ML20044H159

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LER 93-016-00:on 930509,discovered That Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Pressure Switch PS-3 Sensing Line Disconnected in Local Panel.Caused by Personnel Error. Pressure Switch Calibr & Line reconnected.W/930527 Ltr
ML20044H159
Person / Time
Site: North Anna Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 05/27/1993
From: Kane G
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-93-016, LER-93-16, NUDOCS 9306080014
Download: ML20044H159 (4)
v • d • e


Text

4 W VIRGINIA ELEC TRIC AND POWE R CO MP ANY NO RTH AN NA POWE R S TATION P. O. BO X 4 02 M IN E R AL. VIRGINI A 23117 10 CFR 50.73 May 27,1993 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NAPS:MPW Attention: Document Control Desk Docket Nos. 50-338 Washington, D.C. 20555 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4 NPF-7

Dear Sirs:

The Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Units 1 & 2.

Report No. 50-338/93-016-00 This Repon has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Corporate Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very truly yours, G. - 'r Station Manager

Enclosure:

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, N.W. 1 Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. D. R. Taylor NRC Resident Inspector North Anna Power Station  ;

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6080014 930527 ADOCK 05000338 f I l PDR U

.- . = . ._. ___ _ -- _ _ _ _

NRC FowW 3es us Nuctra REcmToRY couussic3 unDvED oua NO. 31504104 One EXPIRES: A'IMl2 j ESTwATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THn3 INFORMATON l

. COLLECTION REOUESTI 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN l UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTMATE TO THE RECOROS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430) U.S.

NUCLEAR REQULAToRY COWWISSloN. WASHINGTON, DC 20665. AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31540104). OFFICE OF WANAGEWENT AND BUDGET.WASHhGTON.DC 20503.

FOCE.ITY NAME (1) Of4KET NWER (2) PAGE m North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 01sl0l010l313l8 1lOFl0l3 T'I'E i'8 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ANALYZER INOPERABLE FOR GREATER THAN 30 DAfS DUE TO A DISCONNECTED PRESSURE SWITCH SENSING LINE AS A RESULT OF PERSONNEL ERROR EVENT DATE l5) LER NUWBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER F ACILITIES INVOLVED (a)

WCNTH DAV YEAR YEAR SEOUElmAL REvtsiON WoNTH DAY YEAR NWED ma hwatn North Anna Unit 2 Ol 5 l 010 l 0131319 00:XET kuMER(Sl 0 5 0 9 9 3 9 3 0 1 b 0 0 0 5 2 7 9 3 gl5lg3 gjg} } }

optRAyNO TMis RE POHI 18 SUBW! '1ED PUR$UANT TO THE RE QUIHEWENTS OF 10 C5 R $:(Checa one or remre of the totteng)()1)

WODE (9) 1 20 402(t4 20.405(c) 50 73a@tIr) F3i1(b)

POWER 20.40fga41W) 50 36(cH1) 60.73 a/2)M 73.71(c$

LEVEL mg pg gg OTHER tape ir.m e t 50) 1 00 - _ _ . w m mW.

20 40f4a)(1)(W) 50.73(a)Z(1) 50.M a)(2)(viii)( A) 20 40$ia)(1)0v) 50.4a)(2)(ll) 50.73 aj@(vie)(B) 20 40Nax1Hv) 50.73(a>@(4) 50.73 ag2)(a)

LICE NSEE CONTACT FOR TMiS LE R (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER G. E. Kane MEA CODE 7 0 3 8l9l4l-l2l1l0l1 CoMPI E TI: ONE LINE FOR E ACH COMPONENT F ALLURE DE SCRIBED IN THIS RE PORT (13)

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I Ill lli E XPECTED WONTH DAY YEAR SUBWISSON VES fW r.n ne.e EkPEUED Sutta 8AON Date NO DATE (15J l l l '

nasinAci u-i,im o.. . .,~,, , . o si On May 9, 1993, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1, 100 percent power, it was discovered that a containment hydrogen analyzer pressure switch (PS-3) sensing line was disconnected in the local panel. With the sensing line disconnected the flow through the analyzer would be altered in a manner that would invalidate the sample a..a l y s is . This condition would render the analyzer inoperable. The TS action for an inoperable analyzer was entered at 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br /> on May 9, 1993. Subsequently, the pressure switch was calibrated and the sensing line was reconnected. Tne Technical Specification action was cleared at 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br /> on May 9, 1993. An investigation could not determine the exact cause for the disconnected sensing line but it is believed to have occurred following the last calibration in February 1993. As such, the allowed 30 day outage time for one of the shared analyzers required by TS 3.6.4.1.a was exceeded. Further review identified the Unit 2 containment hydrogen analyzer was removed from service for calibration in March 1993.

However, the Unit 2 analyzer was returned to service prior to the 7 day limit of TS 3.6.4.1.b for two inoperable analyzers. The condition is prohibited by TS and is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B)

The cause of the event is personnel error resulting in an inoperable analyzer.

This event posed no significant safety implications since alternative means were available to sample containment hydrogen levels throughout the event.

Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time.

