeal Board, even 6 if it ordered the proceedings reopened, could do no more 7 than order what has alreaay been mandated by the Commission. .

8 Thus, the _public health and safety are protected through 9 implementation of the IDVP and no significant safety issues 10 remain to be addressed. Therefore the standard prescribed 11 by the Commission regarding the need for a significant new 12 safety issue to reopen closed records has not been met.

13 (CLI-81-5, uupra.)

14 B. The Motion Is Not Timely.

15 Joint Intervenors' motion is addressed to the 16 adequacy of PGandE's quality assurance program. In his 17 affidavit (p. 98) Mr. Hubbard complains that he was not 18 allowed to testify during the 1977 ASLB full power hearings 19 and that his previous efforts to introduce a QA contention 20 had been denied. Mr. Hubbard's statements, while 21 technically correct, are misleading if not placed in the 22 proper context'.

23 The_ original notice of henring in this proceeding 24 was published in the Federal Register on October 19, 1973.

25 Joint Intervenors advanced a total of 47 prcpoced conten-s 26 tions (with some duplication), some of which were accepted

1 for litigation purposes, and by March 11, 1974 the time to 2 advance contentions expired, in accordance with the NRC's 3 (then AEC) regulations. (10 CFR 2.714(b).) 5/ None of 4 these proposed contentions concerned QA. In pleadings dated 5 March 3, 1977 Joint Intervenors sought to add, among others, 6 a generalized and broad contention on QA. The motions were

. 7 supported by affidavits of Mr. Hubbard dated March 10 and .

8 April 27, 1977._

In an order dated May 25, 1977 the ASLB 9 denied the contention 10 "

. . . on the basis of timeliness, not required by law or regulation, lack of 11 specificity and unconscionable delay in the proceeding." (Order at 2.)

12 13 The order provided further as follows:

14 "CLPI [ attorneys for Joint Intervenors]

requested at the prehearing conference 15 that, if the 'new' contentions were denied, those aspects of the contentions 16 which relate to seismic design could be raised within the context of the previ-17 ously accepted seismic contentions. The Board believes that applicable, specific 18 aspects of any required backfitting or of Quale y Assurance procedures or 19 implementation would be appropriate for hearing insofar as seiE ic design of the 20 plant is_ concerned. The Board will carefully consider any applicable, 21 specific aspect of the seismic design 22 23 Sf 10 CFR 2.714(b) provides that a petitioner "must" file his contentions and the bases for each contention " set 24 forth with reasonable specificity" not later than

" fifteen (15) days prior to the holding of the 25 special prehearing conference pursuant to S 2.751a l . . .

" The first day of that prehearing conference in

• 26 this proceeding was March 26, 1974.

4

1 that m_ al b_e raised by CLPI . (Emphasis added.)

2 "The Board, on its own motion, hereby 3 directs PGandE and the Staff to present evidence on the Quality Assurance pro-4 gram at Diablo. Canyon by having avail-able witnesses who are knowledgeable on 5 this matter at the scheduled hearing."

6 As requested by the ASLB in its order PGandE and 7 the Staff presented testimony on the Diablo Canyon Quality .

8 Assurance Program at the so-called "non-seismic safety 9 hearings" October 18 and 19, 1977. Joint Intervenors did 10 not chose to cross-examine the witnesses despite being 11 SPecifically offered a chance to do so (TR. 3609, 3618) and 12 their proposed findings of fact on the subject were, at 13 best, perfunctory. More important, despite the Board's 14 invitation to do so, Joint Intervenors made no subsequent 15 attempt whatsoever to litigate " Quality Assurance procedures 16 or implementation . . . insofar as seismic design of the 17 Pl ant is concerned."

18 Several years later Joint Intervenors attempted to 19 once again raise a generalized QA contention in the low 20 Power proceedings, but such a contention was denied by the 21 ASLB in its order dated February 13, 1981 on the following 22 gro nds:

23 " Joint Intervenors did nca take advan-tage of an opportunity to be heard on 24 quality assurance matters in hearings raised by the Board on October 18-19, 25 1977. They have not demonstrated in their filings or oral argument a specif-

• 26 ic relationship between this contention 1 and the additional requirements for fuel loading and low power testing arising 2 from the accident at TMI as specified by the Commission in NUREG-0737. (Tr.

