ML20044C954

LER 93-015-00:on 930427,discovered That Portions of Containment Pressure Channels That Input to Containment Spray hi-hi Pressure Not Tested Monthly.Caused by Personnel Error.Test Procedures changed.W/930507 Ltr

ML20044C954
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	05/07/1993
From:	Kane G VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-93-015, LER-93-15, NUDOCS 9305140186
Download: ML20044C954 (4)

Text

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% ORTH AN NA POWER S TATION P. O BO X 4 02 W IN E R AL, VIRGINI A 23117 10 CFR 50.73 May 7,1993 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NAPS:MPW Attention: Document Control Desk Docket Nos. 50-338 Washington, D.C. 20555 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4 NPF-7

Dear Sirs:

The Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensec Event Repon applicable to North Anna Units 1 & 2.

Report No. 50-338/93-015-00 This Repon has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Opemting Committee and will be forwarded to the Corporate Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very Truly Yours, G.E. a Station. anager

Enclosure:

oc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Sucet, N.W.

Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. M. S. ksser NRC Senior Resident Inspector Nonh Anna Power Station 14009G [3 338"18$$ oSSSdge , ;

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- i On April 27, 1993, at 0931 hours0.0108 days <br />0.259 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.542455e-4 months <br /> with Unit 1 in Mode 1, 100 percent power, and j j Unit 2 in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, the continuing evaluation of Technical i Specification (TS) surveillance requirements, being performed as a corrective l action reported under LER 50-338/92-007-00, identified an additional missed surveillance. Specifically, portions of the containment pressure channels j that input to Containment Spray-High High Pressure were not being tested i during the monthly channel functional test. A review of the Type "A" test, j performed on March 31, 1993 for Unit 1, indicated that the pressure channels j functioned as designed. Therefore, additional testing was not required. Unit 2 testing was satisfactorily completed at 0950 hours0.011 days <br />0.264 hours <br />0.00157 weeks <br />3.61475e-4 months <br /> on April 27, 1993. This

condition is prohibited by Technical Specifications 4.3.2.1.1 Table 4.3-2 and is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B) .

The cause of the event was personnel error resulting in failure to develop adequate redures to test the entire component circuitry during initial TS implementa.. ;a.

No significant safety consequences resulted from these conditions because

, subsequent testing determined the affected circuitry was capable of performing i the required functions. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time during this event.

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• Erint l en Of the Event On April 27, 1993, at 0931 hours0.0108 days <br />0.259 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.542455e-4 months <br /> with Unit 1 in Mode 1, 100 percent power, and {

Unit 2 in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, the continuing evaluation of Technical Specification (TS) surveillance requirements, being performed as a corrective action reported under LER 50-33B/92-007-00, identified an additional missed  :

surveillance. Specifically, portions of the containment pressure channels (EIIS System JG, Component CHA) that input to Containment Spray-High High  ;

Pressure (EIIS System BE) were not being tested during the monthly channel  !

functional test. A review of the Type "A" test, performed on March 31, 1993 l for Unit 1, indicated that the pressure channels functioned as designed. [

Therefore, additional testing was not required. Unit 2 testing was satisfacterily ecmpleted at 0950 hours0.011 days <br />0.264 hours <br />0.00157 weeks <br />3.61475e-4 months <br /> on April 27, 1993. This condition is prohibited by Technical Specifications 4.3.2.1.1 Table 4.3-2 and is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B) .

The containment pressure channels used for Containment Depress- ization Accident are unique in that they " energize to actuate" versus "de-ez~rgize to  ;

actuate". This is an intentional design feature to minimize the likelihood of an inadvertent spray actuation in containment. Unlike other protection '

channels, since the input relays (EIIS System JG, Component RLY) are normally de-energized and remain that way when placed in " bypass" during iv,+t al ^

testing, the input relays and corresponding annunciators could *

's verified.

The functional testing of the Containment Spray-High High Pressure channels warranted exception to the typical functional test methodology since inadvertent actuation of Containment Spray is intolerable. The monthly functional test now compensates for this design by verifying continuity through the applicable comparator test switch cards and through the input relay coils on both trains.

i 2.0 sienificant safety cen.ecuan-es and Trnlicatiens No significant safety consequences resulted from these conditions because j subsequent testing determined the affected circuitry was capable of performing i the required functions. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time during this event. i 3.0 cause of the Event l The cause of the event was personnel error resulting in failure to develop adequate procedures to test the entire component circuitry. The functional testing for portions of the containment pressure channels that input to Containment Spray-High High Pressure were not included in the test procedures.

4.0 T mediate corrective Actiens The periodic test procedures were changed and verification of operability for the containment pressure channels was completed for both units.

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. w .s== _ == p nl c i n i n i n l 31318 913 -lv 0l1 I5 -l 0 f l0 013 OF 013 TE.XTre amaa.(in 5.0 Additional Cerre tive Actlens Permanent periodic test procedure revisions were completed and approved. The procedures include testing the portions of the Containment Spray-High High Pressure circuitry previously missed.

6.0 Actions to Prevent Recurrence The periodic test procedure revisions are sufficient to preclude recurrence.

7.0 S4-41mr Events Missed surveillances concerning failure to test entire component circuitry include:

LER N1/2-92-007-00 regarding missed surveillances on the monthly Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump bus undervoltage/underfrequency channel functional test, 18 month Unit 1 undervoltage/underf requency channel calibration and monthly safety injection input to reactor trip.

LER N1/2-92-009-01 regarding missed surveillances on the containment purge and exhaust radiation monitor monthly channel functional test and power operated relief valve alarm identified during corrective action reported under LER N1/2-92-007-00.

LER N1/2-92-014-00 regarding missed surveillances en the emergency diesel generator start circuitry, emergency bus undervoltage/ degraded voltage trip circuitry and station service bus undervoltage/underfrequency sensors identified during corrective action reported under LER N1/2-92-007-00.

LER N1/2-93-008-00 regarding missed surveillances on the RCS loop stop valve position limit switch inputs to the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) and manual SI switch input to all four reactor trip and bypass breaker circuits.

LER N1/2-93-013-00 regarding missed surveillances on the manual Phase "A" isolation switches and SI signal interlock to the "H" & "J" Bus Undervoltage Protection circuitry.

R0 Additional Inferation The systematic review of the surveillance program was initiated to ensure full compliance with the TS at North Anna. The review involves a line-by-line examination to verify that TS surveillance requirements are completely addressed by station procedures. These reviews are currently scheduled to be completed by June 1993. Status to date includes: Chapters 2 Power Distribution Limits, 4 Reactor Coolant System, 5 Emergency Core Cooling System, 6 Containment, 7 Plant Systems, B Electric Power, 9 Refueling, 10 Special Test Exceptions, and 11 Radioactive Storage - complete; Chapters 1 Reactivity Control and 3 Instrumentation (RPS, ESF, and Radiation Monitoring)

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