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l we roaW 2neA U1MUCLDR nEQdATORY tmmtn APPRoVFD oWS NO. 31504104

    • 8I EMPmES: EKne ESTlWATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO (X)WPLY WITH THIS INFORMATON UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) coLLECTON REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD CouMENTS REGARDING BURDEN Tm CONDNUEON ESTlWATE TO THE RECORDS APO REPORTS WAMAGEWENT GRANCH (P430L UJB.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoWWISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20666. AND To THE PAPERWORK REDUCTON PROJECT (31500104L OFFICE OF WANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON.DC 20603.

F ACQJTY kmE (1) DOLatU mLMILA @ LER NUER {t) pact (3; North Anna Power Station yua gr stouem woma  : E uvisco uvan Units 1 and 2 l TEXT to mee ====e a sommes, asseme upc rem asum 0 7) nlclainlcl31318 913 "l 0 l 1 l 6 -l 0 1 l0 012 OF 013 1.0 Descriotion of the Event On May 9, 1993, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1, 100 percent power, it was discovered that a containment hydrogen analyzer (EIIS System IP, Component AA) pressure switch (PS-3) (EIIS Component 63) sensing line was disconnected in the local Post Accident Monitoring Panel (PAM) (EIIS System IP, Component PL).

With the sensing line disconnected the flow through the analyzer would be altered in a manner that would invalidate the sample analysis. This condition would render the analyzer inoperable. The Technical Specification action for en inoperable analyzer was entered at 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br /> on May 9, 1993.

Subsequently, the pressure switch was calibrated and the sensing line was reconnected. The TS action was cleared at 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br /> on May 9, 1993. An investigation could not determine the exact cause for not reconnecting the sensing line but it is believed to have occurred following the last calibration in February 1993. As such the allowed 30 day outage time provided by TS 3.6.4.1.s was exceeded. Further review identified that the Unit 2 containment hydrogen analyzer was removed from service for performance of its 92 day calibration in March 1933. However, the Unit 2 analyzer was returned to service prior to the 7 day limit of TS 3.6.4.1.b for two inoperable analyzers. This condition is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (1) (B) .

On May 9, 1993 during an inspection of the Unit 1 local analyzer panel the sensing line to pressure switch PS-3, downstream of the conductivity cell, was discovered disconnected. A subsequent investigation could not determine the exact cause for not reconnecting the sensing line However, it is believed the sensing line was not reconnected following removal of test equipment during the last calibration of PS-3 in February 1993. During the February 1993 calibration the conductivity cell was calibrated before the pressure switches. As a result of this testing sequence, no subsequent test in the calibration procedure functionally verified that the sensing line had been reconnected (i.e. no system trouble alarm from low flow). Maintenance procedures allow sections to be performed in any sequence since they are written as stand alone sections.

The analyzer functions to monitor hydrogen concentration inside containment following a Loss Of Cooling Accident (LOCA). In an accident situation, with the sensing line disconnected, wnen the Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) panel power switch is turned to " ANALYZE" anct a sample is to be taken the analyzer trouble alarm would have actuated due to low flow. l 1

2.0 Signif.icant Sgt f ety Conag7aences and Imolications This event posed no significant safety implications since alternative means I were available to sample containment hydrogen levels throughout the event.

In addition, analyses documented in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report show that hydrogen concentration, eith no controls employed, for the first 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> following a LOCA remains below 4 percent. During post-LOCA conditions, had the analyzer been placed in service, no leakage out of the disconnected sensing line would hsve occurred. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time.

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NRc FORM 3saA UA MEL5AR REGULAm mamma APPMWED OMS NO. 31800104

. *Mn Expats: mar ESTiMARD BURDEN PER ESPoNSE TO CX)M*tY WTn4 THS INFORMATION UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) cCLLECTON REQUEST: 540 HRS FORWARD CX2tMENTS REGARONG BURDEN TEXT CONTINUATION E8 man To mE RECORDS AN3 REPORTS MANM1EMENT BRANCH (P4306 U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISSloN, WASHINGTON, Oc 2 0 6814, AND TO THE PAPERWoRM REDUCTON PROJECT (3150010sk OFFICE oF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON,CC 205M 00LxU ntulLAG) l FaciuTY hAME ol LM HUhEIER MI PAGE(3 a -sw noeon I North Anna Power Station uom wn Units 1 and 2 ll Ol c i n f e l q l 3l 318 9131 l-l 1 0 l 1l 6 l-l 0 l0 013 0F 013 TEXT m . a we e,= smaaw 07) 3.0 Cause of the Event The cause of the event is personnel error resulting in the Unit 1 containment hydrogen analyzer being inoperable. Self check of procedure step completion was not adequate. The procedure step required two actions to be performed with the second being to reconnect the sensing line following removal of test equipment. This action was not performed nor verified. Other multi-action steps were completed satisfactorily both prior to and after the missed action.

LO Immadiate corrective Actions The shift supervisor was notified and the TS action was entered for an inoperable analyzer. The Instrument Department calibrated the pressure switch and reconnected the sensing line to PS-3.

5.0 Addit.ional Corrnctive Actions Instrument technicians have been counseled on the importance of completing all actions required by procedures.

The Unit 1 containment hydrogen analyzer calibration procedure has been changed to include simultaneous verification during calibration activities to ensure disconnected tubing is reconnected. An independent verification is now required for reconnected tubing prior to returning the equipment to service.

6.0 Actions to prevent Recurrence Actions taken regarding personnel counseling and procedural changes are sufficient to preclude recurrence.

7.0 Similar Events None ,

B_0 Additional Informati,Qn None I

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