3 178). For these reasons and in accor-dance with the Commission Revised 4 Statement of Policy of December 18, 1980 (at page 8) contention 3 is denied."

5 (Order at 18.)

6 Joint Intervenors later voluntarily abandoned their

-- 7 identical QA contention in the post-TMI full power .

8 proceedings. 6[ _

9 In addition much 'of the material referenced in and 10 attached to the Hubbard affidavit has been available in the 11 various public document rooms literally for years -- some of 12 it dates as far back as the 1960s. While the items being 13 found under the IDVP and PGandE Technical Program are "new,"

14 many of the deficiencies in implementation of design QA 15 were, as pointed out in the Hubbard affidavit and 16 attachments, noted historically and available to Joint 17 Intervenors. In any event Joint Intervenors should have 18 advanced their QA contention before March 11, 1974 when it 19 was timely to do so.

20 ///

21 ///

22 23 6/ On March 24, 1981 Joint Intervenors filed a motion to reopen the full power proceedings. Contention 1 in 24 that motion involved QA. On June 30, 1981 at the prehearing conference for the full power proceedings 25 Joint Intervenors filed a Statement of Clarified Con-

• tentions which withdrew Contention 1 of the March 24, 26 1981 motion.

4 m _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . . _

1 C. A Different Result Would Not Have Been Reached If The New Information Had Been 2

Considered By The Board.

3 The Commission has emphasized that to reopen 4 closed records it requires that the significant new evidence 5 would have caused a different result had it been considered 6 originally. (CLI-81-5, supra.) This test must include all 7 of the new evidence, and not just the facts favoring one .

8 side. In addition to the fact that there have been open 9 items, deviations and errors in the design effort and 10 deficiencies in the area of quality assurance, the fact is 11 undisputed that the commission has mandated the IDVP.

12 Further, that program as established will discover and 13 correct any deficiencies found. If this information were 14 known to the Licensing Board when it issued its July 17, 15 1981 decision the result would not be different. Certainly the above referenced fact would be cited, but again, the end 16 17 result would be the same.

18 The Motion and supporting affidavit urge this 19 Board to set aside that portion of the ASLB July 17, 1981 20 decision dealing with PGandE's quality assurance program.

Such action would not be proper. In the first place, a 21 review of the' uncontroverted testimony presented at the 22 23 hearing and other portions of this. answer indicates that 24 PGandE did have a quality assurance program in place. This 25 /// s 26 ///

\

Q I was confirmed by the NRC Staff testimony which discussed, 2 among other things, its compliance inspections. 7f 3 In the second place, whatever deficiencies may 4 have existed in quality assurance are being corrected by the 5 IDVP, as ordered by the Commission. The IDVP will more than 6 compensate for any past QA deficiencies. Indeed, in ruling 7 on the appeals pending before it in this proceeding ~, this -

8 Board can_ conclude that the IDVP is a complete answer on the 9 merits to any such appeal.

10 V 11 JOINT INTERVENORS DO NOT MEET THE TESTS WHICH MUST BE SATISFIED TO ADMIT LATE-12 FILED CONTENTIONS.

13 As noted earlier the time to file contentions 8f 14 in this proceeding expired in 1974. The requirements for 15 late contentions are set forth in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1) and 16 (d). Each is considered briefly below, and each is subject 17 to the general observation that Joint Intervenors in their 18 motion have made no attempt to comply with a_ny n of them.

19 This is fatal to their cause (CLI-81-5, 13 NRC 361, 364).

20 ///

21 7f Incidentally, the Staff in its testimony made a point 22 by point refutation of the allegations of the Hubbard affidavits of March 10 and April 27, 1977. (Staff 23 testimony following Tr. 3614.)

24 8/ PGandE notes that Joint Intervenors technically have not submitted a specific contention. Thus, to the 25 usual obicctions directed to lack of specificity as a

• defect in a contention in violation of 10 CFR 2.714(b),

26 PGandE would also here add lack of substance.

a

1 A. No Good Cause For Failure To File On Time Has Been Shown. 9/

2 3 As indicated earlier much of the material on which 4 the motion is based is not new but has in fact been avail-5 able to Joint Intervenors for years. During the period it 6 was timely to propose contentions, Joint Intervenors should 7 have advanced one on QA but did not do so. They have made .

8 no showing, justifying a delay of almost eight years. A 9 Licensing Board has already ruled that such a contention was 10 late in 1977. (ASLB Order May 25, 1977.)

11 B. Other Means Exist Whereby The Joint Intervenors' Interest Will Be Protected.

12 13 It is clear that the Commission and Staff can 14 adequately protect Joint Intervenors' interest. The order 15 and letter of November 19, 1981 require final Commission and 16 Staff approval of the IDVP and resultant modifications to 17 assure that Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant is in compli-18 ance with the License Application. The Joint Intervenors 19 can add nothing to this.

20 ///

21 ///

22 ///~

23 24 9/ The cases imposing this requirement are legion. (See, 25

• for example, Duke Power Company (Perkins Nuclear 26 Station, Units 1, 2, and 3) 12 NRC 350 (1980).)

1 C. Joint Intervenors' Participation Will Not Assist In Developing A Sound Record.

2 3 The complete answer to Joint Intervenors' Motion 4 is contained in the IDVP, the Project internal technical 5 program, and the results thereof. With provision made for 6 final Staff and Commission approvals there is no need to

.. 7 develop any additional hearing record. --

8 D. Joint Intervenors' Participation Will Troaden -- The Issues And Delay The 9 Proceedings.

10 Joint Intervencrs' Motion broadly requests

" reopening the record for hearing 11 . . .

and the submission of relevant evidence 12 by all parties." (Motion at 2 and 16. )

13 For the reasons outlined in the Summer case discussed 14 Previously, a reopened hearing would actually have nothing 15 new to consider since the IDVP and the Project internal 16 technical program have been developed and are being imple-17 mented. Thus, a reopened hearing would needlessly broaden 18 the issues and prolong the proceeding since any evidence 19 Presented would only confirm arrangements presently in 20 P l ace.

21 22 23 24 25 m, 26

Respectfully submitted, MALCOLM H. FURBUSH PHILIP A. CRANE, JR.

RICHARD F. LOCKE Pacific Gas and Electric Company P. O. Box 7442 San Francisco, CA 94120 (415) 781-4211 . . .

ARTHUR C. GEHR

. . . . . .. .. Snell & Wilmer 3100 Valley Bank Center Phoenix, AZ 85073 (602) 257-7288 BRUCE NORTON Norton, Burke, Berry & French, P.C.

3216 N. Third Street Suite 300 Phoenix, AZ 85012-2699 (602) 264-0033 5ttorneys for Pacific Gas and Electric Company i

s By 1 - ~' '

Bruce Norton Dated: July 2, 1982 4

1

4e UNITED STATES OF' AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .

• 00. s - ~ . (. -

m.

) Y,.

• In the Matter of nn,

)

' 43

) Docket No. 50-275 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-323- .

(<. . ...

Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, ) 3 ..

. _ ~ %f

)

Units 1 and 2 -) .

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The foregoing document (s) of Pacific Gas and Electric Company has (have) been served today on the following by deposit in the United . -

States mail, properly stamped and addressed:

Mrs. Sandra A. Silver Judge John F. Wolf --- ~ . _ . ,.

1760 Alisal Street Chairman San Luis Obispo, California 93401 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Gordon Silver Washington, D. C. 20555 1760 Alisal Street San Luis Obispo, California 93401 Judge Glenn O. Bright Atomic Safety and Licensing Board John Phillips, Esq.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Joel Reynolds, Esq.

Washington, D. C. 20555 Center for Law in the Public Interest .

10951 W. Pico Boulevard - Suite 300 Judge Jerry R. Kline Los Angeles, California 90064 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission David F. Fleischaker, Esq.

7 Washington, D. C. 20555 P. O. Box 1178 Oklahoma City Mrs. Elizabeth Apfelberg Oklahoma 73101 C/o Nancy Culver 192 Luneta Drive Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.

San Luis Obispo, California 93401 Snell & Wilmer 3100 Valley Bank Center Janice E. Kerr, Esq. Phoenix, Arizona 85073 Public Utilities Commission of the State of California Bruce Norton, Esq.

5246 State Building Norton, Burke, Berry & French, P.C.

350 McAllister Street 3216 N. Third Street l

I San Francisco, California 94102 Suite 300 l

Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2699 l

Mrs. Raye Fleming 1920 Mattie Road Chairman Shell Beach, California 93449 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mr. Frederick Eissler U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

! Scenic Shoreline Preservation Washington, D. C. 20555

• Conference, Inc.

4623 More Mesa Drive Santa Barbara, California 93105

]

l i

.o tr -

Chairman Judge Thomas S. Moore Atomic Safety and Licensing Chairman Appeal Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appeal Board Washington, DC 20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Secretary

• U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Judge W. Reed Johnson Washington, DC 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Attn: Docketing and Service Section U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Bradley W. Jones, Esq. ,

Office of Executive Legal Director

• Judge John H. Buck BETH 042 ~

Atomic Safety and Licensing U. S. N u c l e a r Re g u l a to'r'y ' 'C o mmi s's i o n Appeal Board Washington, DC 20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Richard B. Hubbard MHB Technical Associates Commissioner Nunzio J. Palladino 1723 Hamilton Avenue, Suite K Chairman San Jose, CA 95125 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street N.W.

Mr. Carl Neiberger Washington, DC 20555 Telegram Tribune P. O. Box 112 Commissioner John F. Ahearne San Luis Obispo, CA 93402 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street N.W.

Herbert H. Brown, Esq. Washington, DC 20555 Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.

Christopher B. Hanback, Esq. Commissioner Victor Gilinsky Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Christopher & Phillips 1717 H Street N.W.

1900 M Street N.W. Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20036 Commissioner James K. Asselstine l Byron S. Georgiou, Esq. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Legal Affairs Secretary 1717 H Street N'.W.

Governor's Office Washington, DC 20555 State Capitol Sacramento, CA 95814 Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts l

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street N.W.

Washincton, DC 20555 W

A =

" I ~/ /' Attorney Pacific Ga /and Electr c Company Date: July 2,*1982

• Copies of IDVP Program Management Plan, Phase I and Phase II, sent.to ASLAB only. Other parties received copies pursuant to IDVP distribudions.

'RELATED CODDGePONDE? ICE 00' i' J

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,

.f,9 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION pf//

7 -

3 s ~..,..

4 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD 5

6

. y '-

8 ~

)

In the Mattir'of~ ~ ) Docket No. 50-275 l 9 )

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC )

10 COMPANY ) (Low Power Proceeding)

)

11 (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power )

Plant, Unit No. 1) )

12 )

13 14 I

15 AFFIDAVIT OF R. C. ANDERSON, J. B. HOCH, G. H. MOORE, l

l M. R. TRESLER, W. H. WHITE 16 l 17 18 STATE OF CALIFORNIA )

19 ) ss.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN )

20 FRANCISCO )

21 l 22 23 The above being duly sworn, depose rad say:

24 25 1. On September 28, 1981 PGandE notified the s I 26 Regional Administrator of the NRC's Region V Office of z.of 301h

4 1 Inspection and Enforcement of a potential problem in the 2 analysis of piping systems contained in the annulus area of 3 the containment building. In response, the Staff issued 4 Board Notification No. 81-27 and scheduled a series of 5 public meetings with PGandE to discuss the problem and 6 structure a program to resolve it. PGandE meanwhile

.. 7 implemented a design verification program to address ,

8 discrepancies it had found in the seismic design of the 9 annulus area of the containment.

10 2. PGandE's program has subsequently been 11 expanded into two separate and comprehensive' design 12 verification programs; one being performed by a group of 13 independent reviewers and the other being performed 14 internally by the PGandE/Bechtel Project (" Project"). These 15 Programs will verify, on an extensive sampling basis, both 16 the seismic and non-seismic design of safety related 17 structures, systems and components for the Diablo Canyon 18 Pl ant.

19 3. The verification program pt rformed by the 20 group of independent reviewers is called tne Independent 21 Design Verification Program ("IDVP"). This program is 22 managed and supported by Teledyne Engineering Services 23 Company with R. L. Cloud Associates, R. F. Reedy Inc. and l

24 the Stone and Webster Engineering Company performing 25 independent design verification work in their respective

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26 areas of responsibility: R. L. Cloud Associates -- seismic, l

l l

i

1 structural and mechanical design; R. F. Reedy -- quality 2 assurance; Stone and Webster --

systems design. The 3 Independent Design Verification Program includes performing 4 independent analyses and reviews, on a sampling basis, to 5 verify the adequacy of the design. Some of the areas in 6 which technical verifications are performed include

. 7 structures, piping and supports, equipment qualification, .

8 electrical raceways and ventilation duct supports, and 9 system design. The verification program, moreover, is 10 designed to be self-expanding if deemed warranted by the 11 IDVP. The program establishes criteria for performance of 12 such additional verifications 'resulting from either the QA 13 reviews or the sample calculations. Detailed descriptions 14 of the independent program are contained in "Diablo Canyon 15 Nuclear Power Plant -

Unit 1, Independent Design 16 Verification Program, Program Management Plan, Phase I,"

17 approved by the NRC in a letter dated April 27, 1982, and 18 Phase II, "Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant - Unit 1, 19 Independent Design Verification Program, Program Management 20 Plan, Phase II," submitted to the NRC on June 18, 1982.

l l 21 These plans are attached to this affidavit.

22

4. The Project internal technical program 23 includes verification work performec; by a combined team of 24 PGandE and Bechtel personnel. As a part of the Project 25 internal technical program, 'URS/Blume has conducted the i

26 Blume Internal Review (BIR). 'The Project work includes

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1 reverification of. add tiogt.1 samples as well as responding *

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2 to the findings of the IDVP. The Project internal technical ,

program also includes specialized analysis and qualifica_ tion / /

3 I -

m 4 work being performed by Wes,?ingbpuse Electric Corp f.and TERA , , a 5 Corp. The technical verifications are being performed in *

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6 the areas of seismic' and non-seismic safety-related s < ~

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__. 7 structures, systems and compode'nts. .This program was also ,

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8 approved by the NRC Staff in its April 47, 1982 letter.<

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• ,4 Th$ two v$rification .prcgrams have ' been f

9 5.

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10 established in stric,t ace'ordance wit'l th,e'yovember 19, 1981 ,

,, , a, 11 Commission order, and j the letter from Mr. Harold DentonL of f

12 the same date. Alle verificItion efforts, both the PIcject's -

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13 and the independenth beviewers', '

are being performed in

. .. 1 7.

14 accordance with the latest .s ,

approved " Quality As,surance 15 programs for the involved companies. +

/. i, 16 6. Over the past 9 months .- an extensive amount of 17 verification and review work "has been performed under the i

18 two verification programs. ,, The organizations involved in j >- .

19 the verification programs ht.ve expended approximately 2,500 g 1 .

20 man-months or in excess >of 400,000 man-hours in reviewing

• lj 21 structures, systems and" components. In this effort,

• .it t 22 thousands of calculations and analyses have been reviewed. ,,#

1 23 7. The IDVP to date has yielded ~172 findings.

1 24 The vast majority of.'these findings are not errors, and very 25 few are errors of actual or potential s'ignificance. Under

\ s 26 the classification system used in the IDVP, all findings are l l 4' ,/

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l M f 1 first characterized as an "Open Item." (See attached 2 Glossary.) An Open Item is either a QA or Design Control 3 deficiency, a violation of the verification criteria, or an 4 apparent inconsistency identified in the performance of the 5 work. Each Open Item is ultimately recategorized as an 6 " Error," a "Deviatica," or a " Closed Item." Errors are

. 7 broken down into four categories, with Class A Errors being .

8 the most significant and Class D Errors being the least 9 important. When the IDVP effort related to an Open Item is 10 complete, the IDVP issues a completion report. Of the 172 11 IDVP findings to date, completion reports have been issued Jg for .eighty-nine (89) items, which have been categorized as

. 13 follows: only one (1) Class A Error (may require physical i

14 modifications or changes in operating procedures), no 15 Class B Errors (resolvable by more realistic calculations or f

16 retesting); six (6) Class C Errors (no design criteria or

, 17 Operating limits exceeded); seventeen (17) Deviations

(

18 (departure from standard procedure which are not mistakes in 19 analysis, design, or construction), and fifty-two (52) 20 Closed Items (neither Errors nor Deviations, with no further 21 IDVP action required). Of the remaining eighty-three IDVP 22 findings for which no completion reports have been issued, 23 the IDVP has identified these findings as follows: five (5) 24 Class A Errors; one (1) Class E Error; fifteen (15) Class C 25 Errors; no Class D Errors; seven (7) Deviations; fifty-four

s l 26 (54) Open Items; and one (1) Closed Item.

l l

1 8. The engineering design process, particularly 2 for seismic design, generally involves a complex combination 3 of engineering judgment, expert opinions, assumptions, 4 modeling techniques, computer analyses and other 5 calculational methodology which is all directed toward 6 developing a reasonable understanding of the performance of

., 7 structures, systems and components under postulated .

8 Operating, accident and seismic conditions. Final designF 9 are then developed based on this understanding. The final 10 design considers inherent conservatisms as well as specific 11 margins and " safety" factors applied throughout the 12 engineering process to cover certain changes, discrepancies 13 and unknowns. It is not surprising, then, that an 14 independent verification program would discover differences, i

l 15 discrepancies and even technical disagreements with the l

16 original designs. Furthermore, although these kinds of l

1 17 items have been surfacing throughout the verification l

18 Programs' development thus far, these differences are l

l 19 exaggerated by the " low threshold" of the identification i

20 criteria used for the IDVP.

21 ///

22 ///

23 ///

24 25 s 26

1 PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF 2 RICHARD C. ANDERSON 3

4 5

7 6 My name is Richard C. Anderson. I am the l

. .. 7 Engineering Manager in the Diablo Canyon integrated project .

8 organization consisting of the Pacific Gas and Electric 9 Company and Bechtel Power ~ Corporation employees. I am a 10 Registered Mechanical and Nuclear Engineer in the State of 11 California. I hold a BS degree in Mechanical Engineering 12 from the University of California at Berkeley.

13 I have been with Bechtel for more than 24 years 14 and for the past 5 years h' ave been assigned as an engineer-l 15 ing manager in Bechtel's San Francisco Division, responsible 16 for all engineering work in the Pacific Northwest and Japan.

17 I have been assigned since March, 1982 specifically to the 18 Diablo Canyon Project to act as Project Engineering Manager.

19 Prior to these Engineering Manager assignments, I was the 20 chief nuclear / environmental engineer for Bechtel's San 21 Francisco Power Division, involved in nuclear power plant 22 design, safety, and operation.

23 Prior to that, I was assigned as an assistant 24 project engineer on a proposed nuclear power plant project 25 for PGandE and as mechanical supervisor and later project

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26 engineer on another large nuclear power plant project in the I . .

1 United States. These assignments included supervision and 2 coordination of design, specification, procurement, and 3 quality control activities.

4 I also served as senior mechanical engineer for 5 various other nuclear power facility projects in the U.S.

6 and abroad, which included work in systems, safety and

.. 7 equipment engineering. '

8 I have been an instructor in Bechtel's power plant 9 courses for over 10 years and have given numerous talks and 10 lectures in California on nucl~e ar power and energy issues.

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 l

25 s

26 4

I 1

l 1 PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF 2 JOHN B. HOCH 3

4 5 My name is John B. Hoch. Since January 1982 I 6 have been employed as Project Manager of the Diablo Canyon

. 7 Project organization at PGandE. My responsibilities' include -

8 managerial __an,d supervisory duties, and providing coordinate 9 and direction of the Diablo Canyon Project organization.

10 From 1980 to 1982 I was employed as Manager of the 11 Nuclear Projects Department at PGandE. My responsibilities 12 include managerial and supervisory duties, and providing 13 coordination and direction of the Nuclear Projects 14 Department in matters related to PGandE's nuclear power 15 plants.

16 From 1959 to 1980 I was employed as an Engineer in 17 various disciplines in PGandE's Engineering Department. My 18 responsibilities included engineering, design, analysis 19 work, activities related to NRC licensing, and engineering 20 management for PGandE's Diablo Canyon Power Plant.

21 My educational background includes a BS degree in 22 Mechanical Engineering from the Univeristy of Idaho, 1959, 23 and graduate. studies in Engineering, University of 24 California, Berkeley, 1961 to 1962.

25 I am a Registered Professional Engineer s

26 (Mechanical and Nuclear) in the State of California.

1 PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF 2 GARY H. MOORE 3

4 5

6 My name is Gary H. Moore. I am the Unit 1 Project

.. 7 Engineer of the Diablo Canyon Project consisting of the .

8 integrated organization of Pacific Gas and Electric Company 9 and Bechtel Power Corporation. I have held this position 10 since January, 1982. I am responsible for the project 11 engineering work related to the design and analysis of 12 Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1. I am a Registered 13 Professional Engineer in Mechanical and Control Systems .n 14 the State of California.

15 My educational background is as follows:

16 San Jose State University - BS in Mechanical Engineering, 17 1968 18 San Jose State University - MS in Mechanical Engineering, 19 1969 20 I joined PGandE in 1969 as a Mechanical Engineer 21 in the Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering Department, 22 designing instrumentation and control (I&C) systems for 23 conventional fossil plants.

(

, 24 In 1977, I was named a Senior Mechanical Engineer 25 supervising the I&C Group assigned to the Potrero Unit 7 s

26 Project.

8

1 In 1979, I was named Supervising Mechanical 2 Engineer, supervising the Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering 3 Department's entire I&C Group, including responsibility for 4 the I&C design of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.

5 I have completed the following formal training 6 courses:

. 7 Simulator Training - Westinghouse Nuclear Training -Center, .

8 Zion, Illinois

- - - ~ . - . _ _ . .

9 Westinghouse PWR Information Course 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

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22 23 e 24 25 e.

26 1 PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF 2 MICHEL R. TRESLER 3

4 5 My name is Michel R. Tresler. From 1981 to the 6 present I have been employed as a Piping Design Coordinator 7 at PGandE. My responsibilities include supervision, ,

8 coordination, and direction of the piping and pipe support 9 analysis and design for Diablo Canyon Power Plant.

10 From 1980 to 1981 I was employed as a Supervising 11 Project Control Engineer in PGandE's Nuclear Projects 12 Department with responsibility to develop, implement and 13 maintain a project control system for Diablo Canyon Power 14 Plant.

i 15 From 1964 to 1980 I was employed in various l

16 Positions as an engineer and superintendent in PGandE's 17 Engineering Department and General Construction Department.

18 During that time, I held the positions of Engineer, Resident 19 Mechanical Engineer, Project Superintendent, and Assistant 20 Station Construction Superintendent. My responsibilities 21 included engineering, analysis, design, field engineering I

22 services, and' supervision and management activities related l

! 23 to large fossil-fired units and the Diablo Canyon Power 24 Plant. In particular from 1966 to 1970 I prepared startup 25 procedures and supervised startup activities related to w

l 26 fossil and nuclear power plants.

4

1 My educational background includes a BS degree in 2 Mechanical Engineering from the California Polytechnic State 3 University, 1964.

4 I have completed the following formal training 5 courses:

6 a. Westinghouse Reactor Operator Training School, 1969.

. 7 b. Westinghouse Design Lecture Series specific to~ Diablo .

8 Canyon, system and components design, 1971.

9 c. Stat-A-Matrix course covering the establishment of a QA 10 program and personnel training, 1973.

11 d. Westinghouse PWR Information Course, 1980.

12 e. Westinghouse simulator Training, 1980.

l 13 14 15 16 l 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 i l 24 l

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l 26 l

1 PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF 2 DR. WILLIAM H. WHITE 3

4 5

6 My name is William H. White. I am an Assistant

.. 7 Project Engineer in the Diablo Canyon integrated organiation .

8 consisting of Pacific Gas and Electric Company and Bechtel 9 Power Corporation employees. My responsibilities include 10 supervision and direction of seismic related engineering 11 analyses for the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Project Engineering 12 Organization. I am a Registered Professional Engineer and 13 member of the American Society of Civil Engineers.

14 My educational background includes:

15 BS, Civil Engineering, University of Idaho; 16 MS, Civil Engineering, University of Colorado; 17 PhD, Civil Engineering, University of Colorado 18 For the past 5 years, I have been an engineering

19 specialist with Bechtel's San Francisco Power Division i

1 l 20 working with the chief civil engineer's staff in the area of 21 seismic analysis for several Bechtel projects.

22 Earlier, I was a structural engineer with the 23 Tennessee Valley Authority where I was responsible for 24 seismic analysis of all Category I structures for a 25 twin-unit nuclear power plant, including the seismic input s

26 for the design of the nuclear steam supply system.

l a

1 I was an assistant professor at Oregon State 2 University where I taught undergraduate and graduate courses 3 in structural mechanics and analysis and computer 4 applications. I performed a special study for Bechtel on 5 soil-structure interaction for the proposed Mendocino 6 nuclear power plant while teaching at Oregon State

. 7 University. -

8 While employed at the Bettis Atomic Power 9 Laboratory, I was a senior engineer working on shock 10 analysis of nuclear reactors aboard submarines and was 11 involved in programs to assess the shock resistance of 12 reactor internals subjected to long-term irradiation damage.

13 14 15 .

16 17 18 19 20 21 l .

22 23 e 24 25 s

26 1

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1 9. While the overall verification effort has 2 identified a number of Open Items, Deviations, and Errors, 3 in our judgment, the findings thus far in the review of the 4 seismic design for the Diablo Canyon plant would not have 5 caused any system, structure or component to fail to perform 6 its intended safety function.

7 .

9 Dated: June 30, 1982 9

10 ,

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Richard C. Anderson ' Michael R. Tre'sler 12 s ,

13 '

William H. White 15  %

Gary . Moore 16 17 18 Subscribed and sworn to before 19 me this 30th day of June, 1982 1

2C s 21 .

(Nancy J./ LemasWr, 22 Notary Public in and for the City and County of San Francisco, 23 State of California.

My commission expires April 14, 1986.

24 25 s

26

l 1 GLOSSARY 2

3 4

5 IDVP OPEN ITEM 6 This term is used by the independent reviewers to

. 7 describe any item of concern or potential concern identified ,

8 by the IDVP that has not been verified, fully understood,

_ . - ~ . - . . . ,

9 and its significance assessed by the IDVP.

10 An Open Item report is issued by the IDVP for the 11 Purpose of reporting an IDVP response to a QA and Design 12 Control deficiency, a violation of the verification 13 criteria, such as differences in calculations or system 14 configuration, or an apparent inconsistency identified in 15 the performance of the work.

16 17 IDVP ERROR 18 The term as used by Joint Intervenors in their 19 Motion and by Mr. Hubbard in his affidavit is a 20 characterization of any and all items identified by the IDVP 21 and Project technical program. All but a small number of 22 these Open Items have been verified by the IDVP as not being 23 " errors." ,

24 An Error is a form of program resolution of an 25 Open Item indicating an incorrect result that has been s

26 verified as such. It may be due to mathematical mistake,

1 use of wrong analytical method, omission of data, or use of 2 inapplicable data. An Error is classified as one of the 3 following:

4 Class A Error - An Error is considered Class A if 5 design criteria or operating limits of safety related 6 equipment are exceeded as a result, and physical 7 modifications or changes in operating procedures are .

8 required.__, , ,

9 Class B Error - An Error is considered Class B if 10 design criteria or operating limits of safety related

, 11 equipment are exceeded, but are resolvable by means of more 12 realistic calculations or retesting.

13 Class C Error - An Error is considered Class C if 14 no design criteria or operating limits are exceeded. No 15 physical modifications are required.

16 Class D Error - An Error is considered Class D if 17 safety related equipment is not affected. No physical 18 modifications are required.

19 From the definitions above, only Class A or B 20 Errors result in exceeding a design criterion or operating 21 limit. Consequently, only Class A or B Errors could be of 22 safety significance, but are not necessarily so.

23 l 24 DEVIATION 25 This is a term used by the IDVP to identify a form w 26 of program resolution of an Open Item indicating a departure

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1 from standard procedure which is not a mistake in analysis, 2 design or construction. No physical modifications are 3 required, but if any are applied they are subject to 4 verification by the IDVP.

5 6 DISCREPANCY AND DEFICIENCY 7 These terms have been used interchangeably in the .

8 Hubbard affidavit and Joint Intervenors' Motion with the 9 terms " error or " serious design error. "

10 11 IDVP CLOSED ITEMS 12 This is a term used by the IDVP. It is a form of 13 IDVP program resolution of an Open Item which indicates that 14 the reported item is neither an Error nor a Deviation. No 15 further IDVP action is required.

16 17 IDVP COMPLETION REPORT 18 This report is used by the independent reviewers

, 19 to indicate that the IDVP effort related to an IDVP Open l

20' Item is complete.

21 22 -

23 ,

24 l

25 w

26